Fmln Evaluation of 11 November Offensive; Revised Fmln Military Plans - TruthH

Central Intelligence Agency · 1990

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Introduction

The FMLN's own evaluation of its November 11 offensive, with revised military plans, fills a CIA item from 1990. The November offensive had carried the war into the capital's rich districts and changed the war's terms. A movement grading its own biggest battle, on paper, gave watchers a rare inside measure of the movement's strength and mood.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1990
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE5035
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000049167

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

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TOT: 2214542 FEB 90

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COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR =

SUBJECT: FMLN EVALUATION OF 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE; REVISED
FALN MILITARY PLANS

DOI: 11 NOVEMBER - MID-DECEMBER 1989

IN MID-DECEMBER )9886
HAT THE FALN

GENERAL COMM THREE PHASE ENCY" PLAN AFTER THE
FMLN'S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN THE FIRST HOURS OF
THE 11) NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE.
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2. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS TO
SEIZE PRINCIPAL MILITARY GARRISONS IN THE CITIES OF SAN SALVADOR, SAN
MIGUEL, USULUTAN, SANTA ANA, AND ZACATECOLUCA. HE SAID FMLN
INSURGENTS FAILED TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES IN THE INITIAL PHASE OF
THE 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE BECAUSE OF STRATEGIC ERRORS COMMITTED AT
ALL LEVELS OF THE FAMLN COMMAND.

3. THE EMERGENCY PLAN CALLED FOR RESERVE FORCES TO REMAIN IN
PLACE OUTSIDE TARGET CITIES, RATHER THAN SUPPORTING INSURGENTS
ENGAGED IN COMBAT.

PAN 2
4, EER ERRORS BY THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND
RESULTED IN THE NE EMERGENCY PLAN. FOR EXAMPLE, THE

GENERAL COMMAND HAD MADE NO PROVISION FOR THE FAILURE OF FAMLN COMBAT
UNITS TO ACHIEVE THEIR PRIMARY GOALS. IN ADDITION, FALN UNITS FAILED
TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS. THE FMLN ALSO FAILED TO TAKE OVER RADIO
STATIONS, WHICH THEY HAD PLANNED TO USE TO ANNOUNCE THEIR "VICTORY"
OVER THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF) AND TO RALLY SUPPORT AMONG
THE POPULACE. ALSO, MOST FMLN COMMANDERS WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE
AREAS THEIR UNITS WERE FIGHTING IN, WHICH RESULTED IN A SLOWER
ADVANCE BY THESE UNITS THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED.

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5. IN SAN MIGUEL, THE FMLN SUFFERED A MAJOR SETBACK WITH THE
DEATH OF COMMANDER ALIAS "GUATUZO" AND THE WOUNDING OF ALIAS
AMADEO." THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED THE LOSS OF
THESE TWO CO AUSED CONFUSION A OMBATANTS, PREVENTING
THEM FROM ATTAINING THEIR OBJECTIVES. DENTIFIED GUATUZO AS A
NICARAGUAN. { NO OTHER TION 1S AVAILABLE ON
WH THOUGHT GUATUZO WAS A NICARAGUAN.) \. 1. |. 0g.

6. IN VIEW OF THE FACTORS CITED ABOVE, THE FALN INSTITUTED ITS
EMERGENCY PLAN. PHASE ONE CALLED FOR FMLN COMBATANTS TO MAINTAIN
THEIR POSITIONS AND NOT ATTACK MILITARY CUARTELS. IT ALSO INSTRUCTED
FMLN UNITS TO FORCE THE ESAF TO USE ARTILLERY AND AIR ATTACKS IN
POPULATED AREAS, THUS FOSTERING INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF THE
SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. FMLN UNITS WERE ALSO INSTRUCTED TO
FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE TERRAIN, INTERCEPT ESAF RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS TO ANTICIPATE COUNTERATTACKS, AND INFILTRATE CIVILIANS
INTO ESAF AREAS TO CARRY QUT SURVEILLANCE IN PREPARATION FOR FURTHER
FMLN MILITARY ACTION.

FO Approved for Release

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PAGE O04 .

NOVEMBER AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF ESAF AIR AND ARTILLERY
ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS CONVINCED THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND TO
DELAY THE WITHDRAWAL OF COMBATANTS FROM THE CITIES, AS PHASE ONE ALSO
CALLED FOR. THE GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE
WOULD MAKE THE FALN RETREAT FROM THE CITIES EASIER, AND ALLOW IT TO

CARRY OUT SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE ACTIONS WITH LITTLE OR NO NEGATIVE
PRESS COVERAGE.

8. PHASE TWO OF THE PLAN BEGAN ON 4 DECEMBER, AND CALLED FOR
"MASS DESTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE {T ALSO
CALLED FOR AMBUSHES AGAINST ESAF UNITS PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE
COFFEE GROWING REGIONS, AND FOR THE TAKEQVER OF MILITARY UNITS IN

SMALL CITIES. THE GENERAL COMMAND HOPED THIS STRATEGY WOULD DRAW
ESAF UNITS FROM MAJOR CITIES-

9. PHASE THREE, FOR WHICH A DATE WAS NOT SET, CALLED FOR THE
uSE SF HEAVY SUPPORT WEAPONS .

SUCH AS RECOILLESS RIFLES AND MORTARS 40R AN EIGHT HOUR PERIOD
AGAINST MILITARY CUARTELS, THE FMLN ERRED IN
NOT EMPLOYING HEAVY WEAPONS BURING THE 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE.
HOWEVER, THE FALN GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE SEEN AS
JUSTIFIED (N USING THESE WEAPONS, BECAUSE OF HEAVY INTERNATIONAL
PRESS COVERAGE OF ESAF ARTILLERY AND AIR ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED
AREAS, AND THE DEATHS OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS. CMMMALSO CITED
UNIDENTIFIED "PRO-SOVIET" COUNTRIES AS SUPPORTI FMLN'S PLANS TO
USE HEAVY SUPPORT WEAPONS. c Se apen aee

Pal ie *

10. PHASE THREE WAS INTENDED TO FORCE ESAF UNITS OUT OF THEIR
GARRISONS, BY STAGIN 4 MLN ATTACKS IN UPPER CLASS NEIGHBORHOODS. THE

FMLN GENERAL COMMAND’ BEL SAF UNITS COULD THEN BE MORE
EASILY AMBUSHED. PHASE THREE. WAS TO MAKE
EXTENSIVE USE OF FALN COMBATANTS FORCIBLY RECRUITED SINCE 11

NOVEMBER, BUT ONLY AFTER THEY HAD RECEIVED THREE MONTHS OF MILITARY
TRAINING. COMBATANTS WOUNDED IN PHASE ONE WOULD ALSO TAKE PART IN
PHASE THREE ONCE THEY HAD RECOVERED FROM THEIR WOUNDS. (SOURCE
COMMENT: THE THREE MONTH TRAINING PERIOD FOR THE FORCIBLY RECRUITED
COMBATANTS--MOST OF WHOM WERE RECRUITED IN DECEMBERINOICATES THAT

acs OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN WOULD PROBABLY COMMENCE IN MARCH OF
1990.

oe ( COMMENT: GIVEN THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR
SINCE NOVEMB

989, IT 1S UNCLEAR WHETHER THE THIRD PHASE OF THE

EMERGENCY PLAN OUTLINED IN THIS REPORT WOULD STILL BE A CONSIDERATION
IN THE FALN'S PLANNING IN 1990.)

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