Title: Church Committee: Book III - Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans Author: Church Committee Pages: 996 Agency: n/a RIF#: n/a Subjects: n/a Source: AARC SENATE 94THCONGRESS 2d Session f REPORT l No 94 755 SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS BOOK III FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECTTO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE APRIL23 (under authority of the order of APRIL14) 1976 U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTINGOFFICE 89-984O WASHINGTON1976 For sale by the Superintendentof DocumentsU.S GovernmentPrintingOffice WashingtonD.C 20402 Price$7.65 SENATESELECTCOMMITTEETO STUDYGOVERNMENTALOPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES FRANKCHURCHIdaho Chairman JOHNG TOWERTexasViceChairman PHILIPA HARTMichigan HOWARDH BAKERJR.Tennessee WALTERF MONDALEMinnesota BARRYGOLDWATER Arizona WAIITERD HUDDLESTON Kentucky CHARLESMcCMATHIASJR. Maryland ROBERTMORGANNorthCarolina RICHARDS SCHWEIKERPennsylvania GARYHARTColorado WILLIAM G MILLRR StaffDirector FREDERICK A O SCHWARZ Jr. ChiefCounsel CURTIS R SMOTHERS Counselto theMinority AUDREY HATRYClerkoftheCommittee CONTENTS Letter of Transmittal Page v COINTELPRO The FBI's Covert Action Programs Against American Citizens 1 Dr Martin Luther King Jr. CaseStudy 79 The FBI's CovertActionProgram To Destroy The Black Panther Party 185 The Use of Informants In FBI Intelligence Investigations 225 Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance 271 Warrantless Surreptitious Entries FBI "Black Bag Break-ins And MicrophoneInstallations 353 The Developmentof FBI DomesticIntelligence Investigations 373 DomesticCIA and FBI Mail Opening 559 CIA Intelligence CollectionAbout Americans CHAOSProgram And The Officeof Security 679 National Security AgencySurveillanceAffectingAmericans 733 Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens By The Military 785 The Internal RevenueService An Intelligence Resourceand Collector 835 National Security Civil Liberties And The Collectionof Intelligence A Report On The Huston Plan 921 Staff List 987 (v) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities and pursuant to the mandate of Senate Resolution 21 I am transmitting herewith to the Senate thirteen detailed staff reports set forth in this volume which supplement Book II of the Committee's final report entitled Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans These staff reports present in substantially greater detail the results of the Committee's inquiry into various areas which were highlighted in the final report Once again I want to gratefully acknowledge the great effort dedica tion and talent of the Committee staff The principal authors and edi tors of these reports are indicated in Appendix C of Book II of the final report Finally I want to express the deep appreciation of the Committee to Senator Walter F Mondale for his excellent supervision of the prepa ration of these reports as Chairman of the Domestic Intelligence Subcommittee FRANKCHURCH Chairman (1) COINTELPRO THE FBI's COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS CONTENTS Page I Introduction and Summary 3 A "Counterintelligence program" a misnomer for domestic covert action 4 B Who were the targets 4 1 The five targeted groups 4 2 Labels without meaning 4 C What were the purposes of COINTELPRO 5 1 Protecting national security 5 2 Preventing violence 6 3 Maintaining the existing social and political order 6 D What techniques wereused 7 1 The techniques of wartime 7 2 Techniques carrying a serious risk of physical emo tional or economic damage 9 E Legal restrictions were ignored 10 F Command and control 11 1 1956 71 11 2 Post-1971 12 G Termination 12 1 The grey area between counterintelligenceand inves tigation 12 2 Is COINTELPRO continuing 13 3 The future of COINTELPRO 14 II The Five Domestic Programs 15 A Origins 15 B The programs 16 1 CPUSA 16 2 The 1960expansion 17 3 Socialist Workers Party 17 4 White hate 18 5 Black nationalist-hate groups 20 6 The Panther directives 22 7 New Left 23 8 New Left directives 24 III The Goals of COINTELPRO Preventing or Disrupting the Exer ciseof First Amendment Rights 27 A Efforts to prevent speaking 28 B Efforts to prevent teaching 29 C Efforts to prevent writing and publishing 30 D Efforts to prevent meeting 31 IV COINTELPRO techniques 33 A Propaganda 34 1 Reprint mailings 34 2 "Friendly media 35 3 Bureau-authored pamphlets and fliers 37 B Efforts to promote enmity and factionalism within groups or betweengroups 40 1 Encouragingviolencebetweenrival groups 40 2 Anonymousmailings 43 3 Interviews 44 4 Usinginformantsto raise controversialissues 44 5 Fictitious organizations 45 6 Labelingtargets as informants 46 2 IV COINTELPRO Techniques Continued Page C Usinghostilethird parties against target groups 49 D Disseminating derogatory information to family friends and associates 50 E Contacts with employers 56 F Use and abuse of Government processes 57 1 Selectivelaw enforcement 57 2 Interference with judicial process 58 3 Candidates and political appointees 59 4 Investigating committees 60 G Exposing "Communist infiltration of groups 60 V Commandand Control The ProblemofOversight 62 A Within the Bureau 62 1 Internal administration 62 2 Coordination 62 3 Results 62 4 Blurred distinction between counterintelligence and investigation 63 5 Inspection 63 B Outsidethe Bureau 1956-71 64 1 Executivebranch 65 2 The Cabinet 69 3 Legislativebranch 70 C Outsidethe Bureau Post-1971 73 VI Epilogue 76 (3) COINTELPRO THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS I INTRODUCTIONANDSUMMARY COINTELPRO is the FBI acronym for a series of covert action programs directed against domestic groups In these programs the Bureau went beyond the collection of intelligence to secret action de signed to "disrupt and "neutralize target groups and individuals The techniques were adopted wholesale from wartime counterintelli gence and ranged from the trivial (mailing reprints of Reader's Digest articles to college administrators) to the degrading (sending anonymous poison-pen letters intended to break up marriages) and the dangerous (encouraging gang warfare and falsely labeling members of a violent group as police informers) This report is based on a staff study of more than 20,000 pages of Bureau documents depositions of many of the Bureau agents involved in the programs and interviews of several COINTELPRO targets The examples selected for discussion necessarily represent a small per centage of the more than 2,000 approved COINTELPRO actions Nevertheless the cases demonstrate the consequences of a Government agency's decision to take the law into its own hands for the "greater good of the country COINTELPRO began in 1956 in part because of frustration with Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceed overtly against dissident groups it ended in 1971 with the threat of public exposure.l In the intervening 15 years the Bureau conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propa gation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter violence. Many of the techniques used would be intolerable in a democratic society even if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity but COINTELPRO went far beyond that The unexpressed major premise of the programs was that a law enforcement agency has the duty to do whatever is necessary to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order OnMarch8 1971the FBI resident agencyin Media Pennslyvania was broken into Documentsstolen in the break-in were widely circulated and published by the press Since some documents carried a "COINTELPRO caption a word unknown outside the Bureau Carl Stern a reporter for NBC commenceda Freedomof Information Act lawsuit to compelthe Bureau to produceother docu ments relating to the programs The Bureau decided because of "security reasons to terminate them on April 27 1971 (Memorandumfrom C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 4/27/71 Letter from FBI headquarters to all SAC's 4/28/71.) 2The Bureau's direct attacks on speaking teaching writing and meeting are discussed at pp 28-33 attempts to prevent the growth of groups are set forth at pp 34-40 4 "Counterintelligence Program" A Misnomer for Domestic Covert Action COINTELPRO is an acronym for "counterintelligence program. Counterintelligence is defined as those actions by an intelligence agency intended to protect its own security and to undermine hostile intelligence operations Under COI NTELPRO certain techniques the Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adopted for use against perceived domestic threats to the established political and social order The formal programs which incorporated these tech niques were therefore also called "counterintelligence. 'a "Covert action is however a more accurate terns for the Bureau's programs directed against American citizens "Covert action is the label applied to clandestine activities intended to influence political choices and social values. Who Were the Targets The Five Targeted Groups The Bureau's covert action programs were aimed at five perceived threats to domestic tranquility the "Communist Party USA pro gram (1956 71) the "Socialist Workers Party program (1961 69) the "White Hate Group program (1964 71) the "Black Nationalist Hate Group program (1967 71) and the "New Left program (1968 71) Labels Without Meaning The Bureau's titles for its programs should not be accepted un critically They imply a precision of definition and of targeting which did not exist Even the names of the later programs had no clear definition The Black Nationalist program according to its supervisor included "a great number of organizations that you might not today characterize as black nationalist but which were iii fact primarily black. as In deed the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference was labeled as a Black Nationalist "Hate Group. 4 Nor could anyone at the Bureau even define "New Left, except as "more or less an at titude. 5 Furthermore the actual targets were chosen from a far broader group than the names of the programs would imply The CPUSA program targeted not only Party members but also sponsors of the For a discussion of U.S intelligence activities against hostle foreign in telligenceoperations seeReport on Counterintelligence See Senate Select CommitteeReport "AllegedAssassination Plots Involving ForeignLeaders and Staff Report "CovertActionin Chile. 8 BlackNationalist Supervisordeposition 10/17/75 p 12 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 8/25/67 p 2 New Left Supervisor's deposition 10/28/75 p 8 The closestany Bureau docu ment comes to a definition is found in an investigative directive "The term 'New Left does not refer to a definite organization but to a movementwhich is providing ideologies or platforms alternate to those of existing communist and other basic revolutionary organizations the so-called 'Old Left. The New Left movement is a loosely-bound free-wheeling college-oriented movement spearheaded by the Students for a Demorcatic Society and includes the more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and anti-draft protest organizations. (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 10/28/68 Hearings Vol 6 Exhibit 61 p 669.) Although this characterization is longer than that of the New Left Supervisor it does not appear to be substantively different 5 National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee 6 and civil rights leaders allegedly under Communist in fluence or simply not "anti-Communist." The Socialist Workers Party program included non-SWP sponsors of antiwar demonstra tions which were cosponsored by the SWP or the Young Socialist Al liance its youth group.6 The Black Nationalist program targeted a range of organizations from the Panthers to SNCC to the peaceful Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and included most black student groups. New Left targets ranged from the SDS 11to the In teruniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,12 from all of Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left") 13to the New Mexico Free University 14and other "alternate schools,l5 and from under ground newspapers 16to students protesting university censorship of a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on them. C What Were the Purposes of COINTELPRO The breadth of targeting and lack of substantive content in the descriptive titles of the programs reflect the range of motivations for COINTELPRO activity protecting national security preventing violence and maintaining the existing social and political order by "disrupting and "neutralizing groups and individuals perceived as threats 1 Protecting National Security The first COINTELPRO against the CPUSA was instituted to counter what the Bureau believed to be a threat to the national security As the chief of the COINTELPRO unit explained it We were trying first to develop intelligence so we would know what they were doing [and] second to contain the threat.. To stop the spread of communism to stop the effectiveness of the Communist Party as a vehicle of Soviet intelligence propaganda and agitation.175 Had the Bureau stopped there perhaps the term "counterintel ligence would have been an accurate label for the program The ex 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office 11/6/64 'One civil rights leader the subject of at least three separate counterintel ligence actions under the CPUSA caption was targeted because there was no "direct evidence that he was a communist "neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-communist. One of the actions utilized information gained from a wiretap the other two involveddissemination of personal life in formation (Memorandumfrom J.A Sizooto W.C Sullivan 2/4/64 Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/12/64 Memoranda from FBI Headquarters to NewYork Field Office3/26/64 and 4/10/64 Memorandum to New York Field Officefrom FBI Headquarters 4/21/64 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquaters to Baltimore Field Office10/6/65.) 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office 11/29/68 FBI Headquarters memorandum 8/25/67 p 2 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Jackson Field Office 2/8/71 pp 1-211Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San AntonioField Office10/31/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/26/66 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office 6/18/68 1 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to AlbuquerqueField Office3/14/69 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office7/13/69 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office11/14/69 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office 11/4/68 1TiCOINTELPROUnit Chiefdeposition 10/16/75 p 14 6 pansion of the CPUSA program to non-Communists however and the addition of subsequent programs make it clear that other pur poses were also at work Preventing Violence One of these purposes was the prevention of violence Every Bureau witness deposed stated that the purpose of the particular program or programs with which he was associated was to deter violent acts by the target groups although the witnesses differed in their assessment of how successful the programs were in achieving that goal The pre ventive function was not however intended to be a product of specific proposals directed at specific criminal acts Rather the programs were aimed at groups which the Bureau believed to be violent or to have the potential for violence The programs were to prevent violence by deterring membership in the target groups even if neither the particular member nor the group was violent at the time As the supervisor of the Black National ist COINTELPRO put it "Obviously you are going to prevent vio lence or a greater amount of violence if you have smaller groups. (Black Nationalist supervisor deposition 10/17/75 p 24.) The COIN TELPRO unit chief agreed "We also made an effort to deter or counteract the propaganda and to deter recruitment where we could This was done with the view that if we could curb the organiza tion we could curb the action or the violence within the organiza tion. lTb In short the programs were to prevent violence indirectly rather than directly by preventing possibly violent citizens from joining or continuing to associate with possibly violent groups.i8 The prevention of violence is clearly not in itself an improper purpose preventing violence is the ultimate goal of most law enforce ment Prosecution and sentencing are intended to deter future crimi nal behavior not only of the subject but also of others who might break the law In that sense law enforcement legitimately attempts the indirect prevention of possible violence and if the methods used are proper raises no constitutional issues When the government goes beyond traditional law enforcement methods however and attacks group membership and advocacy it treads on ground forbidden to it by the Constitution In Brandenberg v Ohio 395 U.S 411 (1969) the Supreme Court held that the government is not permitted to "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is directed toward inciting or producing imminent law less action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the ab sence of such clear and present danger the government cannot act against speech nor presumably against association Maintaining the Existing Social and Political Order Protecting national security and preventing violence are the pur poses advanced by the Bureau for COINTELPRO There is another purpose for COINTELPRO which is not explicit but which offers "bUnit Chiefdeposition 10/16/75 p 54 18"Possibly violent did not necessarily mean likely to be violent Concededly non-violentgroups were targeted because they might someday change Martin Luther King Jr was targeted because (amongother things) he might "abandon his supposedobedienceto white liberal doctrines (non-violence)and embrace black nationalism. (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 3/4/68 p 3.) 7 the only explanation for those actions which had no conceivable ra tional relationship to either national security or violent activity The unexpressed major premise of much of COINTELPRO is that the Bureau has a role in maintaining the existing social order and that its efforts should be aimed toward combating those who threaten that order.19 The "New Left COINTELPRO presents the most striking exam ple of this attitude As discussed earlier the Bureau did not define the term "New Left, and the range of targets went far beyond alleged "subversives or "extremists. Thus for example two student par ticipants in a "free speech demonstration were targeted because they defended the use of the classic four-letter word Significantly they were made COINTELPRO subjects even though the demonstration "does not appear to be inspired by the New Left because it "shows obvious disregard for decency and established morality. 20In another case reprints of a newspaper article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says Withdrawal Not the Answer were mailed to members of the Vietnam Day Committee "to convince [them] of the correctness of the U.S for eign policy in Vietnam. 21Still another document inveighs against the "liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left which were "taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies. 22 Upholding decency and established morality defending the correctness of U.S foreign policy and attack ing those who thought the Chicago police used undue force have no apparent connection with the expressed goals of protecting national security and preventing violence These documents among others examined compel the conclusion that Federal law enforcement offi cers looked upon themselves as guardians of the status quo The at titude should not be a surprise the difficulty lies in the choice of weapons D What Techniques Were Used 1 The Techniques of Wartime Under the COINTELPRO programs the arsenal of techniques used against foreign espionage agents was transferred to domestic enemies As William C Sullivan former Assistant to the Director put it This is a rough tough dirty business and dangerous It was dangerous at times No holds were barred We have used [these techniques] against Soviet agents They have used [them] against us [The same methods were] brought home against any organization against which we were tar geted We did not differentiate This is a rough tough busi ness.23 Mr Sullivan's description rough tough and dirty is accurate In the course of COINTELPRO's fifteen-year history a number of in "This attitude toward change is apparent in many of those Bureau activities investigated by the Committee It played a large part in the Martin Luther King Jr case whichis the subject of a separate report FBI Headquarters memorandum 11/4/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office11/1/65 "Memorandum from Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 8/29/64 pp 1-8 William C Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 pp 97-98 8 dividual actions may have violated specific criminal statutes 24a num ber of individual actions involved risk of serious bodily injury or death to the targets (at least four assaults were reported as "re sults") 25and a number of actions while not illegal or dangerous can only be described as "abhorrent in a free society. 26On the other hand many of the actions were more silly than repellent The Bureau approved 2,370 separate counterintelligence actions.27 Their techniques ranged from anonymously mailing reprints of news paper and magazine articles (sometimes Bureau-authored or planted) to group members or supporters to convince them of the error of their ways,28 to mailing anonymous letters to a member's spouse accusing the target of infidelity 29from using informants to raise controver sial issues at meetings in order to cause dissent,30 to the "snitch jacket (falsely labeling a group member as an informant),31 and encourag ing street warfare between violent groups 32from contacting mem bers of a "legitimate group to expose the alleged subversive back ground of a fellow member,33 to contacting an employer to get a tar get fired 34 from attempting to arrange for reporters to interview targets with planted questions,35 to trying to stop targets from speak ing at all 36from notifying state and local authorities of a target's criminal law violations,37 to using the IRS to audit a professor not just to collect any taxes owing but to distract him from his political activities.38 2 A memorandum prepared for the Justice Department Committee which studied COINTELPROin 1974stated that COINTELPROactivities "may have violated the Civil Rights statute the mail and wire fraud statutes and the pro hibition against divulging information gained from wiretaps (Memorandum to H E Petersen 4/25/74.) Internal Bureau documents show that Bureau officialsbelieved sending threats through the mail might violate federal extor tion statutes (See e.g. Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office2/19/71.) Such threats were mailed or telephoned on several occasions "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office 1/30/70 "Hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights 11/20/74 p 11 The Petersen Committee composedof Department of Justice attorneys and Bureau agents was formed in 1974at the request of Attorney General Saxbe to investigate COINTELPRO Its conclusionsare discussed on Pp 73-76 273,247actions were proposed E.g. Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 11/1/65 TBE.g. Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 11/26/68 30E.g. Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/12/68 E.g. Memorandumfrom Newark Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/3/69 The term "snitch jacket is not part of Bureau jargon it was used by those familiar with the Bureau's activities directed against the Black Panther Party in a staff interview E.g. Memorandumfrom ColumbiaField Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/4/70 E.g. Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to ChicagoField Office8/2/68 E.g. Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Cleveland and Boston Field Offices5/5/64 'E.g. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office 11/18/69 'E.g. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office 4/6/70 "E.g. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office 11/19/70 "E.g. Memorandum from Midwest City Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/1/68 9 2 Techniques Carrying A Serious Risk of Physical Emotional or Economic Damage The Bureau recognized that some techniques were more likely than others to cause serious physical emotional or economic damage to the targets Any proposed use of those techniques was scrutinized care fully by headquarters supervisory personnel in an attempt to balance the "greater good to be achieved by the proposal against the known or risked harm to the target If the "good was sufficient the proposal was approved.39 For instance in discussing anonymous letters to spouses the agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO stated [Before recommending approval] I would want to know what you want to get out of this who are these people If it's somebody and say they did split up what would accrue from it as far as disrupting the New Left is concerned Say they broke up what then.. [The question would be] is it worth it 3sa Similarly with regard to the "snitch jacket technique falsely labeling a group member as a police informant the chief of the Racial Intelligence Section stated You have to be able to make decisions and I am sure that labeling somebody as an informant that you'd want to make certain that it served a good purpose before you did it and not do it haphazardly It is a serious thing As far as I am aware in the black extremist area by using that tech nique no one was killed I am sure of that.40 Moore was asked whether the fact that no one was killed was the result of "luck or planning. He answered "Oh it just happened that way I am sure. 71 It is thus clear that as Sullivan said "No holds were barred,) 42 although some holds were weighed more carefully than others When the willingness to use techniques which were concededly dan gerous or harmful to the targets is combined with the range of pur poses and criteria by which these targets were chosen the result is neither "within bounds nor "justified in a free society.43 '9Mechanically the Bureau's programs were administered at headquarters but individual actions were proposed and usually carried out by the field A field proposal under the COINTELPRO caption would be routed to a special agent supervising that particular program During most of COINTELPRO's history that supervisor was a memberof the sectionat the DomesticIntelligence Division with investigative responsibility for the subject of the proposal The supervisor's recommendationthen went up through the Bureau hierarchy Pro posals were rarely approved below the level of Assistant Director in charge of the Division and often were approvedby oneof the top three men in the Bureau 3 New Left supervisor testimony 10/28/75 pp 72 74 '0GeorgeC Mooretestimony 11/3/75 p 62 Moore 11/3/75 p 64 Sullivan 11/1/75 p K 4 James B Adamstestimony 11/19/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 73 75 10 E Legal Restrictions Were Ignored What happened to turn a law enforcement agency into a law viola tor Why do those involved still believe their actions were not only defensible but right 44 The answers to these questions are found in a combination of factors the availability of information showing the targets vulnerability gathered through the unrestrained collection of domestic intelligence the belief both within and without the Bureau that it could handle any problem and frustration with the apparent inability of tradi tional law enforcement methods to solve the problems presented There is no doubt that Congress and the public looked to the Bureau for protection against domestic and foreign threats As the COINTEL PRO unit chief stated At this time [the mid-1950s] there was a general philosophy too the general attitude of the public at this time was you did not have to worry about Communism because the FBI would take care of it Leave it to the FBI I hardly know an agent who would ever go to a social affair or something if he were introduced as FBI the comment would be "we feel very good because we know you are han dling the threat. We were handling the threat with what directives and statutes were available There did not seem to be any strong interest of anybody to give us stronger or better defined statutes.45 Not only was no one interested in giving the Bureau better statutes (nor for that matter did the Bureau request them),but the Supreme Court drastically narrowed the scope of the statutes available The Bureau personnel involved trace the institution of the first formal counterintelligence program to the Supreme Court reversal of the Smith Act convictions The unit chief testified The Supreme Court rulings had rendered the Smith Act technically unenforceable... It made it ineffective to prose cute Communist Party members made it impossible to prose cute Communist Party members at the time.46 This belief in the failure of law enforcement produced the subsequent COINTELPROs as well The unit chief continued 44The unit chief stated "The Bureau peopledid not think that they weredoing anything wrong and most of us to this day do not think we were doing anything wrong. (Unit chief 10/16/75 p 102.) Moorefelt the same way "I thought I did something very important during those days I have no apologies to make for anything wedid really. (Moore11/3/75 p 25.) u Unit chief 10/16/75 pp 11 12 14 Unit chief 10/10/75 pp 12-14 Deputy AssociateDirector Adams testimony ou COINTELPROnoted that "interpretations as to the constitutionality of [the Smith Act of 1940]leave us with a statute still on the booksthat proscribes cer tain actions but yet the degree of proof necessary to operate under the few remaining areas is such that there was no satisfactory way to proceed. (Adams testimony 11/19/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 71.) In fact the Smith Act decisions did not comedown until 1957 Perhaps the witnesses were referring to Commu nist Party v Subversive Activities Control Board 351 U.S 115 (1956) which held that testimony by "tainted Governmentwitnesses required remanding the case to the Board 11 The other COINTELPRO programs were opened as the threat arose in areas of extremism and subversion and there were not adequate statutes to proceed against the organiza tion or to prevent their activities.47 Every Bureau witness deposed agreed that his particular COINTELPRO was the result of tremendous pressure on the Bureau to do something about a perceived threat coupled with the inability of law enforcement techniques to cope with the situation either because there were no pertinent federal statutes,4 or because local law enforce ment efforts were stymied by indifference or the refusal of those in charge to call the police Outside pressure and law enforcement frustration do not of course fully explain COINTELPRO Perhaps after all the best explanation was proffered by George C Moore the Racial Intelligence Section chief The FBI's counterintelligence program came up because there was a point if you have anything in the FBI you have an action-oriented group of people who see something happen ing and want to do something to take its place.49 F Command and Control 1 1956 71 While that "action-oriented group of people was proceeding with fifteen years of COINTELPRO activities where were those respon sible for the supervision and control of the Bureau Part of the answer lies in the definition of "covert action" clandestine activities No one outside the Bureau was supposed to know that COINTELPRO ex isted Even within the Bureau the programs were handled on a "need to-know basis Nevertheless the Bureau has supplied the Committee with docu ments which support its contention that various Attorneys General advisors to Presidents members of the House Appropriations Sub committee and in 1958 the Cabinet were at least put on notice of the existence of the CPL SA and White Hate COINTELPROs The Bureau cannot support its claim that anyone outside the FBI was informed of the existence of the Socialist Workers Party Black Nationalist or New Left COINTELPROs and even those letters or 4 Unit chief 10/16/75 p 15 One witness also pointed out that while the federal antiriot and antibomb ing statutes were not passed until 1968 inadequate statutes were not the only problem Statutes directed at specificcriminal acts would only have served to allow prosecution after the crime they wouldnot have prevented the act in the first place He also stated that he did not believe it would be possible to pass a statute which would have given the Bureau the tools necessary to prevent violence by disrupting the growth of violence-proneorganizations "because of something called the United States Constitution. When asked whether that an swer implied that preventing the growth of an organization is unconstitutional he answered "I think so. (Black Nationalist supervisor 10/1/75 pp 25-26.) He was the only Bureau witness who had reservations about COINTELPRO's constitutionality Another witness gave a more typical response When asked whether anybody at any time during the course of the programs discussedtheir constitutionality or legal authority he replied "No we never gave it a thought. (Moore 11/3/75 p 83.) sMoore 11/3/75 p 79 12 briefings which referred (usually indirectly) to the CPUSA and White Hate COINTELPROs failed to mention the use of techniques which risked physical emotional or economic damage to their targets In any event there is no record that any of these officials asked to know more and none of them appears to have expressed disapproval based on the information they were given As the history of the Domestic Intelligence Division shows the absence of disapproval has been interpreted by the Bureau as suffi cient authorization to continue an activity (and occasionally even express disapproval has not sufficed to stop a practice) Perhaps however the crux of the "command and control problem lies in the testimony by one former Attorney General that he was too busy to know what the Bureau was doing, and by another that as a matter of political reality he could not have stopped it anyway.51 2 Post 1971 Whether the Attorney General can control the Bureau is still an open question The Petersen Committee which was formed within the Justice Department to investigate COINTELPRO at Attorney General Saxbe's request worked only with Bureau-prepared summaries of the COINTELPRO files.52 Further the fact that the Department of Justice must work with the Bureau on a day-to-day basis may influence the Department's judgment on Bureau activities.52 G Termination If COINTELPRO had been a short-lived aberration the thorny problems of motivation techniques and control presented might be safely relegated to history However COINTELPRO existed for years on an "ad hoc basis before the formal programs were instituted and more significantly COINTELPRO-type activities may continue today under the rubric of "investigation. 1 The Grey Area Between Counterintelligence and Investiga tion The word "counterintelligence had no fixed meaning even before the programs were terminated The Bureau witnesses agreed that there is a large grey area between "counterintelligence and "aggressive investigation, and that headquarters supervisors sometimes had diffi culty in deciding which caption should go on certain proposals.54 Aggressive investigation continues and may be even more disrup tive than covert action An anonymous letter (COINTELPRO) can be ignored as the work of a crank an overt approach by the Bureau RamseyClark testimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 249 NicholasdeB Katzenbach testimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 217 These summaries were the point of departure far the Select Committee's investigation but were deemedunsatisfactory for a completeinquiry 'For instance the Department is defending litigation commencedagainst the Bureau by COINTELPROvictims who happen to have received their files through Freedom of Information Act requests More such litigation may arise as more targets learn of Bureau actions taken against them The New Left supervisor stated "[The COINTELPROcaption was] as much as it was anything else and administrative deviceto channel the mail to the Bu reau we get back to this old argument between the supervisors not argu ment but discussion betweenthe supervisors it falls on yours no it doesn't it's yours. (NewLeft Supervisor 10/28/75 p 49.) 13 ("investigation") is not so easily dislnissed.55 The line between infor mation collection and harassment can be extremely thin 2 Is COINTELPRO Continuing COINTELPRO-type activities which are clearly not within the "grey area between COINTELPRO and investigation have continued on at least three occasions Although all COINTELPROs were offi cially terminated "for security reasons on April 27 1971 the docu ments discontinuing the program provided In exceptional circumstances where it is considered counter intelligence action is warranted recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains These recommendations will be considered on an individual basis.56 The Committee requested that the Bureau provide it with a list of any "COINTELPRO-type actions since April 28 1971 The Bureau first advised the Committee that a review failed to develop any infor mation indicating post-termination COINTELPRO activity Subse quently the Bureau located and furnished to the Committee two instances of COINTELPRO-type operations.57 The Committee has discovered a third instance four months after COINTELPRO was terminated information on an attorney's political background was furnished to friendly newspaper sources under the so-called "Mass Media Program, intended to discredit both the attorney and his client.58 The Committee has not been able to determine with any greater precision the extent to which COINTELPRO may be continuing Any proposals to initiate COINTELPRO-type action would be filed under the individual case caption The Bureau has over 500,000 case files and each one would have to be searched In this context it should be "The Bureau can and does reveal its interest in the subjects of investigation to employees family members and neighbors The Black Nationalist super visor explained "Generally speaking we should not be giving out information to somebodywe are trying to get information from As a practical matter some times we have to The mere fact that you contact somebody about someone gives them the indication that the FBI is interested in that person. (Black Nationalist deposition 10/17/75 p 16) See also the statement of the Social Workers Party 10/2/75 which details more than 200 incidents involving its members since COINTELPRO's termination The SWP believes these to be as disruptive as the formal SWP COINTELPRO Memorandum from Charles D Brennan to William C Sullivan 4/27/71 Hearings Vol 6 Exhibit 55-3 In oneinstance a fieldofficewas authorized to contact the editor of a South ern newspaper to suggest that he have reporters interview Klan members and write an article basedon those interviews The editor was also furnished informa tion on Klan use of the polygraph to "weed out FBI informants. Accordingto the Bureau "subsequentpublication of the Klan's activities resulted in a number of Klan officialsceasing their activities. (Letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee 10/24/75.) The second case involved an anonymous letter and de rogatory newspaper clipping which were sent to a Black Panther Party officein the Northeast to discredit a Panther leader's abilities (Letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee 9/24/75.) It should be noted that Charles Colsonspent sevenmonths in jail for similar activity involvingthe client 14 noted that a Bureau search of all field office COINTELPRO files revealed the existence of five operations in addition to those known to the Petersen committee.59 A search of all investigative files might be similarly productive 3 The Future of COINTELPRO Attitudes within and without the Bureau demonstrate a continued belief by some that covert action against American citizens is permis sible if the need for it is strong enough When the Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO was released Director Kelley responded "For the FBI to have done less under the circumstances would have been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people. He also restated his "feeling that the FBI's counterintelligence pro grams had an impact on the crises of the time and therefore that they helped to bring about a favorable change in this country. 60In his testimony before the Select ,Committee Director Kelley continued to defend COINTELPRO albeit with some reservations What I said then in 1974 ,and what I believe today is that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they felt was expected of them by the President the Attorney Gen eral the Congress and the people of the United States.. Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Coun terintelligence Programs and there were some substantial ones should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role in the FBI's case as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an immi nent threat to human life or property.62 Nor is the Director alone in his belief that faced with sufficient threat covert disruption is justified The Department of Justice pro mulgated tentative guidelines for the Bureau which would have per mitted the Attorney General to authorize "preventive action where Letter from Attorney General Edward H Levi to the Senate Select Commit mittee 5/23/75 These included (1) 37 actions authorized between 1960 and 1971"aimed at militant groups which sought Puerto Rican independence (2) "Operation Hoodwink, from October 1966to July 1968 "aimed at putting orga nized crime elements in competition with the Communist Party USA (3) a 1961program targeted against "a foreign-dominated group (4) two actions taken betweenJanuary 1969and March 1971against "a foreign nationality group in the United States and (5) seven actions between 1961 and 1968 against members leaders and factions of "a foreign communistparty. The FBI's operations against "a foreign communistparty indicate that the Bureau as well as the CIA has engagedin covert action abroad "Clarence M Kelley testimony House Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee hearings 11/20/74 pp 44-45 This statement appears to be an explicit recognitionthat one purpose of COINTELPROwas to influencepolitical events 'Clarence M Kelley testimony 12/10/75 Hearings vol 6 p 283 284 Affirmativelegal steps to meet an imminent threat to life or property are of course quite proper The difficulty with the Director's statement juxtaposed as it was with a discussionof COINTELPRO is that the threats COINTELPRO purported to meet were not imminent the techniques used were sometimes illegal and the purposeswent far beyondthe prevention of death or destruction 15 there is a substantial possibility that violence will occur and "prose cution is impracticable. Although those guidelines have now been dropped the principle has not been rejected II THE FIVEDOMESTICPROGRAMS A Origin The origins of COINTELPRO .are rooted in the Bureau's jurisdic tion to investigate hostile foreign intelligence activities on American soil Counterintelligence of course goes beyond investigation it is affirmative action taken to neutralize hostile agents The Bureau believed its wartime counterattacks on foreign agents to be effective and what works against one enemy will work against another In the atmosphere of the Cold War the American Communist Party was viewed as a deadly threat to national security In 1956 the Bureau decided that a formal counterintelligence pro gram coordinated from headquarters would be an effective weapon in the fight against Communism The first COINTELPRO was there fore initiated.83 The CPUSA COINTELPRO accounted for more than half of all approved proposals.64 The Bureau personnel involved believed that the success of the program one action was described as "the most effective single blow ever dealt the organized communist move ment 65 made counterintelligence techniques the weapons of choice whenever the Bureau assessed a new and in its view equally serious threat to the country As noted earlier law enforcement frustration also played a part in the origins of each COINTELPRO In each case Bureau wit nesses testified that the lack of adequate statutes uncooperative or ineffective local police or restrictive court rulings had made it impos sible to use traditional law enforcement methods against the tar geted groups Additionally a certain amount of empire building may have been at work Under William C Sullivan the Domestic Intelligence Divi sion greatly expanded its jurisdiction Klan matters were transferred in 1964 to the Intelligence Division from the General Investigative Division black nationalist groups were added in 1967 and just as the Old Left appeared to be dying out, the New Left was gradually added to the work of the Division's Internal Security Section in the late 1960s Finally it is significant that the five domestic COINTELPROs were started against the five groups which were the subject of inten sified investigative programs Of course the fact that such intensive investigative programs were started at all reflects the Bureau's proc ess of threat assessment the greater the threat the more need to "Memorandum from Alan Belmont to L V Boardman 8/28/56 Hearings vol 6 exhibit 12 1,388of a total of 2,370 "Excerpt from materials prepared for the FBI Director's briefingof the House AppropriationsSubcommitteeFY 1966p 2 Accordingto Sullivan membershipin the CommunistParty declinedsteadily through the '60s When the CPUSAmembershipdropped belowa certain figure Director Hoover ordered that the membership figures be classified Sullivan believes that this was done to protect the Bureau's appropriations (Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 33-34.) 16 know about it (intelligence) and the more impetus to counter it (covert action) More important however the mere existence of the additional information gained through the investigative pro grams inevitably demonstrated those particular organizational or personal weaknesses which were vulnerable to disruption COIN TELPRO demonstrates the dangers inherent in the overbroad col lection of domestic intelligence when information is available it can bo and was improperly used B The Programs Before examining each program in detail some general observa tions may be useful Each of the five domestic COINTELPROs had certain traits in common As noted above each program used tech niques learned from the Bureau's wartime efforts against hostile foreign agents Each sprang from frustration with the perceived inability of law enforcement to deal with what the Bureau believed to be a serious threat to the country Each program depended on an intensive intelligence effort to provide the information used to dis rupt the target groups The programs also differ to some extent The White Hate program for example was very precisely targeted each of the other programs spread to a number of groups which do not appear to fall within any clear parameters.67 In fact with each subsequent COINTELPRO the targeting became more diffuse The White Hate COINTELPRO also used comparatively few techniques which carried a risk of serious physical emotional or eco nomic damage to the targets while the Black Nationalist COIN TELPRO used such techniques extensively The New Left COIN TELPRO on the other hand had the highest proportion of proposals aimed at preventing the exercise of free speech Like the progression in targeting the use of dangerous degrading or blatantly uncon stitutional techniques also appears to have become less restrained with each subsequent program 1 CPUSA. The first official COINTELPRO program against the Communist Party USA was started in August 1956 with Direc tor Hoover's approval Although the formal program was instituted in 1956 COINTELPRO-type activities had gone on for years The memorandum recommending the program refers to prior actions constituting "harassment, which were generated by the field during the course of the Bureau's investigation of the Communist Party.88 'These prior actions were instituted on an ad hoc basis as the oppor tunity arose As Sullivan testified "[Before 1956] we were engaged in COINTELPRO tactics divide confuse weaken in diverse ways an organization [Before 1956] it was more sporadic It depended on a given office . 1i6 In 1956 a series of field conferences was held to discuss the develop ment of new security informants The Smith Act trials and related proceedings had exposed over 100 informants leaving the Bureau's "For instance the Southern Christian Leadership Conference was targeted as a "Black Nationalist-Hate Group. (Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's 3/4/68 p 4.) 'Memorandum from Alan Belmont to L V Boardman 8/28/56 Hearings Vol 6 exhibit 12 Sullivantestimony 11/1/75 pp 42-43 17 intelligence apparatus in some disarray During the field conferences a fornial counterintelligence program was reconnended partly be cause of the gaps in the informant ranks. Since the Bureau had evidence that until the late 1940s the CPUSA had been "blatantly involved in Soviet espionage and believed that the Soviets were continuing to use the Party for "political and intel ligence purposes, 71 there was no clear line of demarcation in the Bureau's switch from foreign to domestic counterintelligence The initial areas of concentration were the use of informants to capitalize on the conflicts within the Party over Nikita Khrushchev's denuncia tion of Stalin to prevent the CP's efforts to take over (via a merger) a broad-based socialist group to encourage the Socialist Workers Party in its attacks on the CP and to use the IRS to investigate under ground CP members who either failed to file or filed under false names As the program proceeded other targets and techniques were de veloped but until 1960 the CPUSA targets were Party members and the techniques were primarily aimed at the Party organization (fac tionalism public exposure etc.) The 1960 Expansion. In March 1960 CPUSA COINTELPRO field offices received a directive to intensify counterintelligence efforts to prevent Communist infiltration ("COMINFIL") of mass organizations ranging from the NAACP 72to a local scout troop.73 The usual technique would be to tell a leader of the organization about the alleged Communist iii its midst the target of course being the alleged Communist rather than the organization In an increasing number of cases however both the alleged Communist and the organi zation were targeted usually by planting a news article about Com munists active in the organization For example a newsman was given information about Communist participation in a SANE march with the express purpose being to discredit SANE as well as the partici pants and another newspaper was alerted to plans of Bettina Apth eker to join a United Farm Workers picket line. The 1960 "COMIN FIL memorandum marks the beginning of the slide from targeting CP members to those allegedly under CP "influence (such civil rights leaders as Martin Luther King Jr.) to "fellow travelers (those tak ing positions supported by the Communists such as school integration increased minority hiring and opposition to HUAC.)75 Socialist Workers Party. The Socialist Workers Party ("SWP") COINTELPRO program was initiated on October 12 1961 by the headquarters supervisor handling the SWP desk (but with Hoover's concurrence) apparently on a theory of even-handed treat 7 As noted earlier Bureau personnel also trace the decisionto adopt counter intelligence methods to the Supreme Court decisionsoverturning the Smith Act convictions As the unit chief put it "The SupremeCourt rulings had rendered the Smith Act technically unenforceable It made it ineffectiveto prosecute Communist Party members made it impossible to prosecute CommunistParty membersat the time. (Unit chief 10/16/75 p.14) Unit chief 10/16/75 p 10 72Memorandumfrom New Haven Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/24/60 ' Memorandum from Milwaukee Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/13/60 PP 1-2 7dMemorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office9/13/68 7Sullivan 11/1/75 p 29 18 ment if the Bureau has a program against the CP it was only fair to have one against the Trotskyites (The COINTELPRO unit chief in response to a question about why the Bureau targeted the SWP in view of the fact that the SWP's hostility to the Communist Party had been useful in disrupting the CPSU A answered "I do not think that the Bureau discriminates against subversive organizations.") 79 The program was not given high priority only 45 actions were ap proved and was discontinued in 1969 two years before the other four programs ended (The SWP program was then subsumed in the New Left COINTEIPRO.) Nevertheless it marks an important departure from the CPUSA COINTELPRO although the SWP had contacts with foreign Trotskyite groups there was no evidence that the SWP was involved in espionage These were in C D Brennan's phrase "home grown tomatoes.) The Bureau has conceded that the SWP has never been engaged in organizational violence nor has it taken any criminal steps toward overthrowing the country.78 Nor sloes the Bureau claim the SWP was engaged in revolutionary acts The Party was targeted for its rhetoric significantly the orig inating letter points to the SWPs "open espousal of its line "through running candidates for public office and its direction and/or support of "such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South. Further the American people had to be alerted to the fact that "the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx Lenin and Engles as interpreted by Leon Trotsky. 's Like the CPUSA COINTELPRO non-Party members were also targeted particularly when the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (the SWP's youth group) started to co-sponsor antiwar marches.80 4 White Hate. The Klan COINTELPRO began on July 30 1964 with the transfer of the "responsibility for development of in formants .and gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division The memorandum recommending the reorgani zation also suggested that "counterintelligence and disruption tactics be given further study by I)II) and appropriate recommendations made. 81 79Unit chief 10/16/75 p 40 "Charles D Brennan testimony Senate Select Committee on Campaign Ac tivities 6/13/73 p 10 78Robert Shacklefordtestimony 2/6/76 pp 88-89 7 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters 0For example anonymousletters were sent to the parents of two nonmember students participating in a hunger strike against the war at a midwest college because the fast was sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance The letters warned that the students participation "could lead to injury to [their] health and damage [their] academicstanding, and alerted them to their sons "involve ment in left wing activities. It was hopedthat the parents would "protest to the collegethat the fast is being allowed and that the YoungSocialist Alliancewas permitted on campus (Memorandumfrom FBI headquarters to ClevelandField Office11/29/68.) 81Memorandumfrom J H Galeto Charles Tolsen 7/30/64 p 5 Opinionwithin the Division had been sharply divided on the merits of this transfer Somesaw it as an attempt to bring the Intelligence Division's expertise in penetrating secret organizations to bear on a problem Klan involvementin the murder of civil rights workers creating tremendous pressures on the Bureau to solve Traditional law enforcement methods were insufficient because of a lack of 19 Accordingly on September 2 1964 a directive was sent to seventeen field offices instituting a COINTELPRO against Klan-type and hate organizations "to expose disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activi ties of the various Klans and hate organizations their leadership and adherents. 82Seventeen Klan organizations and nine "hate organiza tions (e.g. American Nazi Party National States Rights Party etc.) were listed as targets The field offices were also instructed specifically to consider "Action Groups" "the relatively few individuals in each organization who use strong arm tactics and violent actions to achieve their ends. 83However counterintelligence proposals were not to be limited to these few but were to include any influential member if the opportunity arose As the unit chief stated The emphasis was on determining the identity and exposing and neutralizing the violence prone activities of "Action Groups, but also it was important to expose the unlawful activities of other Klan organizations We also made an effort to deter or counteract the propaganda and to deter violence and to deter recruitment where we could This was done with the view that if we could curb the organization we could curb the action or the violence within the organization.84 The White Hate COINTELPRO appears to have been limited with few exceptions,85 to the original named targets No "legitimate right wing organizations were drawn into the program in contrast with the earlier spread of the CPUSA and SWP programs to non members This precision has been attributed by the Bureau to the superior intel ligence on "hate groups received by excellent informant penetration Bureau witnesses believe the Klan program to have been highly effective The unit chief stated I think the Bureau got the job don... I think that one reason we were able to get the job done was that we were able to use counterintelligence techniques It is possible that we eventually could have done the job without counterintelli gence techniques I am not sure we could have done it as well or as quickly.80 This view was shared by George C Moore Section Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section which had responsibility for the White Hato and Black Nationalist COINTELPROs I think from what I have seen and what I have read as far as the counterintelligence program on the Klan is concerned that it was effective I think it was one of the most effective Federal statutes and the noncooperationof locallaw enforcement Others thought that the Rlan's activities were essentially a law enforcementproblem and that the transfer would dilute the Division's major internal security responsibility Those whoopposedthe transfer lost and trace many of the Division'ssubsequent difficulties to this "substantial enlargement of the Division's responsibilities ("Unit chief 10/16/75 pp 45-47.) 88Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office9/2/64 p 1 FBI Headquarters memorandum 9/2/64 p 3 Unit Chief 10/14/75 p 54 'A few actions were approved against the "Minutemen, when it became knownthat memberswere stockpilingweapons 86Unit Chief 10/16/75 p 48 20 programs I have ever seen the Bureau handle as far as any group is concerned.S7 5 Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.88-In marked contrast to prior COINTELPROs which grew out of years of intensive intelligence investigation the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO and the racial intelligence investigative section were set up at about the same time in 1967 Prior to that time the Division's investigation of "Negro matters was limited to instances of alleged Communist infiltration of civil rights groups and to monitoring civil rights protest activity However the long hot summer of 1967 led to intense pressure on the Bureau to do something to contain the problem and once again the Bureau heeded the call The originating letter was sent out to twenty-three field offices on August 25 1967 describing the program's purpose as .. to expose disrupt misdirect discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist hate-type organizations and groupings their leadership spokesmen membership and supporters and to counter their pro pensity for violence and civil disorder Efforts of the various groups to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents must be frustrated.S9 Initial group targets for "intensified attention were the Southern Christian Leadership Conference the Student Nonviolent Coordinat ing Committee Revolutionary Action Movement Deacons for Defense and Justice Congress of Racial Equality and the Nation of Islam Individuals named targets were Stokely Carmichael H "Rap Brown Elijah Muhammed and Maxwell Stanford The targets were chosen by conferring with Headquarters personnel supervising the racial cases the list was not intended to exclude other groups known to the field According to the Black Nationalist supervisor individuals and or ganizations were targeted because of their propensity for violence or their "radical or revolutionary rhetoric [and] actions Revolutionary would be [defined as] advocacy of the over throw of the Government Radical [is] a loose term that might cover for example the separatist view of the Nation of Islam the influence of a group called U.S Incorporated.. Generally they wanted a separate black nation They [the NOI] advocated formation of a separate black nation on the territory of five Southern states.90 e'Moore 11/3/75 p 31 "Note that this characterization had no substantive meaning within the Bureau Seep 4 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAO's 8/25/67 B0Black Nationalist supervisor 10/17/75 pp 66-67 The supervisor stated that individual NOI memberswere involvedwith sporadic violenceagainst police but the organization was nat itself involved in violence (Black National super visor 10/17/75 p 67.) Mooreagreed that the NOI was not involved in organi zational violence adding that the Nation of Islam had been unjustly blamedfor violencein the ghetto riots of 1967and 1968 "Wehad a goodinformant coverage of the Nation of Islam We were able to take a very positive stand and tell the Department of Justice and tell everybody else who accused the Nation of 21 The letter went on to direct field offices to exploit conflicts within and between groups to use news media contacts to disrupt ridicule or dis credit groups to preclude "violence-prone or "rabble rouser lead ers of these groups from spreading their philosophy publicly and to gather information on the "unsavory backgrounds" immorality sub versive activity and criminal activity of group members.91 According to George C Moore the Southern Christian Leadership Conference was included because .. at that time it was still under investigation because of the communist infiltration As far as I know there were not any violent propensities except that I note .. in the cover memo [expanding the program] or somewhere that they mentioned that if Martin Luther King decided to go a certain way he could cause some trouble I cannot explain it satisfacto rily this is something the section inherited.92 On March 4 1968 the program was expanded from twenty-three to forty-one field ofices.93 The letter expanding the program lists five long-range goals for the program to prevent the "coalition of militant black nationalist groups, which might be the first step toward a real "Mau Mau in America to prevent the rise of a "messiah who could "unify and electrify, the movement naming specifically Martin Luther King Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammed to prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups by pinpointing "potential troublemakers and neu tralizing them "before they exercise their potential for violenceto prevent groups and leaders from gaining "respect ability by discrediting them to the "responsible Negro com munity to the white community (both the responsible com munity and the "liberals" the distinction is the Bureau's) and to Negro radicals and Islam .. [that they] were not involvedin any of the riots or disturbances Elijah Muhammedkept them under control and he did not have them on the streets at all during any of the riots. (Moore 11/3/75 p 36.) When asked why therefore the NOI was included as a target Mr Moore answered "Because of the potential they did represent a potential they were a paramilitary type They had drills the Fruit of Islam they had the capability because they were a force to be reckoned with with the snap of his finger Elijah Mohammedcould bring them into any situation So that there was a very definite potential very definite potential. (Moore 11/3/75 p 37.) "The unit chief who wrote the letter on instructions from his superiors con cedes that the letter directed field officesto gather personal life information on targets not for "scandalous reasons, but "to deter violenceor neutralize the ac tivities of violence-pronegroups. (Unit chief 10/16/75 p 66.) Moore 11/3/75 pp 37 39 40 Primary targets listed in this secondletter are the Southern Christian Lead ership Conference the Student NonviolentCoordinating Committee Revolution ary Action Movement Nation of Islam Stokely Carmichael H "Rap Brown Martin Luther King Maxwell Stanford and Elijah Muhammed CORE was droppedfor reasons no witness was able to reconstruct The agent who prepared the second letter disagreed with the inclusion of the SOLO but lost (Black Nationalist supervisor 10/17/75 p 14.) 22 (5) to prevent the long range growth of these organiza tions especially among youth by developing specific tactics to "prevent these groups from recruiting young people. 94 6 The Panther Directives. The Black Panther Party ("BPP") was not included in the first two lists of primary targets (August 1967 and March 1968) because it had not attained national importance By November 1968 apparently the BPP had become sufficiently active to be considered a primary target A letter to certain field offices with BPP activity dated November 25 1968 ordered recipient offices to submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP. Proposals were to be received every two weeks Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing upon the differences between the BPP and US Inc (Ron Karenga's group) which had reached such proportions that "it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals. 95 On January 30 1969 this program against the BPP was expanded to additional offices noting that the BPP was attempting to create a better image In line with this effort Bobby Seale was conducting a "purge 99 of the party including expelling police informants Recipient offices were instructed to take advantage of the opportunity to further plant the seeds of suspicion concerning disloyalty among ranking officials.97 Bureau witnesses are not certain whether the Black Nationalist program was effective Mr Moore stated I know that the overall results of the Klan [COINTEL PRO] was much more effective from what I have been told than the Black Extremism [COINTELPRO] because of the number of informants in the Klan who could take action which would be more effective In the Black Extremism Group we got a late start because we did not have ex tremist activity [until] '67 and '68 Then we had to play catch-up It is not easy to measure effectiveness... There were policemen killed in those days There were bombs thrown There were establishments burned with molotov cocktails... We can measure that damage You cannot meas ure over on the other side what lives were saved because somebody did not leave the organization or suspicion was sown on his leadership and this organization gradually de clined and [there was] suspicion within it or this organiza tion did not join with [that] organization as a result of a black power conference which was aimed towards consolida tion efforts All we know either through their own ineptitude maybe it emerged through counterintelligence maybe I think we like to think that that helped to do it. that there was not this development What part did counterintelligence [play?] We hope that it did play a part Maybe we just gave it a nudge. 98 "Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's 3/4/68 pp 3-4 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office 11/25/68 8 MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SAC's 1/30/69 "This technique the "snitch jacket, was used in all COINTELPRO pro grams B Moore 11/3/75 pp 34 50-52 23 7 New Left. The Internal Security Section had undergone a slow transition from concentrating on the "Old Left" the CPUSA and SWP to focusing primarily on the activities of the "New Left" a term which had no precise definition within the Bureau.99 Some agents defined "New Left functionally by connection with protests Others defined it by philosophy particularly antiwar philosophy On October 28 1968 the fifth and final COINTELPRO was started against this undefined group The program was triggered in part by the Columbia campus disturbance Once again law enforcement meth ods had broken down largely (in the Bureau's opinion) because col lege administrators refused to call the police on campus to deal with student demonstrations The atmosphere at the time was described by the Headquarters agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO During that particular time there was considerable public Administration I mean governmental Administration [and] news media interest in the protest movement to the ex tent that some groups I don't recall .any specifics but some groups were calling for something to be done to blunt or re duce the protest movements that were disrupting campuses I can't classify it as exactly an hysteria but there was con siderable interest [and concern] That was the framework that we were working with It would be my impression that as a result of this hysteria some governmental leaders were looking to the Bureau.100 And once again the combination of perceived threat public outcry and law enforcement frustration produced a COINTELPRO According to the initiating letter the counterintelligence program's purpose was to "expose disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activi ties of the various New Left organizations their leadership and ad herents with particular attention to Key Activists "the moving forces behind the New Left. The final paragraph contains an exhortation to a "forward look enthusiasm and interest because of the Bureau's concern that "the anarchist activities of a few can paralyze institutions of learning induction centers cripple traffic and tie the arms of law enforcement officials all to the detriment of our society. The internal memorandum recommending the program further sets forth the Bu reau's concerns Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence caused to a large extent by various individuals generally con nected with the New Left Some of these activists urge revolu tion in America and call for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam They continually and falsely allege police bru As the New Left supervisor put it "I cannot recall any documentthat was written defining New Left as such It is my impression that the characteriza tion of New Left groups rather than being definedat any specifictime by docu ment it more or less grew... Agreeingit was a very amorphousterm he added "It has never been strictly defined as far as I know... It is more or less an attitude I would think. (New Left supervisor 10/28/75 pp 7-8.) 100NewLeft supervisor 10/28/75 pp 21-22 24 tality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts to further their so-called causes The document continues The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurri lously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses.' 1 Based on those factors the Bureau decided to institute a new COINTELPRO 8 New Left Directives. The Bureau's concern with "tying the hands of law enforcement officers, and with the perceived weaIness of college administrators in refusing to call police onto the campus led to a May 23 1968 directive to all participating field offices to gather information on three categories of New Left activities false allegations of police brutality to "counter the wide-spread charges of police brutality that invariably arise following student-police encounters immorality depicting the "scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters activities habits and living conditions representative of New Left adherents" and action by college administrators "to show the value of college administrators and school officials taking a firm stand, and pointing out "whether and to what extent faculty mem bers rendered aid and encouragement. The letter continues "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored It cannot be expected that information of this type will be easily obtained and an imagina tive approach by your personnel is imperative to its success. 1 3 The order to furnish information on "immorality was not carried out with sufficient enthusiasm On October 9 1968 headquarters sent another letter to all offices taking them to task for their failure to "remain alert for and to seek specific data depicting the depraved nature and moral looseness of the New Left and to "use this material in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them. 1 4 Recipient offices were again instructed to be "particularly alert for this type of data 105and told 101Memorandumfrom Charles D Brennan to William C Sullivan 5/9/68 10Memorandumfrom FBI headquarters to all SAC's 5/23/68 104Memorandumfrom FBI headquarters to all SACs 10/9/68 10This time the field officesgot the message One example of information furnished under the "Immorality caption comes from the Boston field office "[Informant] who has provided reliable information in the past concerning the activities of the New Left in the Metropolitan Boston area has advised that numerous meetings concerninganti-Vietnam and/or draft activity are conducted by members sitting around the table or a living room completelyin the nude These same individuals both male and female live and sleep together regularly and it is not unusual to have these people take up residence with a different partner after a six or sevenmonthperiod "Accordingto the informant the living conditions and habits of some of the New Left adherents are appalling In that certain individuals have been known to wear the same clothes for an estimated period of weeksand in someinstances 25 As the current school year commences it can be expected that the New Left with its anti-war and anti-draft entourage will make every effort to confront college authorities stifle mili tary recruiting and frustrate the Selective Service System Each office will be expected therefore to afford this program continuous effective attention in order that no opportunity will be missed to destroy this insidious movement.10G As to the police brutality and "college administrator categories the Bureau's belief that getting tough with students and demonstrators would solve the problem and that any injuries which resulted were deserved is reflected in the Bureau's reaction to allegations of police brutality following the Chicago Democratic Convention On August 28 1968 a letter was sent to the Chicago field office instructing it to "obtain all possible evidence that would disprove these charges [that the Chicago police used undue force] and to "con sider measures by which cooperative news media may be used to coun teract these allegations. The administrative "note (for the file) states Once again the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left are taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies.. We should be mindful of this situation and develop all pos sible evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false allegations.104 In the same vein on September 9 1968 an instruction was sent to all offices which had sent informants to the Chicago convention dem onstrations ordering them to debrief the informants for information "indicating incidents were staged to show police reacted with undue force and any information that authorities were baited by militants into using force. 108The offices were also to obtain evidence of possible violations of anti-riot laws.109 The originating New Left letter had asked all recipient offices to respond with suggestions for counterintelligence action Those re for months Personal hygiene and eating habits are equally neglected by these people the informant said "The informant has noted that those individuals who most recently joined the movement are in most instances the worst offenders as far as moral and personal habits are concerned However if these individuals remain in the movementfor any length of time their appearance and personal habits appear to improve somewhat. (Memorandumfrom Boston Field Officeto FBI Head quarters 6/13/68.) 10 MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SACs 10/9/68 107Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to ChicagoField Office8/28/68 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC'S 9/9/68 109Note that there was no attempt to determine whether the allegations were true Ramsey Clark Attorney General at the time testified that he did not know that either directive had been issued and that "they are highly improper. He also noted that the Bureau's closeworkingrelationship with state and localpolice forces had made it necessaryto "preempt the FBI in cases involvingthe investi gation of policemisconduct "we found it necessary to use the CivilRights Divi sion and that is basically what we did. (Clark 12/3/75 Hearings vol 6 PP 254-255.) 26 sponses were analyzed and a letter sent to all offices on July 6 1968 setting forth twelve suggestions for counterintelligence action which could be utilized by all offices Briefly the techniques are preparing leaflets designed to discredit student demonstrators using photographs of New Left leadership at the respective universi ties "Naturally the most obnoxious pictures should be used" instigating "personal conflicts or animosities between New Left leaders creating the impression that leaders are "informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies sending articles from student newspapers or the "underground press which show the depravity of the New Left to university offi cials donors legislators and parents "Articles showing advocation of the use of narcotics and free sex are ideal having members arrested on marijuana charges sending anonymous letters about a student's activities to par ents neighbors and the parents employers "This could have the effect of forcing the parents to take action sending anonymous letters or leaflets describing the "activities and associations of New Left faculty members and graduate assist ants to university officials legislators Boards of Regents and the press "These letters should be signed A Concerned Alumni, or A Con cerned Taxpayer " using "cooperative press contacts to emphasize that the "dis ruptive elements constitute a "minority of the students "The press should demand an immediate referendum on the issue in question" exploiting the "hostility among the SDS and other New Left groups toward the SWP YSA and Progressive Labor Party using "friendly news media and law enforcement officials to disrupt New Left coffeehouses near military bases which are attempt ing to "influence members of the Armed Forces using cartoons photographs and anonymous letters to "ridi cule the New Left and using "misinformation to "confuse and disrupt New Left activities such as by notifying members that events have been can celled.11o As noted earlier the lack of any Bureau definition of "New Left resulted in targeting almost every anti-war group,ll and spread to students demonstrating against anything One notable example is a proposal targeting a student who carried an "obscene sign in a demon stration protesting administration censorship of the school newspaper ll0Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 7/6/68 ulThe NewLeft supervisorconfirmedwhat the documentsreveal "legitimate (nonviolent) antiwar groups were targeted because they were "lending aid and comfort to more disruptive groups Accordingto the New Left supervisor "This [nonviolent groups protesting against the war] was the type of thing that the New Left the violent portion would seize upon They could use the legitimacy of an accepted collegegroup or outside group to further their inter ests. (NewLeft supervisor 10/28/75 p 39) Nonviolentgroups were thus disrupted so there would be less opportunity for a violent group to make use of them and their respectability Professors active in "NewLeft matters, whether involvedin violenceor just in general protest were targeted for "using [their] good officesto lend aid and comfort to the entire protest movementor to help disrupt the schoolthrough [their] programs. (New Left supervisor 10/28/75 p 69.) 27 and another student who sent a letter to that paper defending the demonstration.112 In another article regarding "free love on a univer sity campus was anonymously mailed to college administrators and state officials since free love allows "an atmosphere to build up on campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left. 113 None of the Bureau witnesses deposed believes the New Left COIN TELPRO was generally effective in part because of the imprecise targeting III THEGOALSOFCOINTELPROPREVENTINGORDISRUPTINGTHE EXERCISE OFFIRSTAMENDMENTRIGHTS The origins of COINTELPRO demonstrate that the Bureau adopt ed extralegal methods to counter perceived threats to national security and public order because the ordinary legal processes were believed to be insufficient to do the job In essence the Bureau took the law into its own hands conducting a sophisticated vigilante operation against domestic enemies The risks inherent in setting aside the laws even though the pur pose seems compelling at the time were described by Tom Charles Huston in his testimony before the Committee 114 The risk was that you would get people who would be sus ceptible to political considerations as opposed to national security considerations or would construe political con siderations to be national security considerations to move from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate And you just keep going down the line 115 The description is apt Certainly COINTELPRO took in a stag gering range of targets As noted earlier the choice of individuals and organizations to be neutralized and disrupted ranged from the violent elements of the Black Panther Party to Martin Luther King Jr. who the Bureau concedes was an advocate of nonviolence from the Communist Party to the Ku Klux Klan and from the advocates of violent revolution such as the Weathermen to the supporters of peaceful social change including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy The breadth of targeting springs partly from a lack of definition for the categories involved and partly from the Bureau's belief that dissident speech and association should be prevented because they were incipient steps toward the possible ultimate commission of an act which might be criminal Thus the Bureau's self-imposed role as pro tector of the existing political and social order blurred the line be "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters MinneapolisField Office 11/4/68 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office8/27/68 114Huston was the Presidential assistant who coordinated the 1970 recom mendations by an interagency committee for expanded domestic intelligence including concededlyillegal activity The so-called "Huston Plan is the sub ject of a separate report " Tom Charles Huston testimony 9/23/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 45 69-9840 76 3 28 tween targeting criminal activity and constitutionally protected acts and advocacy The clearest example of actions directly aimed at the exercise of con stitutional rights are those targeting speakers teachers writers or publications and meetings or peaceful demonstrations. Approxi mately 18 percent of all approved COINTELPRO proposals fell into these categories." The cases include attempts (sometimes successful) to get university and high school teachers fired to prevent targets from speaking on campus to stop chapters of target groups from being formed to prevent the distribution of books newspapers or periodicals to dis rupt news conferences to disrupt peaceful demonstrations including the SCLC's Washington Spring Project and Poor People's Campaign and most of the large antiwar marches and to deny facilities for meet ings or conferences A Efforts to Prevent Speaking An illustrative example of attacks on speaking concerns the plans of a dissident stockholders group to protest a large corporation's war production at the annual stockholders meeting. The field office was authorized to furnish information about the group's plans (obtained from paid informants in the group) to a confidential source in the company's management The Bureau's purpose was not only to "cir cumvent efforts to disrupt the corporate meeting, but also to prevent any attempt to "obtain publicity or embarrass corporate officials.u9 In another case,12panonymous telephone calls were made to the edi torial desks of three newspapers in a Midwestern city advising them that a lecture to be given on a university campus was actually being sponsored by a Communist-front organization The university had recently lifted its ban on Communist speakers on campus and was ex periencing some political difficulty over this decision The express pur pose of the phone calls was to prevent a Communist-sponsored speaker from appearing on campus and for a time it appeared to have worked One of the newspapers contacted the director of the university's con ference center He in turn discussed the meeting with the president of 'The usual constitutional inquiry is whether the government is "chilling First Amendment rights by indirectly discouraging a protected activity while pursuing an otherwise legitimate purpose In the case of COINTELPRO the Bureau was not attempting indirectly to chill free speech or association it was squarely attacking their exercise "'The percentage is derived from a cross-indexedtabulation of the Petersen Committee summaries Interestingly these categories account for 39 percent of the approved "New Left proposals which reflects both the closeconnectionbe tween antiwar activities and the campuses and the "aid and comfort theory of targeting in which teachers were targeted for advocating an end to the war through nonviolentmeans 118The group was composedlargely of university teachers and clergymenwho had bought shares in order to attend the meeting (Memorandumfrom Minne apolisField Officeto FBI headquarters 4/1/70.) Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office4/23/70 memorandumfrom MinneapolisField Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/1/70 'Memorandum from Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/26/60 Memorandafrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/27/60 10/28/60 10/31/60 Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to Alan H Belmont 10/26/60 29 the university who decided to cancel the meeting."_ The sponsoring organization supported by the ACLU took the case to court and won a ruling that the university could not bar the speaker (Bureau head quarters then ordered the field office to furnish information on the judge.) Although the lecture went ahead as scheduled headquarters commended the field office for the affirmative results of its suggestion the sponsoring organization had been forced to incur additional ex pense and attorneys fees and had received newspaper exposure of its "true communist character. B Efforts to Prevent Teaching Teachers were targeted because the Bureau believed that they were in a unique position to "plant the seeds of communism [or whatever ideology was under attack] in the minds of unsuspecting youth. Fur ther as noted earlier it was believed that a teacher's position gave respectability to whatever cause he supported In one case a high school teacher was targeted for inviting two poets to attend a class at his school The poets were noted for their efforts in the draft re sistance movement This invitation led to an investigation by the local police which in turn provoked sharp criticism from the ACLU The field office was authorized to send anonymous letters to two local newspapers to the city Board of Education and to the high school administration suggesting that the ACLU should not criticize the police for probing into high school activities "but should rather have focused attention on [the teacher] who has been a convicted draft dodger. The letter continued "[the teacher] is the assault on aca demic freedom and not the local police. The purpose of the letter according to Bureau documents was "to highlight [the teacher's] antidraft activities at the local high school and to "discourage any efforts he may make there The letter was also intended to "show support for the local police against obvious attempts by the New Left to agitate in the high schools. 122No results were reported In another case,123a university professor who was "an active par ticipant in New Left demonstrations had publicly surrendered his draft card and had been arrested twice (but not convicted) in antiwar demonstrations The Bureau decided that the professor should be "removed from his position at the university The field office was au thorized to contact a "confidential source at a foundation which contributed substantial funds to the university and "discreetly suggest that the [foundation] may desire to call to the attention of the Univer sity administration questions concerning the advisability of [the pro fessor's] continuing his position there. The foundation official was told .by the university that the professor's contract would not be re newed but in fact the professor did continue to teach The following 121It is interesting to note that after the anonymouscalls to the newspapers giving information on the "communist nature of the sponsor the conference center director called the local FBI officeto ask for information on the speaker He was informed that Bureau records are confidentialand that the Bureau could not make any comment Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office6/19/69 '1 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office5/1/70 30 academic year therefore the field office was authorized to furnish additional information to the foundation official on the professor's arrest and conviction (with a suspended sentence) in another demon stration No results were reported In a third instance the Bureau attempted to "discredit and neutral ize a university professor and the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy in which he was active The field office was authorized to send a fictitious-name letter to influential state political figures the mass media university administrators and the Board of Regents accusing the professor and "his protesting cohorts of "giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and wondering if the strategy is to bleed the United States white by prolonging the war in Vietnam and pave the way for a takeover by Russia. No results were reported.124 C Efforts to Prevent Writing and Publishing The Bureau's purpose in targeting attempts to speak was explicitly to prevent the "propagation of a target's philosophy and to deter "re cruitment of new members Publications and writers appear to have been targeted for the same reasons In one example,125 two university instructors were targeted solely because they were influential in the publication of and contributed financial support to a student "under ground newspaper whose editorial policy was described as "left-of center anti-establishment and opposed [to] the University adminis tration. The Bureau believed that if the two instructors were forced to withdraw their support of the newspaper it would "fold and cease publication This would eliminate what voice the New Left has in the area. Accordingly the field office was authorized to send an anonymous letter to a university official furnishing information con cerning the instructors association with the newspaper with a warn ing that if the university did not persuade the instructors to cease their support the letter's author would be forced to expose their activities publicly The field office reported that as a result of this technique both teachers were placed on probation by the university president which would prevent them from getting any raises Newspapers were a common target The Black Panther Party paper was the subject of a number of actions both because of its contents and because it was a source of income for the Party.126 Other examples in clude contacting the landlord of premises rented by two "New Left newspapers in an attempt to get them evicted 127an anonymous letter to a state legislator protesting the distribution on campus of an under ground newspaper "representative of the type of mentality that is fol uMemoranudm from Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/11/66 memorandumfromFBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/26/66 1 Memorandumfrom MobileField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/9/70 memo randum from FBI Headquarters to MobileField Office12/31/70 memorandum from MobileField Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/3/71 1 In one example a letter signed "A Black Parent was sent to the mayor the Superintendent of Schools the Commander of the American Legion and two newspapers in a northeastern city protesting a high school'ssubscription to the BPP newspaper The letter was also intended to focus attention on the teacher who entered the subscription "so as to deter him from implementingblack ex tremist literature and philosophyinto the BlackHistory curriculum of the school system (Memorandumfrom Buffalo Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/5/70.) 'r Memorandumfrom Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/9/68 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to SAC Los AngelesField Office9/23/68 31 lowing the New Left theory of immorality on certain college cam puses 128a letter signed "Disgusted Taxpayer and Patron to ad vertisers in a student newspaper intended to "increase pressure on the student newspaper to discontinue the type of journalism that had been employed (an article had quoted a demonstrator's "vulgar lan guage") 129 and proposals (which according to the Bureau's re sponse to a staff inquiry were never carried out) to physically disrupt printing plants.13o D Efforts to Prevent Meeting The Bureau also attempted to prevent target groups from meeting Frequently used techniques include contacting the owner of meeting facilities in order to have him refuse to rent to the group 131trying to have a group's charter revoked 132using the press to disrupt a "closed meeting by arriving unannounced 133and attempting to persuade sponsors to withdraw funds.134 The most striking examples of attacks on meeting however involve the use of "disinformation. 135 In one "disinformation case the Chicago Field Office duplicated blank forms prepared by the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam ("NMC") soliciting housing for demonstators coming to Chicago for the Democratic National Convention Chicago filled out 217 of these forms with fictitious names and addresses and sent them to the NMC which provided them to demonstrators who made "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses. The NMC then decided to discard all replies received on the housing forms rather than have out-of-town demonstrators try to locate nonexistent ad dresses. (The same program was carried out when the Washington Mobilization Committee distributed housing forms for demonstrators coming to Washington for the 1969 Presidential inaugural cere monies.) 137 In another case during the demonstrations accompanying inaugura tion ceremonies the Washington Field Office discovered that NMC marshals were using walkie-talkies to coordinate their movements and 1 Memorandum from Newark Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/23/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office6/4/69 12Memorandum from Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/28/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office3/27/69 'For example one proposal requested that the FBI Lab prepare a quart of solution "capable of duplicating a scent of the most foul smelling feces avail able, along with a dispenser capable of squirting a narrow stream for a distance of approximately three feet The proposed targets were the physical plant of a New Left publisher and BPP publications prior to their distribution Head quarters instructed the fieldofficeto furnish more information about the purpose for the material's use and the manner and security with which it would be used The idea was then apparently dropped (Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters 10/13/70 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/23/70.) "1Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office9/23/68 137Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office5/13/69 19Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office6/17/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 12/30/68 196One of the 12standard techniquesreferred to in the NewLeft memorandum discussed at pp 25-26 disinformation bridges the line between "counter intelligence and sabotage 'Memorandum from ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/9/68 memorandumfrom Charles Brennan to William C Sullivan 8/15/68 " Memorandumfrom Washington Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/21/69 32 activities WFO used the same citizen band to supply the marshals with misinformation and pretending to be an NMC unit countermanded NMC orders 138 In a third case 139a midwest field office disrupted arrangements for state university students to attend the 1969 inaugural demonstrations by making a series of anonymous telephone calls to the transporta tion company The calls were designed to confuse both the transporta tion company and the SDS leaders as to the cost of transportation and the time and place for leaving and returning This office also placed confusing leaflets around the campus to show different times and places for demonstration-planning meetings as well as conflicting times and dates for traveling to Washington In a fourth instance the "East Village Other planned to bomb the Pentagon with flowers during the 1967 NMC rally in Washington The New York office answered the ad for a pilot and kept up the pretense right to the point at which the publisher showed up at the air port with 200 pounds of flowers with no one to fly the plane Thus the Bureau was able to prevent this "agitational-propaganda activity as relates to dropping flowers over Washington. ' The cases discussed above are just a few examples of the Bureau's direct attack on speaking teaching writing and meeting Other in stances include targeting the New Mexico Free University for teach ing among other things "confrontation politics and "draft counsel ing training. '41 In another case an editorial cartoonist for a north east newspaper was asked to prepare a cartoon which would "ridicule and discredit a group of antiwar activists who traveled to North Vietnam to inspect conditions there the cartoon was intended to "depict [the individuals] as traitors to their country for traveling to North Vietnam and making utterances against the foreign policy of the United States. 12 A professor was targeted for being the faculty advisor to a college group which circulated "The Student As Nigger 1'8Egil Kroghhas stated to the Committeestaff that he was in charge of coordi nating D.C law enforcement efforts during demonstrations and gained the cooperation of NMC marshals to ensure an orderly demonstration This law enforcement/NMC coordination was effected through the same walkie-talkie system the Bureau was disrupting (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Washington Field Office 1/10/69 staff summary of Egil Krogh interview 5/23/75.) "'Memorandum from Cincinnati Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/20/68 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office12/29/68 "'Memoranda from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/15/67 9/26/67 and 10/17/67 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYork Field Office9/29/67 By letter of January 14 1976 the Bureau submitted specificin stances of "action other than arrest and prosecution to prevent any stage of [a] crime or violent acts from being initiated which had been taken The examples wereintended to aid in developing"preventiveaction guidelines Oneof the exampleswas the prevention of the publisher's plan to drop flowers over the Pentagon "A plan was thus thwarted which couldwell have resulted in tragedy had another pilot accepted such a dangerous flyingmission and violated Federal or local regulations in flyinglow over the Pentagon which is also in the heavy traffic pattern of the Washington National Airport. The letter does not explain why it was necessaryto act covertlyin this case If flyingover the Penta gon violates Federal regulations the Bureau could have arrested those involved when they arrived at the airport No informant was involved the newspaper had advertised openlyfor a pilot "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to AlbuquerqueField Office3/19/69 " Memorandumfrom Boston Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/22/66 33 on campus.143 A professor conducting a study on the effect and social costs of McCarthyism was targeted because he sought information and help from the American Institute of Marxist Studies.144 Contacts were made with three separate law schools in an attempt to keep a teaching candidate from being hired or once hired from getting his contract renewed." The attacks on speaking teaching writing and meeting have been examined in some detail because they present in their purist form the consequences of acting outside the legal process Perhaps the Bu reau was correct in its assumption that words lead to deeds and that larger group membership produces a greater risk of violence Never theless the law draws the line between criminal acts and constitution ally protected activity and that line must be kept.'46 As Justice Brandeis declared in a different context fifty years ago Our government is the potent the omnipresent teacher For good or for ill it teaches the whole people by its example Crime is contagious If the Government becomes a law breaker it breeds contempt for law it invites every man to become a law unto himself To declare that in the adminis tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal would bring terrible retribution Against the pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face Olmstead v U.S. 277 U.S.439,485 (1927) IV COINTELPROTECHNIQUES The techniques used in COINTELPRO were and are used against hostile foreign intelligence agents Sullivan's testimony that the "rough tough dirty business 147of foreign counterintelligence was brought home against domestic enemies was corroborated by George Moore whose Racial Intelligence Section supervised the White Hate and Black Nationalist COINTELPROs You can trace [the origins] up and back to foreign intelli gence particularly penetration of the group by the individual informant Before you can engage in counterintelligence you must have intelligence If you have good intelligence and "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to El Paso Field Office 12/6/68 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office3/19/65 1'6Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Clevelandand Boston Field Offices 5/5/64 1 Mr Huston learned that lessonas well "We went from this kind of sincere intention honest intention to developa series of justifications and rationalizations based upon this distorted view of inherent executive power and from that whether it was direct .. or was indirect or inevitable as I tend to think it is you went down the road to where you ended up with these peoplegoinginto the Watergate "And so that has convincedme that you have just got to draw the line at the top of the totem pole and that we would then have to take the risk it is not a risk-free choice but it is one that I am afraid in my judgment that we do not have any alternative but to take. (Huston 9/23/75 p 45-1 7 Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 97-98 34 know what it's going to do you can seed distrust sow mis information The same technique is used in the foreign field The same technique is used misinformation disruption is used in the domestic groups although in the domestic groups you are dealing in '67 and '68 with many many more across the country than you had ever dealt with as far as your foreign groups.148 The arsenal of techniques used in the Bureau's secret war against domestic enemies ranged from the trivial to the life-endangering Slightly more than a quarter of all approved actions were intended to promote factionalization within groups and between groups ;a roughly equal number of actions involved the creation and dissemination of propaganda.149 Other techniques involved the use of federal state and local agencies in selective law enforcement and other use (and abuse) of government processes disseminating derogatory information to family friends and associates contacting employers exposing "com munist infiltration or support of target groups and using organiza tions which were hostile to target groups to disrupt meetings or other wise attack the targets A Propaganda The Bureau's COINTELPRO propaganda efforts stem from the same basic premise as the attacks on speaking teaching writing and meeting propaganda works Certain ideas are dangerous and if their expression cannot be prevented they should be countered with Bureau approved views Three basic techniques were used (1) mailing re prints of newspaper and magazine articles to group members or po tential supporters intended to convince them of the error of their ways (2) writing articles for or furnishing information to "friendly media sources to expose target groups 150and (3) writing printing and disseminating pamphlets and fliers without identifying the Bu reau as the source 1 Reprint Mailings The documents contain case after case of articles and newspaper clippings being mailed (anonymously of course) to group members The Jewish members of the Communist Party appear to have been inundated with clippings dealing with Soviet mistreatment of Jews Similarly Jewish supporters of the Black Panther Party received articles from the BPP newspaper containing anti-Semitic state ments College administrators received reprints of a Reader's Digest article 151and a Barron's article on campus disturbances intended to persuade them to "get tough. 152 Perhaps only one example need be examined in detail and that only because it clearly sets forth the purpose of propaganda reprint mail ings Fifty copies of an article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says With 148Moore 11/3/75 pp 32-33 149The percentages used in this section are derived from a staff tabulation of the Petersen Committeesummaries The numbersare approximate becauseit was occasionally difficult to determine from the summary what the purpose of the techniquewas 'The resulting articles could then be used in the reprint mailing program 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office11/4/68 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office9/12/68 35 drawal Not the Answer, described as "an excellent article in support of United States foreign policy in Vietnam, were mailed to certain unnamed professors and members of the Vietnam Day Committee "who have no other subversive organizational affiliations. The pur pose of the mailing was "to convince [the recipients] of the correct ness of the U.S foreign policy in Vietnam. 153 Reprint mailings would seem to fall under Attorney General Levi's characterization of much of COINTELPRO as "foolishness. 154 They violate no one's civil rights but should the Bureau be in the anonymous propaganda business 2 "Friendly Media Much of the Bureau's propaganda efforts involved giving informa tion or articles to "friendly media sources who could be relied upon not to reveal the Bureau's interests." The Crime Records Division of the Bureau was responsible for public relations including all head quarters contacts with the media In the course of its work (most of which had nothing to do with COINTELPRO) the Division assem bled a list of "friendly news media sources those who wrote pro Bureau stories.156 Field offices also had "confidential sources (unpaid Bureau informants) in the media and were able to ensure their cooperation The Bureau's use of the news media took two different forms plac ing unfavorable articles and documentaries about targeted groups and leaking derogatory information intended to discredit individ uals.15 A typical example of media propaganda is the headquarters letter authorizing the Boston Field Officeto furnish "derogatory information about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source [name excised] 158 153Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office11/1/65 154Levi 12/11/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 318 155"Name checks were apparently run on all reporters proposedfor use in the program to make sure they were reliable In one case a check of Bureau files showed that a television reporter proposed as the recipient of information on the SDS had the same name as someonewhohad served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade The field officewas asked to determine whether the "individuals were "identical. The fieldofficeobtained the reporter's credit records voting registra tion and local police records and determined that his credit rating was satis factory that he had no arrest record that he "stated a preference for oneof the two major political parties" and that he was not in fact the man who fought in the Spanish Civil War Accordingly the information was furnished (Memo randum from Pittsburgh Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/26/68 memoran dum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office1/23/69.) "'The Bureau also noted for its files those who criticized its work or its Director and the Division maintained a "not-to-contact list which included the names of some reporters and authors One proposal to leak information to the Boston Globe was turned down because both the newspaper and one of its reporters "have made unfounded criticisms of the FBI in the past. The Boston Field Officewas advised to resubmit the suggestion using another newspaper (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office2/8/68.) 13Leakingderogatoryinformation is discussedat p 50 158The Committee'sagreement with the Bureau governingdocumentproduction provided that the Bureau could excise the names of "confidentialsources when the documentswere deliveredto the Committee Althoughthe staff was permitted to see the excised names at Bureau headquarters it was also agreed that the namesnot beused 36 Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are good Emphasize to him that the NOI predilection for vio lence,159preaching of race hatred and hypocrisy should be exposed Material furnished [name] should be either public source or known to enough people as to protect your sources Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is completely pro tected by [name].160 In another case information on the Junta of Militant Organizations ("JOMO a Black Nationalist target) was furnished to a source at a Tampa television station.161 Ironically the station manager who had no knowledge of the Bureau's involvement invited the Special Agent in Charge his assistant and other agents to a preview of the half-hour film which resulted The SAC complimented the station manager on his product and suggested that it be made available to civic groups.162 A Miami television station made four separate documentaries (on the Klan Black Nationalist groups and the New Left) with materials secretly supplied by the Bureau One of the documentaries which had played to an estimated audience of 200,000 was the subject of an internal memorandum "to advise of highly successful results of coun terintelligence exposing the black extremist Nation of Islam. [Excised] was elated at the response The station received more favorable telephone calls from viewers than the switch board could handle Community leaders have commented favorably on the program three civic organizations have asked to show the film to their members as a public service and the Broward County Sheriff's Office plans to show the film to its officers and in connection with its community serv ice program This expose showed that NOI leaders are of questionable character and live in luxury through a large amount of money taken as contributions from their members The extreme nature of NOI teachings was underscored Miami sources ad vised the expose has caused considerable concern to local NOI leaders who have attempted to rebut the program at each open meeting of the NOI since the program was pre sented Local NOI leaders plan a rebuttal in the NOI news paper Attendance by visitors at weekly NOI meetings has dropped 50% This shows the value of carefully planned counterintelligence action.168 The Bureau also planted derogatory articles about the Poor People's Campaign the Institute for Policy Studies the Southern Students Organizing Committee the National Mobilization Committee and a host of other organizations it believed needed to be seen in their "true light. "'Note that Bureau witnesses testifiedthat the NOI was not in fact involved in organizationviolence Seepp 20-21 18 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to BostonField Office2/27/68 Memorandumfrom Tampa Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/5/68 "'Memorandum from Tampa Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/7/69 'Memorandum from G C Mooreto William C Sullivan 10/21/69 0 37 3 Bureau-Authored Pamphlets and Fliers The Bureau occasionally drafted printed and distributed its own propaganda These pieces were usually intended to ridicule their tar gets rather than offer "straight propaganda on the issue Four of es these fliers are reproduced in the following pages Digit It's time to pull the chain brcthers and sisters It the peace mov:.men in Ameriks it to survive the crap influence of the Socialist Worers Party ar:d its bsstard youth m,roup YoungSociallat m,.st be ill-shed fram NewM.obe once and for all Sta;-,nant zerca Freddie Eelctead rind Harry Ring both memooraof the SWPNat'l Cormittee :mist be dumped Let's r,ct rid of to. Carol Lirans Gua Horowitze and the Joanna Mtani:,s alon with other SWPshitu DMND ANENDTOSWPBALLINGWrite i c 1C-beLoch It r Suite 900 1039 Versiont Ave. iv.};. Washin:;ton D.C NOTE Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/14/70 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 1/20/70 ;CA':RULESSimplypick the faggot from the following photos Print your choice on the entry blank at the bottom of this pane and pop it into the mail YOUCOULD EISILY ... - OwTir?-7 T-rcA1'11 CK.117E1.79 CONST 5011Fabulous Prizes * Nothing To Buy! ,.. MarkRudd Herbert Marcus( * YOUcan win! Hurry! Hurry! 38 2.1 - r .:--t DaveDellinger ChoGuervara* .CHECK THESECOLOSSAL PRIZES! GUNIIPR= Seven f"il days in Hanoi Expensespaid! *.SECOND PRIZE Fcurteen full days in Hanoi! * "_'GIRD PRIZE A weekendwith Josie Dukein d genuine fire-damaged ColumbiaUniversity dormitoryI * FOURTH PRIZE Twoweekendswith tubby little Josiel * ADDITIONAL PRIZES 500 rolls of red toilet tissue each Sheet 1Jearing the picture of ChairmanMao in living color! *.t-p::-: t-oi?.:",ct-c-:a-c-c-::-r.c-t-t-o::11A IL TODA Yi:-:HK-c-g:'-t-::-c-pa-::c-:-ep-t-g-t-a-ail-a F;.0 CC.INTEST Pct Office Box220 Old Chelsea Station HawYork NewYork (10011) The R:'tLFag pictured above is Name Address Zip (0tate Cho unfortunately was disconnected from the world last year.) NOTE Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/7/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYorkField Office2/14/69 39 PLASH PLASH FLASH FLASH FLASH FLASH DESPERATEDAVEDANGLES DINGUS V,_ Murderously Mangles MCBE Washir_etcn D C Jan 20 Speaking in his usual high pitched voice Dave Dellinger National Chairman of the National Mobilizatiaon Comr.ittee (MORE) today cleimed that the anti inaugural demonstrations called by his crganization had been responsible in getting the Paris peace talks going again Dellinger mace this startling disclosure before an audience of newsmen in the dingy Hawthorne School which housed many of his followers A cluster of the latter stood behind their Guru sniffling and fingering wilted flowers Dellinger looking pale more fairy-like than ever tried to control the squeaks in his voice to no avail "Howmany demonstrators did MODEbring to the inaugural he was asked "At least 10,000 he answered "Bullshit was heard in several sections of the room Dellinger shuffled his notes Let's make that 5,000. "Bullshit "Would you believe 3,000 3ilahce Dave rolled his eyes at the ceiling "I'm not going to play at numbers he chirped "What matters is that MCBEaccomplished so much Wedid get the peace talks going Wedid break some windows in the National Geographic Society building Despite police brutality our brave people managed to throw cans and sticks at the President.n His voice went higher sounding like glass bells in a soft summer breeze "Weshook the establishment gentlemen. Associated Press stood up "Weunderstand MCBEis broke That you lost control of the thing That SDSand many other organizations in the peace movement refused to back you That you have no idea how MOREfunds were spent. Dellinger put a finger in his mouth and sucked it reflectively Someminutes passed before he spoke "MOPE is solvent boys As of this morning we have :1.5h in the treasury The price of peace is high. He tried to look grim "SDS of course is just a bunch of dirty college kids with grass for brains Wedidn't want then cr need them. He formed his lips into a cute bow "I must re now We're hitching a ride back to NewYork today unless we can raise bus fare. He shoved four fingers intc his mouth and was led slowly from the room hurening "WeShall Overcome. NOTE Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/21/69 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 1/24/69 InMayI hit a .~"i,s I wentto aPanther capitalistwith ,v 4_rallyandtheybrokemy abottleandthe~ 'anewteethandthe bastardbrokor..y ,otherarmI got30 noseOurchiefr , ~','f .daleforbeinga bum acidhoedMork (ii;) /f?:J WellSOSis dead Ruddtoldustoy snuggleuptoourt A blockbrothers~i 7 hateourgut andthe ~y Armywon'thaveme wonderIf the folksstill live ~""~ '/ rw."~.\ in thesomeold _ place?^ yy S 40 Hyfolksbusted( theirhumpsto sendmoto college I blewmymind onMaoCheend MorcusoNanit wasrovolution ell overthe scone Weeven K burnedthe -!--~--r library notto nontionflags anddraftcards ~f)e i 67,o ils' d f tOt HlS ButI tookup withADStho 1 Thirdinrldand RevolutionI dugthegrossbit andballingthem radicalchicks It wasn'tall b>.f"s~'"'1 easythoughiV I gotthe i clapfromthe) 1-+" chicks..end r last FellIo celleda TPF pigamother f fuckerand o,:; brokemy front teeth Hy folkssent bror.dfornew 40 c*senors~,~ "I "TUDgIfTS ^OSAD_NOCRATIC SCCIZTY NOTE Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/5/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYork Field Office8/11/69 B Effects to Promote Enmity and Factionalism Within Groups or Between Groups Approximately 28% of the Bureau's COINTELPRO efforts were designed to weaken groups by setting members against each other or to separate groups which might otherwise be allies and convert them into mutual enemies The techniques used included anonymous mail ings (reprints Bureau-authored articles and letters) to group mem bers criticizing a leader or an allied group 364using informants to raise controversial issues forming a "notional" a Bureau-run splinter group to draw away membership from the target organiza tion encouraging hostility up to and including gang warfare be tween rival groups and the "snitch jacket. 1 Encouraging Violence Between Rival Groups The Bureau's attempts to capitalize on active hostility between tar get groups carried with them the risk of serious physical injury to the targets As the Black Nationalist supervisor put it It is not easy [to judge the risks inherent in this technique] You make the best judgment you can based on all the circum stances and you always have an element of doubt where you are dealing with individuals that I think most people would characterize as having a degree of instability 165 The Bureau took that risk The Panther directive instructing re cipient officers to encourage the differences between the Panthers and 161This technique was also used in disseminating propaganda The distinction lies in the purpose for which the letter article or flier was mailed 186Black Nationalist supervisor 10/17/75 p 40 41 U.S. Inc which were "taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals, 166is just one example A separate report on disruptive efforts aimed at the Panthers will examine in detail the Bureau's attempts to foment violence These efforts included anonymously distributing cartoons which pictured the U.S organization gloating over the corpses of two murdered Panthers and suggested that other BPP members would be next, and sending a New Jersey Panther leader the following letter which purported to be from an SDS member :168 "To Former Comrade [name] "As one of those little bourgeois snooty nose' 'little schoolboys' 'little sissies Dave Hilliard spoke of in the Guardian of 8/16/69 I would like to say that you and the rest of you black racists can go to hell I stood shoulder to shoulder with Carl Nichols last year in Military Park in Newark and got my a whipped by a Newark pig all for the cause of the wineheads like you and the rest of the black pussycats that call themselves Panthers Big deal you have to have a three hour educational session just to teach those . (you all know what that means don't you ! It's the first word your handkerchief head mamma teaches you) how to spell it "Who the hell set you and the Panthers up as the vanguard of the revolutionary and disciplinary group You can tell all those wineheads you associate with that you'll kick no one's .. a , because you'd have to take a three year course in spelling to know what an a is and three more years to be taught where it's located "Julius Lester called the BPP the vanguard (that's leader) organization so international whore Cleaver calls him racist now when full allegiance is not given to the Panthers again racist What the hell do you want Are you getting this Are you lost If you're not digging then you're really hope less "Oh yes ! We are not concerned about Hilliard's threats "Brains will win over brawn The way the Panthers have retaliated against US is another indication The score US 6 Panthers-0 "Why I read an article in the Panther paper where a California Panther sat in his car and watched his friend get shot by Karenga's group and what did he do He run back and write a full page story about how tough the Panthers are and what they're going to do Ha Ha B S "Goodbye [name] baby and watch out Karenga's com ing 1 8Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office11/25/68 i87Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/20/69 memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/27/69 memo randum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office4/4/69 'Memorandum from Newark Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/25/69 Accordingto the proposal the letter would not be typed by the fieldofficesteno graphic pool because of the language The field officealso used asterisks in its communicationwith headquarters which "refer to that colloquial phrase which implies an unnatural physical relationship with a material parent. Pre sumably the phrase was used in the letter when it was sent to the Panthers 42 Right On as they say. An anonymous letter was also sent to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers a Chicago gang "to whom violent type activity shooting and the like are second nature, advising him that "the brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's sup posed to he a hit out for you. The letter was intended to "intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups and cause "retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership. 169 EDITOR What's with this bull SDS outfit I'll tell you what they has finally showed there true color White They are just like the commies and all the other white radical groups that suck up to the blacks and use us We voted at our meeting in Oakland for community control over the pigs but SDS says no Well we can do with out them mothers We can do it by ourselfs OFF THE PIGS POWER TO THE PEOPLE Soul Brother Jake In another case the Bureau tried to promote violence not between violent groups but between a possibly violent person and another target The field office was given permission to arrange a meeting between an SCLC officer and the leader of a small group described as "anti-Vietnam black nationalist [veterans'] organization. The leader of the veterans group was known to be upset because he was not receiving funds from the SCLC He was also known to be on leave from a mental hospital and the Bureau had been advised that he would be recommitted if he were arrested on any charge It was be lieved that "if the confrontation occurs at SCLC headquarters, the veterans group leader "will lose his temper start a fight, and the "police will be called in. The purpose was to "neutralize the leader by causing his commitment to a mental hospital and to gain "un favorable publicity for the SCLC. 17 At least four assaults two of them on women were reported as "results of Bureau actions The San Diego field office claimed credit for three of them In one case US members "broke into a BPP meeting and "roughed up a woman member. In the second instance a critical newspaper article in the Black Panther paper was sent to the US leader The field office noted that "the possibility exists that some sort of retaliatory actions will be taken against the BPP. 172The prediction proved correct the field officereported that as a result of this mailing members of US assaulted a Panther newspaper vendor. The third assault occurred after the 'Memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/12/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to OhicagoField Office1/30/69 'Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters 11/25/68 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Philadelphia Field Office 12/9/68 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/10/69 p 4 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/12/69 13Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/12/69 43 San Diego Police Department acting on a tip from the Bureau that "sex orgies were taking place at Panther headquarters raided the premises (The police department conducted a "research project, dis covered two outstanding traffic warrants for a BPP member and used the warrants to gain entry.) The field office reported that as a "direct result of the raid the woman who allowed the officers into the BPP headquarters had been "severely beaten up by other members.174 In the fourth case the New Haven field office reported that an in formant had joined in a "heated conversation between several group members and sided with one of the parties "in order to increase the tension. The argument ended with members hitting each other The informant "departed the premises at this point since he felt that he had been successful causing a flammable situation to erupt into a fight. 175 2 Anonymous Mailings The Bureau's use of anonymous mailings to promote factionalism range from the relatively bland mailing of reprints or fliers criticizing a group's leaders for living ostentatiously or being ineffective speakers to reporting a chapter's infractions to the group's headquarters in tended to cause censure or disciplinary action Critical letters were also sent to one group purporting to be from another or from a member of the group registering a protest over a proposed alliance For instance the Bureau was particularly concerned with the al liance between the SDS and the Black Panther Party A typical ex ample of anonymous mailing intended to separate these groups is a letter sent to the Black Panther newspaper 176 In a similar vein is a letter mailed to Black Panther and New Left leaders. Dear Brothers and Sisters Since when do us Blacks have to swallow the dictates of the honky SDS Doing this only hinders the Party progress in gaining Black control over Black people We've been over by the white facists pigs and the Man's control over our destiny We're sick and tired of being severly brutalized denied our rights and treated like animals by the white pigs We say to hell with the SDS and its honky intellectual ap proaches which only perpetuate control of Black people by the honkies The Black Panther Party theory for community control is the only answer to our problems and that is to be followed and enforced by all means necessary to insure control by Blacks over all police departments regardless of whether they are run by honkies or uncle toms The damn SDS is a paper organization with a severe case of diarhea of the mouth which has done nothing but feed us 1 Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/3/69 1T6Memorandumfrom New Haven Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/18/70 149Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/27/69 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office9/5/69 17Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/10/70 memo randum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office3/3/70 69-9840 76 4 44 lip service Those few idiots calling themselves weathermen run around like kids on halloween A good example is their "militant activities at the Northland Shopping Center a couple of weeks ago They call themselves revolutionaries but take a look at who they are Most of them come from well heeled families even by honky standards They think they're helping us Blacks but their futile misguided and above all white efforts only muddy the revolutionary waters The time has come for an absolute break with any non Black group and especially those SDS and a return to our pursuit of a pure black revolution by Blacks for Blacks Power ! Off the Pigs! !!! These examples are not of course exclusive but they do give the flavor of the anonymous mailings effort Interviews Interviewing group members or supporters was an overt "inves tigative technique sometimes used for the covert purpose of disrup tion For example one field office noted that "other [BPP] weak nesses that have been capitalized on include interviews of members wherein jealousy among the members has been stimulated and at the same time has caused a number of persons to fall under suspicion and be purged from the Party. 178 In another case fourteen field offices were instructed to conduct simultaneous interviews of individuals known to have been contacted by members of the Revolutionary Union The purpose of the coordi nated interviews was "to make possible affiliates of the RU believe that the organization is infiltrated by informants on a high level 17 In a third instance a "black nationalist target attempted to or ganize a youth group in Mississippi The field office used informants to determine "the identities of leaders of this group and in interview ing these leaders expressed to them [the target's] background and his true intentions regarding organizing Negro youth groups. Agents also interviewed the target's landlords and "advised them of certain aspects of [his] past activities and his reputation in the Jackson vi cinity as being a Negro extremist. Three of the landlords asked the target to move.180The same field officereported that it had interviewed members of the Tougaloo College Political Action Committee an "SNCC affiliated student group The members were interviewed while they were home on summer vacation "Sources report that these interviews had a very upsetting effect on the PAC organization and they felt they have been betrayed by someone at Tougaloo College Many of the members have limited their participation in PAC affairs since their interview by Agents during the summer of 1968. 181 Using Informants To Raise Controversial 1882168 The Bureau's use of informants generally is the subject of a sepa rate report It is worth noting here however that the use of inform "'Memorandum from Indianapolis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/23/69 "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs 10/28/70 180Memorandumfrom Jackson Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/27/68 181Ibid 45 ants to take advantage of ideological splits in an organization dates back to the first COINTELPRO The originating CUPSA document refers to the use of informants to capitalize on the discussion within the Party following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin.182 Informants were also used to widen rifts in other organizations For instance an informant was instructed to imply that the head of one faction of the SDS was using group funds for his drug habit and that a second leader embezzled funds at another school The field office reported that "as a result of actions taken by this informant there have been fist fights and acts of name calling at several of the recent SDS meetings. In addition members of one faction "have made early morning telephone calls to other SDS members and "have threatened them and attempted to discourage them from attending SDS meetings. 183 In another case ,an informant was used to "raise the question among his associates that an unmarried 30-year old group leader "may be either a bisexual or a homosexual. The field office believed that the question would "rapidly become a rumor and "could have serious results concerning the ability and effectiveness of [the target's] leadership. 184 5 Fictitious Organizations There are basically three kinds of "notional or fictitious organiza tions All three were used in COINTELPRO attempts to factionalize The first kind of "notional was the organization whose members were all Bureau informants Because of the Committee's agreement with the Bureau not to reveal the identities of informants the only example which can be discussed publicly is a proposal which although approved was never implemented That proposal involved setting up a chapter of the W.E.B DuBois Club in a Southern city which would be composed entirely of Bureau informants and fictitious persons The initial purpose of the chapter was to cause the CPUSA expense by sending organizers into the area cause the Party to fund Bureau coverage of out-of-town CP meetings by paying the informants expenses and receive literature and instructions Later the chapter was to begin to engage in deviation from the Party line so that it would be expelled from the main organization "and then they could claim to be the victim of a Stalinist type purge. It was anticipated that the entire operation would take no more than 18 months.185 The second kind of "notional was the fictitious organization with some unsuspecting (non-informant) members For example Bureau informants set up a Klan organization intended to attract member ship away from the United Klans of America The Bureau paid the informant's personal expenses in setting up the new organization which had at its height 250 members.186 The third type of "notional was the wholly fictitious organization with no actual members which was used as a pseudonym for mailing 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 9/6/56 18iMemorandumfrom Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/12/68 p 2184Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/2/70 'Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/9/64 186Memdraiidumfrom C D Brennan tow C Sullivan 8/28/67 46 letters or pamphlets For instance the Bureau sent out newsletters from something called "The Committee for Expansion of Socialist Thought in America, which attacked the CPUSA from the "Marxist right for at least two years.18 6 Labeling Targets As Informants The "snitch jacket technique neutralizing a target by labeling him a "snitch or informant so that he would no longer be trusted was used in all COINTELPROs The methods utilized ranged from having an authentic informant start a rumor about the target mem ber,188 to anonymous letters or phone calls,189 to faked informants reports 19 When the technique was used against a member of a nonviolent group the result was often alienation from the group For example a San Diego man was targeted because he was active in draft counseling at the city's Message Information Center He had coincidentally been present at the arrest of a Selective Service violator and had been at a "crash pad just prior to the arrest of a second violator The Bureau used a real informant to suggest at a Center meeting that it was "strange that the two men had been arrested by federal agents shortly after the target became aware of their locations The field office reported that the target had been "completely ostracized by members of the Message Information Center and all of the other individuals throughout the area associated with this and/or related groups. 191 In another case a local police officer was used to "jacket the head of the Student Mobilization Committee at the University of South Carolina The police officer picked up two members of the Committee on the pretext of interviewing them concerning narcotics By pre arranged signal he had his radio operator call him with the message "[name of target] just called Wants you to contact her Said you have her number. 192No results were reported The "snitch jacket is a particularly nasty technique even when used in peaceful groups It gains an added dimension of danger when it is used as indeed it was in groups known to have murdered informers.193 For instance a Black Panther leader was arrested by the local police with four other members of the BPP The others were released but the leader remained in custody Headquarters authorized the field office to circulate the rumor that the leader "is the last to be released because "he is cooperating with and has made a deal with the Los Angeles Police Department to furnish them information concerning the BPP. Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to W C Sullivan 1/5/65 MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to San DiegoField Office2/14/69 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Jackson Field Office11/15/68 'Memorandum from FBI Headquaters to New York Field Office 2/9/60 " Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/17/69 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office 3/6/69 memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/30/69 Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/31/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office2/14/69 10One Bureau document stated that the Black Panther Party "has murdered two membersit suspected of beingpoliceinformants. (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office2/18/71.) 47 The target of the first proposal then received an anonymous phone call stating that his own arrest was caused by a rival leader.'94 In another case the Bureau learned that the chairman of the New York BPP chapter was under suspicion as an informant because of the arrest of another member for weapons possession In order to "cast further suspicion on him the Bureau sent anonymous letters to BPP headquarters in the state the wife of the arrested member and a local member of CORE saying "Danger-Beware-Black Broth ers [name of target] is the fink who told the pigs that [arrested members] were carrying guns. The letter also gave the target's address.195 In a third instance the Bureau learned through electronic surveil lance of the BPP the whereabouts of a fugitive After his arrest the Bureau sent a letter in a "purposely somewhat illiterate type scrawl to the fugitive's half-brother Brother Jimmie was sold out by Sister [name the BPP leader who made the phone call picked up by the tap] for some pig money to pay her rent When she don't get it that way she takes Panther money How come her kid sells the paper in his school and no one bothers him How comes Tyler got busted up by the pigs and her kid didn't How comes the FBI pig fascists knew where to bust Lonnie and Minnie way out where they were Think baby 196 In another example the chairman of the Kansas City BPP chapter went to Washington in an attempt to testify before a Senate subcom mittee about information he allegedly possessed about the transfer of firearms from the Kansas City Police Department to a retired Army General The attempt did not succeed the committee chairman ad journed the hearing and then asked the BPP member to present his information to an aide The Bureau then authorized an anonymous phone call to BPP headquarters "to the effect that [the target] was paid by the committee to testify that he has cooperated fully with this committee and that he intends to return at a later date to furnish additional testimony which will include complete details of the BPP operation in Kansas City. 197 In the fifth case the Bureau had so successfully disrupted the San Diego BPP that it no longer existed One of the former members how ever was politicking for the position of local leader if the group is ever reorganized. Headquarters authorized the San Diego field officeto send anonymous notes to "selected individuals within the black community of San Diego to "initiate the rumor that [the target] 1 Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/11/69 memorandumto San Diego Field Officefrom FBI Headquarters 2/19/69 'Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/14/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office3/10/69 'Memorandum to FBI Headquarters from SAC Newark 7/3/69 memo randum to NewarkField Officefrom FBI Headquarters 7/14/69 1HMemorandumfrom Kansas City Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/16/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office11/3/69 48 who has aspirations of becoming the local Black Panther Party Cap tain is a police informant. 198 In a sixth case a letter alleging that a Washington D.C. BPP leader was a police informant was sent "as part of our continuing effort to foment internal dissension within ranks of Black Panther Party 199 Brother I recently read in the Black Panther newspaper about that low dog Gaines down in Texas who betrayed his people to the pigs and it reminded me of a recent incident that I should tell you about Around the first part of Feb I was locked up at the local pigpen when the pigs brought in this dude who told me he was a Panther This dude who said his name was [de leted] said he was vamped on by six pigs and was brutalized by them This dude talked real bad and said he had killed pigs and was going to get more when he got out so I thought he probably was one of you The morning after [name] was brought in a couple of other dudes in suits came to see him and called him out of the cell and he was gone a couple of hours Later on these dudes came back again to see him [Name] told me the dudes were his lawyers but they smelled like pig to me It seems to me that you might want to look into this because I know you don't want anymore low-life dogs helping the pigs brutalize the people You don't know me and I'm not a Panther but I want to help with the cause when I can A lumpen brother In a seventh case the "most influential BPP activist in North Caro lina had been photographed outside a house where a "shoot out with local police had taken place The photograph which appeared in the local newspaper showed the target talking to a policeman The pho tograph and an accompanying article were sent to BPP headquarters in Oakland California with a handwritten note supposedly from a female BPP member known to be "disenchanted with the target say ing "I think this is two pigs oinking. 200 Although Bureau witnesses stated that they did not authorize a "snitch jacket when they had information that the group was at that time actually killing suspected informants,201 they admitted that the risk was there whenever the technique was used "Memorandum to FBI Headquarters from San Diego Field Office 6/6/70 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San DiegoField Office3/6/70 'Memorandum from Charlotte Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/23/71 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office3/31/71 'Memorandum from Charlotte Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/23/71 memorandumFBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office3/31/71 901In fact some proposals were turned down for that reason See e.g. letter from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office2/18/71 in which a proposal that an imprisoned BPP member be labeled a "pig informer was rejected be cause it was possibleit would result in the target's death But note that just one month later two similar proposals were approved Letter from FBI Head quarters to Washington Field Office3/19/71 and letter from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office3/31/71 49 It would be fair to say there was an element of risk there which we tried to examine on a case by case basis.202 Moore added "I am not aware of any time we ever labeled anybody as an informant. that anything [violent] ever happened as a result and that is something that could be measured. When asked whether that was luck or lack of planning he responded "Oh it just happened that way I am sure. 203 C Using Hostile Third Parties Against Target Groups The Bureau's factionalism efforts were intended to separate indi viduals or groups which might otherwise be allies Another set of ac tions is a variant of that technique organizations already opposed to the target groups were used to attack them The American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars for ex ample printed and distributed under their own names Bureau authored pamphlets condemning the SDS and the DuBois Clubs In another case a confidential source who headed an anti-Commu nist organization in Cleveland and who published a "self-described conservative weekly newspaper, the Cleveland Times was anony mously mailed information on the Unitarian Society of Cleveland's sponsorship of efforts to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities The source had "embarrassed the Unitarian minister with questions about the alleged Communist connections of other cosponsors "at public meetings. 2 4 It was anticipated that the source would publish a critical article in her newspaper which "may very well have the result of alerting the more responsible people in the community to the nature of the move ment and "stifle it before it gets started. 205 The source newspaper did publish an article entitled "Locals to Aid Red Line, which named the Minister among others as a local sponsor of what it termed a "Communist dominated plot to abolish the House Committee.206 One group described as a "militant anticommunist right wing orga nization more of an activist group than is the more well known John Birch Society, was used on at least four separate occasions The Bu reau developed a long-range program to use the organization in "coun terintelligence activity by establishing a fictitious person named "Lester Johnson who sent letters made phone calls offered financial support and suggacted action In view of the activist nature of this organization and their lack of experience and knowledge concerning the interior workings of the [local] CP [the field office proposes] that efforts be made to take over their activities and use them in such a manner as would be best calculated by this office to 80 BlackNationalist supervisor 10/17/75 p 39 20 Moore 11/3/15 p 64 20The minister has given the Select Committeean affidavit which states that there was an organized attempt by the Bureau's source to disrupt the Church's meetings including "fist fights. Affidavit of Rev Dennis G Kuby 10/19/75 'Memorandum from Cleveland Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/28/64 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters toClevelandField Office11/6/64 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office11/6/64 50 completely disrupt and neutralize the [local] CP all without [the organization] becoming aware of the Bureau's interest in its operation.207 "Lester Johnson used the organization to distribute fliers and let ters opposing the candidacy of a lawyer running for a judgeship 208 and to disrupt a dinner at which an alleged Communist was to speak.209 "Johnson also congratulated the organization on disrupting an anti draft meeting at a Methodist Church furnishing further information about a speaker at the meeting,210 and suggested that members picket the home of a local "communist functionary. 211 Another case is slightly different from the usual "hostile third party actions in that both organizations were Bureau targets "Op eration Hoodwink was intended to be a long-range program to dis rupt both La Cosa Nostra (which was not otherwise a COINTELPRO target) and the Communist Party by "having them expend their en ergies attacking each other. The initial project was to prepare and send a leaflet which purported to be from a Communist Party leader to a member of a New York "family attacking working conditions at a business owned by the family member.212 D Disseminating Derogatory Information to Family Friends and Associates Although this technique was used in relatively few cases it accounts for some of the most distressing of all COINTELPRO actions Per sonal life information some of which was gathered expressly to be used in the programs was then disseminated either directly to the target's family through an anonymous letter or telephone call or in directly by giving the information to the media y"Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/18/66 p 2 saeMemorandum from Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/19/67 The lawyer was targeted along with his law firm becausethe firm "has a long history of providing services for individual communistsand communistorgani zations, and because he belongedto the National Lawyers Guild 409Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office 1/16/67 ' Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office 1/10/67 411Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office 11/3/66 41Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 10/4/66 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 10/5/66 A similar proposal attempted "to cause dissension between Negro numbers operators and the Italian hoodlumelement in Detroit The Bureau had informa tion that black "numbers men were contributing money to the local "black power movement. An anonymousletter containing a black hand and the words "watch out was sent a minister who was "the best known black militant in Detroit. The letter was intended to achieve two objectives First the minister was expected to assume that "the Italian hoodlum element was responsible for this letter report this to the Negro numbers operators and thereby cause them to further resent the Italian hoodlumelement. 'Second it is also possible that [the minister] may becomeextremely frightened upon receipt of this letter and sever his contact with the Negro numbers men in Detroit and might even restrict his black nationalist activity or leave Detroit (Memorandumfrom the Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/14/68 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office6/28/68.) 51 Several letters were sent to spouses three examples follow.213 The names have been deleted for privacy reasons The first letter was sent to the wife of a Grand Dragon of the United Klans of America ("Mrs A") It was to be "typed on plain paper in an amateurish fashion. 214 "My Dear Mrs (A) "I write this letter to you only after a long period of pray ing to God I must cleanse my soul of these thoughts I certainly do not want to create problems inside a family but I owe a duty to the klans and its principles as well as to my own menfolk who have cast their divine lot with the klans "Your husband came to [deleted] about a year ago and my menfolk blindly followed his leadership believing him to be the savior of this country They never believed the "stories that he stole money from the klans in [deleted] or that he is now making over $25,000 a year They never believed the stories that your house in [deleted] has a new refrigerator washer dryer and yet one year ago was threadbare They refuse to believe that your husband now owns three cars and a truck including the new white car But I believe all these things and I can forgive them for a man wants to do for his family in the best way he can "I don't have any of these things and I don't grudge you any of them neither But your husband has been committing the greatest of the sins of our Lord for many years He has taken the flesh of another unto himself "Yes Mrs A he has been committing adultery My men folk say they don't believe this but I think they do I feel like crying I saw her with my own eyes They call her Ruby Her last name is something like [deleted] and she lives in the 700 block of [deleted] Street in [deleted.] I know this I saw her strut around at a rally with her lustfilled eyes and smart aleck figure "I cannot stand for this I will not let my husband and two brothers stand side by side with your husband and this woman in the glorious robes of the klan I am typing this because I am going to send copys to Mr Shelton and some of the klans leaders that I have faith in I will not stop until your husband is driven from [deleted] and back into the flesh-pots from wherein he came 23Letters were also sent to parents informing them that their children were in communes or with a roommateof the oppositesex information on an actress pregnancy by a Black Panther was sent to a gossip columnist and information about a partner's affair with another partner's wife was sent to the membersof a law firmas well as the injured spouses Personal life information was not the only kind of derogatory information disseminated information on the "subversivebackground of a target (or family member) was also used as were arrest records "'Memorandum from RichmondField Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/26/66 52 "I am a loyal klanswoman and a good churchgoer I feel this problem affects the future of our great country I hope I do not cause you harm by this and if you believe in the Good Book as I do you may soon receive your husband back into the fold I pray for you and your beautiful little chil dren and only wish I could tell you who I am I will soon but I am afraid my own men would be harmed if I do. "A God-fearing klanswoman The second letter was sent to the husband ("Mr B") of a woman who had the distinction of being both a New Left and Black Nation alist target she was a leader in the local branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom "which group is active in draft resistance antiwar rallies and New Left activities, and an officer in ACTION a biracial group which broke off from the local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality and which "engaged in numerous acts of civil disruption and disobedience. 215 Two informants reported that Mr B had been making suspicious inquiries about his wife's relationship with the Black males in ACTION The local field office proposed an anonymous letter to the husband which would confirm his suspicions although the inform ants did not know whether the allegations of misconduct were true It was hoped that the "resulting marital tempest would "result in ACTION losing their [officer] and the WILPF losing a valuable leader thus striking a major blow against both organizations. 21e Accordingly the following letter,21e8 written in black ink was sent to the husband ='aMemorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/30/70 218Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/30/70 Note that there is no allegation that ACTION was engaged in violence When the target wasinterviewedbythe staff she was asked whether ACTIONever took part in violent activities She replied that someoneoncespat in a communioncup during a church sit-in and that memberssometimesused four letter words which was consideredviolent in her city The staff memberthen asked about more con ventionally violent acts such as throwing bricks or burning buildings Her response was a shocked "Oh no! I'm a pacifist I wouldn't be involved in an organization like that (Staff interview of a COINTELPROtarget ) Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/30/70 53 t r ~! rt.Onvle O--L 4 cry ~ zw ~,~ -e G r~~ ~~ v ~ ~~ ( /L \ A letter from the field office to headquarters four months later reported as a "tangible result of the letter that the target and her husband had recently separated following a series of marital arguments 54 This matrimonial stress and strain should cause her to func tion much less effectively in ACTION While the letter sent by the [field office] was probably not the sole cause of this separation it certainly contributed very strongly.217 The third letter was sent to the wife of a leader of the Black Libera tors ("Mrs C") She was living in their home town with their two daughters while he worked in the city Bureau documents describe Mrs C as a "faithful loving wife who is apparently convinced that her husband is performing a vital service to the Black world.. She is to all indications an intelligent respectable young mother who is active in the AME Methodist Church. 218 The letter was "prepared from a penmanship spelling style to imi tate that of the average Black Liberator member It contains several accusations which should cause [X's] wife great concern. It was expressly intended to produce "ill feeling and possibly a lasting dis trust between X and his wife it was hoped that the "concern over what to do about it would "detract from his time spent in the plots and plans of his organization. 21s The letter was addressed to "Sister C 'Memorandum from St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/17/70 218Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/14/69 p 1 Z Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/14/ 69 pp 2-3 55 r-N - The Petersen Committee said that some COINTELPRO actions were "abhorrent in a free society. This technique surely falls within that condemnation.220 'House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights Hearings 11/20/74 p 11 56 E Contacts with Employers The Bureau often tried to get targets fired with some success." If the target was a teacher the intent was usually to deprive him of a forum and to remove what the Bureau believed to be the added pres tige given a political cause ,by educators In other employer contacts the purpose was either to eliminate a source of funds for the individual or (if the target was a donor) the group or to have the employer apply pressure on the target to stop his activities For example an Episcopal minister furnished "financial and other assistance to the Black Panther Party in his city The Bureau sent an anonymous letter to his bishop so that the church would exert pressure on the minister to "refrain from assistance to the Black Panther Party. 222Similarly a priest who allowed the Black Panther Party to use his church for its breakfast program was targeted his bishop received both an anonymous letter and three anonymous phone calls The priest was transferred shortly thereafter. In another case a black county employee was targeted because he had attended a fund raiser for the Mississippi Summer Project and on another occasion a presentation of a Negro History Week program Both functions had been supported by "clandestine CP members. The employee according to the documents had no record of subversive ac tivities "he and his wife appear to be genuinely interested in the wel fare of Negroes and other minority groups and are being taken in by the communists. The Bureau chose a curiously indirect way to in form the target of his friends Party membership a local law enforce ment official was used to contact the County Administrator in the expectation that the employee would be "called in and questioned about his left-wing associates. 224 The Bureau made several attempts to stop outside sources from funding target operations.225 For example the Bureau learned that SNCC was trying to obtain funds from the Episcopal Church for a "liberation school. Two carefully spaced letters were sent to the Church which falsely alleged that SNCC was engaged in a "fraudulent scheme involving the anticipated funds The letters purported to be from local businessmen approached by SNCC to place fictitious orders for school supplies and divide the money when the Church paid the bills.2 Similar letters were sent to the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizing from which SNOC had requested a grant for its "Agrarian Reform Plan. This time the letters alleged kickback approaches in the sale of farm equipment and real estate.227 Other targets include an employee of the Urban League who was fired because the Bureau contacted a confidential source in a foundation which funded the League 228a lawyer known for his representation There were 84contacts with employersor 3 percentof the total 222Memorandumfrom New Haven Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/12/69 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office9/11/69 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office9/29/64 'The FBI also used a "confidentialsource in a foundation to gain funding for a "moderate civil rights organization (Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto W C Sullivan 10/23/68.) "8Memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/18/70 'Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/19/70 'Memoranda from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office3/3/69 and 4/3/69 57 of "subversives, whose nonmovement client received an anonymous letter advising it not to employ a "well-known Communist Party apologist 229and a television commentator who was transferred after his station and superiors received an anonymous protest letter The commentator who had a weekly religious program had expressed admiration for a black nationalist leader and criticized the United States defense policy.23o F Use and Abuse of Government Processes This category which comprises 9 percent of all approved proposals includes selective law enforcement (using Federal state or local authorities to arrest audit raid inspect deport etc.) interference with judicial proceedings including targeting lawyers who represent "subversives" interference with candidates or political appointees and using politicians and investigating committees sometimes with out their knowledge to take action against targets 1 Selective Law Enforcement Bureau documents often state that notifying law enforcement agen cies of violations committed by COINTELPRO targets is not counter intelligence but part of normal Bureau responsibility Other docu ments however make it clear that "counterintelligence was precisely the purpose "Be alert to have them arrested, reads a New Left COINTELPRO directive to all participating field offices.231Further there is clearly a difference between notifying other agencies of information that the Bureau happened across in an investigation in plain view so to speak--and instructing field offices to find evidence of violations any violations to "get a target As George Moore stated Ordinarily we would not be interested in health violations because it is not my jurisdiction we would not waste our time But under this program we would tell our informants per haps to be alert to any health violations or other licensing requirements or things of that nature whether there were violations and we would see that they were reported 232 State and local agencies were frequently informed of alleged statu tory violations which would come within their jurisdiction.233 As noted above this was not always normal Bureau procedure A typical example of the attempted use of local authorities to disrupt targeted activities is the Bureau's attempt to have a Democratic Party fund raiser raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commis 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office7/2/64 $80MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office3/28/69 R41Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters toall SAC's 10/9/68 Moore 11/3/75 p 47 'Federal agencies were also used For instance a foreign-born professor active in the New Left was deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Bureau's instigation (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San DiegoField Office9/6/68.) The Bureau's use of the IRS in COINTELPRO is included in a separate report Among other actions the Bureau obtained an activist professor's tax returns and then used a source in a regional IRS officeto arrange an audit The audit was intended to be timed to interfere with the professor's meetings to plan protest demonstrations in the 1968Democratic convention 58 sion.234The function was to be held at a private house the admission charge included "refreshments. It was anticipated that alcoholic beverages would be served A confidential source in the ABC Com mission agreed to send an agent to the fund raiser to determine if liquor was being served and then to conduct a raid.235 (In fact the raid was cancelled for reasons beyond the Bureau's control A prior raid on the local fire department's fund raiser had given rise to con siderable criticism and the District Attorney issued an advisory opin ion that such affairs did not violate state law The confidential source advised the field office that the ABC would not after all raid the Democrats because of "political ramifications.") 238 In the second case the target was a "key figure Communist He had a history of homosexuality and was known to frequent a local hotel The Bureau requested that the local police have him arrested for homosexuality it was then intended to publicize the arrest to "embarrass the Party. Interestingly the Bureau withdrew its request when the target stopped working actively for the Party because it would no longer cause the intended disruption.237 This would appear to rebut the Bureau's contention that turning over evidence of viola tions to local authorities was not really COINTELPRO at all but just part of its job 2 Interference With Judicial Process The Bureau's attempts to interfere with judicial processes affecting targets are particularly disturbing because they violate a fundamental principle of our system of government Justice is supposed to be blind Nevertheless when a target appeared before a judge a jury or a probation board he sometimes carried an unknown burden the Bureau had gotten there first Three examples should be sufficient A university student who was a leader of the Afro American Action Committee had been arrested in a demonstration at the university The Bureau sent an anonymous letter to the county prosecutor intended to discredit her by exposing her "subversive connections" her adoptive father was described as a Communist Party member The Bureau believed that the letter might aid the prosecutor in his case against the student Another anonymous letter containing the same information was mailed to a local radio announcer who had an "open mike program critical of The fund raiser was targeted because of two of the candidates who would be present One a state assemblymanrunning for reelection was active in the Vietnam Day Committee the other the Democraticcandidate for Congress had been a sponsor of the National Committeeto Abolishthe House Committeeon Un-AmericanActivities and had led demonstrations opposingthe manufacture of napalm bombs (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office10/21/66.) '" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 11/14/66 Ibid 'Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/23/60 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYork Field Office3/11/60 memo randum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/10/60 memoran dumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYorkField Office11/17/60 59 local "leftist activity The letter was intended to further publicize the "connection between the student and the Communist Party. In the second example a Klan leader who had been convicted on a weapons charge was out on bail pending appeal He spoke at a Klan rally and the Bureau arranged to have newsmen present The result ing stories and photographs were then delivered to the appellate judges considering his case.24 The third instance involved a real estate speculator's bequest of over a million dollars to the three representatives of the Communist Party who were expected to turn it over to the Party The Bureau interviewed the probate judge sitting on the case who was "very co operative and promised to look the case over carefully The judge asked the Bureau to determine whether the widow would be willing to "take any action designed to keep the Communist Party from getting the money. The Bureau's efforts to gain the widow's help in contesting the will proved unsuccessful. 3 Candidates and Political Appointees The Bureau apparently did not trust the American people to make the proper choices in the voting booth Candidates who in the Bu reau's opinion should not be elected were therefore targeted The case of the Democratic fundraiser discussed earlier was just one example Socialist Workers Party candidates were routinely selected for counterintelligence although they had never come close to winning an election In one case a SWP candidate for state office inadvertently protected herself from action by announcing at a news conference that she had no objections to premarital sex a field office thereupon withdrew its previously approved proposal to publicize her common law marriage. Other candidates were also targeted A Midwest lawyer whose firm represented "subversives (defendants in the Smith Act trials) ran for City Council The lawyer had been active in the civil rights move ment in the South and the John Birch Society in his city had recently mailed a book called "It's Very Simple The True Story of Civil Rights to various ministers priests and rabbis The Bureau received a copy of the mailing list from a source in the Birch Society and sent an anonymous follow-up letter to the book's recipients noting the pages on which the candidate had been mentioned and calling their attention to the "Communist background of this "charlatan. 242The " Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office7/22/69 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office 4/9/69 Charles Colsonspent seven months in jail for violating the civil rights of a de fendant in a criminal case through the deliberate creation of prejudicial pre trial publicity "0Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to MiamiField Office6/23/66 memo randum from MiamiField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/30/66 " Memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/5/67 The Bureau also obtained legal advice from a probate attorney on how the will could be attacked contacted other relatives of the deceased leaked information about the will to a city newspaper and solicited the efforts of the IRS and state tax ing authorities to depletethe estate as muchas possible "'Memorandum from Atlanta Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/13/70 'Memorandum from Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/15/65 memorandumfroth FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office9/22/65 69-9840 76 5 60 Bureau also sent a fictitious-name letter to a television station on which the candidate was to appear enclosing a series of informative questions it believed should be asked.243 The candidate was defeated He subsequently ran (successfully as it happened) for a judgeship Political appointees were also targeted One target was a member of the board of the NAACP and the Democratic State Central Commit tee His brother according to the documents was a communist and the target had participated in some Party youth group activities fifteen years earlier The target's appointment as secretary of a city transportation board elicited an anonymous letter to the Mayor with carbons to two newspapers protesting the use of "us taxpayers money in the appointment of a "known Communist to a highly paid job more anonymous letters to various politicians the American Legion and the county prosecutor in the same vein and a pseudonymous letter to the members of the transportation board stating that the Mayor had "saddled them with a Commie secretary because he thinks it will get him a few Negro votes.244 4 Investigating Committees State and Federal legislative investigating committees were occa sionally used to attack a target since the committees interests usually marched with the Bureau's Perhaps the most elaborate use of an investigating committee was the framing of a complicated "snitch jacket. In October 1959 a legis lative committee held hearings in Philadelphia "ostensibly to show a resurgence of CP activity in the area.245 The Bureau's target was subpoenaed to appear before the committee but was not actually called to testify The field officeproposed that local CP leaders be contacted to raise the question of "how it was possible for [the target] to escape testifying before the committee this "might place suspicion on him as being cooperative with the investigators and "raise sufficient doubt in the minds of the leaders regarding [the target] to force him out of the CP or at least to isolate and neutralize him. Strangely enough the target was not a bona fide CP member he was an undercover in filtrator for a private anti-Communist group who had been a source of trouble for the FBI because he kept getting in their way A more typical example of the use of a legislative committee is a series of anonymous letters sent to the chairman of a state investigating committee that was designated to look into New Left activities on the state's college campuses The target was an activist professor and the letters detailed his "subversive background. G Exposing "Communist Infiltration of Groups This technique was used in approximately 4 percent of all approved proposals The most common method involved anonymously notify Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/1/65 5 Memorandum from Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/24/66 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office 11/3/66 According to the documents "operating under the direction of New York headquarters, a document was placed in the record by the Committeewhich according to the "presiding officer, indicated that the CP planned to hold its national convention in Philadelphia The field officeadded "This officeis not aware of any such plan of the CP. Memorandumfrom Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters 11/3/59 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Phila delphia Field Office11/12/59 61 ing the group (civil rights organization PTA Boy Scouts etc.) that one or more of its members was a "Communist, 246so that it could take whatever action it deemed appropriate Occasionally however the group itself was the COINTELPRO target In those cases the information went to the media and the intent was to link the group to the Communist Party For example one target was a Western professor who was the im mediate past president of a local peace center "a coalition of anti Vietnam and antidraft groups. He had resigned to become chairman of the state's McCarthy campaign organization but it was anticipated that he would return to the peace center after the election Accord ing to the documents the professor's wife had been a Communist Party member in the early 1950s This information was furnished to a newspaper editor who had written an editorial branding the SDS and various black power groups as "professional revolutionists. The information was intended to "expose these people at this time when they are receiving considerable publicity to not only educate the public to their character but disrupt the members of the peace organization.247 In another case the Bureau learned through electronic surveillance of a civil rights leader's plans to attend a reception at the Soviet Mis sion to the United Nations (The reception was to honor a Soviet author.) The civil rights leader was active in a school boycott which had been previously targeted the Bureau arranged to have news photographers at the scene to photograph him entering the Soviet mission.248 Other instances include furnishing information to the media on the participation of the Communist Party Presidential candidate in a United Farm Workers picket line 249"confidentially telling estab lished sources of three Northern California newspapers that the San Francisco County CP Committee had stated that the Bay area civil rights groups would "begin working on the area's large newspapers "in an effort to secure greater employment of Negroes 25 and fur nishing information on Socialist Workers Party participation in the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to "dis credit the antiwar group by tying it "into the subversive movement. 251 'Note that the "Communist label was looselyapplied and might mean only that an informant reported that a target had attended meetings of a "front group some years earlier As noted earlier none of the "COINTELPRO labels were precise " Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Phoenix Field Office6/11/68 'Memorandum from William C Sullivan 2/4/64 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to NewYorkField Office2/12/64 " The target was not intended to be the United Farm Workers but a local collegeprofessor expected to participate in the picket line The Bureau had un successfullydirected "considerableefforts to prevent hiring the professor Ap parently the Bureau did not consider the impact of this techniqueon the United Farm Workers efforts Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/12/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office9/13/68 6 Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/16/64 861Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/10/67 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office3/14/67 62 V COMMANDANDCONTROLTHE PROBLEMOF OVERSIGHT A Within the Bureau Internal Administration The Bureau attempted to exercise stringent internal controls over COINTELPRO All counterintelligence proposals had to be approved by headquarters Every originating COINTELPRO document con tains a strong warning to the field that "no counterintelligence action may be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization. The field would send a proposal under the COINTELPRO caption to the Seat of Government the Bureau term for headquarters where it would be routed to the Section Chief of the section handling the particular COINTELPRO program.252 The recommendation would then be attached to the proposal be ginning the process of administrative review The lowest level on which a proposal could be approved was the Assistant Director Do mestic Intelligence Division to whom the Section Chief reported via the Branch Chief More often the proposal would go through the Assistant to the Director ,and often to the Director himself Coordination The Counterintelligence programs were coordinated with the rest of the section's work primarily through informal contacts but also through section meetings and the Section Chief's knowledge of the work of his entire section Further although the initial COINTELPRO was an effort to cen tralize what had been an ad hoc series of field actions the programs continued to be essentially field-oriented with little target selection by headquarters However the Section Chief would attempt to make sure targets were being effectively chosen by occasionally sending out di rectives to field offices to intensify the investigation of a particular individual or group and to consider the subject for counterintelligence action.253 Results Participating field offices were required to send in status letters (usually every ninety days) reporting any tangible results They were instructed to resolve any doubts as to whether a counterintelligence action caused the observed result in their favor Nevertheless results were reported in only 527 cases or 22 percent of the approved actions When a "good result was reported the field office or agent involved frequently received a letter of commendation or incentive taward.254 762The CPUSA SWP and New Left programs were handled in the Internal Security Section the White Hate program was first handled in a short-lived three-man "COINTELPROunit which during the three years of its existence supervised the CP and SWP programs as well and then was transferred to the Extremists Section the Black Nationalist program was supervisedby the Racial Intelligence Section The Section Chief would then route the proposal to the COINTELPRO supervisor for each program Occasionally the Section Chief made a recommendationas to the proposal more often the supervisor made the initial decisionto approve or deny 'GNo control file was maintained of these directives Since these directives were sent out under the investigative caption the first time the COINTELPRO caption would be used was on the field proposal which responded to the directives 'b (Unit chief 10/16/75 p 167.) There is no central fileof such awards so the number is retrievable only by searching each agent's personnel file 63 4 Blurred Distinction Between Counterintelligence and In vestigation It is possible that some actions did not receive headquarters scrutiny simply because the field officeswere never told precisely what "counter intelligence was Although Bureau procedures strictly required COINTELPRO proposals to be approved at headquarters and a con trol file to be maintained both in the field and at headquarters the field offices had no way to determine with any certainty just what was counterintelligence and what was investigation Many of the tech niques overlap contacts with employers contacts with family members contacts with local law enforcement even straight interviewing are all investigative techniques which were used in COINTELPRO ac tions. More importantly actions in the Rev Martin Luther King case which cannot by any stretch of the language be called "investiga tive were not called COINTELPRO but were carried under the investigative caption 256 The Bureau witnesses agree that COINTELPRO has no fixed defini tion and that there is a large grey area between what is counterintelli gence and what is aggressive investigation As the Black Nationalist supervisor put it "Basically actions taken to neutralize an individual or disrupt an organization would be COINTELPRO actions which were primarily investigative would have been handled by the investi gative desks, even though the investigative action had disruptive effects 2568Aggressive investigation continues and in many cases may be as disruptive as COINTELPRO because in an investigation the Bureau can and does reveal its interest An anonymous letter (COIN TELPRO) can be discarded as the work of a crank but if the local FBI agent says the subject of an investigation is a subversive an em ployer or family member pays attention Inspection The Inspection Division attempted to ensure that standard proce dures were being followed The Inspectors focused on two things field officeparticipation and the mechanics of headquarters approval How ever the Inspection Division did not exercise oversight in the sense of looking for wrongdoing Rather it was an active participant in COINTELPRO by attempting to make sure that it was being effi ciently and enthusiastically conducted. Accordingto Moore even the "snitch jacket" labeling a group member as an informant when he is not is not solely a counterintelligencetechnique but may be used in an ordinary investigation to protect a real informant "Maybe you had an informant whoselife was at stake becausesomebodysuspected him and the degree of response might be the degree that you would have to use in order to sow enough suspicion on other people to take it away from your informant. (Moore 11/3/75 p 70) 2 SeeDr Martin Luther King Report 25 BlackNationalist deposition 10/17/75 p 15 2 As Mooreput it "This was a program and wheneverthe Bureau had a pro gram you had to produceresults becauseit was scrutinized by the inspectors not onlyduring your owninspectionon a yearly basis but also scrutinized in the field during fieldinspections. (Moore 11/3/75 p 43.) The New Left supervisor who receivedcopies of the inspection reports stated that "it would be an innocuous type report in every instance I can recall. (NewLeft supervisor 10/28/75 p 72) For example one Domestic Intelligence Division inspection report on the "White Hate programs noted under "Accomplishments that the declinein Klan orgaiiizatioils iS attributable to "hard-hitting investigations counterintelligence (Continued) 64 As the Assistant Director then in charge of the Inspection Division testified the "propriety of COINTELPRO was not investigated He agreed that his job was to "determine whether the program was being pursued effectively as opposed to whether it was proper, and added "There was no instruction to me nor do I believe there is any instruc tion in the Inspector's manual that the Inspector should be on the alert to see that constitutional values are being protected. 258 B Outside the Bureau 1956 1971 There is no clear answer to the question whether anyone outside the Bureau knew about COINTELPRO One of the hallmarks of COINTELPRO was its secrecy No one outside the Bureau was to know it existed. A characteristic instruction appeared in the Black Nationalist originating letter You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive opera tions and techniques considered under the program.28o Thus for example anonymous letters had to be written on commer cially purchased stationery newsmen had to be so completely trust worthy that they were guaranteed not to reveal the Bureau's interest and inquiries of law enforcement officials had to be under investigative pretext In approving or denying any proposal the primary consid eration was preventing "embarrassment to the Bureau. Embarrass ment is a term of art It means both public relations embarrassment criticism and any revelation of the Bureau's investigative interest to the subject which may then be expected to take countermeasures.28 (Continued) programs directed at them and penetration by our racial informants. The report then lists several specificactions including the defeat of a candidate with Klan affiliations the removalfrom officeof a high Klan official and the issuance of a derogatory press release (Inspection Domestic Intelligence Division 1/8 26/71 pp 15 17-19.) 2 Mark Felt testimony 2/3/76 pp 56 65 For security reasons no instructions were printed in the Manual In service training for intelligenceagents did contain an hour on COINTELPRO so it may be assumed that most agents knew somethingabout the programs For instances in which Attorneys General the Cabinet and the House Sub committee on Appropriations were allegedly informed of the existence of the CPUSAand Klan COINTELPROs 8B0Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 8/25/67 'a One example of the lengths to which the Bureau went in maintaining secrecy may be instructive The Bureau sent a letter to Klan memberspurport ing to be from the "National Intelligence Committee" a super-secret Klan disciplinary body The letter fired the North Carolina Grand Dragon and sus pended the Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton Shelton complained to both the local postal inspector and the FBI resident agency (which solemnlyassured him that his complaint was not within the Bureau's jurisdiction) The Bureau had intended to mail a second "NIC letter but the plans were held in abeyance until it couldbe learned whether the postal inspectorintended to act on Shelton's complaint The Bureau therefore contacted the local postal inspector using their investigation of Shelton's complaintas a pretext to see what the inspector intended to do The field officereported that the local inspector had forwarded the complaintto regionalheadquarters whichin turn referred it to a Chief Postal Inspector in Washington D.C The Bureau's liaison agent was then sent to that office to determine what action the postal authorities planned to take He returned with the information that the Post Officehad referred the matter to the Fraud Section of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division under a cover 65 This secrecy has an obvious impact on the oversight process There is some question whether anyone with oversight responsibility outside the Bureau was informed of COINTELPRO In response to the Com mittee's request the Bureau has assembled all documents available in its files which indicate that members of the executive and legislative branches were so informed.262 1 Executive Branch On May 8 1958 Director Hoover sent two letters one to the Hon orable Robert Cutler Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and the other to Attorney General William Rogers containing the same information The Attorney General's letter is captioned "COMMU NIST PARTY USA-INTERNAL SECURITY. The letters are fairly explicit notification of the CPUSA COINTELPRO In August of 1956 this Bureau initiated a program designed to promote disruption within the ranks of the Communist Party (CP) USA .. Several techniques have been utilized to accomplish our objectives.263 The letters go on to detail use of informants to engage in controver sial discussions after which "acrimonious debates ensued suspicions were aroused and jealousies fomented" and anonymous mailings of anti-communist material both reprinted and Bureau-prepared to active CP members.264 (Two examples of the Bureau's product were enclosed.) "Tangible accomplishments achieved by the program were "disillusionment and defection among Party members and increased factionalism at all levels. 265However the only techniques disclosed were use of informants and anonymous propaganda mailings There is no record of any reply to these letters letter stating that since Shelton's allegations "appear to involve an internal struggle for Klan control and "since the evidenceof mail fraud was somewhat tenuous in nature, the Post Officedid not contemplateany investigation Neither apparently did the Department The Bureau did not inform either the Postal Inspector or the Criminal Division that it had authored the letter under review Instead when it appeared the FBI's role would not be discovered the Bureau prepared to send out the secondletter a plan which was discontinuedwhen the Klan "notional was proposed Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters 5/9/67 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office5/24/67 memo randum from Charlotte Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/31/67 memoran dum from Atlanta Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/7/67 memorandumfrom Atlanta Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/13/67 memorandumfrom Birming ham Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/14/67 memorandum from Charlotte Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/28/67 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Atlanta and Charlotte Field Offices 6/29/67 memorandum from Atlanta Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/27/67 memorandumfrom Bernard Rachner to Charles Brennan 7/11/67 memorandumfrom Charlotte Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/22/67 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office8/21/67 These documentswere also made available to the Petersen Committee The Petersen Committee twice asked the Bureau for documents showing outside knowledge and twice was told there were none Onlyas the Petersen report was ready to go to press did the Bureau find the documents delivered (Staff inter viewwith Henry Petersen.) R Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the AttorneyGeneral 5/8/58 ' Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the Attorney General 5/8/58 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the AttorneyGeneral 5/8/58 66 On January 10 1961 letters from the Director were sent to Dean Rusk Robert Kennedy and Byron R White who were about to take office as Secretary of State Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General respectively The letters enclosed a top secret summary mem orandum setting forth the overall activities of the Communist Party USA and stated "Our responsibilities in the internal security field and our counterattack against the CPUSA are also set out in this memorandum. 266 The five-page memorandum contains one section entitled "FBI Counterattack. This section details penetration of the Party at all levels with security informants use of various techniques to keep the Party off-balance and disillusioned infiltration by informants in tensive investigation of Party members and prosecution Only one paragraph of that report appears at all related to the Bureau's claim that the CPUSA COINTELPRO was disclosed As an adjunct to our regular investigative operations we carry on a carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPUSA which keeps it off balance Our primary purpose in this program is to bring about disillusionment on the part of individual members which is carried on from both inside and outside the Party organization [Sentence on use of informants to disrupt excised for security reasons.] In certain instances we have been successful in preventing communists from seizing control of legitimate mass orga nizations and have discredited others who were secretly oper ating inside such organizations For example during 1959 we were able to prevent the CPUSA from seizing control of the 20,000-member branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Chicago Illinois.287 The only techniques disclosed were use of informants and COMINFIL exposure There is no record of any replies to these letters On September 2 1965 letters were sent to the Honorable Marvin Watson Special Assistant to President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach (whose letter was captioned "PENETRATION AND DISRUPTION OF KLAN ORGANIZATIONS RACIAL MAT TERS") These two-page letters refer to the Bureau's success in solv ing a number of cases involving racial violence in the South They then detail the development of a large number of informants and the value of the information received from them One paragraph deals with "disruption We also are seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan organizations Typical is the manner in which we exposed and thwarted a "kick back scheme a Klan group was using in one southern state to help finance its activities One member of the group was selling insurance to other Klan mem bers and would deposit a generous portion of the premium refunds in the Klan treasury As a result of action we took the insurance company learned of the scheme and cancelled all the policies held by Klan members thereby cutting on a siz " MemorandumfromDirector FBI to the AttorneyGeneral 1/10/61 'Memorandum from Director FBI to the Attorney General 1/10/61 p 4 67 able source of revenue which had been used to finance Klan activities.268 Notifying an insurance company of a kick back scheme involving its premiums is not a "typical COINTELPRO technique It falls within that grey area between counterintelligence and ordinary Bureau re sponsibilities Nevertheless the statement that the Bureau is "seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan organizations is considered by the Bureau to be notification of the White Hate COINTELPRO even though it does not distinguish between the inevi table and sometimes proper disruption of intensive investigation and the intended disruption of covert action On September 3 1965 Mr Katzenbach replied to the Director's letter with a two-paragraph memorandum captioned "Re Your memo randum of September 2 regarding penetration and disruption of Klan organizations. The body of the memorandum makes no reference to disruption but praises the accomplishments of the Bureau in the area of Klan penetration and congratulates Director Hoover on the devel opment of his informant system and the results obtained through it The letter concludes It is unfortunate that the value of these activities would in most cases be lost if too extensive publicity were given to them however perhaps at some point it may be possible to place these achievements on the public record so that the Bureau can receive its due credit.269 The Bureau interpreted this letter as approval and praise of its White Hate COINTELPRO Mr Katzenbach has said that he has no memory of this document nor of the response He testified that during his term in the Department he had never heard the terms "COINTEL or COINTELPRO and that while he was familiar with the Klan inves tigation he was not aware of any improper activities such as letters to wives.270Mr Katzenbach added It never occurred to me that the Bureau would engage in the sort of sustained improper activity which it apparently did Moreover given these excesses I am not surprised that I and others were unaware of them Would it have made sense for the FBI to seek approval for activities of this nature espe cially from Attorneys General who did not share Mr Hoover's political views who would not have been in sympathy with the purpose of these attacks and who would not have con doned the methods 271 The files do not reveal any response from Mr Watson On December 19 1967 Director Hoover sent a letter to Attorney General Ramsey Clark with a copy to Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher captioned "KU KLUX KLAN INVESTIGA TIONS FBI ACCOMPLISHMENTS and attaching a ten-page memorandum with the same caption and a list of statements and pub Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the Attorney General 9/2/65 p 2 Memorandumfrom Nicholas deB Katzenbach to J Edgar Hoover 9/3/65 210NicholasdeB Katzenbach testimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 206-207 271Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 217 68 lications regarding the Ku Klux Klan "and the FBI's role in investi gating Klan matters. The memorandum was prepared "pursuant to your conversation with Cartha DeLoach of this Bureau concerning FBI coverage and penetration of the Ku Klux Klan. 272 The memo is divided into eleven sections Background Present Status FBI Responsibility Major Cases Informants Special Proj ects Liaison With Local Authorities Klan Infiltration of Law En forcement Acquisition of Weapons and Dynamite of the Ku Klux Klan Interviews of Klansmen and Recent Developments The first statement in the memorandum which might conceivably relate to the White Hate COINTELPRO appears under the heading "FBI Responsibility . We conduct intelligence investigations with the view toward infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan with informants neutralizing it as a terrorist organization and deterring vio lence.273 The Bureau considers the word "neutralize to be a COINTELPRO key word Some specific activities which were carried out within the Bureau under the COINTELPRO caption are then detailed under the heading "Special Projects. The use of Bureau informants to effect the re moval of Klan officers is set forth under the subheadings "Florida, "Mississippi, and "Louisiana. More significantly the "Florida paragraph includes the statement that "We have found that by the removal of top Klan officers and provoking scandal within the state Klan organization through our informants the Klan in a particular area can be rendered ineffective. 274This sentence although somewhat buried should if focused upon have alerted the recipients to actions going beyond normal investigative activity Other references are more vague referring only to "containing the growth or "controlling the expansion of state Klans.275 There is no record of any reply to this letter which Clark does not remember receiving Did [these phrases in the letter] put me on notice No Why I either did not read them or if I did read them didn't read them carefully I think I didn't read this I think perhaps I had asked for it for someone else and either bucked it on to them or never saw it.276 MemorandumfromDirector FBI to the AttorneyGeneral 12/19/67 p 1 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the Attorney General 2/19/67 p 4 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the Attorney General 12/19/67 p 8 " The paragraph under the subheading "Tennessee includes the statement that through a highly placed Bureau informant "we were able to control the ex pansion of the Klan. The paragraphs under the subheading "Virginia states that after the United Klaus of America began an intensive organizational effort in the state "We immediately began an all-out effort to penetrate the Virginia Klan contain its growth and deter violence. The specificexamples given how ever are not OOINTELPROactions but liaison with state and local authorities prosecution cooperationwith the Governor and warning a civil rights worker of a plot against his life The paragraph under the subheading "Illinois contains nothing relating to COINTELPRO activities but refers to cooperation with state authorities in the prosecution of a Klan officialfor a series of bombings (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the Attorney General 12/19/67 pp 8-10.) "8Clark 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 235 69 He added "I think that any disruptive activities such as those you reveal regarding the COINTEL program and the Ku Klux Klan should be absolutely prohibited and subjected to criminal prosecu tion. 277 Finally on September 17 1969 a letter was sent to Attorney General Mitchell with copies to the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorneys General of the Criminal Division Internal Security Divi sion and Civil Division captioned "INVESTIGATION OF KLAN ORGANIZATIONS RACIAL MATTERS (KLAN) , which in forms the recipients of the "significant progress we have recently made in our investigation of the Ku Klux Klan. The one page letter states that "during the last several months,278 while various national and state leaders of the United Klan of America remain in prison we have attempted to negate the activities of the temporary leaders of the Ku Klux Klan. 279 The only example given is the "careful use and instruction of selected racial informants to "initiate a split within the United Klans of America. This split was evidenced by a Klan rally during which "approximately 150 Klan membership cards were tacked to a cross and burned to signify this breach. 280 The letter concludes "We will continue to give full attention to our responsibilities in an effort to accomplish the maximum possible neu tralization of the Klan. 281There is no record of any replies to these letters While the only documentary evidence that members of the executive branch were informed of the existence of any COINTELPRO has been set forth above the COINTELPRO unit chief stated that he was certain that Director Hoover orally briefed every Attorney General and President since he wrote "squibs for the Director to use in such briefings He could not however remember the dates or subject matter of the briefings and the Bureau was unable to produce any such "squibs (which would not in any case have been routinely saved) Cartha DeLoach former Assistant to the Director testified that he "distinctly recalled briefing Attorney General Clark "generally concerning COINTELPRO.282 Clark denied that DeLoach's testi mony was either true or accurate adding "I do not believe that he briefed me on anything even as he says generally concerning COINTELPRO whatever that means. 283The Bureau has failed to produce any memoranda of such oral briefings although it was the habit of both Director Hoover and DeLoach to write memoranda for the files in such situations.284 2 The Cabinet The Bureau has furnished the Committee a portion of a briefing paper prepared for Director Hoover for his briefing of the Cabinet Clark 12/3/75 Hearings p 221 279The White Hate COINTELPROhad been goingon for fiveyears "Memorandum from Director FBI to the Attorney General 9/17/69 28 Ibid 'e Ibid 389DeLoach 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 183 "Clark 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 232 !8fUnit Chief 10/14/75 p 136 and 10/21/75 p 42 70 presided over by President Eisenhower dated November 6 1958 There is no transcript of the actual briefing The briefing as a whole apparently dealt with among other things seven programs which are "part of our overall counterintelligence operations and which are "specific answers to specific problems which have arisen within our investigative jurisdiction. Six of the programs apparently related to espionage The seventh deals with the CPUSA To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the United States we have a seventh program designed to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its members During the past few years this program has been most effective Selective informants were briefed and trained to raise controversial issues within the Party In the process many were able to advance themselves to higher positions The Internal Revenue Service was furnished the names and addresses of Party functionaries who had been active in the underground apparatus Based on this information investi gations were instituted in 262 possible income tax evasion cases Anticommunist literature and simulated Party docu ments were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen mem bers 285 This statement although concise would appear to be a fairly explicit notification of the existence of the CPUSA COINTELPRO There are no documents reflecting any response 3 Legislative Branch The Bureau has furnished excerpts from briefing papers prepared for the Director in his annual appearances before the House Appro priations Subcommittee During the hearings pertaining to fiscal years 1958 1959 1960 1961 1963 1966 and 1967,286these briefing papers were given to the Director to be used in top secret off-the-record testi mony relating to the CPUSA and White Hate COINTELPROs No transcripts are available of the actual briefings and it is therefore not possible to determine whether the briefing papers were used at all or conversely whether the Director went beyond them to give addi tional information Additionally portions of the briefing papers are underlined by hand and portions have been crossed out also by hand Some sections are both underlined and crossed out The Bureau has not been able to explain the meaning of the underlining or cross marks However if the briefing papers were used as written the Sub committee was informed of the existence of the CPUSA and Klan COINTELPROs The FY 1958 briefing paper is in outline form Under the heading "auxiliary measures directed against Communist Party-USA is a paragraph entitled "FBI counterintelligence program to exploit Party 'split The Bureau also recently inaugurated a newly devised coun terintelligence program which is designed to capitalize upon "Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing to the President and his cabinet 11/6/58 pp 35-36 'The actual dates of the hearings wouldbe 1957 1958 1959 1960 1962 1965 and 1966 71 the "split presently existing in the leadership of the Com munist Party-USA Among other objectives efforts are being made by the Bureau through informants and other tech niques to keep these rifts open and to otherwise weaken the party where possible to do so in an anonymous manner The Internal Revenue Service has been given the names of 336 communist underground subjects so that the agency may be able to entertain prosecutions for filing of false income tax returns or other violations within the jurisdiction of that Service The FY 1959 briefing paper on the CPUSA deals primarily with informant penetration but includes the statement that "to counter act [CPUSA] activities the FBI for years has had a planned intensive program designed to infiltrate penetrate disorganize and disrupt the Communist Party USA. 287In covering informant activities the paper includes the statement "they [informants] have likewise worked to excellent advantage as a disruptive tactic. 288The one specific ex ample cited has been deleted by the Bureau because it tends to identify an informant The FY 1960 briefing paper is even more explicit The pertinent section is entitled "FBI's Anti-Communist Counterintelligence Pro gram. It details use of informants to engage in controversial discus sions "to promote dissension factionalism and defections which "have been extremely successful from a disruptive standpoint. 289One paragraph deals with propaganda mailings "carefully concealing the identity of the FBI as its source" 290another paragraph states that "Communist Party leaders are considerably concerned over this anonymous dissemination of literature. 291 The FY 1961 briefing paper again titled "FBI's Counterintelli gence Program states that the program was devised "to promote dis sension factionalism and defections within the communist cause. 292 The only technique discussed (but at some length) is anonymous propaganda mailings The effectiveness of the technique according to the paper was proven from the mouth of the enemy that the mail ings "appear to be the greatest danger to the Communist Party USA. 293 The FY 1963 briefing paper captioned "Counterintelligence Pro gram, is extraordinarily explicit It reveals that Since August 1956 we have augmented our regular investiga tive operations against the Communist Party-USA with a "counterintelligence program which involves the applica 'e'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefingof the House Appropriations Subcom mittee FY 1959p 54 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefingof the House Appropriations Subcom mittee FY 1959p 58 'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefingof the House Appropriations Subcom mittee FY 1960p 76 'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefingof the House Appropriations Subcom mittee FY 1960p 76 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefingof the House Appropriations Subcom mittee FY 1960p 77 907Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations SubcommitteeFY 1961p 80 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcom mittee FY 1961p 81 72 tion of disruptive techniques and psychological warfare di rected at discrediting and disrupting the operations of the Party and causing disillusionment and defections within the communist ranks The tangible results we are obtaining through these covert and extremely sensitive operations speak for themselves.294 The paper goes on to set forth such techniques as disrupting meet ings rallies and press conferences through causing the last-minute cancellation of the rental of the hall packing the audience with anti communists arranging adverse publicity in the press and giving friendly reporters "embarrassing questions for Communists they interviewed The briefing paper also mentions the use of newsmen to take photographs which show the close relationship between the leaders of the CPUSA and officials of the Soviet Union using inform ants to sow discord and factionalism exposing and discrediting Com munists in such "legitimate organizations as the YMCA and the Boy Scouts and mailing anonymous propaganda.295 The briefing paper for FY 1966 again refers to "counterintelligence action "We have since 1956 carried on a sensitive program for the purpose of disrupting exposing discrediting and otherwise neutraliz ing the Communist Party-USA and related organizations. 298The paper cites two examples The first is an operation conducted against a Communist Party functionary who arrived in a (deleted) city to conduct a secret two-week Party school for local youth The Bureau arranged for him to be greeted at the airport by local television news men The functionary lost his temper pushing the reporter away and swinging his briefcase at the cameraman who was busily filming the entire incident The film was later televised nationally The second technique is described as "the most effective single blow ever dealt the organized communist movement. The description has been de leted "as it tends to reveal a highly sensitive technique. 297The COINTELPRO unit chief also stated that this one single action suc ceeded in causing a "radical decrease in CPUSA membership but refused to tell the Committee staff what that action was because it involved foreign counterintelligence.299 The final briefing paper for FY 1967 refers to the CPUSA pro gram and its expansion in 1964 to include "Klan and hate-type or ganizations and their memberships. It continues "counterintelligence action today is a valuable adjunct to investigative responsibilities and the techniques used complement our investigations All information related to the targeted organizations their leadership and members which is developed from a variety of sources is carefully reviewed for its potential for use under this program. 299 'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee FY 1963 'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee FY 1963 "Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee FY 1966 p 62 This is the first time the targeting of non-Party members can be inferred 'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee FY 1966 p 63 B96Unit chief 10/16/75 p 113 'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee FY 1967 p 71 73 Examples cited are the Bureau's preparation of a leaflet on the W.E.B DuBois Clubs entitled "Target .. American Youth! spon sored by the VFW alerting owners of meeting locations to their use by Communists alerting the Veterans Administration to a Klan member's full-time employment in order to reduce his pension and the IRS to the fact that he failed to file tax returns exposing the in surance kick back scheme also referred to in the 1965 letters to Watson and Katzenbach and increasing informant coverage by duplicating a Klan business card given to prospective members.3oo C Outside the Bureau Post-1971 In the fall of 1973 the Department of Justice released certain COINTELPRO documents which had been requested by NBC re porter Carl Stern in a Freedom of Information Act request following the Media Pennsylvania break-in In January 1974 Attorney General Saxbe asked Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen to form an intradepartmental committee to study COINTELPRO and report back to him.3o1The committee was composed of both Department at torneys and Bureau agents The Department lawyers did not work directly with Bureau documents instead the Bureau prepared sum maries of the documents in the COINTELPRO control file which did not include the identities or affiliations of the targets and the Depart ment members were allowed to do a sample comparison to verify the accuracy of the summaries A revised and shortened version of the report of the Petersen Com mittee was made public in November 1974 The public report was pref aced by a statement from Attorney General Saxbe which stated that while "in a small number of instances some of these programs in volved what we consider today to be improper activities, most of the activities "were legitimate. 301The public version did not examine the purposes or legality of the programs or the techniques although it did state some COINTELPRO activities involved "isolated instances of practices that "can only be considered abhorrent in a free society. 3o2 The confidential report to Attorney General Saxbe examined the legal issues at some length It emphasized that many COINTELPRO activities "were entirely proper and appropriate law enforcement pro cedures. 303These included the following notifying other Government authorities of civil and criminal violations of group members interviewing such group mem bers disseminating public source material on such individ uals and groups to media representatives encouraging in formants to argue against the use of violence by such groups and issuing general public comment on the activities policies 'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee FY 1967 pp 72-73 901Althoughportions of the Committee'sreport were made publicin April 1974 Petersen has testified that the purpose of the report was simply to inform the Attorney General The inquiry was not intended to be conclusiveand certainly was not an adversary proceeding "We were doing a survey rather than con ducting an investigation. (Henry Petersen testimony 12/11/75 Hearing Vol 6 p 271.) $O7William Saxbe statement Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Sub Committeeof the HouseCommitteeon the Judiciary 11/20/74 p 9 Petersen committeereport CRCRHearings 11/20/74 p 11 30Petersen committeereport CRCR Hearings 11/20/74 p 26 74 and objectives of such groups through testimony at legisla tive hearings and in other formal reports.304 On the other hand the report concluded that many other COINTEL PRO activities designed to expose disrupt and neutralize domestic groups "exceeded the Bureau's investigative authority and may be said to constitute an unwarranted interference with First Amendment rights of free speech and associations of the target individuals and or ganizations. 305 Department attorneys prepared two legal memoranda one view ing COINTELPRO as a conspiracy to deprive persons of First Amendment rights under 18 U.S.C 241 and the other rejecting that view.306The committee itself reached the following conclusion While as a matter of pure legal theory it is arguable that these programs resulted in Section 241 violations it is the view of the committee that any decision as to whether prosecution should be undertaken must also take into account several other important factors which bear upon the events in ques tion These factors are first the historical context in which the programs were conceived and executed by the Bureau in response to public and even Congressional demands for action to neutralize the self-proclaimed revolutionary aims and violence prone activities of extremist groups which posed a threat to the peace and tranquility of our cities in the mid and late sixties second the fact that each of the COINTEL PRO programs was personally approved and supported by the late Director of the FBI and third the fact that the in terferences with First Amendment rights resulting from in dividual implemented program actions were insubstantial Under these circumstances it is the view of the committee that the opening of a criminal investigation of these matters is not warranted 307 The report also concluded that there were "substantial questions as to the liability of various former and present officials to civil suit "under tort theories of defamation of interference with contract rights. 308 The Departmental committee's crucial conclusion was that the inter ferences with First Amendment rights were "insubstantial. It appears to have reached that conclusion by ignoring the declared goals of the programs cutting down group membership and preventing the "prop agation of a group's philosophy Further the committee brushed over dangerous or degrading techniques by breaking down the categories of actions into very small percentages and then concluded that if only 1 percent of the actions involved poison pen letters to spouses then the activity was "insubstantial as compared to the entirety of COINTEL proposals even though as to the individuals in that category the in vasion might be very substantial indeed 804Petersen CommitteeReport pp 26-27 306Petersen CommitteeReport p 27 908Petersen CommitteeReport p 21 847Peterson CommitteeReport pp 21-22 8 8Petersen CommitteeReport p 22 75 Another weakness in the Petersen committee report is its charac terization as legitimate of such techniques as "leaking public source material to the media interviewing group members and notifying other government authorities of civil and criminal violations The term "public source material is misleading since the FBI's files con tain a large amount of so-called public source data (such as arrest records outdated or inaccurate news stories) which should not be "leaked outside the Bureau to discredit an individual.309 Interviews can be conducted in such an intrustive and persistent manner as to constitute harassment Minor technical law violations can be mag nified when uncovered and reported by the FBI to another agency for the purpose of disruption rather than objective law enforcement.31 Claims that a technique is legitimate per se should not be accepted without examining the actual purpose and effect of the activity Although the Petersen committee's report concluded that "the opening of a criminal investigation of these matters is not war ranted. 311the Committee did recommend broad changes in Bureau procedures First the report urged that "a sharp distinction be made between FBI activities in the area of foreign counterintelligence and those in the domestic field. 312The committee proposed that the Attorney General issue a directive to the FBI prohibiting it from instituting any counterintelligence pro gram such as COINTELPRO without his prior knowledge and approval Specifically this directive should make it un mistakably clear that no disruptive action should be taken by the FBI in connection with its investigative responsi bilities involving domestic based organizations except those 80 For instance the 20-years-past"Communist activities of a target professor's wife were found in "public source material, as were the arrest records of a prominent civil rights leader Both were leaked to "friendly media on condition that the Bureau's interest not be revealed a See e.g. the attempt to get an agent on the AlcoholBeverageControlBoard to raid a DemocraticParty fundraiser The CivilRights Divisionrefused to endorse this conclusion although it was under heavypressure fromtop Department executivesto doso Assistant Attorney General J Stanley Pottinger was first informed of the Petersen committee report a weekbeforeits publicrelease and no officialof the CivilRights Division had previouslyexaminedany of the COINTFLPROmaterials or summaries After the report's release the Civil Rights Division was permitted a short time to review some of the materials (Staff summary of interview with Assistant Attorney GeneralPottinger 4/21/76.) Under these restrictions the Civil Rights Division was not able to review "everythingin the voluminousfiles, but rather conductedonly a "general survey of the program unrelated to specificallegations of criminal violations. Assistant Attorney GeneralPottinger advised Attorney General Saxbe upon the completion of this brief examination of COINTELPRO that the Divisionfound "no basis for making criminal charges against particular individuals or involving particular incidents. Althoughsomeof the acts reviewedappeared "to amount to technical violations, the Divisionconcludedthat "without more information prosecutive action would not be justified under its "normal criteria. However Pottinger stressed that a "differentprosecutionjudgment wouldbe indicated if specificacts more fully known and developed could be evaluated in a complete factual context. (Memorandumfrom J Stanley Pottinger Assistant Attorney General to Attorney GeneralSaxbe 12/13/74.) 818Petersen Committee Report Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights Hearings 11/20/74 p 25 69-9840 76 6 76 which are sanctioned by rule of law procedure or judicially recognized and accepted police practices and which are not in violation of state or federal law The FBI should also be charged that in any event where a proposed action may be perceived with reason to unfairly affect the rights of citi zens it is the responsibility of the FBI as an institution and of FBI agents as individuals to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his authorized representative.313 Attorney General Saxbe did not issue such a directive and the matte] is still pending before Attorney General Levi.314 VI EPILOGUE On April 1 1976 Attorney General Levi announced the establish ment of a special review committee within the Department of Justice to notify COINTELPRO victims that they were the subjects of FBI activities directed against them Notification will be made "in those in stances where the specific COINTELPRO activity was improper ac tual harm may have occurred and the subjects are not already aware that they were the targets of CONINTELPRO activities. 315 The review committee has established guidelines for determin ing which COINTELPRO activities were "improper, but it will be difficult to make that determination without giving an official im primatur to questionable activities which do not meet the notification criteria For example there is little point in notifying all recipients of anonymous reprint mailings that they received their copy of a Reader's Digest article from the FBI but the Department should not suggest that the activity itself is a proper Bureau function Other acts which fall within the "grey area between COINTELPRO and aggressive investigation present similar problems.31 Nevertheless a Departmental notification program is an important step toward redressing the wrongs done and carries with it some 3UPetersen Committee Report Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rightshearings 11/20/74 p 28 814Attorney General Levi has proposed a series of guidelines on domestic intelligence A set of "preventive action guidelines was prepared which would have authorized the Bureau to take "nonviolent emergency measures to "ob struct or prevent the use of force or violence upon the Attorney Generals authorization These guidelines have now been abandoned because the Attorney General determined that it was not possible to frame general language which would permit proper (and indeed ordinary) law enforcement measures such as increased guards around building or traffic control during a demonstration while preventing COINTELPROtype activity 816Departmentof Justice release 4/1/76 The notificationguidelinesread as follows The review of the COINTELPROfiles should be conductedby the existing Shaheen committee An individual should be notifiedin those instances where an action directed against him was improper and in addition there is reason to believe he may have been caused actual harm In making this determination in doubtful cases the committee should resolve the question in favor of notification Excluded from notificationshould be those individuals whoare knownto be aware that they werethe subjects of COINTELPROactivities An advisory group will be created to pass upon those instances where the committeeis uncertain as to whether notificationshould be given and otherwise to advise the committeeas requested The manner of notification should be determined in each case to protect rights to privacy 77 additional benefits For the first time Departmental attorneys will review the original files rather than relying on Bureau-prepared sum maries Further the Department will have acknowledged finally that COINTELPRO was wrong Official repudiation of the programs is long overdue The American people need to be assured that never again will an agency of the government be permitted to conduct a secret war against those citizens it considers threats to the established order Only a combination of legislative prohibition and Departmental control can guarantee that COINTELPRO will not happen again The notifica tion program is an auspicious beginning Notificationshould be given as the work of the committeeproceeds without waiting for the entire reviewto becompleted In the event that the committee determines in the process of review that conduct suggests disciplinary action or referral of a matter to the Criminal or CivilRights Divisions the appropriate referral shouldbemade S No departure from these instructions will be made without the express approval of the Attorney General The committee may request such departure only through and with the recommendationof the advisorygroup (Letter from Department of Justice to the Select Committee 4/23/76.) (79) DR MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. CASE STUDY CONTENTS Page I Introduction 81 II The COMINFIL Investigation 86 III Concern Increases in the FBI and the Kennedy Administration Over Allegations of Communist Influence in the Civil Rights Movement and the FBI Intensifies the Investigation January 1962-October 1963 Introduction and Summary__ Summary 94 The Justice Department warns Dr King about advisers A and B January 1962-June 1963 95 Allegations about Dr King during hearings on the public accommodations bill and the administration's response July 1963 98 The Attorney General considersa wiretap of Dr King and rejects the idea July 1963 100 The Attorney General voices concern over continuing FBI reports about Dr King July-August 1963 102 The FBI intensifies its investigation of alleged Communist influence in the civil rights movement July-September 1963 104 IV Electronic Surveillanceof Dr Martin Luther Kingand the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Introduction and Summary 111 Legal standards governing the FBI's duty to inform the Justice Department of wiretaps and microphonesduring the period of the Martin Luther King investigation 112 Wiretap surveillance of Dr King and the SCLC October 1963-June 1966 115 Microphonesurveillance of Dr King January 1964-No vember 1965 120 Reasons for the FBI's microphone surveillance of Dr King 120 Evidence bearing on whether the Attorneys General authorized or knew about the microphone sur veillanceof Dr King 123 Attorney General Robert F Kennedy 124 AttorneyGeneralNicholasdeB Katzenbach 126 V The FBI's Effort to Discredit Dr Martin Luther King 1964 Intro duction and Summary 131 TheFBI disseminatesthe first King "Monograph and At torney GeneralKennedyordersit recalled October1963 131 TheFBI plans its campaign to discredit Dr King Decem ber 23 1963 133 William Sullivan proposes a plan to promote a new Negro leader January 1964 135 FBI Headquarters orders the fieldofficesto intensify efforts to discredit Dr King April-August 1964 137 Steps taken by the FBI in 1964to discredit Dr King 140 Attempts to discredit Dr King with the White House 140 Attemptsto discredit Dr King with the Congress 140 Attempts to discredit Dr King with universities 141 Attempts to discredit Dr King with churches 142 Attempts to discredit Dr King with the Pope 142 6 The attempt to discredit Dr King during his receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize 143 7 Attempts to block Dr King's publications 144 8 Attempt to undermine the National ScienceFoun dation's cooperationwith the SCLC 145 9 Unsuccessful FBI attempts to locate financial improprieties 145 F The question of whether Government officialsoutside of the FBI wereaware ofthe FBI's effortto discredit Dr King 146 80 Page VI The Hoover-King Controversy Becomes Public and a Truce is Called April December 1964 Summary Firststeps in the public controversy April November 1964 Tapes are mailed to Dr King November 21 1964 Attempts by the FBI to "leak to reporters tape recordings embarrassing to Dr King Roy Wilkins of NAACP meets with DeLoach to discuss allegations about Dr King November 27 1964 Dr King and Director Hoover meet December 1 1964 Civilrights leaders attempt to dissuade the FBI from dis crediting Dr King December 1964 May 1965 Farmer-DeLoach meeting December 1 1964 Young-Abernathy-DeLoach meeting January 8 1965 Carey-DeLoachmeeting May 19 1965 VII The FBI Program Against Dr King 1965 68 A Major efforts to discredit Dr King 1965 68 Attempts to discredit Dr King with churches Attemptsto discredit Dr King with heads of Gov ernment agencies Attempts to discredit Dr King by using the press Attempts to discredit Dr King with major political and financialleaders Attempts to discredit Dr King with congressional leaders B COINTELPRO operations against Dr King C The FBI's efforts to discredit Dr King during his last months D Attempts to discredit Dr King's reputation after hisdeath VIII Conclusion DR MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. CASE STUDY 1 INTItODIICTION From December 1963 until his death in 1968 Martin Luther King Jr 'was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neutralize him as an effective civil rights leader In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war against Dr King No holds were barred We have used [similar] techniques against Soviet agents [The same methods were] brought home against any organization against which we were tar geted We did not differentiate This is a rough tough busi ness. The FBI collected information about Dr King's plans and activi ties through an extensive surveillance program employing nearly every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal Wire taps which were initially approved by Attorney General Robert F Kennedy were maintained on Dr King's home telephone from Octo ber 1963 until mid-1965 the SCLC headquarter's telephones were covered by wiretaps for an even longer period Phones in the homes and offices of some of Dr King's close advisers were also wiretapped The FBI has acknowledged 16 occasions on which microphones 'were hidden in Dr King's hotel and motel rooms in an "attempt to obtain information about the "private activities of King and his advisers for use to "completely discredit them. FBI informants in the civil rights movement and reports from field offices kept the Bureau's headquarters informed of developments in the civil rights field The FBI's presence was so intrusive that one major figure in the civil rights movement testified that his colleagues referred to themselves as members of "the FBI's golden record club. 3 The FBI's formal program to discredit Dr King with Government officials began with the distribution of a "monograph which the FBI realized could "be regarded as a personal attack on Martin Luther King," and which was subsequently described by a Justice Depart ment official as "a personal diatribe a personal attack without evidentiary support. 5 Congressional leaders were warned "off the record about alleged dangers posed by Reverend King The FBI responded to Dr King's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize by attempting to undermine his re ception by foreign heads of state and American ambassadors in the countries that he planned to visit When Dr King returned to the 1William Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 p 97 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 1/28/64 AndrewYoungtestimony 2/19/76 p 55 Memorandumfrom Alan Belmontto ClydeTolson 10/17/63 Burke Marshall testimony 3/3/76 p 32 (81) 82 United States steps were taken to reduce support for a huge banquet and a special "day that were being planned in his honor The FBI's program to destroy Dr King as the leader of the civil rights movement entailed attempts to discredit him with churches universities and the press Steps were taken to attempt to convince the National Council of Churches the Baptist World Alliance and lead ing Protestant ministers to halt financial support of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and to persuade them that "Negro leaders should completely isolate King and remove him from the role he is now occupying in civil rights activities. 6When the FBI learned that Dr King intended to visit the Pope an agent was dis patched to persuade Francis Cardinal Spellman to warn the Pope about "the likely embarrassment that may result to the Pope should he grant King an audience. The FBI sought to influence universities to withhold honorary degrees from Dr King Attempts were made to prevent the publication of articles favorable to Dr King and to find "friendly news sources that would print unfavorable articles The FBI offered to play for reporters tape recordings allegedly made from microphone surveillance of Dr King's hotel rooms The FBI mailed Dr King a tape recording made from its micro phone coverage According to the Chief of the FBI's Domestic Intelli gence Division the tape was intended to precipitate a separation be tween Dr King and his wife in the belief that the separation would reduce Dr King's stature.'$ The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr King and his advisers interpreted as a threat to re lease the tape recording unless Dr King committed suicide The FBI also made preparations to promote someone "to assume the role of leadership of the Negro people when King has been completely dis credited. 8 The campaign against Dr King included attempts to destroy the Southern Christian Leadership Conference by cutting off its sources of funds The FBI considered and on some occasions executed plans to cut off the support of some of the SCLC's major contributors in cluding religious organizations a labor union and donors of grants such as the Ford Foundation One FBI field office recommended that the FBI send letters to the SCLC's donors over Dr King's forged signature warning them that the SCLC was under investigation by the Internal Revenue Service The IRS files on Dr King and the SCLC were carefully scrutinized for financial irregularities For over a year the FBI unsuccessfully attempted to establish that Dr King had a secret foreign bank account in which he was sequestering funds The FBI campaign to discredit and destroy Dr King was marked by extreme personal vindictiveness As early as 1962 Director Hoover penned on an FBI memorandum "King is no good. 9 At the August 1963 March on Washington Dr King told the country of his dream that "all of God's children black men and white men Jews and Gen tiles Protestants and Catholics will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual Free at last free at last Thank Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 12/16/64 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 8/31/64 p 1 William Sullivantestimony 11/1/75 pp 104-105 Memorandumfrom WilliamSullivan to AlanBelmont 1/8/64 9Memorandumfrom James Bland to William Sullivan W3/62 83 God almighty I'm free at last. 10The FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division described this "demagogic speech as yet more evidence that Dr King was "the most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the country. 11Shortly afterward Time magazine chose Dr King as the "Man of the Year, an honor which elicited Director Hoover's com ment that "they had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this one. 12Hoover wrote "astounding across the memorandum inform ing him that Dr King had been granted an audience with the Pope despite the FBI's efforts to prevent such a meeting The depth of Direc tor Hoover's bitterness toward Dr King a bitterness which he had effectively communicated to his subordinates in the FBI was apparent from the FBI's attempts to sully Dr King's reputation long after his death Plans were made to "brief congressional leaders in 1969 to prevent the passage of a "Martin Luther King Day. In 1970 Director Hoover told reporters that Dr King was the "last one in the world who should ever have received the Nobel Peace Prize.13 The extent to which Government officials outside of the FBI must bear responsibility for the FBI's campaign to discredit Dr King is not clear Government officials outside of the FBI were not aware of most of the specific FBI actions to discredit Dr King Officials in the Justice Department and White House were aware however that the FBI was conducting an intelligence investigation not a criminal investigation of Dr King that the FBI had written authorization from the Attorney General to wiretap Dr King and the SCLC offices in New York and Washington and that the FBI reports on Dr King contained considerable information of a political and personal nature which was "irrelevant and spurious to the stated reasons for the investigation. Those high executive branch officials were also aware that the FBI was disseminating vicious characterizations of Dr King within the Government that the FBI had tape recordings embar rassing to Dr King which it had offered to play to a White House official and to reporters and that the FBI had offered to "leak to reporters highly damaging accusations that some of Dr King's advisers were communists Although some of those officials did ask top FBI officials about these charges they did not inquire further after receiving false denials In light of what those officials did know about the FBI's conduct toward Dr King they were remiss in fail ing to take appropriate steps to curb the Bureau's behavior To the extent that their neglect permitted the Bureau's activities to go on un checked those officials must share responsibility for what occurred The FBI now agrees that its efforts to discredit Dr King were unjustified The present Deputy Associate Director (Investigation) testified Mr ADAMS There were approximately twenty-five inci dents of actions taken [to discredit Dr King] I see no statutory basis or no basis of justification for the activity The CHAIRMANWas Dr King in his advocacy of equal 1 Speechdeliveredby Dr Martin Luther Kingduring the MarchonWashington 8/28/63 "Memorandum from WilliamSullivan to AlanBelmont 8/30/63 p 1 'sHoovernote onUnitedPress International release 12/29/63 Timemagazine 12/14/70 "Bill Moyers testimony 3/2/76 pp 17-18 84 rights for black citizens advocating a course of action that in the opinion of the FBI constituted a crime Mr ADAMSNo sir The CHAIRMANHe was preaching non-violence was he not as a method of achieving equal rights for black citizens Mr ADAMS That's right .. Now as far as the activities which you are asking about the discrediting I know of no basis for that and I will not attempt to justify it.15 The FBI conducted its investigation of Dr King and the SCLC under an FBI manual provision called COMINFIL permitting the investigation of legitimate noncommunist organizations sus pected by the FBI of having been infiltrated by communists to determine the extent if any of communist influence The FBI's investigation was based on its concern that Dr King was being influenced by two persons hereinafter referred to ,as Adviser A and Adviser B that the Bureau believed were members of the Com munist Party Officials in the Justice Department relied on the FBI's representa tions that both of these advisers were communists that they were in a position to influence Dr King and that Adviser A in fact exercised some influence in preparing Dr King's speeches and publications Burke Marshall Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights from 1961-1965 testified that he "never had any reason to doubt [the FBI's] allegations concerning [Adviser A]. He recalled that the charges about Adviser A were "grave and serious, and said that he believed Attorney General Kennedy had permitted the investigation to pro ceed because Stopping the investigation in light of those circumstances would have run the risk that there would have been a lot of complaints that the Bureau had been blocked for political reasons from investigating serious charges about communist infiltration in the civil rights movement.17 Edwin Guthman Press Secretary for the Justice Department from 1961 through 1964 testified that Attorney General Robert Kennedy "viewed this as a serious matter, that he did not recall "that any of us doubted that the FBI knew what it was talking about, and that al though the question of whether Adviser A was influencing Dr King was never fully answered "we accepted pretty much what the FBI reported as being accurate. 18 We have been unable to reach a conclusion concerning the accuracy of the FBI's charges that the two Advisers were members of the Com munist Party USA or under the control of the Party during the FBI's COMINFIL investigation However FBI files do contain informa tion that Adviser A and Adviser B had been members of the Commu nist Party at some point prior to the opening of the COMINFIL in vestigation in October 1962 FBI documents provided to the Commit tee to support the Bureau's claim that both men were members of the Communist Party at the time the COMINFIL investigation was opened are inconclusive Moreover the FBI has stated that it cannot '5James Adams testimony 11/19/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 65 37Marshall 3/3/76 p 55 1eEdwin Guthmantestimony 3/16/76 p 16 85 provide the Committee with the full factual basis for its charges on the grounds that to do so would compromise informants of continuing use to the Bureau Without access to the factual evidence we are unable to conclude whether either of those two Advisers was connected with the Commu nist Party when the "case was opened in 1962 or at any time there after We have seen no evidence establishing that either of those Advisers attempted to exploit the civil rights movement to carry out the plans of the Communist Party In any event the FBI has stated that at no time did it have any evidence that Dr King himself was a communist or connected with the Communist Party Dr King repeatedly criticized Marxist philoso phies in his writing and speeches The present Deputy Associate Di rector of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division when asked by the Committee if the FBI ever concluded that Dr King was a communist testified "No sir we did not. 20 The FBI's COMINFIL investigation appears to have centered almost entirely on discussions among Dr King and his advisers about proposed civil rights activities rather than on whether those advisers were in fact agents of the Communist Party Although the FBI conducted disruptive programs COINTELPROs against al leged communists whom it believed were attempting to influence civil rights organizations the Bureau did not undertake to discredit the individual whom it considered Dr King's most "dangerous adviser until more than four years after opening the COMINFIL investiga tion.21 Moreover when a field office reported to FBI headquarters in 1964 that the Adviser was not then under the influence and control of the Communist Party the FBI did not curtail either its investigations or discrediting program against Dr King and we have no indication that the Bureau informed the Justice Department of this finding.22 Rather than trying to discredit the alleged communists it believed were attempting to influence I)r King the Bureau adopted the curious tactic of trying to discredit the supposed target of Com munist Party interest Dr King himself Allegations of communist influence on Dr King's organization must not divert attention from the fact that as the FBI now states its activities were unjustified and improper In light of the Bureau's remarks about Dr King its reactions to his criticisms the viciousness of its campaign to destroy him and its failure to take comparable measures against the Advisers that it believed were communists it is highly questionable whether the FBI's stated motivation was valid It was certainly not justification for continuing the investigation of Dr King for over six years or for carrying out the attempts to destroy him Our investigation indicates that FBI officials believed that some of Dr King's personal conduct was improper Part of the FBI's efforts to undermine Dr King's reputation involved attempts to persuade Government officials that Dr King's personal behavior would be an embarrassment to them The Committee did not investigate Dr King's Adams 11/19/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 66 "Airtel from FBI Director to NewYorkOffice3/18/66 Memorandumfrom SAC NewYorkto Director FBI 4/14/64 86 personal life since such a subject has no proper place in our investiga tion Moreover in order to preclude any further dissemination of information obtained during the electronic surveillances of Dr King the Committee requested the FBI to excise from all documents sub mitted to the Committee any information which was so obtained We raise the issue of Dr King's private life here only because it may have played a part in forming the attitudes of certain FBI and admin istration officials toward Dr King Many documents which we examined contained allegations about the political affiliations and morality of numerous individuals We have attempted to be sensitive to the privacy interests of those individ uals and have taken care not to advance the effort to discredit them We have excised many of the Bureau's characterizations from the doc uments quoted in this report In some cases however in order fully to explain the story it was judged necessary to quote extensively from Bureau reports even though they contain unsupported allegations We caution the reader not to accept these allegations on their face but rather to read them as part of a shameful chapter in the nation's history The reader is also reminded that we did not conduct an investigation into the assassination of Dr King In the course of investigating the FBI's attempts to discredit Dr King we came across no indication that the FBI was in any way involved in the assassination U THE COMINFILINVESTIGATION In October 1962 the FBI opened its investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and of it's president Dr Martin Luther King Jr The investigation was conducted under an FBI manual provision captioned "COMINFIL" an acronym for communist infiltration which authorized investigations of legitimate noncommunist organizations which the FBI believed to be influenced by communist party members in order to determine the extent of the alleged communist influence.23 These wide-ranging investigations were 'FBI Manual Section 87e The Section in effect at the time the FBI initi ated its investigation of Dr King and the SCLC was captioned "Legitimate Noncommunist Organizations that are Communist Infiltrated, and provided in part No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced agents "AdvseBureau promptly under caption COMINFIL (name of organization) when oneof the followingexists and includeyour recommendationfor instituting an investigation The Communist Party has specificallyinstructed its members to infil trate the organization Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in suf ficient strength to influence or control the organization "(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and re ported on Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration or that organiza tion is specifictarget for infiltration and that Bureau is not investigating legiti mate activities of organization Address of organization Brief characterization of organization including total membership Principal officersof organization 87 conducted with the knowledge of the Attorney General and were pred icated on vague executive directives and broad statutes.24 The FBI kept close watch on Dr King and the SCLC long before opening its formal investigation FBI Director J Edgar Hoover reacted to the formation of the SCLC in 1957 by reminding agents in the field of the need for vigilance In the absence of any indication that the Communist Party has attempted or is attempting to infiltrate this organization you should conduct no investigation in this matter However in view of the stated purpose of the organization you should remain alert for public source information concerning it in connection with the racial situation.25 In May 1962 the FBI had included Dr King on "Section A of the Reserve Index as a person to be rounded up and detained in the event of a "national emergency. 26During this same period the FBI Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence its policyResults of this program including Communist Party affiliations of officersand members. Clarence Kelley the present Director of the FBI was asked by the Com mittee "Taking the current manual and trying to understand its applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King case under section 87 permission is granted to open investigations of the influence of non-subversive groups and the first sentence reads When information is received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a non subversive group or organization an investigation can be opened. "Now I take it that is the same standard that was used in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 1960's so that investigation could still be opened today under the current FBI manual Mr KELLEr"I think so. (Clarence Kelley testimony 12/10/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 308.) See Report on the Developmentof FBI DomesticInvestigations p 479 86Memorandum from Director FBI to Special Agent in Charge Atlanta 9/20/57 The "stated purpose of the SCLC was to organize a register-and vote campaign among Negroes in the South (Trezz Anderson Pittsburgh Courier 8/17/57.) Considerable "public source information was recorded in FBI files both before and after this date 96The action memorandum stated that Dr King's name "should be placed in Section A of the Reserve Index and tabbed communist. (Memorandum from Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 5/11/62.) Persons to be listed in SectionA of the Reserve Index were described by the FBI as people "who in time of national emergency are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financialaid to subversiveelementsdue to their subversive associations and ideology. The types of persons to be listed in SectionA included "(a) Professors teachers or leaders (b) Labor union organizersor leaders Writers lecturers newsmen entertainers and others in the mass media field Lawyers doctors and scientists Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid. See Committee staff report on Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations Dr King was placed on the Reserve Index despite the fact that as late as November1961the Atlanta Field Officehad advised FBI Headquarters that there was "no information on which to base a security matter inquiry. (Airtel from SAC Atlanta to Director FBI 11/21/61.) 88 ordered its field offices to review their files for "subversive infor mation about Dr King and to submit that information to FBI head quarters in reports "suitable for dissemination. 27 The Bureau had apparently also been engaged in an extensive sur veillance of Dr King's civil rights activities since the late 1950s under an FBI program called "Racial Matters. This program which was unrelated to COMINFIL required the collection of "all perti nent information about the "proposed or actual activities of indi viduals and organizations "in the racial field. 23Surveillance of Dr King's civil rights activities continued under the Racial Matters pro gram after the COMINFIL case was opened Indeed the October 1962 memorandum which authorized the COMINFIL case specifically provided that "any information developed concerning the integra tion or racial activities of the SCLC must [also] be reported [under a] Racial Matters caption. 29 The first FBI allegations that the Communist Party was attempt ing to infiltrate the SCLC appeared in a report from the FBI to Attorney General Robert F Kennedy dated January 8 1962.3 The report stated that one of Dr King's advisers hereinafter referred to as "Adviser A" was a "member of the Communist Party USA. 31 Within a few months FBI reports were describing another of Dr King's associates hereinafter referred to as "Adviser B" as a "mem ber of the National Committee of the Communist Party. 32 The allegations concerning these two individuals formed the basis for opening the COMINFIL investigation in October 1962 It is unclear why the FBI waited nine months to open the COMIN FIL investigation.33 The Bureau might have been hoping to acquire new information from microphone and wiretap surveillance of Ad viser A's office which was initiated in March 1962.34However it does Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 2/27/62 The instructions did not definewhat was meant by "subversive. Reports from fieldofficesduring the ensuing months consideredas "subversive such information as the fact that Dr King had beenone of 350signers of a petition to abolishthe HouseCommittee on Un-AmericanActivities (FBI Report NewYork 4/13/62.) Theseinstructions to the fieldwere issued on the first day of Dr King's trial in which he and seven hundred other civil rights demonstrators were charged in Albany Georgia with parading without a permit (Atlanta Constitution 2/28/62 p 1.) BFBI Manual Section 122 p 5 This policywas later interpreted as requiring "coverage of demonstrations meetings "or any other pertinent information concerningracial activity. (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 6/27/63.) 8 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 10/23/62 p 2 0On the same day the Southern Regional Counsel a respected civil rights study group issued a report criticizing the Bureau's inaction during civil rights demonstration that were then occurring in Albany Georgia This report is dis cussedat pp 89-90 mMemorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 1/5/62 E9Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 10/22/62 "FBI headquarters first requested the field officesfor recommendationscon cerning whether a COMINFILinvestigation should be openedon July 20 1962 This was the same day on which officialsin Albany Georgia sought a judicial ban against demonstrations led by Dr King alleging that Negroeshad been en dangering the lives of police officers"and agents of the Federal Bureau of In vestigation. (New York Times 7/22/62) 84A microphonewas installed in Adviser A's officeon March 16 1962 (Airtel from .SAC New York to Director FBI 3/16/62) and a wiretap was installed on his officetelephoneon 3/20/62 (Airtel from SAO NewYorkto Director FBI 3/20/62) The wiretap was authorized by the Attorney General (Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 3/6/62) The microphonewas approved 89 not appear that these surveillances collected ally additional informa tion bearing on the FBI's characterization of Adviser A as a "coin munist Despite the goals and procedures outlined in the COMINFIL sec tion of the FBI Manual the Bureau's investigation of Dr King did not focus on whether any of his advisers were acting under Communist Party discipline and control or were working to enable the Commu nist Party to influence or control the SCLC.15 The microphone which had been installed in Adviser A's officein March 1962 was discontinued before the COMINFIL investigation began,36 and although wiretap coverage of Adviser A continued and even intensified 37 the infor mation obtained appears to have related solely to his advice to Dr King concerning the civil rights movement and not at all to the alleged Communist Party origins of that advice.3b Two FBI reports prepared in succeeding years which summarize the FBI's information about Adviser A do not contain evidence substantiating his purported rela tionship with the Communist Party 39 Without full access to the Bureau's files the Committee cannot de termine whether the FBI's decision to initiate a COMINFIL investi gation was motivated solely by sincere concerns about alleged com munist infiltration or whether it was in part influenced by Director Hoover's animosity toward Dr King The FBI Director's sensitivity to criticism and his attitude toward Dr King are documented in sev eral events which occurred during the period when the FBI was con sidering initiating the COMINFIL investigation As early as February 1962 Director Hoover wrote on a memorandum that Dr King was "no good. 40 In January 1962 an organization called the Southern Regional Council issued a report criticizing the Bureau's inaction during civil rights demonstrations in Albany Georgia.41 An updated version of that report was released in November 1962 A section entitled "Where was the Federal Government made the following observations about the FBI only at the FBI division level (Memorandumfrom James Bland to William Sul livan 3/2/62) FBI Manual Section87 pp 12 13 83 85 Former Assistant Director Sullivan testified "If a man is not under the discipline and control of the Communist Party ipso facto he is not really a member of the CommunistParty The Party demands the man's complete discipline the right of complete discipline over a Party member That is why they have the graduations you see the fellow traveler not a Party member because he would not accept the entire discipline of the Party The sympathizer another graduation of it what we call the dupe the victim of Communistfronts and so forth The key I am glad you raised this question the key to membershipis does this man accept completelythe Party discipline If he does not he is not regarded as a genuine member. (Sullivan 11/1/75 p 18.) $8It was discontinued on August 16 1962 See Airtels from SAC New York to Director FBI 8/16/62 and 11/15/62 and Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC NewYork 11/23/62 '7The Attorney General authorized a wiretap on AdviserA's hometelephonein November 1962 (Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 11/20/62) 9BE.g. Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General Kennedy BIndeed in April 1964a fieldofficereported that Adviser A was not under the influenceof the CommunistParty Memorandumfrom SACNewYorkto Director FBI 4/14/64 , Memorandumfrom James Bland to William Sullivan 2/3/62 Special Report .SouthernRegional Council 1/8/62 90 There is a considerable amount of distrust among Al bany Negroes for local members of the Federal Bureau of In vestigation With all the clear violations by local police of constitu tional rights with undisputed evidence of beatings by sheriffs and deputy sheriffs the FBI has not made a single arrest on behalf of Negro citizens The FBI has [taken] dozens of affidavits from Negro citizens complaining that their constitutional rights had been violated by city and county officials But eight months later there was no sign of action on these charges The FBI is most effective in solving ordinary crimes and perhaps it should stick to that.42 Newspaper coverage of the report's allegations were forwarded to Bureau headquarters by the Atlantic office Although Bureau rules required prompt investigation of allegations such as those in the South ern Regional Council's Report no investigation was undertaken 43 Before even receiving the full report Bureau officials were describing it as "slanted and biased, and were searching their files for informa tion about the report's author.44 Shortly after the Report was issued newspapers quoted Dr King as saying that he agreed with the Report's conclusions that the FBI had not vigorously investigated civil rights violations in Albany Dr King reportedly stated One of the great problems we face with the FBI in the South is that the agents are white Southerners who have been influenced by the mores of the community To maintain their status they have to be friendly with the local police and people who are promoting segregation Every time I saw FBI men in Albany they were with the local police force.45 FBI headquarters was immediately notified of Dr King's re marks.46 After noting that Dr King's comments "would appear to dovetail with information indicating that King's advisors are Communist Party (CP) members and he is under the domination of "Albany A Study of Racial Responsibility, Southern Regional Council 11/14/62 "Item #17 FBI Response to Senate Select Committee 10/15/75 FBI rules provided that allegations about Bureau misconduct had to be investigated and that "every logical lead which will establish the true facts should be completely run out unless such action would embarrass the Bureau Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont 11/15/62 The updated report was received at headquarters on December5 1962 (Memorandumfrom SAC Atlanta to Director FBI 12/4/62 ) Atlanta Constitution 11/19/62 p 18 In 1961a report issued by the U.S Commission on Civil Rights entitled "Justice, had addressed the problem of FBI agents investigating local law enforcementofficialsand reached a similar conclusionincludingmistrust of the FBI by southern Blacks "Memorandum from SAC Atlanta to Director FBI 11/19/62 91 the CP, 47Bureau officials decided to contact Dr King in an effort to "set him straight. 48 The FBI's effort to contact Dr King consisted of a telephone call to the SCLC office in Atlanta by Cartha I) DeLoach head of the FBI's Crime Records Division and one by the Atlanta Special Agent in Charge Both calls were answered by secretaries who promised to ask I)r King to return the calls When Dr King did not respond DeLoach observed It would appear obvious that Rev King does not desire to be told the true facts He obviously used deceit lies and treachery as propaganda to further his own causes .. I see no futher need to contacting Rev King as he obviously does not desire to be given the truth The fact that he is a vicious liar is amply demonstrated in the fact he constantly associates with and takes instructions from [a] member of the Com munist Party.49 Two years later in late 1964 the Director was refusing to meet with Dr King because "I gave him that opportunity once and he ignored it. 50 William Sullivan who was head of the Domestic Intelligence Division during the investigation of Dr King testified [Director Hoover] was very upset about the criticism that King made publicly about our failure to protect the Negro in the South against violations of the Negro civil liberties and King on a number of occasions soundly criticized the Direc tor Mr Hoover was very distraught over these criticisms and so that would figure in it I think behind it all was the racial bias the dislike of Negroes the dislike of the civil rights movement I do not think he could rise above that.51 47Memorandumfrom AlexRosento Alan Belmont 11/20/62 98Memorandumfrom Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson 11/26/62 A decisionwas made that Dr King should be contacted by both Assistant Director DeLoach and Assistant Director William Sullivan "in order that there will be a witness and there can be no charge of provincialism inasmuch as Cartha D DeLoach comesfrom the South and Mr Sullivan comesfrom the North. (Ibid.) "Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr 1/15/63 FBI officials also "interviewed or otherwise contacted various newspaper publishers to set [them] straight about Dr King's remarks (Memorandumfrom Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont 1/17/63.) One of the publishers contacted was described as "im pressed with the Director and as being on the "Special CorrespondentsList. (Letter from Cartha DeLoach to one of the publishers 11/29/62 p 3.) The FBI also took steps to "point out the "evasive conduct of King to the Attorney Generaland CivilRights Commission (Letter FBI Director to Attorney General 1/18/63 Letter FBI to Staff Director Commissionon Civil Rights 1/18/63.) 'Note on memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 11/20/64 'William Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 p 62 Sullivan's assessment must be viewed in light of the feud that subsequently developedbetween Sullivan and Hooverand whichultimately led to Sullivan's dismissal from the FBI That fend is discussedin the committee'sfinal report 69-9840 76 7 92 The FBI sent frequent reports about Dr King's plans and activities to officials in both the Justice Department and the White House from the initiation of the COMINFIL investigation until Dr King's death in 1968 Despite the fact that the investigation of Dr King failed to produce evidence that Dr King was a communist or that he was being influenced to act in a way inimical to American interests no responsi ble Government official ever asked the FBI to terminate the investiga tion Their inaction appears to have stemmed from a belief that it was safer to permit the FBI to conduct the investigation than to stop the Bureau and run the risk of charges that the FBI was being muzzled for political reasons Burke Marshall testified that the "charges made by the Bureau against Adviser A "were grave and serious. The Kennedy Admin istration had been outspoken in its support of Dr King and ordering the FBI to terminate its investigation would in Marshall's opinion "have run the risk that there would have been a lot of complaints that the Bureau had been blocked for political reasons from investigating serious charges about communist infiltration in the civil rights movement.52 Edwin O Guthman Press Chief for the Justice Department under Attorney General Kennedy testified that Robert Kennedy viewed the charges about Adviser A as a serious matter and not in the interest of the country and not in the interest of the civil rights movement The question of whether he was influencing King and his contacts with King that was a matter which was not fully decided but in those days we accepted pretty much what the FBI reported as being accurate.53 Guthman testified that he was told by Kennedy in 1968 that Kennedy had approved wiretap coverage of Dr King's home and of two SCLC offices in October 1963 because "he felt that if he did not do it Mr Hoover would move to impede or block the passage of the Civil Rights Bill and that he felt that he might as well settle the matter as to whether [Adviser A] did have the influence on King that the FBI contended.... 54Attorney General Kennedy's reasons for approving the wiretaps are discussed at length in a subsequent chapter.65 Of relevance here is the support which Guthman's observations lend to Marshall's recollection that Attorney General Kennedy permitted the COMINFIL investigation to continue from concern about the truth of the FBI's charges and about the political consequences of terminat ing the investigation The Johnson Administration's willingness to permit the FBI to continue its investigation of Dr King also appears to have involved political considerations Bill Moyers President Johnson's assistant testified that sometime around the spring of 1965 President Johnson "seemed satisfied that these allegations about Martin Luther King were not founded. Yet President Johnson did not order the investi gation terminated When asked the reason Moyers explained that President Johnson Marshall 3/3/76 p 55 Edwin Guthman testimony 3/16/76 p 16 Guthman 3/16/76 p 5 Seepp 115-116 93 was very concerned that his embracing the civil rights move ment and Martin Luther King personally would not backfire politically He didn't want to have a southern racist Senator produce something that would be politically embarassing to the President and to the civil rights movement We had lots of conversations about that... Johnson as everybody knows bordered on paranoia about his enemies or about being trapped by other people's activities over which he had no responsibility. Intelligence reports submitted by the Bureau to the White House and the Jdtice Department contained considerable intelligence of po tential political value to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations The Attorneys General were informed of meetings between Dr King and his advisers including the details of advice that Dr King received the strategies of the civil rights movement and the attitude of civil rights leaders toward the Administrations and their policies.57 The implications of this inside knowledge were graphically described by one of Dr King's legal advisers Harry Wachtel The easiest example I can give is that that if I'm an attorney representing one side negotiating and trying to achieve some thing and if the Attorney on the other side had information about what my client was thinking and what we were talking about it would become a devastatingly important impedi ment to our negotiation our freedom of action.58 Burke Marshall however described the Bureau's reports about Dr -King and the SCLC as "of no use it was stupid information. He elaborated I was in touch with Martin King all the time about all kinds of information that went way beyond what was report ed by the Bureau about what he was going to do where he was going to be the wisdom of what he was going to do who he was going to do it with what the political situation was The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Dr King were in some sense close associates of mine [Information of the type included in FBI reports] was all information that I would have had any way 59 Bill Moyerstestimony 3/2/76 p 22 67The FBI files are replete with examples of politically valuable intelligence about Dr King that was sent to the Justice Department and the White House For instance in May 1963 at a critical point in the Congressionaldebate over the public accommodationsbill Hoover informed the Attorney General of a dis cussion between Dr King and an adviser "concerninga conferencewhich Rev erend King reportedly has requested with you and the President. The discus sion was reported to have centered on the Administration's sensitivity overits in ability to control the racial situation and on the need to maintain the pace of civil rights activities "so that the President will have to lookfor an alternative. Dr King was said to believethat the President would then be receptive to ideas from Dr King which would provide a solution to "his problem [his] fear of violence .. . Dr King was said to have stated that if a conferencewith the President could not be worked out then the movementwould have to be "en larged, and that "he would like to put so much pressure on the President that he wouldhave to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional. (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 5/31/63.) 58Harry Wachteltestimony 2/27/76 p 12 'Burke Marshall 3/3/76 p 54 56-57 94 III CONCERNINCREASESIN THEFBI ANDTHE KENNEDYADMINISTRATION OVERALLEGATIONSOF COMMUNISTINFLUENCEIN THE CIVILRIGHTS MOVEMENTANDTHE FBI INTENSIFIESTHE INVESTIGATIONJANUARY 1962-OCTOBER1963 Introd/u,ction and Summary This chapter explores developments in the Martin Luther King case from the period preceding the FBI's opening of the COMINFIL in vestigation in October 1962 through the FBI's decision to intensify its investigation of suspected communist influence in the civil rights movement in October 1963 Particular emphasis is placed on the inter nal reasons for the FBI's intensification of its investigation of Dr King and on the interplay between the Justice Department and the FBI during this period In summary the evidence described in this chapter establishes that the FBI barraged the Justice Department with a stream of memo randa concerning the Communist Party's interest in the civil rights movement and Dr King's association with two individuals referred to in this report as Advisers A and B who were alleged to have strong ties to the Party. In response to the Bureau's warnings the Justice Department endeavored to convince Dr King to sever his relations with those individuals but met with only mixed success Dr King continued to turn to Adviser A for advice Adviser B whose asso ciation with Dr King and allegedly with the Communist Party had been picked up by the press in late 1962 publicly announced his resig nation from the SCLC in early July 1963 although he apparently continued to associate with Dr King on an informal basis During hearings over the administration's proposed public accom modations bill in July 1963 critics of the bill charged that the civil rights movement and Dr King in particular were influenced by Com munists Dr King's plans for a civil rights march on Washington in August were receiving increasing publicity On July 16 the Attorney General raised with the FBI's Justice Department liaison Courtney Evans the possibility of a wiretap on Dr King and one of his legal advisers The following day the FBI sent an analysis of its COMINFIL information to the Justice Department The administration decided to continue its public support of Dr King During the ensuing week the President informed the press that there was no evidence that civil rights demonstrations were Communist-inspired the Attorney Gen eral announced that the 1;BI had no evidence that any civil rights leaders were controlled by Communists and the Attorney General rejected the FBI's request for authority to wiretap Dr King In August 1963 the Justice Department received a report from the FBI which apparently contained allegations extremely unfavor able to Dr King The Attorney General told Courtney Evans that he faced impeachment if the report was "leaked, and demanded that it be resubmitted with a cover memorandum detailing the factual basis for the allegation The memorandum submitted in response to that request contained no information concerning Dr King that had not already been known to the Attorney General in July but the Attorney General permitted the investigation to proceed B0The memoranda also contained information about the civil rights movement of considerablepolitical value to the administration 95 In lath July 1963 the FBI opened a file entitled "Communist In fluence in Racial Matters, and closely monitored preparations for the August 28 Civil Rights March on Washington The FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division informed Director Hoover shortly before the March that Communist influence in the civil rights movement was negligible The Director disagreed The head of the Domestic Intelli gence Division William Sullivan responded by recommending more intense FBI surveillance of the civil rights movement A The Justice Department Warns Dr King About Advisers A and B January 1962-June 1963 The Kennedy administration's concern over FBI allegations that Communists were influencing the civil rights movement led the Justice Department to make several attempts to persuade Dr King to sever his relations with Advisers A and B In January 1962 Hoover first warned Attorney General Kennedy that Advisor A a member of the Communist Party U.S.A. "is allegedly a close adviser to the Reverend Martin Luther King. 62Shortly afterwards Assistant Attorney Gen eral Burke Marshall of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Di vision told Dr King that the Bureau claimed Adviser A was a com munist and advised that they break off relations.83 According to an FBI memorandum Deputy Attorney General Byron R White also considered speaking with Dr King about Adviser A but decided against doing so when told by the FBI that revealing too much of the FBI's information might tip off Dr King or Adviser A to the identity of certain FBI informants.64 Dr King gave no indication of breaking off relations with Adviser A who was a close friend and trusted advisor He did however appar ently consider the adverse effects on the civil rights movement that his association with Adviser B might cause. In June 1962 the FBI intercepted a conversation 88in which Adviser A recommended that Dr King informally use Adviser B as his executive assistant noting that "as long as Adviser B did not have the title of Executive Direc tor there would not be as much lightning flashing around him. Dr King was reported to have agreed remarking that "no matter what a man was if he could stand up now and say he is not connected then as far as I am concerned he is eligible to work for me. 67 On October 8 1962 the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division pre pared a memorandum summarizing accounts that had previously appeared in newspapers concerning Adviser B's alleged Communist background and his association with Dr King The Division for warded the memorandum to Cartha D DeLoach head of the Crime Records Division the FBI's public relations arm for "possible use by his contacts in the news media field in such Southern states as Alabama where Dr King has announced that the next targets for ' Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General1/8/62 Burke Marshall testimony 3/31/76 p 10 Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 2/6/62 GAllegationsconcerningAdviser B's membershipin the CommunistParty had receivedwide publicity in the newspapers There were no such press allegations about Adviser A "Adviser A'sphoneswerecoveredbyFBI wiretaps Seep 88 Memorandumfrom NewYorkField Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/21/62 p 6 96 integration of universities are located. DeLoach's signature and the notation "handled Augusta (illegible) Atlanta 1 /19 appear on the recommendation.68 The article was apparently disseminated because an October 25 1962 article in the Augusta Chronicle described Adviser B as a mem ber of the CPUSA's National Committee who was serving as Dr King's "Acting Executive Director. Dr King publicly responded on October 30 that "no person of known Communist affiliation could serve on the staff of the SCLC and denied any knowledge that Adviser B had Communist affiliations Dr King also announced Ad viser B's temporary resignation from the SCLC pending an SCLC investigation of the allegations A stream of memoranda from the FBI however warned the Jus tice Department that Adviser B continued as an as..ociate of Dr King despite his apparent resignation from the SCLC In December Director Hoover was cautioning the Attorney General that Adviser B continued to "represent himself as being affiliated with the New York Office of the SCLC and during late November and early December 1962 was actively engaged in the work of this organization. 60A few days later the Attorney General was informed that Advisers A and B were planning a "closeted critical review with Dr King con cerning the direction of the civil rights movement Kennedy penned on the memorandum "Burke this is not getting any better. 70 In early February 1963 Dr King asked the Justice Department for a briefing on Adviser B's background apparently in response to newspaper articles about Adviser B resulting from the Bureau's cam paign to publicize Adviser B's relationship with Dr King Assistant Attorney General Marshall noted in a memorandum that he had "been in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to have it handled as soon as possible. 11Sometime later in February Marshall spoke with Dr King about severing his association with Ad visers A and B Memoranda from Director Hoover to the Justice De partment during the ensuing months however emphasized that Dr King was maintaining a close relationship with both men Those memoranda to the Justice Department contained no new information substantiating the charges that either was a member of the Communist Party or that either was carrying out the Party's policies.72 "Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to William Sullivan 10/8/62 p 2 The memorandumbears the caption "CommunistParty USA COINTELPRO. This is the first indication of a counterintelligenceprogram directed against Ad viser B AdviserA becamethe subject of such a program in 1966 For a discussion of the FBI's COINTELPROeffort see staff report on COINTELPRO Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 1/23/63 p 1 "Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 1/10/63 The At torney General was subsequently told that Adviser B Dr King and Adviser A conferred with other membersof the SCLCon January 10and 11 (Memorandum from Director FBI to Burke Marshall 1/31/63.) Memorandumfrom AlexRosento Alan Belmont 2/4/63 "On March 10 the Attorney General was informed that Adviser A and Dr King had engagedin a lengthy conversationconcerningan article that Dr King was preparing for The Nation (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 3/12/63) On June 3 the Director sent the Attorney General a nine page "concise summary of information about Adviser A emphasizing his role as Dr King's adviser (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 6/3/63.) An FBI memorandum in early June reported a discussion between 97 The Attorney General's concern over Dr King's association with the two advisers continued A memorandum by Hoover states that on June 17 1963 The Attorney General called and advised he would like to have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to Martin Luther King and tell Dr King he has to get rid of [Advisers A and B] that he should not have any contact with them directly or indirectly I pointed out that if Dr King continues this association he is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more Communists trying to take advantage of [the] movement and bigots down South who are against integration are beginning to charge Dr King is tied in with Communists I stated I thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is rather widely known and with things crystalizing for them now nothing could be worse than for Dr King to be associ ated with it.73 Marshall subsequently spoke with Dr King about Advisers A and B.74In a follow-up memorandum written several months later Marshall stated .. I brought the matter to the attention of Dr King very explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a scheduled meeting which Dr King had with the President This was done at the direction of the Attorney General and the President separately [and] strongly urged Dr King that there should be no further connection between Adviser B and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Dr King stated that the connection would be ended.75 Dr King later told one of his associates that the President had told him "there was an attempt (by the FBI) to smear the movement on the basis of Communist influence The President also said I assume you know you're under very close surveillance. 76 Adviser A and Dr King concerningwhether Dr King would appear on a tele vision program in connectionwith a projected article in the Saturday Evening Post Dr King accepted Adviser A's recommendation that he read the article before committinghimself because the reporter "raised a lot of questions about [Adviser B] and that kind of thing. (Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 617/63.) "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to ClydeTolson Alan Belmont Cartha DeLoach AlexRosen William Sullivan 6/17/63 During this period the Attorney General requested a report from the Internal Security Division concerningDr King The reply dated June 28 cited Advisers A and B as the chief sources of alleged Communistinfluenceon Dr King (Memorandumfrom J Walter Yeag ley to the Attorney General 6/28/63.) "Andrew Young who was present at the meeting with Burke Marshall testi fied that Marshall had said that the Bureau had informed the Justice Depart ment that there was in fact Communistinfluencein the civil rights movement and had explicitly mentioned AdviserA When Youngasked Marshall for proof he said that he had none and that he "couldn't get anything out of the Bureau. Young recalled that Marshall had said "We ask (the Bureau) for things and weget these big memos but they don't ever really say anything. Youngtestified that Marshall "was asking us to disassociate ourselves from [Adviser Al alto gether. (Andrew Youngtestimony 2/19/76 pp 40 44) Memorandumfrom Burke Marshall to J Edgar Hoover 9/12/63 T Young 2/19/76 p 40 98 Marshall's and the President's warnings did not go unheeded On July 3 1963 Dr King sent the Attorney General a copy of a letter to Adviser B bearing that date. In that letter Dr King stated that an investigation by the SCLC had proven the charges concerning Ad viser B's association with the Communist Party groundless but that his permanent resignation was necessary because "the situation in our country is such that any allusion to the left brings forth an emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired.7 78 B Allegations About Dr King During Hearings on the Public Accommodations Bill and the Administration,'s Response July 1963 Allegations of Communist influence in the civil rights movement were widely publicized in the summer of 1963 by opponents of the ad ministration's proposed public accommodations bill On July 12 1963 Governor Ross E Barnett of Mississippi testified before the Senate Commerce Committee that civil rights legislation was "a part of the world Communist conspiracy to divide and conquer our country from within. 79Barnett displayed a photograph entitled "Martin Luther King at Communist Training School taken by an informant for the Georgia Commission of Education which showed Dr King at a 1957 Labor Day Weekend seminar at the Highland Folk School in Mont eagle Tennessee with three individuals whom he alleged were com munists When Senator Mike Monroney challenged the accuracy of this characterization Barnett stated that he had not checked the al legations with the FBI and suggested that the Commerce Committee do so The FBI subsequently concluded that the charges were false.8O Later that day Senator Monroney asked Director Hoover for his views on whether Dr King and the leaders of other civil rights organi zations had Communist afliliations.81 Senator Warren G Magnuson also asked Hoover about the authenticity of the photograph the status of the Georgia Commission on Education and the nature of the Highlander Folk School.82 Director Hoover forwarded these requests and similar inquiries from other Senators to the Justice '7Letter from Martin Luther King Jr to AdviserB 7/3/63 78King letter 7/3/63 which concluded "We certainly appreciate the years of unselfishservice which you have put into our NewYork Officeand regret the ne cessity of your departure Certainly yours is a significantsacrificecommensurate with the sufferingsin jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation We all pray for the day whenour nation may be truly the land of the free MayGod bless you and continue to inspire you in the service of your fellowman. Ross Barnett testimony Senate CommerceCommittee 7/12/63 p 1 'The FBI informed the Justice Department that none of those individ uals were Communist Party members and that there was no evidence sup porting the charge that the school was a communist training center (Memo randum from MiltonJones to Cartha DeLoach 7/16/63 p 2) CongressmanAndrew Young then an adviser to Dr King testified that the Highlander Folk Schoolphotographhad been frequently used to smear Dr King in the South CongressmanYoung'stestimony that the Schoolwas not a Commu nist institution was consistent with the FBI's conclusion (Andrew Youngtesti mony 2/18/76 p 53) 87Letter from Senator MikeMonroneyto J Edgar Hoover 7/12/63 8 Letter from Senator Warren G Magnusonto J Edgar Hoover 7/16/63 99 Department8 with a memorandum summarizing the COMINFIL information about SCL In substance the Communist Party USA is not able to as sume a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time However the Party is attempting to exploit the current racial situation through propaganda and participation in demonstrations and other activities whenever possible Through these tactics the Party hopes ultimately to pro gress from its current supporting role to a position of active leadership [Emphasis added.] In the same memorandum Director Hoover brought up the subject of Advisers A and B's alleged Communist affiliations He claimed that the Communist Party had pinned its hopes on Adviser A and that although Adviser B had resigned from the SCLC he continued to associate with Dr King. On July 15 Governor George C Wallace of Alabama testified before the Senate Commerce Committee in opposition to the Civil Rights bill berating officials for "fawning and pawing over such people as Martin Luther King and his pro-Communist friends and associates. Wallace referred to the picture displayed by Governor Barnett three days before and added Recently Martin Luther King publicly professed to have fired a known Communist [Adviser B] who had been on his payroll But as discovered by a member of the US Congress the public profession was a lie and Adviser B had re mained on King's payroll.8s On July 17 the President announced at a news conference We have no evidence that any of the leaders of the civil rights movement in the United States are Communists We have no evidence that the demonstrations are Communist inspired There may be occasions when a Communist takes part in a demonstration We can't prevent that But I think it is a convenient scapegoat to suggest that all of the difficul ties are Communist and that if the Communist movement would only disappear that we would end this.87 "Tolson urged Hoover to let the Attorney General respond to these reports otherwise Hoover might be called before the Committeeto testify concerning "current racial agitation. The Director noted on the bottom of the memoran dum "I share Tolson's views. Memorandumfrom ClydeTolson to the Director 7/16/63 "Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 7/17/63 "Wallace introduced into the record a copy of an article from the Birming kam News "King's SCLCPays [Adviser B.] Despite Denial, June 30 1963 The article stated that Dr King had told reporters that Adviser B had not been associated with the SCLCsince December1962 but that a "highly authorized source revealed that Dr King was continuing to accept Adviser B's services and to pay his expenses The article also reported allegations about Adviser B's associationwith the CommunistParty Public Papers of the Presidents John F Kennedy p 574 100 On July 23 Robert Kennedy sent to the Commerce Committee the Justice Department's response to the queries of Senators Monroney and Magnuson Based on all available evidence from the FBI and other sources we have no evidence that any of the top leaders of the major civil rights groups are Communists or Communist con trolled This is true as to Dr Martin Luther King Jr. about whom particular accusations were made as well as other leaders It is natural and inevitable that Communists have made efforts to infiltrate the civil rights groups and to exploit the current racial situation In view of the real injustices that exist and the resentment against them these efforts have been remarkably unsuccessful.88 Burke Marshall who aided in formulating these responses for the Justice Department told the Committee that rumors of communist infiltration in the civil rights movement had caused the Administra tion considerable concern At that point in some sense the business was a political problem not from the point of view of the support that the civil rights movement was giving the administration or any thing like that but how to be honest with the Senators with this problem facing us and at the same time not to give ammu nition to people who for substantive reasons were opposed to civil rights legislation Generally for years the civil rights movement in the South and to some extent in some quarters in the North were con stantly referred to as communist infiltrated communist in spired radical movements... So that the political problem that I would identify with this whole situation would be that and not a question of whether or not there was support given the Administration by civil rights groups in the South.69 C The Attorney General Considers a Wiretap of Dr King and Rejects the Idea July 1963 On July 16 1963 the day after Governor Wallace's charges that Dr King was dominated by Communists and the day before the Presi dent's denial of Communist influence in the civil rights movement the Attorney General raised with Courtney Evans the possibility of wire tap coverage of Dr King According to Evans memorandum about this meeting The AG was contacted at his request late this afternoon He said that a New York attorney who has had close asso ciation with Martin Luther King and with [Adviser A] had been to see Burke Marshall about the racial situation Ac Senator Richard Russell of Georgia who had also inquired of the FBI about Dr King was orally briefed by Nicholas Katzenbach and Courtney Evans on November1 1963 Accordingto a memorandumby Evans the Attorney General had madeseveral aftempts to draft a reply to Senator Russell's inquiries and had finally settled on an "innocuous written reply and an oral briefing (DeLoachto Mohr 2/5/76) 8 Burke Marshall testimony 3/3/76 p 13 101 cording to the AG [the attorney] had indicated he had some reservations about talking with [Adviser A] on the phone Marshall thought he might have been referring to a possible phone tap and passed it off by telling [the New York at torney] this was something he would have to take up with [Adviser A.] The purpose of the AG's contact was that this brought to his attention the possibility of effecting technical coverage on both [the New York attorney] and Martin Luther King I told the AG that I was not at all acquainted with [the New York attorney] but that in so far as Dr King was concerned it was obvious from the reports that he was in a travel status practically all the time and it was therefore doubtful that a technical surveillance on his office or home would be very productive I also raised the question as to the repercussions if it should ever become known that such a surveillance had been put on Dr King The AG said this did not concern him at all that in view of the possible Communist influence in the racial situation he thought it advisable to have as complete coverage as possible I told him under the circumstances that we would check into the matter to see if coverage was feasible and if so would submit an appropriate recommendation to him9 Reports from the FBI offices indicated that wiretaps were feasible,81 and Director Hoover requested the Attorney General to approve wire taps on phones in Dr King's home SCLC offices,92and the New York attorney's home and law office.93 On July 24 the day after his letter to the Commerce Committee exonerating Dr King the Attorney General informed Evans that he had decided against technical surveillance of Dr King but had ap proved surveillance of the New York Attorney.84 The Attorney General informed me today that he had been considering the request he made on July 16 1963 for a technical surveillance on Martin Luther King at his home and office and was now of the opinion that those would be ill-advised At the time the Attorney General initially asked for such a surveillance he was told there was considerable doubt that the productivity of such surveillance would be worth the risk because King travels most of the time and that there might be serious repercussions should it ever become known "Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont 7/16/63 The New Yorkattorney was describedby the FBI as a counselto Dr King and an activist in civil rights matters (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 7/22/63.) Airtel from SACAtlantic to Director FBI 7/24/63 "Technical surveillance feasiblewith full security. "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General 7/23/63 9MemorandumJ Edgar Hooverto Attorney General 7/22/63 The only evidenceof communistties of the New York attorney that the FBI appears to have giventhe Attorney Generalwas an informant's allegation that in 1953and 1954he had been an active member of the Labor Youth League an organization which had been cited as "subversive under Executive Order 10450(Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General) 102 the Government had instituted this coverage These were the very thoughts that the Attorney General expressed today in withdrawing his request With reference to the other technical surveillance requested at the same time namely the one on [the New York at torney] the Attorney General felt this was in a different category and we should go forward with this coverage It is noted that this was previously approved in writing by the Attorney General .. We will take no further action to effect technical cover age on Martin Luther King either at his home or at his office at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the absence of a further request from the Attorney General95 In June 1969 Director Hoover told a reporter for the Washington Evening Star that Attorney General Kennedy had "requested that the telephones of Dr King be covered by electronic devices and was per suaded by our people not to do it in view of the possible reper cussions, and because Dr King's constant traveling made a wiretap impractical9 When the Committee asked Courtney Evans whether the idea of installing a wiretap originated with the Attorney General he testified No this is not clear in my mind at all The record that has been exhibited to me really doesn't establish this definitely although that inference can be drawn from some of the memo randa But it is my recollection without the benefit of any specifics that there was much more to it than this And I have the feeling that there were pressures existing in time to develop more specific information that may have had a bearing here Q Pressures emanating from where and upon whom A I think from both sides the Bureau wanted to get more specific information and the Department wanted resolved the rather indefinite information that had been received indicating the possibility of Communist influence on the Dr King movement.97 D The Attorney General Voices Concern Over Continuing FBI Reports About King July August 1963 Following the appearance of an article on July 25 1963 in the Atlanta Constitution titled "One-time Communist Organizer Heads Rev King's Office in N.Y., Dr King announced that an SCLC inves tigation of Adviser B indicated that he had "no present connection with the CP nor any sympathy with its philosophy. Dr King ex plained that Adviser B had been on the SCLC staff on a temporary basis since his resignation in December 1962 but that he had left the SCLC on June 26 1963 by "mutual agreement because of concern 96Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 7/25/63 Jeremiah O'Leary The Evening Star 6/19/69 Hoover memorandum for record 6/19/69 CourtneyEvans testimony 12/1/75 pp 7-8 103 that his affiliation with the integration movement would be used against it by "segregationists and race baiters. The Justice Department however continued to receive reports from the FBI that Dr King was continuing his association with Ad visers A and B90 Shortly after Attorney General Kennedy's July 23 response to the Commerce Committee Courtney Evans Advisor B [deleted] pointed out to Marshall the undesirability of making the spe cific comments as to giving complete clearance to Martin Luther King as Marshall had had the full details as to King's association with [Adviser A] and [Adviser B.] Marshall said that he was most appreciative of our warning him about these pitfalls and he would be guided accordingly in any future statements He added that he would also appre ciate our continuing to highlight for him any information concerning communist activity in the Negro movement. loo On July 29 Director Hoover sent the Justice Department a report from the New York Office entitled "Martin Luther King Jr. Affilia tion with the Communist Movement. 1 1The entry under the caption "Evidence of Communist Party Sympathies, has been deleted by the FBI from copies of the report given to the Committee on the grounds that it might compromise informants It was a general characteriza tion and ran for only one and one-half lines A memorandum from Courtney Evans described Attorney General Kennedy's reaction The Attorney General stated that if this report got up to the Hill at this time he would be impeached He noted if this report got out it would be alleged the FBI said King was [excised by the FBI] The Attorney General went on to say that the report had been reviewed in detail by Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall who had told him there wasn't anything now here concerning King's alleged communist sympathies but that it was the timing of the report and its possible misuse that con cerned him The Attorney General went on to say that he didn't feel he could fully trust everyone in the Internal Secu rity Division of the Department I pointed out to the Attorney General that first of all this report was classified secret and was just a summary report to bring our files and that of the Department's up to date He said that while this was undoubtedly true the submission of the report at this time in this form presented definite hazards He therefore asked that the report be resubmitted to him with a cover memorandum setting forth the exact evidence avail On July 17 in the midst of publicity concerningDr King's association with Adviser B Director Hoover informed the Attorney General that although Ad viser B had formally resigned from the SCLC he was continuing his associa tion with Dr King (Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 7/17/63.) 1 Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 7/29/63 101R.eportof SpecialAgent Martin Luther King Jr. Affiliationwith the Com munist Movement 7/22/63 104 able to support the statement that King has been described [excised by the FBI].1 2 The reason for Attorney General Kennedy's reaction is unclear.' s It may be that he feared a "leak of the FBI's allegations concerning communist influence over Dr King would be particularly embarrass ing in light of the Administration's recent statements in support of Dr King The Attorney General's insistence on a supplemental memorandum detailing the underlying evidence coupled with the tone of the memorandum also suggests that he was anxious to get to the bottom of the charges Hoover resubmitted the report with a cover letter stating in part In this connection your attention is invited to my letter of February 14 1962 in captioned matter and to my letter of July 17 1963 captioned "Request from Senator Monroney Concerning Current Racial Agitation, both of which contain information to the effect that Adviser A has characterized King [deleted by FBI].104 The relevant portions of the February 14 1962 memorandum and the July 17 1963 memorandum have been deleted from copies sup plied to the Committee It is clear however that the Attorney Gen eral had been aware of whatever information those memoranda con tained when he had decided not to approve the King wiretaps the previous month Despite the FBI's failure to produce any new evidence to substan tiate its apparently unfavorable characterization of Dr King the question of whether Advisers A and B continued to influence Dr King remained a matter of concern to the Justice Department On Aug ust 20 1963 Evans reported Today the Attorney General asked if we would continue to keep him closely informed of information received relative to Advisers B's contact with Martin Luther King He had specific reference to our letter of August 2 1963 It appears that the Attorney General is receiving conflict ing advice within the Department proper as to whether there is sufficient evidence of a continuing contact between King and Adviser B to justify some action The Civil Rights Divi sion has expressed the thought that nothing need be done by the Department On the other hand Andrew Oehmann the Attorney General's Executive Assistant has counseled him that in his judgment there is ample evidence there is a con tinuing relationship which Martin Luther King is trying to conceal105 E The FBI Intensifies Its Investigation of Alleged Communist Influence in the Civil Rights Movement July September 1963 On July 18 1963 in response to intelligence reports that the Com munist Party was encouraging its members to participate actively in 1WMemorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 8/1/63 'Burke Marshall testified that he could not recall this incident Burke Mar shall testimony 3/3/76 p 25 10Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney general 8/2/63 '0BMemorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 8/20/611 105 the forthcoming March on Washington the FBI opened a file captioned "Communist Influence in Racial Matters. Field offices were advised it is reasonable to assume that the future will witness a strong effort on the part of the CPUSA to inject itself into and to exploit the struggle for equal rights for Negroes Therefore during the investigation of the CPUSA each re cipient office should be extremely alert to data indicating in terest plans or actual involvement of the Party in the current Negro movement This matter should be given close attention and the Bureau kept currently advised.108 The results of voluminous reports from field officesaround the coun try concerning the plans of the Communist Party and "other subversive groups were summarized by the Domestic Intelligence Division in a report dated August 22 1963.107That report concluded that there was rio evidence that the March "was actually initiated by or is controlled by the CP, 108although the Party had publicly endorsed the March and had urged members to "clandestinely participate in order to "foster the illusion that the CP is a humanitarian group acting in the interest of the Negro. The Party's tactics were summarized CP leaders have stressed the fact that the March is not the be all and end all in itself Events which subsequently flow from the March will be of utmost importance such as follow ing up in contacts now being made by CP members working in support of the demonstration Utilizing the March the Party has three basic general objectives Participation by CP members through legitimate organizations Attempt to get the Party line into the hands of sym pathizers and supporters of the March through distribution of "The Worker and Party pamphlets Utilize the March as a steppingstone for future Party activity through contacts now being made by Party members involved in the March.' 9 The next day the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted to the Director a 67-page Brief detailing the CPUSA's efforts to exploit the American Negro and finding virtually no successes in these efforts A synopsis observed (1) "The 19 million Negroes in the United States today constitute the largest and most important racial target of the Communist Party USA Since 1919 communist leaders have devised countless tactics and programs designed to penetrate and control Negro population. The "colossal efforts focused around "equal opportunity, and efforts were presently being 10Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SpecialAgents in Charge 7/18/63 p 2 101Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 8/22/63 p 1108Baumgardner memorandum 8/22/63 p 1 The report noted that Adviser A was critical of the Party's role in the civil rights movementand that he had said he did not consider himself under the control of the Party in his dealings with Dr King 100Baumgardner memorandum 8/22/63 p 2 106 made with "limited degrees of success to infiltrate legitimate Negro organizations "[T]here is no known substantial imple mentation of Communist Party aims and policies among Negroes in the labor field. "While not the instigator and presently unable to direct or control the coming Negro August 28 March on Washing ton D.C. communist officials are planning to do all possible to advance communist aims in a supporting role. "Despite tremendous sums of money and time spent by the ommunist Party USA on the American Negro during the past 44 years the Party has failed to reach its goal with the Negroes. "There has been an obvious failure of the Communist Party of the United States to appreciably infiltrate influence or control large numbers of American Negroes in this coun try The Communist Party in the next few years may fail dismally with the American Negro as it has in the past On the other hand it may make prodigious strides and great success with the American Negroes to the serious detriment of our national security Time alone will tell. 110 William Sullivan who then headed the Domestic Intelligence Divi sion of the FBI testified that this "Brief precipitated a dispute between Director Hoover and the Domestic Intelligence Division over the extent of communist influence in the civil rights movement and that the resulting "intensification was part of an attempt by the Intelligence Division to regain Hoover's approval." The documentary evidence bearing on the internal FBI dispute is set forth below with Sullivan's explanation of what occurred Sullivan's comments how ever should be considered in light of the intense personal feud that subsequently developed between Sullivan and Director Hoover and which ultimately led to Sullivan's dismissal from the Bureau While Sullivan testified that the intensified investigation of the SCLC was the product of Director Hoover's prodding the Domestic Intelligence Division to conform its evidence to his preconceptions the documen tary evidence may also be read as indicating that the Domestic Intel ligence Division was manipulating the Director in a subtle bureau cratic battle to gain approval for expanded programs Sullivan testified that a careful review of the files in preparation for writing the "Brief revealed no evidence of "marked or substantial Communist infiltration of the movement and that he had instructed his assistant to "state the facts just as they are and "then let the storm break. 12 Sullivan said he had known that Hoover would be displeased with his conclusions because Hoover was convinced the civil rights movement was strongly influenced by communists Sullivan's prediction was borne out by Hoover's observations scrawled across the bottom of the memorandum This memo reminds me vividly of those I received when Castro took over Cuba You contended then that Castro and his cohorts were not communists and not influenced by cm 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 8/23/63 p 1 [Emphasis added] William Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 p 12 " Sullivan 11/1/75 p 13 107 munists Time alone proved you wrong I for one can't ignore the memoes re King Advisers A and B et al as having only an infinitesimal effect on the efforts to exploit the American Negro by the Communists.13 Sullivan recalled This [memorandum] set me at odds with Hoover A few months went by before he would speak to me Everything was conducted by exchange of written communications It was evident that we had to change our ways or we would all be out on the street.114 The Director penned sarcastic notes on subsequent memoranda from the Domestic Intelligence Division In the margin of a report that over 100 Communist Party members were planning to participate in the March on Washington the Director wrote "just infinitesi mal ! 115A preliminary report on possible communist influence on the March noted that Party functionaries were pleased with the March believed it would impress Congress and that a "rally of similar proportions on the subject of automation could advance the cause of socialism in the United States. Director Hoover remarked "I assume CP functionary claims are all frivolous. 116Sullivan tes tified the men and I discussed how to get out of trouble To be in trouble with Mr Hoover was a serious matter These men were trying to buy homes mortgages on homes children in school They lived in fear of getting transferred losing money on their homes as they usually did In those days the market was not soaring and children in school so they wanted another memorandum written to get us out of this trouble we were in I said I would write the memorandum this time The onus always falls on the person who writes a memorandum.117 On August 30 Sullivan wrote his apologetic reply The Director is correct We were completely wrong about believing the evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro was not a communist or under communist influence On investigating and writing about communism and the American Negro we had better remember this and profit by the lesson it should teach us . Personally I believe in the light of King's powerful demagogic speech yesterday 18 he stands head and shoulders over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to 118Baumgardner memorandum 8/23/63 p 3 11Sullivan 11/1/75 p 20 "Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 8/26/63 p 1 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 8/29/63 p 3114Sullivan 11/1/75 p 22 'The "demagogic speech was Dr King's "I have a dream speech When shownthis entry by the Committee Sullivantestified "I do not apologizefor this tactic Youeither had to use this tactic or you did not exist I put in this memorandum what Hoover wanted to hear He was so damn mad at us. (Sullivan 11/1/75 p 29) 69-9840 76 8 108 influencing great masses of Negroes We must mark him now if we have not done so before as the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of corn mimism the Negro and national security . [I]t may be unrealistic to limit ourselves as we have been doing to legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive evi dence that would stand up in testimony in court or before Congressional Comm;ttees that the Communist Party USA sloes wield substantial influence over Negroes which one day could become decisive We regret greatly that the memorandum did not measure up to what the Director has a right to expect from our analysis.119 Sullivan testified concerning this memorandum Here again we had to engage in a lot of nonsense which we ourselves really did not believe in We either had to do that or we would be finished." The memorandum stated that "The history of the Communist Party IT.S.A. is replete with its attempts to exploit influence and recruit the Negro. After reading this entry Sullivan testified These are words that are very significant to me because I know what they mean We build this thing and say all this is a clear indication that the Party's favorite target is the Negro today When you analyze it what does it mean How often has it been able to hit the target .. We did not discuss that because we would have to say they did not hit the target hardly at all. In an apparent further effort to please the Director Sullivan recom mended on September 16 1963 "increased coverage of communist in fluence on the Negro. His memorandum noted that "all indications pointed toward increasing "attempts by the Party to exploit racial unrest The field was to "intensify coverage of communist influence on Negroes by giving "fullest consideration to the use of all possible investigative techniques. Further we are stressing the urgent need for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through our Counter intelligence Program these desi nned to attempt to neutral ize or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field.'22 Hoover rejected this proposal with the remarks No I can't understand how you can so agilely switch your thinking and evaluation Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was in effective and infinitesimal This notwithstanding many memos of specific instances of infiltration Now you want to load the Field down with more coverage in spite of your re 'Memorandum from William Sullivan to AlanBelmont 8/30/63 p 1 120Sullivan 11/1/75 p 30 '2 Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 p 41 "'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 9/16/63 109 cent memo depreciating C.P influence in racial movement I don't intend to waste time and money until you can make up your minds what the situation really is.l23 Sullivan testified that he had interpreted Hoover's note to mean that the Director was egging us on to come back and say "Mr Hoover you are right we are wrong There is communist infiltration of the American Negro We think we should go ahead and carry on an intensified program against it. He knew when he wrote this he knew precisely what kind of reply he was going to get.l24 Sullivan responded in a memorandum to the Deputy Associate Director Alan Belmont On returning from a few days leave I have been advised of the Director's continued dissatisfaction with the manner in which we prepared a Brief on [communist influence in racial matters] and subsequent memoranda on the same sub ject matter This situation is very disturbing to those of us in the Domestic Intelligence Division and we certainly want to do everything possible to correct our shortcomings The Director indicated he would not approve our last SAC letter until there was a clarification and a meeting of minds relative to the question of the extent of communist influence over Negroes and their leaders .. As we know facts by themselves are not too meaningful for they are somewhat like stones tossed in a heap as con trasted to the same stones put in the form of a sound edifice It is obvious that we did not put the proper interpretation upon the facts which we gave to the Director [Emphasis added.] As previously stated we are in complete agreement with the Director that communist influence is being exerted on Martin Luther King Jr. and that King is the strongest of the Negro leaders [w]e regard Martin Luther King to be the most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the country May I repeat that our failure to measure up to what the Director expected of us in the area of Communist-Negro relations is a subject of very deep concern to us in the Domes tic Intelligence Division We are disturbed by this and ought to be I want him to know that we will do everything that is humanly possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to Director Hoover's note on Baumgardner memorandum 9/16/63 p 2 Hoover commentedonthe transmittal slip "I have certainly been misled by previous memoswhich clearly showed com munist penetration of the racial movement The attached is contradictory of all that We are wasting manpower and money investigating OP effort in racial matter if the attached is correct (Memorandumfrom ClydeTolsonto the Direc tor 9118/63.) 12Sullivan 11/1/75 p 46 110 communist penetration and influence over Negro leaders and their organizations.125 Sullivan resubmitted his proposed intensification instructions to the field This time the Director agreed The intensification was put into effect by an SAC letter dated Octo ber 1 1963 which contained the usual allusion to "efforts and "at tempts by the Communist Party to influence the civil rights move ment but which said nothing about the absence of results The history of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) is replete with its attempts to exploit influence and recruit the Negro The March on Washington August 28 1963 was a striking example as Party leaders early put into motion efforts to accrue gains for the CPUSA from the March The presence at the March of around 200 Party members ranging from several national functionaries headed by CPUSA Gen eral Secretary Gus Hall to many rank-and-file members is clear indication of the Party's favorite target (the Negro) today All indications are that the March was not the "end of the line and that the Party will step up its efforts to exploit racial unrest and in every possible way claim credit for itself relating to any "gains achieved by the Negro A clear-cut indication of the Party's designs is revealed in secret informa tion obtained from a most sensitive source that the Party plans to hold a highly secretive leadership meeting in Novem ber 1963 which will deal primarily with the Negro situation The Party has closely guarded plans for Gus Hall to under take a "barnstorming trip through key areas of the country to meet Party people and thus better prepare himself for the November meeting In order for the Bureau to cope with the Party's efforts and thus fulfill our responsibilities in the security field it is necessary that we at once intensify our coverage of communist influence on the Negro Fullest consideration should be given to the use of all possible investigative techniques in the in vestigation of the CP USA those communist fronts through which the Party channels its influence and the many individ ual Party members and dupes There is also an urgent need for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through '_Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 9/25/63 p 1 Sullivan named the "changing situation in the CommunistParty-Negro relations area as the reason for a more intense investigation of communist influence in racial matters "During the past two weeks in particular there have been sharp stepped-up activities on the part of communist officialsto infiltrate and to dominate Negro developmentsin this country Further they are meeting with successes. A review of the Bureau files for the month prior to Sullivan's memorandum reveals no increase in CPUSAactivity or any successon its part The only rele vant entries indicate At a meeting on August 30 leading Party functionaries termed the March on Washington a success, and discussed what action to take to advance civil rights legislation Demonstrations were discussed but none were planned (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 9/5/63) On August 30 Adviser B was observed spending an hour in the building housing the New York SCLCoffices (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attor ney General 9/5/63) 111 our Counterintelligence Program for the purpose of attempt ing to neutralize or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field Because of the Bureau's responsibility for timely dis semination of pertinent information to the Department and other interested agencies it is more than ever necessary that all facets of this matter receive prompt handling.126 The instruction to use "all possible investigative techniques appears to have dictated the intensification of the COMINFIL investigation of the SCLC This was consistent with Sullivan's assurance to Director Hoover at the end of September that "we will do everything that is humanly possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to the Communist penetration and influence over Negro leaders and their organizations. The emphasis on "imaginative and aggressive tactics to disrupt Communist Party activities in the Negro field appears to have in volved an expansion of the COINTELPRO operation already under way against the Communist Party In 1956 the Bureau had ini tiated a COINTELPRO operation against the Communist Party USA with the goal of "feeding and fostering internal friction within the Party The program was soon expanded to include "preventing communists from seizing control of legitimate mass organizations and discrediting others who [are] secretly operating inside such organizations. 127The October 1 1963 "intensification instruction emphasized this latter objective of disruption.129 The intensification order appears to have been more a product of preconceptions and bureaucratic squabbles within the FBI than a response to genuine concerns based on hard evidence that communists might be influencing the civil rights movement Because Director Hoover is deceased the Committee was able to obtain only one side of the story Sullivan's version depicts the Domestic Intelligence Division executing an about-face after Director Hoover rejected its conclusion that evidence did not indicate significant communist influ ence reinterpreting its original data to reach conclusions the Director wanted to hear and then basing its recommendations for action on the new "analysis. However the memoranda could also support a conten tion that the Domestic Intelligence Division misled Director Hoover in order to maneuver him into supporting expanded domestic intelligence programs IV ELECTRONICSURVEILLANCE OFDR MARTINLUTHERKINGANT)THE SOUTHERNCHRISTIANLEADERSHIPCONFERENCE Introduction and Summary In October 1963 Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved an FBI request for permission to install wiretaps on phones in Dr King's 128Director FBI to SAC 10/1/63 [Emphasis added.] 127The history of COINTELPRO FBI's counterintelligenceoperations to dis rupt various domestic dissident groups is discussed in a separate staff report AdviserB had been the target of onesuchCOINTELPROoperation in 1962 when the Bureau attempted to generate a series of newspaper articles designedto ex posehis allegedParty background Seepp 95-96 1 The use of COINTELPROtechniques to discredit Dr King is discussed in the ensuing chapters 112 home and in the SCLC's New York and Atlanta offices to determine the extent if any of "communist influence in the racial situation. The FBI construed this authorization to extend to Dr King's hotel rooms and the home of a friend No further authorization was sought until mid-1965 after Attorney General Katzenbach required the FBI for the first time to seek renewed authorization for all existing wiretaps The wiretaps on Dr King's home were apparently terminated at that time by Attorney General Katzenbach the SCLC wiretaps were terminated by Attorney General Ramsay Clark in June 1966 In December 1963 three months after Attorney General Kennedy approved the wiretaps the FBI without informing the Attorney General planned and implemented a secret effort to discredit Dr King and to "neutralize him as the leader of the civil rights movement One of the first steps in this effort involved hiding microphones in Dr King's hotel rooms Those microphones were installed without Attorney General Kennedy's prior authorization or subsequent noti fication neither of which were required under practices then current The FBI continued to place microphones in Dr King's hotel rooms until November 1965 Attorney General Katzenbach was apparently notified immediately after the fact of the placement of three micro phones between May and November 1965 It is not clear why the FBI stopped its microphone surveillance of Dr King although its decision may have been related to concern about public exposure during the Long Committee's investigation of electronic surveillance This chapter examines the legal basis for the wiretaps and micro phones the evidence surrounding the motives for their use and the degree to which Justice Department and White House officials were aware of the FBI's electronic surveillance of Dr King A Legal Standards Governing the FBI's Duty to Inform the Justice Department of Wiretaps and Microphones During the Period of the Martin Luther King Invvestigation The FBI's use of wiretaps and microphones to follow Dr King's activities must be examined in light of the accepted legal standards and practices of the time Before March 1965 the FBI followed differ ent procedures for the authorization of wiretaps and microphones Wiretaps required the approval of the Attorney General in advance However once the Attorney General had authorized the FBI to initi ate wiretap coverage of a subject the Bureau generally continued the wiretap for as long as it judged necessary As former Attorney General Katzenbach testified The custom was not to put a time limit on a tap or any wiretap authorization Indeed I think the Bureau would have felt free in 1965 to put a tap on a phone authorized by Attorney General Jackson before World War II.13 In "national security cases the FBI was free to carry out micro phone surveillances without first seeking the approval of the Attorney General or informing him afterward The Bureau apparently derived authority for its microphone practice from a 1954 memorandum sent by Attorney General Brownell to Director Hoover stating 10NicholasKatzenbachtestimony 11/12/75 p 87 113 It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone sur veillance is the only possible way to uncovering the activities of espionage agents possible saboteurs and subversive per sons In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of develop ing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both such functions The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes... I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and therefore may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the na tional interest.131 The Justice Department was on notice that the FBI's practice was to install microphones without first informing the Justice Department Director Hoover'told Deputy Attorney General Bryon White in May 1961 in the internal security field we are utilizing microphone surveillances on a restricted basis even though trespass is nec essary to assist in uncovering the activity of Soviet intelli gence agents and Communist Party leaders In the inter est of national safety microphone surveillances are also uti lized on a restricted basis even though trespass is necessary in uncovering major criminal activities.132 A memorandum by Courtney Evans indicates that he discussed microphones in "organized crime cases with the Attorney General in July 1961 It was pointed out to the Attorney General that we had taken action with regard to the use of microphones in [organized crime] cases and we were nevertheless utilizing them in all instances where this was technically feasible and where valuable information might be expected The strong objec tions to the utilization of telephone taps as contrasted to microphone surveillances was stressed The Attorney General stated he recognized the reasons why telephone taps should be restricted to national-defense-type cases and he was pleased we had been using microphone surveillances where these ob " Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director FBI "Micro phone Surveillance, 5/20/54 Attorney General Brownell's memorandum au thorizing "unrestricted use of microphonesurveillance in national security cases waspromptedby the SupremeCourt's decisionin Irvine v California 347U.S 128 (1961) in whichthe Court denouncedas "obnoxious the installation of a micro phone in a criminal suspect's bedroom 7'3Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Deputy Attorney General ByronWhite 5/4/81 114 jections do not apply wherever possible in organized crime matters. The Justice Department later summarized this practice in a brief to the Supreme Court Under Departmental practice in effect for a period of years prior to 1963 and continuing into 1965 the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was given authority to ap prove the installation of devices such as [microphones] for intelligence (but not evidentiary) purposes when required in the interest of internal security or national safety includ ing organized crime kidnappings or matters wherein human life might be at stake.134 On March 30 1965 at the urging of Attorney General Katzenbach the FBI adopted a uniform procedure for submitting both wiretaps and microphones to the Attorney General for his approval prior to in stallation Director Hoover described the new procedures in a memo randum to the Attorney General In line with your suggestion this morning I have already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the place ment of microphones In other words I shall forward to you from time to time requests for authority to install micro phones where deemed imperative for your consideration and approval or disapproval Furthermore I have instructed that where you have approved either a phone tap or the installation of a microphone you will be advised when such is discontinued if in less than six months and if not discontin ued in less than six months that a new request be submitted by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation.335 One week later Katzenbach sent to the White House a proposed Presidential directive to all Federal agencies on electronic surveillance This directive formally issued by President Johnson on June 30 1965 forbade the nonconsensual interception of telephone communica tions by Federal personnel "except in connection with investigations related to the national security and then only after obtaining the written approval of the Attorney General The directive was less precise concerning microphone surveillance Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear nontelephone conversations is an even more difficult problem Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to Alan Belmont July 7 1961 A Bureau memorandum by Director Hoover several years later states that Evans subse quently gave then Senator Robert Kennedy a letter dated February 17 1966 stating that Evans had never discussedthe use of microphoneswith Kennedyand that Evans "did not know of any written material that was sent to you (Ken nedy) concerningmicrophonesurveillances The letter from Evans to Kennedy was released to the press Director Hooverconcludedin his memorandumreport ing this incident that in view of Evans "disregard for the truth and duplicity toward the FBI he should not be contacted without prior Bureau approval. (Memorandum J Edgar Hoover Re Courtney A Evans Person Not To Be Contacted December15 1966.) Blackv UnitedStates 385U.S 26 (1966) ' Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 3/30/65 p 2 115 which raises substantial and unresolved questions of con stitutional interpretation I desire that each agency conduct ing such investigations consult with the Attorney General to ascertain whether the agency's practices are fully in accord with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of others.'36 B Wiretap Surveillance of Dr King and the SCLC October 1963 June 1966 On September 6 1963 Assistant Director William Sullivan first recommended to Director Hoover that the FBI install wiretaps on Dr King's home and the officesof the Southern Christian Leadership Con ference.13 Sullivan's recommendation was apparently part of an at tempt to improve the Domestic Intelligence Division's standing with the Director by convincing him that Sullivan's Division was concerned about alleged communist influence on the civil rights movement and that the Division intended as Sullivan subsequently informed the Director to "do everything that is humanly possible in conducting its investigation.138 Sullivan's recommendation was viewed with scepticism by the FBI leadership since Attorney General Kennedy had rejected a similar proposal two months earlier Associate Director Clyde Tolson noted on the memorandum containing Sullivan's proposal "I see no point in making this recommendation to the Attorney General in view of the fact that he turned down a similar recommendation on July 22 1963. 139 Director Hoover scrawled below Tolson's note "I will approve though I am dizzy over vacillation as to influence of CPUSA. 14 In late September 1963 the FBI conducted a survey and concluded that wiretap coverage of Dr King's residence and of the New York SCLC office could be implemented without detection.14 On October 7 citing "possible communist influence in the racial situation, Hoover requested the Attorney General's permission for a wiretap "on King at his current address or at any future address to which he may move and "on the SCLC office at the current New York address or to any other address to which it may be moved. 142Attorney General Ken nedy signed the request on October 10 and on October 21 also ap proved the FBI request for coverage of the SCLC's Atlanta office.l'3 Two memoranda by Courtney Evans indicate that the Attorney Gen eral was uncertain about the advisability of the wiretaps On Octo ber 10 the Attorney General summoned Evans to discuss the FBI's request for the wiretaps on Dr King's home telephone and the New York SCLC telephones Evans wrote 180LyndonB Johnson Presidential Directive 6/30/65 Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan 9/6/63 'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 9/25/63 p 5 The dispute between Sullivan and Hoover and the intensification which developed from it are describedpp 104et seq 'Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan 10/4/63 attachment 'Bland memorandum 10/4/63 attachment la Bland memorandum 10/4/63 p 1 'u Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy 10/7/63 'Hoover memorandum 10/7/63 Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney GeneralRobert Kennedy 10/1S/63 116 The Attorney General said that he recognized the import ance of this coverage if substantial information is to be de veloped concerning the relationship between King and the communist party He said there was no question in his mind as to the coverage in New York City but that he was worried about the security of an installation covering a residence in Atlanta Georgia He noted that the last thing we could af ford to have would be a discovery of a wiretap on King's residence I pointed out to the Attorney General the fact that a resi dence was involved did not necessarily mean there was any added risk because of the technical nature of the telephone system After this discussion the Attorney General said he felt we should go ahead with the technical coverage on King on a trial basis and to continue it if productive results were forthcoming He said he was certain that all Bureau representatives involved would recognize the delicacy of this particular matter and would thus be even more cautious than ever in this assignment .194 According to Evans memorandum the Attorney General signed the authorization for the wiretap immediately after this conversation Another memorandum by Evans describes the Attorney General's reaction on approving the Bureau's request for a wiretap on the Atlanta SCLC officea week later The Attorney General is apparently still vacillating in his position as to technical coverage I reminded him of our previous conversation wherein he was assured that all possible would be done to insure the security of this operation The Attorney General advised that he was approving [the wiretaps] but asked that this coverage and that on King's residence be evaluated at the end of thirty days in light of the results secured so that the continuance of those surveillances could be determined at that time.145 Wiretaps were installed on the SCLC's New York office on Octo ber 24 1963 and at Dr King's home and the SCLC's Atlanta office on November 8 1963 The FBI made an internal evaluation of the wiretaps in December 1963 and decided on its own to extend the wiretaps for three months Reading the Attorney General's authori zation broadly the FBI construed permission to wiretap Dr King "at his current address or at any future address to include hotel room phones and the phone at the home of friends with whom he tempo rarily stayed The FBI installed wiretaps without seeking further authorization on the following occasions Location Installed Discontinued King'sAtlanta home Nov8,1963APr30,1965 Afriend'shome Aug14,1964Sept8,1964 HyattHouseMotelLosAngeles Apr241964Apr26,1964 HyattHouseMotelLosAngeles July7,1964July9,1964 Claridge HotelAtlantic City Aug22,1964Aug27,1964 SCLC Atlantaieadquarters Nov8,1963June21,1966 SCLC NewYorkheadquarters Oct 24,1963Jan24,1964 July13,1964July31,1964 1 Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 10/10/63 I Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 10/21/63_ 117 The Committee was not able to ascertain why Attorney General Ken nedy approved the FBI's request for wiretaps in October 1963 after refusing an identical request in July 1963 Burke Marshall Ken nedy's assistant in charge of civil rights affairs testified that he could not recall ever having discussed the matter with the Attorney General It was his opinion however that the decision had been influenced by events arising out of concern about possible communist influence in the civil rights movement that had been widely publicized during the hearings on the Public Accommodations Act in the summer of 1963 Marshall recalled that Dr King had made a "commitment to the Attorney General and to the President to "stop having any communi cation with Advisers A and B Subsequently information came in not as far as Adviser B but as far as Adviser A was concerned that that commitment was not lived up to and I have assumed since although I do not re member discussing it with Robert Kennedy that the reason that he authorized the tap was that he wanted to find out what was going on From his point of view Martin Luther King had made a commitment on a very important matter .. [and] King had broken that commitment So therefore the Attorney General wanted to find out whether [Adviser A] did in fact have influence over King what he was telling King and so forth.147 Marshall's answer to a question concerning whether anyone in the Justice Department ever considered asking the FBI to 'discontinue the investigation of Dr King also sheds some light on why the Attor ney General might have decided to approve the wiretaps Not that I know of [The FBI's allegations concerning Ad viser A] were grave and serious and the inquiries from the Senate and from the public both to the President and to the Attorney General as well as the Bureau had to be answered and they had to be answered fully Stopping the investiga tion in light of those circumstances would have run the risk that there would have been a lot of complaints that the Bureau had been blocked for political reasons from investigating seri ous charges about communist infiltration in the civil rights movement.148 Edwin O Guthman the Justice Department Public Relations Chief during Robert Kennedy's tenure as Attorney General told the Com mittee that he had spoken with then Senator Robert Kennedy about the wiretap when it was revealed in a Jack Anderson story in 1968 According to Guthman Robert Kennedy told him he had been importuned or requested by the FBI over a pe riod of time to wiretap the phones of Dr King specifically wiretap the phones as I recollect at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and I think 1 Burke Marshall testimony 3/3/76 p 20 The "commitmenton a very impor tant matter had been Dr King's promise to sever his relations with Adviser A 1NMarshall 3/3/76 p 55 118 Martin Luther King's home but I'm not certain about that... Robert Kennedy said that he finally agreed in the fall of 1963 to give the FBI permission to wiretap the phones and my clear recollection on this is that his feeling was that if he did not do it Mr Hoover would move to impede or block the passage of the civil rights bill which had been introduced in the summer of 1963 and that he felt that he might as well settle the matter as to whether (Adviser A) did have the in fluence on King that the FBI contended... My recollection is that there had been a number of conversations with King by Burke Marshall and Robert Kennedy and I think President Kennedy had indicated to King that he ought not to have any thing to do with (Adviser A) My understanding and recol lection is that King said he would and then each time the FBI would come back and say he's still in contact with (Adviser A) Robert Kennedy viewed this as a serious matter and not in the interest of the country and not in the interest of the civil rights movement if the FBI information was accu rate.149 Guthman testified that he could not recall Kennedy's elaborating on the steps that he had feared Director Hoover would take against the civil rights legislation if he had not agreed to the wiretap against the civil rights legislation if he had not agreed to the wiretap but gave his own opinion that "Hoover's influence on the Hill could be considerable and it could have been a form of public statement or conferring with Senators in that area. 150 It is also not clear why Attorney General Kennedy insisted that the wiretaps be evaluated after 30 days and then failed to complain when the FBI neglected to send him an evaluation Evans after reviewing his memorandum stating that the Attorney General required the FBI to evaluate the wiretaps after 30 days testified that he assumed the Attorney General had "expected the Bureau to submit the results of that evaluation to him. When asked if the Attorney General had ever inquired into whether the evaluation had been made Evans testified I am reasonably certain he never asked me I would point out however that the assassination of President Kennedy fol lowed these events reasonably close in point of time and this disrupted the operation of the Office of the Attorney Gen era1151 In March 1965 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach requested the FBI to submit all of its wiretaps for reauthorization.152 He testified In late April 1965 in accordance with this program I re ceived a request from the Bureau to continue a tap on Dr King's personal phone I ordered it discontinued It is how ever possible that a request for the continuation of a pre existing tap on the headquarters of the Southern Christian 1DEdwin O Guthman testimony 3/16/76 pp 5 15-17 'fi Guthman testimony 3/16/76 p 17 CourtneyEvans testimony 12/1/75 p 15 1 NicholasKatzenbach testimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 210 119 Leadership Conference was made about the same time and I may have approved that tap I do not recall the date or the circumstances which would have led me to do so.'53 Documents provided to the Committee by the FBI reflect that in early April 1965 the Atlanta office informed headquarters that it was discontinuing the wiretap on Dr King's home because he was moving On April 19 the Director authorized a survey to determine if a wire tap could be placed on the phone in Dr King's new residence with "full security. The Director's memorandum also stated that "After receipt of results of survey and Atlanta's recommendations a memo randum will be prepared along with any necessary correspondence with the Attorney General. 154A memorandum from the Atlanta office the next month states "On [May 6 1965] Mr Sullivan tele phonically advised that the installation of this Tesur [technical sur veillance] was not authorized at this time. 155 The Bureau has been unable to find a record of anv discussions be tween FBI officials and Attorney Katzenbach concerning this wiretap and there are no memoranda in the Bureau files which indicate the reason that the wiretap on Dr King's new home was not authorized The FBI terminated the wiretap on the New York SCLC office in January 1964 only two months after it had been installed "for lack of productivity. 156The wiretap was reinstalled in July 1964 and discontinued later that month because "the office moved. 157No fur ther wiretaps were placed on the New York office The wiretap on the Atlanta SCLC office was reviewed by Attorney General Katzenbach on October 27 1965 and received his approval A Bureau memorandum recommending continuation of the coverage in April 1966 was returned with a notation by Katzenbach dated June 20 1966 stating "I think this coverage should be discontinued particularly in light of possible charges of a criminal nature against [certain SCLC employees]. 159Technical coverage was discontinued the following day.16o Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned down two requests by the FBI for wiretaps on the phones of the SCLC once on January 3 1968 and again on January 17 1969.161Clark wrote the Director concern ing the 1968 request I am declining authorization of the requested installation of the above telephone surveillance at the present time There has not been an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to national security.162 Clark's refusal to authorize an SCLC wiretap in 1969 occurred two days before he left office at the termination of the Johnson Admin 'Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings p 210 'Memorandum from Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 4/19/65 75Memorandumfrom SAC Atlanta to Director FBI 5/19/65 "Memorandum from SAC New York to Director FBI 1/27/64 'Memorandum from Director FBI to SAC New York 8/7/64 " Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 6/22/66 The charges had nothingto do with Dr King 15Memorandumfrom Joseph Sizooto Files 6/23/66 7 Memorandumfrom RamseyClark to J Edgar Hoover 1/3/68 memorandum from RamseyClark to J Edgar Hoover 1/17/69 'Clark memorandum 1/3/68 120 istration Less than a month later the Director informed the Atlanta office that an SCLC wiretap "is in line to be presented to the new At torney General and a survey with full security assured is desir able. 163FBI files contain no indication of the disposition of this final request C MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE OF DR KING JANU ARY 1964-NOVEMBER 1965 From January 1964 through November 1965 the FBI installed at least 15 hidden microphones in hotel and motel rooms occupied by Martin Luther King 164The FBI has told the Committee about the following microphone surveillances Willard Hotel Washington D.C (Jan 5,1964) Shroeder Hotel Milwaukee (Jan 27,1964) Hilton Hawaiian Village Honolulu (Feb 18 1964) Ambassador Hotel Los Angeles (Feb 20,1964) Hyatt House Motel Los Angeles (Feb 22,1964) Statler Hotel Detroit (Mar 19 1964) Senator Motel Sacramento (Apr 23,1964) Hyatt House Motel Los Angeles (July 7,1964) Manger Hotel Savannah Ga (Sept 28 1964) Park Sheraton Hotel New York (Jan 8 1965) Americana Hotel New York (Jan 28 1965) Sheraton Atlantic Hotel New York (May 12,1965) Astor Hotel New York (Oct 14 1965) New York Hilton Hotel New York (Oct 28,1965) Americana Hotel New York (Nov 29,1965) .185 1 Reasons for the FBI's Microphone Surveillance of Dr King The wiretaps on Dr King's home telephone and the phones of the SCLC offices were authorized by the Attorney General for the stated purpose of determining whether suspected communists were influenc ing the course of the civil rights movement FBI documents indicate that the microphone coverage (which was initiated without the knowledge of the Attorney Generals in conformance with practice then current) was originally designed not only to pick up information bearing on possible Communist influence over Dr King but also to obtain information for use in the FBI's secret effort to discredit Dr 1 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 2/14/69 1 4Witnesses have indicated that other microphonesmight have been used to cover the activities of Dr King and his associates although those microphones might have been placed by local law enforcement officers Bureau documents indicate that the New York and Miami police did in fact place microphonesin Dr King's hotel rooms (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Special Agent in Charge New York 5/7/65 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to Wil liam Sullivan 5/27/66) CongressmanAndrew Young who was oneof Dr King's chief aides testified "We found a bug in the pulpit in a church in Selma Ala hama in 1965 and we didn't evenmoveit or destroy it We tookit out from under the pulpit taped it on top of the pulpit ,and Reverend Abernathy called it this little do-hickey and he said 'I want youto tell Mr Hoover I don't want it under here where there is a whole lot of static I want him to get it straight, and he preached to the little bug. (Andrew Youngtestimony 2/19/76 p 55.) Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee 7/24/75 pp 4-5 (The Bureau also authorized the installation of a microphoneat the Park Sheraton Hotel in New York on March 29 1965 but Dr King did not stay at the hotel and the coveragewas terminated.) 121 King as the leader of the civil rights movement '66 By 1965 references to discrediting efforts had been dropped and documents requesting authorization for microphones mentioned only the purpose of obtaining information about possible communist influences. The details of the Bureau's efforts to undermine Dr King are discussed in the ensuing chapters The first microphones were installed about two weeks after a Decem ber 23 196.3 FBI conference at which methods of "neutralizing Dr King were explored). Microphone surveillance was again discussed at an all-day conference at FBI Headquarters in February 1964 attended by representatives of the FBI laboratory "preparatory to effecting coverage of the activities of Martin Luther King Jr. and his associates in Honolulu. 169Justifying the need for microphone coverage the Chief of the FBI's Internal Security Section wrote that the FBI was "attempting to obtain information about "the [private] activities of Dr King and his associates so that Dr King could be "completely discredited. 16 The FBI memorandum authorizing the placement of the first micro phone on Dr King at the Willard Hotel in early January 1964 gave as a basis "the intelligence and counterintelligence possibilities which thorough coverage of Dr King's activities might develop.... 171 The Willard Hotel "bug yielded 19 reels of tape A memorandum summarizing the tapes was sent to the Director with William Sullivan's recommendation that it be shown to Walter Jenkins President John son's Special Assistant "inasmuch as Dr King is seeking an appoint ment with President Johnson. 172Cartha D DeLoach Assistant to the Director showed the summary memorandum to Jenkins and later wrote I told Jenkins that the Director indicated I should leave this attachment with him if he desired to let the President person ally read it Jenkins mentioned that he was sufficiently aware of the facts that he could verbally advise the President of the matter Jenkins was of the opinion that the FBI could perform a good service to the country if this matter could somehow be confidentially given to members of the press I 19See for example Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 116/64 memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 1/28/64 SomeBureau witnesses have suggestedthat the microphoneswere installed only to intercept conversations between Dr King and other individuals such as Ad viser A to determine the extent of communistinfluenceover King The Bureau however was unable to produceany evidencethat it had anticipated meetingsbe tween Dr King and Adviser A or betweenDr King and any other of his advisers whom the Bureau alleged had communist connections on the initial occasions whenmicrophoneswere used 1"!Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 10/29/65 memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 11129/65 "'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 1/13/64 This con ference and the FBI's attempts to discredit King are discussed infra pp 133 et seq 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 2/4/64 'Baumgardner memorandum 1/28/64 "Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 1/6/64 'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 1/13/64 The memo randum did not indicate how the information had been obtained 122 told him the Director had this in mind however he also be lieved we should obtain additional information prior to dis cussing it with certain friends.173 The FBI was apparently encouraged by the intelligence afforded by "bugs and by the White House's receptiveness to that type of infor mation A microphone was installed at the Shroeder Hotel in Mil waukee two weeks later but was declared "unproductive because "there were no activities of interest developed. 174Dr King's visit to Honolulu in mid-February 1964 was covered by a squad of surveillance experts brought in for the occasion from San Francisco One of these experts was described in a Bureau memorandum as the "most experienced most ingenious most unruffled most competent sound man for this type of operation in the San Francisco Office another was chosen because he had "shown unusual ingenuity persis tence and determination in making microphone installations and a third had "been absolutely fearless in these types of operations for over twelve years. 175More than twenty reels of tape were obtained during Dr King's stay in Honolulu and his sojourn in Los Angeles immediately afterward.176 Director Hoover agreed to send a copy of a memorandum describing the contents of the tapes to Jenkins and Attorney General Kennedy in order to remove all doubt from the Attorney General's mind as to the type of person King is It will probably also eliminate King from any participation in [a memorial for President Kennedy which the Attorney General was helping to arrange].177 Dr King's stay in Los Angeles in July 1964 was covered by both wiretaps and microphones in his hotel room The wiretap was intended to gain intelligence about Dr King's plans at the Republican National Convention Microphone surveillance was requested to attempt to ob tain information useful in the campaigns to discredit him 176Sulli van's memorandum describing the coverage was sent to Hoover with a recommendation against dissemination to the White House or the Attorney General as in this instance it is merely repetitious and does not have nearly the impact as prior such memoranda We are continu ing to follow closely King's activities and giving considera tion to every possibility for future similar coverage that will add to our record on King so that in the end he might be dis credited and thus be removed from his position of great stat ure in the Negro community. 178Memorandumfrom Cartha D DeLoachto J Edgar Hoover 1/14/64 Jenkins told members of Committee staff in an informal interview that he had never suggesteddisseminating derogatory material about Dr King to the press (Staff summary of interview with Walter Jenkins 12/1/75 p 2.) The Committeedid not take Jenkins testimony because Jenkins informed the Committee that he was ill 1 Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 1/28/64 145Airtel SpecialAgentin charge San Francisco to FBI Director 2/25/64 17 The FBI also coveredDr King's activities with photographicsurveillance 1 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 3/4/64 The memorandumdid not show how the information had been obtained Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 7/2/64 1 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 7/15/64 123 Hoover wrote on the memorandum "Send to Jenkins. The sum mary memorandum and a cover letter were sent to Jenkins on July 17.150 It should also be noted that Dr King's activities at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City New Jersey in August 1964 were closely monitored by the FBI Microphones were not installed on that occasion although wiretaps were placed on Dr King's hotel room phone The stated justification for the wiretap was the investi ~ation of possible communist influence and the fact that Dr King may indulge in a hunger fast as a means of protest. 181A great deal of potentially useful political information was obtained from this wiretap and disseminated to the White House.18 The memorandum authorizing microphone coverage of Dr King's room in Savannah Georgia during the annual SCLC conference in September and October 1964 described surveillance as necessary be cause it was "expected that attempts will again be made to exert in fluence upon the SCLC and in particular on King by communists. 183 The seven "bugs in Dr King's rooms during visits to New York from January to November 1965 were justified in contemporaneous internal FBI memoranda by anticipated meetings of Dr King with several people whom the FBI claimed had affiliations with the Com munist Party.184 No mention was made of the possibility of obtaining private life material in memoranda concerning these "bugs. 185 2 Evidence Bearing on Whether the Attorneys General Au thorized or Knew About the Microphone Surveillance of Dr King In summary it is clear that the FBI never requested permission for installing microphones to cover Dr King from Attorney General Ken nedy and there is no evidence that it ever directly informed him that it was using microphones There is some question however concerning whether the Attorney General ultimately realized that the FBI was using "bugs because of the nature of the information that he was being sent Evidence concerning Attorney General Katzenbach's knowledge of microphone surveillance of Dr King is contradictory In March 1965 Katzenbach required the FBI for the first time to seek the Justice Department's approval for all microphone installations The FBI has given the Committee documents which indicate that Katzenbach was 'B0Letter from J Edgar Hooverto Walter Jenkins 7/17/64 'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 8/21/64 1efThe FBI's surveillance of Dr King and other civil rights leaders at the Atlantic City DemocraticNational Conventionis discussedat length in a separate staff report dealingwith electronicsurveillance 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 9/28/64 1eMemoranda from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan 1/8/65 1/29/65 and 5/13/65 memorandumfrom William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 10/14/65 memo randa from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 10/29/65and 11/29/65 'Possible reasons that the mention of the collection of private life material was dropped from FBI memoranda during this period include (1) the "truce between Dr King and the FBI after December1964 (see pp 163 et seq.) and (2) the fact that after May 1965the FBI was required to inform the Attorney General of microphonesurveillance and did not want to leave a "paper record referring to the FBI's program to discredit Dr King 69-9840 76 9 124 informed shortly after the fact of three microphone installations on Dr King that he did not object to those installations and that he urged the FBI to use caution in its surveillance activities Katzenbach does not now recall having been informed about the FBI's micro phone surveillance of Dr King (a) Attorney General Robert F Kennedy. The FBI makes no claim that Attorney General Kennedy was expressly informed about the microphones placed in Dr King's hotel rooms The only FBI claim that Attorney General Kennedy might have been aware of the micro phones is a Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum written in December 1966 which states concerning microphone coverage of King Attorney General Robert F Kennedy was furnished the pertinent information obtained perusal of which would indicate that a microphone was the source of this information.186 Next to this entry Hoover wrote "when A memorandum from the Domestic Intelligence Division a few days later explained Attorney General Robert F Kennedy was furnished an eight page "Top Secret memorandum dated March 4 1964 This memorandum is a summary of microphone coverage . in the Willard Hotel Washington D.C. Hilton Hawaiian Village Honolulu Hawaii Ambassador Hotel Los Angeles California and the Hyatt House Hotel Los Angeles Cali fornia The wording of the memorandum is couched in such a manner that it is obvious that a microphone was the source.'S7 The question of whether Attorney General Kennedy suspected that the FBI was using microphones to gather information about Dr King must also be viewed in light of the Attorney General's express authorization of wiretaps in the King case on national security grounds and of the FBI's practice known to officials in the Justice Department of installing microphones in national security cases without notifying the Department We have examined the Bureau's claim with respect to Attorney General Kennedy's possible knowledge about the microphones and have found the following evidence As noted above on January 13 1964 William Sullivan recom mended to Hoover that President Johnson's assistant Walter Jenkins be given a copy of a memorandum detailing information discovered through the Willard Hotel bug.188 Sullivan expressed doubts how ever about whether the Attorney General should be given the in formation The attached document is classified "Top Secret to mini mize the likelihood that this material will be read by someone who will leak it to King However it is possible despite its classification the Attorney General himself may reprimand King on the basis of this material If he does it is not likely 'Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan 12/15/66 p 2 'g Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan 12/19/66 1 Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to AlanBelmont 1/13/64 This incident is discussed at p 121 125 we will develop any more such information through the means employed It is highly important that we do develop further information of this type in order that we may com pletely discredit King as the leader of the Negro people Next to Sullivan's recommendation that Courtney Evans hand-deliver a copy of the memorandum to the Attorney General Director Hoover wrote "No A copy need not be given the A.G. 189 Jenkins was subsequently shown a copy of the report but was not told the source of the information Shortly after the Honolulu bug Sullivan changed his mind and recommended that the Attorney General be informed of information gathered by both the Willard and Honolulu bugs to "remove all doubt from the Attorney General's mind about the type of person King is. 180Sullivan suggested Mr Evans personally deliver to the Attorney General a copy of the attached "Top Secret memorandum It is also believed that Mr Evans should indicate to the Attorney Gen eral that if King was to become aware of our coverage of him it is highly probable that we will no longer be able to develop such information through the means employed to date and that we of course are still desirous of continuing to develop such information Director Hoover wrote next to this recommendation "O.K. A notation in the margin states "Done 3/10/64 E [vans]. 19iThe memorandum sent to the Attorney General did not state the source of the informa tion that it contained When shown Sullivan's memorandum by the Committee Courtney Evans testified that he did not recall delivering the memorandum about Dr King to the Attorney General but that "I assume I must have in view of this record. 192He doubted that he had spoken with the At torney General about the substance of the memorandum however be cause "if I did have a conversation with him I believe I would have written a memorandum as to that conversation. 193When asked if he recalled ever telling the Attorney General that the memorandum con tained information obtained through microphone coverage Evans testified No I do not And considering the tenor of the times then I would probably have been very circumspect and told him 1NSullivan memorandum 1/13/64 Sullivan's remarks in this passage under score the tension generated by the mutually inconsistent policies of the FBI and the Justice Department toward Dr King Sullivan viewed the FBI's task as gathering information with which to discredit Dr King He perceivedthe At torney General's goal was to prevent Dr King from being discredited Sullivan feared that if the Attorney Generalwere told of the derogatory informationabout Dr King the Attorney General might reprimand Dr King Thus the FBI would be thwarted in its goals if it gave the Attorney General information which he neededto ensure that Dr Kingnot bediscredited "Baumgardner memorandum 3/4/64 See p 122 The memorandum also stated "We avoided mentioning specificdates as to when it took place or men tion of when the information was received thus to avoid if possible a ques tion being raised by the Attorney General as to why he was not told earlier of the Willard incident. 1 Baumgardner memorandum 3/4/64 p 2 1B8CourtneyEvans testimony 12/1/75 p 20 1B7Evans 12/1/75 p 20 The FBI has told the Committeethat nosuch memoran dumexists in its files 126 exactly what I was instructed to tell him and nothing more I think it is a matter of record that the relation ship between the Attorney General and the Director had deteriorated to the point that they weren't speaking to each other And consequently I felt that it was essential that I followed these instructions very explicitly.194 A memorandum from Evans dated September 11 1964 indicates that the Attorney General had in fact received the summary mem orandum but sheds no light on whether he was told the source of the information Before leaving office Attorney General Kennedy instructed his Executive Assistant Harold Reis to return to the Bu reau copies of top secret memoranda submitted to him by the FBI on March 4 1964 and June 1 1964 as Mr Kennedy did not feel this material should go to the general Department files These memoranda deal with activities of Martin Luther King Reis accordingly handed these mem oranda to me They are attached.195 It is uncertain whether the Attorney General understood the source of the information after reading the FBI summary memoranda Evans told the Committee that he never received any indication that the Attorney General suspected the FBI was following Dr King's activities with hidden microphones and surmised that the Attorney General might have assumed the information was the product of live informants or surveillance by local law enforcement agencies.196 Walter Jenkins who also read these memoranda told the Committee that he had not suspected that the FBI had obtained the informa tion in them by using microphones.197 Bill Moyers President John son's Assistant also saw several of the memoranda concerning Dr King and testified that he had not realized that the FBI had col lected the information through microphones He told the Committee however that "the nature of the general references that were being made I realized later could only have come from that kind of knowledge unless there was an informer in Martin Luther King's presence a good bit of the time.198 (b) Attorney General Nich,olae deB Katzenbach. Four FBI doc uments appear to indicate that Attorney General Katzenbach was informed about the FBI's microphone surveillance of Dr King Kat zenbach testified that he could not recall having been informed of the surveillance and stated that it would have been inconsistent with his claimed disapproval of a wiretap on Dr King's home at the same time The Bureau's position appears in a Domestic Intelligence memoran dum listing the wiretaps and microphones installed in the investigation of Dr King Attorney General Katzenbach was specifically notified of three of these microphone installations In each of these three 1 Evans 1/21/75 pp 21-22 Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 9/11/64 19 Evans 12/1/75 pp 21-22 197Staffsummaryof Walter Jenkins interview 1975p 3 1 BBill Moyerstestimony 3/2/76 p 89 127 instances the Attorney General was advised that a trespass was involved in the installation.199 The Bureau maintains that Attorney General Katzenbach was advised of microphone placements in Dr King's hotel rooms on the following occasions On May 13 1965 the New York field office installed a microphone in Dr King's suite at the Sheraton Atlantic Hotel in New York pursuant to authorization from an Inspector in the Domestic Intelli gence Division apparently without Director Hoover's prior knowl edge According to a contemporaneous memorandum the New York office had only a few hours notice of Dr King's arrival and needed to install the microphone "immediately. 200A memorandum dated May 17 addressed to the Attorney General and signed by Director Hoover stated On May 12 1965 information was obtained indicating a meet ing of King and his advisors was to take place in New York on that date Because of the importance of that meeting and the urgency of the situation a microphone surveillance was effected on May 13 201 On October 14 1965 a microphone was installed in Dr King's room in the Astor Hotel in New York This installation was approved by William Sullivan head of the Domestic Intelligence Division again without Director Hoover's prior knowledge "on New York's assur ance that full security was available and since time was of the essence (Sullivan claimed that the FBI had learned of Dr King's plan to visit New York only a few hours before.) 2D2On his memorandum inform ing Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont of the microphone place ment Sullivan wrote "Memo to AG being prepared. A memorandum to the Attorney General dated October 19 and signed by Director Hoover stated that the Astor Hotel surveillance had been placed because of the "importance of Dr King's meeting with his advisers in New York "and the urgency of the situation. 203 On November 9 1965 a microphone was installed in Dr King's room in the Americana Hotel in New York A Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum of that date states On New York's assurance that full security was available and since time was of the essence [as the FBI had learned of Dr King's planned visit to New York on that day] New York was told to go ahead with the installation Inasmuch as the installation will be made today (11/29/65) and deac tivated immediately upon King's departure probably 11/30/65 we will promptly submit a memorandum to the Attorney General advising when the installation was made and when it was taken off.204 'Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan 12/15/75 p 2 '0 Memorandumfrom Joseph Sizooto WilliamSullivan 5/13/65 'Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 5/17/65 "Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 10/14/65 "Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 10/19/65 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 11/29/65 128 A memorandum to the Attorney General dated December 1 1965 and bearing Director Hoover's signature stated that "a microphone surveillance was effected November 29 1965 on King and was dis continued on November 30 1965. The reason for the installation was the "importance of the meeting and the urgency of the situation ))205 The FBI has given the Committee copies of the three memoranda to Attorney General Katzenbach informing him that microphones had been placed on Dr King's rooms Each is initialed "N deB K in the upper right hand corner When shown these memoranda Katzen bach testified "Each of these bears my initials in what appears to be my handwriting in the place where I customarily initialed Bureau memoranda. 206 He denied however any recollection of having received the memoranda.20i The Bureau also supplied the Committee with a transmittal slip dated December 10 1965 Mr Hoover Obviously these are particularly delicate surveillances and we should be very cautious in terms of the non-FBI people who may from time to time necessarily be involved in some aspect of installation NdeB K2'08 Katzenbach identified the handwritten note as his and testified that although he recalled writing the note he could not recall why he had written it When asked if he recalled the "delicate surveil lances mentioned in the note Katzenbach told the Committee I don't recall and I have nothing in my possession that has served to refresh my recollection and nothing has been shown to me by the Committee staff that serves to refresh my recollection Q In your opinion could this note have referred to the three mentioned electronic surveillances against Dr King MT KATZENBACHOn its face it says that it did it would seem to me that would be a possibility I point out that it could refer to almost anything My opinion is obvi ously since I don't recall getting the first three that this was not associated with it and I really don't have enough recol lection of what was associated with it to say I did see Mr 4a6MemorandumfromDirector FBI to Attorney General 12/1/65 2D8NicholasKatzenbachtestimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 211 When asked if he thought his initials in the corner of the three documents were forgeries Katzenbach testified "Let me be just as clear about that as I can I have no recollection of receiving these documents and I seriously believethat I would have recollectedthem had I received them If they are my initials and if I put them on then I am clearly mistaken in that recollection. (Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings p 227.) "Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach to J Edgar Hoover 12/10/65 The Bureau asserts that the transmittal slip which bears an FBI secretary's notation "Martin Luther King, was located in the FBI's Martin Luther King file The serial number for filing on the transmittal slip is immediately sub sequent to the serial number of the December 1 notification The Bureau has informed the committee however that there is no evidence that the two memoranda were ever attached to one another or that anything was attached to the transmittal slip whenit cameto the Bureau 129 Helms on that date Whether it related to something he asked for I don't know.209 Katzenbach added that he was puzzled by the fact that the handwritten note if related to the December 1 memorandum from the Director is written on a separate piece of paper It was then and is now my con sistent practice to write notes of that kind on the incoming piece of paper provided there is room to do so.210 The documentary evidence the three notices that a microphone had been placed on a room occupied by Dr King shortly before and the note in Katzenbach's handwriting referring to "delicate surveil lances which the FBI states was sent to the Bureau with the last of the notices indicates that Attorney General Katzenbach knew of the microphone surveillance but did not order it halted Katzenbach in denying any knowledge of the microphones pointed to two factors mitigating against the likelihood of his having permitted the surveil lance to continue once learning of it his rejection of a wiretap on Dr King's new home in April 1965 the fact that his handwritten note urged caution in future surveillances and that no microphone sur veillances were carried out after the date of the note.21 Katzenbach's position throughout his testimony before the Commit tee is best summarized by a portion of a written sworn statement that he submitted at the time of his public appearance These memoranda do not indicate on their face the Bureau sought any prior authorization or state any reasons why it was not sought They appear to present me with information after the fact and request no authority to perform similar surveillances in the future I believe the Bureau knew full well that I would not authorize the surveillances in question not only because of the circumstances surrounding Dr King but particularly because the bugs were to be placed in a hotel room That is among the worst possible invasions of privacy and would demand the strongest conceivable justification In deed I believe this position had been made clear in written memoranda to the Bureau dating back to the 1950s and I have a clear recollection of being critical of the Bureau for installing a bug in the bedroom of a leading member of the Mafia I reaffirmed this position to the Bureau sometime in 1965 or 1966 but that reaffirmation may have postdated these memoranda Finally I cannot recall any memoranda at any time inform ing me that the Bureau had installed a tap or a bug without 80 Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings p 229 Katzenbach also told the Committee "Mycalendar does showthat on that date I had a meetingalone with the Deputy Director of the CIA Mr Helms which he had requested the previous afternoon The meeting was a brief one and would be consistent with a request by the CIA for domestic surveillances by the FBI I rarely saw Mr Helms alone and he did on one or two occasionsmake such a request But I have no recollectionof the subject matter of that particular meeting and cannot therefore say that this handwritten note is related to it. (Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings p 211.) 810Katzenbach12/3/75 Hearings p 211 al Katzenbach 11/12/75 pp 75-76 130 my prior authorization While I authorized Mr Hoover to do so in emergency circumstances in a memorandum written in the summer of 1965 not only does the May memorandum pre date that authorization but there is nothing in the memo randa which suggests that on any of these occasions was there an "emergency. Further my calendars which are in the possession of the Committee indicate my general avail ability 212to the Bureau on two occasions involving these memoranda and my total availability to the Bureau on the third Nor do I have any recollection that the "emergency procedure was ever invoked by the Bureau during my term in office Obviously I do not believe that I received these memo randa Equally obvious is the fact that if I initialed them I am mistaken in my belief. Although apparently no microphones were placed in Dr King's hotel rooms after the November 29 1965"bug at the Americana Hotel the Domestic Intelligence Division did make one further attempt to install a microphone A memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach then Assistant to the Director dated January 21 1966 states that Sullivan had authorized the New York officeto "bug King's room during an anticipated three-day stay Clyde Tolson wrote across this memorandum "Remove this surveillance at once 1/21, and Hoover added his "yes. Tolson added a note on the bottom of the memoran dum complaining "No one here approved this I have told Sullivan again not to institute a mike surveillance without the Director's ap proval. Hoover wrote next to this comment "Right. 214 212Katzenbach wrote in a footnote asterisked after this reference to his "gen eral availability "For communicationspurposes it was my consistent practice to be met by Bureau agents whenever I traveled In addition I kept the White House operator informed of how to reach me at all times In the first occasion I left myofficefor a flight to Chicagoat 2 :30p.m and was as a practical matter unavailable to the Bureau only during the two-hour flight On the secondocca sion I left my officeat 12:35 p.m for a one-hour flight to New York and was similarly unavailable only during the flight On the third occasion I was in my Washington officeall day and thus always available to the Bureau. Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings pp 211-212 nMemorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach 1/21/66 The significanceof this memorandumis unclear Hoover'sand Tolson'sstrong reactions to Sullivan's approval of a microphoneon King's room an action which Sullivan had taken several times before may have been in response to the "delicate surveillances warning of the Attorney General or an added caution in light of the LongCommitteeinvestigation into electronic surveillance (The Long Com mittee investigation is discussed in the CommitteeStaff Report about electronic surveillance.) It is perhaps significantthat on the same day that Tolsonordered Sullivan to remove the "bug from Dr King's hotel room C D DeLoach met with Senator Longand accordingto a memorandumby DeLoach secured Senator Long'spromisenot to call any FBI witnesses to testify before his Subcommittee DeLoach's account of that meeting states "While we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Sub committee we have not yet eliminated certain dangers which might be created as a result of newspaper pressure on Long We therefore must keep on top of this situation at all times. (Memorandumfrom C D DeLoach '.1 C Tolson 1/121/66Ordering Sullivan to remove the microphonein Dr King el room which would have proven extremely embarrassing if it had been disco(Bred mighthave beenoneof Tolson'sresponsesto DeLoach'swarning.) 131 V THE FBT'SEFFORTTO DISCREDITDR MARTINLtiTI-IERKING 1964 Introduction and Summary In December 1963 a meeting was convened at FBI headquarters to discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader. Two weeks later FBI agents planted the first microphones in Dr King's hotel rooms in an "attempt to obtain information about the private "activities of Dr King and his asso ciates so that Dr King could be "completely discredited. That same week the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended the promotion of a new "national Negro leader who could "over shadow King and be in the position to assume the role of the leader ship of the Negro people when King has been completely discredited. The FBI's effort to discredit Dr King and to undermine the SCI ,C involved plans touching on virtually every aspect of Dr King's life The FBI scrutinized Dr King's tax returns monitored his financial affairs and even tried to establish that he had a secret foreign bank account Religious leaders and institutions were contacted in an effort to undermine their support of him and unfavorable material was "leaked to the press Bureau officials contacted members of Congress and special "off the record testimony was prepared for the Director's use before the House Appropriations Committee Efforts were made to turn White House and Justice Department Officials against Dr King by barraging them with unfavorable reports and according to one witness even offering to play for a White House official tape recordings that the Bureau considered embarrassing to King This chapter examines not only the Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr King but the degree to which officials in other branches of the Govern ment were responsible for those actions A few months before the FBI held its December 1963 conference at which its program against Dr King was apparently formulated the Director distributed a "mono graph about Dr King to the heads of several Governmental agencies Attorney General Kennedy ordered it immediately withdrawn During the course of the following year the FBI sent several intelligence re ports bearing on Dr King's private life to the White House and Jus tice Department Although government officials outside the FBI were not aware of the extent of the FBI's efforts to discredit Dr King officials of the Justice Department and of the White House did know that the FBI had offered tape recordings and derogatory information about Dr King to reporters The Attorney General went no further than complaining to the President and accepting a Bureau official's representation that the allegations were not true President Johnson not only failed to order the Bureau to stop but indeed cautioned it against dealing with certain reporters who had complained of its conduct A The FBI Disseminates the First King "Monograph and Attorney General Kennedy Orders It Recalled October 1963 On October 15 1963 William Sullivan forwarded to Assistant Di rector Alan Belmont for his approval a monograph entitled "Commu nism and the Negro Movement A Current Analysis. He proposed 132 that it be distributed to the Attorney General the White House CIA State Department Defense Department and Defense Department in telligence agencies.215 Sullivan testified that the purpose of the mono graph was to "discredit King. 216 Belmont submitted the monograph to the Director with a note stating The attached analysis of Communism and the Negro move ment is highly explosive It can be regarded as a personal attack on Martin Luther King There is no doubt it will have a heavy impact on the Attorney General and anyone else to whom we disseminate.. The memorandum makes good reading and is based on in formation from reliable sources We may well be charged however with expressing opinions and conclusions particu larly with reference to some of the statements about King This memorandum may startle the Attorney General par ticularly in view of his past association with King and the fact that we are disseminating this outside the Department He may resent this Nevertheless the memorandum is a power ful warning against Communist influence in the Negro move ment and we will be carrying out our responsibility by dis seminating it to the people indicated in the attached memo randum.21 The monograph was distributed on October 18 1963 One week later the Attorney General called Courtney Evans and stated that he had just learned that the Army had received a copy of a report about Dr King's alleged communist activities Evans reported to Belmont He was obviously irritated He went on to ask if the Army got copies of all reports submitted to him... The Attorney General asked what responsibilities the Army had in relation to the communist background of Martin Luther King I told the Attorney General that the Army had an interest in communist activities particularly in relation to racial matters because the military had to be called on if civil disturbances arising out of such matters went beyond the ability of civilian authorities This explanation seemed to serve no purpose.218 Director Hoover recorded in a memorandum of the same date The Attorney General called and advised me there was a lot of talk at the Pentagon regarding the document The At torney General anticipated that this information would leak out as the military didn't like the Negroes The Attorney General felt we should get back all copies of the document I told him .. we would get them from all agen Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 10/15/63 " William Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 p 49 2'7Memorandumfrom Alan Belmontto ClydeTolson 10/17/63 Hooverwrote in the margin "We must do our duty and "I am glad you recognizeat last that there exists such influence. Copieswere sent to the Attorney General the White House the Secretary of State the Director of Certtral Intelligence the Secretary of Defense the Director of Naval Intelligence the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Department of Special Investigations of 'the Air Force Memorandumfrom Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont 10/25/63 133 cies to which they were disseminated I also told him if any newspapers asked about this no comment would be made and no mention would be made that such a document existed 218 All copies were recovered by October 28 Burke Marshall Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division under Robert Kennedy told the Committee that the monograph was a personal diatribe a personal attack without eviden tiary support on the character the moral character and person of Dr Martin Luther King and it was only peripher ally related to anything substantive like whether or not there was communist infiltration or influence on the civil rights movement It was a personal attack on the man and went far afield from the charges [of possible communist influence] 22 Marshall recalled that he had been very "irritated about the mono graph and that the Attorney General had "thought it was outrageous. He remembered that the Attorney General had ordered the mono graph withdrawn but did not know if the Attorney General had taken any further steps to reprimand the Bureau.'' B The FBI Plans Its Campaign To Discredit Dr King December 23 19663 On December 23 1963 a nine-hour conference was held at FBI headquarters to discuss Martin Luther King In attendance were As sistant Director Sullivan Internal Security Section Chief Frederick Baumgardner three other FBI headquarters officials and two agents from the FBI's Atlanta Field Office A prepared list of twenty-one proposals was presented and dis cussed The proposals raised the possibility of "using ministers "dis gruntled acquaintances "aggressive newsmen "colored agents Dr King's housekeeper and even suggested using Dr King's wife or "placing a good looking female plant in King's office. 222 An account of the meeting written by William Sullivan emphasized that the Bureau must take a "discreet approach in developing informa tion about Dr King for use "at an opportune time in a counterintelli 212Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Clyde Tolson Alan Belmont John Mohr Cartha DeLoach Alex Rosen and William Sullivan 10/25/63 'Burke Marshall testimony 3/3/76 p 32 Carl T Rowan then Director of USIA was sent a copyof the monograph In a newspaper article in 1969 Rowan wrote "(p)erhaps this is the time for me to reveal that I have read the FBI reports based on electronic surveillance of the late Nobel Prize-winner I know how much dirt the FBI has dug up and 90percent of it is barn-yard gossip that has nothing to do with 'internal security or Marxist influences. (Carl T Rowan "FBI Won't Talk About Additional Wiretappings, The Washington D.C EveningStar 6/20/69 p A 13) 291Marshall testimony 3/3/76 p 34 'FBI work paper "Questions To Be Explored at Conference 12/23/63 re CommunistInfluencein Racial Matters. The Bureau subsequently considered the possibility of getting Detroit police men to raid Dr King's hotel room in March 1964and kept abreast of the Miami police force's plans to raid Dr King's hotel room in 1966 (Unsigned Bureau memorandum "For TelephonicBriefingof Detroit Office Airtel MiamiOfficeto Director FBI 5/23/66) 134 gence move to discredit him. It was generally agreed that the Bureau should make use of "all available investigative techniques coupled with meticulous planning boldness and ingenuity tempered only with good judgment, but that "discretion must not reach the point of timidity. 223 Sullivan's memorandum reported that the following decisions were made at the conference We must determine and check out all of the employees of the SCLC We must locate and monitor the funds of the SCLC We must identify and check out the sources who con tribute to the SCLC We must continue to keep close watch on King's per sonal activities We will at the proper time when it can be done with out embarrassment to the Bureau expose King as an op portunist who is not a sincere person but is exploiting the racial situation for personal gain We will explore the possibility of utilizing additional specialized investigative techniques at the SCLC office Sullivan described the purpose of the meeting as To explore how best to carry on our investigation to pro duce the desired results without embarrassment to the Bu reau Included in our discussion was a complete analysis of the avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an ef fective Negro leader and developing evidence concerning King's continued dependence on communists for guidance and direction.224 Precisely what prompted the Bureau to decide upon this drastic new approach is still unclear William Sullivan was asked by the Committee whether tactics such as placing female "plants, were common practices of the FBI Sulli van testified that they were common practice among intelligence services all over the world This is not an isolated phenomenon This is a common practice rough tough dirty business Whether we should be in it or not that is for you folks to decide We are in it No holds were barred We have used that technique against Soviet agents They have used it against us Question The same methods were brought home Mr SULLIVAN Brought home against any organization against which we were targeted We did not differentiate This is a rough tough business Senator MONDALEWould it be safe to say that the tech niques we learned in fighting true espionage in World Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 12/24/63 Six months later in April 1964 FBI headquarters was still instructing agents in the fieldto "continue to gather information concerning King's personal activities in order that we may consider using this information at an opportune time in a counterintelligence move to discredit him and to consider the possibility of "utilizing contracts in the news media field. (Memorandumfrom FBI Director to Atlanta OfficeApril 1 1964) 124Sullivanmemorandum 12/24/63 135 War II came to be used against some of our own American citizens Mr SULLIVANThat would be a correct deduction.225 Sullivan testified that the plans formulated at the December 24 1963 meeting were in accord with "Mr Hoover's policy. 226After reviewing the memoranda Sullivan emphasized I want to make this clear this is not an isolated phenomenon that this was a practice of the Bureau down through the years I might say it often became a real character assassina tion.227 Sullivan was asked by the Committee whether he or any other em ployees of the Bureau ever objected to using these tactics Sullivan responded Not to my recollection I was not ready at that time to collide with him Everybody in the Division went right along with Hoover's policy I do not recall anybody ever raising a question never once did I hear anybody including myself raise the question is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful is it legal is it ethical or moral We never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning because we were just naturally pragmatists The one thing we were concerned about will this course of action work will it get us what we want will we reach the objective that we desire to reach As far as legality is concerned morals or ethics was never raised by myself or anybody else I think this suggests really in government we are amoral.228 On December 29 1963 less than a week after the FBI conference Time magazine chose Dr King as the "Man of the Year, describing him as the "unchallenged voice of the Negro people [who] has infused the Negroes themselves with the fiber that gives their revolu tion its true stature. 229Hoover wrote across the memorandum in forming him of this honor "They had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this one. 230 C William Sullivan proposes a plan to promote a new negro leader January 1964 On January 6 1964 about two weeks after the FBI's conference to plan methods of "neutralizing Dr King's influence and to gather information about D King's personal life the FBI installed the microphone in Dr King's room at the Willard Hotel As explained in the preceding chapter additional microphones soon followed Sullivan 11/1/75 p 97 7MJ Sullivan 11/1/75 p 85 'r Sullivan 11/1/75 p 87 'Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 92-93 " United Press International release 12/29/63 regarding 1/3/64 Time cover storyUPI release 12/29/63 136 physical and photographic surveillance was initiated special Headquarters "briefings were held "dry runs were planned and the most sophisticated and experienced Bureau personnel were deployed to gather information that might be used in a concerted effort to destroy Dr King's influence Two days after the installation of the Willard Hotel microphones Assistant Director William Sullivan proposed that the FBI select a new "national Negro leader as Dr King's successor In proposing the plan Sullivan stated It should be clear to all of us that Martin Luther King must at some propitious point in the future be revealed to the people of this country and to his Negro followers as being what he actually is a fraud demagogue and scoundrel When the true facts concerning his activities are presented such should be enough if handled properly to take him off his pedestal and to reduce him completely in influence When this is done and it can be and will be done obviously much confusion will reign particularly among the Negro people .. The Negroes will be left without a national leader of sufficiently compelling personality to steer them in the proper direction This is what could happen but need not happen if the right kind of a national Negro leader could at this time be gradually developed so as to overshadow Dr King and be in the position to assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people when King has been completely dis credited For some months I have been thinking about this matter One day I had an opportunity to explore this from a philo sophical and sociological standpoint with [an acquaintance] whom I have known for some years... I asked [him] to give the matter some attention and if he knew any Negro of outstanding intelligence and ability to let me know and we would have a discussion [He] has submitted to me the name of the above-captioned person Enclosed with this memoran dum is an outline of [the person's] biography which is truly remarkable for a man so young On scanning this biography it will 'be seen that [he] does have all the qualifications of the kind of a Negro I have in mind to advance to positions of na tional leadership.. If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way becoming directly involved I think it would be not only a great help to the FBI but would be a fine thing for the country at large While I am not specifying at this moment there are various ways in which the FBI could give this entire matter the proper direction and development There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be very helpful to further such a step These can be discussed in detail later when I have probed more fully into the possibilities 231 When Sullivan was shown this memorandum by the Committee he testified Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to AlanBelmont 1/8/64 137 I'm very proud of this memorandum one of the best mem oranda I ever wrote I think here I was showing some con cern for the country.232 Sullivan sought the Director's approval "to explore this whole mat ter in greater detail. The Director noted his own "o.k. and added I am glad to see that "light has finally though dismally delayed come to the Domestic Int Div I struggled for months to get over the fact that the communists were taking over the racial movement but our experts here couldn't or wouldn't see it.233 It is uncertain whether the FBI took steps to implement Sullivan's plan The FBI files contain no additional memoranda on the subject The successor for Dr King proposed in Sullivan's memorandum has told the Committee that he was never contacted by the FBI and that he was not aware of the FBI's plans for him or of any attempts by the FBI to promote him as a civil rights leader.234 D FBI Headquarters Orders the Field Offices To Intensify Efforts to Discredit Dr King April-August 1964 On April 1 1964 in response to a suggestion from the Atlanta field office for another conference in Washington to plan strategy against Dr King FBI Headquarters ordered the Atlanta and New York offices to give the matter of instant investigation a thorough analysis with a view toward suggesting new avenues of investigation and intensification in areas already being explored Bear in mind the main goals of this matter namely determining the extent of the communist influence in racial matters and taking such action as is appropriate to neutralize or completely dis credit the effectirness of Martin Luther King Jr. as a Negro leader... 235[Emphasis added.] Headquarters listed several areas "having potential for further inquiry possibilities of anonymous source contacts possibilities of uti lizing contacts in the news media field initiating discreet checks relative to developing background information on employees of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) remaining alert to the possibility of capitalizing on any disgruntled SCLC employee the possibility of de veloping information concerning any financial dealings of King which may be illegal and the development of sub versive information pertaining to SCLC employees.236 The Atlanta Office responded with several ideas for "how the ef fectiveness of King can be neutralized or discredited.23 ',Sullivan 11/1/75 p 149 Sullivan memorandum 1/8/64 Staffinterview 11/17/75 This note by Director Hoovershouldberead in light of his "feud with the Domestic Intelligence Division described pp 104 et seq x Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SACAtlanta 4/1/64 Director FBI memorandum 4/1/64 23Memorandumfrom SAC Atlanta to Headquarters 4/14/64 p 11 138 Determining whether a "rift was developing between Dr King and Roy Wilkins head of the NAACP and if so using newspapers friendly to the Bureau to "feed pertinent subversive connections and dealings of King to Wilkins. "Furnishing to friendly newspapers on an anonymous basis cer tain specific leads where he may develop the necessary data so that he may further write critical news stories. "Discreetly investigate the background of twelve key (SCLC) employees and associates in an effort to obtain some weakness that could be used for counter-intelligence activities. "Injection of false information with certain discontented (SCLC) employees. Sending letters to SCLC's financial donors written on SCLC sta tionery fabricated in the FBI laboratory and bearing Dr King's signa ture advising the donors that the IRS was checking SCLC's tax records "It is believed that such a letter of this type from 'SCLC may cause considerable concern and eliminate future contributions. Placing a pretext call to an SCLC creditor to impress him with the "financial plight of the SCLC so that he "may be incited into collection efforts. Examining Dr King's checking accounts and credit card accounts to develop information about his financial affairs Making a survey to determine whether to install a "trash cover of the SCLC officein Atlanta.'' The Atlanta office also assured the Bureau that it would continue to explore the possibility of technical coverage of an Atlanta apart ment frequently used by Dr King although coverage would involve several security problems. Shortly after these proposals were submitted the Director ex pressed "the Bureau's gratitude to the Atlanta agents for their "ag gressive imagination looking toward more and better ways of meeting the problems involved in the investigation. The New York office submitted only a few new suggestions assert ings that "It is felt that [our] coverage is adequate. 241To this the Director replied The Bureau cannot adjudge as adequate any coverage which does not positively provide to the Bureau 100 percent of the intelligence relating to the communist influence in racial mat SAC Atlanta memorandum 4/14/64 239The FBI overcame similar security problems in another city where hotel room coverage of Dr King was desired by supplying "lead information to newsmen "in order that they might determine if they could develop sufficient facts to causean exposeof King. 810Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 4/24/64 The Domestic Intelligence Division ultimately approved taking preliminary steps for possible anonymousmailings to the newsman and to install coverageon any new apart ments that King might lease The other suggestionswere rejected because they did "not appear desirable and/or feasible for direct action by the Bureau at this time. (Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 5/6/64.) 811Memorandumfrom SAC New York to Director FBI 4/14/64 p 2 Those suggestionsessentially included increasing coverageof the NewYork SCLCoffice and sending an anonymousletter to a disaffected SCLCemployee"to cause dis ruption in the New York office. The anonymousletter was ultimately mailed (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC New York 4/20/64.) 139 ters Obviously we are not securing all the information that is pertinent and needs to be secured Our coverage therefore is not deemed adequate.242 With respect to the New York office's conclusions about a civil rights leader and associate of Dr King who was also under close Bureau scrutiny for alleged "subversive ties the Director wrote The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the New York officethat [ ] is not sympathetic to the Party cause While there may not be any direct evidence that [ ] is a communist neither is there any substantial evi dence that he is anticonununist.243 Surprisingly the Bureau did not even comment on the statement of the New York office that Adviser A was "not now under CP dis cipline in the civil rights field. 244 In June 1964 a special unit was established in the Bureau's Internal Security Section to handle exclusively "the over-all problem of com munist penetration with the racial movement. 245The memorandum justifying the special unit pointed out that "urgency for the FBI to stay ahead of the situation is tied to pending civil rights legislation and foreseeable ramifications arising out of the complex political situ ations in an election year where civil rights and social disturbances will play a key role in campaign efforts and possible election results. 248 In August the Bureau issued new instructions directing the field "to broaden its efforts relating to communist influences in the racial field. 247The term "communist, the field was told "should be inter preted in its broadest sense as including persons not only adhering to the principles of the CPUS A itself but also to such splinter and off shoot groups as the Socialist Workers Party Progressive Labor and the like. 248The Director pointed out The news media of recent months mirror the civil rights issue as probably the number one domestic issue in the politi cal spectrum There are clear and unmistakable signs that we are in the midst of a social revolution with the racial move ment as its core The Bureau in meeting its responsibilities in this area is an integral part of this revolution ...2 The Special Unit that had been established in June was made a per manent unit 'Memorandum from Director FBI to SAC New York 4/24/64 usDirector FBI memorandum 4/24/64 p 2 SAC New York memorandum 4/14/64 A detailed comprehensive 163-page internal Headquarters working paper entitled "Communist Party USA Negro Question CommunistInfluencein Racial Matters, dated April 27 1964 includes 14 pages dealing solely with Adviser A but does not include the information received from New York just two weeks earlier that Adviser A "is not now under CP discipline in the civil rights field. 2'sUnsigned FBI Memorandum Addendumby Inspection Division 6/4/64 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 5/20/64 addendumby InspectionDivision p 1 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 8/25/64 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 8/28/64 p 6 Z' Director FBI memorandum 8/28/64 pp 1-2 69-9840 76 10 140 E Steps Taken by the FBI in 1964 to Discredit Dr King The FBI's program to "neutralize Martin Luther King as the leader of the civil rights movement went far beyond the planning and collec tion stage The Committee has discovered the following attempts by the FBI to discredit Dr King in 1964 Attempts to Discredit Dr King with the White House As set forth in the preceding chapter a memorandum summarizing the contents of the Willard Hotel tapes was shown to presidential assistant Walter Jenkins in January 1964 "inasmuch as King is seek ing an appointment with President Johnson. 250The summary of in formation obtained from surveillance at the Willard Honolulu and Los Angeles hotels was sent to the White House and to the Attorney General in March 1964 in order to "remove all doubt from the Attorney General's mind as to the type of person King is. 251A third memorandum derived from microphone surveillance was sent to the White House in July.252 Attempts to Discredit Dr King With the Congress In January 1964 Director Hoover gave off-the-record testimony before the House Appropriations Committee His precise comments are not known The briefing paper prepared for his appearance by the Domestic Intelligence Division however indicates that Director Hoover was prepared to represent to the Committee that Dr King's advisers were communists and that Dr King engaged in improper behavior.253 The Director's off-the-record briefing had an immediate impact The FBI was soon told that the members of the Committee were "very concerned regarding the background of Dr King and that some members of the Committee felt that the President should be requested to instruct the USIA to withdraw a film dealing favorably with the August 1963 March on Washington They were reported to be "par ticularly disturbed and irked at the fact that Martin Luther King appears to predominate the film. 254 In March 1964 Cartha DeLoach Assistant to the Director reported that he had been approached by Representative Howard Smith (D Va.) Chairman of the House Rules Committee According to De Loach's memorandum Representative Smith said that he had heard about the Director's remarks before the Appropriations Committee Congressman Smith was reported to have asked for information for a speech about Dr King on the floor of the House DeLoach declined to furnish the required information but recommended to the Director Sullivan memorandum 1/13/64 p 2 Baumgardner memorandum 3/4/64 'See Chapter IV 268Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 1/22/64 'GMemorandumfrom N P Callahan to John Mohr 1/31/64 Carl Rowan told a Committee staff member that shortly before his appoint ment as Director of USIA was announced he had been invited to the White House for a Sunday evening dinner with the President and Mrs Johnson to view the film about the March Rowan said that when the President asked him if he was going to distribute the film Rowan replied that if he could not "you have to and yourself a new Director. Rowan recalled that the President replied "That's good enough for me. Rowan recalled that after the film had been dis tributed he had been called aside by CongressmanRooney who repeated stories about Dr King that had been given to him by the Bureau Rowan stated that Rooneyhad specificallymentionedthe buggingof Dr King's suite at the Willard Hotel (StaffInterview of Carl T Rowan 8/29/75) 141 that Congressman Smith might be useful in the future because a speech by him about Dr King would be picked up by "newspapers all over the Nation. 255 In a television interview several years later Congressman Rooney stated Now you talk about the FBI leaking something about Mar tin Luther King I happen to know all about Martin Luther King but I have never told anybody INTERVIEWERHow do you know everything about Martin Luther King Representative ROONEY From the Federal Bureau of Investigation INTERVIEWERThey've told you gave you information based on tapes or other sources about Martin Luther King Representative ROONEYThey did INTERVIEWERIS that proper Representative RooNEV Why not 256 3 Attempts to Discredit Dr King with Universities In early March 1964 the Bureau learned that Marquette University in Milwaukee Wisconsin contemplated awarding Dr King an honor ary degree A memorandum noted It is shocking indeed that the possibility exists that King may receive an Honorary Degree from the same institution which honored the Director with such a degree in 1950. By making pertinent information available to fa University official] at this time on a strictly confidential basis we will be giving the University sufficient time to enable it to take postive action in a manner which might avoid embarrassment to the University.257 The university official was briefed by an FBI agent on Dr King's background and assured the Bureau that Dr King would not be considered for an honorary degree The result of this FBI project is unclear In April 1964 the FBI learned that Dr King had been offered an honorary degree by Springfield College DeLoach visited Senator Leverett Saltonstall who was a member of the board of the College in an effort to convince him to influence the College to withdraw its offer According to DeLoach Senator Saltonstall promised to speak with an official of the College The College official was reported to have subsequently visited DeLoach,258 but to have said that he would be unable to "uninvite Dr King because the information concerning $BMemorandumfrom Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr 3/16/64 p 2 Hoover wrote on DeLoach'smemorandum "Someoneon Senator [sic] Rooney'scommit tee certainly betrayed the secrecyof the off-the-recordtestimonyI gave re King I do not want anything on King given to Smith nor anyone else at this time. 'Interview with CongressmanRooney NBC News "First Tuesday, 6/1/71 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 3/4/64 The officerwho handled this assignment was given a letter of commendationby the Director and a monetary award "DeLoach had originally intended not to contact the Collegeofficialbecause of his "close association with (Sargent) Shriver. Senator Saltonstall however requested the Collegeofficialto confer with DeLoach 142 Dr King had to be held in confidence and the board of trustees was governed by "liberals. 259 Attempts to Discredit Dr King with Churches On June 12 1964 William Sullivan wrote a memorandum stating that he had been contacted by the General Secretary of the National Council of the Churches of Christ Sullivan reported that "I took the liberty of advising [him] confidentally of the fact that Dr Martin Luther King not only left a great deal to be desired from the stand point of Communism but also from the standpoint of personal con duct. Sullivan observed I think that we have sowed an idea here which may do some good I will follow up on the matter very discreetly to see what desirable results may emanate there from.990 Sullivan met again with the General Secretary in mid-December 1964 and reported that the General Secretary had assured him "steps have been taken by the National Council of the Churches of Christ to make certain from this time on that Martin Luther King will never get 'one single dollar of financial support from the National Council. Sullivan reported that the Secretary stated that he had discussed Dr King's background with some "key protestant clergymen who were "horrified. Sullivan also noted that the Secretary said that he also intended to discuss the matter with Roy Wilkins to persuade Wilkins "that Negro leaders should completely isolate King and remove him from the role he is now occupying in civil rights activities. 261 On December 8 1964 the Director authorized the disclosure of infor mation about Dr King's personal life to an influential member of the Baptist World Alliance (BWA) so that he could pass the informa tion along to the General Secretary of BWA and to BWA Program Committee members to prevent the Committee from inviting Dr King to address the BWA's 1965 Congress in Miami Beach The Director rejected a proposal however for "arranging for [certain BWA mem bers] to listen to sources we have concerning this matter. 262 Attempts to Discredit Dr King with the Pope On August 31 1964 the FBI learned that Dr King who was going to be touring Europe in September might have plans to visit the Pope Internal Security Section Chief Baumgardner observed It would be shocking indeed for such an unscrupulous character as King to receive an audience with the Pope It is believed that if a plan to see the Pope is in the making it ought to be nipped in the bud We have considered different possibilities for meeting this problem and believe that the best one would be to have Assistant Director Malone of the New York office personally contact Francis Cardinal Spell man and on a highly confidential basis bring to the Cardinal's attention the fact that King is to visit Rome.. "Memorandum from Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 4/8/64 DeLoachstated that he would "deny any such information had been furnished if the official told anyonethat the FBI had briefed him 'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 12/16/64 261Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to AlanBelmont 12/16/64 2 Memorandumfrom MiltonJonesto Cartha DeLoach 12/8/64 143 Malone should be able to impress upon the Cardinal the likely embarrassment that may result to the Pope should he grant King an audience and King is later discredited.263 On September 8 Baumgardner reported Malone called today and stated that he had discussed the situation with Cardinal Spellman over the weekend and he said that the Cardinal took instant steps to advise the Vatican against granting any audience to King Cardi nal Spellman is going to Rome next week and thus will be on the scene personally and further insure that the Pope is not placed in an embarrassing position through any contact with King.26 The FBI's efforts were to no avail The Pope met with Dr King The Director wrote across the memoranda informing him of that meeting "astounding, and "I am amazed that the Pope gave an audience to such a [excised by FBI].265 The Director then initiated inquiries into the reason for the failure of this project 6 The Attempt to Discredit Dr King During His Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize On October 14 1964 Martin Luther King was named to win the Nobel Peace Prize He received the prize in Europe on December 10 1965 The FBI took measures to dampen Dr King's welcome both in Europe and on his return home On November 22 1964 two weeks before Dr King's trip to receive the prize the Domestic Intelligence Division assembled a thirteen page updated printed version of the monograph which Attorney Gen eral Kennedy had ordered recalled in October 1963.266A copy was sent to Bill Moyers Special Assistant to the President on December 1 1964 with a letter requesting his advice concerning whether the monograph should also be distributed to "responsible officials in the Executive Branch. 267Moyers gave his permission on December 7,268and copies were distributed to the heads of several executive agencies.269 Information about Dr King's private life was also made available to United Nations representatives Adlai Stevenson and Ralph Bunche who the Bureau had learned were being considered as possible par "Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 8/31/64 F 1 The Chief of the Security Section recommended "If approved Assistant Director Maloneshould personally orally brief Francis Cardinal Spellman in accordance with the attached Top Secret summary [con taiiling information about Dr King's private life] This is the same summary we previously used in preventing King's receiving an honorary degree from Marquette University. (Baumgardner to Sullivan 8/31/64.) 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 9/8/64 Director's notes on UPI release 9/8/64 and New York Herald Tribune 9/19/64 "Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 11/22/64 Seepp 131 et seq 9 7Letter from J Edgar Hooverto Bill Moyers 12/1/64 9 aMemorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 12/7/64 "Copies were distributed to Acting Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach the Secretaries of State and Defense the Director of the CIA and the heads of the Military Intelligenceagencies as well as to USIA 144 ticipants at the December 1964 "welcome home reception for Dr King.27O Three days after Vice President-elect Humphrey participated in one of the "welcome home receptions for Dr King in New York the Bureau sent him a copy of the updated King monograph and a sep arate memorandum entitled "Martin Luther King Jr. His Personal Conduct. 272On December 8 1964 the Bureau decided to brief Gov ernor Nelson Rockefeller about Dr King's private life and alleged Communist associations apparently to dissuade the Governor from taking part in ceremonies commending Dr King for having received the Nobel Prize.2n Upon learning that Dr King might meet with a certain foreign leader FBI headquarters instructed the FBI representative in that country to brief the proper authorities about Dr King.274 The United States ambassadors in London and Oslo were briefed about Dr King because "the Ambassadors might consider entertaining King while he is in Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize and it might be possible to "forestall such action by the Ambassadors if they were briefed. The ambassadors in Stockholm and Copenhagen were also briefed because "King is also to visit those cities. 275 On November 10 1964 the FBI learned that the United States Information Agency was considering requesting Dr King to engage in a one-week lecture tour in Europe following his receipt of the Noble Prize Hoover approved the Domestic Intelligence Division's recom mendation that USIA be furnished with the latest critical Bureau reports about Dr King.276 7 Attempts to Block I)r King's Publication On September 11 1964 the FBI learned that Dr King intended to publish an article in a major national publication The Domestic Intel ligence Division noted that it did not know "what line King will take in the article or what its specific stands will be, but nonetheless rec ommended that "it would be well to prevent any publication of his views. 277 The task of preventing publication was assigned to an agent with contacts at the magazine who had "forestalled the publication of an article by Dr King in that magazine earlier in 1964.278 The agent subsequently reported that he had contacted an official of the magazine in late September According to the agent the official had agreed to "endeavor to assist the FBI and had been briefed about King but was unable to block publication because a contractual agreement had already been made.279The FBI did ap parently have some influence at the magazine however because a mem orandum reporting the incident concludes 270Untitled memorandum 11/12/64 275Letter from J Edgar Hooverto Hubert Humphrey 12/21/64 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 12/8/64 Cablefrom Director FBI to Legat 11/10/64 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 11/30/64 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 11/12/64 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 9/11/64 "Baumgardner memorandum 9/11/64 Memorandumto Cartha DeLoach 11/3/64 145 In connection with this [magazine] article by King our sources have indicated that since he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize he has attempted through some of his associates to change the [magazine] article in an effort to soften criti cism made by him against other civil rights groups and leaders King feared that such criticism would cause difficul ties in the civil rights movement The [magazine] however has resisted King's efforts to make these changes.2SV In February 1964 the Director alerted the field officesthat Dr King was writing a new book and noted that "it is entirely possible that with the publication of the book the Bureau may desire to take some action possibly in the counterintelligence area or otherwise which may be designed to discredit King or otherwise neutralize his effectiveness ... 281 The field offices were instructed to maintain information relating to the preparation and publication of the book The FBI files indicate that this information was collected but it is not clear whether it was ever used Attempt to Undermine the National Science Foundation's Cooperation with the SCLC The FBI sent the National Science Foundation (NSF) a copy of the second printed monograph on King in order to convince the NSF to remove the SCLC from "the NSF program to obtain qualified Negro students from southern schools. 282 9 Unsuccessful FBI Attempts to Locate Financial Improprie ties In early January 1964 the Chief of the Internal Security Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division Frederick J Baumgardner rec ommended that "examination of recent income tax returns of King might well reveal information which could assist the Bureau in its efforts to discredit King or neutralize his effectiveness. 283The In telligence Division subsequently acquired from the Internal Revenue Service copies of income tax returns for the prior five years of Dr King the SCLC and the Gandhi Society,2 an organization which the FBI stated "augmented the fund-raising activities of the SCLC.285 The Intelligence Division of the IRS told the Bureau that "IRS had very carefully scrutinized King's returns in the past but had not been able to establish a cause of action against him. 288How ever the IRS assured the FBI that Dr King's current returns would f0FBI memorandum 11/3/64 p 21 'Memorandum from Director FBI to Special Agent in Charge New York 2/18/64 "Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 12/17/64 p 2 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 1/8/64 Baumgardner observed that it was "essential that our current requests of the IRS be handled in a manner which would provide for optimum security so that neither King nor any other unauthorized individuals may becomeaware of the Bureau's interest and so that no embarrassment may cometo the Bureau. YeA wiretap had been placed on the Ghandi Societyin July 1963 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 3/25/64 'Memorandum from Daniel Brennan to William Sullivan 3/27/64 146 be scrutinized "very carefully to determine whether any violations ap pear. 287None did Undeterred the Director informed the field offices that "the Bureau believes that more than ever it would be most desirable to identify any bank where [King] may have an account and consider an audit of such account. 288 One effort to uncover derogatory information about Dr King was conceived by the Supervisor in charge of the King case during a golf game.289 A remote acquaintance of the Supervisor mentioned that he had heard from a friend that an acquaintance had said that Dr King had a numbered account in a foreign bank with a balance of over one million dollars The Supervisor suggested to Sullivan If we can prove that King is hoarding large sums of money we would have available possibly the best information to date which could be used to discredit him especially in the eyes of his own people ... we may take the action to discredit King ourselves through friendly news sources or the like or we might turn the information over to the Internal Revenue Service for possible criminal prosecution.290 The plan was approved by Director Hoover and an inquiry was initiated By December 1965 the investigation into a possible foreign bank account was described by the Director as "the most important presently pending facet of the King investigation.291 The investiga tion was dropped shortly afterward however when it developed that the initial source of the allegation informed the FBI that "it was merely a wild conclusion that had been previously drawn by someone whose identity he does not now recall. 292 F The Question of Whether Gorermnent Officials Outside of the FBI Were Aware of the FBI's Effort to Discredit Dr King There is no doubt that the responsible officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were aware of the FBI's COMINFIL in vestigation involving Dr King and the SCLC and that the wiretaps used by the FBI to collect its information were authorized under procedures existing at the time While there is some question con cerning whether officials outside of the FBI were aware that the FBI was using microphones to cover I)r King's activities there is no doubt that the product of the microphone surveillance was widely dis seminated within the executive branch Indeed dissemination of the printed "monograph about Dr King to several executive agencies was expressly approved by Bill Moyers President Johnson's assistant in January 1965 Brennan memorandum 3/27/64 On the bottomof this memorandum Hoover wrote "What a farce ! SB8Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Special Agent in Charge New York 5/21/64 "DIt should be noted that the Supervisor in charge of the King case is still in a high positionwith the FBI and handled the committee'sdocumentsrequests in the King case investigation 2 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 6/29/65 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to SpecialAgent in Charge New Orleans 12/3/65 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 12/10/65 147 The Committee has been unable to determine the extent to which the FBI's effort to discredit I)r King and the SCLC by disseminating unfavorable information outside of the Government was suspected or known about by Government officials responsible for supervising the FBI The Committee requested the FBI to provide any informa tion in its possession reflecting that any Presidents or Attorneys General during the relevant periods were aware of any FBI efforts to "discredit or "neutralize Dr King The Bureau replied A review of the King file in response to other items in cluded in the request and a polling of all Headquarters per sonnel involved in that and previous reviews did not result in the location or recollection of any information in FBIHQ files to indicate any of the aforementioned individuals were specifically aware of any efforts steps or plans or proposals to "discredit or "neutralize King It is of course evident that much information developed in the course of the King case involving him in activities of interest to the White House and to representatives of the Department of Justice including Attorneys General Kennedy and Katzenbach as well as Assistant Attorney General Marshall was such that it could conceivably have been the opinion of one or more of the above individuals that such information was being provided to "discredit or "neutralize King.293 Nicholas Katzenbach Burke Marshall Walter Jenkins and Bill Moyers have told the Committee that they did not realize that the FBI was engaged in a concerted effort to discredit Dr King and that to the best of their knowledge Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson as well as Attorney General Robert Kennedy were not aware of that effort There was no evidence that the FBI's program to dis credit Dr King was authorized outside of the FBI There is evidence however that officials responsible for supervising the FBI received indications that such an effort to discredit Dr King might be taking place and failed to take adequate steps to prevent it President John son and his Attorneys General were aware at least of Bureau attempts to disseminate unfavorable reports about Dr King to the press Top Executive Branch officials have told the Committee that they had believed that the FBI had tape recordings embarrassing to Dr King and that the FBI had offered to play those tapes both to a government official and to reporters The evidence reveals a disturbing attitude of unconcern by responsible officials and a failure on their part to make appropriate corrective measures As Nicholas Katzenbach explained to the Committee Nobody in the Department of Justice connected with Civil Rights could possibly have been unaware of Mr Hoover's feelings (against Dr King) Nobody could have been un aware of the potential for disaster which those feelings em bodied But given the realities of the situation I do not Letter from FBI to the Senate SelectCommittee 11/6/75 148 believe one could have anticipated the extremes to which it was apparently carried."g The following incidents have played a part in our determination that high officials of the Executive Branch must share responsibility for the FBI's effort against Dr King As described in the previous chapter a summary memorandum containing information gathered from the FBI microphone placed in Dr King's room in the Willard hotel was shown to Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins by Cartha DeLoach on January 14 1964 According to DeLoach's contemporaneous account of that meeting Jenkins was of the opinion that the FBI could perform a good service to the country if this matter could somehow be confidentially given to members of the press I told him the Director had this in mind however also believed we should obtain additional information prior to discussing it with cer tain friends.295 DeLoach testified that he could not recall the meeting with Jenkins but that the memorandum should accurately reflect his conversation. Jenkins told the Committee staff in an unsworn interview that he did not recall the meeting described in DeLoach's memorandum but that he had no reason to doubt that he had read the summary memoran dum which DeLoach claims Jenkins saw Jenkins expressly denied however that he had suggested that the information in the summary memorandum should be "leaked to the press or that either he or President Johnson had ever suggested that information about Dr King should be "leaked to anyone He added however that he might have used words to the effect that "this is something people should know about" referring to people in the Government which could have been misinterpreted by DeLoach He did not recall DeLoach telling him that the Director ultimately planned to leak this informa tion to "certain friends. "7 A February 5 1964 FBI memorandum reports a conversation between Edwin Guthman the Justice Department's press secretary and John Mohr of the Domestic Intelligence Division According to Mohr's memorandum Guthman told Mohr that he had heard that a reporter was preparing an article about Dr King's alleged Com munist affiliations Guthman stated he was quite concerned inasmuch as it appeared there had been a leak from the FBI in connection with this matter He told me the Attorney General had been most hopeful that there would be no "leaks concerning King From the tone of Guthman's entire remarks it would ap pear he had two thoughts in mind without actually stating such thoughts These thoughts were (1) that the Attorney 'B' Hearings Vol 6 p 209 'Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to J Edgar Hoover 1/14/64 This memorandumis alsodiscussedpp 121-122 39 Cartha DeLoachtestimony 11/25/75 p 150 Staff summary Walter Jenkins interview 12/1/75 pp 1-2 Jenkins said that he was physically unable to undergo the strain of a sworn and transcribed session 149 General is most anxious that information concerning King not be released and (2) that the Attorney General's connec tions with King and his defensive statements concerning King to Congress in Civil Rights hearings would certainly injure the Attorney General's political chances for the future (H)e told me once again the Attorney General was not worried about what an exposure of King could do to him He stated he and the Attorney General are only trying to protect FBI sources of information.298 The memorandum states that Guthman was told "there had been no leaks from the FBI concerning Dr Martin Luther King, and that Guthman had responded that "he had no proof whatsoever that the FBI had furnished information to the newspapers concerning King. Guthman testified that he recalled the Justice Department had "sus pected that the information had been leaked by the FBI. When asked the basis for that suspicion he said that "we felt that the question of King and the association with [Advisers A] was a matter which was rather tightly held since it was not something of general knowl edge. 299Guthman said that he could "not specifically recall a reac tion by Attorney General Kennedy to this "leak except to be somewhat displeased over it But that was in a sense all in a day's work and I don't recall anything specific.300 Guthman testified that he did not recall any further efforts to deter mine whether the FBI had in fact leaked the story.30 Guthman testified that DeLoach's memorandum "distorted his remarks Guthman said that his visit had been motivated not by con cerns about Kennedy's political future but rather by a concern to pro tect FBI sources.301gA memorandum dated February 5 1964 by Guth man does not mention a meeting with Mohr but does contain an account of a meeting between Guthman and Cartha DeLoach on the previous day We both agreed that it was inevitable that King's connec tions with (Adviser A) would ultimately become public I told DeLoach that our concern was over the FBI's source and that we had no other concern as to what the Attorney Gen eral had said or what our actions had been in connection with Martin Luther King DeLoach said he thought we should be concerned in view of what the Attorney General had said on the subject I pointed out that anything the Attorney General had said had been cleared with the FBI I told Deke that our record in this mat ter could stand any scrutiny and that both Senator Russell "Memorandum from John Mohr to Cartha DeLoach 2/5/64 Hoover wrote next to the last paragraph quoted above "There has never been such solicitude in the past. R Edwin Guthman testimony 3/16/76 p 13 H0Guthman 3/16/76 p 12 '01Guthman 3/16/76 p 20 " Guthman 3/16/76 p 22 150 and Senator Monroney had been fully apprised of the facts last summer or last fall.302 A memorandum by Courtney Evans later that day reports that Evans discussed this matter with Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall who said that he did not intend to tell the reporter anything about Dr King but that "if he developed anything at all with regard to [the reporter's] source of information he would pass this along to us . Evans memorandum also notes "According to information developed by our Atlanta officeon February 4 1964 [the reporter] had in his possession what appeared to 'be a blind memorandum containing information as to [Adviser A's alleged connections with the Commu nist Party]. 303 A memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Director Hoover dated February 18 1964 apparently alludes to this incident and provides some insight into the political implications of the FBI's investigation of Dr King According to DeLoach's memorandum Walter Jenkins and Bill Moyers of the White House told him that Burke Marshall had called and "indicated that the Attorney General had thought it highly advisable for the President to see the Department of Justice file on Martin Luther King to make certain that the President knew all about King. 304 The memorandum states that Marshall then told Moyers that he wanted to give the White House a little warning He stated that he personally knew that the FBI had leaked information concerning Martin Luther King to a newspaper reporter Marshall told Moyers that he thought the White House should know this inasmuch as information concerning King would undoubtedly be coming out before the public in the near future Director Hoover wrote next to this entry "Marshall is a liar. 3 5 The memorandum reports that Jenkins told DeLoach that he thought the Attorney General was concerned with "being on record with the President with the fact that although he has for political purposes defended King he wants the President to realize that he the Attorney General is well aware of King's Communistic back ground. 308 The Director's handwritten note states "Katzenbach did his dirt against us before Warren Commission and now Marshall is trying to poison the W (hite) H (ouse) about FBI. 307 Neither Burke Marshall nor Bill Moyers recalled the events de scribed in DeLoach's memorandum Marshall testified however about an incident involving the FBI's leaking information to a reporter that may well have been the same incident Marshall recalled that sometime in 1964 a reporter told him that the Atlanta office of the FBI had given him information unfavorable to Dr King Marshall said that he phoned the Bureau official with whom he normally con 8DIMemorandumEdwin Guthman 2/5/64 807Memorandumfrom CourtneyEvans to AlanBelmont 2/5/64 80Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto J Edgar Hoover 2/18/64 7a6DeLoachmemorandum 2/18/64 90 DeLoachmemorandum 2/18/64 8UT DeLoachmemorandum 2/18/64 151 ducted business and said "I'm informed by a reporter that your people in Atlanta have given this information about Martin Luther King and that I think it is outrageous. The official at first said "I don't believe it, but promised to inquire further He later called and said "The Director wants you to know that you're a damned liar. Marshall told the Committee "It was very difficult with the Bureau because if you said that they were leaking derogatory information they would say 'no we're not. 3 3 (3) Bill Moyers President Johnson's assistant testified that some time during the "hurley-burley disorganized period shortly after President Kennedy's assassination and prior to President Johnson's state of the Union address he heard laughter inside Walter Jenkins office Moyers inquired and was told by a secretary that an FBI agent had come to the office and offered to play for Jenkins a tape recording which would have been personally embarrassing to Dr King Jenkins refused to listen to the tape A week later the same FBI agent again came to the White House and offered to play the tape for Jenkins and again Jenkins refused to listen to it.309 Jenkins told the Committee that he did not recall ever having been offered tapes by the FBI and did not know of anyone on the White House staff who had been.31 In addition to this incident Moyers testified that he had been generally aware that the FBI reports about Dr King included infor mation of a personal nature unrelated to the purpose of the FBI's in vestigation When asked if he had ever asked the FBI why it was dis seminating this type of material to the White House Moyers re sponded I don't remember I just assumed it was related to a fallout of the investigations concerning the communist allegations which is what the President was concerned about Question Did you ever question the propriety of the FBI's disseminating that type of information Answer I never questioned it no I thought it was spurious and irrelevant If they were looking for other alleged com munist efforts to embarrass King and the President which is what the President thought Kennedy or Johnson it would just seem natural that other irrelevant and spurious infor mation would come along with that investigation Question And you found nothing improper about the FBI's sending that information along also Answer Unnecessary Improper at that time no Question Do you recall anyone in the White House ever questioning the propriety of the FBI's disseminating this type of material Answer I think there were comments that tended to ridicule the FBI's doing this but no.311 Moyers testified that he had not suspected that the FBI was cov ering Dr King's activities with microphones although he con '0BBurke Marshall testimony 3/3/76 pp 46-47 "Bill Moyers testimony 3/2/76 p 19 staff summary of Bill Moyers Inter view 11/24/75 010Jenkins (staff summary) 12/1/75 p 4 ffi1Moyers 3/2/76 p 17 152 ceded "I subsequently realized I should have assumed that The nature of the general references that were being made I realized later could only have come from that kind of knowledge unless there was an informer in Martin Luther King's presence a good bit of the time. 312 (4) According to Nicholas Katzenbach on November 25 1964 the Washington Bureau Chief of a national news publication told him that one of his reporters had been approached by the FBI and given an opportunity to listen to some "interesting tapes involving Dr King.313 Katzenbach told the Committee I was shocked by this revelation and felt that the Presi dent should be advised immediately On November 28 I flew with Mr Burke Marshall the retiring head of the Civil Rights Division to the LBJ Ranch On that occasion he and I informed the President of our conversation with the news editor and expressed in very strong terms our view that this was shocking conduct and po litically extremely dangerous to the Presidency I told the President my view that it should be stopped immediately and that he should personally contact Mr Hoover I received the impression that President Johnson took the matter very seri ously and that he would do as I recommended On the following Monday I was informed by at least one other reporter and perhaps two of similar offers made to them the prior week I spoke to the Bureau official who had been identified as having made the offer and asked him about it He flatly denied that any such offer had been made or that the FBI would engage in any such activity Thereupon I asked at least one of the reporters perhaps all of them whether they would join me in confronting the Bureau on this issue They declined to do so I do not know whether President Johnson discussed this matter with Mr Hoover or what if anything was said How ever I was quite confident that that particular activity ceased at that time and I attributed it to Mr Johnson's inter vention From that time until I left the Justice Department I never heard from any person of subsequent similar activity by the Bureau and I assumed it had ceased I should add only this I believed that the tapes in question were not tapes re sulting from Bureau surveillance but tapes acquired from State law enforcement authorities and that such a representa tion was made to the reporter at the time." Katzenbach testified that Cartha DeLoach was the Bureau official whom the reporters had identified as having offered the tapes Katzen bach said that he had contacted DeLoach on his own volition and that he did not tell DeLoach that he had discussed the matter with the President He said that when he asked DeLoach if the Bureau had ~L2Moyers 3/2/76 p 17 al Thetwo newsmenturned downthe Bureau's offer NicholasKatzenbachtestimony 12/3/73 Hearings Vol 6 p 210 153 been offering to play tape recordings concerning Dr King to report ers DeLoach "told me rather angrily they were not. 315 Burke Marshall when questioned by the Committee about these events testified that the same two reporters had also informed him that Director Hoover was offering to play tape recordings of Dr King He testified that he had assumed the reporters were telling the truth that these tape recordings existed and that they were being leaked by the FBI. 316He testified that he had not suspected that the FBI had produced the tapes itself from microphone coverage but that he had assumed the FBI had acquired the tape recordings from Southern law enforcement agencies It did not occur to me that the FBI would go around placing microphones in Dr King's hotel The notion that they would plant the microphone that they had a whole system of surveillance of that sort involving illegal entry and trespass and things like that did not occur to me I would not have put it past the local police but I considered at the time except for Mr Hoover himself that the Bureau was a tightly con trolled well-run efficient law abiding law enforcement agency that it didn't do things like that and therefore it didn't occur to me that they had done it.317 Marshall recalled that he and Katzenbach had flown to President Johnson's ranch in Texas and had told the President that the FBI was offering the tape recordings to reporters Marshall said that the Presi dent was "shocked, and that the "conversation was in the context of it being very important and a very nasty piece of business that had to be stopped. Marshall did not know however what action the President subsequently took if any and could not remember whether the President had voiced an intention to take any specific action.318 DeLoach when asked if he had ever discussed the contents of tape recordings or surveillances of Dr King with members of the press testified "I don't recall any such conversations. 318DeLoach did state however that he had known about the tape recordings of I)r King He testified that one such tape recording had been in his officeon one occasion and that "it was so garbled and so terrible I mean from the standpoint of fidelity that I told them to knock it off and take it back. 320 The only record of this episode in the FBI files is a memorandum by DeLoach dated December 1 1964 stating in part Bill Moyers while I was at the White House today advised that word had gotten to the President this afternoon that [the newsman] was telling all over town that the FBI had told him that Martin Luther King was [excised] [The newsman] according to Moyers had stated to several people NicholasKatzenbachtestimony 11/12/75 pp 97-98 StBMarshall testimony 3/3/76 p 39 "7Marshall testimony 3/3/76 p 43 "NMarshall testimony 3/3/76 p 43 DeLoachtestimony 11/25/75 p 156 DeLoachtestimony 11/25/76 p 188 154 that "If the FBI will do this to Martin Luther King they will undoubtedly do it to anyone for personal reasons. Moyers stated the President wanted to get this word to us so we would know not to trust [the newsman] Moyers also stated that the President felt that [the newsman] lacked in tegrity and was certainly no lover of the Johnson administra tion or the FBI I told Moyers this was certainly obvious.321 DeLoach testified that he could not recall the events surrounding this memorandum Bill Moyers after reviewing DeLoach's memo randum testified that he recalled nothing about the incident involving the newsman or about Katzenbach's and Marshall's discussion with the President He did not recall ever having heard that the Bureau had offered to play tape recordings of I)r King to reporters or ever having discussed the matter with DeLoach He testified however that DeLoach's memorandum sounds very plausible I'm sure the President called me or he told me to tell him whatever [DeLoach's document reflects] Question I)id the President tell you that he understood that [the newsman] was saying all over town that the Bureau had been offering tapes Answer I can't remember the details of that You know I can't tell you the number of times the President was sounding off at [the newsman].322 When asked if it would be fair to conclude that the President had com plained to Moyers about the newsman's revealing that the Bureau had offered to play tapes rather than about the fact that the Bureau had such tapes and had offered to play them Movers replied "It would be fair to conclude that I don't recall if that was exactly the way the President said it. 323 VI TILEHOOVER-KINGCONTROVERSY BECOMESPUBLICAND A TRUCEIS CALLEDAPRIL DECEMBER1964 Summary Director Hoover's dislike for I)r King which had been known with in the Bureau since early 1962,324became a matter of public record in November 1964 when Director Hoover described Dr King at a meet ing with women reporters as the "most notorious liar in the country I)r King responded that the Director was obviously "faltering under the responsibilities of his office The FBI immediately intensified its secret campaign against Dr King offering to play the tapes from microphone surveillance of Dr King to reporters and to leak stories concerning him to the press The FBI also sent a tape recording made from the microphone surveillance to Dr King with a warning which Dr King and his close associates interpreted as an invitation to suicide The public aspects of the dispute peaked in December 1964 shortly before Dr King went to Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize Dr 12Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 12/1/64 322Bill Moyerstestimony 3/2/76 p S az3Moyerstestimony 3/2/76 p 9 324As early as February 1962 the Director had informed the DomesticIntelli genceDivision "Kingis nogoodanyway. 155 King publicly announced that it was time for the controversy to end and arranged a meeting with Director Hoover to seal a truce The FBI's public criticism stopped but the Bureau's secret campaign to discredit Dr King continued Believing that Dr King's downfall would severely harm the entire movement for racial equality several prominent civil rights figures met with FBI officials to voice their con cern and seek assurances from the FBI that the attacks on Dr King would stop A First Steps in the Public Controversy April-November 1964 Although the FBI had been covertly engaged in a massive campaign to discredit Dr King for several months the fact that the FBI was the source of allegations about communist influence in the civil rights movement did not become public until the release of Director Hoover's off-the-record testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in April 1964 The Director was quoted in the press as having testi fied that Communist influence does exist in the Negro movement and can influence large masses of people. 325Dr King immediately issued a forceful reply It is very unfortunate that Mr J Edgar Hoover in his claims of alleged communist infiltration in the civil rights movement has allowed himself to aid and abet the salacious claims of southern racists and the extreme right-wing elements We challenge all who raise the "red issue whether they be newspaper columnists or the head of the FBI himself to come forward and provide real evidence which contradicts this stand of the SCLC We are confident that this cannot be done We affirm that SCLC is unalterably opposed to the mis guided philosophy of communist It is difficult to accept the word of the FBI on commu nist infiltration in the civil rights movement when they have been so completely ineffectual in resolving the continued may hem and brutality inflicted upon the Negro in the deep south It would be encouraging to us if Mr Hoover and the FBI would be as diligent in apprehending those responsible for bombing churches and killing little children as they are in seeking out alleged communist infiltration in the civil rights movement.326 In early May 1964 Director Hoover made the following response to a question from United Presss International concerning whether any 8'6NewYorkTimes 4/22/64 p 30 840FBI transcription of Dr King's statement to press Memorandumfrom Wil liam Sullivan to Alan Belmont 4/23/64 Another FBI memorandumwhich dealt with Dr King's statement indicated the Bureau's opinion that someone"high in the Administrationnot knownto us apparently agreed with Dr King's press release. Sullivan's report about Dr King's statement pointed out that "King quoted the AG against the Director to the effect that it is to be expected that communist will try to infiltrate civil rights movements but they had not suc ceeded in making the expected impact. (Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to AlanBelmont 4/23/64 ) 69-9840 76 11 156 communists were in positions of leadership in the civil rights movement Let me first emphasize that I realize the vast majority of Negroes have rejected and recognize communism for what it is The existence and importance of the communist influence in the Negro movement should not be ignored or minimized nor should it be exaggerated The Communist Party will use its forces either in the open forum of public opinion or through its sympathizers who do not wear the badge of com munism but who spout some of the same ideas carried in the Communist Party line This is the influence which is capable of moving large masses of loyal and dedicated citizens toward communist objectives while being lured away from the true issues involved It is up to the civil rights organizations them selves to recognize this and face up to it.327 On May 11 Dr King appeared on the news program "Face the Nation. He denied communists had infiltrated decision-making posi tions in the civil rights movement or the SCLC and remarked that it was "unfortunate that "such a great man as Director Hoover had made allegations to that effect Dr King added that the Director should more appropriately have remarked on how surprising it was that so few Negroes had turned to communism in light of the treatment they had received Dr King said that the Justice Department had warned him of only one suspected communist in the SCLC and that he had fired that individual.328 The feud between Director Hoover and Dr King heightened on No vember 18 1964 with the Direector's public allegation that Dr King was the "most notorious liar in the country Director Hoover made that comment during a meeting with women reporters in the context of explaining how FBI agents were assigned in civil rights cases According to a memorandum of the meeting written by DeLoach [The Director] stated it was a common belief in some circles that Special Agents in the South were all without exception southern born agents As a matter of fact 70% of the agents currently assigned to the South were born in the North He stated that the "notorious Martin Luther King had at tempted to capitalize on this matter by claiming that all agents assigned to the Albany Georgia Resident Agency were southern born agents As a matter of fact 4 out of 5 of 'Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Edwin Guthman 5/14/64 p 4 Director Hoover's answer was initially submitted to Guthman the Attorney General's SpecialAssistant for Public Information Guthman strongly objectedto the answer becauseit "put communistinfluencein the civil rights movementout of perspective. He then had a lengthy conferencewith DeLoaah and the answer quoted above was agreed upon (Memorandumfrom Edwin Guthman to Cartha DeLoach 5/12/64 DeLoach memorandum 5/14/64.) Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 5/11/64 The Headquarters agent who reported on the televisionprogram added the com ment "King's obviousreference was to the removal of (Adviser B) from the SOLO Asexpected King lied about beingwarned of anyone else because he had beenwarned about (Adviser A) and has nevertheless maintained a closeassocia tion with (AdviserA). (Baumgardner memorandum 5/11/64.) 157 the agents assigned to the Albany Georgia Resident Agency were northern born The Director stated he had instructed me to get in touch with Reverend King and line up an ap pointment so that King could be given the true facts He stated that King had refused to give me an appointment and therefore he considered King to be the most "notorious liar in the country.329 When the reporters asked Director Hoover for more details about Dr King he stated off the record "He is one of the lowest characters in the country. There was an immediate inquiry as to whether he could be quoted on the original statement that Martin Luther King was a liar and he stated "Yes that is public record. 330 Nicholas Katzenbach who was then Acting Attorney General testi fied that he talked with Director Hoover about that press conference and [Hoover] told me that it was not his practice to have press conferences had not done so in the past and would not do so again in the future Perhaps the depth of his feeling with respect to Dr King was revealed to me by his statement that he did not understand all the publicity which the remark had attracted because he had been asked a simple question and given a simple truthful answer.331 Some of Dr King's advisers drafted a strong response one of which would have "blown Hoover out of the water calling him every name in the book. 332Before they had an opportunity to release the state ment Dr King who was then in Bimini issued the following public reply I cannot conceive of Mr Hoover making a statement like this without being under extreme pressure He has apparently fal tered under the awesome burden complexities and responsi bilities of his office. Dr King also sent a telegram to Director Hoover which was made public stating I was appalled and surprised at your reported statement maligning my integrity What motivated such an irresponsi ble accusation is a mystery to me 3DMemorandumfrom Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr 11/18/64 p 6 'DeLoach memorandum 11/18/64 p 10 DeLoach told the Committeeabout the incident "I passed Mr Hoovera note and told him that if he really felt that way he should keep it off the record He paid no attention to that note I passed him a secondnote and made the same statement and he paid no attention to that and on the third occasionthat I passed him a note he said out loud to the women that DeLoachtells me I should keep these statements concerning King off the record but that's none of his business I made it for the record and you can use it for the record. (Cartha DeLoach testimony 11/25/75 p 169 See also DeLoachtestimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 173.) Katzenbachtestimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 210 Harry Wachteltestimony 2/27/76 p 42 NewYork Times 11/20/64 p 18 158 I have sincerely questioned the effectiveness of the F.B.I in racial incidents particularly where bombings and brutalities against Negroes are at issue I will be happy to discuss this question with you at length in the near future Although your statement said you have at tempted to meet with me I have sought in vain for any record of such a request.'3a Dr King also criticized Director Hoover in a press interview on the same day for "following the path of appeasement of political powers in the South. 335 The Domestic Intelligence Division prepared an analysis of the allegations in Dr King's telegram emphasizing the events two years earlier which the FBI had interpreted as a refusal by Dr King to be interviewed.336 Sullivan recommended against replying to Dr King's charges or meeting with Dr King The Director penned his agreement on Sullivan's memorandum O.K But I can't understand why we are unable to get the true facts before the public We can't even get our accomplish ments published We are never taking the aggressive but above lies remain unanswered. The following day the FBI mailed a tape recording from the Wil lard Hotel microphone surveillance to Dr King accompanied by a letter which Dr King and his associates interpreted as an invitation to suicide B Tapes Are Mailed to King November 21 1964 Sometime in mid-November 1961 a decision was made at FBI Head quarters to mail a tape recording made during microphone surveillance of Dr King to the SCLC office in Atlanta William Sullivan who was responsible for the proiect testified that he first learned of the plan when Alan Belmont Assistant to the Director told him that Director Hoover wanted one of the King tapes mailed to Coretta King to precipitate their separation thereby diminishing Dr King's stature Belmont told Sullivan that the FBI laboratory would "sterilize the tape to prevent its being traced to the Bureau. Sullivan was to have the tape mailed from a southern state. Sullivan told the Committee that he had opposed the plan because it would warn Dr King that his activities were being covered by micro phones According to Sullivan Belmont agreed that the plan was unwise but said that he had no power to stop it because the orders had come from Hoover and Tolson. 834NewYorkTimes 11/20/64 p 18 836NewYorkTimes 11/20/64 p 18 886That incidentis describedat pp 89-91 3f7Memorandumfrom Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont 11/20/64 p 4 Director Hoover remarked on another memorandum "I have no intention of seeingKing I gavehim that opportunityonceand he ignoredit. 888William Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 pp 104-105 The Willard Hotel tape was called in from the Washington field officeon November 19 1964 The de cision at Headquarters would have been made sometimeearlier probably as a result of the "notoriousliar controversy &78 Sullivan 11/1/75 p 105 159 The FBI technician who prepared the tape told the Committee that he had been ordered to produce a "composite tape from coverage of hotel rooms in Washington D.C. San Francisco and Los Angeles After the tape was completed a copy was left with Sullivan.34o Sullivan testified that he ordered a "tight-lipped reliable agent to fly to Tampa Florida to mail a package to Coretta King He did not tell the agent that the package contained the King tape.341The agent testified that he flew to Miami and then called Sullivan who in structed him to address the package to Martin Luther King Jr The agent said that he mailed the package from a post office near the Miami airport.342 A travel voucher provided to the Committee by the FBI indicates that the agent flew to Miami on November 21 1964 Congressman Andrew Young who was then Dr King's assistant recalled that the tape arrived at the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta sometime before December 1964 Congressman Young said that the office personnel assumed the tape contained another of Dr King's speeches it was stored for a while and later sent to Dr King's home along with several other tapes.343 Dr King Congressman Young and some others listened to the tape sometime after Dr King had returned from receiving the Nobel Peace Prize probably in January 1965 Con gressman Young testified that he probably destroyed the tape several years later Congressman Young recalled that the tape was of "very poor qual ity very garbled, but that at least part of it appeared to have been made during a conversation between Dr King and other civil rights leaders at the Willard Hotel He testified that none of the comments on the tape related to the commission of a crime or to "affection for communism "It was personal conversation among friends. 344 According to Congressman Young a letter had accompanied the tape stating that the tape would be released in 34 days and threatening "there is only one thing you can do to prevent this from happening. Congressman Young said that when he and Dr King read the letter "we assumed that the letter and the tape had been mailed 34 days before the receipt of the Nobel Prize and that this was a threat to expose Martin just before he received the Nobel Prize. Congressman Young testified I think that the disturbing thing to Martin was that he felt somebody was trying to get him to commit suicide and because it was a tape of a meeting in Washington and the postmark was from Florida we assumed nobody had the capacity to do that other than the Federal Bureau of Inves tigation 346 30Staff summary of [FBI Technician] interview 7/25/75 p 5 The tape which was ultimately sent to Dr King however may have consisted of the Willard coverage '41Sullivan 11/1/75 p 106 84tStaff summary of [FBI Agent] interview 4/23/75 The agent recalled that the package which was marked "fragile, did not have a return address Sulli van rememberedthat the agent had commentedthat he had had trouble mailing the package because it had no return address but that he had "talked his way around it. (Sullivan 11/1/75 p 109.) " Andrew Youngtestimony 2/19/76 pp 6-9 Youngrecalled that the package containing the tape had a Florida postmark "4Young 2/19/76 p 7 Young 2/19/76 p 8 160 Both Young and Ralph Abernathy who also heard the tape and read the letter interpreted it as inviting Dr King to take his own life.346 'William Sullivan testified that he could not recall such a letter 347 The FBI provided the Committee with a copy of a letter which was found in Sullivan's office files following his discharge in 1971348The letter stated in part King look into your heart You know you are a complete fraud and a greater liability to all of us Negroes White people in this country have enough frauds of their own but I am sure they don't have one at this time that is any where near your equal You are no clergyman and you know it I repeat that you are a colossal fraud and an evil vicious one at that . King like all frauds your end is approaching You could have been our greatest leader But you are done Your "honorary degrees your Nobel Prize (what a grim farce) and other awards will not save you King I repeat you are done. The American public the church organizations that have been helping Protestants Catholics and Jews will know you for what you are an evil beast So will others who have backed you You are done King there is only one thing left for you to do You know what it is You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been selected for a specific reason it has definite practical significance) You are done There is but one way out for you You better take it before your filthy fraudulent self is bared to the nation Andrew Young stated that the last paragraph of this letter was identical with the letter that had been sent to the SCLC headquarters but that the other portions of the letter appeared to be an earlier draft of the letter that he had seen.349Sullivan testified that he did not re call ever having seen the document although it was "possible that he had something to do with it and simply cannot remember.350 Sullivan also testified that he could not recall any conversations at the FBI con cerning the possibility of Dr King's committing suicide After read ing the last paragraph of the letter he conceded that it could be inter preted as an invitation to suicide although so far as Sullivan knew "8Young 2/19/76 p 8 staff summary of Ralph Abernathy interview 11/19/ 75 p 3 S47Sullivan 11/1/75 p 112 348The Bureau said it could not find a copyin any of its other files 'The letter given to the Committeeby the FBI was single spaced Andrew Youngtestified that Dr King had received "a double spaced letter and it was about a page and a half It was typed in a very old typewriter very bad typing. He was certain however that the last paragraph of the two letters were nearly identical The one sent to Dr King "was simplified and has shorter simpler sentences but essentially said the same thing especially the part about there's only one thing left for you to do I remember that vividly. (Young 2/19/76 p.36) B60Sullivan 11/1/75 p 112 Sullivan suggested that the letter might have been"planted in his files 161 the FBI's goal was simply to convince Dr King to resign from the SCLC not to kill himself.351 When asked by the Committee what had ultimately happened to the letter received by Reverend King Andrew Young testified I'm not really sure about this now but I think we discussed something about a letter with DeLoach I'm not certain whether it was DeLoach or the local FBI agents and they said they would be glad to look into it They said whenever we got any of these kind of threatening letters to send them to them and they would be glad to investigate That letter may have been sent back to DeLoach.35 C Attempts by the FBI to "Leak to Reporters Tape Recordings Embarrassing to Dr King After Director Hoover denounced Dr King as a "notorious liar in mid-November the FBI apparently made several attempts to "leak tape recordings concerning Dr King to newsmen One offer involving the Bureau Chief of a national news publication has been discussed at length in the preceding chapter.353 David Kraslow another reporter has told a Committee staff member that one of his "better sources at the Bureau offered him a transcript of a tape recording about Dr King Kraslow said that his source read him a portion of the transcript on the phone and claimed that it came from a "bug operated by a Southern police agency Kraslow said that he declined the offer.354 It is not known how many other reporters were approached by the FBI during that period Nicholas Katzenbach testified that at least one other reporter had informed him of a similar Bureau offer,355and other witnesses such as James Farmer have mentioned additional "leaks from the Bureau.356 961One FBI witness testified that he interpreted the "34 days to refer to Christmas and that the FBI had apparently hoped Dr King would resign for Christmas (James Adams testimony 11/19/75 Hearings vol 6 pp 66-68.) Whenasked about this interpretation AndrewYoungtestified "We didn't think of that We thought that he was talking about committing suicide and we tied the date to the Noble Prize That is the way we dis cussed it to commit suicide or that he was going to be publicly humiliated just at the moment of his receipt of the NoblePrize. (Andrew Young 2/19/76 p 37) Carl Rowan stated during a staff interview that he had been informed by a reliable source whom he declined to identify that the decision to mail the tape recording and letter had been made during a meeting at which Director Hoover was present Rowan's source said that the Director was "livid over Dr King's receipt of the NobelPeace Prize and that methodsof preventing Dr King from receiving the Prize were discussed at the meeting Accordingto the source there was a discussion at the meeting concerning allegations that Dr King had tried to commit suicide when he was young (such allegations had appeared in the news media e.g Time 1/3/64 p 14) and that he still had suicidal tendencies The source told Rowan that the participants in the meeting had concludedthat if the tape were mailed Dr King might be so distressed that he would commit suicide (Staff summary of Carl Rowan interview 8/29/75 p 2.) 96Young 2/19/76 p 38 Young'sconferencewith DeLoachis discussed p 169 P X68Seep 152et seq T Staff summary DavidKraslow interview Katzenbach 11/12/75 p 91 Katzenbach was unable to recall the identity of the reporter ss James Farmer Staff Interview 11/13/75 p 5 162 D Roy Wilkins of NAACP meets-with DeLoach to discuss allegations about Dr King November 27,1994 On November 24 1964 Director Hoover gave a speech at Loyola University in Chicago in which he referred to moral laxness in civil rights group On November 27 Roy Wilkins Executive Secretary of NAACP phoned DeLoach and requested a meeting Wilkins told the Committee that he had been disturbed by Hoover's Loyola University speech a few days before and that he had realized Hoover had been referring to Dr King because of rumors then circulating that the FBI had developed "derogatory material about Dr King Wilkins was spurred into meeting with DeLoach by pointed inquiries from several reporters about whether Director Hoover's remarks had been directed toward Dr King Wilkins described his motivation in re questing the meeting as "protecting the civil rights movement. He said that Dr King did not learn of his meeting with DeLoach until over a week after it had occurred." DeLoach and Wilkins have given the Committee differing accounts of what was said at their meeting DeLoach's version is summarized in a letter that he sent to President Johnson on November 30 1964 Wilkins said that the ruination of King would spell the downfall of the entire civil rights movement Wilkins indi cated that [if allegations concerning King's personal conduct and supposed connections with communists were publicized] many of his Negro associates would rise to his defense He felt however that many white people who believe in the civil rights movement and who yearly contribute from $500 to $50,000 to this movement would immediately cease their finan cial support This loss coupled with the loss of faith in King by millions of Americans would halt any further progress of the civil rights movement 358 A memorandum by DeLoach written shortly after the meeting states I told him that if King wanted war we certainly would give it to him Wilkins shook his head and stated there was no doubt in his mind as to which side would lose if the FBI really came out with all its ammunition against King I told him the ammunition was plentiful and that while we were not respon sible for the many rumors being initiated against King we had heard of these rumors and were certainly in a position to substantiate them 359 DeLoach's memorandum stated that the meeting had concluded with Wilkins promise to "tell King that he can't win in a battle with the FBI and that the best thing for him to do is to retire from public life. Wilkins told the Committee that DeLoach's description of the meet ing was "self serving and filled with inaccuracies and denied De Loach's description of his remarks as "pure invention. 36OWilkins stated that he had expressed his concern that accusations about Dr King would cripple the civil rights movement noting that if charges Staff summary Roy Wilkins interview 11/23/75 p 1 Letter Hooverto President 11/30/64 Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr 11/27/64 p 2 8B Wilkinsstaff summary 11/23/75 p 2 163 were publicly levied against Dr King the black community would side with Dr King and the white community with Director Hoover Wilkins said that he advised DeLoach that the FBI should not over react to Dr King's criticisms and that he considered Dr King's criti cism of the FBI's failure to vigorously enforce the civil rights laws to be totally justified Wilkins told the Committee that although he had considered the meeting a "success at the time after reading DeLoach's memorandum he realized that he had failed to convey the impression that he had intended since DeLoach had clearly misinterpreted his remarks.361 When DeLoach was asked by the Committee if the "ammunition he had threatened to use against I)r King was the tape recordings DeLoach replied "I don't know what I had in mind frankly it's been so long ago I can't recall. 362Wilkins did not remember DeLoach's use of the term "ammunition, but did recall that DeLoach frequently alluded to "derogatory information, although Wilkins was unclear whether DeLoach was referring to allegations about Dr King's per sonal conduct or about Communist infiltration of the SCLC.363 The following day an official of the Domestic Intelligence Division proposed to William Sullivan head of the Division that several lead ing members of the Black community should be briefed about Dr King by the FBI "on a highly confidential basis. It was proposed that "the use of a tape such as contemplated in your memorandum together with a transcript for convenience in following the tape, should be used "The inclusion of U.S Government officials such as Carl Rowan or Ralph Bunch is not suggested as they might feel a duty to advise the Whitey House of such contemplated meet ing This group should include such leadership as would be capable of removing King from the scene if they of their own volition decided this was the thing to do after such a briefing. 363a E Dr King and Director Hoover Meet December 1 1964 According to one of Dr King's legal counsels Harry Wachtel sev eral prominent civil rights leaders told Dr King of their concern that public controversy with Director Hoover would hurt the civil rights movement but promised to support Dr King should such a confronta tion occur 'Wachtel recalled that I)r King and his staff pondered "how to defuse this and prevent it from hecoming the principal focus of the struggle Hoover versus King, which "could only have lead to a divi sion and thus a dilution of the growing strength of the civil rights movement. Wachtel testified Everything pointed toward the problem of how Hoover would respond if Dr King said in effect "you're a liar prove your case If you call me a liar prove it. Every lawyer worth his salt knows this is the beginning of the Alger Hiss type of dilemma Libel and slander litigation or public debate of Wilkins (staff summary) 11/23/75 p 2 Cartha DeLoachtestimony 11/25/75 p 173 Wilkins (staff summary) 11/23/75 p 2 'g (Memorandumfrom J A SizootoW C Sullivan 12/1/64.) 164 famous personalities can easily lead to destruction of an on going movement You end up spending your time fighting over "truth as a defense. 3"1 Dr King and his advisers settled on an approach to the problem and on the evening of November 30 1964 at a public meeting in honor of his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize I)r King announced his intention to meet with Director Hoover to iron out their differences I do not plan to engage in public debate with Mr Hoover and I think the time has come for all this controversy to end and for all of us to get on with the larger job of civil rights and law enforcement.365 According to Andrew Young who was then Dr King's Executive Assistant the meeting was arranged by Dr Archibald Carey a close friend of both DeLoach and Dr King at King's request. Young recalled that Dr King had been surprised by Director Hoover's "most notorious liar allegation and wanted to find out what was at the heart of the problem.3f7 Walter Fauntroy who said that his recollection of events surrounding the meeting was "fuzzy, added that Dr King had also been motivated by a desire to bring to the Direc tor's attention complaints of Southern SCLC workers concerning the lack of FBI protection during civil rights demonstrations.368 The meeting between Dr King and Director Hoover took place at 3 :30 p.m on the afternoon of December 1 1964 Dr King was accom panied by Ralph Abernathy Secretary of the SCLC Andrew Young Dr King's Executive Assistant and Walter Fauntroy the SCLC rep resentative in Washington Director Hoover was accompanied by Cartha DeLoach DeLoach detailed the meeting in a twelve-page memorandum which Young and Abernathy described as "substantially accurate find ing fault chiefly with the praise of Director Hoover and of the FBI which DeLoach attributed to Dr King According to the DeLoach account Dr King said (he) wanted to clear up any misunderstanding which might have occurred He stated that some Negroes had told him that the FBI had been ineffective however he was inclined to dis count such criticism Reverend King asked that the Direc tor please understand that any criticism of the Director and the FBI which had been attributed to King was either a mis quote or an outright misrepresentation He stated this par ticularly concerned Albany Georgia Reverend King stated he personally appreciated the great work of the FBI which had been done in so many instances . Reverend King stated he has never made any personal at 84Harry Wachteltestimony 2/27/76 p 46 UnitedPress International release 12/1/64 'Andrew Youngtestimony 2/19/76 p 13 Carey's recollection supports this aceount (Staff summary of Archibald Carey interview 11/21/75.) Staff summaryof AndrewYounginterview 11/19/75 p 1 Staff summaryofWalter Fauntroy interview 11/17/75 p 1 165 tack upon Mr Hoover Reverend King said that the Di rector's report to the President this summer on rioting was a very excellent analysis Reverend King stated he has been and still is very con cerned regarding the matter of communism in the civil rights movement Reverend King stated that from a strong philo sophical point of view he could never become a communist .. He claimed that when he learns of the identity of a com munist in his midst he immediately deals with the problem by removing this man He stated there have been one or two communists who were engaged in fund raising for the SCLC Reverend King then corrected himself to say that these one or two men were former communists and not Party members at the present time He stated that he had insisted that [Adviser B] leave his staff because the success of his organiza tion was far more important than friendship with [Ad viser B.] 369 According to Young the meeting opened with a simple exchange of greetings not with the excessive praise of the Director reflected in DeLoach's memorandum and then Director Hoover proceeded to give a monologue that lasted for some fifty-five minutes DeLoach's summary memorandum bears out Young's characterization of the meeting as essentially a briefing by Director Hoover on_FBI opera tions relating to civil rights. 'B Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 12/2/64 PP 1-2 '"After reporting Dr King's opening remarks to Director Hoover the para graphs from the bottom of the secondpage to the end of'the memorandumbegin "The Director interrupted Kingof state "The Director told Kingand his associates. "The Director told ReverendKing that the FBI . "The Director told King that manycases. "TheDirector madeit clear to ReverendKingand his associates. "The Director made referenceto ReverendKing's allegation. "The Director madereferenceto the recentcasein . "The Director explainedthat there is a great misunderstandingtoday . "TheDirector spokeof the FBI's successfulpenetration of the KKK. "He spokeof the FBI's casein Louisiana. "The Directortold the groupthat . "The Directorexplainedthat in Alabama. "TheDirector told ReverendKingand his associatesthat . "The Director madeit veryclear to ReverendKingand his associates. "The Director told ReverendKinghe desiredto givehimsomeadvice. "The Directortold ReverendKing that in due time . "The Directorpraised the Georgiapapers that . "The Director told King that he wantedto makeit veryclear . "The Director explainedthat we have . "The Director spokeonceagain of the necessityof . "The Director spokeof a . "ReverendKing interrupted the Directorat this point and asked . "The Director told ReverendKing and his associates. "The Director mentionedthat he wanted to makeit very plain that . "The Director proudlyspokeofthe ability of Agentsto . "The Director spokeof the MackCharlesParker case in . "The Director told ReverendKingthat in manyinstances . "ReverendAbernathy stated that the Negroeshave a real problemin . "The Director explainedthat . "ReverendAbernathy stated that .. "The Director stated that . "The Director reiterated that . "The Director interrupted Kingand brieflydetailed fivecases. 166 Congressman Young testified that neither the Director's pointed cri ticism of Dr King nor the possibility that the FBI was spreading rumors about Dr King was raised at the meeting.311 Neither Young nor Abernathy recalled any hint of blackmail but Abernathy did remember quite clearly that at one point Hoover "gave King a lecture reminding him that he was a man of the cloth and a national leader and that he should "behave himself. Abernathy did not discern any hint that Dr King had not lived up to the expected standards He said that I)r King remained "very calm, thanked Director Hoover for the reminder and agreed that it was important for a national leader to set a moral exam ple Abernathy said that the Director then told Dr King "If you haven't done anything wrong you don't have anything to worry about. 373 Although DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting states that Direc tor Hoover and Dr King discussed possible Communist influence in the SCLC Andrew Young testified He never brought up the subject of Communism at all . (Adviser A's) name never came up and there was never any discussion in our meeting about Communism or Communist advisers.373 DeLoach described the meeting to the Committee as follows I fully expected it to be a confrontation However to the con trary it was more or less of a love feast with Mr Hoover tell ing Dr King that I)r King is a symbol of leadership for 12 million Negroes and should be careful about his associations and about his personal conduct and I)r King telling Mr Hoover that he had not wished to cast any reflection upon the FBI and had no intention of doing so in the future In other words it was a very peaceful meeting (DeLoach p 170) 374 31Young 2/19/73 p 14 8f2Staff summary of Ralph Abernathy interview 11/14/75 p 2 Uponreflection Abernathy stated that he was uncertain whether this latter exchange had oc curred at the December1 meeting or at someother meeting However he could not recall any other meeting betweenI)irect.orHooverand Dr King at which he was present DeLoach's memorandum account of the meeting does not mention this exch'angeand AndrewYoungcouldnot recall it In 1970 when the Bureau received a series of inquiries followinga series of stories in the press suggestingthat Director Hooverhad "blackmailed Dr King at the December1964meeting by threatening to "expose hts alleged "extramari tal activities, the FBI prepared a formletter stating "I receivedyour letter of and wouldlike to assure that the FBI doesnot engagein blackmail activities Also there is not one shred of truth in the allega tion that this Bureau blackmailedMartin Luther King. eraYoung 2/19/76 p 19 " DeLoach 11/25/75 p 170 Time magazinesubsequentlycarried two accounts of the Hoover-Kingmeeting Accordingto the December14 1970issue of Time Director Hooverdescribedthe meetingas follows "I got a wire from the Reverend King in New York He was getting ready to get the NobelPrize He was the last one in the world who should ever have re ceivedit He wired asking to see me I held hint in completecontemptbecauseof the things he said and becauseof his conduct First I felt I shouldn't see him but then I thought he might becomea martyr if I didn't King was very suave and smooth He sat right there where you're sitting and said he never criticized the FBI I said Mr King I never calledhim reverend stop right there you're lying He then pulled out a press release that he said he intended to give to the press I said don't showit to meor read it to me I couldn't understand howhe couldhave 167 Andrew Young agreed that there had been not even an attitude of hostility In fact Hoover was very disarming in that he congratulated Dr King for having won the Nobel Prize and as far as we are concerned this was not the same man that called Martin a notorious liar We at tributed it to the fact of his age and the kinds of possible fluctuations that are possible with people under pressure in advanced years.375 Young also told the Committee that within a few weeks of the meet ing the FBI announced that it had arrested suspects in the summer murder of three civil rights workers in the South "So in a sense we were reassured that the FBI was doing its law enforcement job and we hoped the personal tensions as far as Dr. King was concerned were over and done. 378 Harry Wachtel said that Dr King and his advisors had viewed the meeting as a success because it had "defused the FBI's attacks in time to permit Dr King to travel to Europe and receive the Nobel Prize Wachtel believed that Dr King's response to Hoover's chal lenge prevented the FBI from succeeding in what Wachtel viewed as an attempt to promote disputes and factionalism among the civil rights leaders The factionalism that the FBI sought to create was wide spread It came out in the Committee's record that they were even seeking a new leader In CIA terms you find yourself a new president of a country who is in your control They were applying to domestic affairs the type of factionalism that they had worked on so successfully... And you had to be around to know that it didn't take much to disrupt this deli cate marriage of the leadership of the civil rights move ment.377 A memorandum written by DeLoach on December 12 1964 indi cates that the FBI also viewed the feud with Dr King as having quieted In response to an inquiry from William Sullivan concerning prepared a press release evenbeforewe met Then he asked if I wouldgoout and have a photographtaken with him and I said I certainly would mind And I said if you ever say anything that is a lie again I will brand you a liar again Strange to say he neverattacked the Bureau again for as longas he lived. The exchangewhich Director Hoover reported to Time magazine does not ap pear in DeLoach'sdetailed memorandumof the meeting Youngalso denied the Director's account and noted that "there was a publicHooverthat made remarks about Dr King that weremoreon that tone but in the meeting noneof that kind of attitude or none of those statements were made. (Young 2/19/75 p 17.) TheAugust17 1970issueof Timemagazinestates "Hoover Timelearned explainedto King just what damagingprivate detail he had on the tapes and lectured him that his morals should be those befitting a NobelPrize winner He also suggestedthat King should tone down his criticism of the FBI. Youngtestified "there was nothing like that at the meeting. (Young 2/19/76 p 17) and DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting does not report such a conversation 318Young 2/19/76 p 15 3 Young 2/19/75 p 14 97Wachtel 2/27/76 p 48 168 whether the remainder of the tape recordings about Dr King should be transcribed DeLoach responded I fully agree that the work should eventually be done partic ularly if an additional controversy arises with King I see no necessity however in this work being done at the present time inasmuch as the controversy has quieted down considerably and we are not in need of transcripts right now .. I would recommend that we hold off doing this tremendous amount of work until there is an actual need.378 F Civil Rights Leaders Attempt To Dissivade the FBI From Dis crediting Dr King December 1964-May 1965 1 Farmer-DeLoacch Meeting December 1 1964 On December 1 1964 apparently immediately following Hoover's meeting with Dr King 379 James Farmer National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality met with DeLoach to convince him not to launch a smear campaign against Dr King Farmer explained the circumstances leading up to the meeting to the Committee as follows During the last week in November 1964 Farmer met with the editor of a New York newspaper who said that he had been with an FBI agent when Director Hoover's accusation of Dr King as a "notorious liar, was reported The editor told Farmer that the Agent had re marked "the Chief has finally gotten it off his chest. The Agent then went into a "tirade against Dr King A few days later Farmer was told by a reporter from the New York Post that stories about Dr King were being repeated in journalistic circles Shortly afterwards Farmer was informed that a conservative columnist was preparing a deroga tory story about Dr King and that the FBI was prepared to back up his allegations Farmer told the Committee that a CORE staff member had verified this rumor with an FBI contact who reportedly said "the chief wants Farmer to know that he had no interest in "getting Farmer Whitney Young or Roy Wilkins only King. 38 Farmer then called DeLoach whom he considered to be a "man of his word, and asked for a private conference Before the meeting Farmer met with Dr King and told him about the allegations Dr King approved Farmer's meeting with DeLoach but did not tell Farmer that he was intending to meet with Director Hoover On December 1 Farmer conferred with DeLoach in the back seat of a limousine while driving around Washington D.C Farmer told the Committee that DeLoach began the conversation by remarking "I know why you wanted to come down here. He recalled that DeLoach DeLoachmemorandum 12/10/64 addendum Director Hoover wrote on the memorandum "I think it shouldbe donenowwhile it is fresh in the minds of the specially trained agents. A notation states "Done We have prepared 321pp of transcripts 3/26/65. e'BDeLoach's memorandum of the meeting sets it at 5 p.m. after the King Hoover meeting Farmer however said that DeLoach left the King-Hoover meeting to confer with him (Staff summary of James Farmer interview 11/13/75 p 5.) Farmer (staff summary) 11/13/75 pp 1-2 169 said that the FBI did have evidence which supported the rumors about Dr King but that the Bureau was not "peddling the information.381 DeLoach's memorandum of that meeting states Farmer told me that he had heard from a number of news men that the FBI planned to expose Reverend King by tomorrow Wednesday December 2 1964 He stated that he and King had had a lengthy conference last night in New York City and that it had been agreed that Farmer should come down to see me and prevent this action being taken if at all possible He stated he knew that King had made a sudden decision to come down also and that he hoped that King's meeting with the Director had been an amiable one I told him that it had been I told Farmer that we of course had no plan whatsoever to expose Reverend King I told him that our files were sacred to us and that it would be unheard of for the FBI to leak such information to newsmen I told him I was com pletely appalled at the very thought of the FBI engaging in such endeavors.. I again repeated that we had never entertained the idea to expose Reverend King however I wanted Farmer to defi nitely know that the campaign of slander and vilification against the Director and the FBI should stop without any delay I told him that if this war continued that we out of necessity must defend ourselves I mentioned that I hoped it would not be necessary for the FBI to adopt defensive tactics Farmer got the point without any difficulty what soever He immediately assured me that there would be no further criticism from him He stated he felt certain there would be no further criticism from King Farmer was shown DeIoach's memorandum by the Committee He denied that he had assured DeLoach that his or Dr King's criticism of the FBI would cease that there had been any discussion of "war fare, and he stated that he did not know what the reference to his "getting the point meant.383 2 Young-Abernathy-DeLoach Meeting January 8 1965 On January 8 1965 shortly after the tape and letter were brought to the attention of the leaders of the SCLC Andrew Young and Ralph Abernathy at Dr King's urgings requested a meeting with Director Hoover Both Young and Abernathy told the Committee that the purpose of the meeting was to determine why the FBI was antagonistic toward Dr King and to stem continuing attacks against Dr King's character Young said that the meeting was prompted by the receipt of the tape and letter.384 Abernathy confirmed this account and added that al Farmer (staff summary),11/13/75 pp 2-4 Farmer (staff summary) 11/13/76 p 4 Young2/19/76 p 20 Youngtestifiedthat "We asked for the meeting because even though we thought that Hoover wasn't as bad as he seemedpublicly and we thought this was just a sort of lapse in his behavior we still kept getting reports from the press about stories that werestill beingtold and we receivedthe tape. 170 though they had not assumed that the FBI had sent the tape itself they did believe that the FBI had at least known about the tape and could help in terminating the campaign of personal abuse directed against Dr King.385 DeLoach rather than Director Hoover met with Young and Aber nathy Abernathy told the Committee that he had made it unmis takably clear to DeLoach they were concerned about charges bearing on Dr King's personal conduct.386 DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting states Reverend Abernathy spoke very generally pointing out that people were always "making charges and "innuendoes against Mr King Reverend Young said it looked like there were some attempts to smear and ruin the civil rights movement that just lately there has been some new evidence in this regard and that very obviously the activities of Mr King and the SCLC are under close surveillance.. [Young] said he did feel though there must be some sort of concerted organized campaign that was being directed against King and the SCLC.. Reverend Abernathy stated that there were three points they had wanted to discuss communist infiltration allega tions that King was getting rich on the civil rights move ment and the third point had to do with allegations about the personal life and moral character of King... Abernathy said that he was not going to make allegations against the FBI but that some things were wing on they just could not understand Reverend Young said that King had been receiving letters charging him with immorality that these letters attacked his personal life Reverend Young said that he was deeply concerned about irresponsible usage of personal information on the part of scandalmongers and wondered if there could be any "leaks from the Government He was assured that there were no leaks from the FBI that the Director ran a tight organization and that any irresponsibility on the part of any agent would not 'be tolerated.387 Andrew Young testified that he "thought that he had mentioned the letter and tape recording that had been received by Dr King He re called that DeLoach denied everything He denied that an FBI agent would ever talk to the press about anything Question Did you bring up the issue of whether the FBI was tapping Dr King's phone SCLC's phone or bugging Dr King YOUNG Yes we did He assured us that was not true.388 Abernathy (staff summary) 11/14/75 pp 2-3 9 Abernathy (staff summary) 11/14/75 p 2 'Memorandum from Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 1/11/65 pp 1-3 Young 2/1W76 p 38 171 3 Carey-DeLoach Meeting May 19 1965 On May 19 1965 Dr Archibald J Carey Jr. then a Chicago attorney who was well acquainted with Dr King DeLoach and Director Hoover met with DeLoach to "mediate in what he re garded as an unfortunate dispute among his friends Dr Carey told the Committee staff that I)r King had first brought to his attention rumors about Dr King's "communist sympathies and personal con duct during a weekend visit to Chicago some time in May 1965 On that occasion Dr King told Dr Carey that the FBI was trying to dis credit him and might release stories to the press regarding his per sonal life in the near future Dr Carey told the Committee that Dr King did not ask him to talk with the FBI about their attempt to discredit him but rather that he had volunteered to "see what he could do. Dr King gave his assent's DeLoach in a memorandum of the meeting wrote that "Carey told me that he wanted to enlist the sympathies of the FBI in not letting any effort to discredit King occur. DeLoach said that he had told Dr Carey that "the FBI had plenty to do without being responsible for a discrediting campaign against Reverend King. DeLoach ended the memorandum with the comment Dr Carey is the third individual that King has had come to see us relative to requesting that we not expose him Roy Wilkins Jim Farmer and Reverend Abernathy have all been here for the same purpose It is obvious that King is becoming very disturbed and worried about his background else he would not go to such great efforts to have people ap proach the FBI I did not commit the FBI in any manner insofar as exposing King is concerned To the contrary I let Carey flatly know of King's derelictions insofar as false allegations against us are concerned and of the fact that King and other civil rights workers owed the FBI a debt of gratitude they would never be able to repay 39 Director Hoover wrote on the memorandum "Well handled. Dr Carey told the Committee staff that he contacted Dr King after the meeting and suggested that criticizing the FBI was not the best strategy for the civil rights movement Dr Carey said that he had asked both Dr King and Director Hoover not to alienate each other He also said that he had been concerned less with the truth or falsity of any of the allegations that were made than with ending the dispute.' Staff summary of Archibald Carey interview 12/21/75 pp 1-2 DeLoach in a memorandumconcerninghis meeting with Dr Carey wrote that Dr Carey had said "He had cometo see us on behalf of Martin Luther King He added that King was in Chicago last weekend and stayed in Carey's home and at that time indicated every evidence of great disturbance King told Carey he had been reliably informed there was a massive effort to discredit him by the Federal Bureau of Investigation This effort is to begin this week. (Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 5/19/65 p 1) Dr Careytold the Committeethat DeLoachhad exaggerated Dr King's concern overthese rumoursin his memorandum 8B0DeLoachmemorandum 5/19/65 p 2 $B0iCarey (staff summary) 11/21/75 p.3 69-9840 76 12 172 VII THE FBI PROGRAMAGAINSTDR KING:1965 1968 The public dispute between Dr King and Director Hoover ended with their December 1 1964 meeting The Bureau's covert attempts to discredit Dr King and undermine his influence in the civil rights movement did not cease however but continued unabated until Dr King's death."l Although the intensity of the FBI's campaign against Dr King appears to have been reduced somewhat in 1966 and 1967 Dr King's public stand against the war in Vietnam in mid-1967 re vived the FBI's attempt to link Dr King and the SCLC with com munism A Major Efforts to Discredit Dr King 196'5 1968 1 Attempts to Discredit Dr King With Churches On February 1,1965 The Domestic Intelligence Division learned that Dr King was scheduled to speak at the Davenport Iowa Catholic Interracial Council's banquet and receive a "Pacem in Terris award in memory of Pope John Internal Security Section chief Frederick Baumgardner observed "it is shocking indeed that King continues to be honored by religious groups. 392Baumgardner recommended that Assistant Director Malone contact Francis Cardinal Spellman and suggest that "in the end it might well be embarrassing to the Catholic Church for having given honors to King. The Director noted on the memorandum "I see no need to further approach Spellman" he was apparently alluding to the unsuccessful attempt to sabotage Dr King's audience with the Pope through Spellman's intervention There is no record of any further action In February 1966 Dr King held a press conference following a meeting with the Reverend John P Cody Archbishop of the Chicago Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church and announced that he and Cody were in agreement on general civil rights goals and that he hoped priests and nuns in Chicago would participate in SCLC programs The Domestic Intelligence Division subsequently recommended that a special agent acquainted with the Archbishop brief him about Dr King to aid "the Archbishop in determining the degree of cooperation his archdiocese will extend to King's program in Chicago and [to] result in a lessening of King's influence in Chicago. 893 The Archbishop was briefed on February 24 1966 "along the lines discussed with Assistant Director Sullivan. 394The agent who con ducted the briefing wrote that he felt "certain that [Cody] will do everything possible to neutralize King's effect in this area. 896 InApril 1966 the FBI Legal Attache in Paris requested permission to inform the pastor of the American Church in Paris of Dr King's background "in an effort to convince him that his continued support of Martin Luther King may result in embarrassment for him and the "Even after Dr King's death the FBI tried to tarnish his public image See PP 183 7 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 2/1/65 8 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 2/18/66 Memorandumfrom SAC Chicago to Director FBI 2/24/66 Sullivan had apparently suggested that the Archbishopbe informed about alleged communist influenceon Dr King and about Dr King's private life ' 6SAC Chicagomemorandum 2/24/66 173 American Church in Paris. 396The pastor was briefed on May 9 1966 According to the agent who conducted the briefing the pastor was skeptical about the FBI allegations but promised to keep the informa tion in mind for future dealings with Dr King.397 2 Attempts to Discredit Dr King With Heads of Government Agencies In March 1965 the FBI contacted former Florida Governor LeRoy Collins Collins was then Director of the Community Relations Serv ice Department of Commerce a position the Bureau viewed as "some thing of a mediator in problems relating to the racial field. 398The FBI told Collins that Corretta King had criticized his participation in developments in Selma Alabama and had said that Collins was "blinded by prejudice. A copy of the December 1964 monograph about Dr King was also sent to Collins "in view of [his] important position relative to the racial movement. 399 Also in March 1965 the FBI learned that the Internal Revenue Serv ice intended to invite Dr King as one of 19 guest lecturers at a series of seminars on Equal Employment Opportunities When the IRS requested routine name checks on the 19 individuals Director Hoover approved a Domestic Intelligence Division request to send the IRS a copy of the December 1964 monograph normal procedures were fol lowed in checking the other 18 people 40 In December 1966 Domestic Intelligence Director William Sullivan reported that he had met with Ambassador U Alexis Johnson during a tour of the FBI's Legal Attache Office in Japan and was surprised to learn that Johnson was unaware of allegations that communists were influencing Dr King Sullivan recommended that Johnson be sent a copy of the monograph about Dr King "because of his position. 401 Director Hoover approved the plan and a copy of the monograph was sent to the FBI Legal Attache in Tokyo for hand-delivery to the Ambassador.402 Dr King publicly announced his opposition to American involve ment in the war in Vietnam in a speech at New York's Riverside Church on April 4 1967 Six days later Charles Brennan of the Do mestic Intelligence Division recommended the circulation of an up dated draft of the King monograph to the White House Brennan's memorandum states that the revised monograph contained allegations about communist influence over Dr King as well as personally deroga tory allegations.4 3 Director Hoover approved and copies of the revised monograph were sent to the White House the Secretary of State the Secretary of De j Memorandumfrom LEGAT Paris to Director FBI 4/14/66 ' Memorandumfrom LEGAT Paris to Director FBI 5/9/66 'B8Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 3/23/65 30BBaumgardner memorandum 3/23/65 'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 3/31/65 The delivery was made shortly thereafter (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Internal RevenueService 4/2/65) '''Memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach 12/19/66 p1Memorandumfrom Director FBI to LEGAT Tokyo 12/28/66 'Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan 4/10/67 174 fense the Director of the Secret Service and the Attorney General404 A copy was subsequently sent to the Commandant of the Marine Corps who had been interested in "King's activities in the civil rights move ment but recently had become quite concerned as to whether there are any subversive influences which have caused King to link the civil rights movement with the anti-Vietnam War movement. The Do mestic Intelligence Division recommended that a copy be given to the Marine Commandant because "it is felt would definitely be to the bene fit of [the Commandant] and to the Bureau ... 4 5 In February 1968 FBI Headquarters learned that Dr King planned a "Washington Spring Project for April 1968 According to a Do mestic Intelligence Division memorandum the Director suggested that the King monograph be again revised That memorandum noted Bringing this monograph up-to-date and disseminating it at high level prior to King's "Washington Spring Project should serve again to remind top-level officials in Government of the wholly disreputable character of King.. Because of the importance of doing a thorough job on this we will conduct an exhaustive field review to bring together the most complete and up-to-date information and to present it in a hard-hitting manner4 The revised monograph dated March 12 1968 was disseminated to the White House the Attorney General and the heads of various gov ernment intelligence agencies.407 3 Attempts to Discredit Dr King By Using the Press Despite Cartha DeLoach's assurances to Andrew Young and Ralph Abernathy that the FBI would never disseminate information to the press the Bureau continued its efforts to cultivate "friendly news sources that would be willing to release information unfavorable to Dr King Ralph McGill the pro-civil rights editor of the Atlanta Constitution was a major focus of the Bureau's attentions The Bu reau apparently first furnished McGill with derogatory information about Dr King as part of an attempt to dissuade community leaders in Atlanta from participating in a banquet planned to honor Dr King upon his return from the Nobel Prize ceremonies After a meeting with McGill William Sullivan reported that McGill said that he had stopped speaking favorably of Dr King that he had refused to take an active part in preparing for the banquet and that he had even taken steps to undermine the banquet McGill's version of what transpired will never be known since McGill is deceased According to Sullivan's memorandum however Mr McGill told me that following my first discussion with him a few weeks ago he contacted a banker friend in Atlanta who was helping to finance the banquet to be given King next Wednesday night The banker was disturbed and said he Letters from J Edgar Hooverto the Attorney General Director U.S Secret Service the Secretary of State the White House and the Secretary of Defense 4/10/67 406:Memorandumfrom CharlesBrennan to WilliamSullivan 8/30/67 406Memorandumfrom GeorgeMooreto William Sullivan 2/29/68 'Memoranda from George Moore to William Sullivan 3/11/68 and 3/19/68 175 would contact some other bankers also involved and see if sup port could be quietly withdrawn McGill's friend and some of the bankers did take steps to withdraw but this was very quickly relayed to bankers in Haiti who were on the thres hold of an important financial deal with the Atlanta Georgia bankers They took the position that if the Atlanta bankers did not support the Martin Luther King party their finan cial deal with these Georgia bankers was off As a result they got cold feet and decided to go ahead with financing King's party McGill told me that a Catholic leader in Georgia an Episcopal clergyman and a Jewish rabbi are also quite active in support of this party for King .. I told him that he might want to explore very confidentially and discreetly the subject matter with these three men.. McGill told me that he thinks it is too late now especially in view of the financial interest of the Georgia bankers in the Haiti deal to prevent the banquet from taking place However McGill said he would do what he could to encourage key people to limit their praise and support of King as much as possible McGill also told me that he is taking steps through [a Negro leader] to get key Negro leaders to unite in op sition to King and to gradually force him out of the civi rights movement if at all possible. The FBI subsequently told the White House that McGill believes that the very best thing that could happen would be to have King step completely out of the civil rights move ment and public life for he feels that if this is not done sooner or later King will be publicly exposed Mr McGill believes that an exposure of King will do irreparable harm to the civil rights movement in which he Mr McGill and others are so interested and have worked so hard for and likewise it will do injury to different citizens of the country who have been supporting King.. 410 In late May 1965 a reporter from United Press International re quested the Bureau for information about Dr King for use in a series of articles about the civil rights leader The Special Agent in Charge in Atlanta recommended that the Bureau give the reporter both public source and confidential information about Dr King because the re porter "is the UPI's authority in the South on the Negro movement and his articles carry a great deal of influence and [the SAC did not believe] that he would prepare anything flattering or favorable to King. The Director approved a recommendation that the reporter be supplied with a public source document and with a "short summa tion of allegations concerning communist influence over Dr King to be used "merely for orientation purposes.) 411 ' Memorandumfrom William Sullivan to Alan Belmont 1/21/65 "oLetter from J Edgar Hooverto BillMoyers 1/22/65 'Memorandum from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan 5/24/65 176 In October 1966 the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended that an article "indicting King for his failure to take a stand on the [black power] issue and at the same time exposing the degree of com munist influence on him be given to a newspaper contact "friendly to the Bureau "such as [the] Editor of U.S News and World Report. It is felt that the public should again be reminded of this com munist influence on King and the current controversy among civil rights leaders makes this timely to do so.412 Attached to the memorandum was a proposed article which noted that the efforts of several civil rights leaders to denounce "Black Power had been "undermined by one man in the civil rights move ment who holds in his hands the power to silence the rabble rousers and to give the movement renewed momentum. The article attributed Dr King's equivocation to his advisers who were alleged to have had affiliations with the Communist Party or organizations associated with the Party Dr King's decision to oppose the Vietnamese war was also attributed to these advisers 413 One project involving the mass media which the FBI felt had been particularly successful was its attempt to prevent Dr King from ob taining contributions from James Hoffa of the Teamsters Union In October 1966 the FBI discovered that Dr King planned to meet with Hoffa but that Dr King had wanted to avoid publicity because in the words of the Bureau Disclosure of King's transparent attempt to blackmail Hoffa with the large Negro membership of Hoffa's union to solve the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's financial problems would cause an uproar among leaders of organiza tions having large Negro memberships pointing out their own vulnerability to such a squeeze by any unscrupulous civil rights leader This potential collusion between large labor unions and the civil rights movement could also react to the detriment of the Negro in that through large financial dona tions an unscrupulous labor leader could subvert the legiti mate aims and objectives of the civil rights movement to his own purposes.414 The Crime Records Division prepared an article for public release raising the question of "who really gets squeezed when these two pythons get together. 416The Domestic Intelligence Division also recommended a Bureau official be designated now to alert friendly news media of the meeting once the meeting date is learned so that Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 10/27/66 Director Hoover's "O.K. appears at the bottom of the memorandum There is also a note stating "U.S Newsand World Report will not use article of this natute. It is not knownwhether the article was actually distributed " Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 10/28/66 "Memorandum from Charles Brennan to Frederick Baumgardner William Sntlivan attached to Baumgardner memorandum 10/28/66 177 arrangements can be made for appropriate press coverage of the planned meeting to expose and disrupt it.417 Director Hoover's "O.K. appears below that recommendation On discovering that the meeting was about to occur the Crime Records Division notified a reporter for the New York Daily News and a national columnist "News photographers and wire services are also being alerted to give coverage.... 418 A Crime Records Division memorandum on the following day re ported that "in view of publicity in the New York Daily News regard ing this proposed meeting King and his aides had decided that it would be unwise to meet with Hoffa. The Bureau then notified reporters that Dr King was coming to Washington D.C The reporters "cornered Dr King as he came off the plane and quizzed him about the proposed meeting The Crime Records Division reported these events to the Director with the assessment that "our counterintelligence aim to thwart King from receiving money from the Teamsters has been quite successful to date. Director Hoover initialed the memorandum re porting this news "Excellent. 419 In March 1967 Director Hoover approved a recommendation by the Domestic Intelligence Division to furnish "friendly reporters ques tions to ask Dr King The Intelligence Division believed that Dr King would be particularly "vulnerable to questions concerning his opposition to the war in Vietnam and recommended that a reporter be selected to interviev6 Dr. King "ostensibly to question King about his new book, but with the objective of bringing out the foreign policy aspects of Dr King's philosophy This could then be linked to show that King's current policies remarkably parallel communist efforts This would cause ex treme embarrassment to King.42o In October 1967 the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended that an editorial in a Negro magazine which criticized Dr King for his stance on the Vietnam war be given to "friendly news sources. The purpose of the dissemination was to "publicize King as a traitor to his country and his race and to "reduce his income from a series of shows given by Harry Belafonte to earn funds for the SCLC The recommendation was approved by the Director and is marked "Handled 10/28/67. 421 4 Attempts to Discredit Dr King With Major Political and Financial Leaders In March 1965 the FBI learned that a "Martin Luther King Day was being planned in a major city The Domestic Intelligence Division recommended that the Special Agent in Charge "personally meet with the Governor and brief him concerning King in order to "in duce him to minimize the affair and especially the award for King. 419Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 11/3/66 19Memorandumfrom Robert Wickto Cartha DeLoach 11/8/66 4 Memorandumfrom Robert Wick to Cartha DeLoach 11/9/66 Memorandumfrom Charles Brennan to William.Sullivan 3/8/67 The pro posal was given Director Hoover's "O.K. and a handwritten note in the margin initialed by the Chief of the Crime Records Division states "handled. '_Memorandumfrom GeorgeMooreto William Sullivan 10/18/67 178 The Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum was initialed by the Director and bears the handwritten notation "handled 3-5-65 WCS[ullivan]. 422 In October 1966 the FBI learned that Dr King had met with McGeorge Bundy then Director of the Ford Foundation and received a tentative offer of a grant for the SCLC The Domestic Intelligence Division decided that officials of the Foundation might not be aware of the "subversive backgrounds of King's principal advisers, but that if they were briefed "this might preclude any assistance being granted. Director Hoover approved a plan to have a former FBI agent who was then a vice-president of the Ford Motor Company approach Bundy.423 The ex-agent was contacted briefed on Dr King and according to DeLoach "stated he would personally contact Bundy in an effort to put a stop to King receiving any funds from the Ford Foundation. 424 In a memorandum dated October 26 1966 DeLoach reported that the ex-agent had contacted Bundy but that Bundy had refused to talk with him about Dr King saying that he would only talk with a person having first-hand knowledge about Dr King and would not listen to rumors DeLoach recommended that the FBI not directly ap proach Bundy since "it is doubtful that contact with him by the FBI will convince him one way or another. Director Hoover wrote on DeLoach's memorandum "Yes We would get no where with Bundy. 425 5 Attempts to Discredit Dr King With Congressional Leaders According to a memorandum by Assistant to the Director DeLoach Speaker of the House John McCormack requested a briefing about Dr King's background and activities in August 1965 DeLoach re ported that he briefed McCormack for 45 minutes about Dr King's private life and about possible communist influence over Dr King According to DeLoach McCormack stated that "he now recognized the gravity of the situation and that something obviously must be done about it. 426McCormack was not interviewed by the committee staff Not all Congressional inquiries about Dr King however were an swered by the Bureau For example in January 1968 DeLoach re ported that he had met with 'Senator Robert C Byrd at the Senator's request DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting states that the Sen ator expressed concern over Dr King's plan for demonstrations in Washington D.C during the summer and said that it was time Dr King "met his Waterloo. DeLoach's memorandum states that Sen ator Bvrd asked if the FBI would prepare a speech about Dr King which he could deliver on the floor of the Senate DeLoach declined to provide any information that was not on the public record al " Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 3/2/65 4 Memorandumfrom Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan 10/24/66 4 NfemorandumfromCartha DeLoachto ClydeTolson 10/26/66 'Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson 10/26/66 DeLoach's memorandum noted "I personally feel that Bundy is of the pseudo-intellec tual Ivy League group that has little respect for the FBI. Bundy confirmed that he had been approached concerning Dr King and that he had refused to talk about Dr King 4 Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 8/14/65 179 though he did promise to keep the Senator informed of new public source items.427The Committee staff did not interview Senator Byrd B COINTELPRO Operations Against Dr King and His Associates The FBI elevated its activities against Dr King and his associates to the status of formal counterintelligence programs (COINTEL PRO) during this period.428 In July 1966 the Director instructed the New York field office that "immediate steps should be taken to discredit expose or otherwise neutralize Adviser A's role as a clandestine communist. 429An agent was assigned full-time to "care fully review the [Adviser A] case file seeking possible counterintel ligence approaches. He reported that there was no derogatory in formation on Adviser A's personal life,43 and that the only "effective way to neutralize [him] is by public exposure of his alleged Com munist Party associations.431 None of the FBI's efforts against Ad viser A appear to have met success The FBI considered initiating a formal COINTELPRO to dis credit Dr King and Dr Benjamin Spock in Mav 1967 when rumors developed concerning the possibility that King and Spock might run as "peace candidates in the 1968 presidential election The New York field office recommended postponing the effort to expose "communist connections of persons associated with King and Spock until they had formally announced their candidacy." The Chicago field office pro posed waiting until the summer of 1968 reasoning that by then the Administration would have either resolved the Vietnam conflict or if not the Communist Party would be emphasizing the peace theme and exposure of Communist Party links with the King-Spook cam paign "would doubtlessly be appreciated by the Administration." While the Chicago field office felt that the Bureau should not "rule out the use of "flyers leaflets cards and bumper stickers to discredit the King-Spock ticket it recommended "the use of a political column ist or reporter for this purpose. 434Apparently no steps were taken to implement the plan In August 1967 the Bureau initiated a COINTELPRO captioned "Black Nationalist Hate Groups. This program is extensively de scribed in the Staff Report on COINTELPRO The document initiat ing the program states " Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto ClydeTolson 1/19/68 128COINTELPROis discussed at length in the Staff Report on COINTELPRO 'Memorandum from Director FBI to SAC New York 7/18/66 Allegations concerning Adviser A's suspected Communist Party affiliations are discussed at pp 149-150 "'The complete absence of any derogatory information on Adviser A's per sonal life did not prevent the Bureau from attempting to developsuch informa tion In October 1967the New York officeinformed Washington it would "con tinue its efforts to place [AdviserA] in a compromisingposition with a woman acquaintance (Memorandumfrom SAC New York to Director FBI 10/7/66.) Memorandumfrom SAC NewYorkto Director FBI 8/15/66 'Memorandum from SAC New York to Director FBI 2/25/67 'Memorandum from SACThe field officenoted "Effectivelytabbing as com munists or as communist-hackedthe more hysterical opponentsof the President on the Vietnam question in the midst of the Presidential campaign would be a real boonto Mr Johnson. 'Memorandum from SAC Chicago to Director FBI 6/1/67 The Chicago officeobserved "It is emphasized that this person should he respected for his balance and fair-mindedness An article or series by an established conservative wouldnot adequately serveour purposes. 180 The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose disrupt misdirect discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of black-nationalist hate-type organizations and groupings their leadership spokesmen membership and supporters and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder Intensified attention under this program shouldbe afforded to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Southern Christian Leadership Conference Revolutionary Action Movement the Deacons for Defense and Justice Congress of Racial Equality and the Nation of Islam [Emphasis added.] 435 The Domestic Intelligence Division expanded the Black National ist-Hate Groups COINTELPRO in February 1968 The instructions to the field officeslisted as a "goal Prevent the rise of a "messiah who could unify and elec trify the militant black nationalist movement Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah he is the martyr of the movement today Martin Luther King Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position Elijah Muhammed is less of a threat because of his age King could be a real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience to "white liberal doctrines (nonvio lence) and embrace black nationalism .435 The SCLC was retained as a "primary target of the COINTELPRO and Martin Luther King's name was added to the list of persons who were targets The supervisor of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO told the Committee that he could recall no counterintelligence activities di rected against the SCLC but that several were taken against Dr King. 37 C The FBI's Efforts to Discredit Dr King During His Last Months Between 1965 and early 1967 the files indicate that Bureau concern about Dr King had decreased This concern was revived by Dr King's April 4 1967 speech at New York's Riverside Church in which he opposed the Administration's position in Vietnam The FBI inter preted this position as proof he "has been influenced by communist advisers, and noted that King's remarks were "a direct parallel of the communist position on Vietnam. 438A week after the speech the FBI sent the White House and the Justice Department a revised edi tion of the printed King monograph In early December 1967 Dr King announced plans to hold demon strations in major American cities including Washington D.C. to spur Congress into enacting civil rights legislation The FBI followed closely developments in Dr King's "Washington Spring Project for warding to the White House information concerning Adviser A's Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Special Agents in Charge 8/25/67 4 Memorandumfrom Director FBI to Special Agents in Charge 3/4/68 's' Testimony 10/17/75 p 14 Memorandumfrom Charles Brennan to William Sullivan 4/10/67 181 fund-raising activities and Dr King's plans to tape a lecture series for a foreign television system allegedly to raise funds for the project In February 1968 the FBI again revised the King monograph and distributed it to certain officials in the Executive Branch The Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum recommending the new monograph stated that its dissemination "prior to King's Washington Spring Project should serve again to remind top-level officials in Govern ment of the wholly disreputable character of King. 41 In early March the Bureau broadened its Black Nationalist-Hate Groups COINTELPRO explicitly to include Dr King.42 Toward the end of the month the FBI began to disseminate information to the press "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising campaign for the Washington Spring Project. The first of many plans included circulating a story that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited Since the churches have offered support no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations 43 On March 25 the Bureau approved a plan to mail an anonymous letter to a civil rights leader in Selma Alabama who was "miffed with Dr King and a copy of that letter to a Selma newspaper hoping that the newspaper might interview the leader about its contents The Bureau described the purpose of the letter as calling to the attention of [the civil rights leader] that King is merely using the Negroes of the Selma area for his own personal aggrandizement that he is not genuinely interested in their welfare but only in their donations that in all probability the individuals going to Washington for the Spring Project will be left stranded without suitable housing or food The letter should also play up the possibility of violence." There is no indication in FBI files that the letter was mailed During the latter part of March Dr King went to Memphis Ten nessee where a strike by Sanitation Workers had erupted into violent riots A March 28 1968 Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum stated A sanitation strike has been going on in Memphis for some time Martin Luther King Jr. today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis King was in an automobile preceding the marchers As the march developed acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting "'Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan 12/18/67 memo randum from Director FBI to LEGAT 12/21/67 'Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan 2/29/68 Seediscussion supra p 180 "'Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan 3/26/68 'Memorandum from SAC Mobile to Director FBI 3/25/68 memorandum from Director FBI to SAC mobile 4/2/68 182 This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washing ton in April ACTION Attached is a blind memorandum pointing out the above which if you approve should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources The memorandum carried Director Hoover's "O.K. and the notation "handled on 3/28/68. 445 On March 29 1968 the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended that the following article be furnished to a cooperative news source Martin Luther King during the sanitation workers strike in Memphis Tennessee has urged Negroes to boycott down town white merchants to achieve Negro demands On 3/29/68 King led a march for the sanitation workers Like Judas lead ing lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence and when the violence broke out King disappeared The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patron ized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there for his hasty exit Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel white owned operated and almost exclusively patron ized was the place to "cool it. There will be no boycott of white merchants for King only for his followers.946 On April 4 Dr King returned to Memphis This time he registered at the Lorraine Hotel We have discovered no evidence that the FBI was responsible for Dr King's move to the Lorraine Hotel." f Memorandumfrom GeorgeMoore to William Sullivan 3/28/68 An article about violence in the sanitation strike published in the Memphis Commercial Clarion on March29 1968 echoedthe wordingof the FBI memorandum although there is no proof that the FBI was responsiblefor the article The article stated "Yesterday's march ostensiblya protest on behalf of the city's striking sanita tion workers was generally consideredto be a dress rehearsal by Dr King for his planned march on Washington April 22. (Memphis Commercial Clarion 3/29/68.) " Memorandumfrom GeorgeMooreto William Sullivan 3/29/68 "'Dr King's associates and the FBI both deny that this last effort to discredit Dr King influencedhis decisionto moveto the Lorraine Hotel Dr Ralph Aber nathy who was with Dr King during his last days told the Committeethat he had not been aware of any newspaper articles criticizing Dr King for staying at the Holiday Inn during his visit the previous week He was certain that the Lor raine had not been chosenbecauseof any articles that might have appeared and said that Dr King always stayed at the Lorraine when he visited Memphis with the exceptionof the prior visit In that instance Dr King had been brought to the HolidayInn bypolicefollowinga riot during the sanitation strike (Staff sum mary of Ralph Abernathy interview 11/19/75 p 2.) A handwritten note on the FBI memorandumcriticizing Dr King for staying at the Holiday Inn states "handled 4-3-68. The FBI questioned the agent who wrote "handled on the memorandumand informed the Committeethat he did not recall the memorandum and did not know whether "handled indicated that he had disseminated the article or simplycleared the memorandumthrough the CrimeRecordsDivisionofthe FBI Accordingto the FBI Dr King checkedinto the Lorraine Hotel at 10:30 a.m on April 3 The FBI has concludedthat "the notation indicating that the pro posed furnishing of information to news media was handled on April 3 1968 would of course preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checkinginto the Hotel Lorraine.. 183 D Attempts to Discredit Dr King's Reputation After His Death The FBI's attempts to discredit Dr King did not end with his death In March 1969 the Bureau was informed that Congress was considering declaring Dr King's birthday a national holiday and that members of the House Committee on Internal Security might be contacting the Bureau for a briefing about Dr King The Crime Records Division recommended briefing the Congressmen because they were "in a position to keep the bill from being reported out of Com mittee if "they realize King was a scoundrel. DeLoach noted "This is a delicate matter but can be handled very cautiously. Director Hoover wrote "I agree It must be handled very cautiously. 447a In April 1969 FBI Headquarters received a recommendation for a counterintelligence program from the Atlanta Field Office The nature of the proposed program has not been revealed to the Committee A memorandum concerning the plan which the Bureau has given to the Committee however notes that the plan might be used "in the event the Bureau is inclined to entertain counterintelligence action against Coretta Scott King and/or the continuous projection of the public image of Martin Luther King.... 441 The Director informed the Atlanta office that "the Bureau does not desire counterintelligence action against Coretta King of the nature you suggest at this time 948 CONCLUSION Although it is impossible to gauge the full extent to which the FBI's discrediting programs affected the civil rights movement the fact that there was impact is unquestionable Rumors circulated by the FBI had a profound impact on the SCLC's ability to raise funds According to Congressman Andrew Young a personal friend and associate of Dr King the FBI's effort against Dr King and the SCLC "chilled contributions There were di rect attempts at some of our larger contributors who told us that they had been told by agents that Martin had a Swiss bank account or that Martin had confiscated some of the monies from the March on Wash ington for his personal use None of that was true. 449Harry Wachtel one of Dr King's legal counsels who handled many of the financial and fund raising activities of the SCLC emphasized that the SCLC was always in need of funds "Getting a grant or getting a contribution is a very fragile thing A grant delayed has a very serious impact on an organization whose financial condition was pretty rough. 450 Wachtel testified that the SCLC continually had to overcome rumors of poor financial management and communist connections The material stayed in the political bloodstream all the way through to the time of Dr King's death and even after In our efforts to build a King Center it was around It was like a contamination 451 "7eMemorandumfrom Milton Jones to Thomas Bishop 3/18/69 [Emphasis in original] "'Memorandum from SAC Atlanta to Director FBI 4/3/69 'Memorandum from Director FBI to SAC Atlanta 4/14/69 Young 2/19/76 pp 25-26 /bWachtel 2/27/76 pp 31-32 " Wachtel 2/27/76 p 49 184 The SCLC leadership assumed that anything said in meetings or over the telephone would be intercepted by wiretaps bugs or in formants Ironically the FBI memorandum reporting that a wiretap of the SCLC's Atlanta officewas feasible stated In the past when interviews have been conducted in the office of Southern Christian Leadership Conference certain employees when asked a question in a half joking manner and a half serious manner replied "You should know that already don't you have our wires tapped It is noted in the past State of Georgia has conducted investigations regard ing subject and Southern Christian Leadership Conference.452 Harry Wachtel commented on the impact constant surveillance on members of the SCLC When you live in a fishbowl you act like you're in a fish bowl whether you do it consciously or unconsciously I can't put specifics before you except to say that it beggars the imagination not to believe that the SCLC Dr King and all its leaders were not chilled or inhibited from all kinds of activities political and even social 453 Wachtel also pointed out the ramifications stemming from the Gov ernment's advance knowledge of what civil rights leaders were thinking It is like political intelligence It did not chill us from saying it but it affected the strategies and tactics because the people you were having strategies and tactics about were privy to what you were about They knew your doubts Take events like strategies in Atlantic City Decision-making concerning which way to go joining one challenge or not supporting a particular situation or not had to be limited very strongly by the fact that information which was ex pressed by telephone or which could even possibly be picked up by bugging would be in the hands of the President 464 Perhaps most difficult to gauge is the personal impact of the Bureau's programs Congressman Young told the Committee that while Dr King was not deterred by the attacks which are now known to have been instigated in part by the FBI there is "no question but that hewas personally affected It was a great burden to be attacked by people he respected particularly when the attacks engendered by the FBI came from people like Ralph McGill He sat down and cried at the New York Times editorial about his statement on Vietnam but this just made him more determined It was a great personal suffering but since we don't really know all that they did we have no way of knowing the ways that they affected us.455 'a Memorandum SpecialAgentin Charge Atlanta to Director FBI 10/10/63 'ESWachtel 2/27/76 pp 10 19 Wachtel 2/27/76 p 10 Young 2/19/76 p 16 THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY CONTENTS Page Introduction 187 A The effort to promote violencebetween the Black Panther Party and other well-armed potentially violent organizations 188 The effort to promote violence between the Black Panther Party and the United Slaves (US) Inc 189 The effort to promote violencebetweenthe BlackstoneRangers and the Black Panther Party 195 B The effort to disrupt the Black Panther Party by promoting internal dissention 198 General efforts to disrupt the Black Panther Party member ship 198 FBI role in the Newton-Cleaverrift 200 C Covert effortsto underminesupport of the Black Panther Party and to destroy the party's public image 208 1 Efforts to discourage and to discredit supporters of the Black Panther Party 208 2 'Efforts to promote criticism of the Black Panthers in the mass media and to prevent the Black Panther Party and its sympathizers from expressingtheir views 2l3 D Cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local policedepartments in disrupting the Black Panther Party 220 (185) I 69-9840 76 13 THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY INTRODUCTION In August 1967 the FBI initiated a covert action program COINTELPRO to disrupt and "neutralize organizations which the Bureau characterized as "Black Nationalist Hate Groups. The FBI memorandum expanding the program described its goals as Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist groups.. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and elec trify the militant nationalist movement Martin Luther King Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position.. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups... Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them.. prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations especially among youth. 2 The targets of this nationwide program to disrupt "militant black nationalist organizations included groups such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) the Revolutionary Action Move ment (RAM) and the Nation of Islam (NOI) It was expressly directed against such leaders as Martin Luther King Jr. Stokley Carmichael H Rap Brown Maxwell Stanford and Elijah Muhammad The Black Panther Party (BPP) was not among the original "Black Nationalist targets In September 1968 however FBI Di rector J Edgar Hoover described the Panthers as "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country "Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the teaching of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung its members have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and have engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the country Leaders and representatives of the Black Panther Party travel extensively all over the United States preaching their gospel of hate and violence not only to ghetto residents For a description of the full range of COINTELPROprograms see the staff report entitled "COINTELPRO The FBI's Covert Action Programs Against American Citizens. 'Memorandum from G C Moore to W C Sullivan 2/29/68 pp 3-4 (187) 188 but to students in colleges universities and high schools as well. . By July 1969 the Black Panthers had become the primary focus of the program and was ultimately the target of 233 of the total 29:I authorized "Black Nationalist COINTELPRO actions. Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau's COINTELPRO tactics was to prevent violence some of the FBI's tactics against the BPP were clearly intended to foster violence and many others could reasonably have been expected to cause violence For example the FBI's efforts to "intensify the degree of animosity between the BPP and the Blackstone Rangers a Chicago street gang included sending an anonymous letter to the gang's leader falsely informing him that the Chicago Panthers had "a hit out on him. The stated intent of the letter was to induce the Ranger leader to "take reprisals against the Panther leadership. Similarly in Southern California the FBI launched a covert effort to "create further dissension in the ranks of the BPP. 7 This effort included mailing anonymous letters and caricatures to BPP members ridiculing the local and national BPP leadership for the express pur pose of exacerbating an existing "gang war between the BPP and an organization called the United Slaves (ITS) This "gang war re sulted in the killing of four BPP members by members of ITS and in numerous beatings and shootings Although individual incidents in this dispute cannot be directly traced to efforts by the FBI FBI offi cials were clearly aware of the violent nature of the dispute engaged in actions which they hoped would prolong and intensify the dispute and proudly claimed credit for violent clashes between the rival fac tions which in the words of one FBI official resulted in "shootings beatings and a high degree of unrest in the area of southeast San Diego. 8 James Adams Deputy Associate Director of the FBI's Intelligence Division told the Committee None of our programs have contemplated violence and the instructions prohibit it and the record of turndowns of rec ommended actions in some instances specifically say that we do not approve this action because if we take it it could result in harm to the individual. But the Committee's record suggests otherwise For example in May 1970 after US organization members had already killed four BPP members the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles FBI officewrote to FBI headquarters Information received from local sources indicate that in general the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physical _ 'New YorkTimes 9/8/68 'This figure is based on the Select Committee'sstaff study of Justice Depart ment COINTELPRO"Black Nationalist summariesprepared by the FBI during the Petersen Committeeinquiry into COINTELPRO 'Memorandum from ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/13/69 "Ibid 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13 other offices) 11/25/68 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/16/70 James Adamstestimony 11/19/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 76 189 ly afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions to avoid confrontations In view of their anxieties it is not presently felt that the Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in an internecine struggle between the two organizations The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized It is intended that US Inc will be appropriately and discreet ly advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be brought together and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course [Emphasis added.] 10 This report focuses solely on the FBI's counterintelligence program to disrupt and "neutralize the Black Panther Party It does not exam ine the reasonableness of the basis for the FBI's investigation of the BPP or seek to justify either the politics the rhetoric or the actions of the BPP This report does demonstrate however that the chief investigative branch of the Federal Government which was charged by law with investigating crimes and preventing criminal conduct itself engaged in lawless tactics and responded to deep-seated social problems by fomenting violence and unrest A The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and Other TVell-Aimed Potentially Violent Organizations The Select Committee's staff investigation has disclosed a number of instances in which the FBI sought to turn violence-prone organi zations against the Panthers in an effort to aggravate "gang warfare. Because of the milieu of violence in which members of the Panthers often moved we have been unable to establish a direct link between any of the FBI's specific efforts to promote violence and particular acts of violence that occurred We have been able to establish beyond doubt however that high officials of the FBI desired to promote violent confrontations between BPP members and members of other groups and that those officials condoned tactics calculated to achieve that end It is deplorable that officials of the United States Govern ment should engage in the activities described below however danger ous a threat they might have considered the Panthers equally dis turbing is the pride which those officials took in claiming credit for the bloodshed that occurred 1 The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and the United Slores (US) Inc FBI memoranda indicate that the FBI leadership was aware of a violent power struggle between the Black Panther Party and the United Slaves (US) in late 1968 A memorandum to the head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division for example stated On 11/2/68 BPP received information indicating US members intended to assassinate Leroy Eldridge Cleaver . "Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/26/70 pp 1-2 190 at a rally scheduled at Los Angeles on 11/3/68 A Los Angeles racial informant advised on 11/8/68 that [a BPP member] had been identified as a US infiltrator and that BPP headquarters had instructed that [name deleted] should be killed During BPP rally US members including one [name deleted] were ordered to leave the rally site by LASS mem bers (Los Angeles BPP Security Squad) and did so US capitulation on this occasion prompted BPP members to decide to kill [name deleted] and then take over US orga nization Members of LASS were given orders to elimi nate name deleted] and [name deleted]. This memorandum also suggested that the two ITS members should be told of the BPP's plans to "eliminate them in order to convince them to become Bureau infoimants.12 In November 1968 the FBI took initial steps in its program to disrupt the Black Panther Party in San Diego California by ag gravating the existing hostility between the Panthers and US A memorandum from FBI Director Hoover to 14 field offices noted a state of "gang warfare existed with "attendant threats of murder and reprisals. between the BPP and US in southern California and added In order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences as well as to exploit all avenues of creating further dissention in the ranks of the BPP recipient offices are instructed to submit imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP.13 As the tempo of violence quickened the FBI's field office in San Diego developed tactics calculated to heighten tension between the hos tile factions On January 17 1969 two members of the Black Panther Party Apprentice "Buchey Carter and John Huggins were killed by US members on the UCLA campus following a meeting involving the two organizations and university students.14 One month later the San Diego field office requested permission from headquarters to mail derogatory cartoons to local BPP offices and to the homes of promi nent BPP leaders around the country.15 The purpose was plainly stated The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that the US organization feels that they are ineffectual in adequate and riddled with graft and corruption.16 In the first week of March the first cartoon was mailed to five BPP members and two underground papers all in the San Diego area.17 According to an FBI memorandum the consensus of opinion within n Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto W C Sullivan 11/5/68 "Ibid An earlier FBI memorandumhad informed headquarters that "sources have reported that the BPP has let a contract on Karenga [the leader of US] because they feel he has sold out to the establishment. (Memorandum from Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/25/68 p 1.) "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13 other fieldoffices) 11/25/68 14Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/20/69 Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/20/69 i Ibid Seememorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/12/69 191 the BPP was that US was responsible and t.hat the mailing consti tuted an attack on the BPP by US.13 In mid-March 1969 the FBI learned that a BPP member had been critically wounded by US members at a rally in Los Angeles The field office concluded that shots subsequently fired into the home of a US member were the results of a retaliatory raid by the BPP.'s Tensions between the BPP and US in San Diego however appeared to lessen and the FBI concluded that those chapters were trying "to talk out their differences. The San Diego field office reported On 3/27/69 there was a meeting between the BPP and US organization Wallace [BPP leader in San Diego] . concluded by stating that the BPP in San Diego would not hold a grudge against the ITS members for the killing of the Panthers in Los Angeles (Huggins and Carter) He stated that he would leave any retaliation for this activity to the black community. On 4/2/69 there was a friendly confrontation between US and the BPP with no weapons being exhibited by either side US members met with BPP members and tried to talk out their differences.20 On March 27 1969 the day that the San Diego field office learned that the local BPP leader had promised that his followers "would not hold a grudge against local US members for the killings in Los Angeles the San Diego office requested headquarters approval for three more cartoons ridiculing the BPP and falsely attributed to US One week later shortly after the San Diego office learned that US and BPP members were again meeting and discussing their differ ences the San Diego field officemailed the cartoons with headquarters approval.21 On April 4 1969 there was a confrontation between US and BPP members in Southcrest Park in San Diego at which according to an FBI memorandum the BPP members "ran the US members off. 22 On the same date US members broke into a BPP political education meeting and roughed up a female BPP member.23 The FBI's Special Agent In Charge in San Diego boasted that the cartoons had caused these incidents The BPP members strongly objected being made fun of by cartoons being distributed by the US organization (FBI cartoons in actuality) .. [Informant] has advised on several occasions that the cartoons are "really shaking up the BPP. They have made the BPP feel that US is getting ready to move and this was the cause of the confrontation at South crest Park on 4/4/69.24 'aMemorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/12/69 P 4 Memorandumfrom Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/17/69 20Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/10/69 21Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/27/69 r Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/10/69 D 4 23Ibid 24I bid 192 The fragile truce had ended On May 23 1969 John Savage a mem ber of the BPP in Southern California was shot and killed by US member Jerry Rome aka Tambuzi The killing was reported in an FBI memorandum which stated that confrontations between the groups were now "ranging from mere harrassment up to and includ ing beating of various individuals. 25In mid-June the San Diego FBI office informed Washington headquarters that members of the US organization were holding firearms practice and purchasing large quantities of ammunition Reliable information has been received that members of the US organization have purchased ammunition at one of the local gun shops On 6/5/69 an individual identified as [name deleted] purchased 150 rounds of 9 MM ammunition 100 rounds of .32 automatic ammunition and 100 rounds of .38 special ammunition at a local gun shop [Name deleted] was tentatively identified as the individual who was responsible for the shooting of BPP member [name deleted] in Los An geles on or about 3/14/69.26 Despite this atmosphere of violence FBI headquarters authorized the San Diego field office to compose an inflammatory letter over the forged signature of a San Diego BPP member and to send it to BPP headquarters in Oakland California. The letter complained of the killing of Panthers in San Diego by US members and the fact that a local BPP leader had a white girlfriend.28 According to a BPP bulletin two Panthers were wounded by US gunman on August 14 1969 and the next day another BPP member Sylvester Bell was killed in San Diego by US members.29 On August 30 1969 the San Diego office of US was bombed The FBI believed the BPP was responsible for the bombing.3 The San Diego office of the FBI viewed this carnage as a positive development and informed headquarters "Efforts are being made to determine how this situation can be capitalized upon for the benefit of the Counterintelligence Program.... 31The field office further noted In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US.32 The San Diego FBI office pointed with pride to the continued vio lence between black groups Shootings beatings and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego Al though no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation it is felt that a 2GMemorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/5/69 p 3 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/13/60 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office 6/17/69 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/6/69 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/20/69 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/18/69 alIbid p 3 32Ibid. p 1 193 substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program. [Emphasis added.] 33 In early September 1969 the San Diego field office informed head quarters that Karenga the Los Angeles US leader feared assassina tion by the BPP.34 It received permission from headquarters to exploit this situation by sending Karenga a letter purporting to be from a US member in San Diego alluding to an article in the BPP newspaper criticizing Karenga and suggesting that he order reprisals against the Panthers The Bureau memorandum which originally proposed the letter explained The article which is an attack on Ron Karenga of the US organization is self-explanatory It is felt that if the follow ing letter be sent to Karenga pointing out that the contents of the article are objectionable to members of the US orga nization in San Diego the possibility exists that some sort of retaliatory action will be taken against the BPP ...35 FBI files do not indicate whether the letter which was sent to Karenga by the San Diego office was responsible for any violence In January 1970 the San Diego office prepared a new series of counterintelligence cartoons attacking the BPP and forwarded them to FBI headquarters for approval.36 The cartoons were composed to look like a product of the US organization The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that the US Organization considers them to be ineffectual in adequate and [considers itself] vitally superior to the BPP.37 One of the caricatures was "designed to attack the Los Angeles Panther leader as a bully toward women and children in the black community Another accused the BPP of "actually instigating a re cent Los Angeles Police Department raid on US headquarters A third cartoon depicted Karenga as an overpowering individual "who has the BPP completely at his mercy . 33 On January 29 1970 FBI headquarters approved distribution of these caricatures by FBI field offices in San Diego Los Angeles and San Francisco The authorizing memorandum from headquarters stated US Incorporated and the Black Panther Party are oppos ing black extremist organizations Feuding between repre sentatives of the two groups in the past had a tendency to limit the effectiveness of both The leaders and incidents de picted in the caricatures are known to the general public particularly among the Negroes living in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles San Diego and San Francisco The leaders and members of both groups are distrusted by a large number of the citizen within the Negro commu "Ibid. p 2 "Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/3/69 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/12/69 "Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/23/70 "Ibid. p 1 Ibid. p 2 194 nities Distribution of caricatures is expected to strengthen this distrust. Bureau documents provided to the Select Committee do not indicate whether violence between BPP and US members followed the mail ing of this third series of cartoons In early May 1970 FBI Headquarters became aware of an article entitled "Karenga King of the Bloodsuckers in the May 2 1970 edition of the BPP newspaper which "vilifies and debases Karenga and the US organization. 40Two field offices received the following request from headquarters [s]ubmit recommendation to Bureau for exploitation of same under captioned program Consider from two aspects one against US and Karenga from obvious subject matter the second against BPP because inherent in article is admission by BPP that it has done nothing to retaliate against US for killing of Panther members attributed to US and Karenga an admission that the BPP has been beaten at its own game of violence 41 In response to this request the Special Agent in Charge in Los Angeles reported that the BPP newspaper article had already re sulted in violence but that it was difficult to induce BPP members to attack US members in Southern California because they feared US members 42 The Los Angeles field office hoped however that "internecine struggle might be triggered through a skillful use of informants within both groups The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized It is intended that US Inc will be appropriately and dis cretely advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be brought to gether and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course [Emphasis added.] 43 The release of Huey P Newton BPP Minister of Defense from prison in August 1970 inspired yet another counterintelligence plan An FBI agent learned from a prison official that Newton had told an inmate that a rival group had let a $3,000 contract on his life The Los Angeles office presumed the group was US and proposed that an anonymous letter be sent to David Hilliard BPP Chief of Staff in Oakland purporting to be from the person holding the contract on Newton's life The proposed letter warned Hilliard not to be around when the "unscheduled appointment to kill Newton was kept and cautioned Hilliard not to "get in my way. 44 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office1/29/70 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco Field Offices5/15/70 Ibid "Memorandum from Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/26/70 "Ibid. pp 1-2 "Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/10/70 195 FBI headquarters however denied authority to send the letter to Hilliard Its concern was not that the letter might cause violence or that it was improper action by a law enforcement agency but that the letter might violate a Federal statute While Bureau appreciates obvious effort and interest ex hibited concerning anonymous letter studied analysis of same indicates implied threat therein may constitute extor tion violation within investigative jurisdiction of Bureau or postal authorities and may subsequently be embarrassing to Bureau 45 The Bureau's stated concern with legality was ironic in light of the activities described above 2 The Effort To Promote Violence Between the Blackstone Rangers and the Black Panther Party In late 1968 and early 1969 the FBI endeavored to pit the Black stone Rangers a heavily armed violence-prone organization against the Black Panthers.46 In December 1968 the FBI learned that the recognized leader of the Blackstone Rangers Jeff Fort was resisting Black Panther overtures to enlist "the support of the Blackstone Rangers. 47In order to increase the friction between these groups the Bureau's Chicago office proposed sending an anonymous letter to Fort informing him that two prominent leaders of the Chicago BPP had been making disparaging remarks about his "lack of com mitment to black people generally. The field office observed Fort is reportedly aware that such remarks have been circulated but is not aware of the identities of the indi vidual responsible He has stated that he would "take care of individuals responsible for the verbal attacks directed against him Chicago consequently recommends that Fort be made aware that [name deleted] and [name deleted] together with other BPP members locally are responsible for the circula tion of these remarks concerning him It is felt that if Fort were to be aware that the BPP was responsible it would lend impetus to his refusal to accept any BPP overtures to the Rangers and additionally might result in Fort having "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office9/30/70 "There is no question that the Blackstone Rangers were well-armed and violent The Chicagopolice had linked the Rangers and rival gangs in Chicago to approximately290killings from 1965--69Report of Captain Edward Buckney ChicagoPolice Dept. Gang Intelligence Unit 2/23/70 p 2 One Chicagopolice officer familiar with the Rangers told a Committee staff member that their governing body the Main 21 was responsible for several ritualistic murders of black youths in areas the gang controlled (Staff summary of interview with Renault Robinson 9/25/75.) "Memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/16/68 Forte also had a well-earned reputation for violence Between September 1964 and January 1971 he was charged with more than 14 felonies including murder (twice) aggravated battery (seven times) robbery (twice) and contempt of Congress (Select Committee staff interview of FBI criminal records.) A De cember 1968FBI memorandum noted that a search of Forte's apartment had turned up a .22caliber four-shot derringer pistol (Memorandumfrom Chicago Field Officeto FRI Headquarters 12/12/68 p 2.) 196 active steps taken to exact some form of retribution toward the leadership of the BPP [Emphasis added.] 48 On about December 18 1968 Jeff Fort and other Blackstone Rangers were involved iii a serious confrontation with members of the Black Panther Party During that day twelve members of the BPP and five known mem bers of the Blackstone Rangers were arrested on Chicago's South ide.49 A report indicates that the Panthers and Rangers were arrested following the shooting of one of the Panthers by a Ranger.49a That evening according to an FBI informant around 10:30 p.m. approximately thirty Panthers went to the Blackstone Rangers head quarters at 6400 South Kimbark in Chicago Upon their arrival Jeff Fort invited Fred Hampton Bobby Rush and the other BPP members to come upstairs and meet with him and the Ranger leadership.49b The Bureau goes on to describe what transpired at this meeting everyone went upstairs into a room which appeared to be a gymnasium where Fort told Hampton and Rush that he had heard about the Panthers being in Ranger territory during the clay attempting to show their "power and he wanted the Panthers to recognize the Rangers "power. Source stated that Fort then gave orders via walkie-talkie whereupon two men marched through the door carrying pump shotguns Another order and two men appeared car rying sawed off carbines then eight more each carrying a .45 caliber machine gun clip type operated from the shoulder or hip then others came with over and under type weapons Source stated that after this procession Fort had all Rangers present approximately 100 display their side arms and about one half had .45 caliber revolvers Source advised that all the above weapons appeared to be new Source advised they left the gym went downstairs to an other room where Rush and Hampton of the Panthers and Fort and two members of the Main 21 sat by a table and dis cussed the possibility of joining the two groups Source re lated that Fort took off his jacket and was wearing a .45 caliber revolver shoulder holster with gun and had a small caliber weapon in his belt Source advised that nothing was decided at the meeting about the two groups actually joining forces however a de cision was made to meet again on Christmas Day Source stated Fort did relate that the Rangers were behind the Panthers but were not to be considered members Fort wanted the Panthers to join the Rangers and Hampton wanted the opposite stating that if the Rangers joined the Panthers then together they would be able to absorb all the other Chi cago gangs Source advised Hampton did state that they couldn't let the man keep the two groups apart Source ad "Memorandum from ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/16/68 p 2 Letter Head Memorandum 12/20/68 " From confidential FBI interview with inmate at the House of Correction 26thand California St in Chicago 11/12/69 49bLetterhead Memorandum12/20/68 197 vised that Fort also gave Hampton and Rush one of the above .45 caliber machine guns to "try out. Source advised that based upon conversations during this meeting Fort did not appear over anxious to join forces with the Panthers however neither did it appear that he wanted to terminate meeting for this purpose.'9 On December 26 1968 Fort and Hampton met again to discuss the possibility of the Panthers and Rangers working together This meet ing was at a South Side Chicago bar and broke up after several Panthers and Rangers got into an argument.' On December 27 Hampton received a phone call at BPP Headquarters from Fort tell ing him that the BPP had until December 28 1968 to join the Black stone Rangers Hampton told Fort he had until the same time for the Rangers to join the BPP and they hung up.49e In the wake of this incident the Chicago office renewed its proposal to send a letter to Forte informing FBI headquarters As events have subsequently developed the Rangers and the BPP have not only not been able to form any alliance but enmity and distrust have arisen to the point where each has been ordered to stay out of the other territory The BPP has since decided to conduct no activity or attempt to do recruiting in Ranger territory.J0 The proposed letter read Brother Jeff I've spent some time with some Panther friends on the west side lately and I know what's been going on The brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you I'm not a Panther or a Ranger just black From what I see these Pan thers are out for themselves not black people I think you ought to know what they're up to I know what I'd do if I was you You might hear from me again (sgd.) A black brother you don't know [Emphasis added.] 51 The FBI's Chicago officeexplained the purpose of the letter as follows It is believed the above may intensify the degree of ani mosity between the two groups and occasion Forte to take retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the BPP alleging a Ranger plot against the BPP leadership however it is not felt this would be productive principally because the BPP at present is not believed as violence prone as the Rangers to whom violent type activity shooting and the like is second nature.52 4 Ibid. pp 3-4 +eaFBI SpecialAgentInformant Report 12/30/68 Ibid E0Memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/10/69 Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/13/69 p 1 52Ibid 198 On the evening of January 13 1969 Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush appeared on a Chicago radio talk show called "Hot Line. Dur ing the course of the program Hampton stated that the BPP was in the "process of educating the Blackstone Rangers. 52aShortly after that statement Jeff Fort was on the phone to the radio program and stated that Hampton had his facts confused and that the Rangers were educating the BPP.52b On January 16 Hampton in a public meeting stated that Jeff Fort had threatened to blow his head off if he came within Ranger territory.52c On January 30 1969 Director Hoover authorized sending the anon ymous letter.53 While the Committee staff could find no evidence link ing this letter to subsequent clashes between the Panthers and the Rangers the Bureau's intent was clear.54 B The Effort To Disrupt the Black Panther Party by Promoting Internal Dissension 1 General Efforts to Disrupt the Black Panther Party Mem bership In addition to setting rival groups against the Panthers the FBI employed the full range of COINTELPRO techniques to create rifts and factions within the Party itself which it was believed would "neutralize the Party's effectiveness.55 Anonymous letters were commonly used to sow mistrust For exam ple in March 1969 the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a local BPP member feared that a faction of the Party allegedly led by Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush was "out to get him.56 Headquar ters approved sending an anonymous letter to Hampton which was drafted to exploit dissension within the BPP as well as to play on mistrust between the Blackstone Rangers and the Chicago BPP lead ership Brother Hampton Just a word of warning A Stone friend tells me [name deleted] wants the Panthers and is looking for somebody to get you out of the way Brother Jeff is supposed to be in terested I'm just a black man looking for blacks working to gether not more of this gang banging.57 " Memorandumfrom SpecialAgentto SAC Chicago 1/15/69 52bIbid 620Memorandumfrom Special Agent to SAC Chicago 1/28/69 reporting on informant report "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office 1/30/69 "There are indications that a shooting incident between the Rangers and the Panthers on April 2 1969 in a Chicago suburb may have been triggered by the FBI Accordingto Bobby Rush coordinator of the ChicagoBPP at the time a group of armed BPP members had confronted the Rangers because Panther William O'Neal who has since surfaced as an FBI informant had told them that a Panther had been shot by Blackstone Rangers and had insisted that they retaliate This account however has not been confirmed (Staff sum mary of interview with Bobby Rush 11/26/75.) 'The various COINTELPROtechniques are described in detail in the Staff Report onCOINTELPRO "Memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/24/69 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office 4/8/69 199 Bureau documents indicate that during this time an informant with in the BPP was also involved in maintaining the division between the Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers.5;a In December 196S the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a leader of a Chicago youth gang the Mau Mau's planned to complain to the national BPP headquarters about the local BPP leadership and questioned its loyalty. FBI headquarters approved an anonymous letter to the Mau Mau leader stating Brother [deleted] I'm from the south side and have some Panther friends that know you and tell me what's been going I know those two [name deleted] and [name deleted] that run the Panthers for a long time and those mothers been with every black outfit going where it looked like they was something in it for them The only black people they care about is themselves I heard too they're sweethearts and that [name deleted] has worked for the man that's why he's not in Viet Nam Maybe that's why they're just playing like real Panthers I hear a lot of the brothers are with you and want those mothers out but don't know how The Panthers need real black men for leaders not freaks Don't give up brothers [Emphasis added.] 59 A black friend The FBI also resorted to anonymous phone calls The San Diego Field Office placed anonymous calls to local BPP leaders naming other BPP members as "police agents. According to a report from the field office these calls reinforced by rumors spread by FBI informants within the BPP induced a group of Panthers to accuse three Party members of working for the police The field office boasted that one of the accused members fled San Diego in fear for his life.60 The FBI conducted harassing interviews of Black Panther mem bers to intimidate them and drive them from the Party The Los Angeles Field Office conducted a stringent interview program in the hope that a state of distract [sic] might remain among the members and add to the turmoil presently going on within the BPP.61 The Los Angeles office claimed that similar tactics had cut the mem bership of the United States (US) by 50 percent.62 6 Memorandumfrom Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/28/69 Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/30/68 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to ChicagoField Office1/30/69 Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/12/69 The FBI had successwith this technique in other cases For example the FBI placed another anonymouscall to Stokely Carmichael's residence in New York City Carmichael's mother was informed falsely that several BPP memberswere out to kill her son and that he should "hide out. The FBI memorandumreport ing this incident said that Mrs Carmichael sounded "shocked on hearing the news and stated that she would tell Stokely when he came home The memo randum observed that on the next day Stokely Carmichael left New York for Africa (Memorandumfrom NewYork Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/9/68 p 2.) e Memorandumfrom Los Angeles Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/17/69 p 1 "Memorandum from Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/3/69 200 FBI agents attempted to convince landlords to force Black Panther members and officesfrom their buildings The Indianapolis Field Office reported that a local landlord had yielded to its urgings and promised to tell his Black Panther tenants to relocate their offices.63The San Francisco office sent an article from the Black Panther newspaper to the landlord of a BPP member who had rented an apartment under an assumed name The article which had been written by that member and contained her picture and true name was accompanied by an anon ymous note stating "(false name) is your tenant (true name) 61 The San Francisco office secured the eviction of one Black Panther who lived in a public housing project by informing the Housing Au thority officials that she was using his apartment for the BPP Free Breakfast Program. When it was learned that the BPP was con ducting a Free Breakfast Program "in the notorious Haight-Ashbury District of San Francisco, the Bureau mailed a letter to the owners of the building Dear Mr (excised) I would call and talk to you about this matter but I am not sure how you feel and I do not wish to become personally em broiled with neighbors It seems that the property owners on (excised) Street have had enough trouble in the past without bringing in Black Panthers Maybe you are not aware but the Black Panthers have taken over (address deleted) Perhaps if you drive up the street you can see what they are going to do to the property values They have already plastered a nearby garage with big Black Panther posters A concerned property owner.66 The Bureau also attempted to undermine the morale of Panther members by attempting to break up their marriages In one case an anonymous letter was sent to the wife of a prominent Panther leader stating that her husband had been having affairs with several teenage girls and had taken some of those girls with him on trips.67 Another Panther leader told a Committee staff member that an FBI agent had attempted to destroy his marriage by visiting his wife and showing photographs purporting to depict him with other women.68 2 FBI Role in the Newton-Cleaver Rift In March 1970 the FBI initiated a concerted program to drive a permanent wedge between the followers of Eldridge Cleaver who was then out of the country and the supporters of Huey P Newton who Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/8/69 The FBI discoveredthat the Indianapolis BPP wouldhave difficultyin new quarters because of its financial plight a fact which was discovered by monitoring its bank account (Memorandum from Indianapolis Field Officeto FBI Head quarters 9/23/69.) Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/15/69 "Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 10/21/70 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 10/22/70 Memorandumfrom San FranciscoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/26/68 "The Bureau documents presented to the Committee do not record of this contact 201 was then serving a prison sentence in California.6 An anonymous letter was sent to Cleaver in Algeria stating that BPP leaders in Cali fornia were seeking to undercut his influence The Bureau subse quently learned that Cleaver had assumed the letter was from the then Panther representative in Scandanavia Connie Matthews and that the letter had led Cleaver to expel three BPP international repre sentatives from the Party.70 Encouraged by the apparent success of this letter FBI headquar ters instructed its Paris Legal Attache to mail a follow-up letter again written to appear as if Matthews was the author to the Black Panther Chief-of-Staff David Hilliard in Oakland California The letter al leged that Cleaver "has tripped out Perhaps he has been working too hard, and suggested that Hilliard "take some immediate action before this becomes more serious. The Paris Legal Attache was instructed to mail the letter At a time when Matthews is in or has just passed through Paris immediately following one of her trips to Algiers The enclosed letter should be held by you until such an occasion arises at which time you are authorized to immediately mail it in Paris in such a manner that it cannot be traced to the Bureau.71 In early May Eldridge Cleaver called BPP national headquarters from Algeria and talked with Connie Matthews Elbert Howard and Roosevelt Hilliard A Bureau report stated Various items were discussed by these individuals with Hil liard Connie Matthews discussed with Hilliard "those letters appearing to relate to the counterintelligence letters which have been submitted to Cleaver and Hilliard purportedly by Matthews.. It appears that [Elbert Howard] had brought copies of the second counterintelligence letter to David Hilliard with him to Algiers which were then compared with the . letter previously sent to Cleaver in Algiers and that .. dis cussed this situation .72 The San Francisco Field Office reported that some BPP leaders sus pected that the CIA or FBI had sent the letters while others sus pected the Black Panther members in Paris A subsequent FBI memorandum indicated that suspicion had focused on the Panthers in Europe.73 On August 13 1970 the day that Huey Newton was released from prison the Philadelphia Field Office had an informant distribute a fictitious BPP directive to Philadelphia Panthers questioning New 6BIn September 1969 FBI Headquarters had encouraged the field officesto undertake projects aimed at splitting the BPP on a nationwide basis (Memoran dum from FBI Headquarters to Newark New York and San Francisco Field Offices9/18/69.) 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Legat Paris and San Francisco Field Office4/10/70 "Ibid. pp 1-2 Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/8/70 'aMemorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/28/70 202 ton's leadership ability. The Philadelphia office informed FBI Headquarters that the directive stresses the leadership and strength of David Hilliard and Eldridge Cleaver while intimating Huey Newton is useful only as a drawing card It is recommended this directive be mailed personally to Huey Newton with a short anonymous note The note would indicate the writer a Community Worker in Philadelphia for the BPP was incensed over the suggestion Huey was only being used by the Party after founding it and wanted no part of this Chapter if it was slandering its leaders in private.7 Headquarters approved this plan on August 19 1970.76 FBI officials seized on several incidents during the following months as opportunities to advance their program In an August 1970 edition of the BPP newspaper Huey Newton appealed to "oppressed groups, including homosexuals to "unite with the BPP in revolutionary fashion. 77FBI headquarters approved a plan to mail forged letters from BPP sympathizers and supporters in ghetto areas to David Hil liard protesting Newton's statements about joining with homosexuals hoping this would discredit Newton with other BPP leaders.78 In July and August 1970 Eldridge Cleaver led a United States dele gation to North Korea and North Vietnam Ramparts editor Robert Scheer who had been a member of the delegation held a press con ference in New York and according to the Bureau glossed over the Panther's role in sponsoring the tour.79 The New York office was au thorized to send an anonymous letter to Newton complaining about Sheer's oversight to strain relations between the BPP and the "New Left. 80On November 13 1970 the Los Angeles field office was asked to prepare an anonymous letter to Cleaver criticizing Newton for not aggressively obtaining BPP press coverage of the BPP's sponsorship of the trip 81 In October 1970 the FBI learned that Timothy Leary who had escaped from a California prison where he was serving a sentence for possessing marijuana was seeking asylum with Eldridge Cleaver an Algiers The San Francisco field office noting that the Panthers were officially opposed to drugs sent Newton an anonymous letter call ing his attention to Cleaver "playing footsie with Leary.82 In Janu ary when Cleaver publicly condemned Leary FBI headquarters ap proved sending Newton a bogus letter from a Berkeley California commune condemning Cleaver for "divorcing the BPP from white revolutionaries. 87 Memorandumfrom Philadelphia Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/13/70 Ibid. pp 1-2 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Philadelphia and San Francisco Field Offices8/19/70 Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/31/70 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office9/9/70 7BMemorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/21/70 A0Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and NewYork Field Office10/29/70 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office11/3/70 " Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/28/70 " Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and NewYork Field Offices2/5/71 203 In December 1970 the BPP attempted to hold a Revolutionary Peo ples Constitutional Convention (RPCC) in Washington D.C The Bureau considered the convention a failure and received reports that most delegates had left it dissatisfied.84 The Los Angeles FBI field officesuggested a letter to Cleaver designed to provoke Cleaver to openly question Newton's leadership It is felt that distance and lack of personal contact between New ton and Cleaver do offer a counterintelligence opportunity that should be probed In view of the BPP's unsuccessful attempt to convene a Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC) it is suggested that each division which had individuals attend the RPCC write numerous letters to Cleaver criticizing New ton for his lack of leadership It is felt that if Cleaver re ceived a sufficient number of complaints regarding Newton it might create dissension that later could be more fully exploited.85 FBI headquarters approved the Los Angeles letter to Cleaver and asked the Washington field office to supply a list of all organizations attending the RPCC.86 A barrage of anonymous letters to Newton and Cleaver followed Two weeks later the San Francisco office mailed Newton an anony mous letter supposedly from a "white revolutionary, complaining about the incompetence of the Panthers who had planned the confer ence.86aThe New York office mailed a complaint to the BPP national headquarters purportedly from a black student at Columbia Univer sity who attended the RPCC as a member of the University's student Afro-American Society.8fi The San Francisco office sent a letter con taining an article from the Berkeley Barb to Cleaver attacking New ton's leadership at the RPCC Mailed with the article was a copy of a letter to Newton criticizing the RPCC and bearing the notation Mr Cleaver Here is a letter I sent to Huey Newton I'm sincere and hope you can do something to set him right and get him off his duff.86c In January 1971 the Boston office sent a letter purportedly from a "white revolutionary, to Cleaver stating in part "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles San Francisco and WashingtonField Offices12/15/70 85Memorandumfrom Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/3/70 p.2"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles San Francisco and WashingtonField Offices12/15/70 A list of 10organizations whosemembersat tended the RPCC was forwarded to the FBI officesin Atlanta Boston Chicago Detroit NewYork and San Francisco (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Atlanta (and 5 other Field Offices) 12/31/70.) There is no indication concerning howthe Bureau obtainedthis list 98Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 12/16/70 Memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/14/70 " Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office1/6/71 69-9840 76 14 204 Dear Revolutionary Comrade The people's revolution in America was greatly impeded and the stature of the Black Panther Party both nationally and internationally received a major setback as an outcome of the recent Revolutionary People's Constitutional Conven tion The Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention did little if anything to organize our forces to move against the evils of capitalism imperialism and racism Any unity or solidarity which existed between the Black Panther Party and the white revolutionary movement before the Conven tion has now gone clown the tube The responsibility of any undertaking as meaningful and important to the revolution should not have been dele gated to the haphazard ways of [name deleted] whose title of Convention Coordinator places him in the posi tion of receiving the Party's wrath Huey Newton him self (should) have assumed command.. The Black Panther Party has failed miserably No longer can the Party be looked upon as the "Vanguard of the Revo lution. Yours in Revolution Lawrence Thomas Students for a Democratic Society Memorandumfrom Boston Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/8/71 This let ter was sent to Cleaverthrough Oakland BPP headquarters to determinewhether the BPP in Californiawouldforward the letter to him (Ibid.) One letter to Cleaver written to appear as if it had come from Con nie Matthews Newton's personal secretary read in part Things around headquarters are dreadfully disorganized with the comrade commander not making proper decisions The newspaper is in a shambles No one knows who is in charge The foreign department gets no support I fear there is rebellion working just beneath the surface We must either get rid of the Supreme Commander [New ton] or get rid of the disloyal members. In a January 28 1971 evaluation FBI headquarters noted that Huey Newton had recently disciplined high BPP officials and that he prepared "to respond violently to any question of his actions or poli cies. The Bureau believed that Newton's reaction was in part a "result of our counterintelligence projects now in operation. Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/18/70 FBI headquarters authorized this letter on January 21 1971stating that the Bureau must now seize the time and "immediately send the letter (Memo randum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 1/21/71 p 2.) Shortly afterward a letter was sent to Cleaver from alleged Puerto Rican po litical allies of the BPP in ChicagoThe YoungLords What do we get A disorganized Convention apologeticspeakers and flunkys whopush us around no leadership no ideas no nothing [Y]our talk is nice but your ideas and action is nothing You are gone those you left behind have big titles but cannot lead cannot organize are afraid to even come out among the people The oppressedof Amerikka cannot wait We must movewith out you (Memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/19/71 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicagoand San Francisco Field Offices1/27/71.) 205 The present chaotic situation within the BPP must be ex ploited and recipients must maintain the present high level of counterintelligence activity You should each give this mat ter priority attention and immediately furnish Bureau rec ommendations designed to further aggravate the dis sention within BPP leadership and to fan the apparent dis trust by Newton of anyone who questions his wishes.$$ The campaign was intensified On February 2 1971 FBI headquar ters directed each of 29 field offices to submit within eight days a pro posal to disrupt local BPP chapters and a proposal to cause dissention between local BPP chapters and BPP national headquarters The di rective noted that Huey Newton had recently expelled or disciplined several "dedicated Panthers and This dissention coupled with financial difficulties offers an ex ceptional opportunity to further disrupt aggravate and pos sibly neutralize this organization through counterintelligence In light of above developments this program has been intensi field and selected offices should increase measurably the pressure on the BPP and its leaders.89 A barrage of anonymous letters flowed from FBI field offices in response to the urgings from FBI headquarters A fictitious letter to Cleaver signed by the "New York 21, criticized Newton's leadership and his expulsion of them from the BPP.90 An imaginary New York City member of the Youth Against War and Facism added his voice to the Bureau's fictitious chorus of critics of Newton and the RPCC. 1 An anonymous letter was sent to Huey Newton's brother Melvin New ton warning that followers of Eldridge Cleaver and the New York BPP chapter were planning to have him killed.92 The FBI learned that Melvin Newton told his brother he thought the letter had been written by someone "on the inside of the BPP organization because of its specificity.93 Huey Newton reportedly remarked that he was "definitely of the opinion there is an informer in the party right in the ministry. 93a On February 19 1971 a false letter allegedly from a BPP official in Oakland was mailed to Don Cox a BPP official close to Cleaver in Algeria The letter intimated that the recent death of a BPP member in California was the result of BPP factionalism (which the Bureau knew was not the case.) The letter also warned Cleaver not to allow his wife Kathleen to travel to the United States because of the pos sibility of violence.94 A letter over the forged signature of "Big Man Howard editor of the BPP newspaper told Cleaver Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Boston LosAngeles NewYork and San FranciscoField Offices1/28/71 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to 29Field Offices2/2/71 9 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYork and San Francisco Field Offices2/3/71 91Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYorkField Office2/3/71 9aMemorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office2/10/71 93Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/12 71 s The FBI was able to bespecificbecauseof its wiretaps on the phonesof Huey Newtonand the BlackPanther headquarters "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office2/19/71 206 Eldridge [Name deleted] told Inc Huey talked with you Friday and what he had to say I'm disgusted with things here and the fact that you are being ignored... It makes me mad to learn that Huey now has to lie to you I'm referring to his fancy apartment which he refers to as the throne. I can't risk a call as it would mean certain expulsion You should think a great deal before sending Kathleen If I could talk to you I could tell you why I don't think you should 95 The San Francisco office reported to headquarters that because of the various covert actions instituted against Cleaver and Newton since November 11 1970 fortunes of the BPP are at a low ebb Newton is positive there is an informant in Headquarters Cleaver feels isolated in Algeria and out of contact with Newton and the Supreme Commander's [Newton's] secretary (Connie Matthews) has disappeared and been denounced 96 On April 8 1976 in Executive Testimony Kathleen Cleaver testified that many letters written to appear as if they had come from BPP members living in California caused disruption and confusion in the relationship between the Algerian Section and the BPP leadership in Oakland She stated We did not know who to believe about what so the general effect not only of the letters but the whole situation in which the letters were part was creating uncertainty It was a very bizarre feeling.96a On February 26 1971 Eldridge Cleaver in a television interview criticized the expulsion of BPP members and suggested that Pan ther Chief-of-Staff David Hilliard be removed from his post As a result of Cleaver's statements Newton expelled him and the "Inter communal Section of the Party in Algiers Algeria.97 On March 25 1971 the Bureau's San Francisco office sent to various BPP "Solidarity Committees throughout Europe bogus let ters on "fascsimiles of BPP letterhead stating "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office2/24/71 The phone call from Cleaver to Newton mentioned in this letter had been in tercepted by the FBI An FBI memorandumcommentedthat the call had been prompted by an earlier Bureau letter purporting to come from Connie Mat thews "The letter undoubtedly provoked a long distance call from Cleaver to Newton which resulted in our being able to place in proper perspective the relationship of Newtonand Cleaverto obtain the details of the Geronimo[Elmer Pratt] Group and learn of the disaffectionsand the expulsion of the New York group. (Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/25/71.) "Memorandum from San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/25/71 I{athleenCleavertestimony 4/8/76 p 34 Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/2/71 FBI headquarters instructed the SAC San Francisco to mail Cleaver a copy of the March 6 edition of the BPP newspaper which announcedhis expulsion from the BPP along with an anonymous note saying "This is what we think of punks and cowards. (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office3/10/71.) 207 To Black Panther Embassies You have received copies of February 13 1971 issue of The Black Panther declaring [three BPP members] as enemies of the People The Supreme Servant of the People Huey P Newton with concurrence of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party has ordered the expulsion of the entire Intercommunal Section of the Party at Algiers You are advised that Eldridge Leroy Cleaver is a murderer and a punk without genitals D.C Cox is no better Leroy's running clogs in New York have been righteously dealt with Anyone giving any aid or comfort to Cleaver and his jackanapes will be similarly dealt with no matter where they may be located [Three BPP international representatives names deleted] were never members of the Black Panther Party and will never become such Immediately report to the Supreme Commander any attempts of these elements to contact you and be guided by the above instructions Power to the People David Hilliard Chief of Staff For Huey P Newton Supreme Commander.98 On the same day FBI headquarters formally declared its counter intelligence program aimed at "aggravating dissension between New ton and Cleaver a success A letter to the Chicago and San Francisco Field Offices stated Since the differences between Newton and Cleaver now appear to be irreconcilable no further counterintelligence activity in this regard will be undertaken at this time and now new targets must be established David Hilliard and Elbert "Big Man Howard of National Headquarters and Bob Rush of Chicago BPP Chapter are likely future targets.. Hilliard's key position at National Headquarters makes him an outstanding target Howard and Rush are also key Panther functionaries and since it was necessary for them to affirm their loyalty to New ton in "The Black Panther newspaper of 3/20/71 they must be under a certain amount of suspicion already making them prime targets San Francisco and Chicago furnish the Bureau their com ments and recommendations concerning counterintelligence activity designed to cause Newton to expell Hilliard Howard and Rush 99 This letter was contained in a memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 3/16/71 pp 1-2 BMemorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and ChicagoField Offices3/25/71 208 C Covert Efforts To Undermine Support of the Black Panther Party and to Destroy the Party's Public Image 1 Efforts To Discourage and To Discredit Supporters of the Black Panthers The Federal Bureau of Investigation's program to "neutralize the Black Panther Party included attempts to deter individuals and groups from supporting the Panthers and when that could not be accomplished often extended to covert action targeted against those supporters The Bureau made a series of progressively more severe efforts to destroy the confidence between the Panthers and one of their major California supporters Donald Freed a writer who headed an or ganization of white BPP sympathizers called "Friends of the Pan thers. In July 1969 the Los Angeles Field Office sent the local BPP office a memorandum bearing Freed's name and address to "Friends of the Panthers. Written in a condescending tone and including a list of six precautions whites should keep in mind when dealing with Panthers the memorandum was calculated to cause a "rift between the Black Panther Party and their assisting organizations." A few days later the Bureau had leaflets placed in a park near a BPP sponsored national conference in Oakland California alleging that Freed was a police informant. The FBI viewed with favor an intensive local investigation of Freed for "harboring and "possession of illegal firearms. It is felt that any prosecution or exposure of either Freed or [name deleted] will severely hurt the BPP Any exposure will not only deny the Panthers money but additionally would cause other white supporters of the BPP to withdraw their support It is felt that the Los Angeles chapter of the BPP could not operate without the financial support of white sympathizers.102 The Bureau's Los Angeles Division also arranged for minutes of a BPP support group to be provided to the BPP when it was learned that statements of members of the support group were critical of Panther leaders.'o3 The FBI attempted to disaffect another BPP supporter Ed Pearl of the Peace and Freedom Party by sending him a cautionary letter bearing a fictitious signature A Bureau memorandum describing the letter says The writer states that although he is not a member of the BPP he is a Mexican who is trusted by BPP members The writer advises that he has learned from BPP members that certain whites in the PFP who get in the way of the Panthers will be dealt with in a violent manner The object sought in this letter is to cause a breach between the PFP and the BPP The former organization had been furnishing money and support to the latter.'o4 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office7/25/69 101Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/28/69 102Memorandumfrom Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/24/69 103Memorandumfrom Los Angeles Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/29/69 p 1104Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto W C Sullivan 12/27/68 209 Famous entertainment personalities who spoke in favor of Panther goals or associated with BPP members became the targets of FBI programs When the FBI learned that one well-known Hollywood actress had become pregnant during an affair with a BPP member it reported this information to a famous Hollywood gossip columnist in the form of an anonymous letter The story was used by the Holly wood colunmist.10 In June 1970 FBI headquarters approved an anonymous letter informing Hollywood gossip columnist Army Archerd that actress Jane Fonda had appeared at a BPP fund-raising function noting that "It can be expected that Fonda's involvement with the BPP cause could detract from her status with the general public if reported in a Hollywood gossip column. "1 The wife of a famous Hollywood actor was targeted by the FBI when it discovered that she was a financial contributor and supporter of the BPP in Los Angeles.10i A caricature attacking her was prepared by the San Diego FBI office. A famous entertainer was also targeted after the Bureau concluded that he supported the Panthers Two COINTELPRO actions against this individual were approved because FBI headquarters "believed they would be an effective means of combating BPP fund-raising activities among liberal and naive individuals.109 The Bureau also contacted the employers of BPP contributors It sent a letter to the President and a Vice-President of Union Carbide in January 1970 after learning that a production manager in its San Diego division contributed to the BPP The letter which centered around a threat not to purchase Union Carbide stock stated in part Dear Mr [name deleted] I am writing to you in regards to an employee in your San Diego operation [name deleted].. I am not generally considered a flag-waving exhibition ist but I do regard myself as being a loyal American citizen I therefore consider it absolutely ludicrous to invest in any corporation whose ranking employees support assist and encourage any organization which openly advocates the vio lent overthrow of our free enterprise system It is because of my firm belief in this self-same free enter prise capitalistic system that I feel morally obligated to bring this situation to your attention Sincerely yours T F Ellis Post Office Box San Diego California 110 'Memorandum from Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/3/70 10 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office6/25/70 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/3/70 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/2/70 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office3/5/70 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/22/70 The name "T F Ellis is completelyfictitious and the Post OfficeBox could not have been traced to the FBI 210 The response of Union Carbide's Vice President was reported in a San Diego Field Office memorandum On 3/21/70 a letter was received from Mr [name deleted] Vice President of the Union Carbide Corporation concern ing a previously Bureau-approved letter sent to the Union Carbide Corporation objecting to the financial and other sup port to the BPP of one of their employees [name deleted] The letter indicated that Union Carbide has always made it a policy not to become involved in personal matters of their employees unless such activity had an adverse affect upon that particular employee's performance.' One of the Bureau's prime targets was the BPP's free "Breakfast for Children program which FBI headquarters feared might be a potentially successful effort by the BPP to teach children to hate police and to spread "anti-white propaganda. 12 In an admitted at tempt "to impede their contributions to the BPP Breakfast Program, the FBI sent anonymous letters and copies of an inflammatory Black Panther Coloring Book for children to contributors including Safe way Stores Inc. Mayfair Markets and the Jack-In-The-Box Cor poration.113 On April 8 1976 in Executive Testimony a former member of the BPP Central Steering Committee stated that when the coloring book came to the attention of the Panther's national leadership Bobby Seale ordered it destroyed because the book "did not correctly reflect the ideology of the Black Panther Party ... 14 Churches that permitted the Panthers to use their facilities in the free breakfast program were also targeted When the FBI's San Diego office discovered that a Catholic Priest Father Frank Curran was permitting his church in San Diego to be used as a serving place for the BPP Breakfast Program it sent an anonymous letter to the Bishop of the San Diego Diocese informing him of the priest's ac tivities.115 In August 1969 the San Diego Field Office requested per mission from headquarters to place three telephone calls protesting Father Curran's support of the BPP program to the Auxiliary Bishop of the San Diego Diocese All of the above calls will be made from "parishioners ob jecting to the use of their church to assist a black militant cause Two of the callers will urge that Father Curran be re moved as Pastor of the church and one will threaten suspen sion of financial support of the church if the activities of the Pastor are allowed to continue Fictitious names will be utilized in the event a name is re quested by the Bishop It is felt that complaints if they do not effect the removal of Father Curran will at least result in Father Curran becoming aware that his Bishop is 111Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/1/70 n2Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office7/30/69 79Ibid. Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/30/70 'K Cleaver 4/8/76 p 16 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/29/69 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office 9/9/69 211 cognizant of his activities and will thus result in a curtail ment of these activities. After receiving permission and placing the calls the San Diego office reported "the Bishop appeared to be quite concerned over the fact that one of his Priests was deeply involved in utilization of church facilities for this purpose. 117 A month later the San Diego office reported that Father Curran had been transferred from the San Diego Diocese to "somewhere in the State of New Mexico for permanent assignment. In view of the above it would appear that Father Curran has now been completely neutralized The BPP Breakfast Program without the prompting of Father Curran has not been renewed in the San Diego area It is not anticipated at this time that any efforts to re-estab lish the program will be made in the foreseeable future. In another case the FBI sent a letter to the superior of a clergyman in Hartford Connecticut who had expressed support for the Black Panthers which stated in part Dear Bisnor It pains me to have to write this letter to call to your at tention a matter which if brought to public light may cause the church a great deal of embarrassment I wish to remain anonymous with regard to the information because in divulg ing it I may have violated a trust I feel however that what I am writing is important enough that my conscience is clear Specifically I'm referring to the fact that Reverend and Mrs [name deleted] are associating with leaders of the Black Panther Party I recently heard through a close friend of Rev erend [name deleted] that he is a revolutionist who advocates overthrowing the Government of the United States and that he has turned over a sizable sum of money to the Panthers I can present no evidence of fact but is it possible Reverend [name deleted] is being influenced by Communists Some statements he has made both in church and out have led me to believe he is either a Communist himself or so left-wing that the only thing he lacks is a card I beseech you to counsel with Reverend [name deleted] and relay our concern over his political philosophies which among other things involves association with a known revolutionist [name deleted] head of the Black Panther Party in New Haven I truly believe Reverend [name deleted] to be a good man but his fellow men have caused him to go overboard and he now needs a guiding light which only you can provide Sincerely A Concerned Christian.119 11 Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/29/69 17Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/18/69 ""Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/6/69 p 3119Memorandumfrom NewHaven Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/12/69 p 3 212 Anonymous FBI mailings were also sent to public officials and persons whose help might sway public opinion against the BPP In December 1969 the FBI mailed Bureau-reproduced copies of BPP "Seasons Greetings cards to ten FBI field offices 120with the follow ing instructions Enclosed for each office are 20 copies of reproductions of three types of Black Panther Party (BPP) "seasons greetings cards which depict the violent propensities of this organiza tion You should anonymously mail these cards to those news paper editors public officials responsible businessmen and clergy in your territory who should be made aware of the vicious nature of the BPP.121 The San Francisco office mailed its cards to several prominent local persons and organizations.122 The Bureau also targeted attorneys representing Black Panther members In July 1969 the Los Angeles Field Office suggested that a break between the BPP membership and Charles Garry an attorney who frequently represented BPP members might be accomplished by planting a rumor that Garry Bobby Seale and David Hilliard were conspiring to keep BPP leader Huey Newton in jai1.123This proposal was rejected by FBI headquarters out of concern that the Bureau might be recognized as the source of the rumor.'24 Headquarters did suggest however Los Angeles should review the ideas set forth especially as they pertain to Charles Garry Bobby Seale and David Hilliard and prepare a specific counterintelligence proposal designed to create a breach between the BPP and Garry Consider such things as anonymous communications and anonymous telephone calls as well as cartoons and other logi cal methods of transporting your idea.12 When the San Francisco Division learned that Garry intended to represent Bobby Seale at the Chicago 7 trial it sent the Chicago office transcripts of hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the California State Senate's Report on Un-American Activities which allegedly showed that Garry was connected with the Communist Party It was intended to distribute this material "to co operative news media in that city. 126 'The officeswere Baltimore Boston Chicago Kansas City Los Angeles Newark NewHaven NewYork San Diego and San Francisco 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore (and 9 other Field Offices) 12/24/69 p 1 'These included the Mayor the Glide Foundation (church foundation) Catholic Archdioceseof San Francisco Episcopal Diocese of California Lu theran Church Editor San Francisco Chronicle Editor San Francisco Examiner United Presbyterian Church San Francisco Conferenceof Christians and Jews San FranciscoChamberof Commerce San FranciscoBar Association and San Francisco Board of Supervisors (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/12/70.) 'Memorandum from Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/1/69 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office7/14/69 'Ibid "'Memorandum from San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquartrs 10/6/69 213 Similarly when two local BPP leaders filed suit against the San Diego Police Department charging harassment illegal arrest and illegal searches the San Diego Field Office reviewed its files to determine if any public source information is available which describes [the attorney's] activities in behalf of CP (Communist Party) activities If so an appropriate request will be forwarded to the Bureau concerning a possible letter to the editor and/or an editorial.Y2 The FBI also sought to destroy community support for individual BPP members by spreading rumors that they were immoral This idea was originally advanced in an August 1967 memorandum from FBI headquarters to all major field offices Many individuals currently active in black nationalist orga nizations have backgrounds in immorality subversive ac tivity and criminal records Through your investigation of key agitators you should endeavor to establish their unsavory backgrounds Be alert to determine evidence of misappropria tion of funds or other types of personal misconduct on the part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical or war ranted counterintelligence may be instituted.128 An example of "successful implementation of this program was a 1970 report from the San Diego Field Office that it had anonymously informed the parents of a teenage girl that she was pregnant by a local Panther leader The parents showed extreme concern over a previously un known situation and [name deleted] was forced to resign from the BPP and return home to live It also became gen eral knowledge throughout the Negro community that a BPP leader was responsible for the difficulty being experienced by [name deleted] 129 The field office also considered the operation successful because the mother of another girl questioned the activities of her own daughter after talking with the parent the agents had anonymously contacted She learned that her daughter a BPP member was also pregnant and had her committed to a reformatory as a wayward juvenile.13 2 Efforts To Promote Criticism of the Black Panthers in the Mass Media and To Prevent the Black Panther Party and Its sympathizers from Expressing Their Views The FBI's program to destroy the Black Panther Party included a concerted effort to muzzle Black Panther publications to prevent Panther members and persons sympathetic to their aims from express ing their views and to encourage the mass media to report stories un favorable to the Panthers 12'Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/2/70 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albany (and 22 other Field Of fices) 8/25/67 p 2 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/17/70 p 3130I bid. p 5 214 In May 1970 FBI headquarters ordered the Chicago Los Angeles Miami Newark New Haven New York San Diego and San Fran cisco field offices to advance proposals for crippling the BPP news paper The Black Panther Immediate action was deemed necessary because The Black Panther Party newspaper is one of the most effective propaganda operations of the BPP Distribution of this newspaper is increasing at a regular rate thereby influencing a greater number of individuals in the United States along the black extremist lines Each recipient submit by 6/5/70 proposed counterintelli gence measures which will hinder the vicious propaganda be ing spread by the BPP The BPP newspaper has a circulation in excess of 100,000 and has reached the height of 139,000 It is the voice of the BPP and if it could be effectively hindered it would result in helping to cripple the BPP Deadline being set in view of the need to receive recommendations for the purpose of taking appropriate action expeditiously.'31 The San Francisco Field Office submitted an analysis of the local Black Panther printing schedules and circulation It discouraged dis ruption of nationwide distribution because the airline company which had contracted with the Panthers might lose business or face a law suit and recommended instead a vigorous inquiry by the Internal Revenue Service to have "The Black Panther report their income from the sale of over 100,000 papers each week Perhaps the Bureau through liaison at SOG [seat of government] could suggest such a course of action It is noted that Internal Revenue Service at San Francisco is receiving copies of Black Panther Party funds and letterhead memoranda It is requested that the Bureau give consideration to dis cussion with Internal Revenue Service requesting financial records and income tax return for "The Black Panther. 132 The San Diego Field Office while noting that the BPP newspaper had the same legal immunity from tax laws and other state legislation as other newspapers suggested three California statutes which might be used against The Black Panther One was a State tax on print equipment the second a "rarely used transportation tax law" and the third a law prohibiting business in a residential area.'33 The San Diego Field Office had a more imaginative suggestion how ever spray the newspaper printing room with a foul-smelling chemical The Bureau may also wish to consider the utilization of "Skatol which is a chemical agent in powdered form and when applied to a particular surface emits an extremely noxious odor rendering the premises surroimding the point of application uninhabitable Utilization of such a chemical of 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago (and seven other Field Offices) 5/15/70 1'zMemorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/22/70 133Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/20/70 215 course would be dependent upon whether an entry could be achieved into the area which is utilized for the production of "The Black Panther. 134 The San Diego Division also thought that threats from another radical organization against the newspaper might convince the BPP to cease publication Another possibility which the Bureau may wish to consider would be the composition and mailing of numerous letters to BPP Headquarters from various points throughout the country on stationary [sic] containing the national emblem of the Minutemen organization These letters in several dif ferent forms would all have the common theme of warning the Black Panthers to cease publication or drastic measures would be taken by the Minutemen organization.. Utilization of the Minutemen organization through direc tion of informants within that group would also be a very effective measure for the disruption of the publication of this newspaper.135 On another occasion however FBI agents contacted United Air lines officials and inquired about the rates being charged for transport ing the Black Panther magazine A Bureau memorandum states that the BPP was being charged "the General Rate for printed material but that in the future it would be forced to pay the "full legal rate allowable for newspaper shipment. The memorandum continued Officials advise this increase means approximately a forty percent increase Officials agree to determine consignor in San Francisco and from this determine consignees throughout the United States so that it can impose full legal tariff They believe the airlines are due the differences in freight tariffs as noted above for past six to eight months and are considering discussions with their legal staff concerning suit for recovery of deficit (T) hey estimate that in New York alone will exceed ten thousand dollars.136 In August 1970 the New York Field Office reported that it was con sidering plans directed against (1) the production of the BPP newspaper (2) the distribution of that newspaper and (3) the use of information contained in particular issues for topical counter intelligence proposals The NYO [New York Office] realizes the financial benefits coming to the BPP through the sale of their newspaper Continued efforts will be made to derive logical and practical plans to thwart this crucial BPP operation.137 A few months later FBI headquarters directed 39 field offices to dis tribute copies of a column written by Victor Riesel a labor columnist '34Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/20/70 p 2 1:,.:Ibid.p 3 'Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters and San Francisco Field Office10/11/69 'Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/19/70 216 calling for a nationwide union boycott against handling the BPP newspaper Enclosed for each office are 5() reproductions of a column written by Victor Riesel regarding the Black Panther Party (BPP) Portions of the column deals with proposal that union members refuse to handle shipments of BPP newspapers Obviously if such a boycott gains national support it will result in effectively cutting off BPP propaganda and finances therefore it is most desirable this proposal be brought to 'at tention of members and officials of unions such as Teamsters and others involved in handling of shipments of BPP news papers These shipments are generally by air freight The column also deals with repeated calls for murder of police that appear in BPP paper therefore it would 'also be desir able to bring boycott proposal to attention of members and of ficials of police associations who might be in a position to encourage boycott Each office anonymously mail copies of enclosed to offi cials of appropriate unions police organizations or other in dividuals within its territory who could encourage such a boycott... Handle promptly and advise Bureau of any positive re sults noted Any publicity observed concerning proposed boy cott should be brought to attention of Bureau Be alert for any other opportunities to further exploit this proposal. Bureau documents submitted to the Select Committee staff do not indicate the outcome of this plan On one occasion the FBI's Racial Intelligence Section concocted a scheme to create friction between the Black Panthers and the Na tion of Islam by reducing sales of the NOI paper Muhammed Speaks While both papers advocate white hate a noticeable loss of revenue to NOI due to decreased sales of their paper caused by the BPP might well be the spark to ignite the fuel of conflict between the two organizations Both are extremely money conscious We feel that our network of racial informants many of whom are directly involved in the sale of the NOI and BPP newspapers are in a position to cause a material reduction in NOI newspaper sales Our sources can bring the fact of reve nue loss directly to NOI leader Elijah Muhammad who might well be influenced to take positive steps to counteract the sale of BPP papers in the Negro community We feel that with careful planning and close supervision an open dispute can be developed between the two organizations. FBI headquarters promptly forwarded this suggestion to the field offices in Chicago New York and San Francisco with the express hope that Elijah Muhammed might be influenced "to take positive Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to SAC'sin 39 cities 11/10/70 Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto W C Sullivan 6/26/70 217 steps to counteract the sale of BPI newspapers in the Negro com munity. 140The following month the Chicago Field Office advised against using informants for this project because animosity was al ready developing between the BPP and NOI and any revelation of a Bureau attempt to encourage conflict might serve to bring the BPP and NOI closer together.141 Numerous attempts were made to prevent Black Panthers from airing their views in public For example in February 1969 the FBI joined with the Chicago police force to prevent the local BPP leader Fred Hampton from appearing on a television talk show The FBI memoranduni explaining this incident states the [informant] also enabled Chicago to further harass the local BPP when he provided information the afternoon of 1/24/69 reflecting that Fred Hampton was to appear that evening at local TV studio for video tape interview The tape was to be aired the following day Chicago was aware a warrant for mob action was outstand ing for Hampton in his home town and the above informa tion was provided the Maywood Police Department with a suggestion that they request the Chicago Police Department to serve this arrest warrant. This was subsequently done with Hampton arrested at television studio in presence of 25 BPP members and studio personnel This caused considerable em barrassment to the local BPP and disrupted the plans for Hampton's television appearance.142 Headquarters congratulated the Chicago Field Office on the timing of the arrest "under circumstances which proved highly embarrassing to the BPP. 143 The Bureau's San Francisco officetook credit for preventing Bobby Seale from keeping a number of speaking engagements in Oregon and Washington In May 1969 while Seale was traveling from a speaking engagement at Yale University to begin his West Coast tour a bomb ing took place in Eugene Oregon which the FBI suspected involved the Black Panthers The San Francisco Field Office subsequently reported As this was on the eve of Seale's speech this seemed to be very poor advance publicity for Seale It was de termined to telephone Mrs Seale [Bobby Seale's mother] claiming to be a friend from Oregon bearing the warning that it might be dangerous for Seale to come up This was done Shortly thereafter Mrs Seale reported this to BPP head quarters claiming an unknown brother had sent a warning to Bobby from Oregon Headquarters took this very seriously and when Bobby arrived shortly thereafter he decided not to go north with "all the action going on up there. He subse quently cancelled a trip to Seattle It is believed that the 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago New York and San FranciscoField Offices6/26/70 " Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/15/70 12Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/10/69 "3Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to ChicagoField Office2/20/69 218 above mentioned telephone call was a pivotal point in persuad ing Seale to stay home.144 The San Francisco office reported that not only had Seale been pre vented from making his appearances but that he had lost over $1,700 in "badly needed fees and that relations between Seale and "New Left leaders who had been scheduled to appear with him had become strained In December 1969 FBI headquarters stressed to the San Francisco Field Office the need to prevent Black Panther speaking engagements Several recent communications received at the Bureau indi cate the BPP is encouraging their branches to set up speaking engagements at schools and colleges and the showing of films in order to raise money San Francisco should instruct [local FBI] office covering to immediately submit to the Bu reau for approval a counterintelligence proposal aimed at pre venting the activities scheduled The BPP in an effort to bolster its weak financial position is now soliciting speaking engagements and information has been developed indicating they are reducing their monetary requirements for such speeches We have been successful in the past through contacts with established sources in prevent ing such speeches in colleges or other institutions.145 In March 1970 a representative of a Jewish organization contacted the San Francisco FBI Field Office when it learned that one of its local lodges had invited David Hilliard BPP Chief-of-Staff and Attorney Charles Garry to speak San Francisco subsequently reported to headquarters Public source information relating to David Hilliard Garry and the BPP including "The Black Panther newspaper it self was brought to [source's] attention He subsequently notified the [FBI] office that the [name deleted] had altered their arrangements for this speech and that the invitation to Hilliard was withdrawn but that Charles Garry was per mitted to speak but his speech was confined solely to the re cent case of the Chicago 7.146 The FBI exhibited comparable fervor in disseminating informa tion unfavorable to the Black Panthers to the press and television stations A directive from FBI headquarters to nine field offices in January 1970 explained the program To counteract any favorable support in publicity to the Black Panther Party (BPP) recipient offices are requested to submit their observations and recommendations regarding contacts with established and reliable sources in the television and/or radio field who might be interested in drawing up a program for local consumption depicting the true facts re garding the BPP Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/26/69 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office12/4/69 "'Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 3/18/70 219 The suggested program would deal mainly with local BPP activities and data furnished would be of a public source nature This data could be implemented by information on the BPP nationally if needed . All offices should give this matter their prompt considera tion and submit replies by letter Soon afterward the Los Angeles office identified two local news reporters whom it believed might be willing to help in the effort to discredit the BPP and received permission to discreetly contact [name deleted] for the purpose of ascer taining his amenability to the preparation of a program which would present the true facts about the Black Panther Party as part of a counterintelligence effort.148 Headquarters also suggested information and materials to give to a local newsman who expressed an interest in airing a series of pro grams against the Panthers." In July 1970 the FBI furnished information to a Los Angeles TV news commentator who agreed to air a series of shows against the BPP "especially in the area of white liberals contributing to the 13PP. 15 In October the Los Angeles Division sent headquarters a copy of an FBI-assisted television editorial and reported that an other newsman was preparing yet another editorial attack on the Panthers.' In November 1970 the San Francisco Field Office notified the Direc tor that Huey Newton had "recently rented a luxurious lakeshore apartment in Oakland California. The San Francisco office saw "potential counterintelligence value in this information since this apartment was far more elegant than "the ghetto-like BPP pads and community centers utilized by the Party. It was decided not to "presently leak "this information to cooperative news sources, be cause of a "pending special investigative technique. 152The informa tion was given to the Ban Francisco Examiner however in February 1971 and an article was published stating that Huey P Newton BPP Supreme Commander had moved into a $650-a-month apartment "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office(and 8 other offices) 1/23/70 The San Diegoofficehad already made efforts along the lines proposed in this memorandum In November1969it requested permission from headquarters to inform two newscasters "for use in editorials that the sister and brother-in-law of a Communist Party member were believed to be members of the local Black Panthers The officealso proposed preparing "an editorial for publication in the Copleypress. (Airtel from SAC San Diego to Director FBI 11/12/69.) The San Francisco officehad also leaked information to a San Francisco Examiner reporter who wrote a front-page story complete with photographs concerning "the conversionby the BPP of an apartment into a fortress. (Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/21/70.) 'Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/6/70 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office3/5/70 (this memorandumbears Director Hoover'sinitials) 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco Field Offices5/27/70 'Memorandum from Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/10/70 p 2167Memorandumfrom Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/23/70 "'Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 11/24/70 69-9840 76 15 220 overlooking Lake Merritt in Oakland California under the assumed name of I)on Penn.153 Headquarters approved anonymously mailing copies of the article to BPP branches and ordered copies of the article for "divisions with BPP activity for wailing to newspaper editors. 154 The San Francisco office informed FBI headquarters later in Feb ruary that BPP Headquarters was beseiged with inquiries after the printing of the San Francisco Examiner article and the people at headquarters refuse to answer the news media or other callers on this question This source has further reported that a representative of the Richmond Virginia BPP con tacted headquarters on 2/18/71 stating they had received a xeroxed copy of the article and believed it had been forwarded by the pigs but still wanted to know if it was true.'55 D Cooperation Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Local Police Departments in Disrupting the Black Panther Party The FBI enlisted the cooperation of local police departments in several of its covert action programs to disrupt and "neutralize the Black Panther Party The FBI frequently worked with the San Diego Police Department supplying it with informant reports to encourage raids on the homes of BPP members often with little or no apparent evidence of violations of State or Federal law.156 Examples are numerous In February 1969 the San Diego Field Office learned that members of the local BPP chapter were following each other to determine if police informants had infiltrated their organization The field office passed this information to the San Diego police with the suggestion that BPP members engaged in these surveillances might be followed and arrested for violations of "local 'Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 2/12/71 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 2/8/71Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 2/18/71 In a February 1971report on recent COINTELPROactivity the San Francisco Division described the San Francisco Examiner article as one of its "counterintelligence activities. This report said that because of the article Newtonhad given an interview to another San Francisco daily to try to explain his seeminglyexpensivelifestyle The report also states that copiesof the article were sent to "all BPP and NCCF [National Committee to Combat Fascism] officesin the United States and to three BPP contacts in Europe. (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/25/71.) The suggestion of encouraging local police to raid and arrest members of so-called"Black Nationalist Hate Groups was first put forward in a February 29 1968memorandumto field officesThis memorandumcited as an example of successfuluse of this technique "The Revolutionary Action Movement(RAM) a pro-ChineseCommunistgroup was active in Philadelphia Pa. in the summer of 1967 The Philadelphia officealerted local police who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail As a result RAM leaders spent most of the sum mer in jail and no violencetraceable to RAMtook place. (Memorandumfrom G C Moore to W C Sullivan 2/29/68 p 3.) 221 Motor Vehicle Code laws. 157When the San Diego Field Office re ceived reports that five BPP members were living in the local BPP headquarters and "having sex orgies on almost a nightly basis, it in formed the local police with the hope that a legal basis for a raid could be found.158 Two days later the San Diego office reported to head quarters As a result of the Bureau-approved information furnished to the Sari Diego Police Department regarding the "sex orgies being held at BPP Headquarters in San Diego which had not previously been known to the Police Department a raid was conducted at BPP Headquarters on 11/20/69 [Name deleted] San Diego Police Department Intelligence Unit advised that due to this information he assigned two officers to a research project to determine if any solid basis could be found to conduct a raid His officers discovered two outstanding traffic warrants for [name deleted] a member of the BPP and his officers used these warrants to obtain entry into BPP Headquarters As a result of this raid [6 persons] were all arrested Seized at the time of the arrests were three shotguns one of which was stolen one rifle four gas masks and one tear gas canister Also as a result of this raid the six remaining members of the BPP in San Diego were summoned to Los Angeles on 11/28/69 Upon their arrival they were informed that due to numerous problems with the BPP in San Diego including the recent raid on BPP Headquarters the BPP Branch in San Diego was being dissolved Also as a direct result of the above raid [informants] have reported that [name deleted] has been severely beaten up by other members of the BPP due to the fact that she allowed the officers to enter BPP Headquarters the night of the raid.15 A later memorandum states that confidential files belonging to the San Diego Panthers were also "obtained during this raid. In March 1969 the San Diego Field Office informed Bureau head quarters information was made available to the San Diego Police Department who have been arranging periodic raids in the The San Diego officereported to headquarters "As of one week ago the BPP in San Diego was so completelydisrupted and so much suspicion fear and distrust has been interjected into the party that the members have taken to running surveillances on one another in an attempt to determine who the policeagents are On 2/19/69 this information was furnished to the San DiegoPolice Department with the suggestion that possibly local Motor Vehicle Code laws were being violated during the course of these surveillances. (Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/27/69.) Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/10/69 Headquarters told the San Diego officethat if there was no legal basis for a raid it should "give this matter further thought and submit other proposals to capitalize on this information in the counterintelligence field. (Memoran dum from FBI Headquarters to San DiegoField Office11/18/69 p 1.) 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/3/69 pp 2-3 ' 0Memorandumfrom San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/17/70 222 hope of establishing a possession of marijuana and dangerous drug charge [against two BPP members]. The BPP finally managed to rent the Rhodesian Club at 2907 Imperial Avenue San Diego which will be utilized for a meeting hall A request will be forthcoming to have the San Diego Police Department and local health inspectors examine the club for health and safety defects which are undoubted by [shC]present. The San Diego office also conducted "racial briefing sessions for the San Diego police Headquarters was informed It is also felt that the racial briefing sessions being given by the San Diego Division are affording tangible results for the Counterintelligence Program Through these briefings the command levels of virtually all of the police departments in the San Diego Division are being apprised of the identi ties of the leaders of the various militant groups It is felt that although specific instances cannot be attributed directly to the racial briefing program police officers are much more alert for these black militant individuals and as such are con tributing to the over-all Counterintelligence Program directed against these groups.'s The Committee staff has seen documents indicating extensive coop eration between local police and the FBI in several other cities For example the FBI in Oakland prevented a reconciliation meeting between Huey Newton's brother and former Panthers by having the Oakland police inform one of the former Panthers that the meeting was a "set up. The San Francisco officeconcluded It is believed that such quick dissemination of this type of information may have been instrumental in preventing the various dissidents from rejoining forces with the BPP.163 Another Bureau memorandum reflected similar cooperation in Los Angeles The Los Angeles officeis furnishing on a daily basis informa tion to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office Intelligence Division and the Los Angeles Police Department Intelli gence and Criminal Conspiracy Divisions concerning the activities of the black nationalist groups in the anticipation that such information might lead to the arrest of these mili tants." Information from Bureau files in Chicago on the Panthers was given to Chicago police upon request and Chicago Police Department files were open to the Bureau.' A Special Agent who handled liaison be tween the FBI's Racial Matters Squad (responsible for monitoring BPP activity in Chicago) and the Panther Squad of the Gang In telligence Unit (GIU) of the Chicago Police Department from 1967 through July 1969 testified that he visited GIU between three and "'Memorandum from San DiegoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/26/69 'Memorandum from San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/15/69 ' Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/21/69 'Memorandum Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/1/69 SpecialAgentdeposition 2/26/75 p p 90 223 five times a week to exchange information. The Bureau and Chicago Police both maintained paid informants in the BPP shared in formant information and the FBI provided information which was used by Chicago police in planning raids against the Chicago BPP.'67 According to an FBI memorandum this sharing of informant information was crucial to police during their raid on the apartment occupied by several Black Panther members which resulted in the death of the local Chairman Fred Hampton and another Panther [Prior to the raid] a detailed inventory of the weapons and also a detailed floor plan of the apartment were furnished to local authorities In addition the identities of BPP mem bers utilizing the apartment at the above address were fur nished This information was not available from any other source and subsequently proved to be of tremendous value in that it subsequently saved injury and possible death to police officers participating in a raid on the morning of 12/4/69 The raid was based on the information furnished by the informant .168[Emphasis added.] Special Agent deposition 2/26/75 p 84 The Agent also testified that other FBI agents in the Racial Matters Squad were also involved in the "free flow of information between the Racial Matters Squad and GII', and that at one time or another every agent had exchangedinformation with GILT 187 Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/3/69 p 2 memorandumfrom SpecialAgent to ChicagoField Office12/12/69 '6 Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/8/69 Page 227 228 228 228 230 231 233 233 233 235 235 236 236 237 238 239 239 241 243 244 245 246 246 247 247 248 249 249 250 251 251 252 252 255 255 255 255 256 256 257 257 258 259 THE USE OF INFORMANTS IN FBI DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS CONTENTS I Introduction and Summary A Summary of facts The extensive use of intelligenceinformants The unpublished standards for the use of intelligence informants B Policyand constitutional issuesraisedby the useofintelligence informants C The lack ofjudicial treatment ofintelligenceinformant issues D The scope of the committee's investigation II The Nature of the IntelligenceInformant Technique A Casehistories of particular informants Mary Jo Cook FBI informant in the Vietnam Vet erans Against the War a Background b Cook's instructions c The scope of Cook's reporting d Cook's taking of VVAWdocuments e Reporting on non-VVAW groups and indi viduals Gary Rowe FBI informant in the Ku Klux Klan The use of intelligence informants to report Klan violenceand criminalactivity The scope of Rowe's reporting The issueofparticipation in criminalor violent activity B Examplesofintelligenceinformant coverageof groupssubject to intelligenceinvestigations CaseNo 1 Citizens panel on the merits of an anti ballistic missilesystem (1969) Case No 2 Dr Carl McIntyre's American Christian Action Council (1971) Case No 3 Detroit Black Panther Party (1970) Case No 4 National Conferenceon Amnesty (1974) Case No 5 Public meeting opposing U.S involvement in Vietnam war (1966) Case No 6 Black Nationalist group (1968) CaseNo 7 Investigation of "freeuniversities (1966) Case No 8 Washington D.C Black Panther Party (1970-1971) Case No 9 Women's Liberation Movement (1969) Case No 10 Socialist Workers Party (1949to date) Case No 11 Ku Klux Klan C SpecialFBI informant programs The ghetto informant program The plant informant program (1940-69) The AmericanLegioncontact program (1940-54) D The use of informants at collegesand universities Present FBI policy The background to present policy Initial guidelinesfor use of campusinformers The 1967restrictions Hoover's resistanceto new pressurefor relaxed restrictions on campus informants The Huston plan's recommendation for ex panded campus informant coverage The removal of the age restriction (22) 226 III The Intelligence Informant Program Size Administration and Page Standards 260 The number of intelligenceinformants 260 The FBI administrative system for intelligenceinformants 261 Standards for the use of intelligenceinformants 262 Criteria for the decisionto use informants 263 Limits on the information an informant may report 264 Limits on an informant's conduct and behavior 266 (227) THE USE OF INFORMANTS IN FBI DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS I INTRODUCTION ANDSUMMARY The dangers to a free society that are implicit in the use of secret intelligence informers have long been recognized In his Constitu tional History of England written in the mid-19th century Sir Thomas May observed Men may be without restraints upon their liberty they may pass to and fro at pleasure but if their steps are tracked by spies and informers their words noted down for crimination their associates watched as conspirators who shall say that they are free 1 May pointed to the use of informers by "continental despotisms, noting that "the freedom of a country may be measured by its immu nity from this baleful agency. 2 On the other hand law enforcement officials see informants 3 as a highly effective technique one justified by the public's interest in the detection of crime and the prosecution of criminals FBI of eials testi fied to the Committee that informants "provide one of the best and most complete forms of coverage in their investigations. Former Attorney General Katzenbach testified that the use of intelligence informants in the mid-1960s to infiltrate the Ku Klux Klan a tech nique urged upon the FBI by President Johnson Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Mr Katzenbach was a principal factor in stopping repeated acts of criminal violence This Appendix pursuant to the Committee's mandate under Senate Resolution 21 focuses on the use of informants in FBI intelli gence investigations who are recruited paid and directed by Bureau Special Agents The Committee did not examine the use of informants in FBI criminal investigations nor did the Committee examine in stances of the "walk-in who volunteers information to the FBI on a one-time basis As discussed in more detail below paid and directed intelligence informants are extensively used in FBI domestic intelli gence investigations of groups and individuals These intelligence informants are the subject of this Appendix The use of informants to collect intelligence on Americans is not confined to the FBI The Committee also examined the use of intelli T May Constitutional History of England (1863) p 275 'Id The term "informant is used throughout the remainder of this report That is the term employedin the statute which provides that appropriations for the Department of Justice are available for payment of "informants, 28 U.S.C 524 and is also the term which the FBI employsin its directives 'Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee 11/25/75 Exhibit 33 Hearings Vol 6 p 444 228 gence informants by other governmental agencies In the late 1960s informants and undercover agents were used by the CIA and Army Intelligence to secretly penetrate domestic groups In 1968 about 1500 Army intelligence agents were engaged in monitoring and penetrating civilian activity in the United States although a 1971 Defense Depart ment directive now generally limits the military's collection of infor mation about private groups and individuals the directive permits the military to secretly penetrate civilian groups where approved by the Defense Department See the Appendices on Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military and CIA Intelligence Activities Regarding Americans In addition the Internal Revenue Service uses informants for intelligence purposes See the IRS Report p 863 "Selective Enforcement for Non-Tax Purposes. A Summary of Facts 1 The Extensive Use of Intelligence Informants The paid and directed informant is the most extensively used tech nique in FBI domestic intelligence investigations Informants were used in 85 percent of the domestic intelligence investigations an alyzed in a recent study by the General Accounting Office.5 By com parison electronic surveillance was used in only 5 percent of the cases studied The FBI places strong emphasis on informant coverage in in telligence investigations instructing agents to "develop reliable in formants at all levels and in all segments of groups under investiga tion.6 The Committee's investigation revealed that the FBI was using more than 1,500 domestic intelligence informants as of June 30 1975. The FBI budget for Fiscal Year 1976 programmed a total of $7,401, 000 for the intelligence informant program more than twice the amount allocated for the organized crime informant program .8 The number of intelligence informants has been substantially larger in previous years because of the "Ghetto Informant Program, which at its height comprised over 7,000 informants The FBI began the Ghetto Informant Program in 1967 in the context of the urban riots and violence of the mid-1960's and in response to instructions from the White House and the Attorney General Although "ghetto inform ants were initially used as "listening posts to provide information on the planning or organizing of riots and civil disturbances many were eventually given specific assignments to attend public meetings of "extremists and to identify bookstores and others distributing "ex tremist literature The FBI terminated the program in 1973 after sharp debate within the Bureau over the program's effectiveness and the propriety of the listening post concept Generally there are two types of intelligence informants those the FBI first recruits and then inserts into investigated group under investigation and those who are already members of such a group and are "turned or recruited as FBI informants 5General Accounting Office Domestic Intelligence Operations of the FBI (2/24/76) 6FBI Manualof Instructions Section87B(6) hereinafter cited as "FBI MOI FBI Memorandumto Senate Select Committee 11/28/75 "Memorandum "FBI overall Intelligence Program FY 1977compared to FY 1976. The intelligenceinformant program includes payments to informants for services and expensesas well as FBI personnel and support costs and overhead 229 In addition to paid and directed informants the FBI uses "con fidential sources, defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as per sons who furnish the FBI information available to them through their position such as "bankers telephone company employees and landlords. 9 Confidential sources were used in 50 percent of the cases analyzed by the GAO ranking behind informants and local law en forcement officials as the third most used techniques in intelligence cases As of June 1975 there were 1,254 confidential sources approved by FBI headquarters for domestic intelligence purposes. a 2 The Unpublished .'tandards for the Use of Intelligence In f orm