Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Workbook: End-of-Train (EoT) / Head-of-Train (HoT) Communications

Lampe, Benjamin Ruhlig, Wright, Virginia · 2025

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Introduction

An Idaho National Laboratory workbook dated December 2025, by Benjamin Lampe and Virginia Wright, applies cyber-informed engineering to the radio link between the two ends of a freight train. The head-of-train unit sits with the crew. The end-of-train device rides the last car and reports brake pipe pressure and motion. The link runs on the IEEE 802.16t specification. If the link is spoofed or jammed, the crew can lose sight of the train's tail.

The workbook walks analysts through the CIE principles one by one, as questions. Principle eleven covers control of engineering facts: who holds the plans, and how they leak. Job ads and bid packs can hand a foe the map of a system's weak spots. Each principle pairs such prompts with space to log the design choices they force. The aim is gear that stays safe even when its network does not.

Catalog record

CREATORLampe, Benjamin Ruhlig, Wright, Virginia
YEAR2025
COLLECTIONPAPERS
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE44 KB
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEDOE OSTI

Source: https://www.osti.gov/biblio/3376012

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Cyber-Informed Engineering Workbook: End-of-Train (EoT) / Head-of-Train (HoT) Communications CIE Analysis December 2025 Authors: Benjamin Lampe CIE Researcher Virginia Wright CIE Program Manager This information was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government. Neither the U.S. government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness, of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. government or any agency thereof. Contents 1. Workbook Purpose ................................................................................................................ 4 2. Cyber-Informed Engineering Summary .............................................................................. 4 3. Overview of Train Communications ................................................................................... 13 3.1. IEEE 802.16t Communication Specification ....................................................................... 13 3.2. Train Communications Vulnerability .................................................................................... 14 4. CIE Activity ........................................................................................................................... 16 5. Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 23 Appendix A: Bowtie Template .................................................................................................... 25 CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 1 of 26 Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode BCH Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem BPSK Binary Phase-Shift Keying BS Base Station CIE Cyber-Informed Engineering CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures CWE Common Weakness Enumeration DEs Data Encryption Standard EoT End-of-Train HARQ Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request HE Head-of-Train/End-of-Train or Head End HCE High-Consequence Event HoT Head-of-Train INL Idaho National Laboratory IP Internet Protocol IT Information Technology MAC Media Access Control MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access OT Operational Technology PHY Physical PTC Positive Train Control PTL Precision Train Location QAM Quadrature Amplitude Modulation QPSK Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying SD Software Defined SS Subscriber Station TIMS Train Integrity Monitoring System CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 2 of 26 References 1. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide. Version 1.0, August 7, 2023. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1995796. Figures Figure 1 - CIE Principles and Key Questions...........................................................................................5 Figure 2 - Train Movement Communications System (TMCS) .......................................................... 13 CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 3 of 26 1. Workbook Purpose This workbook presents a vulnerability (CVE-2025-17271) found in train applications and guides a digital risk assessment, mitigation analysis, and the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering principles. The goal of this exercise is to use the engineering discipline to mitigate the potential consequences and ultimately the hazard if this vulnerability were exploited. Workshop participants are encouraged to use the workbook to capture insights and lessons learned. The workbook guides the participant to: • Understand the Head-End (HE) communication vulnerability • Map digital threats to physical consequences • Use bowtie analysis to illustrate both “security” and “engineering” barriers • Apply CIE principles to ensure that even if communications are compromised, the physical engineered system still behaves safely • Produce an actionable set of engineered and infosec controls for implementation 2. Cyber-Informed Engineering Summary Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE)2 offers an opportunity to “engineer out” digital risk across the entire system lifecycle, starting from the earliest possible phases of conceptual design and requirements development and system design—the most optimal times to introduce mitigations against digital risk exploited by a cyber adversary. CIE is a methodology to integrate cybersecurity risk considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, monitoring, or control. CIE uses design decisions and engineering controls to mitigate, or even eliminate, avenues for cyber-enabled attacks or reduce the consequences when an attack occurs. In the same way that engineers design systems for safety, CIE encourages engineers to use similar methods to prevent or lessen the impact of a cyber-attack. CIE also allows the engineers to advise the approaches used by specialized Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity experts to align cybersecurity mitigations to the most critical consequences identified by the engineers. Working together, both parties actively implement engineered and cybersecurity solutions to address the highest-risk consequences in their systems, ensuring robust protection for their devices and infrastructure. This workshop summarizes the principles for Cyber-Informed Engineering, provided with the principle’s initiating question in Figure 1. 1 “CVE-2025-1727 Detail,” National Vulnerability Database, accessed December 12, 2025, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1727. 2 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. Cyber- Informed Engineering Implementation Guide. Version 1.0, August 7, 2023. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1995796. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 4 of 26 Figure 1 - CIE Principles and Key Questions PRINCIPLE KEY QUESTION How do I understand what critical functions my 1 Consequence-Focused Design system must ensure and the undesired consequences it must prevent? How do I select and implement controls to 2 Engineered Controls reduce avenues for attack or the damage that could result? How do I prevent undesired manipulation of 3 Secure Information Architecture important data? How do I determine what features of my system 4 Design Simplification are not absolutely necessary to achieve the critical functions? How do I create the best compilation of system 5 Layered Defenses defenses? How do I proactively prepare to defend my 6 Active Defense system from any threat? How do I understand where my system can 7 Interdependency Evaluation impact others or be impacted by others? How do I understand where digital assets are 8 Digital Asset Awareness used, what functions they are capable of, and our assumptions about how they work? How do I ensure my providers deliver the 9 Cyber-Secure Supply Chain Controls security the system needs? 10 Planned Resilience How do I turn “what ifs” into “even ifs”? How do I manage knowledge about my system? 11 Engineering Information Control How do I keep it out of the wrong hands? How do I ensure that everyone’s behavior and 12 Organizational Culture decisions align with our security goals? CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 5 of 26 PRINCIPLE 1: CONSEQUENCE-FOCUSED DESIGN How do I understand what critical functions my system must ensure and the undesired consequences it must prevent? Consequence-Focused Design is the first principle considered within a Cyber-Informed Engineering project. It results in insights that feed the remainder of the principles. Consequence-Focused Design begins with an analysis of the business purpose and its primary mission, the critical functions of the business, the interconnection of those functions to the system under consideration, and finally, the critical functions of the system itself. The team identifies the most consequential impacts, sometimes referred to as the high-consequence events (HCEs), that could result from disruption of the critical functions, especially those where the disruption of a system function could result in a mission-impacting consequence. The team develops a list of HCEs and prioritizes the most impactful. In the initial review, the team need not evaluate the potential or likelihood of these impacts being induced via digital failure or cyber- attack. Once HCEs are identified, the team can begin to explore how those effects could be realized via adversary attack or digital failure. PRINCIPLE 2: ENGINEERED CONTROLS How do I select and implement controls to reduce avenues for attack or the damage that could

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