c G r 1 &T. n ^">! Edward Bright Mathematics Dept, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE \i a CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS \ . C. F. CLAY, MANAGER LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.G. 4 NEW YORK : G.P.PUTNAM'S SONS BOMBAY ) CALCUTTA V MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD. MADRAS J A. N. W. April 20, 1919 CONTENTS PART I THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE CHAPTER I. MEANING ARTS. PAGES 1. TRADITIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS ... 1-4 2. PHILOSOPHIC RELATIVITY 4-8 3. PERCEPTION 8-15 CHAPTER II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMICAL PHYSICS 4. NEWTON'S LAWS OF MOTION 16-19 5. THE ETHER 20-23 6. MAXWELL'S EQUATIONS 23-26 APPENDIX I : NEWTON'S LAWS OF MOTION . . . 27-28 APPENDIX II: CLERK MAXWELL'S EQUATIONS OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELD 29-30 CHAPTER III. SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 7. CONSENTIENT SETS 3J-32 8. KINEMATIC RELATIONS . . . . . 32-37 9. MOTION THROUGH THE ETHER .... 37~4I 10. FORMULAE FOR RELATIVE MOTION . . . . 41-46 APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL FORMULAE .... 47-50 CHAPTER IV. CONGRUENCE n. SIMULTANEITY 5I-54 12. CONGRUENCE AND RECOGNITION . . . . 54~57 x CONTENTS PART II THE DATA OF SCIENCE CHAPTER V. THE NATURAL ELEMENTS ARTS. PAGES 13. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF NATURE . . . . 59~6t 14. EVENTS , 61-62 15. OBJECTS 62-67 CHAPTER VI. EVENTS 1 6. APPREHENSION OF EVENTS . . . , . 68-71 17. THE CONSTANTS OF EXTERNALITY . . . . 7l~74 18. EXTENSION . . . . . ... 74-77 19. ABSOLUTE POSITION . . . . . . 77~7$ 20. THE COMMUNITY OF NATURE . . . . . 78-79 21. CHARACTERS OF EVENTS . . . . . . 79-81 CHAPTER VII. OBJECTS 22. TYPES OF OBJECTS . . . . . • * 82-83 23. SENSE-OBJECTS . . . . * . . '. 83-88 24. PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS . . . >e. , . 88-93 25. SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS . . . . . . 93-98 26. DUALITY OF NATURE . . , . " - • .» . . 98-99 PART III THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION CHAPTER VIII. PRINCIPLES OF THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 27. THE RELATION OF EXTENSION, FUNDAMENTAL PRO- PERTIES . 101-102 28. INTERSECTION, SEPARATION AND DISSECTION . . 102 29. THE JUNCTION OF EVENTS 102-103 30. ABSTRACTIVE CLASSES . . . . . 104-106 31. PRIMES AND ANTIPRIMES 106-108 32. ABSTRACTIVE ELEMENTS 108-109 CONTENTS xi CHAPTER IX. DURATIONS, MOMENTS AND TIME-SYSTEMS ARTS. PAGES 33. ANTIPRIMES, DURATIONS AND MOMENTS . . . 110-112 34. PARALLELISM AND TIME-SYSTEMS .... 112-115 35. LEVELS, RECTS, AND PUNCTS 115-118 36. PARALLELISM AND ORDER ..... 118-120 CHAPTER X. FINITE ABSTRACTIVE ELEMENTS 37. ABSOLUTE PRIMES AND EVENT-PARTICLES . . 121-123 38. ROUTES. . v 123-126 39. SOLIDS 126 40. VOLUMES ; 126-127 CHAPTER XI. POINTS AND STRAIGHT LINES 41. STATIONS . . 128-129 42. POINT-TRACKS AND POINTS . . . . . 129-131 43. PARALLELISM . . . . . . .131-133 44. MATRICES 133 45. NULL-TRACKS . . . . . . . 133-136 46. STRAIGHT LINES 136-138 CHAPTER XII. NORMALITY AND CONGRUENCE 47. NORMALITY . 139-140 48. CONGRUENCE 141-146 CHAPTER XIII. MOTION 49. ANALYTIC GEOMETRY ...... 147-151 50. THE PRINCIPLE OF KINEMATIC SYMMETRY . . 151-155 51. TRANSITIVITY OF CONGRUENCE .... 155-157 52. THE THREE TYPES OF KINEMATICS . . . . 157-164 Xll CONTENTS PART IV V THE THEORY OF OBJECTS CHAPTER XIV. THE LOCATION OF OBJECTS ARTS. 53. LOCATION 54- UNIFORM OBJECTS 55. COMPONENTS OF OBJECTS . . CHAPTER XV. MATERIAL OBJECTS 56. MATERIAL OBJECTS 57. STATIONARY EVENTS . . . . • . , • , . 58. MOTION OF OBJECTS . . . ... , 59. EXTENSIVE MAGNITUDE CHAPTER XVI. CAUSAL COMPONENTS PAGES 165-167 167-169 169-170 171-172 172-175 1 75-i 77 177-181 60. APPARENT AND CAUSAL COMPONENTS 6 1 . TRANSITION FROM APPEARANCE TO CAUSE . CHAPTER XVII. FIGURES 62. SENSE-FIGURES 63. GEOMETRICAL FIGURES . . 182-184 . 184-189 190-192 193-194 CHAPTER XVIII. RHYTHMS 64. RHYTHMS 195-200 PART I THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE CHAPTER I .>/; " _ MEANING /. Traditional Scientific Concepts . i-i What is a phys- ical explanation? The answer to this question, even when merely implicit in the scientific imagination, must profoundly affect the development of every science, and in an especial degree that of speculative physics. During the modern period the orthodox answer has invariably been couched in terms of Time (flowing equably in measurable lapses) and of Space (timeless, void of activity, euclidean), and of Material in space (such as matter, ether, or electricity). The governing principle underlying this scheme is that extension, namely extension in time or extension in space, expresses disconnection. This principle issues in the assumptions that causal action between entities separated in time or in space is impossible and that ex- tension in space and unity of being are inconsistent. Thus the extended material (on this view) is essentially a multiplicity of entities which, as extended, are diverse and disconnected. This governing principle has to be limited in respect to extension in time. The same material exists at different times. This concession intro- duces the many perplexities centering round the notion of change which is derived from the comparison of various states of self-identical material at different times. w. 2 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE 1-2 The ultimate fact embracing all nature is (in this traditional point of view) a distribution of material throughout all space at a durationless instant of time, and another such ultimate fact will be another distri- .butioh bF the' same material throughout the same space at another; dxirationless instant of time. The difficulties of this extreme statement are evident and were pointed out even in classical times when the concept first took shape. Some modification is evidently necessary. No room has been left for velocity, acceleration, momentum, and kinetic energy, which certainly are essential physical quantities. We must therefore in the ultimate fact, beyond which science ceases to analyse, include the notion of a state of change. But a state of change at a durationless instant is a very difficult conception. It is impossible to define velocity without some reference to the past and the future. Thus change is essentially the importation of the past and of the future into the immediate fact em- bodied in the durationless present instant. This conclusion is destructive of the fundamental assumption that the ultimate facts for science are to be found at durationless instants of time. 1 3 The reciprocal causal action between materials A and B is the fact that their states of change are partly dependent on their relative locations and natures. The disconnection involved in spatial separation leads to reduction t)f such causal action to the transmission of stress across the bounding surface of contiguous materials. But what is contact? No two points are in contact. Thus the stress across a surface necessarily acts on some bulk of the material enclosed inside. To say that the stress acts on the immediately contiguous MEANING 3 material is to assert infinitely small volumes. But there are no such things, only smaller and smaller volumes. Yet (with this point of view) it cannot be meant that the surface acts on the interior. Certainly stress has the same claim to be regarded as an essential physical quantity as have momentum and kinetic energy. But no intelligible account of its mean- ing is to be extracted from the concept of the continuous distribution of diverse (because extended) entities through space as an ultimate scientific fact. At some stage in our account of stress we are driven to the con- cept of any extended quantity of material as a single unity whose nature is partly explicable in terms of its surface stress. 1-4 In biology the concept of an organism cannot be expressed in terms of a material distribution at an instant. The essence of an organism is that it is one thing which functions and is spread through space. Now functioning takes time. Thus a biological or- ganism is a unity with a spatio-temporal extension which is of the essence of its being. This biological conception is obviously incompatible with the tradi- tional ideas. This argument does not in any way depend on the assumption that biological phenomena belong to a different category to other physical phenomena. The essential point of the criticism on traditional con- cepts which has occupied us so far is that the concept of unities, functioning and with spatio-temporal ex- tensions, cannot be extruded from physical concepts. The only reason for the introduction of biology is that in these sciences the same necessity becomes more clear. I 2 4 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE I '5 The fundamental assumption to be elaborated in the course of this enquiry is that the ultimate facts of nature, in terms of which all physical and biological explanation must be expressed, are events connected by their spatio-temporal relations, and that these rela- tions are in the main reducible to the property of events that they can contain (or extend over) other events which are parts of them. In other words, in the place of emphasising space and time in their capacity of disconnecting, we shall build up an account of their complex essences as derivative from the ultimate ways in which those things, ultimate in science, are inter- connected. In this way the data of science, those concepts in terms of which all scientific explanation must be expressed, will be more clearly apprehended . But before proceeding to our constructive task, some further realisation of the perplexities introduced by the traditional concepts is necessary. 2. Philosophic Relativity. 2-1 The philosophical principle of the relativity of space means that the pro- perties of space are merely a way of expressing relations between things ordinarily said to be ' in space/ Namely, when two things are said to be ' both in space ' what is meant is that they are mutually related in a certain definite way which is termed * spatial.' It is an im- mediate consequence of this theory that all spatial entities such as points, straight lines and planes are merely complexes of relations between things or of possible relations between things. For consider the meaning of saying that a particle P is at a point Q. This statement conveys substantial information and must therefore convey something more than the barren assertion of self -identity * P is P.' Thus MEANING 5 what must be meant is that P has certain relations to other particles P', P" , etc., and that the abstract possi- bility of this group of relations is what is meant by the point Q. The extremely valuable work on the foundations of geometry produced during the nineteenth century has proceeded from the assumption of points as ultimate given entities. This assumption, for the logical purpose of mathematicians, is entirely justified. Namely the mathematicians ask, What is the logical description of relations between points from which all geometrical theorems respecting such relations can be deduced? The answer to this question is now practically complete ; and if the old theory of absolute space be true, there is nothing more to be said. For points are ultimate simple existents, with mutual relations disclosed by our per- ceptions of nature. But if we adopt the principle of relativity, these investigations do not solve the question of the founda- tions of geometry. An investigation into the foundations of geometry has to explain space as a complex of rela- tions between things. It has to describe what a point is, and has to show how the geometric relations be- tween points issue from the ultimate relations between the ultimate things which are the immediate objects of knowledge. Thus the starting point of a discussion on the foundations of geometry is a discussion of the character of the immediate data of perception. It is not now open to mathematicians to assume sub silentio that points are among these data. 2-2 The traditional concepts were evidently formed round the concept of absolute space, namely the concept of the persistent ultimate material distributed among 6 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE the persistent ultimate points in successive configura- tions at successive ultimate instants of time. Here * ultimate' means 'not analysable into a complex of simpler entities.' The introduction of the principle of relativity adds to the complexity — or rather, to the perplexity — of this conception of nature. The state- ment of general character of ultimate fact must now be amended into 'persistent ultimate material with successive mutual ultimate relations at successive ultimate instants of time.' Space issues from these mutual relations of matter at an instant. The first criticism to be made on such an assertion is that it is shown to be a metaphysical fairy tale by any comparison with our actual perceptual knowledge of nature. Our knowledge of space is based on observations which take time and have to be successive, but the relations which constitute space are instantaneous. The theory demands that there should be an instantaneous space corresponding to each instant, and provides for no correlation between these spaces; while nature has provided us with no apparatus for observing them. 2-3 It is an obvious suggestion that we should amend our statement of ultimate fact, as modified by the ac- ceptance of relativity. The spatial relations must now stretch across time. Thus if P, P', P", etc. be material particles, there are definite spatial relations connecting P, P', P", etc. at time ^ with P, P', P", etc. at time Z2, as well as such relations between P and P' and P", etc. at time ^ and such relations between P and P' and P" y etc. at time t2. This should mean that P at time t2 has a definite position in the spatial configuration consti- tuted by the relations between P, P', P", etc. at time t^ MEANING 7 For example, the sun at a certain instant on Jan. ist, 1900 had a definite position in the instantaneous space constituted by the mutual relations between the sun and the other stars at a definite instant on Jan. ist, 1800. Such a statement is only understandable (assuming the traditional concept) by recurring to absolute space and thus abandoning relativity; for otherwise it denies the completeness of the instantaneous fact which is the essence of the concept. Another way out of the difficulty is to deny that space is constituted by the relations of P, P', P", etc., at an instant, and to assert that it results from their relations throughout a duration of time, which as thus prolonged in time are observable. As a matter of fact it is obvious that our knowledge of space does result from such observations. But we are asking the theory to provide us with actual relations to be observed. This last emendation is either only a muddled way of admitting that * nature at an instant* is not the ultimate scientific fact, or else it is a yet more muddled plea that, although there is no possibility of correlations between distinct instantaneous spaces, yet within durations which are short enough such non- existent correlations enter into experience. 2-4 The persistence of the material lacks any ob- servational guarantee when the relativity of space is admitted into the traditional concept. For at one instant there is instantaneous material in its instantaneous space as constituted by its instantaneous relations, and at another instant there is instantaneous material in its instantaneous space. How do we know that the two cargoes of material which load the two instants are identical? The answer is that we do not perceive iso- lated instantaneous facts, but a continuity of existence, 8 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE and that it is this observed continuity of existence which guarantees the persistence of material. Exactly so; but this gives away the whole traditional concept. For a * continuity of existence ' must mean an unbroken duration of existence. Accordingly it is admitted that the ultimate fact for observational knowledge is per- ception through a duration; namely, that the content of a specious present, and not that of a durationless instant, is an ultimate datum for science. 2-5 It is evident that the conception of the instant of time as an ultimate entity is the source of all our difficulties of explanation. If there are such ultimate entities, instantaneous nature is an ultimate fact. Our perception of time is as a duration, and these instants have only been introduced by reason of a supposed necessity of thought. In fact absolute time is just as much a metaphysical monstrosity as absolute space. The way out of the perplexities, as to the ulti- mate data of science in terms of which physical ex- planation is ultimately to be expressed, is to express the essential scientific concepts of time, space and material as issuing from fundamental relations between events and from recognitions of the characters of events. These relations of events are those immediate deliver- ances of observation which are referred to when we say that events are spread through time and space. 3. Perception. 3-1 The conception of one universal nature embracing the fragmentary perceptions of events by one percipient and the many perceptions by diverse percipients is surrounded with difficulties. In the first place there is what we will call the ' Berkeleyan Dilem- ma' which crudely and shortly may be stated thus: Perceptions are in the mind and universal nature is out MEANING 9 of the mind, and thus the conception of universal nature can have no relevance to our perceptual life. This is not how Berkeley stated his criticism of mater- ialism; he was thinking of substance and matter. But this variation is a detail and his criticism is fatal to any of the traditional types of * mind-watching-things ' philosophy, even if those things be events and not substance or material. His criticisms range through every type of sense-perception, though in particular he concentrates on Vision. 3*2 "Evpkranar*. Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern the doors, windows, and battlements of that same castle? Alciphron. I cannot. At this distance it seems only a small round tower. Euph. But I, who have been at it, know that it is no small round tower, but a large square building with battlements and turrets, which it seems you do not see. Ale. What will you infer from thence ? Euph. I would infer that the very object which you strictly and properly perceive by sight is not that thing which is several miles distant. Ale. Why so? Euph. Because a little round object is one thing, and a great square object is another. Is it not so ? Ale. I cannot deny it. Euph. Tell me, is not the visible appearance alone the proper object of sight ? Ale. It is. What think you now (said Euphranor, pointing towards the heavens) of the visible appearance of yonder planet? Is it not a round luminous flat, no bigger than a six-pence ? Ale. What then? Euph. Tell me then, what you think of the planet itself? Do * Alciphron, The Fourth Dialogue, Section 10. io I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE you not conceive it to be a vast opaque globe, with several unequal risings and valleys ? Ale. I do. Euph. How can you therefore conclude that the proper object of your sight exists at a distance ? Ale. I confess I do not know. Euph. For your further conviction, do but consider that crimson cloud. Think you that, if you were in the very place where it is, you would perceive anything like what you now see ? Ale. By no means. I should perceive only a dark mist. Euph. Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, which you see here, are those real ones which you suppose exist at a distance ? " 33 Now the difficulty to be faced is just this. We may not lightly abandon the castle, the planet, and the crimson cloud, and hope to retain the eye, its retina, and the brain. Such a philosophy is too simple-minded —or at least might be thought so, except for its wide diffusion. Suppose we make a clean sweep. Science then be- comes a formula for calculating mental ' phenomena * or 'impressions.' But where is science? In books? But the castle and the planet took their libraries with them. No, science is in the minds of men. But men sleep and forget, and at their best in any one moment of insight entertain but scanty thoughts. Science there- 5? \ fore is nothing but a confident expectation that relevant thoughts will occasionally occur. But by the bye, what has happened to time and space ? They must have gone after the other things. No, we must distinguish: space has gone, of course; but time remains as relating the succession of phenomena. Yet this won't do; for this succession is only known by recollection, and recollec- MEANING ii tion is subject to the same criticism as that applied by Berkeley to the castle, the planet, and the cloud. So after all, time does evaporate with space, and in their departure ' you ' also have accompanied them ; and I am left solitary in the character of a void of experience without significance. 3-4 At this point in the argument we may break off, having formed a short catalogue of the sort of considera- tions which lead from the Berkeleyan dilemma to a complete scepticism which was not in Berkeley's own thought. There are two types of answer to this sceptical descent. One is Dr Johnson's. He stamped his foot on a paving-stone, and went on his way satisfied with its reality. A scrutiny of modern philosophy will, if I am not mistaken, show that more philosophers should own Dr Johnson as their master than would be willing to acknowledge their indebtedness. The other type of answer was first given by Kant. We must distinguish between the general way he set about constructing his answer to Hume, and the details of his system which in many respects are highly dis- putable. The essential point of his method is the assumption that ' significance ' is an essential element in concrete experience. The Berkeleyan dilemma starts with tacitly ignoring this aspect of experience, and thus with putting forward, as expressing experience, con- ceptions of it which have no relevance to fact. In the light of Kant's procedure, Johnson's answer falls into its place; it is the assertion that Berkeley has not correctly expounded what experience in fact is. Berkeley himself insists that experience is significant, indeed three-quarters of his writings are devoted to 12 , I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE enforcing this position. But Kant's position is the converse of Berkeley's, namely that significance : is ex- perience. Berkeley first analyses experience, and then expounds his view of its significance, namely that it is God conversing with us. For Berkeley the significance is detachable from the experience. It is here that Hume came in. He accepted Berkeley's assumption that experience is something given, an impression, without essential reference to significance, and exhibited it in its bare insignificance. Berkeley's conversation with God then becomes a fairy tale. 3-5 What is * significance '? Evidently this is a funda- mental question for the philosophy of natural know- ledge, which cannot move a step until it has made up its mind as to what is meant by this 'significance* which is experience. ' Significance ' is the relatedness of things. To say that significance is experience, is to affirm that per- ceptual knowledge is nothing else than an apprehension of the relatedness of things, namely of things in their relations and as related. Certainly if we commence with a knowledge of things, and then look around for their relations we shall not find them. 'Causal connection' is merely one typical instance of the universal ruin of relatedness. But then we are quite mistaken in thinking that there is a possible knowledge of things as unrelated. It is thus out of the question to start with a knowledge of things antecedent to a knowledge of their relations. The so-called properties of things can always be ex- pressed as their relatedness to other things unspecified, and natural knowledge is exclusively concerned with relatedness. 3-6 The relatedness which is the subject of natural MEANING 13 knowledge cannot be understood without reference to the general characteristics of perception. Our percep- tion of natural events and natural objects is a perception from within nature, and is not an awareness contem- plating all nature impartially from without. When Dr Johnson ' surveyed mankind from China to Peru,' he did it from Pump Court in London at a certain date. Even Pump Court was too wide for his peculiar locus standi', he was really merely conscious of the relations of his bodily events to the simultaneous events through- out the rest of the universe. Thus perception involves a percipient object, a percipient event, the complete event which is all nature simultaneous with the per- cipient event, and the particular events which are perceived as parts of the complete event. This general analysis of perception will be elaborated in Part II. The point here to be emphasised is that natural know- ledge is a knowledge from within nature, a knowledge 'here within nature' and 'now within nature,' and is an awareness of the natural relations of one element in nature (namely, the percipient event) to the rest of nature. Also what is known is not barely the things but the relations of things, and not the relations in the abstract but specifically those things as related. Thus Alciphron's vision of the planet is his percep- tion of his relatedness (i.e. the relatedness of his per- cipient event) to some other elements of nature which as thus related he calls the planet. He admits in the dialogue that certain other specified relations of those elements are possible for other percipient events. In this he may be right or wrong. What he directly knows is his relation to some other elements of the universe — namely, I, Alciphron, am located in my percipient i4 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE event 'here and now' and the immediately perceived appearance of the planet is for me a characteristic of another event 'there and now.' In fact perceptual knowledge is always a knowledge of the relationship of the percipient event to something else in nature. This doctrine is in entire agreement with Dr Johnson's stamp of the foot by which he realised the otherness of the paving-stone. 3-7 The conception of knowledge as passive con- templation is too inadequate to meet the facts. Nature is ever originating its own development, and the sense of action is the direct knowledge of the percipient event as having its very being in the formation of its natural relations. Knowledge issues from this reciprocal in- sistence between this event and the rest of nature, namely relations are perceived in the making and because of the making. For this reason perception is always at the utmost point of creation. We cannot put ourselves back to the Crusades and know their events while they were happening. We essentially perceive our relations with nature because they are in the making. The sense of action is that essential factor in natural knowledge which exhibits it as a self-knowledge en- joyed by an element of nature respecting its active relations with the whole of nature in its various aspects. Natural knowledge is merely the other side of action. The forward moving time exhibits this characteristic of experience, that it is essentially action. This passage of nature — or, in other words, its creative advance — is its fundamental characteristic; the traditional concept is an attempt to catch nature without its passage. 3-8 Thus science leads to an entirely incoherent philosophy of perception in so far as it restricts itself MEANING 15 to the ultimate datum of material in time and space, the spatio-temporal configuration of such material being the object of perception. This conclusion is no news to philosophy, but it has not led to any explicit re- organisation of the concepts actually employed in science. Implicitly, scientific theory is shot through and through with notions which are frankly inconsistent with its explicit fundamental data. This confusion cannot be avoided by any kind of theory in which nature is conceived simply as a complex of one kind of inter-related elements such as either persistent things, or events, or sense-data. A more elaborate view is required of which an explanation will be attempted in the sequel. It will suffice here to say that it issues in the assertion that all nature can (in many diverse ways) be analysed as a complex of things ; thus all nature can be analysed as a complex of events, | and all nature can be analysed as a complex of sense- data. The elements which result from such analyses, events, and sense-data, are aspects of nature of funda- i mentally different types, and the confusions of scientific theory have arisen from the absence of any clear re- cognition of the distinction between relations proper to one type of element anol relations proper to another type of element. It is of course a commonplace that elements of these types are fundamentally different. What is here to be insisted on is the way in which this \ commonplace truth is important in yielding an analysis ) of the ultimate data for science more elaborate than that of its current tradition. We have to remember that while nature is complex with time-less subtlety, human thought issues from the simple-mindedness of beings whose active life is less than half a century. CHAPTER II THE FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMICAL PHYSICS 4. Newton9 s Laws of Motion. 4-1 The theoretical difficulties in the way of the application of the philo- sophic doctrine of relativity have never worried practical scientists. They have started with the working assump- tions that in some sense the world is in one euclidean space, that the permanent points in such a space have no individual characteristics recognisable by us, except so far as they are occupied by recognisable material or except in so far as they are defined by assigned spatial relations to points which are thus definitely recognisable, and that according to the purpose in hand either the earth can be assumed to be at rest or else astronomical axes which are defined by the aid of the solar system, of the stars, and of dynamical considerations deduced from Newton's laws of motion. 4-2 Newton's laws* of motion presuppose the notions of mass and force. Mass arises from the conception of a passive quality of a material body, what it is in itself apart from its relation to other bodies ; the notion of ' force ' is that of an active agency changing the phys- ical circumstances of the body, and in particular its spatial relations to other bodies. It is fairly obvious that mass and force were introduced into science as the outcome of this antithesis between intrinsic quality and agency, although further reflection may somewhat mar the simplicity of this outlook. Mass and * Cf. Appendix I to this chapter. THE FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMICAL PHYSICS 17 force are measurable quantities, and their numerical expressions are dependent on the units chosen. The mass of a body is constant, so long as the body remains composed of the same self-identical material. Velocity, acceleration and force are vector quantities, namely they have direction as well as magnitude. They are thus representable by straight lines drawn from any arbitrary origin. 4-3 These laws of motion are among the foundations of science; and certainly any alteration in them must be such as to produce effects observable only under very exceptional circumstances. But, as is so often the case in science, a scrutiny of their meaning produces many perplexities. In the first place we can sweep aside one minor difficulty. In our experience, a finite mass of matter occupies a volume and not a point. Evidently therefore the laws should be stated in an integral form, involving at certain points of the exposition greater elaboration of statement. These forms are stated (with somewhat abbreviated explanation) in dynamical treatises. Secondly, Lorentz's distinction between macro- scopic equations and microscopic equations forces itself on us at once, by reason of the molecular nature of matter and the dynamical nature of heat. A body apparently formed of continuous matter with its in- trinsic geometrical relations nearly invariable is in fact composed of agitated molecules. The equations of motion for such a body as used by an engineer or an astronomer are, in Lorentz's nomenclature, macro- scopic. In such equations even a differential element of volume is to be supposed to be sufficiently large to average out the diverse agitations of the molecules, and w. 2 i8 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE to register only the general unbalanced residuum which to ordinary observation is the motion of the body. The microscopic equations are those which apply to the individual molecules. It is at once evident that a series of such sets of equations is possible, in which the adjacent sets are macroscopic and microscopic relatively to each other. For example, we may penetrate below the molecule to the electrons and the core which compose it, and thus obtain infra-molecular equations. It is purely a question as to whether there are any observed phenomena which in this way receive their interpretation. The inductive evidence for the validity of Newton's equations of motion, within the experimental limits of accuracy, is obviously much stronger in the case of the macroscopic equations of the engineer and the astro- nomer than it is in the case of the microscopic equations of the molecule, and very much stronger than in the case of the infra-microscopic equations of the electron. But there is good evidence that even the infra-micro- scopic equations conform to Newton's laws as a first approximation. The traces of deviation arise when the velocities are not entirely negligible compared to that of light. 4-4 What do we know about masses and about forces ? We obtain our knowledge of forces by having some theory about masses, and our knowledge of masses by having some theory about forces. Our theories about masses enable us in certain circumstances to assign the numerical ratios of the masses of the bodies involved; then the observed motions of these bodies will enable us to register (by the use of Newton's laws of motion) the directions and magnitudes of the forces THE FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMICAL PHYSICS 19 involved, and thence to frame more extended theories as to the laws regulating the production of force. Our theories about the direction and comparative magni- tudes of forces and the observed motions of the bodies will enable us to register (by the use of Newton's laws of motion) the comparative magnitudes of masses. The final results are to be found in engineers' pocket-books in tables of physical constants for physicists, and in astronomical tables. The verification is the concordant results of diverse experiments. One essential part of such theories is the judgment of circumstances which are sufficiently analogous to warrant the assumption of the same mass or the same magnitude of force in assign- ed diverse cases. Namely the theories depend upon the fact of recognition. 4-5 It has been popular to define force as the product of mass and acceleration. The difficulty to be faced with this definition is that the familiar equation of elementary dynamics, namely, mf=P, now becomes mf= mf. It is not easy to understand how an important science can issue from such premisses. Furthermore the simple balancing of a weight by the tension of the supporting spring receives a very artificial meaning. With equal reason we might start with our theories of force as fundamental, and define mass as force divided by acceleration. Again we should be in equal danger of reducing dynamical equations to such identities as pif= p/f- Also the permanent mass of a bar of iron receives a very artificial meaning. 2 2 20 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE 5. The Ether. 5-1 The theory of stress between distant bodies, considered as an ultimate fact, was re- pudiated by Newton himself, but was adopted by some of his immediate successors. In the nineteenth century the belief in action at a distance has steadily lost ground. There are four definite scientific reasons for the adoption of the opposite theory of the transmission of stress through an intermediate medium which we will call the 'ether.' These reasons are in addition to the somewhat vague philosophic preferences, based on the disconnection involved in spatial and temporal separa- tion. In the first place, the wave theory of light also postulates an ether, and thus brings concurrent testi- mony to its existence. Secondly, Clerk Maxwell pro- duced the formulae for the stresses in such an ether which, if they exist, would account for gravitational, electrostatic, and magnetic attractions. No theory of the nature of the ether is thereby produced which in any way explains why such stresses exist ; and thus their existence is so far just as much a disconnected assump- tion as that of the direct stresses between distant bodies. Thirdly, Clerk Maxwell's equations of the electro- magnetic field presuppose events and physical pro- perties of apparently empty space. Accordingly there must be something, i.e. an ether, in the empty space to which these properties belong. These equations are now recognised as the foundations of the exact science of electromagnetism, and stand on a level with Newton's equations of motion. Thus another testimony is added to the existence of an ether. Lastly, Clerk Maxwell's identification of light with electromagnetic waves shows that the same ether is required by the apparently diverse optical and electro- THE FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMICAL PHYSICS 21 magnetic phenomena. The objection is removed that fresh properties have to be ascribed to the ether by each of the distinct lines of thought which postulate it. It will be observed that gravitation stands outside this unification of scientific theory due to Maxwell's work, except so far that we know the stresses in the ether which would produce it. 5-2 The assumption of the existence of an ether at once raises the question as to its laws of motion. Thus in addition to the hierarchy of macroscopic and micro- scopic equations, there are the equations of motion for ether in otherwise empty space. The a priori reasons for believing that Newton's laws of motion apply to the ether are very weak, being in fact nothing more than the inductive extension of laws to cases widely dissimilar from those for which they have been verified. It is how- ever a sound scientific procedure to investigate whether the assumed properties of ether are explicable on the assumption that it is behaving like ordinary matter, if only to obtain suggestions by contrast for the formula- tion of the laws which do express its physical changes. The best method of procedure is to assume certain large principles deducible from Newton's laws and to interpret certain electromagnetic vectors as displace- ments and velocities of the ether. In this way Larmor has been successful in deducing Maxwell's equations from the principle of least action after making the necessary assumptions. In this he is only following a long series of previous scientists who during the nine- teenth century devoted themselves to the explanation of optical and electromagnetic phenomena. His work completes a century of very notable achievement in this field. 22 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE 5-3 But it may be doubted whether this procedure is not an inversion of the more fundamental line of thought. It will have been noted that Newton's equa- tions, or any equivalent principles which are substituted for them, are in a sense merely blank forms. They require to be supplemented by hypotheses respecting the nature of the stresses, of the masses, and of the motions, before there can be any possibility of their application. Thus by the time that Newton's equations of motion are applied to the explication of etherial events there is a large accumulation of hypotheses respecting things of which we know very little. What in fact we do know about the ether is summed up in Maxwell's equations, or in recent adaptations of his equations such as those due to Lorentz. The discovery of electromagnetic mass and electromagnetic momentum suggests that, for the ether at least, we gain simpler conceptions of the facts by taking Maxwell's equations, or the Lorentz-Maxwell equations, as fundamental. Such equations would then be the ultimate microscopic equations, at least in the present stage of science, and Newton's equations become macroscopic equations which apply in certain definite circumstances to etherial aggregates. Such a procedure does not prejudge the debated theory of the purely electromagnetic origin of mass. 5-4 The modern theory of the molecule is destructive of the obviousness of the prejudgment in favour of the traditional concepts of ultimate material at an instant. Consider a molecule of iron. It is composed of a central core of positive electricity surrounded by annular clusters of electrons, composed of negative electricity and rotating round the core. No single characteristic THE FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMICAL PHYSICS 23 property of iron as such can be manifested at an instant. Instantaneously there is simply a distribution of elec- tricity and Maxwell's equations to express our expecta- tions. But iron is not an expectation or even a recollec- tion. It is a fact; and this fact, which is iron, is what happens during a period of time. Iron and a biological organism are on a level in requiring time for functioning. There is no such thing as iron at an instant ; to be iron is a character of an event. Every physical constant respecting iron which appears in scientific tables is the register of such a character. What is ultimate in iron, according to the traditional theory, is instantaneous distributions of electricity; and this ultimateness is simply ascribed by reason of a metaphysical theory, and by no reason of observation. 5-5 In truth, when we have once admitted the hier- archy of macroscopic and microscopic equations, the traditional concept is lost. For it is the macroscopic equations which express the facts of immediate observa- tion, and these equations essentially express the integral characters of events. But this hierarchy is necessitated by every concept of modern physics — the molecular theory of matter, the dynamical theory of heat, the wave theory of light, the electromagnetic theory of molecules, the electromagnetic theory of mass. 6. Maxwell's Equations*. 6-1 A discussion of Maxwell's equations would constitute a treatise on electromagnetism. But they exemplify some general considerations on physical laws. These equations (expressed for an axis-system a) involve for each point of space and each instant of time the vector quantities (Fa, Ga, #a), (La, Ma, Na) and * Cf. Appendix II to this chapter. 24 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE («a, va9 wa), namely the electric and magnetic 'forces' and the velocity of the charge of electricity. Now a vector involves direction ; and direction is not concerned with what is merely at that point. It is impossible to define direction without reference to the rest of space ; namely, it involves some relation to the whole of space. Again the equations involve the spatial differential •^ o o operators z— , r— , r— , which enter through the symbols dxa dya dza curla and diva; and they also involve the temporal differential operator — . The differential coefficients vta thus produced essentially express properties in the neighbourhood of the point (xa, yay za) and of the time ta, and not merely properties at (xa, ya, za, ta). For a differential coefficient is a limit, and the limit of a function at a given value of its argument expresses a property of the aggregate of the values of the function corresponding to the aggregate of the values of the argument in the neighbourhood of the given value. This is essentially the same argument as that ex- pressed above in 1-2 for the particular case of motion. Namely, we cannot express the facts of nature as an aggregate of individual facts at points and at instants. 6-2 In the Lorentz-Maxwell equations [cf. Ap- pendix II] there is no reference to the motion of the ether. The velocity (ua, va, wa) which appears in them is the velocity of the electric charge. What then are the equations* of motion of the ether ? Before we puzzle over this question, a preliminary doubt arises. Does the ether move? Certainly, if science is to be based on the data in- cluded in the Lorentz-Maxwell equations, even if the THE FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMICAL. PHYSICS 25 equations be modified, the motion of the ether does not enter into experience. Accordingly Lorentz assumes a stagnant ether : that is to say, an ether with no motion, which is simply the ultimate entity of which the vectors (Fa, Ga, Ha) and (La, Ma,Na) express properties. Such an ether has certainly a very shadowy existence; and yet we cannot assume that it moves, merely for the sake of giving it something to do. 6-3 The ultimate facts contemplated in Maxwell's equations are the occurrences of pa (the volume- density of the charge), (ua, v» wa), (Fa> Ga, #a), and (Ltt, Ma, Na) at the space-time points in the neighbourhood surround- ing the space-time point (xay yay za, ta). But this is merely to say that the ultimate facts contemplated by Maxwell's equations are certain events which are oc- curring throughout all space. The material called ether is merely the outcome of a metaphysical craving. The continuity of nature is the continuity of events; and the doctrine of trai^mi^ion should be construed as a doctrine of the coextensiveness of events with space 1 - and time and of their reciprocal interaction. In this sense an ether can be admitted; but, in view of the existing implication of the term, clearness is gained by a distinction of phraseology. We shall term the tradi- tional ether an ' ether of material ' or a * material ether,' and shall employ the term ' ether of events ' to express the assumption of this enquiry, which may be loosely stated as being ' that something is going on everywhere and always.' It is our purpose to express accurately the relations between these events so far as they are disclosed by our perceptual experience, and in particular to consider those relations from which the essential concepts of Time, Space, and persistent material are 26 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE derived. Thus primarily we must not conceive of events as in a given Time, a given Space, and consisting of changes in given persistent material. Time, Space, and Material are adjuncts of events. On the old theory of relativity, Time and Space are relations between materials; on our theory they are relations between events. APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER II NEWTON'S LAWS OF MOTION Let (OaXaYaZa) as in the accompanying figure be rect- angular axes at rest; let (xap, yap, zap) be the velocity of a material particle p of mass m at (xa, ya, za) relative to these axes, and let (xap, yap, %ap) be the acceleration of the same particle. Also let (Xap, Yap, Zap) be the force on the particle p. The first two of Newton's laws can be compressed into the equations (Xapj yap, *ap) N M Fig. i. It is unnecessary to trace the elementary consequences of these equations. The third law of motion considers a fundamental charac- teristic of force and is founded on the sound principle that all 28 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE agency is nothing else than relations between those entities which are among the ultimate data of science. The law is, Action and reaction are equal and opposite. This means that there must be particles p1 ', p", p'" , etc. to whose agency (Xap, Y^ Zap) are due, and that we can write J\. ap == •**• app' i •**• app" T" • Yap == Yapp' + Yapp" +• Zap == Zapp' i Zapp" "T" •••< where (Xapp't Yapp', Zapp') is due to p' alone, (Xapp», Yapp", Zapp") to p" alone, and so on. Furthermore let the particle p' be at (xa',ya, %a) and (#'ap', y'ap', z'ap) be the acceleration of/)'. Also let (Xap', Yap', Zap>) be the force on p' ; and let Xap'p, Yap'p, etc. have meanings for p9 analogous to those which Xapp', etc. have for p. Then according to the third law the two forces (Xapp'i Yapp', Zapp') and (Aap-p, I ap'pt Zap'p) are equal and opposite, namely they are equal in magnitude, opposite in direction, and along the line joining p and />'. These requirements issue in two sets of equations •**-app' T -&ap'p — O; •* app' ~r -* ap'p == O> ^app' ~r ^ap'p == O ^3^ and (yaZapp' - Za Yapp') + (j'a'^ap'p - *a' ^ap'p) = O, . . .(4) with two analogous equations. The two equal and opposite forces on p and />', due to their mutual direct agency, namely, \Xapp', Yapp', Zapp) and (Xap'p, Yap'p, Zap'p), together constitute what is called a * stress between/) and/)'/ Thus the third law of motion falls into three parts, symbolised by the three sets of equations (2), (3) and (4). The set (2) ex- presses that all force on matter is due to stresses between it and other ma'tter; and sets (3) and (4) express the two funda- mental characteristics of stresses. We need not stop to enquire whether the short verbal expression of the law logically expresses these three properties. This is a minor point of exposition dependent on the context in which this formulation of the law is found. APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER II MAXWELL'S EQUATIONS It will be convenient to state these equations in the slightly modified form which is due to Lorentz. Space is referred to the fixed rectangular axis system a, as in subarticle 6-1. It will be necessary to explain a few small points of nomenclature and notation. A vector is a directed physical quantity; for example, the electric force at a point is a vector. This example also shows that we have to conceive vectors which have analogous signi- fications at different points of space. Such a vector is the electric force which may have a distinct magnitude and direction at each point of space, but expresses at all points one definite physical fact. Such a vector will be a function of its position, that is to say, of the coordinates of the point (xa, ya, za) of which it is that characteristic vector. Let (Xa., Ya, Za) be any such vector. Then Xa and Ya and Za are each of them functions of (xa, ya, za) and also of the time /a, i.e. they are functions of xat ya, Za, ta. We shall assume that our physical quantities are differentiable, except possibly at exceptional points. Let q(Xa, Ya, Za) stand for (qXa> qYa, qZa), and analogously d(X Y Z^for (dXa ^ ( °" a' a) ' i j* /v T7 *7\r U-A-a , ^ -* a . u^a also diva (*a, Ya, Z.) for _ + -^ + g- and curia (Xa, Ya, Za) for the vector _ dya dza ' dza dxa ' dxa dya ' Finally if (Xa' ', Ya'> Za') be another vector at the same point, then [(x*', Ya!, Za') . (Xa, Ya, Zfl)] 3o I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE stands for what is called the ' vector product* of the two vectors, namely the vector ( Y a Za — Za *a > Za ^-a — ^a Za > -^-a Y a. — Ya Xa). It is evident that curla (Xa, Ya, Za) can be expressed in the symbolic form The vector equation (Xa, Ya, Za) = (Xa , Y a , Za') is an abbreviation of the three equations V" __ V ' V — V ' 7 _ 7 ' ^a — ^a • Let (Fa, Ga, ^fa) be the electric force at (xa, ya, za, ta)t and let (Ltt, Ma, Na) be the magnetic force at the same point and time. Also let pa be the volume density of the electric charge and (ua, va, wa) its velocity ; and let (Pa, Qa, Ra) be the ponderomotive force: all equally at (xa, ya, ^a, ^a). Finally let c be the velocity of light in vacua. Then Lorentz's form of Maxwell's equations is diVa(Fa, Ga, Ha) = p«, ..... ................. (l) diva(La, Ma, Na) = O, ..................... (2) Ma, Na) = - \ ^ (Fa, Ga, Ha) + pa («a, ^a, ^a) [ , (3) Fa, Ga, Ha) = -- ^- (La, Ma, 7Va), ......... (4) (Pa, Qa, Ra) = (Pa, Ga, ft) + [(ttB, ®«, »«) . (La, Ma, ATa)J. (5) It will be noted that each of the vector equations (3), (4), (5) stands for three ordinary equations, so that there are eleven equations in the five formulae. CHAPTER III SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 7. , Consentient Sets, j-i A traveller in a railway carriage sees a fixed point of the carriage. The way- side stationmaster knows that the traveller has been in fact observing a track of points reaching from London to Manchester. The stationmaster notes his station as fixed in the earth. A being in the sun conceives the station as exhibiting a track in space round the sun, and the railway carriage as marking out yet another track. Thus if space be nothing but relations between material bodies, points as simple entities disappear. For a point according to one type of observation is a track of points according to another type. Galileo and the Inquisition are only in error in the single affirmation in which they both agreed, namely that absolute position is a physical fact — the sun for Galileo and the earth for the Inquisition. 7-2 Thus each rigid body defines its own space, with its own points, its own lines, and its own surfaces. Two bodies may agree in their spaces; namely, what is a point for either may be a point for both. Also if a third body agrees with either, it will agree with both. The complete set of bodies, actual or hypothetical, which agree in their space-formation will be called a * con- sentient' set. The relation of a ' dissentient ' body to the space of a consentient set is that of motion through it. The dissentient body will itself belong to another con- sentient set. Every body of this second set will have a 32 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE motion in the space of the first set which has the same general spatial characteristics as every other body of the second consentient set; namely (in technical lan- guage) it will at any instant be a screw motion with the same axis, the same pitch and the same intensity— in short the same screw-motion for all bodies of the second set. Thus we will speak of the motion of one consentient set in the space of another consentient set. For example such a motion may be translation without rotation, and the translation may be uniform or ac- celerated. 7-3 Now observers in both consentient sets agree as to what is happening. From different standpoints in nature they both live through the same events, which in their entirety are all that there is in nature. The traveller and the stationmaster both agree as to the existence of a certain event — for the traveller it is the passage of the station past the train, and for the station- master it is the passage of the train past the station. The two sets of observers merely diverge in setting the same events in different frameworks of space and (according to the modern doctrine) also of time. This spatio-temporal framework is not an arbitrary convention. Classification is merely an indication of characteristics which are already there. For example, botanical classification by stamens and pistils and petals applies to flowers, but not to men. Thus the space of the consentient set is a fact of nature ; the traveller with the set only discovers it. 8. Kinematic Relations. 8-1 The theory of relative motion is the comparison of the motion of a consentient set )8 in the space of a consentient set a with the motion of a in the space of /?. This involves a preliminary SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 33 comparison of the space of a with the space of /?. Such a comparison can only be made by reference to events which are facts common to all observers, thus showing the fundamental character of events in the formation of space and time. The ideally simple event is one in- definitely restricted both in spatial and in temporal extension, namely the instantaneous point. We will use the term 'event-particle' in the sense of 'instan- I > taneous point-event.' The exact meaning of the ideal V restriction in extension of an event-particle will be investigated in Part III; here we will assume that the concept has a determinate signification. 8-2 An , event-particle occupies instantaneously a certain point in the space of a and a certain point in the space of /?. Thus instantaneously there is a certain correlation between the points of the space of a and the points of the space of p. Also if the particle has the character of material at rest at the point in the space of a, this material-particle has a certain velocity in the space of fi ; and if it be material at rest at the point in the space of 0, the material-particle has a certain velocity in the space of a. The direction in £-space of the velocity due to rest in the correlated a-point is said to be opposite to the direction in a-space of the velocity due to rest in the correlated /?-point. Also with con- gruent units of space and of time, the measures of the velocities are numerically equal. The consequences of these fundamental facts are investigated in Part III. The relation of the a-space to the £-space which is expressed by the velocities at points in a-space due to rest in the points of /?-space and by the opposite velocities in £-space due to rest in the points of a-space is called the 'kinematic relation* / w. 3 34 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE between the two consentient sets, or between the two spaces. 83 The simplest form of this kinematic relation between a pair of consentient sets is when the motion of either set in the space of the other is a uniform trans- lation without acceleration and without rotation. Such a kinematic relation will be called^ 'simple/ If a con- sentient group a has a simple kinematic relation to each of two consentient sets, 0 and y, then £ and y have a simple kinematic relation to each other. In technical logical language a simple kinematic relation is sym- metrical and transitive. The whole group of consentient sets with simple kine- matic relations to any one consentient set, including that set itself, is called a * simple' group of consentient sets. The kinematic relation is called * translatory ' when the relative motion does not involve rotation; namely, it is a translation but not necessarily uniform. 8-4 The fact that the relational theory of space in- volves that each consentient set has its own space with its own peculiar points is ignored in the traditional presentation of physical science. The reason is that the absolute theory of space is not really abandoned, and the relative motion, which is all that can be ob- served, is treated as the differential effect of two absolute motions. 8*5 In the enunciation of Newton's Laws of Motion, the velocities and accelerations of particles must be supposed to refer to the space of some given consentient set. Evidently the acceleration of a particle is the same in all the spaces of a simple group of consentient sets — at least this has hitherto been the unquestioned as- sumption. Recently this assumption has been ques- SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 35 tioned and does not hold in the new theory of relativity. Its axiomatic obviousness only arises from the covert assumption of absolute space. In the new theory Newton's equations themselves require some slight modification which need not be considered at this stage of the discussion. In either form, their traditional form or their modified form, Newton's equations single out one and only one simple group of consentient sets, and require that the motions of matter be referred to the space of any one of these sets. If the proper group be chosen the third law of action and reaction holds. But if the laws hold for one simple group, they cannot hold for any other such group. For the apparent forces on particles cannot then be analysed into reciprocal stresses in the space of any set not a member of the original simple group. Let the simple group for which the laws do hold be called the * Newtonian' group. 8-6 Then, for example, if a consentient set a have a non-uniform translator^ kinematic relation to mem- bers of the Newtonian group, the particles of the material universe would, when their motions are referred to the a-space, appear to be acted on by forces parallel to a fixed direction, in the same sense along that direction, and proportional to the mass of the particle acted on. Such an assemblage of forces cannot be expressed as an assemblage of reciprocal stresses be- tween particles. Again if a consentient set ft have a non-translatory kinematic relation to the members of the Newtonian group, then, when motion is referred to the /?-space, ' centrifugal ' and ' composite centrifugal ' forces on particles make their appearance; and these forces cannot be reduced to stresses. 3—2 36 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE 87 The physical consequences of this result are best seen by taking a particular case. The earth is rotating and its parts are held together by their mutual gravi- tational attractions. The result is that the figure bulges at the equator; and, after allowing for the deficiencies of our observational knowledge, the results of theory and experiment are in fair agreement. The dynamical theory of this investigation does not depend on the existence of any material body other than the earth. Suppose that the rest of the material universe were annihilated, or at least any part of it which is visible to our eye-sight. Why not? For after all there is a very small volume of visible matter com- pared to the amount of space available for it. So there is no reason to assume anything very essential in the existence of a few planets and a few thousand stars. We are left with the earth rotating. But rotating relatively to what ? For on the relational theory it would seem to be the mutual relations of the earth's parts which constitute space. And yet the dynamical theory of the bulge does not refer to any body other than the earth, and so is not affected by the catastrophe of annihilation. It has been asserted that after all the fixed stars are essential, and that it is the rotation relatively to them which produces the bulge. But surely this ascription of the centrifugal force on the earth's surface to the influence of Sirius is the last refuge of a theory in distress. The point is that the physical properties, size, and distance of Sirius do not seem to matter. The more natural deduction (on the theory of Newtonian relativity) is to look on the result as evidence that the theory of any empty space is an essential impossibility. Accordingly the absoluteness of SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 37 direction is evidence for the existence of the material ether. This result only reinforces a conclusion which has already been reached on other grounds. Thus space expresses mutual relations of the parts of the ether, as well as of the parts of the earth. 9. Motion through the Ether. 9-1 The existence of the material ether should discriminate between the consentient sets of the Newtonian group. For one such set will be at rest relatively to the ether, and the remaining sets will be moving through it with definite velocities. It becomes a problem to discover pheno- mena dependent on such velocities. Can any phenomena be detected which are unequi- vocally due to a quasi-absolute motion of the earth through the ether? For this purpose we must put aside phenomena which depend on the differential velocities of two bodies of matter, e.g. the earth and a planet, or a star. For such phenomena are evidently primarily due to the relative velocity of the two bodies to each other, and the velocities relatively to the ether only arise as a hypothetical intermediate explanatory analysis. We require phenomena concerned solely with the earth, which are modified by the earth's motion through the ether without reference to any other matter. We have already concluded that the bulging of the earth at the equator is one such required instance, unless indeed (with Newton) we assume absolute space. 9-2 The effects on the observed light due to the relative motions of the emitting body and the receiving body are various and depend in part on the specific nature of the assumed disturbances which constitute light. Some of these effects have been observed, for example, aberration and the effect on the spectrum 38 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE due to the motion of the emitting body in the line of sight. Aberration is the apparent change in the direc- tion of the luminous body due to the motion of the receiving body. The motion of the luminous body in the line of sight should alter the wave length of the emitted light due to molecular vibrations of given periodicity. In other words, it should alter the quality of the light due to such vibrations. These are the effects which have been observed, but they are of the type which we put aside as not relevant to our purpose owing to the fact that the observed effect ultimately depends merely on the relative motion of the emitting and receiving bodies. 9-3 There are effects on interference fringes which we should expect to be due to the motion of the earth. In six months the velocity of the earth in its orbit is reversed. So that such effects as the earth's motion produces in the interference fringes of a certain purely terrestrial apparatus at one time can be compared with the corresponding effects in the same apparatus which it produces after the lapse of six months and — as the experiments have been carried out — the differences should have been easily discernible. No such differences have been observed. The effects, which are thus sought for, depend on no special theory of the nature of the luminous disturbance in the ether. They should result from the simple fact of the wave disturbance, and the magnitude .of its velocity relatively to the apparatus. It will be observed that the difficulty which arises from the absence of this predicted effect does not dis- criminate in any way between the philosophic theories of absolute or of relative space. The effect should arise SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 39 from the motion of the earth relatively to the ether, and there is such relative motion whichever of the alternative spatial theories be adopted. 9-4 Electromagnetic phenomena are also implicated in the theory of relative motion. Maxwell's equations of the electromagnetic field hold in respect to these phenomena an analogous position to that occupied by Newton's equations of motion for the explanation of the motion of matter. They differ from Newton's equations very essentially in their relation to the prin- ciple of relativity. Newton's equations single out no special member of the Newtonian group to which they specially apply. They are invariant for the spatio- temporal transformations from one such set to another within the Newtonian group. But Maxwell's electromagnetic equations are not thus invariant for the Newtonian group. The result is that they must be construed as referring to one par- ticular consentient set of this group. It is natural to suppose that this particular assumption arises from the fact that the equations refer to the physical properties of a stagnant ether ; and that accordingly the consentient set presupposed in the equations is the consentient set of this ether. The ether is identified with the ether whose wave disturbances constitute light ; and further- more there are practically conclusive reasons for believing light to be merely electromagnetic disturb- ances which are governed by Maxwell's equations. The motion of the earth through the ether affects other electromagnetic phenomena in addition to those known to us as light. Such effects, as also in the case of light, would be very small and difficult to observe. But the effect on the capacity of a condenser of the 4o I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE six-monthly reversal of the earth's velocity should under proper conditions be observable. This is known as Trouton's experiment. Again, as in the analogous case of light, no such effect has been observed. 9-5 The explanation [the Fitzgerald-Lorentz hypo- thesis] of these failures to observe expected effects has been given, that matter as it moves through ether automatically readjusts its shape so that its lengths in the direction of motion are altered in a definite ratio dependent on its velocity. The null results of the experiments are thus completely accounted for, and the material ether evades the most obvious method of testing its existence. If matter is thus strained by its passage through ether, some effect on its optical pro- perties due to the strains might be anticipated. Such effects have been sought for, but not observed. Ac- cordingly with the assumption of an ether of material the negative results of the various experiments are ex- plained by an ad hoc hypothesis which appears to be related to no other phenomena in nature. 9-6 There is another way in which the motion of matter may be balanced (so to speak) against the velocity of light. Fizeau experimented on the passage of light through translucent moving matter, and obtained results which Fresnel accounted for by multiplying the refractive index of the moving medium by a co- efficient dependent on its velocity. This is Fresnel's famous 'coefficient of drag.' He accounted for this coefficient by assuming that as the material medium in its advance sucks in the ether, it condenses it in a proportion dependent on the velocity. It might be expected that any theory of the relations of matter to SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 41 ether, either an ether of material or an ether of events, would explain also this coefficient of drag. ]Q. Formulae for Relative Motion. 10-1 In trans- forming the equations of motion from the space of one member of the Newtonian group to the space of another member of that group, it must be remembered that the facts which are common to the two standpoints are the events, and that the ideally simple analysis exhibits events as dissected into collections of event- particles. Thus if a and p be the two consentient sets, the points of the a-space are distinct from the points of the £-space, but the same event-particle e is at the point Pa at the time Ta in the a-space and is at the point Pp at the time Tp in the £-space. With the covert assumption of absolute space which is habitual in the traditional outlook, it is tacitly as- sumed that Pa and Pp are the same point and that there is a common time and common measurement of time which are the same for all consentient sets. The first assumption is evidently very badly founded and cannot easily be reconciled to the nominal scientific creed ; the second assumption seems to embody a deeply rooted experience. The corresponding formulae of trans- formation which connect the measurements of space, velocity, and acceleration in the a-system for space and time with the corresponding measurements in the jS-system certainly are those suggested by common sense and in their results they agree very closely with the result of careful observation. These formulae are the ordinary formulae of dynamical treatises. For such transformations the Newtonian equations are invariant within the Newtonian group. 10-2 But, as we have seen, this invariance, with these 42 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE formulae for transformation, does not extend to Max- well's equations for the electromagnetic field. The conclusion is that — still assuming these formulae for transformation — Maxwell's equations apply to the electromagnetic field as referred to one particular consentient set of the Newtonian group. It is natural to suppose that this set should be that one with respect to which the stagnant ether is at rest. Namely, stating the same fact conversely, the stagnant ether defines this consentient set. There would be no difficulty about this conclusion except for the speculative character of the material ether, and the failure to detect the evidences of the earth's motion through it. This consentient set defined by the ether would for all practical purposes define absolute space. 10-3 There are however other formulae of trans- formation from the space and time measurements of set a to the space and time measurements of set j8 for which Maxwell's equations are invariant. These for- mulae were discovered first by Lannor for uncharged regions of the field and later by Lorentz for the general case of regions charged or uncharged. Larmor and Lorentz treated their discovery from its formal mathe- matical side. This aspect of it is important. It enables us, when we thoroughly understand the sequence of events in one electromagnetic field, to deduce innumer- able other electromagnetic fields which will be under- stood equally well. All mathematicians will appreciate what an advance in knowledge this constitutes. But Lorentz also pointed out that if these formulae for transformation could be looked on as the true formulae for transformation from one set to another of the Newtonian group, then all the unsuccessful experiments SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 43 to detect the earth's motion through the ether could be explained. Namely, the results of the experiments are such as theory would predict. 10-4 The general reason for this conclusion was given by Einstein in a theorem of the highest importance. He proved that the Lorentzian formulae of transfor- mation from one consentient set to another of the Newtonian group — from set a to set £ — are the neces- sary and sufficient conditions that motion with the one particular velocity c (the velocity of light in vacua) in one of the sets, a or 0, should also appear as motion with the same magnitude c in the other set, $ or a. The phenomena of aberration will be preserved owing to the relation between the directions of the velocity expressing the movements in a-space and /2-space respectively. This preservation of the magnitude of a special velocity (however directed) cannot arise with the traditional formulae for relativity. It practically means that waves or other influences advancing with velocity c as referred to the space of any consentient set of the Newtonian group will also advance with the same velocity c as referred to the space of any other such set. 10-5 At first sight the two formulae for trans- formation, namely the traditional formulae and the Lorentzian formulae, appear to be very different. We notice however that, if a and j8 be the two consentient sets and if V^ be the velocity of j8 in the a-space and of a in the £-space, the differences between the two formulae all depend upon the square of the ratio of Vap to c, where c is the velocity of light in vacuo, and are negligible in proportion to the smallness of this number. For ordinary motions, even planetary motions, this 44 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE ratio is extremely small and its square is smaller still. Accordingly the differences between the two formulae would not be perceptible under ordinary circumstances. In fact the effect of the difference would only be per- ceived in those experiments, already discussed, whose results have been in entire agreement with the Lorentz- ian formulae. The conclusion at once evokes the suggestion that the Lorentzian formulae are the true formulae for transformation from the space and time relations of a consentient set a to those of a consentient set j8, both sets belonging to the Newtonian group. We may suppose that, owing to bluntness of perception, mankind has remained satisfied with the Newtonian formulae which are a simplified version of the true Lorentzian relations. This is the conclusion that Einstein has urged. O Fig. 2. 10-6 These Lorentzian formulae for transformation involve two consequences which are paradoxical if we covertly assume absolute space and absolute time. Let a and j8 be two consentient sets of the Newtonian group. Let an event-particle P happen at the point Pa in the a-space and at the point Pp in the £-space, and let another event-particle Q happen at points Qa and Qp in the two spaces respectively. Then according to the traditional scientific outlook, Pa and Pp are not dis- criminated from each other ; and similarly for Qa andjj^. Thus evidently the distance PaQa is (on this theory) SCIENTIFIC RELATIVITY 45 equal to PpQp, because in fact they are symbols for the same distance. But if the true distinction between the a-space and the ^-space is kept in mind, including the fact that the points in the two spaces are radically distinct, the equality of the distances PaQa and PpQp is not so obvious. According to the Lorentzian for- mulae such corresponding distances in the two spaces will not in general be equal. The second consequence of the Lorentzian formulae involves a more deeply rooted paradox which concerns our notions of time. If the two event-particles P and O happen simultaneously when referred to the points Pa and Qa in the a-space, they will in general not happen simultaneously when referred to the points Pp and Qp in the £-space. This result of the Lorentzian formulae contradicts the assumption of one absolute time, and makes the time-system depend on the consentient set which is adopted as the standard of reference. Thus there is an a-tima»as well as an a-space, and a /?-time as well as a /S-space. 10-7 The explanation of the similarities and differ- ences between spaces and times derived from different consentient sets of the Newtonian group, and of the fact of there being a Newtonian group at all, will be derived in Parts II and III of this enquiry from a con- sideration of the general characteristics of our percep- tive knowledge of nature, which is our whole knowledge of nature. In seeking such an explanation one principle may be laid down. Time and space are among the fundamental physical facts yielded by our knowledge of the external world. We cannot rest content with any theory of them which simply takes mathematical equations involving four variables (x, y, z> t) and 46 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE interprets (x, y, z) as space coordinates and t as a measure of time, merely on the ground that some (physical law is thereby expressed. This is not an inter- pretation of what we mean by space and time. What we mean are physical facts expressible in terms of im- mediate perceptions; and it is incumbent on us to produce the perceptions of those facts as the meanings of our terms. Einstein has interpreted the Lorentzian formulae in terms of what we will term the 'message' theory, discussed in the next chapter. 47 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III Let a and ($ be two consentient sets of the Newtonian group. Let (OaXaYaZa) be the rectangular axis system in the space of «, and (Ofi'Xp F/Z/) be the rectangular axis system in the space of f$. First consider the traditional theory of relativity. Then the time-system is independent of the consentient set of reference. Fig. 3- At the time t let the event-particle which instantaneously happens at the point Oa in the space of a happen at Op in the space of j8, and let the event-particle which happens at Op in the space of j8 happen at Oa' in the space of a. Let the axis OaXa be in the direction of the motion of ft in the a-space, and the axis Op'Xp be in the direction reversed of the motion of a in the /?-space. Also let O/ be so chosen that Oa' lies on OaXa. Then the event-particles at the instant t which happen on OaXa are the event-particles which happen at the instant t onOp'Xp'. Also we choose OpY? and Op'Zp so that the event-particles which happen at time t on O/iy and O/Z/ respectively happen on straight lines in the a-space which are parallel to OaYa and OaZa. Let Fa/3 be the velocity of 0 in a-space and 48 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE Vpa be the velocity of a in /?-space. Then (with a suitable origin of time) V* + Vpa = o, ) OaOa'=00 wa) is the velocity of the charge at (xa, ya, %a) at the time ta. Also it immediately follows from formulae (5) that Hence (V + V + V-c8) and vanish together. This proves Einstein's theorem on the in- variance of the velocity £, so far as concerns the sufficiency of the Lorentzian formulae to produce that result. CHAPTER IV CONGRUENCE //. Simultaneity, n-i Einstein analysed the ideas of time-order and of simultaneity. Primarily (according to his analysis) time-order only refers to the succession of events at a given place. Accordingly each given place has its own time-order. But these time-orders are not independent in the system of nature, and their correlation is known to us by means of physical measure- ments. Now ultimately all physical measurement depends upon coincidence in time and place. If Pl and P2 be two places, the time-orders Ol and O2 which belong to P1 and P2 are correlated by observations of coincidences at Pl and at P2 respectively. Thus, confining ourselves to the two places P± and P2, there are two distinct processes of correlating the time- order of events throughout the universe, namely by a series of observations of coincidences at P± based on time-order O± and by a series of observations of coin- cidences at P2 based on time-order O2. These two processes are distinct and will only agree by some accident of special circumstance. 1 1 -2 What are the observations at P1 which will assign to an event at P2 a position in the time-order Ol ? Suppose some message — a wave disturbance, for ex- ample— starts from P1 when event el happens at Px, reaches P2 when event e2 happens at P2, and is immediately reflected so as to return to P1 when event £/' happens at Px. Now according to the method of time-measurement for Ox, there is an event 4—2 52 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE £/ which happens at mid-time between el and e± . Then, when certain conditions have been fulfilled, the event e2 at P2 is defined as simultaneous with the event e± at P! according to the method of correlation appro- priate to place Pj. In this way a time-order of events at P2 is derived solely from observation of coincidence at Px and is based solely on the fundamental time-order Oj at Pj. Thus the time-order at P1 is extended as a time-order for all events at all places. 11-3 There are questions which require elucidation before this definition can be understood. What is a place? We have chosen a vague term on purpose, so as to postpone its consideration until now. A place can only be marked by phenomena capable of recognition, for example the continued appearance of a material body. Thus we must construe Px and P2 to be the names of material bodies, or of persistent sets of circumstances which will serve the same purpose. In general Px and P2 will be in relative motion with respect to each other. What of the message which passes from P1 to P2 and back to Px? Its transmission must be uniform. Suppose the message travels with velocity c, that is, with the velocity of light in vacuo. Then, assuming the electromagnetic formulae for relativity, this velocity relative to Pj is independent (so far as its magnitude is concerned) of the velocity which we ascribe to Pt through space. 1 1 -4 Thus our recording body P3 can be any body at rest in some consentient set of the Newtonian group, and we reckon motion as relative to the space of this set. We send our message with the velocity of light in vacuo. Then, according to the local time-order Ox CONGRUENCE 53 at P19 the event e2 at P2 is simultaneous with the event £/ at Px. This definition of simultaneity in the local time-order at Px is independent of any assumption of absolute rest for Pl9 provided that the electromagnetic formulae for relativity are adopted. The local time- order at P1 is also in complete agreement with the local time-order at any body Ql which is rigidly connected with PI9 i.e. which belongs to the same consentient set. 1 1 '5 The reason why the velocity of light has been adopted as the standard velocity in the definition of simultaneity is because the negative results of the ex- periments to determine the earth's motion require that this velocity, which is the ' c' of Maxwell's equations, should have this property. Also light signals are after all our only way of detecting distant events. Certainly, once granting the idea of time-order being a local affair connected with a specific body P19 the acceptance of the electromagnetic formula connecting ta and tp is a slight affair. There is no presumption against it, once granting the conception of diverse time-orders which had not hitherto been thought of. 1 1 -6 But there are certain objections to the accept- ance of Einstein's definition of simultaneity, the 'signal-theory' as we will call it. In the first place light signals are very important elements in our lives, but still we cannot but feel that the signal-theory somewhat exaggerates their position. The very meaning of simultaneity is made to depend on them. There are blind people and dark cloudy nights, and neither blind people nor people in the dark are deficient in a sense of simultaneity. They know quite well what it means to bark both their shins at the same instant. In fact 54 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE the determination of simultaneity in this way is never made, and if it could be made would not be accurate ; for we live in air and not in vacuo. Also there are other physical messages from place to place; there is the transmission of material bodies, the transmission of sound, the transmission of waves and ripples on the surface of water, the transmission of nerve excitation through the body, and innumerable other forms which enter into habitual experience. The trans- mission of light is only one form among many. Furthermore local time does not concern one material particle only. The same definition of simultaneity holds throughout the whole space of a consentient set in the Newtonian group. The message theory does not ac- count for the consentience in time-reckoning which characterises a consentient set, nor does it account for the fundamental position of the Newtonian group. 12. Congruence and Recognition. 12-1 Again the theory that measurement is essentially coincidence re- quires severe qualification. For if it were true only coincident things, coincident both in time and space, could be equal, yet measurement can only be of the slightest importance in so far as some other element not coincidence enters into it. Let us take a simple example. Two footrules are placed together and are found to coincide. Then at the moment of coincidence they are equal in length. But what is the use of that information ? We want to use one rule to-morrow in London and the other rule a week hence in Manchester, and to know that the stuffs which they measure are of equal length. Now we know that, provided they are made of certain sorts of material (luckily, materials easy to procure) and treated CONGRUENCE 55 with certain precautions (luckily, precautions easy to observe), the footrules will not have altered their lengths to any extent which can be detected. But that means a direct judgment of constancy. Without such a judg- ment in some form or other, measurement becomes trivial. 12-2 It may be objected that whenever the footrules are brought together, or when stuffs measured by them are brought together, the coincidences will be observed ; and that this is all we need for the importance of measurement. But the coincidences will not be observed unless the circumstances of the various experiments are suffi- ciently uniform. The stuffs must be under the same tension or at the same temperatures as on previous occasions. Sooner or later and somehow or other a judgment of constancy, that is, of the preservation of property, is required. Ultimately this judgment reposes upon direct common sense; namely, obviously the foot- rule is of good stiff material and has not perceptibly changed amid slight differences of circumstance. The coincidences which can easily be obtained between lengths of elastic thread inspire no such beliefs, because evidently the thread has been stretched. 12-3 Again, in Einstein's own example, there is the direct judgment of the uniformity of conditions for the uniform transmission of light. Thus any ordinary event among the fixed stars does not affect this uniformity for the transmission from the sun to the earth. Apart from such presuppositions, so obvious that they do not enter into consciousness, the whole theory collapses. 12-4 These judgments of constancy are based on an 56 I. THE TRADITIONS OF SCIENCE immediate comparison of circumstances at different times and at different places. Such judgments are not infallible and are capable of being tested under certain circumstances. For example it may be judged that two footrules would coincide if they were brought together ; and this experiment can be made, and the judgment tested. The rejection of an immediate judgment of constancy is no paradox. There are differences between any dis- tinct sets of circumstances, and it is always possible that these differences cut deeper than we have per- ceived so as to produce unsuspected divergences of properties. But a judgment of constancy is recognition, and re- cognition is the source of all our natural knowledge. Accordingly though isolated judgments may be rejected, it is essential that a rational consideration of nature should assume the truth of the greater part of such judgments and should issue in theories which embody them. 12-5 This recognition of congruity between distinct circumstances has no especial connection with coin- cidence and extends far beyond the mere judgments of time and space. Thus judgments of the matching of colours can be made without coincidence by most people to some slight extent, and by some people with surprising accuracy. It may be urged that only in the case of judgments of spatial and temporal coincidence can great accuracy be obtained. This may be true; but complete accuracy is never obtained, and the ideal of accuracy shows that the meaning is not derived from the measurement. Our recognitions are the ultimate facts of nature for science, and the whole scientific CONGRUENCE 57 theory is nothing else than an attempt to systematise our knowledge of the circumstances in which such recognitions will occur. The theory of congruence is one branch of the more general theory of recognitions. Another branch is the theory of objects which is con- sidered in the next part of this enquiry. PART II THE DATA OF SCIENCE CHAPTER V THE NATURAL ELEMENTS 13. The Diversification of Nature. 13-1 Our per- ceptual knowledge of nature consists in the breaking up of a whole which is the subject matter of perceptual experience, or is the given presentation which is ex- perience— or however else we prefer to describe the ultimate experienced fact. This whole is discriminated as being a complex of related entities, each entity having determinate qualities and relations and being a subject concerning which our perceptions, either directly or indirectly, afford definite information. This process of breaking up the subject matter of experience into a complex of entities will be called the * diversification of nature.' % 13-2 This diversification of nature is performed in different ways, according to different procedures which yield different analyses of nature into component entities. It is not merely that one mode of diversification of nature is incomplete and leaves out some entities which another mode supplies. The entities which are yielded by different modes of diversification are radi- cally different ; and it is the neglect of this distinction between the entities of complexes produced by different modes of diversification which has produced so much confusion in the principles of natural knowledge. 6o II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE There are an indefinite number of types of entity disclosed in this diversification. An attempt in this enquiry to trace the subtlety of nature would only blur the main argument. Accordingly we confine attention to five modes of diversification which are chiefly im- portant in scientific theory. These types of entities are: (i) events, (ii) percipient objects, (iii) sense-objects, (iv) perceptual objects, (v) scientific objects. These are five radically distinct types of entities yielded by five distinct procedures; and their only common quality as entities is that they are all alike subjects yielded for our knowledge by our perceptions of nature. 13-3 The entities which are the product of any one mode of diversification of nature will be called elements, or aspects, of nature; each such entity is one natural element. Thus each mode of diversification produces natural elements of a type peculiar to itself. One mode of diversification is not necessarily more abstract than another. Objects can be looked on as qualities of events, and events as relations between objects, or — more usefully — we can drop the meta- physical and difficult notion of inherent qualities and consider the elements of different types as bearing to each other relations. There are accordingly two main genera of relations to be distinguished, namely ' homogeneous ' relations which relate among themselves natural elements of the same type, and * heterogeneous ' relations which relate natural elements of different types. 13-4 Another way of considering the diversification of nature is to emphasise primarily the relations between natural elements. Thus those elements are what is perceived in nature as thus related. In other words the THE NATURAL ELEMENTS 61 relations are treated as fundamental and the natural eleriients are introduced as in their capacity of relata. But of course this is merely another mode of expression, since relations and relata imply each other. 14. Events. 14*1 Events are the relata of the funda- mental homogeneous relation of * extension.' Every event extends over other events which are parts of itself, and every event is extended over by other events of which it is part. The externality of nature is the outcome of this relation of extension. Two events are mutually external, or are * separate/ if there fe no event which is part of both. Time and space both spring from the relation of extension. Their derivation will be con- sidered in detail in subsequent parts of this enquiry. It follows that time and space express relations between events. Other natural elements which are not events are only in time and space derivatively, namely, by reason of their relations to events. Great confusion has been caused to the philosophy of science by this neglect of the derivative nature of the spatial and tem- poral relations of objects of various types. 14-2 The relation of extension exhibits events as actual — as matters of fact — by means of its properties which issue in spatial relations; and it exhibits events as involving the becomingness of nature — its passage or creative advance — by means of its properties which issue in temporal relations. Thus events are essentially elements of actuality and elements of becomingness. An actual event is thus divested of all possibility. It is what does become in nature. It can never happen again; for essentially it is just itself, there and then. An event is just what it is, and is just how it is related and it is nothing else. Any event, however similar, with different 62 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE relations is another event. There is no element of hypothesis in any actual event. There are imaginary events — or, rather, imaginations of events — but there is nothing actual about such events, except so far as imagination is actual. Time and space, which are entirely actual and devoid of any tincture of possibility, are to be sought for among the relations of events. 14-3 Events never change. Nature develops, in the sense that an event e becomes part of an event e' which includes (i.e. extends over) e and also extends into the futurity beyond e. Thus in a sense the event e does change, namely, in its relations to the events which were not and which become actual in the creative advance of nature. The change of an event £, in this meaning of the term 'change/ will be called the 'passage' of e\ and the word 'change' will not be used in this sense. Thus we say that events pass but do not change. The passage of an event is its passing into some other event which is not it. An event in passing becomes part of larger events ; and thus the passage of events is extension in the making. The terms ' the past,' ' the present,' and ' the future' refer to events. The irrevocableness of the past is the unchangeability of events. An event is what it is, when it is, and where it is. Externality and extension are the marks of events ; an event is there and not here [or, here and not there], it is then and not now [or, now and not then] , it is part of certain wholes and is a whole extending over certain parts. 15. Objects. 15-1 Objects enter into experience by recognition and without recognition experience would divulge no objects. Objects convey the permanences recognised in events, and are recognised as self-identical THE NATURAL ELEMENTS 63 amid different circumstances; that is to say, the same object is recognised as related to diverse events. Thus the self-identical object maintains itself amid the flux of events : it is there and then, and it is here and now ; and the 'it' which has its being there and here, then and now, is without equivocation the same subject for thought in the various judgments which are made upon it. 15-2 The change of an object is the diverse relation- ships of the same object to diverse events. The object is permanent, because (strictly speaking) it is without time and space; and its change is merely the variety of its relations to the various events which are passing in time and in space. This passage of events in time and space is merely the exhibition of the relations of extension which events bear to each other, combined with the directional factor in time which expresses that ultimate becomingness which is the creative advance of nature. These extensional relations of events are analysed in later parts of this enquiry. But here we merely make clear that change in objects is no deroga- tion from their permanence, and expresses their relation to the passage of events; whereas events are neither permanent nor do they change. Events (in a sense) are space and time, namely, space and time are abstrac- tions from events. But objects are only derivatively in space and time by reason of their relations to events. 15-3 The ways in which events and objects enter into experience are distinct. Events are lived through, they extend around us. They are the medium within which our physical experience develops, or, rather, they are themselves the development of that experience. The facts of life are the events of life. 64 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE Objects enter into experience by way of the intellect- uality of recognition. This does not mean that every object must have been known before; for in that case there never could have been a first knowledge. We must rid our imagination of the fallacious concept of the present as instantaneous. It is a duration, or stretch of time ; and the primary recognition of an object consists of the recognition of its permanence amid the partial events of the duration which is present. Its recognition is carried beyond the present by means -of recollection and memory. Rational thought which is the comparison of event with event would be intrinsically impossible without objects. 15-4 Objects and events are only waveringly dis- criminated in common thought. Whatever is purely matter of fact is an event. Whenever the concept of possibility can apply to a natural element, that element is an object. Namely, objects have the possibility of recurrence in experience: we can conceive imaginary circumstances in which a real object might occur. The essence of an object does not depend on its relations, which are external to its being. It has in fact certain relations to other natural elements ; but it might (being the same object) have had other relations. In other words, its self -identity is not wholly dependent on its relations. But an event is just what it is, and is just how it is related; and it is nothing else. Thus objects lack the fixedness of relations which events possess, and thus time and space could never be a direct expression of their essential relations. Two objects have (by the mediation of events) all the mutual space relations which they do have throughout their THE NATURAL ELEMENTS 65 existence, and might have many which they do not have. Thus two objects, being what they are, have no neces- sary temporal and spatial relations which are essential to their individualities. 15-5 The chief confusion between objects and events is conveyed in the prejudice that an object can only be in one place at a time. That is a fundamental property of events ; and whenever that property appears axiom- atic as holding of some physical entity, that entity is an event. It must be remembered however that ordinary thought wavers confusedly between events and objects, It is the misplacement of this axiom from events to- objects which has wrecked the theory of natural objects. 15*6 It is an error to ascribe parts to objects, where 4 part' here means spatial or temporal part. The erroneousness of such ascription immediately follows from the premiss that primarily an object is not in space or in time. The absence of temporal parts of objects is a commonplace of thought. No one thinks that part of a stone is at one time and another part of the stone is at another time. The same stone is at both times, in the sense in which the stone is existing at those times (if it be existing). But spatial parts are in a different category, and it is natural to think of various parts of a stone, simultaneously existing. Such a con- ception confuses the stone as an object with the event which exhibits the actual relations of the stone within nature. It is indeed very natural to ascribe spatial parts to a stone, for the reason that a stone is an instance of a perceptual object. These objects are the objects of common life, and it is very difficult precisely to discern such an object in the events with which it has its most w. 5 / 66 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE obvious relations. The struggle to make precise the concept of these objects either forces us back to the sense-objects or forward to the scientific objects. The difficulty is chiefly one of making thought clear. That there is a perception of an object with self -identity, is shown by the common usage of mankind. Indeed these perceptual objects forced upon mankind — and seemingly also on animals, unless it be those of the lowest type — their knowledge of the objectified char- acter of nature. But the confusion of the object, which is a unity, with the events, which have parts, is always imminent. In biological organisms the character of the organism as an object is more clear. 15-7 The fundamental rule is that events have parts and that — except in a derivative sense, from their relations to events — objects have no parts. On the other hand the same object can be found in different parts of space and time, and this cannot hold for events. Thus the identity of an object may be an important physical fact, while the identity of an event is essentially a trivial logical necessity. Thus the prisoner in the dock may be the man who did the deed. But the deed lies in the irrevocable past ; only the allegation of it is before the court and perhaps (in some countries) a reconstitution of the crime. Essentially the very deed itself is never there. 15-8 The continuity of nature is to be found in events, the atomic properties of nature reside in objects. The continuous ether is the whole complex of events ; and the atoms and molecules are scientific objects, which are entities of essentially different type to the events forming the ether. 15-9 This contrast in the ways we perceive events THE NATURAL ELEMENTS 67 and objects deserves a distinction in nomenclature. Accordingly, for want of better terms, we shall say that we 'apprehend' an event and 'recognise* an object. \ ^ To apprehend an event is to be aware of its passage as happening in that nature, which we each of us know as though it were common to all percipients. It is un- necessary for the purposes of science to consider the difficult metaphysical question of this community of nature to all. It is sufficient that, for the awareness of each, it is as though it were common to all, and that science is a body of doctrine true for this quasi-common nature which is the subject for the experience of each percipient; namely, science is true for each percipient. To recognise an object is to be aware of it in its specific relations to definite events in nature. Thus we refer the object to some events as its 'situations/ we connect it with other events as the locus from which it is being perceived, and we connect it with other events as conditions for such perception of it as in such situa- tions from such a locus of percipience. Accordingly in these (arbitrary) senses of the words we apprehend nature as continuous and we recognise it as atomic. 5—2 CHAPTER VI EVENTS 16. Apprehension of Events. 16-1 It is the purpose of this chapter to summarise the leading characteristics of our knowledge of nature as diversified into a complex of events. Perception is an awareness of events, or happenings, forming a partially discerned complex within the back- ground of a simultaneous whole of nature. This aware- ness is definitely related to one event, or group of events, within the discerned complex. This event is called the percipient event. The simultaneity of the whole of nature comprising the discerned events is the special relation of that background of nature to the percipient event. This background is that complete event which is the whole of nature simultaneous with the percipient event, which is itself part of that whole. Such a com- plete whole of nature is called a * duration.' A duration (in the sense in which henceforth the word will be used) is not an abstract stretch of time, and to that extent the term * duration ' is misleading. In perception the asso- ciated duration is apprehended as an essential element in the awareness, but it is not discriminated into all its parts and qualities. It is the complete subject matter for a discrimination which is only very partially performed. Thus the whole continuum of nature ' now-present * means one whole event (a duration), rendered definite by the limitation * now-present ' and extending over all events now-present. Namely, the various finite events now-present for an awareness are all parts of one asso- EVENTS 69 elated duration which is a special type of event. A duration is in a sense unbounded; for it is, within certain limitations, all that there is. It has the property of completeness, limited by the condition 'now- present'; it is a temporal slab of nature. 1 6-2 This fact of nature as a present- whole is forced on our apprehension by the character of perception. Perceptual awareness is complex. There are the various types of sense-perception, and differences in extensity and in intensity. There are also differences in attention and in consequent clearness of awareness, shading off into a dim knowledge of events barely on the threshold of consciousness. Thus nature, as we know it, is a con- tinuous stream of happening immediately present and partly dissected by our perceptual awareness into separated events with diverse qualities. Within this present stream the perceived is not sharply differen- tiated from the unperceived; there is always an in- definite ' beyond ' of which we feel the presence although we do not discriminate the qualities of the parts. This knowledge of what is beyond discriminating perception is the basis of the scientific doctrine of externality. There is a present-whole of nature of which our detailed knowledge is dim and mediate and inferential, but capable of determination by its congruity with clear immediate perceptual facts. 16-3 The condition * now-present ' specifies a par- ticular duration. It evidently refers to some relation; for 'now' is 'simultaneous with,' and 'present' is 'in the presence of ' or ' presented to.' Thus ' now-present ' refers to some relation between the duration and some- thing else. This 'something else' is the event 'here- present,' which is the definite connecting link between 7o II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE individual experienced knowledge and self-sufficient nature. The essential existence of the event 'here- present' is the reason why perception is from within nature and is not an external survey. It is the ' percipient event.' The percipient event defines its associated duration, namely its corresponding ' all nature.' 16-4 The 'here' in 'here-present' also refers to the specific relation between the percipient event and its associated duration. It means 'here within the dura- tion,' i.e. ' here within the present continuum of nature.' Thus the relation between an event ' here-present ' and its associated duration embodies in some form the property of rest in the duration; for otherwise 'here' would be an equivocation. The relation in any concrete case may be complex, involving more than one meaning of 'here,' but the essential character of the relation is that as we (according to the method of extensive abstraction) properly diminish the extent of such an event, the property of 'rest in' the associated duration becomes more obvious. When an event has the pro- perty of being a percipient event unequivocally here within an associated duration, we shall say that it is ' cogredient' with the duration. 16-5 An event can be cogredient with only one duration. To have this relation to the duration it must be temporally present throughout the duration and exhibit one specific meaning of 'here.' But a duration can have many events cogredient with it. Namely any event, which is temporally present throughout that duration and in relation to an event here-present defines one specific meaning of 'there,' is an event 'there- present ' which has the same relation of cogredience to that duration and (to that extent) is (so far) potentially EVENTS 71 an event ' here-present ' in that duration for some possible act of apprehension. Thus cogredience is a condition for a percipient event yielding unequivocal meanings to ' here ' and ' now.' The relation of cogredience presupposes that the duration extends over the event ; but the two relations must not be confounded. In the first place a duration extends over events which are not temporally present throughout it, so that the specification of the duration would not be a complete answer to the question ' When ?' as asked of the event. Secondly, the question ' Where ? ' which means ' Where in the duration?' may not be susceptible of the one definite answer ' There ' which is only possible if cogredience holds. The question ' Whither ? ' which contemplates change in the ' there ' of an event, definitely refers to events which are parts of a duration but are not cogredient with it. Cogredience is the relation of absolute position within a duration; we must remember that a duration is a slab of nature and not a mere abstract stretch of time. Cogredience is the relation which generates the consentient sets discussed in Chapter III of Part I. The details of the deduction belong to Part III. 16-6 It is not necessary to assume that there is one event which is the system of all nature throughout all time. For scientific purposes the only unbounded events are durations and these are bounded in their temporal extension. 17. The Constants of Externality, ij-i The 'con- stants of externality' are those characteristics of a perceptual experience which it possesses when we assign to it the property of being an observation of the passage of external nature, namely when we apprehend 72 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE it. A fact which possesses these characteristics, namely these constants of externality, is what we call an ' event.' A complete enumeration of these constants is not necessary for our purpose; we only need a survey of just those elements in the apprehension of externality from which the concepts of time, space and material arise. In this survey the attitude of mind to be avoided j is exhibited in the questions, ' How, being in space, \do we know it ? ' ' How, being in time, do we know it ? ' #nd 'How, having material, do we know of it? ' Again we are not considering a priori necessities, nor are we appealing to a priori principles in proof. We are merely investigating the characteristics which in experience we find belonging to perceived facts when we invest them with externality. The constants of externality are the conditions for nature, and deter- mine the ultimate concepts which are presupposed in science. 17-2 In order to enter upon this investigation from the standpoint of habitual experience, consider the simplest general questions which can be asked of a percipient of some event in nature, ' Which ?' 'What?' 'How?1 'When?' 'Where?' 'Whither?' These six questions fall into two sets. The first three invite specification of qualities and discrimination amid alter- native entities ; the remaining three refer to the spatio- temporal relation of a part to a whole within which in some sense the perceived part is located. They can be construed as referring to events or to objects. The former way of understanding them is evidently the more fundamental, for our awareness of nature is directly an awareness of events or happen- EVENTS 73 ings, which are the ultimate data of natural science. The conditions which determine the nature of events can only be furnished by other events, for there is nothing else in nature. A reference to objects is only a way of specifying the character of an event. It is an error to conceive of objects as causing an event, except in the sense that the characters of antecedent events furnish conditions which determine the natures of subsequent events. 17*3 The ultimate nature of events has been blurred by the confusion which seems to be introduced by its acknowledgment. Events appear as indefinite entities without clear demarcations and with mutual relations of baffling complexity. They seem, so to speak, deficient in thinghood. A lump of matter or a charge of electricity in a position at an instant, retaining its self-identity in other positions at succeeding instants, seems a simple clue for the unravelling of the maze. This may be un- reservedly granted; but our purpose is to exhibit this conception of spatio-temporal material in its true rela- tion to events. When this has been effected, the mechanical rigidity (so to speak) of the traditional views of time, space and material is thereby lost, and the way is opened for such readjustments as the advance of experimental knowledge may suggest. 17-4 The six questions of 17-2 immediately reveal that what is ultimate in nature is a set of determinate things, each with its own relations to other things of the set. To say this is a truism, for thought and judg- ment are impossible without determinate subjects. But the reluctance to abandon a vague indetermination of events has been an implicit reason for the refusal to consider them as the ultimate natural entities. I 74 II- THE DATA OF SCIENCE This demarcation of events is the first difficulty which arises in applying rational thought to experience. In perception no event exhibits definite spatio-temporal limits. A continuity of transition is essential. The definition of an event by assignment of demarcations is an arbitrary act of thought corresponding to no per- ceptual experience. Thus it is a basal assumption, essential for ratiocination relating to perceptual ex- perience, that there are definite entities which are events; though in practice our experience does not enable us to identify any such subject of thought, as discriminated from analogous subjects slightly more or slightly less. This assumption must not be construed either as asserting an atomic structure of events, or as a denial of overlapping events. It merely asserts the ideal possi- bility of perfect definiteness as to what does or does not belong to an event which is the subject of thought, though such definiteness cannot be achieved in human knowledge. It is the claim which is implicit in every advance towards exact observation, namely that there is something definite to be known. The assumption is the first constant of ^externality, namely the belief that what has been apprehended as a continuum, is a potentially definite complex of entities for knowledge. The assumption is closely allied with the conception of nature as * given/ This conception is the thought of an event as^a thing which * happened' apart from all theory and as a fact self-sufficient for a knowledge discriminating it alone. 18. Extension. 18-1 The second constant of exter- nality is the relation of extension which holds between events. An event x may * extend over' an event y. EVENTS 75 i.e. in other words y may be part of x. The concepts of time and of space in the main, though not entirely, arise from the empirically determined properties of this relation of extension. It is evident from the uni- versal and uniform application of the spatio-temporal concepts that they must arise from the utilisation of the simplest characteristics without which no datum of knowledge would be recognised as an event belonging to the order of nature. Extension is a relation of this type. It is a property so simple that we hardly recognise it as such — it of course is so. Thus the event which is the passage of the car is part of the whole life of the street. Also the passage of a wheel is part of the event which is the passage of the car. Similarly the event which is the continued existence of the house extends over the event which is the continued existence of a brick of the house, and the existence of the house during one day extends over its existence during one specified second of that day. 1 8 -2 Every element of space or of time (as conceived in science) is an abstract entity formed out of this relation of extension (in association at certain stages with the relation of cogredience) by means of a deter- minate logical procedure (the method of extensive abstraction). The importance of this procedure depends on certain properties of extension which are laws of nature depending on empirical verification. There is, so far as I know, no reason why they should be so, except that they are. These laws will be stated in the succeeding parts so far as is necessary to exemplify the definitions which are there given and to show that these definitions really indicate the familiar spatial and tem- poral entities which are utilised by science in precise y6 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE and determinate ways. Many of the laws can be logi- cally proved when the rest are assumed. But the proofs willxnot be given here, as our aim is to investigate the structure of the ideas which we apply to nature and the fundamental laws of nature which determine their importance, and not to investigate the deductive science which issues from them. 18-3 The various elements of time and space are formed by the repeated applications of the method of extensive abstraction. It is a method which in its sphere achieves the same object as does the dif- ferential calculus in the region of numerical calcula- i tion, namely it converts a process of approximation \ into an instrument of exact thought. The method is merely the systematisation of the instinctive pro- cedure of habitual experience. The approximate pro- cedure of ordinary life is to seek simplicity of relations among events by the consideration of events sufficiently restricted in extension both as to space and as to time; the events are then 'small enough/ The procedure of the method of extensive abstraction is to formulate the law by which the approximation is achieved and can be indefinitely continued. The com- plete series is then defined and we have a 'route of approximation.' These routes of approximation ac- cording to the variation of the details of their formation are the points of instantaneous space (here called 'event-particles'), linear segments (straight or curved) between event-particles (here called 'routes'), the moments of time (each of which is all instantaneous nature), and the volumes incident in moments. Such elements are the exactly determined concepts on which the whole fabric of science rests. \ EVENTS 77 1 8 -4 The parts of an event are the set of events (excluding itself) which the given event extends over. It is a mistake to conceive an event as the mere logical sum of its parts. In the first place if we do so, we are necessarily driven back to conceive of more funda- mental entities, not events, which would not have the mere abstract logical character which (on this supposi- tion) events would then have. Secondly, the parts of an event are not merely one set of non-overlapping events exhausting the given event. They are the whole com- plex of events contained in that event; for example, if a be the given event, and a extends over by and b over c, then a extends over c and both b and c are parts of a. Thus an event has its own substantial unity of being which is not an abstract derivative from logical con- struction. The physical fact of the concrete unity of an event is the foundation of the continuity of nature from which are derived the precise laws of the mathe- matical continuity of time and space. Not any two events are in combination just one event, though there will be other events of which both are parts. We recur to this point in Part III, art. 29, when considering thexjunction of events. 19. Absolute Position. 19-1 The third constant of externality is the fact (already explained) that an event as apprehended is related to a complete whole of nature which extends over it and is the duration associated with the percipient event of that perception. 19-2 The fourth constant of externality is the refer- ence (already explained) of the apprehended event to the percipient event which (when sufficiently restricted in its temporal extension) has a definite station within the associated duration. 78 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE 19-3 The fifth constant is the above-mentioned fact of the definite station of a percipient event within its duration. Namely, when the specious present is properly limited, there is a definite univocal meaning to the relation 'here within the duration' of the percipient event to the duration. 19-4 Thus the third, fourth, and fifth constants of externality convey its very essence, and without them our perceptual experience appears as a disconnected dream. They embody the reference of an event to a definite — an absolute — spatio-temporal position within a definite whole of nature, which whole is defined and limited by the actual circumstances of the perception. This position, or station, within such a whole is presup- posed in the questions, ' When ? ' ' Where ? ' ' Whither ? ' 20. The Community of Nature. 20-1 One other constant of externality is required in scientific thought. We will call it the association of events with a ' com- munity of nature.' This sixth constant arises from the fragmentary nature of perceptual knowledge. There are breaks in individual perception, and there are distinct streams of perception corresponding to diverse percipients. For example, as one percipient awakes daily to a fresh perceptual stream, he apprehends the same external nature which can be comprised in one large duration extending over all his days. Again the same nature and the same events are apprehended by diverse percipients; at least, what they apprehend is as though it were* the same for all. 2O-2 Thus we distinguish between the qualities of events as in individual perception — namely, the sense- data of individuals — and the objective qualities of the actual events within the common nature which is the EVENTS 79 datum for apprehension. In this assumption of a nature common for all percipients, the immediate knowledge of the individual percipient is entirely his perceptual awareness derived from the bodily event * now-present here.' But this event occurs as related to the events of antecedent or concurrent nature. Accordingly he is aware of these events as related to his bodily event * now-present here ' ; but his knowledge is thus mediate and relative — namely, he only knows other events through the medium of his body and as determined by relations to it. The event here-now, comprising in general the bodily events, is the immediate event conditioning awareness. 20-3 The form that this awareness of nature takes is an awareness of sense-objects now-present, namely qualities situated in the events within the duration associated with the percipient event. Thus the im- mediate awareness qualifies the events of the specious present. Thus the common nature which is the object of scientific research has to be constructed as an inter- pretation. This interpretation is liable to error, and involves adjustments. This question is further con- sidered in the next chapter and in Part IV. 21 . Characters of Events. 21 -I The characters of events arbitrarily marked out in nature are of baffling complexity. There are two ways of obtaining events of a certain simplicity. In the first place we may con- sider events cogredient with our present duration. This is in fact to fix attention on a given position in space and to consider what is now going on within it. The spatial relations will be simplified, but (unless we are lucky) the other characters will be very complex. The second method is to consider events whose time-parts 8o II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE show a certain permanence of character. This is in fact to follow the fortunes of objects, and may be termed the natural mode of discriminating the con- tinuous stream of external nature into events. The importance of this mode of discrimination could only be ascertained by experience. 21-2 There is one essential event which each per- cipient discriminates, namely that event of which each part, contained within each successive duration that assumes for him the character of the duration now- present, correspondingly assumes for him the character of the event here-present. This event is the life of that organism which links the percipient's awareness to external nature. 21-3 The thesis of this chapter can finally be sum- marised as follows : There is a structure of events and this structure provides the framework of the externality of nature within which objects are located. Any percept which does not find its position within this structure is not for us a percept of external nature, though it may find its explanation/row external events as being derived from them. The character of the structure receives its exposition from the quantitative and qualitative rela- tions of space and time. Space and time are abstractions expressive of certain qualities of the structure. This space-time abstraction is not unique, so that many space-time abstractions are possible, each with its own specific relation to nature. The particular space-time abstraction proper to a particular observant mind de- pends on the character of the percipient event which is the medium relating that mind to the whole of nature. In a space-time abstraction, time expresses certain qualities of the passage of nature. This passage has also EVENTS 81 been called the creative advance of nature. But this passage is not adequately expressed by any one time- system. The whole set of time-systems derived from the whole set of space-time abstractions expresses the totality of those properties of the creative advance which are capable of being rendered explicit in thought. Thus no single duration can be completely concrete in the sense of representing a possible whole of all nature without omission. For a duration is essentially related to one space-time system and thus omits those aspects of the passage which find expression in other space- time systems. Accordingly there can be no duration whose bounding moments are the first and last moments ! of creation. Objects are entities recognised as appertaining to events; they are the recognita amid events. Events are named after the objects involved in them and according to how they are involved. w. CHAPTER VII OBJECTS 22. Types of Objects. 22-1 We have now to consider natural elements which are objects of various types. There are in fact an indefinite number of such types corresponding to the types of recognisable permanences in nature of various grades of subtlety. It is only necessary here to attempt a rough classification of those which are essential to scientific thought. The consideration of objects introduces the concepts t)f * matter' — or more vaguely, 'material' — of 'trans- mission' and of 'causation.' These concepts express certain relations of objects to events, but the relations are too complex to be fully expressed in such simple terms. 22-2 The essence of the perception of^an object is recognition. There is the primary recognition which is the awareness of permanence within the specious present; there is the indefinite recognition (which we may term 'recollection') which is the awareness of other perceptions of the object as related to other events separate from the specious present, but without any precise designation of the events; and there is the definite recognition (which we may term 'memory') which is an awareness of perception of the object as related to certain other definite events separate from the specious present. 22*3 The awareness of external nature is an aware- ness of a duration, which is the being of nature through- out the specious present, and of a complex of events, OBJECTS 83 each being part of the present duration. These events fall into two sets. In one set is the percipient event and in the other are the external events whose peculiar property, which has led to their discernment, is that they are the situations of sense-objects. 22-4 The percipient event is discerned as the locus of a recognisable permanence which is the ' percipient object/ This object is the unity of the awareness whose recognition leads to the classification of a train of percipient events as the natural life associated with one consciousness. The discussion of the percipient object leads us beyond the scope of this enquiry. Owing to the temporal duration of the immediate present the self-knowledge of the percipient object is a knowledge of the unity of the consciousness within other parts of the immediate present. Thus, though it is a knowledge of what is immediately present, it is not a knowledge knowing itself. 23. Sense-Objects. 23-1 The sense-object is the simplest permanence which we trace as self-identical in external events. It is some definite sense-datum, such as the colour red of a definite shade. We see red- ness here and the same redness there, redness then and the same redness now. In other words, we perceive redness in the same relation to various definite events, and it is the same redness which we perceive. Tastes, colours, sounds, and every variety of sensation are objects of this sort. 23-2 There is no apprehension of external events apart from recognitions of sense-objects as related to them, and there is no recognition of sense-objects except as in relation to external events. In so far as recognition of a sense-object is confined 6—2 84 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE to primary recognition within the present duration, the sense-object and the event do not clearly disentangle themselves; recollection and memory are the chief agents in producing a clear consciousness of a sense- object. But apart from recollection and memory, any factor, perceived as situated in an external event, which might occur again and which is not a relation between other such factors, is a sense-object. Sense- objects form the ultimate type of perceived objects (other than percipient objects) and do not express any permanence of relatedness between perceived objects of yet more fundamental types. 23*3 A sense-object, such as a particular shade of redness, has a variety of relations to the events of nature. These relations are not explicable in terms of the two- termed relations to which attention is ordinarily con- fined. The events which (in addition to the sense-object) enter as terms into such a relation can be classified into three sets (not mutually exclusive), namely (i) per- cipient events, (ii) events which are * situations' of the sense-object, (iii) conditioning events. 23*4 A percipient event in the polyadic relation of a sense-object to nature is the percipient event of an awareness which includes the recognition of that sense- object. An event e is a situation of the sense-object for that percipient event when for the associated awareness the sense-object is a quality of e. Now perception in- volves essentially both a percipient event and an as- sociated duration within which that percipient event is set and with which it is cogredient. A situation of a sense-object in respect to a given percipient event occurs within the associated duration of the percipient OBJECTS 85 event. In fact the content of the awareness derived from a given percipient event is merely the associated duration as extending over a complex of events which are situations of sense-objects of perception and also as extending over the percipient event itself. For ex- ample, an astronomer looks through a telescope and sees a new red star burst into existence. He sees redness situated in some event which is happening now and whose spatial relations to other events, though fairly determinate as to direction from him, are very vague as to distance. 23-5 We say that what he really sees is a star coming into being two centuries previously. But the relation of the event ' really seen ' to the percipient event and to the redness is an entirely different one from that of the event ' seen* to these same entities. It is only the incurable poverty of language which blurs the distinction. This distinction between what is perceived' and what is 'really perceived' does not solely arise from time differences. For example Alciphron, in Berkeley's dialogue, sees a crimson cloud. Suppose that he had seen the cloud in a mirror. He would have 'seen* crimson as situated in an event behind the mirror, but he would have ' really seen ' the cloud behind him. These examples show that the property of being the situation of a sense-object for a given percipient event is in some respects a trivial property of an event. Yet, in other respects, it is very important; namely, it is important for the consciousness associated with the percipient event. The situations of sense-objects form the whole basis of our knowledge of nature, and the whole structure of natural knowledge is founded on the analysis of their relations. 86 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE 23-6 The definiteness for human percipients of the ! situations of sense-objects varies greatly for different types of such objects. The sound of a bell is in the bell, it fills the room, and jars the brain. The feeling a push against a hard rock is associated with the rock as hard- ness^ and with the body as effort, where hardness and effort are objects of sense. This duplication of sense- objects is a normal fact in perception, though one of the two associated pair, either the one in the body or the one in a situation separated from the body, is usually faintly perceived and indeterminate as to situation. 23-7 The relationship between a sense-object and nature, so far as it is restricted to one percipient event and one situation, is completed by the conditioning events. The special characters in which they enter into that relationship depend on the particular case under consideration. Conditioning events may be divided into two main classes which are not strictly discrimin- ated from each other. Namely, there are the events which are 'jussive' conditions and the events which are 'active* conditions. An event which is an active condition is a cause of the occurrence of the sense- object in its situation for the percipient event; at least, it can be so termed in one of the many meanings of the word ' cause.' Also space and time are presupposed as the setting within which the particular events occur. But space and time are merely expressive of the rela- tions of extension among the whole ether of events. Thus this presupposition of space and time really calls in all events of all nature as passive conditions for that f particular perception of the sense-object. The laws of \ nature, express the characters of the active conditioning events and of the percipient events, which issue in the OBJECTS 87 recognition of a definite sense-object in an assigned situation. 23-8 The discovery of laws of nature depends on the fact that in general certain simple types of character of active conditioning events repeat themselves. These are the normal causes of the recognitions of sense-objects. But there are abnormal causes and part of the task in the analysis of natural law is to understand how the abnormal causes are consistent with those laws. For example, the normal cause of the sight of a colour in a situation (near by) is the rectilinear transmission of r light (during the specious present) from the situation to the percipient event through intervening events. The introduction of a mirror introduces abnormality. This is an abnormality of a minor sort. An example of major abnormality is when there is no transmission of light at all. The excessive consumption of alcohol pro- duces delirium and illusions of sight. In this example the active conditioning events are of a totally different character from those involving the transmission of light. The perception is a delusion in the sense that it suggests the normal conditioning events instead of the abnormal conditioning events which have actually occurred. Ab- normal conditioning events are in no way necessarily associated with error. For example, recollection and memory are perceptions with abnormal conditioning events ; and indeed in any abnormal circumstances error only arises when the circumstances are not recognised for what they are. 23-9 Whereas the situations of a sense-object are always simultaneous with the associated percipient event, the active conditioning events are in general antecedent to it. These active conditioning events in general are 88 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE divisible into two classes not very clearly separated, namely the generating events and the transmitting events. This classification is especially possible in the case of perception under normal circumstances. 24. Perceptual Objects. 24-1 Perceptual objects are the ordinary objects of common experience — chairs, tables, stones, trees. They have been termed 'per- manent possibilities of sensation/ These objects are — at least for human beings — the most insistent of all natural objects. They are the 'things' which we see, touch, taste, and hear. The fact of the existence of such objects is among the greatest of all laws of nature, ranking with those from which space and time emerge. A perceptual object is recognised as an association of sense-objects in the same situation. The permanence of the association is the object which is recognised. It is not the case however that sense-objects are only per- ceived as associated in perceptual objects. There is always a perception of sense-objects — some sounds, for instance — not so associated. Furthermore, a sense- object associated in a perceptual object is perceived both as itself and as 'conveying* the perceptual object. For example, we see both the horse and the colour of the horse, but what we see (in the strict sense of the term) is simply colour in a situation. 24-2 This property of 'conveying' an object is fundamental in the recognition of perceptual objects. It is the chief example of abnormal perception of sense- objects. It is already well-known in the theory of art-criticism, as is evidenced in such phrases as ' tactile- values ' or again in such simple phrases as 'painting water so that it looks wet.' The conveyance of a perceptual object by a sense- OBJECTS 89 object is not primarily a judgment. It is a sensuous perception of sense-objects, definite as to situation but not very determinate as to exact character. Judgments quickly supervene and form an important ingredient of what may be termed ' completed recognition.' These judgments will be called * perceptual judgments.' 24-3 Thus in the completed recognition of a percep- tual object we discern (i) the primary recognition of one or more sense-objects in the same situation, (ii) the conveyance of other sense-objects by these primary re- cognitions, and (iii) the perceptual judgment as to the character of the perceptual object which in its turn influences the character of the sense-objects conveyed. The content of the perceptual judgment is (i) that an analogous association of sense-objects, with * legal' modifications and in the same situation as that actually apprehended, is recognisable from other percipient events, and (ii) that the event which is the common situation of these associations of sense-objects, recog- nised or recognisable, is an active condition for these recognitions. 24-4 The situation of a perceptual object is what we call the ' generating ' event among the active conditions for the associated sense-objects, provided that the perceptual judgment is correct. If the perceptual judgment is false, the perceptual object as perceived is a delusion. The situation of a non-delusive perceptual object is independent of any particular percipient event. 24-5 Amid the development of events the same non- delusive perceptual object may be perceived in a developed situation, again with ' legal ' modifications of the association of perceived sense-objects. The 90 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE verbal analysis of what constitutes a legal modification of the association without breach of the essence of the observed permanence would be impossibly complex in each particular case; but the judgment as to what is allowable in modification is immediate in practice, apart from exceptional cases. A non-delusive perceptual object will be called a ' physical object.' It is an essential characteristic of a physical object that its situation is an active condition for its perception. For this reason the object itself is often named as the cause. But the object is only derivatively the cause by its relation to its situation. Primarily a cause is always an event, namely, an active condition. 24-6 The apprehension of an event as the situation of a physical object is our most complete perception of the character of an event. It represents a fundamental perception of a primary law of nature. It is solely by means of physical objects that our knowledge of events as active conditions is obtained, whether as generating conditions or as transmitting conditions. For example, the mirror is recognised as a physical object and its situation is the generating condition for that association of sense-objects ; but its situation is also a transmitting condition for the sense-objects and delusive perceptual objects which are perceived as images behind it. Again, the prism is a physical object and its situation is a transmitting condition for the sense-object which is the spectrum. So far as it is directly perceived in its various situa- tions, a physical object is a group of associations of sense-objects, each association being perceived or perceivable by a percipient object with an appropriate OBJECTS 91 percipient event as its locus. But the object is more than the logical group; it is the recognisable permanent character of its various situations. 24-7 In spite of their insistence in perception these physical objects are infected with an incurable vague- ness which had led speculative physics practically to cut them out of its scheme of fundamental entities. In the first place this vagueness arises from the unique situation of such an object within any small duration. The result is that the object is confounded with the event which is its situation. But a situation is prolonged in time, and a temporal part of that event is not the event itself. Now the object during ten seconds is not part of the object during one of these seconds. The object is always wholly itself during ten seconds or during one second. It is this train of thought which led to the introduction of the durationless instant of time as a fundamental fact, thus fatally confusing the philosophy of science. The error arose from not dis- criminating the object from its situation. The train of events which is the situation of the object through a prolonged stretch of time is not the unique object; it is the set of events with which the object has its unique association. The difficulty of this point of view arises from the fact that a temporal succession of events, each very similar to the others, ceases to mark for us the time-flux in comparison with the rhythmic changes of our bodies. The result is that in perceiving an un- changing cliff the recognition of permanence, i.e. of the object, overwhelms all other perception, the flux of events becoming a vague background owing to the absence of their demarcation in our perceptual experi- ence. 92 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE 24-8 The essential unity of the object amid the spatial parts of its situation is more difficult to grasp. The derivation of space and time by the method of extensive analysis, as explained in Part III of this enquiry, exhibits the essential identity of extension in time and extension in space. Thus the reasons for denying temporal parts of an object are also reasons for denying to it spatial parts. Again, it is true that the leg of a chair occupies part of the space which is occupied by the chair. But in appealing to space we are appealing to relations between events. What we are saying is, that the situation of the leg of the chair is part of the situation of the chair. This fact only makes the leg to be part of the chair in a mediate derivative sense, by way of their relations to their situations. But the leg is one object with a recognisable permanence of association, and the chair is another, with recognisable permanence of association distinct from that of the leg, and their situations in all cir- cumstances have certain definite relations to each other expressible* in temporal and spatial terms. 24-9 The second reason for the vagueness of physical objects is the impossibility of submitting the group of associations, forming the object, to any process of deter- mination with a progressive approximation to precision. A physical object is one of those entities of ordinary experience which refuse to be pressed into the service of science by way of a progressive exactness of deter- mination. Consider for example a definite object such as a certain woollen sock. It wears thin, but it remains the same object; it is darned, and remains the same object; finally after successive repairs no part of the * Cf . Chapters XIV and XV of Part IV. OBJECTS 93 original wool is left, but it is the same sock. The truth is that each time we affirm the self-identity of this object we are construing the group of associations, which we recognise, in a more and more attenuated sense. The object which is both the sock at the end and the sock at the beginning is a very attenuated complex type of permanence, which would not be what we meant by the sock merely at the beginning of its career or as perceived merely at the end of its career. By insisting on the continued identity of the sock, we are in fact continually juggling with what we mean by the sock, always retaining the most com- plete associations which we can trace through the whole continuous series of events forming the successive situations of the sock. The physical object ' works' perfectly for the ordinary usage of life, and is thus fully justified for that purpose in the eyes of the prag- matic philosopher. 24*91 But these objects do represent essential facts of nature; sometimes, as it may seem to us, trivial facts not worth disentangling from the events which are their situations, sometimes useful facts. But their essential character is exemplified when we reach bio- logical facts. A living organism exhibits a certain unity of being which is merely the exhibition of the enhanced importance of the unity of the physical object. 25. Scientific Objects. 25-1 The various types of scientific objects arise from the determination of the characters of the active conditioning events which are essential factors in the recognition of sense-objects. The perceptual judgment which is present in the completed recognition of physical objects introduces the notion of hypothetical perceptions by percipient 94 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE objects, located for an indefinite number of hypothetical percipient events. In other words, it is a judgment on the events of the universe as being favourable active conditions for the perception of the physical object, granting the correspondingly favourable percipient events. There are an indefinite number of such per- cipient events, actual or imaginary. The characters of events as active conditions are to be inferred from their adjustment to these innumerable possibilities of per- ception of each physical object. 25-2 Also in another way physical objects are the links connecting nature as perceived with nature as conditioning its own perception. Physical objects are often termed the causes of the perception of sense- objects, other than 'the sense-objects which are among their own components. For example, the telescope is the cause of the astronomer's seeing the star. But a physical object is a cause only in an indirect mediate sense. The fact of the telescope being in the right position at the right time was an active condition for the astronomer's sight of the star. Now this fact is an event which is a * situation' of the telescope. Thus in our experience the situations of physical objects are discovered to be active conditions for the perception of sense-objects. In this way a knowledge of the char- acters of events, in so far as they are active conditions, can be observed and inferred; and the passage from perception to causation is effected. 25-3 At once the question arises, In what terms are the characters of the conditioning events to be ex- pressed? The unanimous answer has been, that the expression is to be in terms of ' matter,' or — allowing for the more subtle ether — in terms of 'material.' In OBJECTS 95 so deciding none of the distinctions made above have been consistently held in view. The result has been the persistent lapses into confusion which have been exhibited in a brief abstract in the first part of this enquiry. Matter has been classified into the various kinds of matter which are the chemical substances; thence the atomic theory of matter has been established; and thence some form of electromagnetic theory of mole- cules is emerging. It is in the last degree unlikely that the present form of this theory will represent its final stage. All novel theories emerge with a childlike sim- plicity which they ultimately shed. But, apart from specific details, it can as little be doubted that in its main concepts the theory is true. 25 '4 We will accordingly pass by the elaborate task of tracking down and interpreting intermediate stages of scientific concepts — important though they are — and pass at once to the consideration of molecules and i electrons. The characters of events in their capacity \ of active conditioning events for sense-objects are expressed by their relations to scientific ^objects. Scientific objects are not directly perceived, they are inferred by reason of their capacity to express these characters, namely, they express how it is that events are conditions. In other words they express the causal characters of events. 25 '5 At the present epoch the ultimate scientific objects are electrons. Each such scientific object has its special relation to each event in nature. Events as 1 thus related to a definite electron are called the ' field ' of that object. The relations of the object to different parts of the field are interconnected; and, when the 96 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE relationship of the object to certain parts of the field is known, its relationship to the remaining parts can be calculated. As here defined the field of an electron extends through all time and all space, each event bearing a certain character expressed by its relation to the electron. As in the case of other objects, the electron is an atomic unity, only mediately in space and in time by reason of its specific relations to events. This field is divisible into two parts, namely, the * occupied' events and the 1 unoccupied' events. The occupied event corresponds to the situation of a physical object. In order to express these relations of an electron to events with sufficient simplicity, the method of extensive abstraction [cf. Part III] has to be employed. The success of this method depends on the principle of convergence to simplicity with diminution of extent. The result is to separate off the temporal and spatial properties of events. The relations of electrons to events can be expressed in terms of spatial positions and spatial motions at all instants throughout the whole of time. 25-6 In terms of space and time (as derived by the method of extensive abstraction) the situation of a physical object shrinks into its spatial position at an instant together with its associated motion. Also an event occupied by an electron shrinks into the position at an instant of the electric charge forming its nucleus, together with 'its associated motion. But the quanti- tative charge is entirely devoid of character apart from its associated field; it expresses the character of the occupied events which is due to their relation to the electron. Its permanence of quantity reflects the per- OBJECTS 97 manence which is recognised in the electron, considered for itself alone. 25-7 The 'unoccupied' events possess a definite character expressive of the reign of law in the creative advance of nature, i.e. in the passage of events. This type of character of events unoccupied by the electron is also shared by the occupied events. It expresses the role of the electron as an agency in the passage of events. In fact the electron is nothing else than the expression of certain permanent recognisable features in this creative advance. Thus the character of event e which it receives from electron A, which does not occupy it, is one of the in- fluences which govern the change of electron B, which does occupy ey into the occupation of other events succeeding e. The complete rule of change for B can be expressed in terms of the complete character which e receives from its relations to all the electrons in the universe. 25-8 The connectedness of the characters which events receive from a given electron is expressed by the notion of transmission, namely the characters are transmitted from the occupied events according to a regular rule, which depends on the continuity of events arising from their mutual relations of extension. This transmission through events is expressible as a trans- mission through space with finite velocity. 25-9 Thus in an event unoccupied by it an electron is discerned only as an agent modifying the character of that event ; whereas in an event occupied by it the electron is discerned as itself acted on, namely the character of that event governs the fate of the electron. Thus in a sense there is no action at a distance; for w. 7 98 II. THE DATA OF SCIENCE the fate of each electron is wholly determined by the event it occupies. But in a sense there is action at a distance, since the character of any event is modified (to however slight a degree) by any other electron, however separated by intervening events. This action at a distance is in its turn limited to being a transmission through the intervening events. 26. Duality of Nature. 26-1 There are two sides to nature, as it were, antagonistic the one to the other, and yet each essential. The one side is development in creative advance, the essential becomingness of nature. The other side is the permanence of things, the fact that nature can be recognised. Thus nature is always a newness relating objects which are neither new nor old. 26-2 Perception fades unless it is equally stimulated from both sides of nature. It is essentially apprehension of the becomingness of nature. It requires transition, contrast, and newness, and immediacy of happening. Thus essentially perception is an awareness of events in the act of passing into what has never yet been. But equally perception requires recognition. Now electrons — in so far as they are ultimate scientific objects and if they are such objects — do not satisfy the complete condition for recognisability. 26-3 Such ultimate scientific objects embody what is ultimately permanent in nature. Thus they are the objects whose relations in events are the unanalysable expression of the order of nature. But the recognition in perception requires the recurrence of the ways in which events pass. This involves the rhythmic repe- tition of the characters of events. This permanence of rhythmic repetition is the essential character of OBJECTS 99 molecules, which are complex scientific objects. There is no such thing as a molecule at an instant. A molecule requires a minimum of duration in which to display its character. Similarly physical objects are steady com- plexes of molecules with an average permanence of character throughout certain minimum durations. 26-4 Thus the recognition which is involved in perception is the reason for the importance in physical science of Lorentz's hierarchy of microscopic and macroscopic equations. 26-5 The further consideration of objects, in par- ticular their instantaneous spatial positions and the quantitative distribution of material through space, is resumed in Part IV, after the theory of space and time has been established. 7—2 PART III THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION CHAPTER VIII PRINCIPLES OF THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 27. The Relation of Extension, Fundamental Properties. 27-1 The fact that event a extends over event b will be expressed by the abbreviation aKb. Thus ' K* is to be read * extends over ' and is the symbol for the funda- mental relation of extension. 27-2 Some properties of K essential for the method of extensive abstraction are, (i) aKb implies that a is distinct from 6, namely, 1 part ' here means ' proper part ' : (ii) Every event extends over other events and is itself part of other events: the set of events which an event e extends over is called the set of parts of e : (iii) If the parts of b are also parts of a and a and b are distinct, then aKb: (iv) The relation K is transitive, i.e. if aKb and bKc, then aKc: (v) If aKc, there are events such as b where aKb and bKc : (vi) If a and b are any two events, there are events such as e where eKa and eKb. It follows from (i) and (iv) that aKb and bKa are inconsistent. Properties (ii) and (v) and (vi) together 102 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION postulate. something like the existence of an ether; but it is not necessary here to pursue the analogy. 28\ Intersection, Separation and Dissection. 28-1 Two events * intersect' when they havejparts in common. Intersection, as thus defined, includes the case when one event extends over the other, since K is transitive. If every intersector of b also intersects a, then either aKb or a and b are identical. Events which do not intersect are said to be 'se- parated.' A 'separated set* of events is a set of events of which any two are separated from each other. 28-2 A 'dissection' of an event is a jseparated set such that the set of intersectors of its members is identical with the set of intersectors of the event. Thus a dissection is a non-overlapping exhaustive analysis of an event into a set of parts, and conversely the dissected event is the one and only event of which that set is a dissection. There will always be an indefinite number of dissections of any given event. If aKb, there are dissections of a of which b is a member. It follows that if b is part of a, there are always events separated from b which are also parts of a. 29. The Junction of Events . 29-1 Two events x and y are 'joined' when there is a third event z such that (i) z intersects both x and j>, and (ii) there is a dissection of z of which each member is a part of x, or of j, or of both. The concept of the continuity of nature arises entirely from this relation of the junction between two events. Two joined events are continuous one with the other. Intersecting events are necessarily joined; but the notion of junction is wider than that of intersection, for it is possible for two separated events to be joined. PRINCIPLES OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 103 Two events which are joined have that relation to each other necessary for the existence of one event which extends over them and over no extraneous events. Two events which are both separated and joined are said to be ' ad joined/ y 29-2 An event x is said to ' injoin ' an event y when (i) x extends over y, and (ii) there is some third event z which is separated from x and adjoined to y. In this definition a property of the boundary of an event first makes its appearance. The as- sumption that examples of the relation of injunction hold is a long step towards a theory of such boundaries, as the annexed diagram illustrates. It is important to note that injunction has been defined purely in terms of extension. If xKy and z is separated from x and adjoins j>, then •z adjoins x. 293 Injunction and adjunction are the closest types of boundary union possible respectively for an event with its part and for a pair of separated events. The geometry for events is four- dimensional, but in the three-dimensional analogue such a surface union for a pair of volumes would be the existence of a finite area of surface in common. [Note that spatial diagrams, such as the one above, are to some extent misleading in that they emphasise the spatial character of events at the expense of their temporal character. The temporal character is very far from being represented by an extra dimension producing an ordinary four-dimensional euclidean geometry.] io4 HI. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 30. Abstractive Classes. 30-1 A set of events is called an * abstractive class ' when (i) of any two of its members one extends over the other, and (ii) there is no event which is extended over by every event of the set. The properties of an abstractive class secure that its members form a series in which the predecessors extend over their successors, and that the extension of the members of the series (as we pass towards the 1 converging end* comprising the smaller members) diminishes without limit ; so that there is no end to the series in this direction along it and the diminution of the extension finally excludes any assignable event. Thus any property of the individual events which survives throughout members of the series as we pass towards the converging end is a property belonging to an ideal simplicity which is beyond that of any one assignable event. There is no one event which the series marks out, but the series itself is a route of approximation towards an ideal simplicity of ' content.' The systematic use of these abstractive classes is the 'method of extensive abstraction.' All the spatial and temporal concepts can be defined by means of them. 30-2 One class of events — a, say — is said to 'cover' another class of events — /?, say — when every member of a extends over some member of p. If a be an abstractive class and a covers j8, then p must have an infinite number of members and there can be no event which is extended over by every member of p. For any member of a, however small, extends over some member of p. The usual case of covering is when both classes, a and p, are abstractive classes; then each member of a, the covering class, extends over the whole PRINCIPLES OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 105 converging end of £ subsequent to the first member of p which it extends over. 303 Two classes of events are called '^-equal' J when each covers the other. Evidently such classes cannot have a finite number of members, ^-equality is a relation in which two abstractive classes can stand to each other. The relation is symmetrical and tran- sitive, and every abstractive class is J^-equal to itself. [Note. Abstractive classes and the relation of ' covering ' can j be illustrated by spatial diagrams, with the same caution as to their possibly misleading character. Consider a series of squares, concentric and similarly situated. Let the lengths of the sides of the successive squares, stated in order of diminishing size, be Then each square extends over all the subsequent squares of the set. Also let L hm = oi Fig- 5- namely, let hn tend to zero as n increases indefinitely. Then the set forms an abstractive class. Again, consider a series of rectangles, concentric and similarly situated. Let the lengths of the sides of the successive rectangles j stated in order of diminishing size, be (a, h^, (fl, /z2), ...(«, hn),. . . . i i | j a — Fig. 6. Thus one pair of opposite sides is of the same length through- out the whole series. Then each rectangle extends over all the io6 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION subsequent rectangles. Let hn tend to zero as n increases in- definitely. Then the set forms an abstractive class. Evidently the set of squares converges to a point, and the set of rectangles to a straight line. Similarly, using three dimen- sions and volumes, we can thus diagrammatically find abstractive classes which converge to areas. If we suppose the centre of the set of squares to be the same as that of the set of rectangles, and place the squares so that their sides are parallel to the sides | of the rectangles, then the set of rectangles covers the set of squares, but the set of squares does not cover the"* set of rect- ; angles. Again, consider a set of concentric circles with their common centre at the centre of the squares, and let each circle be in- scribed in one of the squares, and let each square have one of the circles inscribed in it. Then the circles form an abstractive class converging to their common centre. The set of squares covers the set of circles and the set of circles covers the set of i squares. Accordingly the two sets are X-equal.] 31. Primes and Antiprimes. 31 •! An abstractive class is called * prime in respect to the formative con- dition o-' [whatever condition V may be] when (i) it satisfies the condition or, and (ii) it is covered by every other abstractive class satisfying the same condition o-. For brevity an abstractive class which is prime in respect to a formative condition a is called a 'or-prime.' Evidently two a-primes, with the same formative con- dition a in the two cases, are jRT-equal. 31-2 An abstractive class is called 'antiprime in respect to the formative condition ay [whatever con- dition * a ' may be] when (i) it satisfies the condition o-, and (ii) it covers every other abstractive class satisfying the same condition cr. For brevity an abstractive class which is antiprime in respect to a formative condition is such that any event-particle on it is joined to P by a rect [e.g. r' and r" in the figure]. The above diagram and succeeding diagrams have the defect of representing matrices by levels, and thus of giving the conceptions an undeserved air of paradox. Again we may take an event-particle P and a point- track p not containing P. In this way a matrix is obtained as explained in 44*3. Then in respect to P the point-track p is divided by two event-particles Ip andj^ into three (logical) parts. The segment between Ip and Jp has the property that any event-particle on it is joined to P by a rect [e.g. r in the figure] ; and either of the two infinite segments, re- spectively beyond Ip and beyond Jp9 is such that any POINTS AND STRAIGHT LINES 135 event-particle on it is joined to P by a point-track [e.g./)' and/)" in the figure]. P Fig. 10. 45-2 It is evident therefore that a matrix in respect to an event-particle P lying on it is separated into four regions by two loci IpPIp and JpPJp which may equally well be termed rects or point-tracks. » P **' J'P Fig. ii. The event-particles in the vertically opposed regions IPPJP and IP'PJP' are joined to P by rects ; and the event- particles in the vertically opposed regions IpPJp and IP'PJP are joined to P by point-tracks. 136 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION The loci which bound the regions separating point- tracks from rects will be called ' null-tracks.' Their special properties will be considered later when con- gruence has been introduced. In any matrix there are two families of parallel null-tracks; and there is one member of each family passing through each event- particle on the rectilinear track. The order of event- particles on a null-track is derived from its intersection with systems of parallel rects [not co-momental] or of parallel point-tracks or from the orders on routes lying on it. 46. Straight Lines. 46-1 There is evidently an im- portant theory of parallelism for families of matrices analogous to the theory of parallels for families of levels. The detailed properties need not be elaborated here. Two matrices may either (i) be parallel, or (ii) inter- sect in one event-particle only, or (iii) intersect in a rect, or (iv) intersect in a point-track, or (v) intersect in a null-track. For the intersection of two levels only cases (i), (ii) and (iii) can occur; for the intersection of a level and a matrix only cases (ii) and (iii) can occur. 46-2 Each matrix contains various sets of parallel point-tracks. Any one such set is a locus of points in the space of some time-system. Such a locus of points is called a 'straight line' in the space of the time- system. A matrix which contains the points of a straight line in the space of any time-system a will be called 'an associated matrix for a,' and it is called 'the matrix including' that straight line. A matrix is an associated matrix for many time- systems, but it is the matrix including only one straight POINTS AND STRAIGHT LINES 137 line in each corresponding space. The family of time- systems for which a given matrix is an associated matrix is called a ' collinear ' family. A whole family of parallel matrices are associated matrices for the same collinear family of time-systems, if any one matrix of the family is thus associated. In the space of any one time-system the straight lines included by a family of parallel associated matrices are said to be parallel. 46-3 A matrix intersects a moment in a rect. If the moment belong to a time-system with which the matrix is associated, this rect in the moment corresponds to the straight line included by the matrix in the sense that it has one particle occupying each of its points. A rect thus associated with a straight line will be said to ' occupy' it. Thus the event-particles on a matrix m associated with a time-system a can be exhaustively grouped into mutually exclusive subsets in two distinct ways : (i)They can be grouped into the points of a which lie on m; this locus of points is the included straight line in the space of a, which we will name ma: (ii) The event- particles on m can be grouped into the sets of parallel rects which are the intersections of m with the moments of a, and thus each of these rects occupies ma. 46-4 There are three different types of meaning which can be given to the idea of * space ' in connection with external nature, (i) There is the four-dimensional space of which event-particles are the points and the rects and point-tracks and null-tracks are the straight lines. In the geometry of this space there is a lack of uniformity between the congruence theories for rects and for point-tracks, and no such theory for null-tracks, (ii) There are the three-dimensional momentary (in- 138 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION stantaneous) spaces in the moments of any time- system a, of which event-particles are the points and rects are the straight lines. The observed space of ordinary perception is an approximation to this exact concept, (iii) There is the time-less three-dimensional space of the time-system a, of which point-tracks are the points and matrices include the straight lines. This is the space of physical science. There is an exact correlation between the time-less space of a time-system and any momentary space of the same time-system. For any point of the momentary space is an event-particle which occupies one and only one point of the time-less space ; and any straight line of the momentary space is a rect which lies in one associated matrix including one straight line of the time-less space, or (in other words) each straight line of the momentary space occupies a straight line of the time-less space. A time-system corresponds to a consentient set of the Newtonian group, and the time-less space of the time-system is the space of the corresponding con- sentient group. CHAPTER XII NORMALITY AND CONGRUENCE 47. Normality. 47-1 A point-track will be said to be * normal ' to the moments of the time-system in the space of which it is a point. A matrix is said to be * normal ' to the moments which are normal to any of the point-tracks which it contains. Consider an event-particle P and a matrix m which contains P. Let a, £, y, . . . be the collinear set of time- systems whose points lie in or are parallel to the matrix m. Let Pa, P^, Py, ... be the moments of the time-systems a, £, y, . . . which contain P. Then the levels Pa/3, Ppyy ... in which respectively Pa and P^, P^ and P7, etc., intersect are identical, and the event-particle P is the sole event-particle forming the intersection of m and Paf3. Also m intersects each of these moments Pa, and P^, and P7, etc., in rects ra, r^ ry, etc., respectively. The level Paj8 and the matrix m are said to be mutually * normal.' It will be noted that any two time-systems, a and /?, determine one level and one matrix which are mutually normal and each contain a given event- particle. Corresponding to any level containing P there is one matrix normal to it at P; and corresponding to any matrix containing P there is one level normal to it at P. If / and m be a level and a matrix normal to each other, then the rects in 7 will be called normal to the rects and point-tracks in m. A pair of rects which are normal to each other will also be called ' perpendicular ' or 'at right-angles.' Two point-tracks can never be i4o III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION normal to each other since no point-track lies on a level. Parallels to normals are themselves normal. 47-2 Continuing the notation of 47-1 we note that the matrix m includes straight lines na, n^ ny, etc., of the spaces of a, j8, y, etc., and intersects the moments Pa, Pp, P7, etc., in rects TaJr^ryy etc., which respectively occupy «a, rip, WT, etc. The rect ra contains P and is normal to every rect lying in Paj3. Let r' be any rect containing P and lying in Pap. Then r' and ra are mutually normal and both lie in the moment Pa. The rect r1 occupies one straight line in the space of a; name this straight line ri ' . Then the straight lines na and ri will be said to be * normal ' to each other. This definition of the normality of straight lines can be given in general terms thus: Two straight lines in the same space are said to be normal to each other when they are respectively occupied by normal rects lying in the same moment of the corresponding time-system. 47-3 Continuing the notation of 47-2 let /' be the level containing ra and r' ; this level lies in Pa and con- tains P. Let m' be the matrix normal to /' at P. Then m' intersects Pa/3 in a rect r" which is normal both to ra and to r'. Thus at an event-particle P in a level Pa/3 pairs of mutually normal rects, r' and r", exist, one of them chosen arbitrarily; and at an event-particle P in a moment Pa triads of mutually normal rects, ra and r' and r", exist, with the usual conditions as to freedom of choice. The correspondence between a momentary space and the time-less space of the same time-system enables us immediately to extend these theorems to pairs of normal straight lines in a plane and to triads of intersecting mutually normal straight lines in three dimensions. NORMALITY AND CONGRUENCE 141 48. Congruence. 48-1 Congruence is founded on the notion of repetition, namely in some sense congruent geometric elements repeat each other. Repetition em- bodies the principle of uniformity. Now we have found repetition to be a leading characteristic of parallelism ; accordingly a close connection may be divined to exist between congruence and parallelism. Furthermore we have just elaborated in outline the principles of nor- mality, pointing out how the property has its origin in the interplay of the relations of extension and co- gredience. ' But — as we know from experience — a leading property of normality is symmetry, namely, symmetry round the normal. Now symmetry is merely another name for a certain sort of repetition ; accordingly congruence and normality should be connected. We are thus led to look for an expression of the nature of congruence in terms of parallelism and normality, in particular in terms of repetition properties associated with them. 48-2 Congruence, in so far as it is derived from parallelism, is defined by the statements that (i) the opposite sides of parallelograms are congruent to each other, and (ii) routes on the same rect, or on the same point-track, which are congruent to the same route are congruent to each other*. Also the general law holds that two routes which (as thus defined) are congruent to a third route, are con- gruent to each other. This law is a substantial theorem as to parallelism, and not a mere consequence of de- finitions. * This definition of congruence is given by Profs. E. B. Wilson and G. N. Lewis in their valuable memoir, 'The Space-Time Manifold of Relativity JProc. of the Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sciences,vol. XLVIII, 1912 i42 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION But congruence, as thus expressed in terms of paral- lelism, merely establishes the congruent relation among straight routes on rects belonging to one parallel family, or on point-tracks belonging to one parallel family. For such routes in any one parallel family a system of numerical measurement can be established, of which the details need not be here elaborated. But no prin- ciple of comparison has yet been established between the lengths of two routes belonging to different parallel families of rects or belonging to different parallel families of point-tracks. When we can determine equal lengths on any two rects, whether parallel or no, the general principles for space-measurement will have been determined; and when we can determine equal lapses [i.e. lengths] of time on any two point-tracks, whether parallel or no, the general principles for time-measure- ment will have been determined. 48-3 Congruence as between different parallel families results from the following definition founded on the repetition property [i.e. symmetry] of normality : Let AM and BC be a pair of mutually normal rects intersecting at M, or be a rect and point-track inter- secting at M [either AM or BC being the rect] and mutually normal, and let M be the middle event- particle of the straight route BC intervening between the event-particles B and C, then the straight routes AB and AC are congruent to each other. From the symmetry of normality either both pairs of particles, namely (A,B) and (A, C), are joined by rects, or both pairs are joined by point-tracks, or both pairs by null-tracks. As in the analogous case of con- gruence derived from parallelism, the transitiveness of congruence expresses a substantial law of nature and NORMALITY AND CONGRUENCE not a mere deduction from the terms of the defini- tion. A B M Fig. 12. 48-4 The isosceles triangle of 48-3 must lie either on a level or on a matrix. If it lies on a level, all the straight routes of the figure must lie on rects. But on a matrix a pair of normals cannot be of the same de- nomination, i.e. not both rects nor both point-tracks. Thus five cases remain over for consideration. These cases are diagrammatically symbolised by the annexed figures where continuous lines represent rects, and dotted lines represent point-tracks. M (iii) B M (iv) B M Fig. 13- Evidently case (i) is the only case in which the triangle lies on a level ; the triangles in the remaining four cases lie on matrices. 144 HI. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION The relations between the diagrams (ii) and (v) can best be seen by combining them into one figure as in (vi), and the relations between (iii) and (iv) by com- bining them into one figure as in (vii). /i >x^ / \\, ./^ / \ ^S^ ^r / \ ^x^ s' 1 \ ^x, ^ r \ ^x. ./^ / **— • * ^ J \ . ^N 5m /^ J5iv A / Cw JA Ciii Fig. 14. 48-5 Case (i) of 48-4 enables us to complete the con- gruence theory for spatial measurements. Let r^ and r2 be any two co-momental rects intersecting in the event- particle A. Let B be any particle on r1? and let r2' be the rect through B parallel to r2. Now assume that it is possible to find one pair of mutually normal rects, r and r', intersecting each other at Ay and respectively intersecting r2' at D and Z)', where DB = BD'. Through B draw r" parallel to r' and intersecting r2 in C* '; and through D draw r/ parallel to rx and intersecting r2 in C'. Then from 48-1, AC" = BD' and AC = BD. Thus C" and C" denote the same event-particle. Now NORMALITY AND CONGRUENCE 145 BM= MC'. Hence by case (i) of 48-4, AB= AC'. Thus lengths on r^ and r2 are comparable. We need not here consider the theorems, either assumed as in- dependent laws of nature or deduced from previous assumptions, by which we know that the rectangular pair (r and r') exist, that C' and C" coincide and do not lie on opposite sides of A, and that BM= MC'. 48-6 Again if r± and r2 are rects which are not co- momental and do not lie in parallel moments, their measurements are still comparable. For two inter- secting moments, M^ and M2, exist, of which Ml contains r± and M2 contains r2. Thus any rect r' in the Fig. 15- level common to Ml and M2 has its measurements comparable both to those on rx and to those on r2 ; and thus, by the transitiveness of congruence, the measure- ments on T-L and r2 are comparable. By this procedure the employment of cases (ii) and (iii) of 48-4 is rendered unnecessary. Accordingly these cases become theorems instead of being definitions of congruence as contem- plated in their original enunciation. If they had been taken as definitions, the deduction of 48-5 would still be possible. But since the figure would now lie in a w. 10 146 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION matrix, one of r and r' would be a point-track and the other a rect. No very obvious principle then exists by which we could know of the existence of the pair (r and r') such that DB= BD' , apart from the assump- tion of the theorem which we want to prove. 487 Cases (iv) and (v) of 48-4 deal with the com- parability of time-measurements in different time- systems. The same remarks as those in 48*6 apply; namely that the method of 48-5 could be applied, if inde- pendently we could convince ourselves that the requisite pair, r and r' (one a point-track and one a rect), exist. This comparability of time-measurements will be achieved by another method which depends on the fact that relative velocity is equal and opposite. The explanation of this method must be reserved for the next chapter. CHAPTER XIII MOTION 49. Analytic Geometry. 49-1 Consider any time- system a: we will term the space of this time-system 'a-space' and its moments ^-moments'; also the points and straight lines of a-space will be termed 'a-points' and 'a-lines,' and rects and levels which lie in a-moments will be termed 'a-rects' and 'a-levels.' If P be any event-particle, then Pa will denote the a-moment which covers P. If /? be any other time- system, there are no j8-moments which are also a- moments, and no ^-points which are also a-points; but there are a-levels which are also /2-levels and a-rects which are also j8-rects. For the two moments Pa and Pp intersect in a common level which will be called Pap. Then rects lying in Paj3 are both a-rects and jS-rects. In particular through P in the level Paj3 pairs of mutually normal rects exist, and every rect through P and Paj8 is a member of one such pair. 49*2 Let O be any arbitrarily chosen event-particle, which we will term the origin; and let OOat be the a-point occupied by O; and let OOax, OOay, OOaz be any triad of mutually rectangular a-rects in the moment Oa, each containing O. In this notation Oat, Oax, etc., do not denote any particular entities, but the symbols such as OOat and OOax are each to be taken as one whole. Let Oaxt denote the matrix containing OOat and OOax, with analogous meanings for Oayt and Oazt', and let Oayz, Oazx and Oaxy denote respectively the levels containing OOay and OOaz, OOaz and OOax, 10 — 2 148 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION OOaX and OOay. Let P be any other event-particle occupying the point OOat, and let PPM, PPay, PPaz be the a-rects through P respectively parallel to OOax> ooay, ooc In the diagram the third dimension of the moments Oa and Pa, namely the #- dimension, is suppressed, so that these moments are diagrammatically represented as two-dimensional. Point-tracks (in this case a-points) are represented by dotted lines. The diagram has the defect of representing matrices, such as Oaxt, by levels, and is thus liable to lead to unfounded assumptions. 49-3 Lengths on all rects, whether or no they be a-rects, are measurable in terms of one unit length. But time-lapses between a-moments — or, what is the same thing, time-lapses along a-points — must be measured in a time-unit peculiar to the time-system a, since as yet no means of obtaining congruent time-units in different time-systems has been disclosed. We will MOTION 149 suppose at present that in each time-system there is a given arbitrarily chosen unit for time-measurement. 49-4 Let the momentary space of Oa be referred to the three rectangular a-rects OOax, OOay, OOaz as axes of coordinates; and let the momentary space of Pa be referred to the three rectangular a-rects PPax, PPay, PPaz as axes of coordinates; and let the time-less space of a [the a-space] be referred to the three rect- angular a-lines respectively included in the matrices Oaxt, Oayt, Oazt as axes of coordinates; and let the four-dimensional space of all particles be referred to the four axes consisting of the three a-rects OOax, OOay, OOaz, and of the a-point OOat as axes of co- ordinates. 49-5 Let K be any event-particle in the moment Oa, and let K occupy the a-point KKat which intersects the moment Pa in the event-particle Q. Let the lapse of time between the moments Oa and Pa be ta, where ta is positive when Pa is subsequent to Oa ; and let the coordinates of the a-point KKat in the a-space be (xa> Ja> #a)« Then the coordinates of K in the momen- tary space of Oa and of Q in the momentary space of Pa are also (xa, ya, za): Also the ' a-coordinates ' of Q in the four- dimensional space of particles are (xaj ya, za, ta); this fact for Q can also be expressed by saying that Q occupies the a-point (xa, ya, za) at the a-time ta. A moment, viewed as a locus of event-particles, is represented by a linear equation in the four coordinates (#a ya, #a> O- ^ut tne converse is not true ; namely, not every linear equation represents a moment. A pair of linear equations represent a level or a matrix, and three independent linear equations represent a rect or a point-track or a null-track. i5o III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 49-6 If a and fi be any two time-systems, two sets of mutually normal axes, OOax, OOay, OOaz, OOa/, and OOpx, OOpy, OO^, OO^, can be found as in the previous subarticle. But these two sets can evidently be so adjusted that OOay is identical with OOpy and OOaz is identical with OO^, where the two rects (OOay and OOaz) must both lie in the level Oa/3. Then Fig. 17. the matrix normal to this level at O will be denoted by Oapf ; it contains through O one a-point OOatJ one £-point OO0,, one a-rect OOax, and one £-rect OO. Then any event-particle is referred to the axes OO OOa2, OOat for the system a, and to the axes OO^, OOpz, OOpt for the system p. Let its a-coordinates be (#a, ya, za, ta) and its ^-coordinates be (xp,yft, Zp, fy), where ya = yp, and ^a = . axi ^J^'ay) MOTION 151 In the diagram, for the sake of simplicity, the particle Q is in the matrix Oa^; and its coordinates [as in the diagram] in the two systems are (xa, 0,0, ta) and (xp, °> °> tp), where PQ (with its proper sign) is xa, HQ (with its proper sign) is ta, P'Q (with its proper sign) is Xp, and KQ (with its proper sign) is tp. A pair of sets of four axes for a and j8 allied as de- scribed in this subarticle are called * mutual axes' for the two systems. 49-7 The formulae for transformation from the a-coordinates to the ^-coordinates, referred to mutual axes, are obviously of the form Xp = £lapxa + tiapta,yp=ya, #£ = *«, tp~tf#ta+Q™pXm (i), where Qa/3, £l'ap, Q^, &™p are constants dependent on the two systems a and j8 and on the two arbitrarily chosen units of time-lapse in a and j8, but evidently not dependent on the arbitrarily chosen set of rect- angular rects OOay and OOaz in the level Oa/3. The corresponding (x, £) -equations, interchanging a and j8, are xa = QpaXp + dpatp, ta = Qfrtp + QfaXp (ii). The two pairs of (#, ^-equations, (i) and (ii), must be equivalent. The conditions are !/3a -n' n:'...(iii). f~ — r^-~ j— « p^ — Only four out of these five conditions are independent. 50. The Principle of Kinematic Symmetry. 50-1 Consider any other time-system TT. The ?r-point (/>„.) occupied by (#a, ja, ^a, Za) and the a-point occupied by 152 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION the same event-particle lie on a matrix m which includes an a-line (ma) of which every a-point is intersected by pw. Thus/v correlates the a-point (#a, ya, za) with the a-time tay and the neighbouring a-point on ma, namely (xa + xadta> ya + yadta, za + zadta), with the neighbour- ing a-time ta -f- dta. In this way IT makes every set of a-coordinates of a variable a-point to be a function of Za; namely it correlates an a-point (xa, ya, za) with the velocity (xa, ya, za), which can also be written fdx d* d Analogously the same time-system -n correlates a £-point (xp, y^ Zp) with the velocity (xp, fa, Zp), which can be written Now the time-system ?r indicates a definite trans- ference from an event-particle (x^ y^, z^y t^) to another event-particle (#„., yv, z^ tv+ dtv) occupying the same 7r-point (XK, jv> %„), where any mutually normal 7r-coor- dinates are employed. The former event-particle is that indicated by (xa,ya, za, ta) and by (x^y^, Zp, tft), and the latter event-particle by (#a+ xadta9 ya+ yadta9 za+ zadta, ta+ dta) and by (xp+ x^dt^y^+y^dt^ zp+ z^dtp, tp+ dtp). Hence from equations (i) of 49-7 Now 77- is any time-system. First identify it with a. Then xa= o, ya = o, za= o. Hence yp= o, Zp= o, and xp is the velocity of the time-system a in the space MOTION 153 of p [or, more briefly, the ' velocity of a in £']. Let this velocity be Vpa ; it is evidently along the #-axis in the space of ft and ^ = ^^ (ii)_ Again identify the system TT with j8. Then x$ = o, y/s = o, *£ = o ; and hence >>a = o, ara= o, and xa is the velocity of ft in a. Let this velocity be Fa/3; it is along the tf-axis in the space of a, and V^-ti^to^ (iii). 50-2 We will now introduce what we will term the 'Principle of Kinematic Symmetry.' Before enunciating this principle it is necessary to determine a standard method of choosing the positive directions of the axes OOax and OOpx in the matrix Ottj8/, and of the axes OOat and OOpt. By reference to the figure of subarticle 45-2 it will be seen that, of the four angular regions into which the rects OOax and OOpx divide the matrix Ott/3/, two vertically opposite regions include no point-tracks passing through O and the remaining two such regions include point-tracks as well as rects through O. The standard choice of positive directions forOOax andOO^ is such that the two regions bounded one by both positive directions of these axes, and the other by both negative directions, should in- clude only rects passing through O. The positive directions for OOat and OOpt are settled by the rule that a positive measure of lapse of time should indicate subsequence in the time-order to the moment Oa. This rule is definite because of the ultimate distinction between antecedence and subsequence in time, which has not otherwise been made use of. This standard choice of positive directions along mutual axes for two time-systems will always be adopted. i54 HI. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION 50-3 The principle of kinematic symmetry has two parts, enunciating consequences which flow from the fact that the time-units in two time-systems a and ft are congruent. The first part may be taken as the definition, or necessary and sufficient test, of such congruence. The first part of the principle can be enunciated as the statement that the measures of relative velocities [i.e. the velocity of ft in a and of a in j8] are equal and opposite; namely ^+F^=O ............ (i)< The second part is the principle of the symmetry of two time-systems in respect to transverse velocities; namely, if a velocity U in a, normally transverse to the direction of ft in a, is represented by the velocity (Vpa> U') in ft, where Vpa is along the direction of a in ft and U' is normally transverse to it, then the same magnitude of velocity U in /?, normally transverse to the direction of a in j8, is represented by the velocity (Fa/s> U') in a, where Fa/3 is along the direction of a in ft, and U' is normally transverse to it. From the first part of the principle, by (ii) and (iii) of 50-1, we deduce . Oo^A* ............... (ii). In order to apply the second part of the principle we first identify n with (xa = o,ya = U, za = o), then from (i) and (ii) of 50-1 Again we identify -n with (x^ = oyy^= U, z$ = o), and by interchanging a and ft in the above formulae we find MOTION 155 Hence by the second part of the principle 51. Transitivity of Congruence. 51-1 It follows, from (iii) of 49-7, and from (ii) and (iii) of 50-1, and from (i), (ii), (iii) of 50-3, that equations (i) of 50-1 can be written where VafS + V^ = o, &ap = Q^, Q^ + Oja = o, 0^(Q^-F^Q^>-i ........ (ii). We can now express &ajS and H^ in terms of Fa/3 and an absolute constant by considering deductions from the transitivity of congruence. 51-2 Let y be a time-system such that the level Oay contains OOax and OOaz, and let these rects be the axes OOyx and OOyz. Then the matrix Oayt contains OOay, OOyy, OOat and OOyt. Thus we have obtained a set of mutual axes for a and y ; namely, (OOax, OOay, 00az, 00at) and (OOyx, OOyy, OOyz, OO7/), where OOay and OOyy now play the part that OOax and OOpx sustain for a and £. Thus the velocities of the time- system TT in a and y are, by (i) of 51-1, connected by : We have here assumed the congruence of the time units in a and y. Now identify ?r with y. Then xy = o, yy = o, ^7 = o, xa = o, ya = Fa7, ^a = o. 156 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION Hence from (i) of 51-1 But Hence V^ = V^ + V^ti^. .. ....... (ii). Again identify TT with ]8. Then xp = o, y$ = o, £0 = o, #a = Fa/3, ya = o, £a = o. Hence from (i) of this subarticle xy = Vaf3/aayy yy=- Vay, zy = o. But *!J +^ + ^=F7V Hence V^ = Vl, + V^tfay ....... . (iii). From (ii) and (iii) and (i) of 50-3 FaV(i - Q# - Fa27/(i - ^) .... (iv). 51-3 Evidently if 8 be any other member of the collinear set of time-systems (a, 0), then F.V(i - Qi?) = Fa27/(i - Oa-,2) ..... .(v). Hence if s be a collinear set of time-systems, and a, j8, S, e be any four of its members, F£/(I - Q;/) = Fi/(i - n;52) ; • | and hence, since Ha5 = Q5a, we obtain F^/(i - Q$ = Fi/(i - Q5-2) = As . . . (vi), where ^s is a constant for the collinear set. Furthermore, if y be a time-system not belonging to s but related to a and 5 as explained in 51-2, 51-4 Now let a, j8, 7] be any three non-collinear time- systems, and construct a diagram to represent elements in the time-less space of a according to the familiar method of geometricians. MOTION 157 The points of the diagram symbolise a-points, and the straight lines of the diagram symbolise a-lines. Let O be any a-point and let OX be the direction in a-space of the velocity Vap. Then OX is the direction in a-space of the velocity (positive or negative) of any member of • m Fig. 18. the collinear set (a, £). Let OL be the direction in a-space of the velocity Var} ; by hypothesis OL is distinct from OX. Let OM be the a-line perpendicular to the a-plane LOX, and let y be a time-system whose velocity in a, namely Fa7, is along OM. Let s denote the collinear set (a, £), s' the collinear set (a, y), and s" the collinear set (a, 77). Hence from (vi) of 51-3 Hence from (vii) of 51-3 Rs' = Ksy Ks' = Ks". Thus ks = ks. ....... ......... (i). Hence, since V^= Vpa and Qa/s = Q^, it is easy to prove that ks is the same for any pair of time-systems ; in other words, that ks is an absolute constant. 52. The Three Types of Kinematics. 52-1 There are thus three types of kinematics possible, according as 158 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION ks is positive, negative, or infinite. The formally possible type where ks is zero requires that either &a/3 or Vap should be zero ; by reference to (i) of 49-7 and to (i) of 51-1 this supposition is seen to lead to results in such obvious contradiction to experience as to preclude the necessity for further examination. Let us name the types retained (according to the familiar habit) the * hyperbolic/ the 'elliptic' and the 'para- bolic' types of kinematics. 52-2 First consider the hyperbolic type and put c2 for ks. The equations of articles 49 and 51 then become Vaft + Vf* = o, o^ - 2) -i. . (i), ^a *a ^ + 6a> ^*. V^x. to- VMI+Z? *„ * /a (r . ***•' #/3 - *,/ "a/S I H T— .("), ....(iii). The equations of transformation, namely (ii), can be expressed symmetrically as between a and p by means of the scheme [where i2 = — i] V 1 J o, i, ^ o, o, c o o MOTION 159 52*3 We notice that The integral ttHdxadyadzadta taken throughout the four-dimensional region of the set of event-particles which analyse [cf . 37*3] an event e will be called the ' absolute extent ' of e. It follows from (i) that the absolute extent of an event is independent of the time-system in which its measure is expressed. Furthermore if K be any function of (xay ya, #a, ta), it can by (ii) of 52-2 be also expressed as a function of and then by (0 dyadzadta - MSKdxftdyftd*ftdtft. . . .(ii), or, in more familiar form, fdta . MKdxadyadza = fdtft. JJJ Kdxft O> be co-momental and TT be the time-system whose moment O^ contains P, then by (i) xl+yl + zl- c2tl = *J +>£ + 4 • • • .(ii). If O and P be sequent and on a point-track, and TT be the time-system whose point OO^ is occupied by P, then by (i) ^-^-tf-^.W* (iii). Thus there are three ways in which the ' separation ' between two event-particles (O and P) can be estimated ; namely, (i) in any assumed time-system a the a-distance between the a-points occupied by the event-particles measures a-space separation: (2) the lapse of a-time between the a-moments occupied by the event-particles measures a-time separation: and (3) if the event-par- ticles be co-momental, J(xl + yl+z*a- c2t2a) measures the 'proper' space separation and there is no 'proper' time separatipn; and if the particles be sequent, ;} measures the 'proper' time separation and there is no 'proper' space separation. MOTION 161 In the framing of physical laws it is essential to con- sider what measure of separation is relevant. It is to be noted that there may be time-systems a (other than 77) of special relevance to the phenomena in question. It is not at all obvious that invariance of form in respect to all time-systems is a requisite in the complete ex- pression of such laws; namely, the demand for rela- tivistic equations is only of limited applicability. If O and P be on a null-track • . xl+yl + sl-c>tl = o (iv). Event-particles on the same null-track may be ex- pected to have special physical relations to each other. Call such event-particles 'co-null/ 52-6 We may conceive a special time-system 77 associated (by some means) with each event-particle (*a> J>a> *a> *a)- Thus 77 is a function of these four co- ordinates of a particle ; or in other words, (xa, ya, za) are functions of (xa, yaj za, ta). A correlation of time-systems to event-particles which is one-many, so that there is one and only one time- system corresponding to each event-particle, is called a * complete kinematic correlation.' The portion of that correlation which only concerns event-particles at the time ta is called a * kinematic ^-correlation.' Other portions can be selected by confining the event-particles to certain regions in the a-space. If in a certain kinematic correlation the time-system 77 be correlated to (xa, ya, zay ta), then 77 is called the time-system of (xa, ya, za, ta) ' proper ' to that correlation. The ' proper' time-system of an event-particle always refers to a certain kinematic correlation implicitly understood. Furthermore (xa, ya> za) is the velocity W. II i62 III. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION at (xayya, za) due to the implicitly understood kinematic correlation at the a-time ta. Then, TT being the proper time-system at (xa, ya, zay ta), (i). Then equations (iii) of 52-2 can be written The kinematic symmetry as between a and p is now apparent in the formulae. The first of equations (ii) can be replaced by ir + i^ + ^=I (iii)- v ap ' fia *" 52-7 In considering the elliptic type of kinematics put — h2 for ks. The equations of article 51 are now embodied in the scheme x y z — ht ., v*P+ *V • 0> 0> h y» 0 , I, 0, 0 *e 0 , 0, I, 0 hf O O O ft h ' °' °» "?* Also V^ + V^ = o, na/3 = % = (i + Vlplh* I — . .(i), (ii). MOTION 163 Also xl+yl + £ + h*t\ = jcj +y*ft + 4 + tftl . .(iii). The fundamental distinction between space and time, i.e. between rects and point-tracks, has failed to find any expression in the formulae for measurement rela- tions. Accordingly with this type of kinematics, it would be natural to suppose that the distinction does not exist and that every rect was a point-track and every point-track a rect. This conception is logically possible but does not appear to correspond to the properties of the external world of events as we know it. Furthermore the electromagnetic equations lose their invariant property. Altogether there appear to be good reasons for putting aside the elliptic type of kinematics as inapplicable to nature. 52-8 In the parabolic type of kinematics we put As=co. Hence Q^=i ................ (i) Then from (ii) of 51-1 and (ii) of 50-3 and (iii) of 50'1 D-=0, Q^=i, tiap=-Vap ....(ii). Thus equations (i) of 49-7 give Xp = xa- Vapta, yp =ya9 Zp = za, tp=ta. .(iii). These are the formulae for the ordinary Newtonian relativity. These formulae are well in accordance with common sense and are in fact the formulae naturally suggested by ordinary experience. To some extent the hyper- bolic formulae lead to unexpected results, though, if c be a velocity not less than that of light, the divergences from the deliverances of common sense take place, in respect to phenomena which are not manifest in ordi- nary experience. But when by refined methods of II — 2 164 HI. METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION observation the divergences between the two types of kinematics should be apparent to the senses, experi- ment has, so far, pronounced in favour of the hyperbolic type. Accordingly it is this type which we consider in the sequel. 52-9 There is however one objection to the hyper- bolic type, as compared to the parabolic type, which is worth considering. In the hyperbolic kinematics there is an absolute velocity c with special properties in nature. The difficulty which is thus occasioned is rather an offence to philosophic instincts than a logical puzzle. But certainly our familiar experience, in some way which it is difficult to formulate in words, leads us to shun the introduction of such absolute physical quantities. This particular difficulty is largely di- minished by noting that the existence of c with its peculiar properties really means that the space-units and time-units are comparable; namely, there is a natural relation between them to be expressed by taking c to be unity. Either the time-unit would then be inconveniently small or the space-unit inconven- iently large; but this inconvenience does not alter the fact that congruence between time and space is de- finable. Always when a possible definition of con- gruence is omitted, such absolute physical quantities occur. The fact that, so far as time and space are concerned, the existence of a congruence theory seems paradoxical, is due to absence of any phenomena depending on that theory except in very exceptional circumstances produced by refined observations. PART IV THE THEORY OF OBJECTS CHAPTER XIV THE LOCATION OF OBJECTS 53. Location. 53-1 We conceive objects as located in space. This conception of location in space is dis- tinct from that of being situated in an event, though the two concepts are closely allied by a determinate connection. The notion of the situation of an object is logically indefinable being one of the ultimate data of science; the notion of the location of an object is definable in terms of the notion of its situation. An object is said to be * located' in an abstractive element if there is a simple abstractive class * converg- ing ' to the element and such that each of its members is a situation of the object. In general when an object is located in an abstractive element there will be many simple abstractive classes converging to the element and such that each of their members is a situation of the object. In any specific case of location usually all abstractive classes of a certain type will possess the required property. It follows from this definition that, in the primary signification of location, an object is located in an element of instantaneous space. The notion of location in an element of time-less space follows derivatively by correlating the elements of instantaneous space to the elements of time-less space in the way already 1 66 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS described. In our immediate thoughts which follow perception we make a jump from the situation of an object within the short specious present to its location in instantaneous space, and thence by further reflexion to its location in time-less space. Thus location in space is always an ideal of thought and never a fact of perception. An object may be located in a volume, an area, a route, or an event-particle of instantaneous space, and thence derivatively it will be located in a volume, or an area, or a segment, or a point of time- less space. 53-2 In considering the scientific object it is the occupied event which corresponds to the situation of the physical object. The occupied event is the situation of the charge, in so far as the single scientific object is conceived as an (ideal) physical object. 53-3 There are evidently many different kinds of location which satisfy the general definition of location in an abstractive element, even when the kind of ab- stractive element is assigned. These differences mainly arise from differences in the relations of objects to parts of their situations. An object is an atomic entity and as such is related to its situations. But a situation is an event with parts of various kinds, and we have to con- sider the various kinds of relationships which objects may have to various kinds of parts of their situations. For example, if the sense-object * redness, of a definite shade' be Ipcated in an area, it will be located in any portion of that area ; and this arises from the fact that if it be situated in an event, it is also situated in any portion of that event. But it is not true that if a chair be situated in an event, that the chair — as one atomic object — is situated in any part of the event though it THE LOCATION OF OBJECTS 167 is so situated in some parts. Again a tune cannot be situated in any event comprised in a duration too short for the successive notes to be sounded. Thus for a tune a minimum quantum of time is necessary. 54. Uniform Objects. 54-1 It will be convenient to classify objects according as they do or do not satisfy certain impprtant conditions respecting their relations to their situations. ' Uniform ' objects are objects with a certain smooth- ness in their temporal relations, so that they require no minimum quantum of time-lapse in the events which are their situations. These are objects which can be said to exist 'at a given moment.' For example, a tune is not an uniform object; but a chair, as ordinarily recognised, is such an object. The example of the chair, and the dissolution of its continuous materials with specific physical constants into assemblages of electrons, warn us that a problem remains over for discussion after we shall have defined the meaning to be assigned to * uniformity.' 54-2 In order to explain more precisely the theory of uniform objects, it is convenient to make a few definitions : A ' slice ' of an event e in a time-system a is that part of e lying between two moments of a, where both moments intersect e. The two moments are called the terminal moments of the slice, and the volumes in which the terminal moments intersect e are called the terminal volumes. For brevity a slice of e in the time- system a is called an ' a-slice of e.' It follows from the continuity of events that any a-moment lying between the terminal moments of an a-slice of e intersects e. in a volume. Such a volume is i68 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS called an a-section of the slice. A slice is itself an event which stretches throughout the duration bounded by its terminal moments. Thus if the duration be the specious present for some percipient, the slice of e is the part of the event e which falls within that specious present. 54-3 The properties of uniform objects will be enunciated as a set of laws regulating their character. Law I. If a be any time-system and e be a situation of an uniform object O, then an a-slice of e exists which is a situation of O. Law II. If a be any time-system and e be a situation of an uniform object O and e' be an a-slice of e which is a situation of O, then every a-slice of e' is a situation ofO. Law I can roughly be construed as meaning that if an uniform object O has been situated in any event, then there is some period of time (in any time-system) during which it has existed ; and in the same way Law II means that if an uniform object has existed during any period of time, then it has existed during any shorter period within that period. These laws are obvious as applied to uniform objects, but not so obvious for objects in general, as * object' is here defined. For example a musical note cannot exist in a period of time shorter than its period of vibration, and a percipient whose specious present was too short could not hear it. It follows from law II that if an uniform object O is situated in an event e and e' be an a-slice of e which is a situation of O, then an abstractive class of a-slices converging to any a-section of e' can be found such that O is situated in each member of the class. Hence evidently O is located in every a-section of e' . This is THE LOCATION OF OBJECTS 169 the conception of an uniform object being located in a spatial volume at a durationless moment of time. With certain explanations and limitations laws I and II apply to many types of objects. In fact it requires an effort to realise that there are cases to which they do not apply. They have been stated above in the most formal manner to exhibit the fact that, when they do apply, they are empirical laws of nature and not £ priori logical truths. 55. Components of Objects. 55-1 The concept of a 'component' of a main object is difficult to make precise. A component of an object O is another dis- tinct object O' such that (i) whenever O is situated in an event ey there is an event e' > which is either e itself or a part of e, in which O' is situated, and (ii) O' may also be situated in an event e" which is not a situation of O or any part of a situation of O. Thus a component is necessary to the main object, but the main object is not necessary to the component. For example, a certain note may be necessary for a certain tune, but the note can be sounded without the tune. The main object requires its component, but the component does not require the main object. But this general idea of a component is not of great importance apart from further specialisation. There are many such specialisations; but in science there are three which are of peculiar importance, namely, ' con- current components,' 'extensive components' and 'causal components.' 55-2 An object O' is a 'concurrent' component of an object O when it is a component of O, and if e be any situation of O, there is an event e' which is part of e and is such that (i) it is a situation of O' and (ii) it is iyo IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS cut in a slice which is a situation of O' by any duration which cuts e in a slice which is a situation of O. Thus a concurrent component lasts concurrently with the main object in any time-system. CHAPTER XV MATERIAL OBJECTS 56. Material Objects. 56-1 A material object is essentially a material object of a certain definite sort; namely, we define sorts of material objects, which are sets of objects with certain definite peculiarities, and a material object is such because it is a member of one of these sorts. For example a piece of wood is a material object because it belongs to the class of wooden objects and because this class possesses the requisite peculiar- ities. Similarly a charge of electricity is a material object for an analogous reason. The objects which compose a set (^) form a sort of ' material ' objects when (i) the objects of the set //, are all uniform, (ii) not more than one member of ju, can be located in any volume, (iii) no member of /* can be located in two volumes of the same moment, (iv) if Ol and O2 be two members of fi respectively located in non-overlapping volumes in the same moment, then any pair of situations of Ol and O2 respectively are separated events, (v) if O be a member of //. situated in an event e, and located in the volume V which is a section of e, and V± be any volume which is a portion of V, then there is a member of /z which is located in Vl and is a concurrent component of O. 56-2 If O be a material object of a certain sort and V be a volume in which O is located and V1 be a portion of Vj then the material object of the same sort as O which is located in Vl is called an * extensive component ' of O. 172 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS 56-3 It is by means of the properties of material objects that the atomic properties of objects are com- bined in mathematical calculations with the extensive continuity of events. Apart from material objects mathematical physics as at present developed would be impossible. For example where the physicist sees the electron as an atomic whole, the mathematician sees a distribution of electricity continuous in time and in space and capable of division into component objects which are also analogous distributions. 57. Stationary Events. 57-1 In order to understand the theory of the motion of material objects, it is first necessary to define the concept of a l stationary* event. Consider some given time-system ?r, and let V denote a volume lying in a certain moment M of this time- system. Let d be a duration of TT bounded by moments M1 and M2, and inhered in by M; so that Mlf M2, M are three parallel moments of the time-system TT, and M lies between Mx and M2. The volume V is the locus of a set of event-particles and each of these event- particles lies in one and only one station of the duration d. Also each station of d either does not intersect V or intersects it in one event-particle only. The assemblage of event-particles lying on stations of d which intersect V [namely, each event-particle lying on one of these stations] is the complete set of event-particles analysing* an event. Such an event is called stationary in the time- system TT and stretches throughout the duration d. It can also be called ' stationary in rf,' since d defines the time-system TT. Every event-particle within the event lies on a station of d; and a station of d either has all its event-particles lying within the event or none of * Cf. subarticle 37-3, Chapter X, Part HI. MATERIAL OBJECTS 173 them. The volume V is the section of the event by the moment M. Furthermore if Mr be any other moment of the time-system TT lying between Mt and M2, it intersects the event in a volume V which is a geo- metrical replica of the volume V. The moments M± and M2 which bound the duration d are the terminal moments of any event which is stationary in d. The stations of d lying in the event intersect Mx and M2 in terminal volumes V± and V2 which are geometrical replicas of V and V . A volume, such as V, in which a moment of n intersects an event stationary in TT is called a ' normal cross-section ' of the event. A moment of another time-system a which intersects the stationary event in a volume J7, but does not intersect either of the terminal volumes, is said to intersect it in an 'oblique cross-section.' All the oblique cross-sections of a stationary event which are made by moments of the same time-system are geometrical replicas of each other. 57-2 Consider an event e stationary in the time- system TT, and let a be another time-system. Let vv be the measure of the normal cross-sections of e and let va be the measure of the oblique cross-sections made by moments of a. We require the ratio of va to vv. Take (as usual) mutual axes for TT and a, and let the event-particle which is the origin lie in M1 which is the antecedent terminal moment of e. Then M± is at the 7r-time zero, and let M2 (the subsequent terminal moment) be at the 7r-time tv. Then if (#„., y^z^ o) be the ^-coordinates of the event-particle in which a station s (of the set composing the event e) intersects MJ, the ^-coordinates of the other end (the subsequent end) of s in Af2 are (xw, y^ *T, tr). i74 IV- THE THEORY OF OBJECTS Furthermore let (xa, ya, #«, ta) be the a-coordinates of the antecedent end of s, and let (x'a, y'a, z'a, t'a) be the a-coordinates of the subsequent end of s. Then by the usual formulae [cf. subarticle 52-2] 1 ' A-\ / T7- j. \ ' ' and xa = &air fa - KTa*T), ya = yin za = z^ i V < i I ' air" ' /.-O^-^ Hence t'a — ta = Ha7r^ . But, by analogous reasoning to that for the elementary case of geometrical parallelograms, the absolute extent of the event e can be expressed as v* tv and as va (t'a — ta). Hence va (t'a — ta) = vvtw. Thus va = a~*vr (i). 57-3 The stations of a duration d of a time-system TT are portions of points of the time-less space of TT [the 77-space]. Thus by prolonging the stations which constitute the stationary event e we obtain the assemblage of 7r-points which is the complete assemblage of ?r-points intersecting the cross-sections of £, each event-particle in each cross-section lying on one and only one such 7r-point and each of these 7r-points intersecting each cross-section in one event-particle. The assemblage of these 7r-points is a volume of the 7r-space, and the successive instantaneous volumes which are the normal cross-sections of e [stationary in TT] each occupy this same volume in the 7r-space. Thus the stationary event e during the lapse of 7r-time throughout which it endures is happening at the same place in the 7r-space. But the successive oblique cross-sections of e formed by moments of another time-system a are instantaneous MATERIAL OBJECTS 175 volumes which successively occupy different volumes in the a-space. These instantaneous volumes travel in the a-space, sweeping over it with the uniform velocity Vav, namely the velocity due to the time-system -n in the a-space. 57*4 A * normal slice' of a stationary event is the slice of it cut off between any two normal cross-sections. An ' oblique slice ' of a stationary event is the slice of it cut off between any two parallel oblique cross-sections. A normal slice of a stationary event is itself a stationary event in the same time-system. 58. Motion of Objects. 58-1 A material object is 'motionless' within a duration when throughout that duration the material object and its extensive com- ponents are all situated in stationary events. In the case of a motionless material object, Law I for uniform objects can be made more precise, as follows: If O be a material object motionless in the duration d and e be the stationary event extending throughout d in which it is situated, then O is situated in any oblique slice of e. The accompanying figures illustrate (i) the kind of slice which is included in this law and (ii) the kind of slice which is excluded. duration d event e slice / slicing duration duration d (i) Fig. 19. ii) iy6 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS It immediately follows that — with the nomenclature of the enunciation of the law — O is located in every oblique cross-section of e. If TT be the time-system of the duration in which O is motionless and, in some other time-system a, d' be the duration of maximum extent which intersects e in an oblique slice, then throughout d' in the time-less space of a the material object O has a uniform motion of translation with the velocity of ?r in a. 58-2 This property, possessed by a material object which is motionless in a time-system TT, of being situated in every oblique slice of its stationary situation is a fundamental physical law of nature. Namely, percipients cogredient with different time-systems can * recog- nise' the same material objects. In other words, the character of a material object is not altered by its motion. 58*3 The motion of a material object O is ' regular' when if V be any volume in which it is located and P be any event-particle in V, and V be any variable volume which contains P and is a portion of V, and O' be the extensive component of O which is located in V ', then, as V is progressively diminished without limit, a time-system TT can be found such that the errors of calculations, respecting magnitudes exhibited by O' which assume that O' is motionless in TT, tend to the limit zero, provided that the time-lapse of the durations in 77 within which O' is motionless is also correspond- ingly diminished without limit. The above definition of regular motion is a descrip- tion of the assumptions in the ordinary mathematical treatment of the motion of a material object (not necessarily rigid) which is not moving with a uniform MATERIAL OBJECTS 177 motion of translation. If a be the standard time-system to which motions are referred, then the velocity of TT in a is the velocity at the event-particle P [i.e. at the a-space point pa at the a-time ta] of the material object. 59. Extensive Magnitude. 59-1 A theory of extensive magnitude is required to complete the theory of material objects. Let O and O' be two objects (material or otherwise), then the statement that O and O' possess quantities of a certain kind and that the ratio of the quantity O to the quantity Of has a certain definite numerical value is a reference to some determinate method of com- parison of O to O' which is the defining characteristic of that kind of quantity*. The quantity of a certain kind possessed by a material object O is called ' extensive' when it is a determinate function of the quantities of the same kind possessed by any two of its extensive components which (i) are exhaustive of O and (ii) are non-overlapping [i.e. have no extensive component in common]. If the determinate function be that of simple addi- tion [so that, q, qly q2 being the quantities possessed respectively by O and its two extensive components, ?=?i+ ?2]> then the kind of quantity will be called ' absolutely' extensive. When an extensive quantity is not absolutely extensive, it will be called * semi-extensive.' 59-2 It is usual in philosophical discussions to con- fine the term * extensive quantity ' to what is here defined as * absolutely extensive quantity,' and to ignore entirely the occurrence of semi-extensive quantities. But in physical science semi-extensive quantities are well * Cf. Principia Mathematica. w. 12 178 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS known. For example, consider a sphere of radius a uniformly charged with electricity throughout its volume. Divide the sphere into two parts, namely a concentric nucleus of radius c and a shell of thickness a — c. Then the electromagnetic mass of the whole sphere is not the sum of the electromagnetic masses of these two parts, but is to be calculated by a quadratic law from the charges. A material object expresses the spatial distribution of a quantity of ' material/ when the quantity is absolutely extensive. 59-3 The volume-density, at a time ta in the a-space of a time-system a, of the distribution of any absolutely extensive quantity possessed by a material object O is calculated by the ordinary mathematical formula. Consider any event-particle P occupying the a-point pa at the a-time ta. Let dva be the measure of a volume in the a-space which contains pa\ and let O' be the extensive component of O located in dvay if there be such an extensive component. Let q be the measure of the quantity possessed by O' '. Then the limit of the ratio of q to dva, as dva is indefinitely diminished, is the density at pa at the time ta of the material [i.e. of the absolutely extensive quantity]. 59-4 The above definitions contemplate quantities immediately possessed by the extensive objects as such, for example, charges of electricity and intensities of sense-objects. But there are also quantities which are only mediately possessed by the objects, but are im- mediately possessed by the events which are their situations. Such quantities may vary with the variation in the situation of the object mediately possessing them. A mediately possessed quantity may for a certain MATERIAL OBJECTS 179 type of material objects satisfy the characteristic con- dition for an extensive quantity. In that case it is an extensive quantity mediately possessed by that type of material objects. All variable extensive quantities are of this mediate character. A quantity mediately pos- sessed by a material object O at a moment Ma [i.e. at a time ta] of a time-system a is the limit of the quantity possessed by the successive converging situations of O in the successive durations of an abstractive class (of durations in the time-system a) which converges to Ma. The volume-density, at a time ta in the a-space of a time-system a, ,of the distribution of any absolutely extensive quantity mediately possessed by a material object O is calculated according to the preceding definition for the case of immediately possessed quan- tities, except that the * quantity mediately possessed by O (or by an extensive component of O) at the time ta ' must be substituted everywhere for the 'quantity possessed by O (or by an extensive component of O).' 59*5 We can compare the volume-densities pa and Pp of an absolutely extensive quantity for two time- systems a and ft respectively at a given event-particle P, assuming, as we may assume, that the motion of the material object possessing (mediately or immediately) the quantity is regular. Let TT be the time-system in which the object O is stationary at P, and let pw be the volume-density at P for the time-system TT. Let Ma9 Mp, M^ be the moments in a, £, and TT respectively which contain P. Let dvv be the measure of a small volume in Mv which contains P [and therefore the measure of the volume in the time- less 7r-space which this instantaneous volume occupies] . Consider the event (e^) stationary in TT of which this 12 2 i8o IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS small volume dvw is a normal cross-section, and bounded by terminal moments M'v and M'l on either side of M^ and both near Mv. Then, by the theory of regular motion, we can take this stationary event (ev) as the situation of an extensive component of O, when dvv is small enough and the duration bounded by M'T and M'l is short enough. Let dva and dvp be the measures of the volumes which are the oblique cross-sections of ev made by Ma and Mp. Then ultimately pvdvv9 padva, and ppdvp are expressions for the measure of the quantity possessed by O. Hence P*dv* = Ppdvp = prdvr. But by equation (i) of 57-2 of this chapter, ThuS PaQaw = PfS&fr = PIT (2). Now take the mutual axes for a and /?, and let (xa9 yay zaj ta) and (xp9 yp, Zp9 tp) be the coordinates of P in a and p respectively, and let (xa, ya, za) and (x^ yft, Zp) be the velocities due to TT in a and j8 respectively. Then by equation (i) of 52-6, ~T2 I (S)- 59-6 Now let — denote differentiation following the d motion (*a, ya, za) at (xa9 yay za, ta), and let — denote °ta differentiation at the point (xa, ya, za). Then it is* easily proved that MATERIAL OBJECTS 181 &air -jr = Qfir-jr- dta dtp Hence from equation (2) of 59-5 above Pa dta pp dtp Again by using the formulae of article 52, we can prove that From these results we immediately deduce Pa Now the condition that the total extensive quantity which is the 'charge' of any extensive component never varies when conceived as distributed through the a-space is i dp — + diva (#a, yay za) = o. Pa«*a This is the well-known equation of continuity. Now equation (4) shows that if this equation holds for the space of any time-system, it holds for the spaces of all time-systems. When the equation of continuity holds, the 'charge' of any extensive component of the material object under consideration never varies. Hence it is a mere matter of words and definition whether the charge is said to be mediately possessed by the object or im- mediately possessed. CHAPTER XVI CAUSAL COMPONENTS 60. Apparent and Causal Characters. 60- 1 Are there any material objects in nature? That there are such bodies is certainly an assumption habitually made in the applications of mathematics. But the assumption does not supersede the necessity for enquiry. We may roughly summarise the properties of material objects, as here defined, by saying that they should be continuous both in time and in space. But this is just what ordinary perceptual objects appear to be. Now perceptual objects are what they appear to be; for a perceptual object is nothing else than the permanent property of its situations, that they all shall exhibit those appearances. Accordingly if a perceptual object appears to be a material object, it is a material object. Now here a difficulty arises; for we all know that, according to Dalton's atomic theory of chemistry, any apparently continuous substance is a discrete collection of molecules, and that furthermore, according to the more recent theories, a molecule is a discrete collection of electric charges. Accordingly, as we are told, if we could take the minutest drop of water and magnify it, the phenomena would be analogous to those of a swarm of flies in a room. It would appear therefore that we are mistaken in classifying a drop of water as being a material object. 60*2 The position that we seem to have arrived at is that on the one hand a drop of water is a material object, because it appears to be one and it is whatever CAUSAL COMPONENTS 183 it appears to be, and that on the other hand it is really something quite different. Such paradoxes mean that vital distinctions have been overlooked. We must distinguish between the drop of water as it appears, the event which is its situation, and the character of the event which causes the event to present that appearance. Namely, there is the appearance of the drop of water. This is character No. i of the event, the apparent character, and is a material object. Again there is the character of the event which is the cause of character No. i. This is character No. 2 of the event and is its causal character. According to the doctrine of science, character No. 2 is not a material object. 60-3 But why trouble about causal characters ? What has pushed science into their consideration? The im- pelling reason is the complex bewildering relationships of the apparent characters. Apparent characters essen- tially involve reference to percipient events, and may be very trivial qualities of the events which they charac- terise. For example, all delusive perceptual objects are apparent characters of events. In the case of a delusive perceptual object character No. 2 of its situation has no existence, except so far as the event is necessarily still a 'passive condition' according to the nomenclature of Chapter VII of Part II. The active conditioning events for a delusive perceptual object must be sought elsewhere than in its situation. Let us confine ourselves to the consideration of non-delusive perceptual objects, that is, to physical objects. 60*4 But the line of separation between delusive and non-delusive perceptual objects is not quite so clear 1 84 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS as we might wish. The definition of delusiveness and non-delusiveness is sufficiently obvious, namely, a perceptual object is non-delusive when it is the ap- parent character of an event which is itself an active condition for the appearance of that character as per- ceptible from all percipient events. In the nomen- clature of Chapter VII of Part II the situation of a physical object is its * generating event/ Now if this definition is to be taken to the foot of the letter, all perceptual objects are delusive; for all per- ception is belated. The sun which we see is the apparent character of an event simultaneous with our percipient event, and this event is about eight seconds subsequent to the generating event corresponding to that appearance of the sun. In the case of other astronomical phenomena the discrepancy is more glaring. In the case of terres- trial perceptual objects the discrepancy is less glaring in many cases, though for sounds it is very insistent and is the reason of their very indeterminate situations. But, speaking generally and admitting exceptions, for the greater part of ordinary domestic perceptions the belatedness of the apparently characterised event behind the causally characterised event is a small fraction of the percipient's specious present. Accordingly our knowledge of causal characters is a theory built up by ignoring this element of delusive- ness in all perceptual objects, and then by introducing it as an additional correction in the exceptional cases. 67. Transition from Appearance to Cause. 61-1 But how can we pass from appearance to cause, seeing that our knowledge of nature is confined to awareness of ap- pearance? For example, all measurement is a measure- ment of appearance. CAUSAL COMPONENTS 185 Evidently therefore causal characters can only be directly known to us as functions of apparent characters. They are characters of characters. For example, a quantity which we assign to a physical object as the result of some measurement is a character of its apparent character. 61-2 It is necessary however to avoid a misunder- standing ; the causal character of an event is not merely a function of the apparent character of that event. It is in truth a function of the apparent characters of all events, though in general the apparent character of that event — or of an associated event of somewhat later date — is the dominant element in the formation of the function. For example, a quantity determined by measurement is a relation of the apparent character of the event to the apparent characters of other events. But it is the dominance of the apparent character which in practice makes the discovery of the causal character generally possible; for it assigns the situation of the causal character. This dominance is merely a practical aid to the discovery of causal characters and has in it no element of necessity. Indeed as causal characters are progressively discovered, scientific theory assigns causal characters to events which are destitute of ap- parent character — namely the events forming the ether in empty space and time. 61-3 So far the explanation of causal characters has exhibited them as the outcome and issue from apparent characters, whereas the causal idea, which is that of science, requires the causal characters should be the origin of the apparent characters. We have to seek the reason for this inversion of ideas. Causal characters are much simpler than apparent 1 86 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS characters ; are more permanent than apparent charac- ters; and depend almost entirely on the event itself, involving other events only (in general) as passive con- ditions providing the necessary background of a whole continuum of nature. The climb from the sense-object to the perceptual object, and from the perceptual object to the scientific object, and from the complex scientific object (such as the molecule) to the (temporally, in a stage of science) ultimate scientific object (such as the electron) is a steady pursuit of simplicity, permanence, and self-sufficiency, combined with the essential attri- bute of adequacy for the purpose of defining the apparent characters. 61-4 The relations of sense-objects to their situations are complex in the extreme, requiring reference to percipient events and transmitting events. Apart from some discovery of laws of nature regulating the asso- ciations of sense-objects, it is impossible by unintelligent unsorted perception to form any concept of the charac- ter of an event from the sense-objects which might be situated there for percipients suffering from any normal or abnormal perceptions. The first stage is the discovery of perceptual objects. Those objects are first known by the instinctive 'con- veyance ' of abnormal perceptions of sense-objects asso- ciated with normally perceived sense-objects. The test of alternative possibilities of normal perception and the discovery of a permanent character in the association which can be expressed independently of any particular percipient event decides between delusive perceptual objects and physical objects. 61*5 The introduction of physical objects enables us in considering the characters of events to sweep CAUSAL COMPONENTS f 187 aside the boundless eccentricities of abnormal per- ceptions. We are still at the stage of apparent characters, but rules have been attained, either by instinctive practice or by the exercise of intelligence or by the interplay between the two, by which we know what to attend to and what to discard in judging the character of an event from the situations of sense-objects. A physical object is the apparent character of its situation. Physical objects are found to be 'material' objects. 6 1 -6 Science now intervenes with the express purpose of exhibiting our perceptions as our awareness of the characters of events and of relations between characters of events. All perceptions are included in the scope of this aim of science, namely, including abnormally perceived sense-objects and delusive perceptual objects. 61-7 The origin of the concept of causation (in this application of the term) is now manifest. It is that of the part explaining the whole — or, avoiding this un- technical use of 'part' and 'whole/ it is that of some explaining all. For the physical objects were obtained by discarding abnormalities, and physical objects express the characters of events, and all our perceptions (in- cluding abnormalities) arise from awareness of these characters. 6l-8 But physical objects fail to satisfy the require- ments of science. They lack definiteness and per- manence, and are not adequate for the purposes of explanation. Now the characters of their mutual rela- tions disclose further permanences recognisable in events and among these are the scientific objects. The gradual recognition of these permanences was at first the slow product of civilised thought without conscious direction. As regards their conscious discovery various 1 88 IV. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS stages may be discerned in scientific history, which sum up the previous growth of ideas and initiate new epochs. One stage is marked by Archimedes' discovery of specific gravity, and another by Newton's discovery of mass. The simplicity of what, in its relation to appearance, is so abstract was then beginning to be discovered, and also its permanence and self-sufficiency as a quality of events. A third stage is the introduction of the concept of molecules and atoms by Dalton's atomic theory. Finally there arose the concepts re- specting the ether, which we here construe as meaning the concept of events in space empty of appearances. 61-9 These causal characters, which are the charac- ters of apparent characters, are found to be expressible as certain scientific objects, molecules and electrons, and as certain characters of events which do not necessarily themselves exhibit any apparent characters. If we follow the route of the derivation of knowledge from the intellectual analysis of sensible experience, molecules and electrons are the last stage in a series of abstractions. But a fact in nature has nothing to do with the logical derivation of concepts. The concepts represent our abstract intellectual apprehension of certain permanent characters of events, just as our perception of sense-objects is our awareness of qualities of nature resulting from the shifting relations of these characters. Thus scientific objects are the concrete causal characters, though wTe arrive "at them by a route of apprehension which is a process of abstraction. In the same way, what, in the form of a sense-object, is concrete for our awareness, is abstract in its character of a complex of relations between scientific objects. Thus what is concrete as causal is abstract in its deriva- CAUSAL COMPONENTS 189 tion from the apparent, and what is concrete as apparent is abstract in its derivation from the causal. The ultimate scientific objects (at present, electrons and positive electric charges) are ' uniform' objects; and, in the limited sense of charges in the 'occupied' events, they are also 'material' objects. There does not appear to be any reason, other than the very natural desire for simplicity, for the assumption that ultimate scientific objects are uniform. Some of the atomic and 'quantum' properties of nature may find their ex- planation in the assumption of non-uniform ultimate scientific objects which would introduce the necessary discontinuities. 61-91 The causal character of the situation of a physical object is the fact that this situation contains a certain assemblage of ultimate scientific objects; namely, the fact that among the parts of this situation are various parts which are the occupied events of these scientific objects. The 'causal components' of a phys- ical object are the scientific objects which occupy parts of the situation of the physical object, and whose total assemblage is what constitutes the qualities which are the apparent character which is the physical object apparent in the situation. 61-92 An adjustment, ordinarily negligible but often important, has to be made to allow for the belatedness of perception. Two situations are thus involved (even although in ordinary cases they are practically identical), namely the situation of the physical object from an assigned percipient event, and the situation of the assemblage of causal components which is the situation of the ' real ' object. CHAPTER XVII FIGURES 62. Sense-Figures. 62-1 There are two types of objects which can be included under the general name of ' figures ' ; objects of one type will be termed ' sense- figures/ and of the other type ' geometrical figures.' Figures of either type arise from the perception of the relation of sense-objects to the properties which their situations have in respect to their relations of extension with other events. The primary type of figure is the sense-figure and the geometrical figure is derivative from it. 62-2 Every sort of sense-object will have its own peculiar sort of sense-figure. The sense-figures associ- ated with some sorts of sense-objects (e.g. smells and tastes) are barely perceptible, whereas the sense-figures associated with other sorts of sense-objects (e.g. sights and touches) are of insistent obviousness. The condition that a sense-object should have a figure within a given duration can be precisely stated : A sense-object O, as perceived in a situation o which extends throughout a duration d of a time-system a, possesses a figure in Aiiv.i- vSSsTICS UBRARY This book is dtre*oVtne last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 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