eae a ee re ee aa ne lal eee aes, pact 003 TOT: 2214542 FEB 90 ee eee eee mw ee ewe www em mw we ee ew we de FeO EE ree ee COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR = SUBJECT: FMLN EVALUATION OF 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE; REVISED FALN MILITARY PLANS DOI: 11 NOVEMBER - MID-DECEMBER 1989 IN MID-DECEMBER )9886 HAT THE FALN GENERAL COMM THREE PHASE ENCY" PLAN AFTER THE FMLN'S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN THE FIRST HOURS OF THE 11) NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE. ae ae 2. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS TO SEIZE PRINCIPAL MILITARY GARRISONS IN THE CITIES OF SAN SALVADOR, SAN MIGUEL, USULUTAN, SANTA ANA, AND ZACATECOLUCA. HE SAID FMLN INSURGENTS FAILED TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES IN THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE BECAUSE OF STRATEGIC ERRORS COMMITTED AT ALL LEVELS OF THE FAMLN COMMAND. 3. THE EMERGENCY PLAN CALLED FOR RESERVE FORCES TO REMAIN IN PLACE OUTSIDE TARGET CITIES, RATHER THAN SUPPORTING INSURGENTS ENGAGED IN COMBAT. PAN 2 4, EER ERRORS BY THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND RESULTED IN THE NE EMERGENCY PLAN. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GENERAL COMMAND HAD MADE NO PROVISION FOR THE FAILURE OF FAMLN COMBAT UNITS TO ACHIEVE THEIR PRIMARY GOALS. IN ADDITION, FALN UNITS FAILED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS. THE FMLN ALSO FAILED TO TAKE OVER RADIO STATIONS, WHICH THEY HAD PLANNED TO USE TO ANNOUNCE THEIR "VICTORY" OVER THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF) AND TO RALLY SUPPORT AMONG THE POPULACE. ALSO, MOST FMLN COMMANDERS WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREAS THEIR UNITS WERE FIGHTING IN, WHICH RESULTED IN A SLOWER ADVANCE BY THESE UNITS THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED. . ‘Ge 5. IN SAN MIGUEL, THE FMLN SUFFERED A MAJOR SETBACK WITH THE DEATH OF COMMANDER ALIAS "GUATUZO" AND THE WOUNDING OF ALIAS AMADEO." THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED THE LOSS OF THESE TWO CO AUSED CONFUSION A OMBATANTS, PREVENTING THEM FROM ATTAINING THEIR OBJECTIVES. DENTIFIED GUATUZO AS A NICARAGUAN. { NO OTHER TION 1S AVAILABLE ON WH THOUGHT GUATUZO WAS A NICARAGUAN.) \. 1. |. 0g. 6. IN VIEW OF THE FACTORS CITED ABOVE, THE FALN INSTITUTED ITS EMERGENCY PLAN. PHASE ONE CALLED FOR FMLN COMBATANTS TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITIONS AND NOT ATTACK MILITARY CUARTELS. IT ALSO INSTRUCTED FMLN UNITS TO FORCE THE ESAF TO USE ARTILLERY AND AIR ATTACKS IN POPULATED AREAS, THUS FOSTERING INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. FMLN UNITS WERE ALSO INSTRUCTED TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE TERRAIN, INTERCEPT ESAF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS TO ANTICIPATE COUNTERATTACKS, AND INFILTRATE CIVILIANS INTO ESAF AREAS TO CARRY QUT SURVEILLANCE IN PREPARATION FOR FURTHER FMLN MILITARY ACTION. FO Approved for Release M ) MOPMINMS Owe OO+CO mA PINntinmse Awe OOnRCO PAGE O04 . NOVEMBER AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF ESAF AIR AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS CONVINCED THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND TO DELAY THE WITHDRAWAL OF COMBATANTS FROM THE CITIES, AS PHASE ONE ALSO CALLED FOR. THE GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WOULD MAKE THE FALN RETREAT FROM THE CITIES EASIER, AND ALLOW IT TO CARRY OUT SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE ACTIONS WITH LITTLE OR NO NEGATIVE PRESS COVERAGE. 8. PHASE TWO OF THE PLAN BEGAN ON 4 DECEMBER, AND CALLED FOR "MASS DESTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE {T ALSO CALLED FOR AMBUSHES AGAINST ESAF UNITS PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE COFFEE GROWING REGIONS, AND FOR THE TAKEQVER OF MILITARY UNITS IN SMALL CITIES. THE GENERAL COMMAND HOPED THIS STRATEGY WOULD DRAW ESAF UNITS FROM MAJOR CITIES- 9. PHASE THREE, FOR WHICH A DATE WAS NOT SET, CALLED FOR THE uSE SF HEAVY SUPPORT WEAPONS . SUCH AS RECOILLESS RIFLES AND MORTARS 40R AN EIGHT HOUR PERIOD AGAINST MILITARY CUARTELS, THE FMLN ERRED IN NOT EMPLOYING HEAVY WEAPONS BURING THE 11 NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, THE FALN GENERAL COMMAND BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE SEEN AS JUSTIFIED (N USING THESE WEAPONS, BECAUSE OF HEAVY INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF ESAF ARTILLERY AND AIR ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS, AND THE DEATHS OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS. CMMMALSO CITED UNIDENTIFIED "PRO-SOVIET" COUNTRIES AS SUPPORTI FMLN'S PLANS TO USE HEAVY SUPPORT WEAPONS. c Se apen aee Pal ie * 10. PHASE THREE WAS INTENDED TO FORCE ESAF UNITS OUT OF THEIR GARRISONS, BY STAGIN 4 MLN ATTACKS IN UPPER CLASS NEIGHBORHOODS. THE FMLN GENERAL COMMAND’ BEL SAF UNITS COULD THEN BE MORE EASILY AMBUSHED. PHASE THREE. WAS TO MAKE EXTENSIVE USE OF FALN COMBATANTS FORCIBLY RECRUITED SINCE 11 NOVEMBER, BUT ONLY AFTER THEY HAD RECEIVED THREE MONTHS OF MILITARY TRAINING. COMBATANTS WOUNDED IN PHASE ONE WOULD ALSO TAKE PART IN PHASE THREE ONCE THEY HAD RECOVERED FROM THEIR WOUNDS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE THREE MONTH TRAINING PERIOD FOR THE FORCIBLY RECRUITED COMBATANTS--MOST OF WHOM WERE RECRUITED IN DECEMBERINOICATES THAT acs OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN WOULD PROBABLY COMMENCE IN MARCH OF 1990. oe ( COMMENT: GIVEN THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR SINCE NOVEMB 989, IT 1S UNCLEAR WHETHER THE THIRD PHASE OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN OUTLINED IN THIS REPORT WOULD STILL BE A CONSIDERATION IN THE FALN'S PLANNING IN 1990.) MOPrPnwmmse Omz-O0O—7c) = motrmnom