Cyber-Informed Engineering Workbook: End-of-Train (EoT) / Head-of-Train (HoT) Communications CIE Analysis December 2025 Authors: Benjamin Lampe CIE Researcher Virginia Wright CIE Program Manager This information was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government. Neither the U.S. government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness, of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. government or any agency thereof. Contents 1. Workbook Purpose ................................................................................................................ 4 2. Cyber-Informed Engineering Summary .............................................................................. 4 3. Overview of Train Communications ................................................................................... 13 3.1. IEEE 802.16t Communication Specification ....................................................................... 13 3.2. Train Communications Vulnerability .................................................................................... 14 4. CIE Activity ........................................................................................................................... 16 5. Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 23 Appendix A: Bowtie Template .................................................................................................... 25 CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 1 of 26 Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode BCH Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem BPSK Binary Phase-Shift Keying BS Base Station CIE Cyber-Informed Engineering CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures CWE Common Weakness Enumeration DEs Data Encryption Standard EoT End-of-Train HARQ Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request HE Head-of-Train/End-of-Train or Head End HCE High-Consequence Event HoT Head-of-Train INL Idaho National Laboratory IP Internet Protocol IT Information Technology MAC Media Access Control MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access OT Operational Technology PHY Physical PTC Positive Train Control PTL Precision Train Location QAM Quadrature Amplitude Modulation QPSK Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying SD Software Defined SS Subscriber Station TIMS Train Integrity Monitoring System CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 2 of 26 References 1. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide. Version 1.0, August 7, 2023. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1995796. Figures Figure 1 - CIE Principles and Key Questions...........................................................................................5 Figure 2 - Train Movement Communications System (TMCS) .......................................................... 13 CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 3 of 26 1. Workbook Purpose This workbook presents a vulnerability (CVE-2025-17271) found in train applications and guides a digital risk assessment, mitigation analysis, and the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering principles. The goal of this exercise is to use the engineering discipline to mitigate the potential consequences and ultimately the hazard if this vulnerability were exploited. Workshop participants are encouraged to use the workbook to capture insights and lessons learned. The workbook guides the participant to: • Understand the Head-End (HE) communication vulnerability • Map digital threats to physical consequences • Use bowtie analysis to illustrate both “security” and “engineering” barriers • Apply CIE principles to ensure that even if communications are compromised, the physical engineered system still behaves safely • Produce an actionable set of engineered and infosec controls for implementation 2. Cyber-Informed Engineering Summary Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE)2 offers an opportunity to “engineer out” digital risk across the entire system lifecycle, starting from the earliest possible phases of conceptual design and requirements development and system design—the most optimal times to introduce mitigations against digital risk exploited by a cyber adversary. CIE is a methodology to integrate cybersecurity risk considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, monitoring, or control. CIE uses design decisions and engineering controls to mitigate, or even eliminate, avenues for cyber-enabled attacks or reduce the consequences when an attack occurs. In the same way that engineers design systems for safety, CIE encourages engineers to use similar methods to prevent or lessen the impact of a cyber-attack. CIE also allows the engineers to advise the approaches used by specialized Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity experts to align cybersecurity mitigations to the most critical consequences identified by the engineers. Working together, both parties actively implement engineered and cybersecurity solutions to address the highest-risk consequences in their systems, ensuring robust protection for their devices and infrastructure. This workshop summarizes the principles for Cyber-Informed Engineering, provided with the principle’s initiating question in Figure 1. 1 “CVE-2025-1727 Detail,” National Vulnerability Database, accessed December 12, 2025, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1727. 2 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. Cyber- Informed Engineering Implementation Guide. Version 1.0, August 7, 2023. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1995796. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 4 of 26 Figure 1 - CIE Principles and Key Questions PRINCIPLE KEY QUESTION How do I understand what critical functions my 1 Consequence-Focused Design system must ensure and the undesired consequences it must prevent? How do I select and implement controls to 2 Engineered Controls reduce avenues for attack or the damage that could result? How do I prevent undesired manipulation of 3 Secure Information Architecture important data? How do I determine what features of my system 4 Design Simplification are not absolutely necessary to achieve the critical functions? How do I create the best compilation of system 5 Layered Defenses defenses? How do I proactively prepare to defend my 6 Active Defense system from any threat? How do I understand where my system can 7 Interdependency Evaluation impact others or be impacted by others? How do I understand where digital assets are 8 Digital Asset Awareness used, what functions they are capable of, and our assumptions about how they work? How do I ensure my providers deliver the 9 Cyber-Secure Supply Chain Controls security the system needs? 10 Planned Resilience How do I turn “what ifs” into “even ifs”? How do I manage knowledge about my system? 11 Engineering Information Control How do I keep it out of the wrong hands? How do I ensure that everyone’s behavior and 12 Organizational Culture decisions align with our security goals? CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 5 of 26 PRINCIPLE 1: CONSEQUENCE-FOCUSED DESIGN How do I understand what critical functions my system must ensure and the undesired consequences it must prevent? Consequence-Focused Design is the first principle considered within a Cyber-Informed Engineering project. It results in insights that feed the remainder of the principles. Consequence-Focused Design begins with an analysis of the business purpose and its primary mission, the critical functions of the business, the interconnection of those functions to the system under consideration, and finally, the critical functions of the system itself. The team identifies the most consequential impacts, sometimes referred to as the high-consequence events (HCEs), that could result from disruption of the critical functions, especially those where the disruption of a system function could result in a mission-impacting consequence. The team develops a list of HCEs and prioritizes the most impactful. In the initial review, the team need not evaluate the potential or likelihood of these impacts being induced via digital failure or cyber- attack. Once HCEs are identified, the team can begin to explore how those effects could be realized via adversary attack or digital failure. PRINCIPLE 2: ENGINEERED CONTROLS How do I select and implement controls to reduce avenues for attack or the damage that could result? For the most critical consequences and impacts determined in Consequence-Focused Design, we have an opportunity to think about the specific controls we’d like to have in place to prevent them. Eventually, we’ll talk about the collection in terms of Layered Defenses, but at first, we can: • Think about what kinds of controls we can have in place to prevent a consequence or mitigate its impact. • Determine which controls are provided as a part of products and services we are using and which ones we might want to design in. • Determine whether we can identify both physical controls and digital controls for a given consequence and the relative costs and benefits of each. • Determine whether our controls prevent an attack, lower the impact of the attack, or serve to provide alarms or warnings of adverse situations. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 6 of 26 PRINCIPLE 3: SECURE INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE How do I prevent undesired manipulation of important data? Each system contains data linked to mission-critical consequences and impacts which should be protected from outsider view and, more importantly, adversary or failure-induced alteration. For each identified data element or stream, a Secure Information Architecture can be designed, guided by the consequences and impacts identified earlier, to segregate the most important data and the systems which contain it to provide more control, protection, and monitoring of those systems and that data. We can start early in system design to identify those data elements most tied to a potential critical consequence, where they originate and are altered through the process, how they should be protected, and whether it is possible to design a data verification mechanism using the process, analog controls, or historic inputs. Once our design is mature and the underlying network and data service architecture is under design, more fine-grained digital controls, and specific zones and segmentation plans can be created. PRINCIPLE 4: DESIGN SIMPLIFICATION How do I determine what features of my system are not absolutely necessary to achieve the critical functions? Systems formed through acquisition often have more features than are explicitly needed to perform required functions. Though these features can be configured not to be available to authorized system users, they are available to adversaries who gain access. These features can potentially lead to catastrophic impacts if used by malicious adversaries. In Design Simplification, we consider which features of the system are not absolutely necessary and, of those, which could lead to impactful adverse consequences if misused. We consider how to reduce the system to the minimum elements needed to provide mission-critical functions and necessary resilience. For each of the non-essential features, we consider whether we can completely remove them. When that is not possible, we collaborate with cybersecurity specialists to determine how to implement alarms and alerts when those functions are leveraged, or whether we can capture undesired commands at a network segmentation boundary before they are executed. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 7 of 26 PRINCIPLE 5: LAYERED DEFENSES How do I create the best compilation of system defenses? The best defensive capability for critical consequences is formed by an assemblage of controls, including physics-based analog mitigations, capabilities to protect key system elements, capabilities to detect adverse operating or security conditions, and capabilities to aid in response and remediation. In Resilient Layered Defenses, engineers and their operational cybersecurity support team work together to, for the most critical consequences identified, arrange the best compilation of those defenses to avert the worst impacts from the prioritized consequences. The engineers and operational cybersecurity team work together to ensure that each of the defensive capabilities and services is tuned based on the identified consequences and how the worst impacts of those consequences can be avoided. PRINCIPLE 6: ACTIVE DEFENSE How do I proactively prepare to defend my system from any threat? Planning for Active Defense can begin as soon as a conceptual design for a system exists, and it continues through the system’s retirement. At the design phase, teams can begin to plan how defensive actions should be carried out for the most consequential events. This activity is aided by ensuring that the system designers, operators, and cybersecurity support team discuss the adverse consequences identified and how such events could occur, especially, at the appropriate level of detail for system maturity, the process, or kill chain of how the adverse consequence would manifest within the system. From this discussion, system states and anomalies which might be initial indicators of one of the identified consequences can be identified. Next, plans can be developed for actions to be taken upon detection of an identified indicator. Plans should include points of contact for specific roles and responsibilities across the spectrum of functions associated with the system, because Active Defense of the system may require support from a broad set of roles, and they may not all be aware of each other. Once plans are in place, systems should be created to ensure that these plans are regularly practiced, and that the overall approach is regularly assessed to identify emerging consequences, indicators, and opportunities for more advanced defensive approaches. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 8 of 26 PRINCIPLE 7: INTERDEPENDENCY EVALUATION How do I understand where my system can impact others or be impacted by others? All systems have interdependencies, both direct and indirect. While teams regularly consider the risks posed by physical interdependencies in the normal systems engineering processes, they rarely consider how a cyber-attack or digital failure of an interdependent system may affect the system under design. When evaluating interdependencies from a cyber-informed perspective, evaluate the physical interdependency risks already considered, but judge whether a cyber-attack might make a given consequence more possible or might have the potential to make it more intense than a physically-driven event. Are there functions in the interdependent system not normally accessible to operators which might cause untoward effects on our system if activated? Where might interdependent systems activate command logic on the system under design? Where might automation between the two systems cause cascading effects? In the same vein, where might the system under design be able to affect the interdependent systems in unexpected ways. PRINCIPLE 8: DIGITAL ASSET AWARENESS How do I understand where digital assets are used, what functions they are capable of, and our assumptions about how they work? The digitization of our energy infrastructure allows incredible benefits, providing speed and automation of operations not previously possible. However, digital assets and digitized functions have different weaknesses and frailty modes than their analog counterparts. Far beyond simply vulnerabilities to attack, these assets can function or be made to function in ways that their analog counterparts would not, and consideration of these risks is important to ensuring that the defensive measures for a system are cyber informed. Digital Asset Awareness begins in design, by considering that any digital device is, at its core, a general-purpose computer with specific command logic for its function layered on top. An attacker, or more rarely, a logic failure, can subvert this logic and cause the device to ignore input, change values in command logic, or even execute commands or automated logic unexpectedly. The consequences considered earlier in the process can highlight specific impacts we want to mitigate in design, hopefully with controls that are not solely digital in nature. Secondly, in operations, digital devices require different forms of maintenance, including patching and upgrades and the export of logs and commands stored on the system. To ensure that such systems are maintained in accordance with the function of our system, we must track the devices installed by hardware model, software version, patch version, location, last update, last export, system function, etc. We should also export logs and, if possible, retain them for CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 9 of 26 forensic needs, along with a “gold disk” configuration of the latest software and logic, if needed. This ensures that we understand where the systems are within our processes, what is occurring on them, how they are maintained, and any emerging risks which have been identified as vulnerabilities. It also ensures that we can restore or replace them if needed. PRINCIPLE 9: CYBER-SECURE SUPPLY CHAIN CONTROLS How do I ensure my providers deliver the security the system needs? Even at the early design phases, engineers can begin to establish the core security features and assumptions which should be implemented by every supplier bringing components or services into the system. These may include guidelines about required features in digital systems, limits on where such systems can be acquired, and how updates must be verified and signed. They may include practices for vendor behavior when providing onsite or remote maintenance. They may include requirements for sharing information about cyber incidents, vulnerabilities, bills of materials, and vendor development processes. Each of these controls contributes to the overall supply chain security of the system. These requirements should be discussed with the roles who may have a responsibility for ensuring them, including procurement, cybersecurity, and system operators. For each control or feature, the team should consider how it will be verified, when it can be verified and how often, and who can perform the verification (procurement, cybersecurity, operators, etc.). These processes should be built into requirements for development and operations of the system, and verification should occur more than once for controls which could change or erode over time. The controls devised by the engineering team should be complementary to those leveraged by the organization’s purchasing and cybersecurity processes, but because they are drawn from potential catastrophic system consequences, they may well exceed the general due diligence performed by the organization. PRINCIPLE 10: PLANNED RESILIENCE How do I turn “what ifs” into “even ifs”? You can imagine the general operating mode of a system, with all functions available and working as expected; however, resilience requires that we imagine and plan for different kinds of failure modes of a system, ideally including those linked to the set of prioritized undesired consequences created earlier. We must understand these failure modes, including how to operate through them, albeit at a lower level of performance or reliability. Ideally, a set of diminished operating modes can be created which, though not ideal, can be built into expectations for well-understood modes of operation. Within each diminished operating mode, CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 10 of 26 plans can be made for what would cause that mode, how that mode would function, and the changes to staff, systems, safety guidelines, performance, or other system conditions when it is assumed. Once part of our overall set of system operating modes, it is reasonable to train, exercise, and assess our performance in each of these diminished modes on a regular basis. These resilient diminished operating modes should include modes assumed because of a digital failure or cyber-attack. For any critical system, diminished operating modes should include operations during an expected cyber-attack involving one or several of those systems, operating when the team is uncertain of the validity of the data emerging from the system, where critical automation logic is not dependable, or where core network connections or support services are not available. It is likely that exercising these modes will require the operations team to pair with cybersecurity counterparts and understand the roles and responsibilities each will perform. Considering these operating modes may also require that the team consider altering the system design to allow limited manual operations options when digital systems are not operating or trusted. Note that a capability may be restored to diminished operation via use of an alternate mechanism or supply source. Considerations for Planned Resilience should also include how untrusted systems can be restored to full function within the system context, including what operational steps will be required to ensure future trust, or whether that is possible given the function of the system or component. PRINCIPLE 11: ENGINEERING INFORMATION CONTROL How do I manage knowledge about my system? How do I keep it out of the wrong hands? From the first conception of a system until its retirement, immense amounts of information are created about how the system is designed, the elements and components within it, the skills required to operate it, its performance, procedures for maintenance and operations, and more. This information, in the wrong hands, can aid an adversary to understand system weaknesses, existing component vulnerabilities, and even human targets to aid in planning their attack. This information can be released during procurement processes, often shared via public release to ensure an open and fair competitive process. It can be released in job listings, where specific technical criteria are used to find good employment candidates but may also tip an adversary to system features or vulnerabilities. It can be shared in news articles or success stories about the system’s entry to operations, where even a system photograph may release information helpful to an adversary. During the system design process, the engineering team can begin to identify, using the prioritized list of consequences developed earlier, the specific information which would be of most value to an adversary to enact an undesired consequence. They can develop administrative processes for protecting the information, determining who can possess it, how to prevent inadvertent duplication and sharing, how to remove access, how to review and approve information release, how to ensure team members understand the sensitivity of the information CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 11 of 26 they have access to, and how to protect it, etc. Because engineering systems are in active use, sometimes for decades, it is crucial that even the earliest information about the system design be protected throughout the lifecycle of the system. PRINCIPLE 12: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE How do I ensure that everyone’s behavior and decisions align with our security goals? Shared beliefs, perspectives, and values about cybersecurity determine how a group will prioritize investments and actions to improve its realization. For a culture which does not value cybersecurity, whether they see it as an unnecessary expense, a low risk or impact, or an impediment to productivity, there will not be a desire to invest in people, processes, and technology to provide cybersecurity. An engineering design team, cognizant of the consequences of digital failure or cyber-attack on a system under design, has a core responsibility to aid the entire set of stakeholders who are accountable, responsible, consulted, or informed about the system to understand the need for cybersecurity and how each stakeholder’s role can affect, both positively and negatively, the overall security of the system. To build a culture of cybersecurity around the system design process, engineering design teams can emulate best practices for building a safety culture. These include having regular discussions about how and why cybersecurity is incorporated into the system, recognizing and celebrating good decisions and right actions of team members, and treating failures as opportunities for learning and improvement. Because team members external to the design process may not recognize how their job role can contribute to or diminish the cybersecurity of the overall system, it is important for the design team to personalize conversations to the individual. As discussed earlier under Supply Chain Controls, these discussions should extend to everyone involved with the system, even a subcontractor or external service provider. Each person interacting with the system should understand the importance of ensuring its security and how their role contributes to that function. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 12 of 26 3. Overview of Train Communications Head-of-Train (HoT)/End-of-Train (EoT) (HE) communications are required for train operations. Figure 2 below provides a high-level view of this communication. Figure 2 - Train Movement Communications System (TMCS)3 HE Communications synchronizes data between each end of the train and are necessary because the use of a caboose train car is no longer present in modern train operations. At the HoT end, the system monitors status information like brake pressure and speed. At the EoT end, the system measures brake pressure, detects train separation, and enables emergency braking. The EoT device is supported by a Precision Train Location (PTL) device to enable the precise location of the end of train to be communicated to the locomotive (i.e., engine) for various safety and operational applications. Currently, the HE communication uses the IEEE 802.16t 4 communication standard which defines its radio modulation scheme and receiver signal technology. 3.1. IEEE 802.16t Communication Specification5 IEEE 802.16t is a connection-oriented technology: where the subscriber station (SS) (i.e., EoT) cannot transmit data until it has been allocated a channel by the base station (BS) (i.e. HoT). These communications typically operate in the frequency range of 2 to 66 GHz. Physical (PHY) Layer Features • Scalable Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) to carry data • Supporting channel bandwidths of between 5 kHz and 100 kHz. Supports adaptive modulation and coding, where: o Good signal conditions, an efficient 64 Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) coding scheme is used. o Poorer signal conditions, a robust Binary Phase-Shift Keying (BPSK) coding scheme is used. 3 Train Movement Communications System (TMCS), 802.16t - The New Standard for Next-Generation HOT-EOT Communications (ODANS Networks, n.d.), https://www.ondasnetworks.com/nghe. 4 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=10812988 5 “IEEE 802.16,” Wikipedia, July 29, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.16. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 13 of 26 o Intermediate signal conditions, 16 QAM and Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying (QPSK) can also be employed. • Support for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antennas to provide good non-line-of- sight propagation characteristics (or higher bandwidth) • Hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) for good error correction performance. Media Access Control (MAC) Layer Features • Convergence Sublayers describe how wireline technologies such as Ethernet, Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and Internet Protocol (IP) are encapsulated on this air interface, and how data is classified, etc. • Newer implementations are integrating secure communications using key exchange during authentication methods, and encryption using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or Data Encryption Standard (DES). • Power saving mechanisms (using sleep mode and idle mode). • Handover mechanisms. 3.2. Train Communications Vulnerability Recent articles, such as the one in Security Week 6, published a vulnerability in the HE communications protocol. The article discusses that this vulnerability allows hackers to remotely control train brakes using unencrypted radio signals (i.e., IEEE 802.16). Despite being known for over 20 years, the issue was not addressed due to industry resistance and the difficulty of proving its impact in real-world scenarios. This vulnerability is listed as entry CVE-2025-1727 in the National Vulnerability Database. The U.S. cybersecurity agency, CISA, recently issued an advisory7 providing a summary of the vulnerability. This workbook explores a cyber-informed engineered response to engineer out the impact of this vulnerability because it cannot be easily mitigated or patched. CIE advocates for a holistic cybersecurity approach that uses both the information security recommendations found in the advisory as well as engineering controls to prevent the undesired impacts of the exploit of the vulnerability, even if adversaries are able to bypass traditional cybersecurity mechanisms. This vulnerability is due to weak authentication, known in the common weakness enumeration (CWE) as CWE-13908. The use of weak authentication mechanisms in radio communications allows attackers to bypass authentication faster and/or with less effort than expected. So, although a mechanism exists to restrict access to specific users or identities, the mechanism does not sufficiently validate that the claimed identity is correct. More specifically, in the HE communication, the protocol used relies on a Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) checksum for packet creation. It is then possible to create these HE packets with a software defined (SD) 6 Eduard Kovacs, “Train Brakes Can Be Hacked over Radio—and the Industry Knew for 20 Years - SecurityWeek,” Security Week, July 14, 2025, https://www.securityweek.com/train-hack-gets-proper- attention-after-20-years-researcher/. 7 End-of-train and head-of-train remote linking protocol (update C), September 18, 2025, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-191-10. 8 “CWE-1390: Weak Authentication,” Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), October 5, 2022, https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1390.html. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 14 of 26 radio and issue brake control commands to the EoT device when the train is in range. A malicious brake control command leads to disrupting operations around the brake systems. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 15 of 26 4. CIE Activity Instructions: Collaborate with your assigned team to evaluate how each principle applies to the fictional project. Use the Bowtie Template provided in Appendix A to document the outcomes of the CIE activity. These outcomes will inform your assessment of the mitigation strategy designed to reduce the consequences associated with digital risks in HE communications and braking hazards in train operations. Be prepared to present your findings during the group briefing. As outlined in the previous section, train systems rely on HE communications to monitor train integrity, brake pipe pressure, and emergency braking conditions. The adoption of digital technologies for these functions has introduced new digital risks. Recent research has demonstrated that HE communication messages can be spoofed by adversaries, creating new pathways to trigger hazards that braking systems—particularly emergency braking—are intended to prevent (impacting safety), or to misuse these systems when not required (impacting reliability and performance). Participants should document their analysis using the Bowtie Analysis sheet in Appendix A. CIE emphasizes Consequence-Focused Design (Principle 1). Central to this analysis is the identification of the hazard—the element within or surrounding the system that is subject to control and may be compromised during a digitally enabled mis-operation. In Bowtie Analysis, a hazard is defined as any component, condition, or process with the potential to cause harm. For example, in a chemical plant, a hazard might be “flammable liquids.” QUESTION: In the train system and its use of brake applications, what is the hazard(s)? Note: Record this item in the Hazards block of the Bowtie Analysis. From the identified hazard, events represent situations in which control over the hazard is lost. In Bowtie Analysis, an event is defined as the failure or undesired operation that the analysis seeks to prevent. Digitally initiated failures represent a new category of risk—digital risk—that emerges as engineered systems increasingly rely on digital technologies for safe and reliable operation. In the context of train braking systems, digital communication is used to transmit braking status and control signals. QUESTION: What type of event(s) becomes possible due to the use of digital communication technology in braking systems? CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 16 of 26 This type of event can be analyzed from two perspectives. For each event, identify the potential outcomes that result from a loss of control over the hazard. To determine which event should be selected as the Top Event in the Bowtie Analysis, it is important to evaluate the possible outcomes associated with each. This approach supports prioritization by helping determine which event poses the greatest impact—particularly useful when analysis time or resources are limited. Because the events listed represent different failure modes, evaluating their consequences in relation to the hazard (e.g., kinetic energy or brake pipe pressure) enables a more focused and risk-informed assessment. Event 1: “False Emergency Brake Activation” QUESTION: What are the possible outcomes? Event 2: “Prevented Emergency Brake Activation (Suppressed E-Brake)” QUESTION: What are the possible outcomes? Are there other potential events related to emergency braking disruption as it pertains to HE communications? Event 3: __________________________________________________ QUESTION: What are the possible outcomes? CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 17 of 26 Based on the events and their associated outcomes, determine which event presents the most unacceptable consequences. This event will be designated as the TOP EVENT for the remainder of the Bowtie Analysis. Select the Top Event: Event #: __________ (This will serve as the Top Event moving forward.) Use this TOP EVENT as the focal point for completing the Bowtie Analysis. If time permits, repeat the exercise for other events using separate copies of the Bowtie Template provided in Appendix A. In the context of CIE, the TOP EVENT represents the chief unacceptable consequence—the failure mode that, if left unmitigated, would result in the most severe impacts. From this point, apply: • CIE Principle 7: Interdependency Evaluation • CIE Principle 8: Digital Asset Awareness These principles guide the identification and mapping of digital technologies that contribute to or are affected by the TOP EVENT. This includes evaluating the extent of the event’s impact across systems, subsystems, and components that are interdependent with the HoT and EoT communication devices. INTERDEPENDENCY EVALUATION Identify and document the underlying systems, subsystems, or devices that share status and control signals with the HoT and EoT devices involved in the braking application function. Describe the nature of their relationship to one or both devices. HoT Unit <------------------ Wireless Link (Data) --------------------> EoT Unit This wireless link enables bidirectional communication of braking status, train integrity, and emergency brake commands. It is the digital backbone of the braking control system. Brake Pipe Automatic Air Brake System Locomotive Braking System CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 18 of 26 Human Machine Interface Human Operator Positive Train Control (PTC) System Train Integrity Monitoring System (TIMS) Event Recorder (Black Box) Power Supply Systems DIGITAL ASSET AWARENESS Given the identified relationships between subsystems and the HoT/EoT units, identify the components that rely on digital technology for their successful operation. This step supports CIE Principle 8: Digital Asset Awareness, which emphasizes understanding the digital elements that may introduce or propagate risk. Instruction: Circle or list the elements that incorporate digital technology. These are considered digital assets and will inform the threat side of the Bowtie Analysis. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 19 of 26 At this stage of the analysis, we have developed an engineered understanding of the digital risks inherent in the train system—specifically as they relate to emergency braking. The coordination between the left-hand side and right-hand side of the bowtie analysis involves coordination between engineering and cybersecurity around elements of these CIE Principles: • CIE Principle 6 – Active Defense: Incorporating proactive detection and response mechanisms (e.g., anomaly detection, logging). • CIE Principle 9 – Cyber-Secure Supply Chain Controls: Ensuring trust in hardware and firmware components. • CIE Principle 10 – Planned Resilience: Designing systems to maintain safe operation despite partial failures or attacks. • CIE Principle 11 – Engineering Information Control: Protecting the integrity and confidentiality of engineering system information and data. • CIE Principle 12 – Organizational Culture: Promoting cross-functional collaboration between engineering and cybersecurity teams. The identification of digital data elements and their interdependencies support the application of CIE Principle 3: Secure Information Architecture. The left-hand side of the Bowtie Analysis focuses on threat identification. This portion of the analysis is typically led by the cybersecurity function, while engineering stakeholders are encouraged to observe and understand the rationale behind threat modeling. To support this, consider the following actions and the threats they enable against HoT/EoT communications: Actions possible: • Generate spoofed “zero brake pressure” • Generate spoofed “e-brake” from EoT • Suppress true emergency transmission • Send fragmented commands to confuse the HoT CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 20 of 26 Enumerate Possible Threats. These threats can be documented directly on the Bowtie Analysis under the selected TOP EVENT or listed here for reference. For each identified threat related to the TOP EVENT, document the corresponding preventative barriers—that is, the controls or countermeasures that can prevent the TOP EVENT from occurring. These barriers represent the information assurance (i.e., info sec) mechanisms that form part of a Layered Defense Strategy, as outlined in CIE Principle 5. These barriers can be documented directly on the left-hand side of the Bowtie Analysis or listed below for reference. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 21 of 26 For the right-hand side of the Bowtie Analysis, enumerate the consequences associated with the selected TOP EVENT. This portion of the analysis is typically led by the engineering function, while cybersecurity professionals are encouraged to observe and understand the engineering rationale behind consequence modeling. Use the outcomes previously identified for the TOP EVENT as distinct consequence entries. For each consequence, document the mitigating barriers (i.e., controls or countermeasures) that can mitigate or reduce the likelihood of the consequence materializing into a physical impact. These barriers can be documented directly on the left-hand side of the Bowtie Analysis or listed below for reference. These barriers represent functional assurance and reflect the application of the following CIE Principles: • CIE Principle 2 – Engineered Controls: Physical and logical mechanisms designed to maintain control. • CIE Principle 4 – Design Simplification: Reducing system complexity to minimize failure modes. ANALYSIS COMPLETE – WELL DONE! CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 22 of 26 The completion of barrier identification on both the left-hand (threat) and right-hand (consequence) sides of the Bowtie Analysis for the selected TOP EVENT represents a shared capability between cybersecurity and engineering to manage and control digital risk. This collaborative effort demonstrates the implementation of a Layered Defense Strategy, as defined by CIE Principle 5, and reinforces the organization’s ability to be both secure and resilient in the face of digitally enabled hazards. The outcome of this exercise highlights the value of integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the organization’s safety and reliability practices. It ensures that engineering teams are not only aware of the presence of digital risk within their systems but are also equipped to address it through engineered controls, system design, and operational awareness. This approach strengthens the organization’s overall posture by embedding cybersecurity considerations into engineering workflows—bridging the gap between digital and physical domains and enabling a more robust and adaptive security-safety culture. 5. Conclusion Overall, this exercise demonstrates that an effective response to the vulnerability present in HoT/EoT communications can leverage the combined efforts of both information assurance— provided by cybersecurity professionals—and functional assurance—delivered by engineers. Together, these disciplines form a comprehensive Layered Defense Strategy. As a recap, the layered defense for the selected TOP EVENTcould be structured as follows: Left Side (Prevention of Threats): • RF hardening • PKI-based mutual authentication • Replay protection • Secure boot in HoT/EoT devices • Configuration lockdown Right Side (Mitigation of Consequences): • Pneumatic fail-safe as the primary defense • Manual emergency brake valve • Deceleration plausibility checking • Redundant brake pipe pressure sensors • Driver alerts for inconsistent EoT telemetry CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 23 of 26 This approach to hazard analysis is not limited to this specific scenario—it is scalable and applicable to any vulnerability affecting engineered systems. By focusing on controlling the consequence side, organizations can proactively manage digital risk, regardless of the evolving threat landscape. Importantly, engineers possess a unique capability to influence and mitigate cyber risk from outside the cyber domain. This reinforces the value of adopting Cyber-Informed Engineering—not as a cybersecurity-only initiative but as a cross-disciplinary strategy that enables organizations to respond to cyber threats with both digital and physical resilience. CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 24 of 26 Appendix A: Bowtie Template CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 25 of 26 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES: CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 26 of 26 CIE Workbook Workshop: HoT/EoT Communications in Train Applications Page 27 of 26