Title: Church Committee: Book II - Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans Author: n/a Pages: 412 Agency: n/a RIF#: n/a Subjects: n/a Source: AARC SENATE 94THCONGRESS 2d Session REPORT No 94 755 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS BOOK II FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECTTO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHERWITH ADDITIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL AND SEPARATE VIEWS APRIL26 (legislativeday APRIL14) 1976 U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTINGOFFICE 68-7860 WASHINGTON1976 ForsalebytheSuperintendent ofDocumentsU.SGovernment PrintingOffice WashingtonD.C20402Price$3.60 SENATESELECTCOMMITTEETOSTUDYGOVERNMENTALOPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES FRANKCHURCHIdaho Chairman JOHNG TOWERTexasViceChairman PHILIPA HARTMichigan HOWARDH BAKERJR. Tennessee WALTERF MONDALEMinnesota BARRYGOLDWATER Arizona WALTERD H'UDDLESTON Kentucky CHARLESMcCMATHIASJR. Maryland ROBERTMORGANNorthCarolina RICHARDS SCHWEIKERPennsylvania GARYHARTColorado WILLIAM G MILLERStaffDirector FREDERICK A O SCHWARZ Jr. ChiefCounsel CURTIS R SMOTHERS CounseltotheMinority AUDREY HATRYClerkoftheCommittee LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Actin ities and pursuant to the mandate of Senate Resolution 21 I am transmitting herewith to the Senate the volume of the Committee's Final Report which presents the results of the Committee's investigation into Federal domestic intelligence activities The Committee's findings and conclusions concerning abuses in intel ligence activity and weaknesses in the system of accountability and control are amply documented I believe they make a compelling case for substantial reform The recommendations section of this volume sets forth in detail the Committee's proposals for reforms necessary to protect the right of Americans The facts revealed by the Commit tee's inquiry into the development of domestic intelligence activity are outlined in the balance of the volume I would add one principal comment on the results of the Commit tee's inquiry The root cause of the excesses which our record amply demonstrates has been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitu tional system of checks and balances to intelligence activities Our experience as a nation has taught us that we must place our trust in lays and not solely in men The founding fathers foresaw excess as the inevitable consequence of granting any part of government un checked power This has been demonstrated in the intelligence field where too often constitutional principles were subordinated to a prag matic course of permitting desired ends to dictate and justify improper means Our recommendations are designed to place intelligence activities within the constitutional scheme for controlling government power The members of this Committee have served with utmost diligence and dedication We have had 126 Full Connntitteemeetings scores of other sessions at which Senators presided at depositions for the tak ing of testimony and over 40 subcommittee meetings devoted to drafting the two volumes of our final report I thank each and every one of my colleagues for their hard work and for their determina tion that the job be done fully and fairly John Tower's service as Vice Chairman was essential to our effec tiveness from start to finish This inquiry could have been distracted by partisan argument over allocating the blame for intelligence ex cesses Instead we have unanimously concluded that intelligence prob lems are far more fundamental They are not the product of any single administration party or man At the outset of this particular volume special mention is also due to Senator Walter F A1ondale for his chairmanship of the subcom mittee charged with drafting the final report on domestic intelligence activity During our hearings Senator Mondale helped to bring into focus the threats posed to the rights of American citizens Ile and his (In) N domestic subcommittee colleagues Senator Howard Baker as rank ing Minority member and Senators Philip Hart Robert Morgan and Richard Schweiker deserve great credit for the complete and com pelling draft which they presented to the Full Committee The staff of the Committee has worked long hard and well With out their work over the past year and during many long nights and weekends the Committee could not have come close to coping with its massive job I commend and thank them all The staff members whose work was particularly associated with this volume and its sup plementary detailed reports are listed in Appendix C FRANK CHURCH Chairman (V) PREFACE In January 1975 the Senate resolved to establish a Committee to conduct an investigation and study of governmental opera tions with respect to intelligence activities and the extent if any to which illegal improper or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government. This Committee was organized shortly thereafter and has conducted a year-long investigation into the intelligence activities of the United States Government the first substantial inquiry into the intelligence community since 'World War H The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial wrongdoing by intelligence agencies on behalf of the administrations which they served A deeper concern underlying the investigation was whether this Government's intelligence activities were governed and controlled consistently with the fundamental principles of American constitu tional government that power must be checked and balanced and that the preservation of liberty requires the restraint of laws and not simply the good intentions of men Our investigation has confirmed that properly controlled and lawful intelligence is vital to the nation's interest A strong and effective intelligence system serves for example to monitor potential military threats from the Soviet Union and its allies to verify compliance with international agreements such as SALT and to combat espionage and international terrorism These and many other necessary and proper functions are performed by dedicated and hard working employees of the intelligence connnunity The Committee's investigation has however also confirmed substan tial wrongdoing And it has demonstrated that intelligence activities have not generally been governed and controlled in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government The task faced by this Committee was to propose effective measures to prevent intelligence excesses and at the same time to propose sound guidelines and oversight procedures with which to govern and control legitimate activities Having concluded its investigation the Committee issues its reports 2 for the purposes of providing a fair factual basis for informed Congressional and public debate on critical issues affecting the role of gov ernmental intelligence activities in a free society and Senate Resolution 21 January 27 1975 Sec 1 The full text of S Res 21is printed at AppendixA 2The Committee'sfinal report is divided into two main volumes The balance of this volumecoversdomesticactivities of intelligenceagenciesand their activi ties overseasto the extent that they affect the constitutional rights of Americans The other volumecoversall other activities of United States foreign and military intelligenceagencies The Committeehas previouslyissued the reports and hearing records set forth in AppendixB VI recommending such legislative and executive action as in the judgment of the Committee is appropriate to prevent re currence of past abuses and to insure adequate coordination control and oversight of the nation's intelligence resources capabilities and activities A THE COMMITTEE'SMANDATE In elaboration of the broad mandate set forth at the outset of this Report the Senate charged the Committee with investigating fourteen specific "matters or questions and with reporting the "full facts on them The fourteen enumerated matters and questions concern (i) what kind of activities have been and should be undertaken by intelligence agencies (ii) whether those activities conform to law and the Constitution and (iii) how intelligence agencies have been and should be coordinated controlled and overseen.3 In addition to investigating the "full facts with respect to such matters the Committee was instructed to determine Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate either in their provisions or manner of enforce ment to safeguard the rights of American citizens to im prove executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the au thority of United States intelligence and related agencies [Id. Sec 2 (12) ] B THE MAJOR QUESTIONS Our investigation addressed the structure history activities and policies of America's most important intelligence agencies The Com mittee looked beyond the operation of individual agencies to examine common themes and patterns inherent in intelligence operations In the course of its investigation the Committee has sought to answer three broad questions First whether domestic intelligence activities have been consistent with law and with the individual liberties guar anteed to American citizens by the Constitution Second whether America's foreign intelligence activities have served the national interest in a manner consistent with the nation's ideals and with national purposes aS Res 21 Sec 2 Examples of the "matters or questions include "The conductof domesticintelligenceor counterintelligenceoperations against UnitedStates citizens bythe FBI or other agencies [Sec 2(2)] "The violation or suspected violation of law by intelligence agencies [Sec 2(10)] Allegations of CIA "domestic activity and the relationship between CIA responsibility to protect sources and methods and the prohibition of its exer cising law enforcementpowers or internal security functions [Sec 2(1) (6)] "The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan [Sec 2(7) (9)1 "The extent and necessity of "covert intelligence activities abroad [Sec 2(14)] Whether there is excessive duplication or inadequate coordination among intelligence agencies [Sec 2(4)(13)] and The "nature and extent of executive oversight [Sec 2(7) (9)] and the "need for improved strengthened or consolidated Congressional oversight [Sec 2(7)(9)(11)] VII Third whether the institutional procedures for directing and controlling intelligence agencies have adequately ensured their compliance with policy and law and whether those pro cedures have been based upon the system of checks and bal ances among the branches of government required by our Constitution The Committee fully subscribes to the premise that intelligence agencies perform a necessary and proper function The Preamble to the Constitution states that our government was created in part to "insure domestic tranquility [and] provide for the common defense. Accurate and timely intelligence can and does help meet those goals The Committee is also mindful however of the danger which in telligence collection and intelligence operations may pose for a so ciety grounded in democratic principles The Preamble to our Con stitution also declares that our government was created to "secure the blessings of liberty and to "establish justice If domestic intelli gence agencies ignore those principles they may threaten the very values that form the foundation of our society Similarly if the gov ernment conducts foreign intelligence operations overseas which are inconsistent with our national ideals our reputation goals and in fluence abroad may be undercut C TIIE NATUREOF THE CoiIMITTEE'SINVESTIGATION 1 SELECTIONOF AGENCIESPROGRAMSANDCASESTO EMLPIIASIZE Necessarily the Committee had to be selective To investigate every thing relevant to intelligence and even everything relevant to the fundamental issues on which we had decided to focus would take for ever Our job was to discover and suggest solutions for the major problems "at the earliest practical date'. Accordingly the Committee had to choose the particular Govern mental entities upon which we would concentrate and then further had to choose particular cases to investigate in depth Many agencies departments or bureaus of the Federal Government have an intelligence function Of these the Committee spent the over whelming preponderance of its energies on five The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Central Intelli gence Agency The National Security Agency The national intelligence components of the Defense Department (other than NSA) and The National Security Council and its com ponent parts. The agencies upon which the Committee concentrated are those whose powers are so great and whose practices were so extensive that they must be understood in order fairly to judge whether the intelli gence system of the Fnited States needs reform and change Having selected the agencies to emphasize the Committee also had to select representative programs and policies on which to concentrate There were many more possible issues and allegations to investigate S Res 21 Sec o Substantial work was also doneon intelligenceactivities of the Internal Reve nue Serviceand the State Department VIII than could be covered fully and fairly The principles which guided our choices were More is learned by investigating tens of programs and incidents in depth rather than hundreds superficially Our goal was to understand causes and where appropriate to sug gest solutions Cases most likely to produce general lessons should receive the most attention Programs were examined from each administration beginning with Franklin Roosevelt's This assured under standing of the historical context within which intelligence activities have developed Fundamental issues concerning the conduct and character of the nation deserve nonpartisan treatment It has become clear from our inquiry moreover that intelligence excesses at home and abroad have been found in every administration They are not the product of any single party administration or man 2 LIMITATIONSANDSTRENGTHS The Focus on Problem Areas The intelligence community has had broad responsibility for activi ties beyond those which we investigated as possibly "illegal improper or unethical Our reports primarily address problem areas and the command and control question generally However the intelligence community performs vital tasks outside the areas on which our inves tigation concentrated This point must be kept in mind in fairness to the agencies and to their employees who have devoted their careers to the nation's service Moreover one of many reasons for checking intel ligence excesses is to restore the confidence good name and effective ness of intelligence agencies so that they may better serve the nation in the future. Caution on Questions of Individual "Guilt or "Innocence A Senate Committee is not a prosecutor a grand jury or a court It is far better suited to determine how things went wrong and what can be done to prevent their going wrong again than to resolve disputed questions of individual "guilt or "innocence For the resolution of those questions we properly rely on the courts Of course to understand the past in order to better propose guid ance for the future the Committee had to investigate the facts under lying charges of wrongdoing Facts involve people Therefore the Committee has necessarily had to determine what particular individ uals appear to have done and on occasion to make judgments on their responsibility WTehave however recognized our limitations and at tempted to be cautious in reaching those judgments the reader should be similarly cautious in evaluating our judgments The Committee's hope is that this report will provoke a national debate not on "Who did it but on "How did it happen and what can be done to keep it from happening again eIndeed it is likely that in somecases the high priority givento activities that appear questionablehas reduced the attention given to other vital matters Thus the FBI for example has placed moreemphasison domesticdissent than on orga nized crime and according to some let its efforts against foreign spies suffer becauseof the amount of time spent checkingup on Americanprotest groups >x (e) Ability to See the Full Scope of the Problem This Committee examined a very broad range of issues and com piled a hughe factual record which covers the origins and development of intelligence programs over seven administrations intelligence activities both at home and abroad and the programs and practices of the several most im portant intelligence agencies Thus for the first time based upon the Committee's investigation it is possible to examine the patterns of intelligence activity and not merely isolated incidents The issues for the country to resolve are best posed by looking as we have done at the aggregate rather than at particular incidents in isolation Neither the dangers nor the causes nor the possible solutions can be fairly evaluated without considering both the broad patterns of intelligence activity which emerge from examining par ticular cases over the past several decades and the cumulative effect of activities of different agencies For example individual cases or programs of governmental surveillance may constitute interference with constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent But only by examining the cumulative impact of many such programs can the danger of "Big Brother Government be realistically assessed Only by understanding the full breadth of governmental efforts against dissenters can one weigh the extent to which those efforts may chill lawful assembly and free expression D TIIE PURPOSEOFTHECOJr rri'rEE's FINDINGSANDRECOMMENDATIONS The central goal of the Committee is to make informed recom mendations based upon a detailed and balanced factual investiga tion about which intelligence activities ought to be permitted and which should be restricted or prohibited and what controls and organizational structure are needed to keep intelligence operations both effective and consistent with this country's most basic values and fundamental in terests 'Some 800 witnesses were examined approximately 250 under oath in executive sessions 50 in public sessions and the balance in interviews The aggregate number of transcript pages is almost 30,000 Approximately 110,000 documentpages were obtained from the various intelligenceagencies (still more were preliminarily reviewed at the agencies) as well as from the White House presidential libraries and other sources Over the course of its investigation the Committeehas had generally good cooperationin obtaining information from the intelligenceagencies and the Ad ministration Of course there were problems particularly at the outset com pliance tooktoo long bureaucratic rules such as the "third agency rule (which required agencies other than the custodian of the documentto review it if they were mentioned) were frustrating But our experiencesuggests that those prob lemscan heworkedout The most important lesson to be derived from our experienceis that effective oversight is impossible without regular access to the underlying working docu ments of the intelligence community Top level briefings do not adequately de scribe the realities For that the documentsare a necessary supplement and at times the onlysource X The first step for this Committee its successor oversight Committees and the Congress as a whole is to devise the legal framework within which intelligence agencies can in the future be guided checked and operate both properly and efficiently A basic law a charter of pow ers duties and limitations does not presently exist for some of the most important intelligence activities (e.g. FBI's domestic intelli gence or NSA) or where it does exist as with CIA it is vague con flicting and incomplete The absence of laws and the lack of clarity in those that exist has had the effect if not the intention of keeping vital issues of national importance away from public debate This Committee's job was to pose the issues that have been ignored for decades The technique for doing so was to investigate and then to propose basic laws and other rules as to what can and cannot be done and on the appropriate command and control structure for in telligence activities There are many other questions such as the efficiency cost and quality of intelligence which are also of vital national importance We have also examined these matters and consider them in this re port But the main emphasis of our investigation was on what should be done and not on how it should be done We seek in our rec ommendations to lay the underlying legal foundation and the con trol and oversight structure for the intelligence community If these are sound then we have faith that the other questions will be an swered correctly in the future But if the foundation is unsound or remains unfinished or if intelligence agencies continue to operate under a structure in which executive power is not effectively checked and examined then we will have neither quality intelligence nor a society which is free at home and respected abroad Policy and Public Perceptions d "Chilling First Amendment Rights_ e Preventing the Free Exchangeof Ideas 7 Cost and Value Page v1 CONTENTS Letter of Transmittal Preface I INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY Intelligence Activity A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens Rights 2 The Questions 4 Summary of the Main Problems 5 1 The Number of People Affectedby Domestic Intelli genceActivity 6 2 Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long 7 3 Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means 10 a Covert Action 10 The FBI's COINTELPRO 10 Martin Luther King Jr 11 b Illegal or Improper Means 12 Mail Opening 12 NSA Monitoring 12 Electronic Surveillance 12 Political Abuse 13 Surreptitious Entries 13 Informants 13 4 Ignoring the Law 13 5 Deficienciesin Accountabilityand Control 14 6 The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Ac tivity 15 General Efforts to Discredit 15 Media Manipulation 15 c Distorting Data to Influence Government 16 17 17 18 II THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 1936to 1976 A Summary 21 The Lesson History Repeats Itself 21 The Pattern BroadeningThrough Time 21 Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence 22 B Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure 1936 1945 23 1 Background The Stone Standard 23 2 Main Developmentsof the 1936 1945Period 24 3 Domestic Intelligence Authority Vague and Conflict ing Executive Orders 24 The OriginalRoosevelt Orders 25 Orders in 1938 39 The Vagueness of "Sub versive Activities and "Potential Crimes 25 Orders 1940 43 The ConfusionContinues 27 4 The Role of Congress 28 Executive Avoidanceof Congress 28 CongressDeclinesto Confront the Issue 29 II THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE Continued B Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure 1936-1945Continued Page 5 Scopeof Domestic Intelligence 30 Beyond Criminal Investigations 30 "Infiltration Investigations 31 Partisan Use 33 Centralized Authority FBI and Military Intelligence 33 6 Control by the Attorney General Compliance and Resistance 34 7 Intrusive Techniques QuestionableAuthorization 36 Wiretaps A Strained Statutory Interpreta tion 36 Bugging Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entry 38 C Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era 1946-1963 38 1 Main Developmentsof the 1946-1963Period 38 2 Domestic Intelligence Authority 40 a Anti-CommunistConsensus 40 b The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Pro gram 42 Originsof the Program 42 Breadth of Investigations 43 FBI Control of Loyalty-Security In vestigations 44 c Executive Directives Lack of Guidance and Controls 45 3 Scopeof DomesticIntelligence 46 a "Subversive Activities 46 The Number of Investigations 47 Vagueand SweepingStandards 47 COMINFIL 48 Exaggeration of Communist In fluence 49 b "Racial Matters and "Hate Groups"_ 50 c FBI Political Intelligence for the White House 51 d IRS Investigation of Political Organizations 53 4 Accountabilityand Control 54 Emergency Detention Act 54 WithholdingInformation 55 CIA DomesticActivity 56 VagueControls on CIA 56 Drug Testing and Cover Programs 56 5 Intrusive Techniques 58 a CommunicationInterception CIA and NSA 58 b FBI Covert Techniques 60 Electronic Surveillance 60 "Black Bag Jobs 61 Mail Opening 62 c Use of FBI Wiretaps 62 6 Domestic Covert Action 65 COINTELPRO CommunistParty 65 Early Expansionof COINTELPRO 67 D Intelligenceand Domestic Dissent 1964-1976 67 Main Points During the 1964-1976Period 67 Scopeof Domestic Intelligence 70 a Domestic Protest and Dissent FBI 70 Racial Intelligence 71 "New Left Intelligence 72 b FBI Informants 74 (1) Infiltration of the Klan 74 II THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE Continued D Intelligence and Domestic Dissent 1964 1976 Continued 2 Scopeof Domestic Intelligence Continued b FBI Informants Continued "Listening Posts in the Black Com Page munity 75 Infiltration ofthe "New Left 76 c Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity 77 d Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence 77 e The Justice Department's Interdivision In formation Unit (IDIU) 78 f COMINFIL Investigations Overbreadth 81 3 DomesticIntelligenceAuthority 82 FBI Intelligence 82 Army Intelligence 84 FBI Interagency Agreements 85 4 Domestic Covert Action 86 a COINTELPRO 86 Klan and "White Hate 86 "Black Nationalist COINTELPRO 87 "New Left COINTELPRO 88 b FBI Target Lists 89 "Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index 89 "Key Activist Program 90 "Key Black Extremist Program 91 Security Index 91 c Internal Revenue ServicePrograms 93 Misuseby FBI and CIA 93 The Special Service Staff IRS Tar geting of IdeologicalGroups 94 5 Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent 96 a Origins of CIA Involvement in "Internal Se curity Functions 96 b CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups 98 CIA Responseto FBI Requests 98 Operation CHAOS 99 c CIA Security Operations Within the United States Protecting "Sources and "Methods 102 d NSA Monitoring 104 6 Intrusive Techniques 104 a Warrantless Electronic Surveillance 105 Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance 1965 68.. 105 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 106 Supreme Court Restrictions on Na tional Security Electronic Surveil lance:1972 107 b CIA Mail Opening 107 c Expansionof NSA Monitoring 108 d FBI Cutbacks 109 The Long Subcommittee Investiga tion 109 Director Hoover's Restrictions 110 7 Accountabilityand Control 111 a The Huston Plan A Domestic Intelligence Network 111 IntelligenceCommunityPressures 112 The Interagency CommitteeReport 113 Implementation 115 II THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE Continued D Intelligence and Domestic Dissent 1964 1976--Continued 7 Accountability and Control Continued page b PoliticalIntelligence 116 Name CheckRequests_ 116 DemocraticNational Convention At lantic City 1964 117 By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage 119 The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (1969) 121 The "17 Wiretaps 122 c The Justice Department's Internal Security Division 122 The "new Internal SecurityDivision 123 The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship 124 d The FBI's Secret "Administrative Index 125 8 Reconsiderationof FBI Authority 127 Developmentsin 1972 1974 128 Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority 131 III FINDINGS 137 A Major Finding Violatingand Ignoring the Law 137 Subfindings (a) Violating Statutory Law and Constitutional Rights 139 (b) IgnoringIllegalIssues 140 (c) Continuing Legal Activities 141 (d) Tightening Security for Illegal Activities 146 (e) ConcealingIllegal Activities 149 (f) Weaknessof Internal Inspection 152 (g) Weaknessof Oversightby SeniorAdministration Officials 157 B Major Finding The Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence Activity 165 Subfindings 167 (a) Broad Scopeof Investigations (b) Imprecise Standards for Investigations 169 (c) OverinclusiveTargeting 172 (d) "Vacuum Cleaner Approach 178 (e) ExcessivelyLongInvestigations 179 C Major Finding ExcessiveUse of Intrusive Techniques 183 Subfindings (a) Insuf&cientLegalStandards and Procedures___ 185 (b) ExcessiveCollectionCoupled with Violentand Illegal Activitiesof Informants and Difficulty of LimitingSurveillance 192 (c) Imprecise Labels Lead to Abusive Use of 205 Techniques D Major Finding Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Dis credit Domestic Groups 211 Subfindings (a) Targeting Law-AbidingCitizens 213 (b) Interference With First Amendment Rights 214 (c) Dangerous Covert Tactics 216 (d) ActionsAgainst Dr Martin Luther King Jr 219 E Major Finding Political Abuseof IntelligenceInformation 225 Subfindings (a) Political Intelligence for the White House 226 (b) DisseminationofIncidental Politicalor Personal Information 232 (c) Volunteering Information to the White House and Targeting Critics and Political Figures__ 237 240 (d) InfluencingSocialPolicy and Political Action__ XV III FINDINGS Continued 'cage F Major Finding Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention 253 Subfindings Volunteering Irrelevant Information and re sponding Unquestioningly to Requests 254 ExcessiveDissemination 259 Federal Employee Security Program 261 FBI Retention of Sensitive Derogatory and Illegally Obtained Information 262 G Major Finding Deficienciesin Control and Accountability 265 Subfindings Presidential Failure to Limit and Control Intelligence Activities 267 Attorneys General Failure to Limit and Con trol FBI IntelligenceActivities 270 Encouraging Political Intelligence 274 Executive Failures to Inquire 275 Congressional Failure to Oversee Intelligence Activity and Exert LegislativeControl 277 Intelligence Agencies Act with Insufficient Authorization 281 Termination of AbusiveOperations 284 IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 289 Conclusions 289 Principles Applied in Framing Recommendations and the Scopeof Recommendations 292 Recommendations 296 1 Intelligence AgenciesAre Subject to the Rule of Law (Recommendations1-3) 296 2 United States Foreign and Military AgenciesShould Be Precluded From Domestic Security Activities (Recommendations4-27) 297 Central Intelligence Agency (Recommenda tions 4-13) 297 b National Security Agency (Recommendations 14-19) 308 c Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies (Recommendations 20-26) 310 3 Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity (Recommendations 27-37) 313 Internal Revenue Service (Recommendations 27-35) 313 Post Office(U.S Postal Service) (Recommen dations 36-37) 315 4 Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlledto Prevent AbusesWithout Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investiga tions of Foreign Espionage (Recommendations 38-69) 316 a Centralize Supervision Investigative Re sponsibility and the Use of Covert Tech niques (Recommendations 38-39) 316 h Prohibitions (Recommendations 40-41) 317 Authorized Scope of Domestic Security In vestigations (Recommendations42-49) 318 Authorized Investigative Techniques (Rec ommendations 50-63) 324 Maintenance and Dissemination of Informa tion (Recommendations64-68) 330 f Attorney General Oversight of the FBI Including Termination ofInvestigations and Covert Techniques (Recommendation69)__ 332 IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Continued Page C Recommendations Continued 5 The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney Generalfor Oversightfor Federal DomesticSecurity Activitiesmust be clarifiedand GeneralCounseland Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened (Recommendations 70-86) 332 a Attorney General Responsibility and Rela ship With Other Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations70-74) 333 b General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 75-81) 333 Officeof Professional Responsibility (Recom mendation 82) 335 d Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors of the FBI (Recommendations 83-85) _ 335 6 Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required (Recommendations 86-89) 336 Administrative Rulemaking (Recommenda tions 86-88) 336 Disclosure(Recommendations 89-90) 336 7 Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded (Recommenda tion 91) 336 8 Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted (Recom mendation 92) 338 9 The Smith Act and the VoorhisAct Should Either Be Repealed or Amended (Recommendation93) 339 10 The Espionage Statute Should Be Modernized (Recommendation94) 339 11 Broaden Accessto Intelligence Agency Files Should Be Provided to GAO as an Investigative Arm of the Congress(Recommendation95) 339 12 Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified (Recommendation96) 339 13 Definitions 339 AppendixA Senate Resolution 21 343 Appendix B Previously Issued Hearings and Reports of Senate Select Committee 355 AppendixC Staff Acknowledgments 357 AdditionalViews Philip A Hart 359 Robert Morgan 363 Introduction to Separate Viewsof Senators John G Tower Howard H Baker Jr. and Barry Goldwater 367 John G Tower 369 Howard H Baker Jr 373 Barry Goldwater 389 Charles McC Mathias Jr 395 I INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY The resolution creating this Committee placed greatest emphasis on whether intelligence activities threaten the "rights of American citizens. 1 The critical question before the Committee was to determine how the fundamental liberties of the people can be maintained in the course of the Government's effort to protect their security The deli cate balance between these basic goals of our system of government is often difficult to strike but it can and must be achieved We reject the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair play have no place in our struggle against the enemies of freedom Moreover our investigation has established that the targets of intelli gence activity have ranged far beyond persons who could properly be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens engaging in lawful activity Americans have rightfully been concerned since before World War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit acts of espionage Similarly the violent acts of political terrorists can seriously endanger the rights of Americans Carefully focused intelli gence investigations can help prevent such acts But too often intelligence has lost this focus and domestic intelli gence activities have invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful assembly and political expression Unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation domestic intelligence activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature We have examined three types of "intelligence activities affecting the rights of American citizens The first is intelligence collection such as infiltrating groups with informants wiretapping or opening letters The second is dissemination of material which has been col lected The third is covert action designed to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order These three types of "intelligence activity are closely related in the practical world Information which is disseminated by the in telligence community or used in disruptive programs has usually been obtained through surveillance Nevertheless a division between collection dissemination and covert action is analytically useful both in understanding why excesses have occurred in the past and in de vising remedies to prevent those excesses from recurring 'S Res 21 sec 2(12) The Senate specificallycharged this Committeewith investigating "the conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence op erations against United States citizens. (Sec 2(2)) The resolution added several examples of specificcharges of possible "illegal improper or unethical governmentalintelligenceactivities as matters to he fully investigated (Sec (2) (1) CIA domesticactivities Sec (2) (3) 1-Liston Plan Sec (2) (10) surrep titous entries electronic surveillance mail opening.) 'Just as the term "intelligence activity encompassesactivities that go far beyond the collection and analysis of information the term "intelligence com munity includes persons ranging from the President to the lowest field opera tives of the intelligenceagencies (1) 68-7860 76 2 2 A Intelligence Activity A New Form of Governmental Power to Im pair Citizens Rights A tension between order and liberty is inevitable in any society A Government must protect its citizens from those bent on engaging in violence and criminal behavior or in espionage and other hos tile foreign intelligence activity Many of the intelligence programs reviewed in this report were established for those purposes Intelli gence work has at times successfully prevented dangerous and abhor rent acts such as bombings and foreign spying and aided in the prosecution of those responsible for such acts But intelligence activity in the past decades has all too often exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental power which are imposed by our country's Constitution laws and traditions Excesses in the name of protecting security are not a recent develop ment in our nation's history In 1798 for example shortly after the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed These Acts passed in response to fear of pro French "subversion made it a crime to criticize the Government.3 During the Civil War President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus Hundreds of American citizens were prose cuted for anti-war statements during World War I and thousands of "radical aliens were seized for deportation during the 1920 Palmer Raids During the Second World War over the opposition of J Edgar Hoover and military intelligence, 120,000 Japanese-Americans were apprehended and incarcerated in detention camps Those actions however were fundamentally different from the intelligence activities examined by this Committee They were gener ally executed overtly under the authority of a statute or a public executive order The victims knew what was being done to them and could challenge the Government in the courts and other forums Intel ligence activity on the other hand is generally covert It is concealed from its victims 5and is seldom described in statutes or explicit execu The Alien Act provided for the deportation of all aliens judged "dangerous to the peace and safety of the nation (1 Stat 570 June 25 1798) The Sedi tion Aet made it a federal crime to publish "false scandalous and malicious writing against the United States government the Congress or the President with the intent to "excite against them the "hatred of the good people of the United States or to "encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States. (1 Stat 596 July 14 1798) There were at least 25 arrests 15 indictments and 10 convictions under the Sedition Act (See James M Smith Freedom's Fetters The Alien and Sedition Laws and AmericanCivilLiberties (Ithaca CornellU Press 1956).) 'Francis Biddle In Brief Authority (Garden City Doubleday 1962) p 224 Roger Daniels Concentration Camps USA Japanese Americans and World WarII (NewYork Holt Rinehart and Winston 1971) p 66 "Many victims of intelligence activities have claimed in the past that they were beingsubjected to hostile action by their government Prior to this investi gation most Americans would have dismissed these allegations Senator Philip Hart aptly described this phenomenonin the course of the Committee'spublic hearings ondomesticintelligenceactivities "As I'm sure others have I have been told for years by among others some of my own family that this is exactly what the Bureau was doing all of the time and in my great wisdom and high office I assured them that they were [wrong] it just wasn't true it couldn't happen They wouldn't do it What you have described is a series of illegal actions intended squarely to deny 3 tive orders The victim may never suspect that his misfortunes are the intended result of activities undertaken by his government and accord ingly may have no opportunity to challenge the actions taken against him It is of course proper in many circumstances such as developing a criminal prosecution for the Government to gather information about a citizen and use it to achieve legitimate ends some of which might be detrimental to the citizen But in criminal prosecutions the courts have struck a balance between protecting the rights of the accused citizen and protecting the society which suffers the conse quences of crime Essential to the balancing process are the rules of criminal law which circumscribe the techniques for gathering evi dence, the kinds of evidence that may be collected and the uses to which that evidence may be put In addition the criminal defendant is given an opportunity to discover and then challenge the legality of how the Government collected information about him and the use which the Government intends to make of that information This Committee has examined a realm of governmental informa tion collection which has not been governed by restraints comparable to those in criminal proceedings We have examined the collection of intelligence about the political advocacy and actions and the private lives of American citizens That information has been used covertly to discredit the ideas advocated and to "neutralize the actions of their proponents As Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone warned in 1924 when he sought to keep federal agencies from investigating "political or other opinions as opposed to "conduct forbidden by the laws When a police system passes beyond these limits it is dan gerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty which it should be our first concern to cherish .. There is always a possibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free institutions be cause it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood. Our investigation has confirmed that warning We have seen seg ments of our Government in their attitudes and action adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited goals such as preventing criminal First Amendment rights to some Americans That is what my children have told mewasgoingon NowI did not believeit "The trick now as I see it Mr Chairman is for this committee to be able to figure out how to persuade the people of this country that indeed it did go on And how shall we insure that it will never happen again But it will happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to understand and accept that it did go on. Senator Philip Hart 11/18/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 41 9As the Supreme Court noted in Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S 436 483 486 (1966) even before the Court required law officersto advise criminal suspects of their constitutional rights before custodial interrogation the FBI had "an exemplary record in this area a practice which the Court said should be "emulated by state and local law enforcementagencies. This commendableFBI tradition in the general fieldof law enforcementpresents a sharp contrast to the widespread disregard of individual rights in FBI domestic intelligence opera tionsexaminedin the balanceof this Report NewYorkTimes 5/13/24 4 violence or identifying foreign spies were expanded to what wit nesses characterized as "vacuum cleaners'',8 sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens The tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their initial scope is a theme which runs through every aspect of our investi gative findings Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing demands for new data And once intelligence has been collected there are strong pressures to use it against the target The pattern of intelligence agencies expanding the scope of their activities was well described by one witness who in 1970 had coordi nated an effort by most of the intelligence community to obtain authority to undertake more illegal domestic activity The risk was that you would get people who would be sus ceptible to political considerations as opposed to national security considerations or would construe political considera tions to be national security considerations to move from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate And you just keep going down the line.9 In 1940 Attorney General Robert Jackson saw the same risk He recognized that using broad labels like "national security or "sub version to invoke the vast power of the government is dangerous because there are "no definite standards to determine what constitutes a subversive activity such as we have for murder or larceny. Jack son added Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners persons on relief or those who are disadvantaged in the strug gle for existence may be regarded as subversive by those whose property interests might be burdened thereby Those who are in office are apt to regard as subversive the activi ties of any of those who would bring about a change of ad ministration Some of our soundest constitutional doctrines were once punished as subversive We must not forget that it was not so long ago that both the term Republican and the term Democrat were epithets with sinister meaning to de note persons of radical tendencies that were subversive of the order of things then dominant.lo This wise warning was not heeded in the conduct of intelligence activity where the "eternal vigilance which is the "price of liberty has been forgotten B The Questions We have directed our investigation toward answering the follow ing questions Which governmental agencies have engaged in domestic spying How many citizens have been targets of Governmental intelligence activity 8Mary Jo Cooktestimony 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 111 James B Adams testimony 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 135 Tom Charles Huston testimony 9/23/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 45 'The Federal Prosecutor Journal of the American Judicature Society (June 1940) p 18 5 What standards have governed the opening of intelligence investiga tions and when have intelligence investigations been terminated Where have the targets fit on the spectrum between those who com mit violent criminal acts and those who seek only to dissent peacefully from Government policy To what extent has the information collected included intimate details of the targets personal lives or their political views and has such information been disseminated and used to injure individuals What actions beyond surveillance have intelligence agencies taken such as attempting to disrupt discredit or destroy persons or groups who have been the targets of surveillance Have intelligence agencies been used to serve the political aims of Presidents other high officials or the agencies themselves How have the agencies responded either to proper orders or to exces sive pressures from their superiors To what extent have intelligence agencies disclosed or concealed them from outside bodies charged with overseeing them Have intelligence agencies acted outside the law What has been the attitude of the intelligence community toward the rule of law To what extent has the Executive branch and the Congress con trolled intelligence agencies and held them accountable Generally how well has the Federal system of checks and balances between the branches worked to control intelligence activity C Summary of the Main Problems The answer to each of these questions is disturbing Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and to much information has beeen collected The Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power The Government operating pri marily through secret informants but also using other intrusive techniques such as wiretaps microphone "bugs surreptitious mail opening and break-ins has swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives views and associations of American citizens Investigations of groups deemed potentially dangerous and even of groups suspected of associating with potentially dangerous orga nizations have continued for decades despite the fact that those groups did not engage in unlawful activity Groups and individuals have been harassed and disrupted because of their political views and their lifestyles Investigations have been based upon vague stand ards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable Unsavory and vicious tactics have been employed including anonymous attempts to break up marriages disrupt meetings ostracize persons from their professions and provoke target groups into rivalries that might result in deaths Intelligence agencies have served the political and personal objectives of presidents and other high officials While the agencies often committed excesses in response to pressure from high officials in the Executive branch and Congress they also occa sionally initiated improper activities and then concealed them from officials whom they had a duty to inform Governmental officials including those whose principal duty is to enforce the law have violated or ignored the law over long periods of time and have advocated and defended their right to break the law 6 The Constitutional system of checks and balances has not adequately controlled intelligence activities Until recently the Executive branch has neither delineated the scope of permissible activities nor estab lished procedures for supervising intelligence agencies Congress has failed to exercise sufficient oversight seldom questioning the use to which its apropriations were being put Most domestic intelligence issues have not reached the courts and in those cases when they have reached the courts the judiciary has been reluctant to grapple with them Each of these points is briefly illustrated below and covered in sub stantially greater detail in the following sections of the report 1 The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity United States intelligence agencies have investigated a vast num ber of American citizens and domestic organizations FBI headquar ters alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files,1 and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI Field Offices The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone.12 In fact substantially more individuals and groups are subject to intelligence scrutiny than the number of files would appear to indicate since typically each domestic intelligence file contains in formation on more than one individual or group and this information is readily retrievable through the FBI General Name Index The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domes tic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA between 1953 1973 producing a CIA computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names.13 At least 130.000 first class letters were opened and photo graphed by the FBI between 1940 1966 in eight U.S cities. Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA com puter system and separate files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the course of CIA's Operation CHAOS (1967 1973).15 Millions of private telegrams sent from to or through the United States were obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with three United States telegraph companies." An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army intelligence files created between the mid-1960's and 1971.17 Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created by the Internal Revenue Service between "Memorandumfromthe FBI to the Senate SelectCommittee10/6/75 12Memorandumfromthe FBI to the Senate SelectCommittee 10/6/75 James Angletontestimony 9/17/75 p 28 13SeeMailOpeningReport SectionIV "FBI MailOpenings. 11Chief International Terrorist Group testimony Commissionon CIA Activi ties Within the United States 3/10/75 pp 1485-1489 11Statement by the Chairman 11/6/75 re SHAMROCK Hearings Vol 5 pp 57-60 1RSeeMilitary SurveillanceReport SectionH "The Collectionof Information about the Political Activities of Private Citizens and Private Organizations. 7 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria. At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a "national emergency".19 2 Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long Intelligence agencies have collected vast amounts of information about the intimate details of citizens lives and about their participa tion in legal and peaceful political activities The targets of intelli gence activity have included political adherents of the right and the left ranging from activitist to casual supporters Investigations have been directed against proponents of racial causes and women's rights outspoken apostles of nonviolence and racial harmony establishment politicians religious groups and advocates of new life styles The widespread targeting of citizens and domestic groups and the exces sive scope of the collection of information is illustrated by the fol lowing examples The "Women's Liberation Movement was infiltrated by in formants who collected material about the movement's policies leaders and individual members One report included the name of every woman who attended meetings,2 and another stated that each woman at a meeting had described "how she felt oppressed sexually or other wise".21 Another report concluded that the movement's purpose was to "free women from the humdrum existence of being only a wife and mother but still recommended that the intelligence investigation should be continued.22 A prominent civil rights leader and advisor to Dr Martin Luther King Jr. was investigated on the suspicion that he might be a Communist "sympathizer The FBI field office concluded he was not.23 Bureau headquarters directed that the investigation continue using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the field officethat 24 is not sympathetic to the Party cause While there may not be any evidence that is a Communist neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist.25 FBI sources reported on the formation of the Conservative American Christian Action Council in 1971.26In the 1950's the Bu reau collected information about the John Birch Society and passed 18See IRS Report Section II "Selective Enforcement for Nontax Purposes. '6Memorandumfrom A H Belmont to L V Boardman 12/8/54 Many of the memoranda cited in this report were actually written by FBI personnel other than those whosenames wereindicated at the foot of the documentas the author Citation in this report of specificmemorandaby usingthe namesof FBI personnel whichsoappear is for documentationpurposesonlyand is not intended to presume authorship or evenknowledgein all cases Memorandumfrom Kansas City Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/20/70 (Hearings Vol 6 Exhibit 54 3) 21Memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/28/69 p 2 (Hearings Vol 6 Exhibit 54 1) 22Memorandum from Baltimore Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/11/70 p 2 Memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/14/64 24Namedeletedby Committeeto protect privacy Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office4/24/64 re CPUSA Negro question 2fJames Adamstestimony 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 137 8 it to the White House because of the Society's "scurillous attack on President Eisenhower and other high Government officials.= Some investigations of the lawful activities of peaceful groups have continued for decades For example the NAACP was investi gated to determine whether it "had connections with the Communist Party The investigation lasted for over twenty-five years although nothing was found to rebut a report during the first year of the investi gation that the NAACP had a "strong tendency to "steer clear of Communist activities. 28 Similarly the FBI has admitted that the Socialist Workers Party has committed no criminal acts Yet the Bureau has investigated the Socialist Workers Party for more than three decades on the basis of its revolutionary rhetoric which the FBI concedes falls short of incitement to violence and its claimed international links The Bureau is currently using its informants to collect information about SWP members political views including those on "U.S involvement in Angola, "food prices, "racial mat ters, the "Vietnam War, and about any of their efforts to support non-SIVP candidates for political office. National political leaders fell within the broad reach of in telligence investigations For example Army Intelligence maintained files on Senator Adlai Stevenson and Congressman Abner Mikva because of their participation in peaceful political meetings under sur veillance by Army agents.30 A letter to Richard Nixon while he was a candidate for President in 1t 68 was intercepted under CIA's mail opening program.31 In the 1960's President Johnson asked the FBI to compare various Senators statements on Vietnam with the Commu nist Party line 32and to conduct name checks on leading antiwar Sena tors 33 As part of their effort to collect information which "related even remotely to people or groups "active in communities which had "the potential for civil disorder Army intelligence agencies took such steps as sending agents to a Halloween party for elementary school children in Washington D.C. because they suspected a local "dissident might be present monitoring protests of welfare mothers organizations in Milwaukee infiltrating a coalition of church youth groups in Colorado and sending agents to a priests conference in Washington D.C. held to discuss birth control measures.34 In the late 1960's and early 1970's student groups were sub jected to intense scrutiny In 1970 the FBT ordered investigations of every member of the Students for a Democratic Society and of "every Black Student Union and similar group regardless of their past or 'Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 5/29/63 Memorandumfrom OklahomaCityField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/19/41 SeeDevelopmentof FBI DomesticIntelligence Investigations SectionIV "FBI Target Lists. 'Chief Robert Shacklefordtestimony 2/6/76 p 91 Senate Judi iary Subcommitteeon Constitutional Rights Report 1973 p 57 Senate Select Committee Staff summary of HTLINGUAL File Review 9/5/75 'FBI Summary Memorandum 1/31/75 re Coverageof T.V Presentation "Letter from J Edgar Hooverto MarvinWatson 7/15/66 See Military Report See II "The Collectionof Information About the Po litical Activities of Private Citizens and Private Organizations. 9 present involvement in disorders. 35Files were opened on thousands of young men and women so that as the former head of FBI intelligence explained the information could be used if they ever applied for a government job.30 In the 1960's Bureau agents were instructed to increase their efforts to discredit "New Left student demonstrators by tactics including publishing photographs ("naturally the most obnoxious picture should be used") ,31using "misinformation to falsely notify members events had been cancelled,'$ and writing "tell-tale letters to students parents.39 The FBI Intelligence Division commonly investigated any in dication that "subversive groups already under investigation were seeking to influence or control other groups.40 One example of the ex treme breadth of this "infiltration theory was an FBI instruction in the mid-1960's to all Field Offices to investigate every "free university because some of them had come under "subversive influence. 41 Each administration from Franklin D Roosevelt's to Richard Nixon's permitted and sometimes encouraged government agencies to handle essentially political intelligence For example President Roosevelt asked the FBI to put in its files the names of citizens sending telegrams to the White House opposing his "national defense policy and supporting Col Charles Lindbergh.42 President Truman received inside information on a former Roosevelt aide's efforts to influence his appointments,43 labor union negotiating plans,44 and the publishing plans of journalists.45 President Eisenhower received reports on purely political and social contacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch,46 Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt 47 and Supreme Court Justice William O Douglas.47a The Kennedy Administration had the FBI wiretap a Congres sional staff member,48 three executive officials,49 a lobbyist,50 and a Washington law firm.51Attorney General Robert F Kennedy received the fruits of a FBI "tap on Martin Luther King Jr.,52 and a "bug on a Congressman both of which yielded information of a political nature.53 MemorandumfromFBI headquarters to all SAC's 11/4/70 3ECharlesBrennan testimony 9/25/75 Hearings vol 2p 117 3 MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SAC's 7/5/68 3 Abstracts of New Left Documents #161 115 43 Memorandumfrom Wash ington Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/21/69 ' Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to ClevelandField Office11/29/68 40FBI Manualof Instructions Sec 87 B(2-f) 91Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San AntonioField Office7/23/69 Memorandumfrom Stephen Early to J Edgar Hoover 5/21/40 6/17/40 "Letter from J Edgar Hoover to GeorgeAllen 12/3/46 44Letter from J Edgar Hooverto Maj Gen Harry Vaughn 2/15/47 'sLetter from J Edgar Hooverto M J Connelly 1/27/50 ' Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson 11/7/55 Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler 2/13/58 4'nLetters from J Edgar Hooverto Robert Cutler 4/21/53-4/27/53 "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 2/16/61 "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 2/14/61 wMemorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 2/16/61 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62 'Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan 12/19/66 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 2/18/61 10 President Johnson asked the FBI to conduct "name checks of his critics and of members of the staff of his 1964 opponent Senator Barry Goldwater.' I-le also requested purely political intelligence on his critics in the Senate and received extensive intelligence reports on political activity at the 1964 Democratic Convention from FBI elec tronic sury eillance.'S President Nixon authorized a program of wiretaps which pro duced for the White House purely political or personal information unrelated to national security including information about a Supreme Court justice. 3 Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means (a) Covert Action. Apart from uncovering excesses in the collec tion of intelligence our investigation has disclosed covert actions di rected against Americans and the use of illegal and improper surveil lance techniques to gather information For example (i) The FBI's COINTELPRO counterintelligence program was designed to "disrupt groups and "neutralize individuals deemed to be threats to domestic security The FBI resorted to counterintelli gence tactics in part because its chief officials believed that the existing law could not control the activities of certain dissident groups and that court decisions had tied the hands of the intelligence community Whatever opinion one holds about the policies of the targeted groups many of the tactics employed by the FBI were indisputably degrading to a free society COINTELPRO tactics included Anonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order to induce their employers to fire them Anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of intelligence targets for the purpose of destroying their marriages 67 Obtaining from IRS the tax returns of a target and then attempt ing to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of de terring a protest leader from attending the Democratic National Convention 58 Falsely and anonymously labeling as Government informants members of groups known to be violent thereby exposing the falsely labelled member to expulsion or physicial attack 59 Pursuant to instructions to use "misinformation to disrupt demonstrations employing such means as broadcasting fake orders on the same citizens band radio frequency used by demonstration marshalls to attempt to control demonstrations,60 and duplicating and falsely filling out forms soliciting housing for persons coming to a demonstration thereby causing "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses" 81 "Memorandum froth J Edgar Hoover to Bill Moyers 10/27/64 'Memorandum from C D DeLoachto John Mohr 8/29/64 'Letter from J Edgar Hoover to H.R Haldeman 6/25/70 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 11/26/68 "Memorandum from [Midwest City] Field Office to FBI Headquarters 8/1/68 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to [Midwest City] Field Office 8/6/68 "Memorandum from ColumbiaField Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/4/70 re COINTELPRO-NewLeft 0Memorandumfrom CharlesBrennan to William Sullivan 8/15/68 'Memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/9/68 11 Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street gang (described as "violence-prone") stating that the Black Panthers were supposed to have "a hit out for you The letter was suggested because it "may intensify animosity and cause the street gang leader to "take retaliatory action".62 (ii) From "late 1963 until his death in 1968 Martin Luther King Jr. was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neutralize him as an effective civil rights leader In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war against Dr King "No holds were barred. 63 The FBI gathered information about Dr King's plans and activi ties through an extensive surveillance program employing nearly every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal in order to obtain information about the "private activities of Dr King and his advisors to use to "completely discredit them.64 The program to destroy Dr King as the leader of the civil rights movement included efforts to discredit him with Executive branch officials Congressional leaders foreign heads of state American am bassadors churches universities and the press.66 The FBI mailed Dr King a tape recording made from microphones hidden in his hotel rooms which one agent testified was an attempt to destroy Dr King's marriage 66The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr King and his advisors interpreted as threatening to release the tape recording unless Dr King committed suicide.67 The extraordinary nature of the campaign to discredit Dr King is evident from two documents At the August 1963 March on Washington Dr King told the country of his "dream that all of God's children black men and white men Jews and Gentiles Protestants and Catholics will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual "Free at last free at last thank God Almightly I'm free at last. The Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division concluded that this "demagogic speech established Dr King as the "most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the country. 88Shortly afterwards and within days after Dr King was named "Man of the Year by Time magazine the FBI decided to "take him off his pedestal, reduce him completely in influence, and select and promote its own candidate to "assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people. 69 In early 1968 Bureau headquarters explained to the field that Dr King must be destroyed because he was seen as a potential "messiah who could "unify and electrify the "black nationalist movement Indeed to the FBI he was a potential threat because he might "aban 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office 1/30/69 re COINTELPROBlack Nationalist-Hate Groups William C Sullivantestimony 11/1/75 p 49 84Memorandumfrom Baumgardner to Sullivan 2/4/64 6 Memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/16/68 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office 1/30/69 re COTNTELPROBlack Nationalist-Hate Groups 08William C Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 104-105 mAndrewYoungtestimony 2/19/76 p 8 8Memorandumfrom Sullivan to Belmont 8/30/63 e Memorandumfrom Sullivanto Belmont 1/8/64 12 don his supposed obedience to white liberal doctrines (non-viol ence).7 70In short a non-violent man was to be secretly attacked and destroyed as insurance against his abandoning non-violence (b) Illegal or Improper Mears. The surveillance which we in vestigated was not only vastly excessive in breadth and a basis for degrading counterintelligence actions but was also often conducted by illegal or improper means For example For approximately 20 years the CIA carried out a pro gram of indiscriminately opening citizens first class mail The Bureau also had a mail opening program but cancelled it in 1966 The Bureau continued however to receive the illegal fruits of CIA's program In 1970 the heads of both agencies signed a document for President Nixon which cor rectly stated that mail opening was illegal falsely stated that it had been discontinued and proposed that the illegal open ing of mail should be resumed because it would provide use ful results The President approved the program but with drew his approval five days later The illegal opening con tinued nonetheless Throughout this period CIA officials knew that mail opening was illegal but expressed concern about the "flap potential of exposure not about the illegality of their activity 71 From 1947 until May 1975 NSA received from inter national cable companies millions of cables which had been sent by American citizens in the reasonable expectation that they would be kept private.72 Since the early 1930's intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged American citizens with out the benefit of judicial warrant Recent court decisions have curtailed the use of these techniques against domestic targets But past subjects of these surveillances have included a United States Congressman a Congressional staff member journalists and newsmen and numerous individuals and groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security such as two White House domestic affairs advisers and an anti-Vietnam War protest group While the prior written approval of the Attor ney General has been required for all warrantless wiretaps since 1940 the record is replete with instances where this requirement was ignored and the Attorney General gave only after-the-fact authorization Until 1965 microphone surveillance by intelligence agen cies was wholly unregulated in certain classes of cases Within weeks after a 1954 Supreme Court decision denouncing the FBI's installation of a microphone in a defendant's bedroom the Attorney General informed the Bureau that he did not believe the decision applied to national security cases and Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs3/4/68 '71See Mail OpeningReport Section II "Legal Considerationsand the Flap Potential. 'See NSAReport Section I "Introduction and Summary. 13 permitted the FBI to continue to install microphones sub ject only to its own "intelligent restraint".73 In several cases purely political information (such as the reaction of Congress to an Administration's legislative proposal) and purely personal information (such as cov erage of the extra-marital social activities of a high-level Ex ecutive official under surveillance) was obtained from elec tronic surveillance and disseminated to the highest levels of the federal government.74 Warrantless break-ins have been conducted by intelli gence agencies since World War II During the 1960's alone the FBI and CIA conducted hundreds of break-ins many against American citizens and domestic organizations In some cases these break-ins were to install microphones in other cases they were to steal such items as membership lists from organizations considered "subversive by the Bureau.75 The most pervasive surveillance technique has been the informant In a random sample of domestic intelligence cases 83% involved informants and 5% involved electronic surveillance.f6 Informants have been used against peaceful law-abiding groups they have collected information about personal and political views and activities.77 To maintain their credentials in violence-prone groups informants have involved themselves in violent activity This phenomenon is well illustrated by an informant in the Klan He was present at the murder of a civil rights worker in Mississippi and sub sequently helped to solve the crime and convict the perpetra tors Earlier however while performing duties paid for by the Government he had previously "beaten people severely had boarded buses and kicked people had [gone] into res taurants and beaten them [blacks] with blackjacks chains pistols. 79Although the FBI requires agents to instruct in formants that they cannot be involved in violence it was understood that in the Klan "he couldn't be an angel and be a good informant. 79 4 Ignoring the Law Officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally recognized that certain activities were illegal but expressed concern only for "flap potential. Even more disturbing was the frequent testimony that the law and the Constitution were simply ignored For example the author of the so-called Huston plan testified Question Was there any person who stated that the activity recommended which you 'have previously identified as being Memorandumfrom Attorney GeneralBrownellto J Edgar Hoover 5/20/54 See finding on Political Abuse To protect the privacy of the targeted individual the Committeehas omitted the citation to the memorandumconcern ingthe exampleofpurer personalinformation Memorandumfrom W C Sullivanto C D DeT.oach7/19/66 p 2 General AccountingOfficeReport on DomesticIntelligence Operationsof the FBT 9/75 Mary.ToCooktestimony 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 111 Gary Rowedeposition 10/17/75 p 9 SpecialAgentNo 3 deposition 11/21/75 p 12 14 illegal opening of the mail and breaking and entry or bur glary was there any single person who stated that such ac tivity should not be done because it was unconstitutional Answer No Question Was there any single person who said such activ ity should not be done because it was illegal Answer No.8 Similarly the man who for ten years headed FBI's Intelligence Division testifed that .. never once did I hear anybody including myself raise the question "Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful is it legal is it ethical or moral. We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning because we were just natu rally pragmatic.81 Although the statutory law and the Constitution were often not "[given] a thought",82 there was 'a general attitude that intelligence needs were responsive to a higher law Thus as one witness testified in justifying the FBI's mail opening program I't was my assumption that what we were doing was justified by what we had to do the greater good the national security.83 5 Deficiencies in Accountability and Control The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a prolonged period of time were due in large measure to the fact that the system of checks and balances created in our Constitution to limit ,abuse of Governmental power was seldom applied to the intelligence com munity Guidance and regulation from outside the intelligence agen cies where it has been imposed at all has been vague Presidents and other senior Executive officials particularly the Attorneys Gen eral have virtually abdicated their Constitutional responsibility to oversee and set standards for intelligence activity Senior government officials generally gave the agencies broad general mandates or pressed for immediate results on pressing problems In neither case did they provide guidance to prevent excesses and their broad mandates and pressures themselves often resulted in excessive or improper intelligence activity Congress has often declined to exercise meaningful oversight and on occasion has passed laws or made statements which were taken by intelligence agencies as supporting overly-broad investigations 8 Huston testimony 9/23/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 41 "William Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 pp 92-93 "The quote is from a Bureau official who had supervised for the "Black Nationalist Hate Group COINTELPRO '"Question Did anybody at any time that you remember during the course of the programs discuss the Constitutionality or the legal authority or anything else like that "Answer No we never gave it a thought As far as I know nobodyengaged or ever had any idea that they were doing anything other than what was the policy of the Bureau which had been policy for a long time. (George Moore deposition 11/3/75 p 83.) Branigan 10/9/75 p 41 15 On the other hand the record reveals instances when intelligence agencies have concealed improper activities from their superiors in the Executive branch and from the Congress or have elected to dis close only the less questionable aspects of their activities There has been in short a clear and sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence community and to ensure its accountability There has been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities of their activities and to comply with directives from those authorities 6 The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity Many of the illegal or improper disruptive efforts directed against American citizens and domestic organizations succeeded in injuring their targets Although it is sometimes difficult to prove that a target's misfortunes were caused by a counter-intelligence program directed against him the possibility that an arm of the United States Govern ment intended to cause the harm and might have been responsible is itself abhorrent The Committee has observed numerous examples of the impact of intelligence operations Sometimes the harm was readily apparent destruction of marriages loss of friends or jobs Sometimes the atti tudes of the public and of Government officials responsible for formu lating policy and resolving vital issues were influenced by distorted intelligence But the most basic harm was to the values of privacy and freedom which our Constitution seeks to protect and which intelligence activity infringed on a broad scale General Efforts to Discredit. Several efforts against individuals and groups appear to have achieved their stated aims For example A Bureau Field Office reported that the anonymous letter it had sent to an activist's husband accusing his wife of infidelity "contributed very strongly to the subsequent breakup of the marriage.84 Another Field Office reported that a drat counsellor deliberately and falsely accused of being an FBI informant was "ostracized by his friends and associates.85 Two instructors were reportedly put on probation after the Bu reau sent an anonymous letter to a university administrator about their funding of an anti-administration student newspaper.86 The Bureau evaluated its attempts to "put a stop to a contribu tion to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as "quite successful. S7 An FBI document boasted that a "pretext phone call to Stokeley Carmichael's mother telling her that members of the Black Panther Party intended to kill her son left her "shocked The memorandum in timated that the Bureau believed it had been responsible for Carmi chael's flight to Africa the following day.88 Media Manipulation. The FBI has attempted covertly to in fluence the public's perception of persons and organizations by dis seminatinq* derogatory information to the press either anonymously or through "friendly news contacts The impact of those articles is Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/19/70 "Memorandum from San Dieeo Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/30/69 "Memorandum from MobileField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/9/70 Memorandumfrom wick to DeLoach 11/9/66 Memorandumfrom NewYork Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/9/68 16 generally difficult to measure although in some cases there are fairly direct connections to injury to the target The Bureau also attempted to influence media reporting which would have any impact on the pub lic image of the FBI Examples include Planting a series of derogatory articles about Martin Luther King Jr. and the Poor People's Campaign.89 For example in anticipation of the 1968 "poor people's march on Washington D.C., Bureau Headquarters granted authority to furnish "cooperative news media sources an article "designed to cur tail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising. 9 Another memo randum illustrated how "photographs of demonstrators could be used in discrediting the civil rights movement Six photographs of partic ipants in the poor people's campaign in Cleveland accompanied the memorandum with the following note attached "These [photo graphs] show the militant aggressive appearance of the participants and might be of interest to a cooperative news source. 91Information on the Poor People's Campaign was provided by the FBI to friendly reporters on the condition that "the Bureau must not be revealed as the source. 92 Soliciting information from Field Offices "on a continuing basis for "prompt dissemination to the news media to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents. The Headquarters direc tive requested among other things that specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters activities habits and living conditions representative of New Left adherents Field Offices were to be exhorted that "Every avenue of possible em barrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored. s3 Ordering Field Offices to gather information which would dis prove allegations by the "liberal press the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left that the Chicago police used undue force in dealing with demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic Convention.95 Taking advantage of a close relationship with the Chairman of the Board described in an FBI memorandum as "our good friend" of a magazine with national circulation to influence articles which re lated to the FBI For example through this relationship the Bureau "squelched an "unfavorable article against the Bureau written by a free-lance writer about an FBI investigation "postponed publication of an article on another FBI case "forestalled publication of an ar ticle by Dr Martin Luther King Jr. and received information about proposed editing of King's articles.96 (e) Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Pub lic Perceptions Accurate intelligence is a prerequisite to sound government policy However as the past head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division reminded the Committee SeeKingReport SectionsVand VII Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto W C Sullivan 10/26/68 Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto W C Sullivan 5/17/68 "Memorandum from FRI Headquarters to Miami Field Office 7/9/68 eaMemorandumfrom C P Brennan to W C Sullivan 5/22/68 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chieaeo Field Office 8/28/68 9dMemorandumfrom W H Stapletonto DeLoach 11/3/64 17 The facts by themselves are not too meaningful They are something like stones cast into a heap.97 On certain crucial subjects the domestic intelligence agencies reported the "facts in ways that gave rise to misleading impressions For example the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division initially dis counted as an "obvious failure the alleged attempts of Communists to influence the civil rights movement. g Without any significant change in the factual situation the Bureau moved from the Division's conclusion to Director Hoover's public congressional testimony charac terizing 'Communist influence on the civil rights movement as "vitally important. 98a FBI reporting on protests against the Vietnam War provides an other example of the manner in which the information provided to decision-makers can be skewed In acquiescence with a judgment al ready expressed by President Johnson the Bureau's reports on dem onstrations against the War in Vietnam emphasized Communist efforts to influence the anti-war movement and underplayed the fact that the vast majority of demonstrators were not Communist controlled.99 "Chillivq First Amendment Rights. The First Amendment protects the Rights of American citizens to engage in free and open discussions and to associate with persons of their choosing Intel ligence agencies have on occasion expressly attempted to interfere with those rights For example one internal FBI memorandum called for "more interviews with New Left subjects "to enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and "get the point across there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox. 100 More importantly the government's surveillance activities in the aggregate whether or not expressly intended to do so tends as the Committee concludes at p 290 to deter the exercise of First Amended rights by American citizens who become aware of the gov ernment's domestic intelligence program Preventive the Free Exchange of Ideas Speakers teachers writers and publications themselves were targets of the FBI's counter intelligence program The FBI's efforts to interfere with the free ex change of ideas included Anonymously attempting to prevent an alleged "Communist front. group from holding a forum on a midwest campus and then investirrat.ing the judge who ordered that the meeting be allowed to proceed.101 hsing another "confidential source in a foundation which con tributed to a local college to apply pressure on the school to fire an activist professor Anonymously contacting a university official to urge him to "per suade two professors to stop funding a student newspaper in order to "eliminate what voice the New Left has in the area Sullivan 11/1/75 p 48 'Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan 8/26/63 p 1 Hoover himself construed the initial Division estimate to mean that Communistinfluencewas "infinitesimal. s SeeFniding onPolitical Abuse p 22.5 SeeFinding onPolitical abuse p 225 10 "NewLeft Notes Philadelphia. 9/16/70 Edition #1 101Memorandum from Detroit Field Offieeto FRT Headquarters 10/26/60 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/27 28 31/60 MemorandumfromBaumgardner to Belmont 10/26/60 68-7860 76 3 18 Targeting the New Mexico Free University for teaching "con frontation politics and "draft counseling training".102 7 Cost and Value Domestic intelligence is expensive We have already indicated the cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in terms of the harm to victims the injury to constitutional values and the damage to the democratic process itself The cost in dollars is also significant For example the FBI has budgeted for fiscal year 1976 over $7 million for its domestic security informant program more than twice the amount it spends on informants against organized crime.103The aggregate budget for FBI domestic security intelligence and foreign counterintelligence is at least $80 million.10 In the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Bureau was joined by the CIA the military and NSA in collecting information about the anti-war movement and black activists the cost was substantially greater Apart from the excesses described above the usefulness of many domestic intelligence activities in serving the legitimate goal of pro tecting society has been questionable Properly directed intelligence investigations concentrating upon hostile foreign agents and violent terrorists can produce valuable results The Committee has examined cases where the FBI uncovered "illegal agents of a foreign power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities in violation of federal law Information leading to the prevention of serious violence has been acquired by the FBI through its informant penetration of ter rorist groups and through the inclusion in Bureau files of the names of persons actively involved with such groups.10 Nevertheless the most sweeping domestic intelligence surveillance programs have produced surprisingly few useful returns in view of their extent For example "See COINTELPRO Report Section III "The Goals of COINTELPRO Preventing or disrupting the exercise of First AmendmentRights. "The budget for FBI informant programs includes not only the payments to informants for their services and expenses but also the expenses of FBI per sonnel who supervise informants their support costs and administrative over head (Justice Department letter to Senate Select Committee 3/2/76) "The Committeeis withholding the portion of this figure spent on domestic security intelligence (informants and other investigations combined) to pre vent hostile foreign intelligence services from deducing the amount spent on counterespionage The $80 million figure does not include all costs of separate FBI activities which may be drawn upon for domesticsecurity intelligencepur poses Among these are the Identification Division (maintaining fingerprint records) the Files and CommunicationsDivision (managing the storage and retrieval of investigative and intelligencefiles) and the FBI Laboratory 'Examples of valuable informant reports include the following one informant reported a plan to ambush police officersand the location of a cache of weapons and dynamite another informant reported plans to transport illegally obtained weaponsto Washington D.C. two informants at one meeting discoveredplans to dynamite two city blocks All of these plans were frustrated by further investigation and protective measures or arrest (FBI memorandum to Select Committee 12/10/75 Senate Select Committee Staff memorandum Intelligence Casesin Which the FBI Prevented Violence undated.) One example of the use of information in Bureau files involved a "name check at Secret Servicerequest on certain persons applyingfor press credentials to cover the visit of a foreign head of state The discoveryof data in FBI files indicating that one such person had been actively involvedwith violent groups led to further investigation and ultimately the issuance of a search warrant The search producedevidence including weapons of a plot to assassinate the foreign head of state (FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee 2/23/76) 19 Between 1960 and 1974 the FBI conducted over 500,000 separate investigations of persons and groups under the "subversive category predicated on the possibility that they might be likely to overthrow the government of the United States.106 Yet not a single individual or group has been prosecuted since 1957 under the laws which prohibit planning or advocating action to overthrow the government and which are the main alleged statutory basis for such FBI investigations.107 A recent study by the General Accounting Office has estimated that of some 17,528 FBI domestic intelligence investigations of in dividuals in 1974 only 1.3 percent resulted in prosecution and con viction and in only "about 2 percent of the cases was advance knowl edge of any activity legal or illegal obtained.108 One of the main reasons advanced for expanded collection of intelligence about urban unrest and anti-war protest was to help re sponsible officials cope with possible violence However a former White House official with major duties in this area under the John son administration has concluded in retrospect that "in none of these situations would advance intelligence about dissident groups [have] been of much help, that what was needed was "physical intel ligence about the geography of major cities and that the attempt to "predict violence was not a "successful undertaking. 109 Domestic intelligence reports have sometimes even been counter productive A local police chief for example described FBI reports which led to the positioning of federal troops near his city as .. almost completely composed of unsorted and unevalu ated stories threats and rumors that had crossed my desk in New Haven Many of these had long before been discounted by our Intelligence Division But they had made their way from New Haven to Washington had gained completely un warranted credibility and had been submitted by the Di rector of the FBI to the President of the United States They seemed to present a convincing picture of impending holocaust). In considering its recommendations the Committee undertook an evaluation of the FBI's claims that domestic intelligence was neces sary to combat terrorism civil disorders "subversion, and hostile 108This figure is the number of "investigative matters handled by the FBI in this area including as separate items the investigative leads in particular cases which are followed up by various field offices (FBI memorandum to Select Committee 10/6/75.) Schackelford2/13/76 p 32 This officialdoes not recall any targets of "sub versive investigations having been even referred to a Grand Jury under these statutes sincethe 1950s 108"FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations Their Purpose and Scope Issues That Need To Be Resolved, Report by the Comptroller General to the House Judiciary Committee 2/24/76 pp 138-147 The FBI contends that these statis tics may be unfair in that they concentrate on investigations of individuals rather than groups (Ibid. Appendix V) In response GAO states that its "sampleof organizationand controlfileswas sufficientto determinethat generally the FBI (lid not report advance knowledgeof planned violence. In most of the fourteen instances where such advance knowledgewas obtained it related to "such activities as speeches demonstrations or meetings all essentially non violent. (Ibid. p 144) 109Joseph Califano testimony 1/27/76 pp 7-8 710James Ahern testimony 1/20/76 pp 16 17 20 foreign intelligence activity The Committee reviewed voluminous materials bearing on this issue and questioned Bureau officials local police officials and present and former federal executive officials We have found that we are in fundamental agreement with the wisdom of Attorney General Stone's initial warning that intelligence agencies nnlst not be "concerned with political or other opinions of indiv-idnals and must be limited to investigating essentially only "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. The Committee's record demonstrates that domestic intelligence which de parts from this standard raises grave risks of undermining the demo cratic process and harming the interests of individual citizens This danger weighs heavily against the speculative or negligible benefits of the ill-defined and overbroad investigations authorized in the past Thus the basic purpose of the reconunendations contained in Part IT of this report is to limit the FBI to investigating conduct rather than ideas or associations The excesses of the past do not however justify depriving the United States of a clearly defined and effectively controlled domestic intelligence capability The intelligence services of this nation's inter national adversaries continue to attempt to conduct clandestine espio nage operations within the United States." Our recommendations provide for intelligence investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activity Moreover terrorists have engaged in serious acts of violence which have brought death and injury to Americans and threaten further such acts These acts not the politics or beliefs of those who would commit them are the proper focus for investigations to anticipate terrorist violence Accordingly the Committee would permit properly con trolled intelligence investigations in those narrow circumstances. Concentration on imminent violence can avoid the wasteful dis persion of resources which has characterized the sweepinn (and fruit less) domestic intelligence investigations of the past But the most important reason for the fundamental change in the domestic in telligence operations which our Recommendations propose is the need to protect the constitutional rights o Americans In lio:ht of the record of abuse revealed by our inquiry the Com mittee is not satisfied with the position that mere exposure of what has occurred in the past will prevent its recurrence Clear legal standards and effective oversight and controls are n c.,,,sary to cn ii that domestic intelligence activity does not itself undermine the democratic system it is intended to protect 'll An indication of the scopeof the problemis the increasingnumber of official representatives of communist governments in the United States For exomple the number of Soviet officialsin this country has increased from 333in 1961to 1,079by early 1975 There were 2,683East-West exchangevisitors and 1.500com mercial visitors in 1974 (FBI Memorandum "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by Foreign Governments, 3/20/75.1 'According to the FBI there were S9 bombings attributable to terrorist activity in 1975 as comparedwith 45 in 1974and 24in 1973 Six persons died in terrorist-olairmedbombingsand 76personswereinjured in 1975 Five other deaths were reported in other types of terrorist incidents Monetarydamage reported in terrorist bombingsexceeded2.7milliondollars It should he noted however that terrorist bombingsare only a fraction of the total number of bombingsin this country Thus the Si) terrorist bombingsin 1975were anions n total of over 1,900 bombings most of which were not according to the FBI attributable clesrly to terrorist activity (FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee 2/23/76.) II THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 1936 TO 1976 A SUMMARY The Lesson, History Repeats Itself During and after the First World War intelligence agencies in cluding the predecessor of the FBI engaged in repressive activity. A new Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone sought to stop the in vestigation of "political or other opinions. 2 This restraint was em bodied only in an executive pronouncement however No statutes were passed to prevent the kind of improper activity which had been ex posed Thereafter as this narrative will show the abuses returned in a new form It is now the responsibility of all three branches of gov ernment to ensure that the pattern of abuse of domestic intelligence activity does not recur The Pattern Broadening Through Time Since the re-establishment of federal domestic intelligence programs in 1936 there has been a steady increase in the government's capa bility and willingness to pry into and even disrupt the political ac tivities and personal lives of the people The last forty years have witnessed a relentless expansion of domestic intelligence activity be yond investigation of criminal conduct toward the collection of polit ical intelligence and the launching of secret offensive actions against Americans The initial incursions into the realm of ideas and associations were related to concerns about the influence of foreign totalitarian powers 1Repressive practices during World War I included the formation of a vol unteer auxiliary force known as the American Protective League which as sisted the Justice Department and military intelligence in the investigation of "un-Americanactivities and in the mass round-up of 50,000persons to discover draft evaders These so-called "slacker raids of 1918 involved warrantless arrests without sufficient probable cause to believe that crime had been or was about to he committed (FBI Intelligence Division memorandum "An Analysis of FBI Domestic Security Intelligence Investigations, 10/28/75.) The American Protective League also contributed to the pressures which re sulted in nearly 2.000prosecutions for disloyal utterances and activities (luring World War I a policy described by John Lord O'Brien Attorney General Greg ory's Special Assistant as one of "wholesale repression and restraint of public opinion. (Zechariah Chafee Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1941) p 69.) Shortly after the war the Justice Department and the Bureau of Investiga tion jointly planned the notorious "Palmer Raids named for Attorney Gen eral A Mitchell Palmer who ordered the overnight round-up and detention of some 10,000persons who were thought to be "anarchist or "revolutionary aliens subject to deportation (William Preston Aliens and Dissenters (Cam bridge Harvard University Press 1963) chs Stanley Cohen A Mitchell Palmer Politician (New York ColumbiaUniversity Press 1963) ells 11-12.) 2See Attorney General Stone's full statement p 23 (21 ) 22 Ultimately however intelligence activity was directed against do mestic groups advocating change in America particularly those who most vigorously opposed the Vietnam war or sought to improve the conditions of racial minorities Similarly the targets of intelligence investigations were broadened from groups perceived to be violence prone to include groups of ordinary protesters 3 Three Periorls of Growth forpomestieIntelligence The expansion of domestic intelligence activity can usefully be di vided into three broad periods (a) the pre-war and World War II period (b) the Cold War era and (c) the period of domestic dissent beginning in the mid-sixties The main developments in each of these stages in the evolution of domestic intelligence may be summarized as follows n 1936 195 By presidential directive rather than statute the FBI and mili tary intelligence agencies were authorized to conduct domestic intelli gence investigations These investigations included a vaguely defined mission to collect intelligence about "subversive activities which were sometimes unrelated to law enforcement Wartime exigencies en couraged the unregulated use of intrusive intelligence techniques and the FBI began to resist supervision by the Attorney General b 1946 1963 Cold War fears and dangers nurtured the domestic intelligence pro grams of the FBI and military and they became permanent features of government Congress deferred to the executive branch in the oversight of these programs The FBI became increasingly isolated from effective outside control even from the Attorneys General The scope of investigations of "subversion widened greatly Under the cloak of secreev the FBI instituted its COINTTLPRO operations to "disrupt and "neutralize "subversives The National Security Agency the FBI and the CIA re-instituted instrusive wartime sur veillance techniques in contravention of law e 1964 1976 Intelligence techniques which previously had been concentrated upon foreign threats and domestic groups said to be tinder Communist influence were applied with increasing intensity to a wide range of do mestic activity by American citizens These techniques were utilized against peaceful civil rights and antiwar protest activity and there after in reaction to civil unrest often without regard for the conse quences to American liberties The intelligence agencies of the United States sometimes abetted by public opinion and often in response to pressure from administration officials or the Congress frequently dis regarded the law in their conduct of massive surveillance and aggres sive counterintelligence operations against American citizens In the past few years some of these activities were curtailed partly in re sponse to the moderation of the domestic crisis but all too often im proper programs were terminated only in response to exposure the threat of exposure or a change in the climate of public opinion such as that triggered by the Watergate affair 23 B ESTABLISHINGA PERMANENTDOMESTICINTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE1936 1945 1 Background The Stone Standard The first substantial domestic intelligence programs of the federal government were established during World War I The Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation (as the FBI was then known) military intelligence other federal investigative agencies and the volunteer American Protective League were involved in these programs.3 In the period immediately following World War I the Bureau of Investigation took part in the notorious Palmer Raids and other activities against persons characterized as "subversive." Harlan Fiske Stone who became Attorney General in 1924 described the conduct of Justice Department and the Bureau of Investigation before he took office as "lawless maintaining many activities which were without any authority in federal statutes and engaging in many practices which were brutal and tyrannical in the extreme. 5 Fearing that the investigative activities of the Bureau could invade privacy and inhibit political freedoms Attorney General Stone announced There is always the posibility that a secret police may be come a menace to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood .. It is important that its activities be strictly limited to the performance of those functions for which it was created and that its agents themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals It is concerned only with their conduct and then only with such conduct as is for bidden by the laws of the United States When a police sys tem passes beyond these limits it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty which it should be our first concern to cherish.6 When Stone appointed J Edgar Hoover as Acting Director of the Bureau of Investigation he instructed Hoover to adhere to this standard The activities of the Bureau are to be limited strictly to in vestigations of violations of law under my direction or under See Joan Jensen The Price of Vigilance (Chicago Rand McNally 1968) One FBI officialrecalled later "There were probably seven or eight such active organizationsoperating at full forceduring war days and it was not an uncommon experiencefor an Agent of this Bureau to call upon an individual in the course of his investigation to find out that six or sevenother Governmentagencieshad been around to interview the party about the same matter. (Memorandumof F X O'Donnell Subject Operations During World War I 10/4/38) See footnote 1 p 21 'Letter from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Jack Alexander 9/21/37 cited in Alpheus T Mason Harlan Fiske Stone Pillar of the Law (New York Viking 19513) p 149 NewYorkTimes 5/10/24 24 the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly con ducting the work of the Department of Justice Nevertheless beginning in the mid-thirties at White House direction the FBI reentered the realm of collecting intelligence about ideas and associations Chain Developments of the 1936 1945 Period In the years preceding World War II domestic intelligence activi ties were reinstituted expanded and institutionalized Based upon vague and conflicting orders to investigate the undefined areas of "subversion and "potential crimes related to national security the FBI commenced a broad intelligence program The FBI was author ized to preempt the field although the military engaged in some in vestigation of civilians The FBI's domestic intelligence jurisdiction went beyond investiga tions of crime to include a vague mandate to investigate foreign in volvement in American affairs In the exercise of this jurisdictional authority the Bureau began to investigate law abiding domestic groups and individuals its program was also open to misuse for political purposes The most intrusive intelligence techniques ini tially used to meet wartime exigencies were based on questionable statutory interpretation or lacked any formal legal authorization The executive intentionally kept the issue of domestic intelligence gathering away from the Congress until 1939 and thereafter the Congress appears to have deliberately declined to confront the issue The FBI generally complied with the Attorney General's policies but began to resist Justice Department review of its activities On one occasion the Bureau appears to have disregarded an Attorney Gen eral's policy directive However important these developments were in themselves the en during significance of this period is that it opened the institutional door to greater excesses in later years 3 Domestic Intelligence Authority Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders The executive orders upon which the Bureau based its intelligence activity in the decade before World War II were vague and conflict ing By using words like "subversion a term which was never defined and by permitting the investigation of "potential crimes and matters "not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes the foundation was laid for excessive intelligence gathering about Americans 'Stone to Hoover 5/13/24 quoted in Mason Harlan Fiske Stone at p 151 AlthoughHooverhad served as head of the General Intelligence Division of the Justice Department at the time of the "Palmer Raids and becamean Assistant Director of the Bureau in 1921 he persuaded Attorney General Stone and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union that he had played an "unwill ing part in the excesses of the past and he agreed to disband the Bureau's "radical division. Baldwin advised Stone "I think we were wrong in our esti mate of his attitude. (Baldwin to Stone 5/6/24 ouoted in Donald Johnson The Challengeto AmericanFreedoms (University of Kentucky Press 1963) pp 174-175.) In December1924 Stonemade HooverDirector of the Bureau of Investigation 25 a The Original Roosevelt Orders In 193-1 according to a memorandum by J Edgar Hoover Presi dent Roosevelt ordered an investigation of "the Nazi movement in this country. In response the FBI conducted a one-time investiga tion described by FBI Director Hoover as "a so-called intelligence investigation. It concentrated on "the Nazi group, with particular reference to "anti-racial and "anti-American activities having "any possible connection with official representatives of the German gov ernment in the United States. s Two years later in August 1936 according to a file memorandum of Director Hoover President Roosevelt asked for a more systematic collection of intelligence about subversive activities in the United States particularly Fas cism and Communism Hoover indicated further that the President wanted a broad picture of the general movement and its activities as [they] may affect the economic and political life of the country as a whole The President and the FBI Director discussed the means by which the Bureau might collect "general intelligence information on this subjects The only record of Attorney General Homer Cummings knowledge of or authorization for this intelligence assignment is found in a memorandum from Director Hoover to his principal assist ant. b Orders in 1938-.39 The Vagueness of "Subversive Activities and "Potential Crimes In October 1938 Director Hoover advised President Roosevelt of the "present purposes and scope of FBI intelligence investigations "together with suggestions for expansion. His memorandum stated that the FBI was collecting 8Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Mr Cowley 5/10/34 J Edgar Hoovermemorandumto the files 8/24/36 This memorandumstates that earlier in the conversation DirectorHooverhad told the President Communistscontrolledor planned to take control of the west Coast long shoreman'sunion the UnitedMineWorkers Unionand the NewspaperGuild (and using those unions would be "able at any time to paralyze the country") "activities .. inspired by Communists had recently taken place in the Government "particularly in some of the Departments and the National Labor Relations Board and The CommunistInternationale had recently issued instructions for all Communiststo "vote for President Rooseveltand against GovernorLandon be cause of the fact that GovernorLandonis opposedto class warfare. These comments indicate that the Bureau had already begun some intelli gence gathering on Communistsand activities "inspired by them prior to any Presidential order In addition Hoover's memorandumreferred to prior intelli gencecollectionon domesticright-wingfiguresFather Charles Coughlinand Gen eral SmedleyButler 18Hooverstated that Secretary of State Hull "at the President's suggestion re quested of me the representative of the Department of Justice to have investiga tion made of the subversiveactivities in this country including communismand fascism. He added that "the Attorney General verbally directed me to proceed with this investigation. (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to F A Tamm 9/10/36.) 26 information dealing with various forms of activities of either a subversive or so-called intelligence type. Despite the references in Director Hoover's 1938 memorandum to "subversive-type investigations an accompanying letter to the Pres ident from Attorney General Homer Cummings made no mention of "subversion and cited only the President's interest in "the so-called espionage situation. 12Cummings successor Attorney General Frank Murphy appears to have abandoned the term "subversive activities. 13 Moreover when Director Hoover provided Attorney General Frank Murphy a copy of his 1938 plan he described it without mentioning "subversion, as a program "intended to ascertain the identity of per sons engaged in espionage counterespionage and sabotage of a nature not within the specific provisions of preeailing statutes. [Emphasis added.] Murphy thereafter recommended to the President that he issue an order concentrating "investigation of all espionage counter espionage and sabotage matters in the FBI and military intelli gence.15 President Roosevelt agreeed and issued an order which like Murphy's letter made no mention of "subversive or general intel ligence It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage coun ter espionage and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice the Military Intelligence Division of the War De partment and the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage counterespionage or sabotage ex 'Memorandum on "domestic intelligence, prepared by J Edgar Hoover enclosedwith letter from Attorney General Cummingsto Roosevelt 10/20/38 Director Hoover met with the President who according to Hoover's memo randum "approved the plan which I had prepared and which had been sent to him by the Attorney General. (Memorandum to the files from J Edgar Hoover 11/7/38.) "Letter from Attorney General Cummingsto the President 10/20/38 "On 2/7/39 the Assistant to the the Attorney General wrote letters to the Secret Service the Bureau of Internal Revenue the Narcotics Bureau the Cus toms Service the Coast Guard and the Postal Inspection Servicestating that the FBI and military intelligence had "undertaken activities to investigate matters relating to espionageand subversive activities. (Letter from J B Keenan As sistant to the Attorney General to F J Wilson Chief Secret Service 2/7/39.) A letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury shortly thereafter also referred to "subverisiveactivities. (Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury 2/16/39.) However a similar letter two days later referred only to matters "involving espionage counterespionage and sabotage, without mentioning "subversiveac tivities. (Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treas ury 2/18/39.) This may have reflecteda decisionby Murphyto ceaseusing "sub versive activities to describeFBI investigations The record doesnot clarify the reason for his deletionofthe phrase "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy 3/16/39 Murphy was aware that the FBI contemplated investigations of subversive ac tivities since Hoover enclosedhis 1938plan with this memorandum "Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the President 6/17/39 27 cept by the three agencies mentioned above [Emphasis added.] 10 Precisely what the President's reference to "potential espionage or sabotage was intended to cover was unclear Whatever it meant it was apparently intended to be consistent with Director Hoover's earlier description of the FBI program to Attorney General Murphy. Three months later after the outbreak of war in Europe Director Hoover indicated his concern that private citizens might provide information to the "sabotage squads which local police departments were creating rather than to the FRI Hoover urged the Attorney General to ask the President to request local officials to give the FBI all information concerning "espionage counterespionage sabotage subversive activities and neutrality regulations." The President immediately issued a statement which continued the confusing treatment of the breadth of the FBI's intelligence authority On the one hand the statement began by noting that the FBI had been instructed to investigate matters relating to espionage sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations On the other hand the President concluded by adding "subversive activities to the list of information local law enforcement officials should relay to the FBI.10 c Orders 1940 43 The (ion fusion Continues President Roosevelt used the term "subversive activities in a secret directive to Attornev General Robert Jackson on wiretapping in 1940 Referring to activities of other nations engaged in "propaganda of so called fifth columns and "preparation for sabotage, he directed the Attorney General to authorize wiretaps "of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the hnited States including suspected spies. The President instructed that such wire taps be limited "insofar as possible"to aliens.20 Neither the President 10ConfidentialM"morandumfrom the President to Department Heads 6/26/39 'Memorandum from Hoover to Murphy 3/16/39 enclosingHoover memoran dum on "domesticintelligence. 10/20/38 18Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy 9/6/39 '0Statement ofthe President 9/6/39 President Roosevelt never formally defined "subversive activities" a term whosevaguenesshas proven a problemthroughout the FBI's history However a hint as to his definitionis contained iii his remarks at a press conferenceon Sep tember 9 1939 A national emergency had just been declared and pursuant thereto the President had issued an authorization for up to 150extra FBI agents to handle "additional duties. In explaining that action he stated he was concernedabout "things that happened before World War I specifically"sabo tage and "propaganda by both belligerents to "sway public opinion [Iit is to guard against that and the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this nation which would tend to he subversive I believe that is the word of our form of Government. (1939 Public Papers of Franklin D Roosevelt pp 495 496.) 'Confidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson 5/21/40 In May 1941 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Novv urged "a broadening of the investigative responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the fields of subversivecontrol of labor. (Memoran dum from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the Presi dent 5/29/41.) The President replied that he was sending their letter to the Attorney General "with my general approval. (Memorandumfrom President Rooseveltto the Secretaries ofWar and Navy 6/4/41.) 28 nor the Attorney General subsequently clarified the scope of the FBI's authority to investigate "subversive activity. The confusion as to the breadth of President Roosevelt's authoriza tion reappeared in Attorney General Francis Biddle's description of FBI jurisdiction in 1942 and in a new Presidential statement in 1943 Biddle issued a lengthy order defining the duties of the various parts of the Justice Department in September 1942 Among other things the FBI was charged with a duty to "investigate criminal offenses against the United States In contrast the FBI was to function as a "clear ing house with respect to "espionage sabotage and other subversive matters. 21 Four months later President Roosevelt renewed his public appeal for cooperation by police and other "patriotic organizations with the FBI In this statement he described his September 1939 order as grant ing "investigative authority to the FBI for "espionage sabotage and violation of the neutrality regulations. The President did not adopt Attorney General Biddle's "clearing-house characterization nor did he mention "subversion. 22 4 The Role of Congress a Executive Avoidance of Congress In 1938 the President the Attorney General and the FBI Director explicitly decided not to seek legislative authorization for the expand ing domestic intelligence program Attorney General Cummings cautioned that the plan for domestic intelligence "should be held in the stricest confidence. 23 Director Hoover contended that no special legislation should be sought "in order to avoid criticism or objections which might be raised to such an expansion by either ill-informed persons or individuals with some ulterior motive. [Emphasis added.] Hoover thought it "undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counter-espionage drive of any great magnitude because the FBI's intelligence activity was al ready "much broader than espionage or counterespionage. 24 Director Hoover contended that the FBI had authority to engage in intelligence activity beyond investigating crimes at the request of the n Attorney General's Order No 3732 9/25/42 p 19 But see Delimitation Agreement between the FBI and Military Intelligence 2/9/42 at footnote 56 'Statement of the President on "Police Cooperation, 1/8/43 A note in the President's handwriting added that the FBI was to receive information "relat ing to espionageand related matters. (Copyin FDR Library.) 'Cummings to Roosevelt 10/20/38 Hoover memorandum enclosed with letter from Cummings to Roosevelt 10/20/38 Director Hoover's full point was that "In consideringthe steps to be taken for the expansionof the present structure of intelligencework it is believedimperative that it be proceededwith with the utmost degreeof secrecyin order to avoid criticism or objectionswhich might be raised to such an expansionby either ill-informedpersons or individuals having someulterior motive The word espionage has long been a word that has been repugnant to the Americanpeopleand it is believedthat the structure which is already in existence is much broader than espionage or counterespionage but covers in a true sense real intelligence values to the three services interested namely the Navy the Army and the civilian branch of the Government the Department of Justice Consequently it wouldseem undesirable to seek any spe cial legislation which would draw .attention to the fact that it was proposedto developa special counterespionagedrive of any great magnitude. 29 Attorney General or the Department of State He relied on an amend ment to the FBI Appropriations Act passed before World War I authorizing the Attorney General to appoint officials not only to "de tect and prosecute federal crimes but also to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice or the Depart ment of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.25 After conflicts with the State Department in 1939 however the FBI no longer relied upon this vague statute for its authority to conduct intelligence investigations instead relying upon the Executive orders.26 b Congress Declines to Confront the Issue Even though Executive officials originally avoided Congress to prevent criticism or objections after the President's proclamation of emergency in 1939 they began to inform Congress of FBI intelligence activities In November 1939 Director Hoover told the House Appro priations Committee that the Bureau had set up a General Intelli gence Division "by authority of the President's proclamation. 27And in January 1940 he told the same Committee that the FBI had author ity under the President's September 6 1939 statement to investigate espionage sabotage neutrality violations and "any other subversive activities. 28 There is no evidence that the Appropriations Committee objected or inquired further into the meaning of that last vague term although members did seek assurance that FBI intelligence could be curtailed when the wartime emergency ended.29 In 1940 a joint resolution was introduced by New York City Con gressman Emmanuel Celler which would have given the FBI broad jurisdiction to investigate by wiretapping or other means or "frus trate any "interference with the national defense due to certain specified crimes (sabotage treason seditious conspiracy espi onage and violations of the neutrality laws) or "in any other man ner. 30Although the resolution failed to reach the House floor it seems likely that rather than opposing domestic intelligence investigations Congress was simply choosing to avoid the issue of defining the FBI's intelligence jurisdiction This view is supported by Congress passage in 1940 and 1941 of two new criminal statutes the Smith Act made it a crime to advocate the violent overthrow of the Government 31and the Voorhis Act required "subversive organizations advocating the '28 U.S.C 533(3) 'The conflicts between the FBI and the State Department in 1939are dis cussedat footnote 54 EmergencySupplementalAppropriationBill 1940 Hearings beforethe House Appropriations Committee 11/30/39 pp 303-307 In fact the FBI had established a General Intelligence Sectionin its Investi gative Division shortly after the President's 1936requests Congress was not advised of the Bureau's activities undertaken prior to September 1939 nor of the President's earlier directives "Justice Department Appropriation Bill 1941 Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee 1/5/40 p 151 The President's 1939statement did not specificallysay that the FBI had authority to investigate "subversiveactivi ties. 1939Hearings p 307 First DeficiencyAppropriation Bill 1941 Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee 2/19/41 pp 188-189 30H.J Res 571 76thCong. 2d Sess (1940) m18U.S.C 2385 2387 30 Government's violent overthrow and having foreign ties to register or be subject to criminal penalties.32 Although as indicated the Executive branch disclosed the fact that the FBI was doing intelligence work and Congress gen erally raised no objection there was one occasion when an Execu tive description of the Bureau's work was less than complete Follow ing Director Hoover's testimony about the establishment of an Intelligence Division and some public furor over the FBI arrest of several Communist Party members in Detroit Senator George Norris (R Neb.) asked whether the Bureau was violating Attorney General Stone's assurance in 1924 that it would conduct only criminal in vestigations Attorney General Jackson replied Mr Hoover is in agreement with me that the principles which Attorney General Stone laid down in 1924 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation was reorganized and Mr Hoover appointed as Director are sound and that the useful ness of the Bureau depends upon a faithful adherence to these limitations The Federal Bureau of Investigation will confine its activi ties to the investigation of violation of Federal statutes the collecting of evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest and the service of process issued by the courts.33 The FBI was in fact doing much more than that and had informed the Appropriations Committee of its practice in general terms Attor ney General Jackson himself stated later that the FBI was conducting "steady surveillance of persons beyond those who had violated fed eral statutes including persons who were a "likely source of federal law violation because they were "sympathetic with the systems or designs of foreign dictators. 34 5 Scope of Domestic Intelligence a Beyond Criminal Investigations According to Director Hoover's account of his meeting with Presi dent Roosevelt in 1936 the President wanted "a broad picture of the impact of Communism and Fascism on American life.35 Similarly the FBI Director described his 1938 plan as "broader than espionage and covering "in a true sense real intelligence. 36Thus it appears that one of the first purposes of FBI domestic intelligence was to perform the "pure intelligence function of supplying executive officials with information believed of value for making policy decisions This aspect of the assignment to investigate "subversion was entirely unrelated to the enforcement of federal criminal laws The second purpose of FBI domestic intelligence gathering was essentially "preventive, 18U.S.C 2386 'Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Senator Norris 86 Cong Rec 5642-5643 "Proceedings of the Federal-State Conferenceon Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense 8/55-6/40 Several months earlier Attorney General Jackson had warned federal prose cutors about the dangers of prosecuting "subversives because of the lack of standards and the danger of overhreadth (Robert H Jackson "The Federal Prosecutor. Journal of the American Judicature Society 6/40 p 18.) Hoovermemorandumto the files 8/24/36 'Hoover memorandum enclosedwith Cummingsto Roosevelt 10/20/38 see p 28 31 in compliance with the President's June 1939 directive to investigate "potential espionage or sabotage.3i As war moved closer preventive intelligence investigations focused on individuals who might be placed on a Custodial Detention List for possible internment in case of war.3S Both pure intelligence about "subversion and preventive intelli gence about "potential espionage or sabotage involved investigations based on political affiliations and group membership and association The relationship to law enforcement was often remote and speculative the Bureau did not focus its intelligence gathering solely on tangible evidence of preparation for crime Directives implementing the general preventive intelligence instruc tion to investigate "potential espionage or sabotage were vague and sweeping In 1939 for instance field offices were told to investigate persons of German Italian and Communist "sympathies and any other persons "whose interests may be directed primarily to the inter est of some other nation than the United States. FBI offices were directed to report the names of members of German and Italian so cieties "whether they be of a fraternal character or of some other nature, and members of any other groups "which might have pro nounced Nationalistic tendencies. The Bureau sought lists of subscribers and officers of German Italian and Communist foreign language newspapers as well as of other newspapers with "notorious Nationalistic sympathies. 39The FBI also made confidential inquiries regarding "various so-called radical and fascist organizations to identify their "leading personnel purposes and aims and the part they are likely to play at a time of national crisis. 40 The criteria for investigating persons for inclusion on the Custodial Detention List was similarly vague In 1939 the FBI said its list in cluded persons with "strong Nazi tendencies and "strong Communist tendencies. 41FBI field offices were directed in 1940 to gather infor mation on individuals who would be considered for the list because of their "Communistic Fascist Nazi or other nationalistic back ground. 42 b "Infiltration Investigations The FBI based its pure intelligence investigations on a theory of subversive "infiltration which remained an essential part of the rationale for domestic intelligence after the war anyone who hap pened to associate with Communists or Fascists or was simply alleged to have such associations became the subject of FBI intelligence re ports.43 Thus "subversive investigations produced intelligence about Confidentialmemorandumfrom the President to Department heads 6/26/39 33Seepp 34-35 'The above-mentioneddirectives were all contained in a memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto FBI Field Offices9/2/39 e Memorandumfrom ClydeTolsonto J Edgar Hoover 10/30/39 91Internal FBI memorandumofE A Tamm 11/9/39 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto FBI Field Offices6/15/40 "Director Hooverdeclared in 1940that advocates of foreign "isms had "suc ceededin boring into every phase of Americanlife masquerading behind front organizations. (Proceedings of the Federal-State Conferenceon Law Enforce ment Problemsof National Defense August5-6 1940.)In his best-sellingbookon Communists Hoover stated "Infiltration is the method whereby Party members move into noncommunist organizations for the purpose of exercising influence for communism If control is secured the organization becomesa communist front. (J Edgar Hoover Masters of Deceit (New York Henry Holt 1958) Ch 16.) 32 a wide variety of lawful groups and law-abiding citizens By 1938 the FBI was investigating alleged subversive infiltration of the maritime industry the steel industry the coal industry the clothing garment and fur industries the automobile industry the newspaper field educational institutions organized labor organizations Negroes youth groups Government affairs and the armed forces 44 This kind of intelligence was transmitted to the White House For example in 1937 the Attorney General sent the President an FBI report on a proposed pilgrimage to Washington to urge passage of legislation to benefit American youth The report stated that the American Youth Congress which sponsored the pilgrimage was understood to be strongly Communistic 45 Later reports in 1937 de scribed the Communist Party's role in plans by the Workers Alliance for nationwide demonstrations protesting the plight of the unem ployed as well as the Alliance's plans to lobby Congress in support of the federal relief program 46 Some investigations and reports (which went into Justice Depart ment and FBI permanent files) covered entirely legal political activi ties For example one local group checked by the Bureau was called the League for Fair Play which furnished "speakers to Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs and to schools and colleges. The FBI reported in 1941 that the organization was formed in 1937 apparently by two Ministers and a businessman for the purpose of furthering fair play tolerance adherence to the Constitution democracy liberty justice understanding and good will among all creeds races and classes of the United States A synopsis of the report stated "No indications of Communist activities. 47 In 1944 the FBI prepared an extensive intelligence report on an active political group the Independent Voters of Illinois apparently because it was considered a target for Communist "infiltration. The Independent Voters group was reported to have been formed for the purpose of developing neighborhood political units to help in the re-election of President Roosevelt and the elec Hoovermemorandum enclosedwith Cummingsto Roosevelt 10/20/38 "Letter from Attorney General Cummingsto the President (and enclosure) 1/30/37 (FDR Library) 4 Letter from Attorney General Cummingsto the President (and enclosure) 8/13/37 (FDR Library) "Report of NewYork City fieldoffice10/22/41 summarizedin Justice T)enart ment memorandumfrom S Brodieto Assistant Attorney GeneralQuinn 10/10/47 33 tion of progressive congressmen Apparently IVI endorsed or aided Democrats for the most part although it was stated to be "independent. It does not appear that it entered its own candidates or that it endorsed any Communists IVI sought to help elect those candidates who would favor fight ing inflation oppose race and class discrimination favor international cooperation support a "full-employment pro gram oppose Facism etc 48 Thus in its search for subversive "influence, the Bureau gathered extensive information about the lawful activities of left-liberal polit ical groups At the opposite end of the political spectrum the activities of numerous right-wing groups like the Christian Front and Christian Mobilizers (followers of Father Coughlin) the American Destiny Party the American Nationalist Party and even the less extreme "America First movement were reported by the FBI.49 Partisan Use The collection of pure intelligence and preventive intelligence about "subversives led to the inclusion in FBI files of political intelligence about the President's partisan critics In May 1940 President Roose velt's secretary sent the FBI Director hundreds of telegrams received by the White House The attached letter stated As the telegrams all were more or less in opposition to na tional defense the President thought you might like to look them over noting the names and addresses of the senders.50 Additional telegrams expressing approval of a speech by one of the President's leading critics Colonel Charles Lindbergh were also re ferred to the FBI.J2 A domestic intelligence program without clearly defined boundaries almost invited such action Centralized Authority FBI and Military Intelligence The basic policy of President Roosevelt and his four Attorneys Gen eral was to centralize civilian authority for domestic intelligence in the FBI Consolidation of domestic intelligence was viewed as a means of protecting civil liberties Recalling the hysteria of World War I Attorney General Frank Murphy declared Twenty years ago inhuman and cruel things were done in the name of justice sometimes vigilantes and others took over the work We do not want such things done today for the work has now been localized in the FBI.53 Centralization of authority for domestic intelligence also served the FBI's bureaucratic interests Director Hoover complained about '8Report of Chicagofield office 12/29/44 summarized in Justice Department memorandumfrom S Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn 10/9/47 "Justice Department memorandumre Christian Front 10/28/41 58Letter from Stephen Early Secretary to the President to J Edgar Hoover 5/21/40 (FDR Library) 62Memorandumfrom Stephen Early Secretary to the President to J Edgar Hoover 6/17/40 58NewYorkTimes 10/1/39 p 38 68-7860 76 4 34 attempts by other agencies to "literally chisel into this type of work. 54He exhorted "We don't want to let it slip away from us. 55 Pursuant to President Roosevelt's 1939 directive authorizing the FBI and military intelligence to conduct all investigations of "poten tial espionage and sabotage an interagency Delimitation Agreement in June 1940 assigned most such domestic intelligence work to the FBI As revised in February 1942 the Agreement covered "investiga tion of all activities coming under the categories of espionage sub version and sabotage. The FBI was responsible for all investigations "involving civilians in the United States and for keeping the military informed of "the names of individuals definitely known to be con nected with subversive activities. 56 The military intelligence agencies were interested in intelligence about civilian activity In fact they requested extensive information about civilians from the FBI In May 1939 for instance the Army G 2 Military Intelligence Division (MID) transmitted a request for the names and locations of "citizens opposed to our participation in war and conducting anti-war propaganda." Despite the Delimitation Agreement the MID's Counterintelligence Corps collected intelligence on civilian "subversive activity as part of a preventive security pro gram using volunteer informers and investigators.SB 6 Control by the Attorney General Compliance and Resistance The basic outlines of the FBI's domestic intelligence program were approved by Attorney General Cummings in 1938 and Attorney Gen eral Murphy in 1939.59Director Hoover also asked Attorney General Jackson in 1940 for policy guidance concerning the FBI's "suspect list Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy 3/16/39 The "literally chisel reference reflectsconcernwith a State Department attempt to "coordinate all domestic intelligence It may explain why after 1938 the FBI no longer relied for its intelligenceauthority on the statutory provisionfor FBI investigations of "officialmatters under control of . the Department of State. Director Hooverstated that the FBI required State Department author ization onlywhere "the subject of a particular investigation enjoysany diplomatic status. "Note attached to letter from Col J M Churchill Army G-2 to Mr E A Tamm FBI 5/16/39 "Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the Officeof Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division 2/9/42 Memorandum from Colonel Churchill Counter Intelligence Branch MID to E A Tamm FBI 5/16/39 Victor J Johanson "The Role of the Armyin the Civilian Arena 1920-1970, U.S Army Intelligence Command Study (1971) The scope of wartime Army intelligencehas beensummarizedas follows "It reported on radical labor groups communists Nazi sympathizers and semi-radical groups concernedwith civil liberties and pacifism The latter well intentioned but impractical groups as one corps area intelligence officerlabeled them were playing into the hands of the more extreme and realistic radical ele ments G 2 still believedthat it had a right to investigate semi-radicals because they undermined adherence to the established order by propaganda through newspapers periodicals schools and churches. (Joan M Jensen "Military Sur veillance of Civilians 1917-1967, in Military Intelligence Hearings before the Senate Subcommitteeon Constitutional Rights (1974) pp 174 175.) Letter from Attorney General Cummingsto the President 10/20/38 letter from Attorney General Murphy to the President 6/17/39 The confusion as to whether Attorney General Murphy Attorney General Jackson and Attorney General Biddle definedthe FBI's duties to coverinvestigation of "subversiveac tivities is indicated at footnotes 13 21 and 34 35 of individuals whose arrest might be considered necessary in the event the United States becomes involved in war. 66 The FBI Director initially opposed however Attorney General Jackson's attempt to require more detailed supervision of the FBI's role in the Custodial Detention Program To oversee this program and others Jackson created a Neutrality Laws Unit (later renamed the Special War Policies Unit) in the Justice Department When the Unit proposed to review FBI intelligence reports on individuals Director Hoover protested that turning over the FBI's confidential reports would risk the possibility of "leaks. He argued that if the identity of confidential informants became known it would endanger their "life and safety and thus the Department would "abandon the "subversives field. 61 After five months of negotiation the FBI was ordered to transmit its "dossiers to the Justice Department Unit.62 To satisfy the FBI's concerns the Department agreed to take no formal action against an individual if it "might interfere with sound investigative techniques and not to disclose confidential informants without the Bureau's "prior approval. 63Thus from 1941 to 1943 the Justice Department had the machinery to oversee at least this aspect of FBI domestic intelligence.64 In 1943 however Attorney General Biddle ordered that the Cus todial Detention List should be abolished as "impractical unwise and dangerous. His directive stated that there was "no statutory author ity or other present justification for keeping the list The Attorney General concluded that the system for classifying "dangerous persons was "inherently unreliable the evidence used was "inadequate and the standards applied were "defective. 65Biddle observed the notion that it is possible to make a valid determination as to how dangerous a person is in the abstract and without reference to 'time environment and other relevant circum stances is impractical unwise and dangerous Returning to the basic standard espoused by Attorney General Stone Attorney General Biddle declared The Department fulfills its proper function by investigating the activities of persons who may have violated the law It is not aided in this work by classifying persons as to dangerous ness.66 "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Jackson 10/16/40 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to L.M.C Smith Chief Neutrality Law Unit 11/28/40 "Memorandum from M F McGuire Assistant to the Attorney General to J Edgar Hooverand L M C Smith 4/21/41 "Memorandum from M F McGuire Assistant to the Attorney General to J Edgar Hoover 4/17/41 The Custodial Detention Program should not be confused with the intern ment of Japanese Americansin 1942 The mass detention of Americanssolelyon the basis of race was exactly what the Program was designed to prevent by making it possible for the government to decide in individual cases whether a person should he arrested in the event of war When the Program was imple mented after Pearl Harbor it was limited to dangerous enemyaliens only FBI Director Hoover opposedthe mass round-up of Japanese Americans "Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General Coxand J Edgar Hoover Director FBI 7/16/43 Memorandumfor Attorney GeneralBiddleto Assistant Attorney GeneralCox and J Edgar Hoover Director FBI 7/16/43 36 Upon receipt of this order the FBI Director did not in fact abolish its list The FBI continued to maintain an index of persons "who may be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the public safety or internal security of the United States.. In response to the Attorney General's order the FBI merely changed the name of the list from Cnsodial Detention List to Security Index Instructions to the field stated that the Security Index should be kept "strictly confidential, and that it should never be mentioned in FBI reports or "discussed with agencies or individuals outside the IBureau except for military intelligence agencies. This incident provides an example of the I+RI's ability to conduct domestic intelligence operations in opposition to the policies of an Attorney General Despite Attorney General Biddle's order the "dan gerousness list continued to be kept and investigations in support of that list continued to be a significant part of the Bureau's work 7 Intrusive Terhaiqu~s Questionable Authorization rt -Wiretaps A Strained Statutory Intel etation In 1940 President Roosevelt authorized FBI wiretapping against "persons suspected of subversive activities against the united States including suspected spies, requiring the specific approval of the At torney General for each tap and directing that they he limited "insofar as possible to aliens. 0R This order was issued in the face of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 which had prohibited wiretapping.63 However the Attor ney General interpreted the Act of 1934 so as to permit government wiretapping Since the Act made it unlawful to "intercept and di vulge. communications Attorney General Jackson contended that it did not apply if there was no divulgence outside the Government [Emphasis added.] 70 Attorney General Jackson's questionable in terpretation was accepted by succeeding Attorneys General (until 1968) but never by the courts." Jackson informed the Congress of his interpretation Congress con sidered enacting an exception to the 1934 Act and held hearings in which Director Hoover said wiretapping was "of considerable im portance because of the "gravity to "national safety of such of Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto FBI Field OfficesRe Dangerousness Classification 8/14/43 This is the only documentpertaining to Director Iloover's decision which appears in the material provided by the FBI to the Select Com mittee covering Bureau policies for the "Security Index. The FBI interpreted the Attorney General's order as applying only to the dangerous classifications previously made by the . Special War Policies Unit of the Justice Depart ment (The full text of the Attorney General'sorder and the FBI directiveappear in Hearings Vol 6 pp. 412-415.) Confidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson 5/21/40 p047 U.S.C 605 The Supreme Court held that this Act made wiretap-obtained evidenceor the fruits thereof inadmissiblein federal criminal cases Xardone v UnitedStates 302U.S 379 (1937):308U.S 338(1939) '0Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Rep Hatton Summers 3/19/41 "E.g. United States v Butenbo 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir 1974) cert denied sub nom Iranor v UnitedStates 419U.S 881 (1974) The Court of Appealsheld in this case that warrantless wiretapping could only he justified on a theory of inherent Presidential power and questioned the statutory interpretation relied upon since Attorney General Jackson's time Until 1967 the Supreme Court did not rule that wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment [Olmstead v United States 275U.S 557 (1927) Katz v United States 389 U.S 347 (1967).1 37 fenses as espionage and sabotage. Apparently relying upon Jackson's statutory interpretation Congress then dropped the matter leaving the authorization of wiretaps to Executive discretion without either statutory standards or the requirement of a judicial warrant, The potential for misuse of wiretapping was demonstrated during this period by several F111 wiretaps approved by the Attorney General or by the White House In 1941 _Attorney General Riddle approved a wiretap on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce with the caveat There is no record of espionage at this time and unless within a month from today there is some evidence connect ing the Chamber of Commerce with espionage I think the surveillance should be discontinued.' However in another case Biddle disapproved an FBI request to wire tap a Philadelphia bookstore "engaged in the sale of Communist litera ture and frequented by "important Communist leaders in 1941. Materials located in Director Toovel.'s "Official and Confidential file indicate that President Roosevelt's aide Harry Hopkins asked the FBI to wiretap his own home telephone in 1944 Additional reports front "technical surveillance of an unidentified target were sent to l iopkins in May and July 1945 when he served as an aide to Presi dent Truman. In 1945 two Truman White IIouse aides E D McKinm and General II II Vaughn received reports of electronic surveillance of a high executive official One of these reports included "transcripts of tele phone conversations between the official] and Justice Felix Frank furter and between the official] and Drew Pearson. 7"a From June 1945 until May 1948 General Vaughn received reports from electronic surveillance of a former Roosevelt White IIouse aide A memorandum by J Edgar Hoover indicates that Attorney General Toni Clark "authorized the placing of a technical surveillance on this individual and that according to ('lark President Truman "was par ticularly concerned about the activities of this individual "and his associates and wanted "a very thorough investigation so that "steps might be taken if possible to see that such activities did not interfere with the proper administration of government. Hoover's memoran dum did not indicate what these "activities were. Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee To authorize Wiretapping 77thCong. 1st Sess (1941) p 112 "Congress continued to refrain from setting wiretap standards until 1968 when the OminbusCrime Control Act was passed The Act was limited to crimi nal eases and once again avoided the issue of intelligencewiretaps [iS U.S.C 2,511(3).] "Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to J Edgar Hoover 11/19/41 Biddle advised Hoover that wiretaps (or "technical surveillances") would not be authorized unless there was "information leading to the conclusionthat the activities of any particular individual or group are connected with espionage or are authorized sourcesoutsideof this country. "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Biddle 10/2/41 memorandumfrom Attorney General Biddle to J Edgar Hoover 10/22/41 "Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee 3/26/76 and enclosures ' Memorandumfrom D M Ladd to Hoover 5/23/45 "'Hoover memorandum 11/15/45 a memorandum headed "Summaries De livered to the White IIouse lists over 175reports sent to General Vaughn from this surveillance memorandum from FBI to Select Committee 3/26/76 and enclosures 38 b Bugging Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entry Intrusive techniques such as bugging mail opening and surreptitious entry were used by the FBI without even the kind of formal Presi dential authorization and requirement of Attorney General approval that applied to warrantless wiretapping During the war the FBI began "chamfering or surreptitious mail opening to supplement the overt censorship of international mail authorized by statute in wartime The practice of surreptitious en try or breaking-and-entering was also used by the FBI in war time intelligence operations. The Bureau continued or resumed the use of these techniques after the war without explicit outside authorization Furthermore the installation of microphone surveillance ("bugs") either with or without trespass was exempt from the procedure for Attorney General approval of wiretaps Justice Department records indicate that no Attorney General formally considered the question of microphone surveillance involving trespass except on a hypotheti cal basis until 1952.7 C DOMESTICINTELLIGENCEI\ THE COLDWAR ERA 1946 1963 1 Main Developments of the 1946 1963 Period The domestic intelligence programs of the FBI and the military intelligence agencies which were established under presidential au thority before World War II did not cease with the end of hostilities Instead they set the pattern for decades to come Despite Director Hoover's statement that the intelligence structure could be "discontinued or very materially curtailed with the termi nation of the national emergency after the war intelligence operations were neither discontinued nor curtailed."0 Congressional deference to the executive branch the broad scope of investigations the growth of the FBI's power and the substantial immunity of the Bureau from effective outside supervision became increasingly significant features of domestic intelligence in the United States New domestic intelligence functions were added to previous responsibilities No attempt was FBI memorandumfrom C E Hennrich to A H Belmont 9/7/51 "Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee 9/23/75 'A 1944 Justice Department memorandum discussed the "admissibility of evidenceobtained by trash covers and microphonesurveillance, in response to a series of hypothetical questions submitted by the FBI The memorandum concludedthat evidenceso obtained was admissibleeven if the microphonesur veillance involved a trespass (Memorandumfrom Alexander Holtzoff Special Assistant to the Attorney General to J Edgar Hoover 7/4/44 c.f. memorandum from Attorney General J Howard McGrath to J Edgar Hoover 2/26/52.) See footnote 229 for the 1950sconsideration of bugs by the Attorney General 80In early 1941 Director Hooverhad had the followingexchangewith members of the HouseAppropriationsCommittee "Mr LIJDLOwAt the close of the present emergency when peace comes it wouldmean that much of this emergencywork necessarily will be discontinued. "Mr noovi R That is correct... If the national emergencyshould terminate the structure dealing with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very materially curtailed accordingto the wishesof Congress. (First Deficiency Appropriation Bill 1911 Hearings before the House Committeeon Appropria tions 3/19/41 pp 18S-139.) 39 made to enact a legislative charter replacing the wartime emergency orders as was clone in the foreign intelligence field in 1947 The main developments (luring the Cold War era may be summa rized as follows Domestic Intelligence Authority During this period there was a national consensus regarding the danger to the United States from Communism little distinction was made between the threats posed by the Soviet Union and by Commu nists within this country Domestic intelligence activity was supported by that consensus although not specifically authorized by the Congress Formal authority for FBI investigations of "subversive activity and for the agreements between the FBI and military intelligence was explicitly granted in executive directives from Presidents Truman and Eisenhower the National Security Council and Attorney Gen eral Kennedy These directives provided no guidance however for conducting or controlling such investigations Scope of Domestic Intelligence The breadth of the FBI's investigation of "subversive infiltration continued to produce intelligence reports and massive files on lawful groups and law-abiding citizens who happened to associate even unwittingly with Communists or with socialists unconnected with the Soviet Union who used revolutionary rhetoric At the same time the scope of FBI intelligence expanded to cover civil rights protest activ ity as well as violent "Klan-type and "hate groups vocal anticom munists and prominent opponents of racial integration The vague ness of the FBI's investigative mandate and the overbreadth of its collection programs also placed it in position to supply the White House with numerous items of domestic political intelligence appar ently desired by Presidents and their aides In response to White House and congressional interest in right wing organizations the Internal Revenue Service began comprehen sive investigations of right-wing groups in 1961 and later expanded to left-wing organizations This effort was directed at identifying contributions and ascertaining whether the organizations were entitled to maintain their exempt status Accountability and Contpol Pervasive secrecy enabled the FBI and the Justice Department to disregard as "unworkable the Emergency Detention Act intended to set standards for aspects of domestic intelligence The FBI's independ ent position also allowed it to withhold significant information from a presidential commission and from every Attorney General and no Attorney General inquired fully into the Bureau's operations During the same period apprehensions about having a "security police. influenced Congress to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising law enforcement powers or performing "inter nal security functions. Nevertheless in secret and without effective internal controls the CIA undertook programs for testing chemical and biological agents on unwitting Americans sometimes with tragic consequences The CIA also used American private institutions as 40 "cover and used intrusive techniques affecting the rights of Americans Intrusive Techniques The CIA and the National Security Agency illegally instituted pro grams for the interception of international communications to and from American citizens primarily first class mail and cable traffic During this period the FBI also used intrusive intelligence gather ing techniques against domestic "subversives and counterintelligence targets Sometimes these techniques were covered by a blanket dele gation of authority from the Attorney General as with microphone surveillance but frequently they were used without outside authoriza tion as with mail openings and surreptitious entry Only conventional wiretaps required the Attorney General's approval in each case but this method was still misused due to the lack of adequate standards and procedural safeguards Domestic Co eel t Action In the mid-fifties the FBI developed the initial COINTELPRO operations which used aggressive covert actions to disrupt and dis credit Communist Party activities The FBI subsequently expanded its COINTELPRO activities to discredit peaceful protest groups whom Communists had infiltrated but did not control as well as groups of socialists who used revolutionary rhetoric but had no con nections with a hostile foreign power Throughout this period there was a mixture of secrecy and dis closure Executive action was often substituted for legislation some times with the full knowledge and consent of Congress and on other occasions without informing Congress or by advising only a select group of legislators There is no question that Congress the courts and the public expected the FBI to gather domestic intelligence about Communists But the broad scope of FBI investigations its specific programs for achieving "pure intelligence and "preventive intelli gence objectives and its use of intrusive techniques and disruptive counterintelligence measures against domestic "subversives were not fully known by anyone outside the Bureau Domestic Intelligence Authority a Anti-Communist Consensus During the Cold War era the strong consensus in favor of govern mental action against Communists was reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court and acts of Congress In the Korean War period for instance the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of domestic Com munist Party leaders under the Smith Act for conspiracy to advocate violent overthrow of the government The Court pinned its decision upon the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party of the United States and its ideological links with the Soviet Union at a time of stress in Soviet-American relations.81 The Court held that the grave and probabledanger posedby the Communist Parts justified this restriction on free speech under the First Amendment "The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders these petitioners felt that the time had comefor action coupledwith the inflammablenature of 41 Several statutes buttressed the FBI's claim of legitimacy for at least some aspects of domestic intelligence Although Congress never di rectly authorized Bureau intelligence operations Congress enacted the Internal Security Act of 1950 over President Truman's veto Its two main provisions were the Subversives Activities Control Act requir ing the registration of members of communist and communist "front groups and the Emergency Detention Act providing for the intern ment in an emergency of persons who might engage in espionage or sabotage In this Act Congress made findings that the Communist Party was"a disciplined organization operating in this nation "under Soviet Union control with the aim of installing "a Soviet style dic tatorship. Going even further in 1954 Congress passed the Com munist Control Act which provided that the Communist Party was "not entitled to any of the rights privileges and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States. S3 In 1956 the Supreme Court recognized the existence of FBI intelli gence aimed at Conunnnist seditious activities. sl The basis for Smith Act prosecutions of "subversive activity was narrowed in 1957 how ever when the Court overturned the convictions of second-string Communist leaders holding that the government must show advocacy "of action and not merely abstract doctrine." In 1961 the Court sustained the constitutionality under the First Amendment of the re quirement that the Communist Party register with the Subversive Acivities Control Board.S6 The consensus should not be portrayed as monolithic President Truman was concerned about risks to constitutional government posed world conditions and the touch-and-gonature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologicallyattuned convinceus that their convictionswere justified on this score. [Dennis v United States 341 U.S 494510 511(1951).1 "64 Stat 987 (1950) The SubversiveActivities Control Act's registration pro visionwas held not to violate the First Amendmentin 1961 [CommunistParty v Nnbrer.sircActivities Control Board 367 L.S 1 (1961).] However registration of Communistsunder the Act was later held to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination [Albertson v Subrersi-vcActivities Control Board 382U.S 70 (19&5).]The EmergencyDetention Act was repealed in 1971 68Stat 775(1954) 50U.S.C 841-844The constitutionality of the Communist ControlActof 1954has never beentested In light of the facts nowknown the SupremeCourt seemsto have overstated the degree to which Congresshad explicitly "charged the FBI with intelligence responsibilities "Congresshas devised an all-embracingprogram for resistance to the various forms of totalitarian aggression It has charged the Federal Bureau of Tnvestigationand the Central Intelligence Agencywith responsibilityfor intelli gence concerning Communist seditious activities against our Government and has denominatedsuch activities as part of a world conspiracy. [Pennsylvania v V(Isom350U.S 497 504 505(1956).] This decisionheld that the federal government had preempted state sedition laws citing President Roosevelt's September 1939statement on FBI authority and an address by FBI Director Hoover to state law enforcement officialsin August1940 "Yates v United States 354 U.S 298 325 (1957) "Justice Douglas who dissented on Fifth Amendmentgrounds agreed with the majority onthe First Amendmentissue "The Bill of Rights was designedto give fullest play to the exchange and dis seminationof ideas that touch the politics culture and other aspects of our life When an organization is used by a foreign power to make advances here ques tions of security are raised beyond the ken of disputation and debate between the people resident here. 'Communist Party v Subversive Activities Control Board 367U.S 1 174(1961).] 42 by the zealous anti Communism in Congress According to one White House staff member's notes during the debate over the Internal Security Act The President said that the situation was the worst it had been since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798 that a lot of people on the Hill should know better but had been stampeded into running with their tails between their legs Truman announced that he would veto the Internal Security Act "regardless of how politically unpopular it was election year or no election year. s But President Truman's veto was overridden by an overwhelming margin b The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Program (1) Origins of the Piog/am. President Truman established a federal employee loyalty program in 1947. Its basic features were retained in the federal employee security program authorized by President Eisenhower in public Executive Order 10400 which with some modifications still applies today. Although it had a much broader reach the program originated out of well-founded concern that Soviet intelligence was then using the Communist Party as a vehicle for the recruitment of espionage agents.s President Truman appointed a Temporary Commision on Employee Loyalty in 1946 to examine the problem FBI Director Hoover submitted a memorandum on the types of activities of "sub versive or disloyal persons in government service which would con stitute a "threat to security As Hoover saw it however the danger was not limited to espionage or recruitment for espionage It extended to "influencing government policies in favor of "the foreign country of their ideological choice. Consequently he urged that attention be given to the associations of government employees with "front organizations including "temporary organizations spontaneous campaigns and pressure movements so frequently used by subversive groups. 91 The President's Commission accepted Director Hoover's broad view of the threat along with the view endorsed by a Presidential Com mission on Civil Rights that there also was a danger from "those who would subvert our democracy by destroying the civil rights of some groups." Consequently the Executive Order included as an indica 6 File memorandum of S J Spingarn assistant counsel to the President 7/22/50 (Spingarn Papers Harry S Truman Library.) ExecutiveOrder9835 12Fed Reg 1935(1947) 89ExecutiveOrder1045018Fed Reg 2489(1953) "A report by a Canadian Royal Commissionin June 1946greatly influenced United States governmentpolicy The Royal Commissionstated that "a number of young Canadians public servants and others who begin with a desire to advance causes which they consider worthy have been induced into joining study groupsof the CommunistParty They are persuaded to keep this adherence secret Theyhave beenled step by step along the ingeneouspsychologicaldevelop ment course until under the influence of sophisticated and unscrupulous leaders they have been persuaded to engage in illegal activities directed against the safety and interests of their own society. The Royal Commissionrecom mended additional security measures "to prevent the infiltration into positions of trust under the Governmentof personslikely to commit such acts of espionage (The Report of the Royal Commission 6/27/46 pp 82_83 686-689.) 'Memorandum from the FBI Director to the President's Temporary Commis sion onEmployeeLoyalty 1/3/47 "President's Committee on Civil Rights To Secure These Rights (1947) p 52 43 tion of disloyalty membership in or association with groups desig nated on an "Attorney General's list as totalitarian fascist communist or subversive or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitu tional means The Executive Order was used to provide a legal basis for the FBI's investigation of allegedly "subversiv e organizations which might fall within these categories.''" Such investigations supplied a body of In telligence data against which to check the names of prospective fed eral enmployees.J (2) Breadth of the Jo i'estiyotions By the raid-1950s the Bureau believed that the Communist Party was no longer used for Soviet espionage it represented only a "potential recruiting ground for spies Thereafter FBI investigations of Communist organizations and other groups unconnected to espionage but falling within the standards of the Attorney General's list frequently became a means for monitoring the political background of prospective federal em ployee by means of the "name check of Bureau files These investi gations also served the "pure intelligence function of informing the Attorney General of the influence and organizational affiliations of so called "subversives. " No organizations were formally added to the Attorney General's list after 1955. However the FBI's "name check reports on prospec tive employees were never limited to information about listed orga nizations The broad standards for placing a group on the Attorney General's list were used to evaluate an employee's background regard less of whether or not he was a member of a group on the list. If a "name check uncovered information about a prospective employee's association with a group which iniyht come within those standards the "Executive Order 9835 part I section 2 cf Executive Order 10450 section 8(a) (5) "In 1960 for instance the Justice I)epartnmentadvised the FBI to continue investigating an organization not on the Attorney General'slist in order to secure "additional information relative to the criteria of the employeesecurity order (Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General T Walter Yeagley to J Edgar Hoover 5/17/60.) 'FBI "name checks are authorized as one of the "national agenciescheeks required by ExecutiveOrder 10.150section3(a) "FBI Monograph "The Menaceof Communismin the United States Today' 7/29/55 pp iv v Seefootnote271 "'The FBI officialin charge of the Internal Security Section of the Intelli gencyDivision in the fifties and early sixties testified that the primary purpose of FBI investigations of communist "infiltration was to advise the Attorney General so that he could determine whether a group should go on the Attorney General's list He also testified that investigations for this purpose continued after the Attorney General ceased adding names of groups to the list (F J Baumgardner testimony 10/8/73 pp 48-49.) Seepp 48 49 for discussionof the FBI's COMINFIL program " Memorandafrom the Attorney Generalto heads of Departmentsand Agencies 4/29/33 7/1.5/.53 9/2,R/53 1/22/:54 Groups designated prior to that time includednumerousdefunct Germanand Japanese societies Communistand Com munist "front organizations the Socialist Workers Party the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and several Ku Klux Klan organizations ExecutiveOrder10450section8(a) (5) 44 FBI would report the data and attach a "characterization of the orga nization relating to the standards.1i0 (3) FBI Coiztco7 of Loyalty-.Security Iii ce.stiggtions. President Eisenhower's 191)3order specifically designated the FBI as responsible for "a full field investigation whenever a "name check or a back ground investigation by the Civil Service Connnission or any other agency uncovered information indicating a potential security risk.'01 President "Truman had refused to give the Bureau this exclusive power initially but he fought a losing battle.'1 Director Hoover had objected that President Truman's order did not give the FBI excusive power and threatened "to withdraw from this field of investigation rather than to engage in a tug of war with the Civil Service Commission. 103President Truman was apprehensive about the FBI's growing power The notes of one presidential aide on a meeting with the President reflect that Truman felt "very strongly anti-FBI on the issue and wanted "to be sure and hold FBI down afraid of Gestapo.'"104 Presidential assistant Clark Clifford reviewed the situation and came down on the side of the FBI as "better qualified than the Civil Service Commission.103 But the President insisted on a compromise which gave Civil Service "discretion to call on the FBI "if it wishes. ' Director Tloover protested this "confusion about the FBI's jurisdiction.' 'hen Justice Department officials warned that Con gress would "find flaws with the compromise President Truman noted on a memorandum from Clifford J Edgar will in all probability get this backward looking Congress to give him what he wants It's dangerous.10 President's Truman's prediction was correct His budget request of $16 million for Civil Service and $8.7 million for the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations was revised by Congress to allocate $7.4 million to the FBI and only $3 million to Civil Service.10 The issue was finally resolved to the FBI's satisfaction when the President issued a state ment declaring that there were "to be no exceptions to the rule that the FBI would make all loyalty investigations.110 "The FBI's field officeswere supplied with such "thumb-nail sketches or characterizations to supplementthe Attorney General'slist and the reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (E g. SA( Letter No 60-34 7/12/60.) 01ExecutiveOrder10450section8(d) "The reference to a "full field investigation where there was "derogatory information with respect to loyalty did not in the Truman order say whowould conductthe investigation (ExecutiveOrder9835part I section4.) "Memoranda from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Tom Clark 3/19/47 and 3/31/47 File memorandumof GeorgeM Elsey 5/2/47 (Harry S Truman Library.) j Memorandumfrom Cark Cliffordto the President 5/7/47 'Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President 5/9/47 letter from President Truman to H B Mitchell U.S Civil Service Commission 5/9/47 (Harry S Truman Library.) 107Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to attorney General Clark 5/12/47 100Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President 5/9/47 (Harry S Truman Library.) 'Eleanor Bontecou Tlie Federal Loyalty-SecurityProgram (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1953) pp 33-34 "Memorandum from J R Steelman Assistant to the President to the Attor ney General 11/3/47 45 e Executive Dire( tives Lack of Guidance aaul Controls Two public presidential statements on FBI domestic intelligence au thority by President Truman in 19)0 and by President Eisenhower in 1953 specifically declared that the FBI was authorized to investi gate "subversive activity, electing the broader interpretation of the conflicting Roosevelt directives _Moreover a confidential directive of the National Security Council in 1949 granted authority to the FBI and military intelligence for investigation of "subversive activities. In 1962 President Kennedy issued a confidential order shifting super vision of these investigations from the NSC to the Attorney General and the NSC's 1949 authorizations were reissued by Attorney General Kennedy in 1964 As with the earlier Roosevelt directives these statements orders and authorizations failed to provide guidance on conducting or con trolling "subversive investigations Under President Truman the Interdepartmental Intelligence Con ference (IIC) " was formally authorized in 1949 to supervise coordination between the FBI and the military of "all investigation of domestic espionage counterespionage_ sabotage subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. 11'2[Emphasis added.] The confidential Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the military intelligence agencies was also revised in 1949 to require greater exchange of "information of mutual interest and to require the FBI to advise military intelligence of developments concerning "subversive groups who were "potential dangers to the security of the United States." In 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean war and in the midst of Congressional consideration of new internal security legislation Director Hoover recommended that Attorney General .J Howard McGrath 114and the AS( draft a statement which President Truman issued in July 1950 providing that the FBI should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage sabotage subversire activities and related matters." [Emphasis added.] " In a March 1949 directive on coordination of internal security President Truman approved the creation of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference ("IIC") Memorandumby J P Coyne Major ChronologicalDevelopmentson the Subject of Internal Security 4/5/49 (Harry S Truman Library) and NSC Memorandum17/4 3/23/49 NSCMemorandum17/5 6/15/49 The National Security Councilwas estab lished by the National Security Act of 1947 which authorized the NSCto advise the President with respect to "the integration of domestic foreign and military policies relating to the "national security. (Section 101 of the National Se curity Actof 1947.)Under this authority the NSCthen approveda secret charter for the ICC composedof the FBI Director (as chairman) and the heads of the three military intelligenceagencies 'Delimitation of Investigative Duties and Agreement for Coordination 2/23/49 A supplementary agreement required FBI and military intelligence officialsin the field to "maintain close personal liaison, particularly to avoid "duplicationiii the use of informers. Where there was "doubt as to whether another agency was interested in information it "should be transmitted. (Supplemental Agreement No 1 to the Delimitation Agreement 6/2/49.) " Letter from Attorney General McGrath to Charles S Murphy Counsel to the President 7/11/50 " Statement of President Truman 7/24/50 46 Despite concern among his assistants,"a President Truman's statement clearly placed him on the record as endorsing FBI investi gations of "subversive activities. The statement said that such in vestigations had been authorized initially by President Roosevelt's "directives of September 1939 and .Tanuary 1943 However those particular directives had not used this precise language.''s Shortly after President Eisenhower took office in 1953 the FBI advised the White House that its "internal security responsibility went beyond "statutory authority The Bureau attached a copy of the Truman statement but not the Roosevelt directive The FBI again broadly interpreted the Roosevelt directive by saying that it had au thorized "investigative work related to "subversive activities." In December 1953 President Eisenhower issued a statement reiterat ing President Truman's "directive and extending the FBI's mandate to investigations under the Atomic Energy Act.118 President Kennedy issued no public statement comparable to the Roosevelt Truman and Eisenhower "directives. However in 1962 he (lid transfer the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to "the supervision of the Attorney General 119and in 1964 Attorney General Robert Kennedy re-issued the IIC charter citing as authority the President's 1962 order and retaining the term "subversion. The char ter added that it slid not "modify or "affect the previous "Presi dential Directives relating to the duties of the FBI and that the Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and military intelligence "shall remain in full force and effect, X20 None of the directives orders or charters provided any definition of the broad and loose terms "subversion or "subversive activities and none of the administrations provided effective controls over the FBI's investigations in this area 3 Scope of Domestic Intelligence a "Subeersice Activities The breadth of the FBI's investigations of "subversive activity led to massive collection of information on law abiding citizens FBI domestic intelligence investigations extended beyond known or sus pected Communist Party members They included other individuals who regarded the Soviet Union as the "champion of a superior way of life and "persons holding important positions who have shown sym pathy for Communist objectives and policies. Members of "non-Stal "" One noted 'This is the most inscrutable Presidential statement I've seen in a long time. Another asked "How in H-- did this get out A third replied "Don't know I thought you were handling. Notes initialed D Bell SJS (S J Spingarn) and GWE (GeorgeW Elsey) 7/24 25/50 (Elsey Papers Harry S Truman Library) Even before the statement was issued one of these aides had warned the President's counsel that the Justice Department was attempting "an end run. [Memorandumfrom G W Elsey to Charles S Murphy Couno'elto the President 7/12/50 (Murphy Papers Harry S Truman Library.) ] 18Seefootnotes19and 22 I] Letter from J Edgar Hooverto Sherman Adams Assistant to the President 1/28/53 and attached memorandum on "FBI Liaison Activities, 1/26/53 Statement of President Eisenhower 12/15/53 "sNational Security Action Memorandum161 Subject U.S Internal Security Programs 6/9/62 "Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to J Edgar Hoover Chair man Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference 3/5/64 47 mist revolutionary socialist groups were investigated because even though they opposed the Soviet regime the FBI viewed them as re garding the Soviet Union "as the center for world revolution. 12 Moreover the FBI's concept of "subversive infiltration was so broad that it permitted the investigation for decades of peaceful protest groups such as the NAACP The Xumbee of Innt'e.tigatioim By 1960 the FBI had opened approximately 432,000 files at headquarters on individuals and groups in the "subversive intelligence field Between 1960 and 1963 an addi tional 9.000 such files were opened. An even larger number of in vestigative files were maintained at FBI field offices. Under the Bureau's filing system a single file on a group could include references to hundreds or thousands of group members or other persons associated with the group in any way and such names were indexed so that the informnat on was readily retrievable T"ague and Sweeping .8tanelai /s. The FBI conducted continu ing investigations of persons whose membership in the Communist Party or in "a revolutionary group had "not been proven, but who had "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs and had "committed past acts of violence (luring strikes riots or demonstrations.' Persons not currently engaged in "activity of a subversive nature were still investigated if they had engaged in such activity "several years ago and there was no "positive indication of disaffection. "4 The FBI Manual stated that it was "not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards for measuring "the dangerousness of in dividual members or affiliates of revolutionary organizations. Per sons could be investigated if they were "espousing the line of "rev olutionary movements Anonymous allegations could start an in vestigation if they were "sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight. The Manual added Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation the question should be resolved in the interest of security and investigation conducted. = The FBI Manual (lid not define "subversive"groups in terms of their links to a foreign government Instead they were "Marxist revolutionary-type organizations "seeking the overthrow of the U.S Government. 126One purpose of investigation was possible prosecu 121Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark 3/5/46 "=Memorandumfrom the FBI to the Senate Select Committee 10/28/75 An indication of the breadth of the investigations is illustrated by the fact that the nun her of files far exceededthe Bureau's estimate of the "alltime high iii CommunistParty membershipwhich was 80.000in 1944and steadily declined thereafter (William C Sullivan testimony 11/1/75 pp 33-34.) 'Report to the HouseCommitteeon the Judiciary by the ComptrollerGeneral of the United States 2/24/76 pp 118--119 Suchinvestigationswereconductedbecausethe CommunistParty had issued instructions that "sleepers should leave the Party and go "underground, still maintaining secret links to the Party (Memorandumfrom J F Bland to A II Belmont 7/30/58.) "Refusal to cooperate with an FBI agent's interview was "taken into con sideration along with other facts in determining whether to continue the in vestigation (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford 6/28/51 ) '' 1960FBI Manual Section87 p 5 1 1960FBI Manual Section87 p 5 48 tion under the Smith Act But no prosecutions were initiated under the Act after 1c9.).1'7 The Justice I)epartnmeint advised the FBI in 196 that such a prosecution required "an actual plan for a violent revolution." The Department's position in 1960 was that "incite ment to action in the foreseeable future was needed.'= Despite the strict requirements for prosecution the FBI continued to investigate "subversive organizations "from an intelligence viewpoint to ap praise their "strength and "dangerousness. 130 (3) CO.111.VFIL The FBI's broadest program for collecting intel ligence was carried out under the heading COMINFIL or Communist infiltration. The FBI collected intelligence about Comnnmist "in fluence under the following categories Political activities Legislative activities Domestic administration issues Negro question Youth matters \Vonien's matters Farmers Matters Cultural activities Veterans matters Religion Education Industry 133 FBI investigations covered "tlie entire spectrnnn of the social and labor movement in the country. 133The purpose as publicly disclosed in the Attorney General's Annual Reports was pure intelligence to "fortify the Government against "subversive pressures," or to "strengthen the Government against "subversive campaigns. 133 In other words the CO_MINFIL program supplied the Attorney General and the President with intelligence about a wide range of groups seeking to influence national policy under the rationale of de termining whether Communists were involved.13 The FBI said it was not concerned with the "legitimate activities of "nonsubversive groups, but only with whether Communists were "gaining a dominant 'The Supreme Court's last decision upholding a Smith Act conviction was Scales v United States 367 U.S 203 (1961) which reiterated that there must he "advocacy of action. See Yates v United States 354 U.S 298 (1957) Memorandumfrom Assistant Attorney General Tompkinsto Director FBI 3/15/56 'Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Director FBI 5/17/60 13019601'BI ManualSection 87 p 5 1311960FBI Manual Section87 pp 83 84 '1960 FBI Manual Section87 pp 5 11 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955 p 195 AnnualReport for 1958p 338 'a AnnualReport for 1964p 375 (Examples of such reports to the White House are set forth later pp 51 53.) The Chief of the Internal Security Section of the FBI Intelligence Divi sion in 1948 1966testified that the Bureau "had to he certain that a group's position did not coincidewith the Communistline "just by accident. The 1BI wouldnot "opena case until it had "specificinformation that "the Communists were there and were "influencing the group to "assist the Communistmove ment. (F J Baumgardner testimony 10/8/75 p 47.) 68-7860 76 5 49 role."Nevertheless COMINFIL reports inevitably described "legitimate activities totally unrelated to the alleged "subversive ac tivity. This is vividly demonstrated by the COMINFIL reports on American's leading civil rights group in this period the NAACP.134 The investigation continued for at least twenty-five years in cities throughout the nation although no evidence was ever found to rebut the observation that the NAACP had a "strong tendency to "steer clear of Communist activities. 1.i9 (4) E,xaygeratioiI of ('oni1nuni.st Ill fle( /l(e. The FBI and the Jus tice Departulent justified the continuation of COIIINFIL investiga tions despite the Contn unist Party's steady decline in the fifties and early sixities oil the theory that the Party was "seeking to repair its losses with the "hope of being able to -move in on movements with "laudable objectives. 14 The FBI reported to the White House in 19(11that the Communist Party had "attempted to take advantage of "racial disturbances in the South and had "endeavored to bring "pressure to bear. on gov ernment officials "through the press labor unions and student groups. At that time the FBI was investigating "two hundred known or sus pected communist front and communist-infiltrated organizations." By not stating how effective the "attempts and "endeavors of the Communists were and by not indicating whether they were'becoming more or less successful the FBI offered a deficient rationale for its sweeping intelligence collection policy William C Sullivan a former head of the FBI Intelligence Division has testified that such language was deliberately used to exaggerate the threat of Communist influence "Attempts and "influence were "very significant words in FBI reports he said These terms obscured what he felt to be the more significant criterion the degree of Com mnist success The Bureau "did not discuss this because we would have to say that they did not hit the target hardly any. I A distorted picture of Communist "infiltration later served to just ifv the FBI's intensive investigations of the groups involved iii protests against the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement including Dr Martin Luther King .JJr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Con ference " AnnualReportfor 1955 p 195 "'For more detailed discussion of the FBI investigations of the NAACPand other civil rights groups see the Report on the Developmentof FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations "'Report of Oklahoma City Field Office 9/19/41 This report continued "Nevertheless there is a strong movementon the part of the Communiststo at tempt to dominate this group Consequently the activities of the NAACPwill he closelyobservedand scrutinized in the future. [Emphasis added.] This stress on Communist "attempts rather than their actual achievements is typical of COMINFILreports The annual reports on the FBI's COMINFILinvestigation of the NAACPindicate that the Communists consistently failed in these "at tempts at the national level although the Bureau took credit for using covert tactics to prevent a Communist takeover of a major NAACPchapter (Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General-elect Robert F Kennedy 1/10/61 attached memorandum subject Communist Party USA FBI Counterattack.) " Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959 pp 247-24S 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover Chairman Interdepartmental Intel ligence Conference to McGeorgeBundy Special assistant to the President for National Security 7/25/61 enclosingIIC Report Status of U.S Internal Security Programs ' WilliamC Sullivantestimony 11/1/75 pp 40 I1 50 b "hncm7 Matteis owl "Hate In the 195Os tlie FBI also developed intelligence programs to inves tigate "Racial Matters and "hate organizations unrelated to "revolu tionary-type subv'crsiyes "Hate organizations were investigated if they had "allegedly adopted a policy of advocating condoning or in citing the use of force or violence to deny others them rights under the ('onstitution. Like the COMINFIL program however the Bureau used its "established sources to monitor the activities of "hate groups which did not "qulify under the "advocacy of violence standard. In 1963 FBI field offices were instructed to report "the formation and identities of "rightist or extremist groups in the "anticommunist field. Ileadquarters approval was needed for investigating "groups in this field whose activities are not in violation of any statutes. 144 I-nder these programs the FBI collected and disseminated intelli gence about the John Birch Society and its founder Robert Welch in 1959. The activities of another right-wing spokesman Gerald L K Smith who headed the Christian Nationalist Crusade were the subject of FBI reports even after the Justice Department had concluded that the group had not violated federal law and that there was no basis for including the group on the "Attorney General's list. 1}6 The FBI program for collecting intelligence on "General Racial flatters was even broader It went beyond "race riots to include "civil demonstrations' and "similar developments. These "develop ments included proposed or actual activities of individuals officials commit tees legislatures organizations etc. in the racial field." The FBI's "intelligence function was to advise "appropriate fed eral and local officials of "pertinent information about "racial inci dents." A briefing of the Cabinet by Director Hoover in 1956 illustrates the breadth of collection and dissemination under the racial matters program The briefing covered not only incidents of violence and the "efforts and "plans of Communists to "influence the civil rights movement but also the legislative strategy of the NAACP and the activities of Southern Governors and Congressmen on behalf of groups opposing integration peacefully. _ " 1960FBI Manual Section122 p 1 SACLetter No 63-27 6/11/63 'The FBI has denied that it ever conducted a "security-type investigation of the Birch Societyor Welch but states the Boston field office"was instructed in 1959to obtain background data on Welch using public sources (Memoran dum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee 2/10/76.) A 1963internal FBI memorandumstated that the Bureau "checkedinto the background of the Birch Society because of its scurrilous attack on President Eisenhower uand other high Government officials. (Memorandum from E J Baumgardner to W C Sullivan 5/29/63.) Reports were sent to the White House see footnote164 'Letter from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Sherman Adams Assistant to the President 11/22/54 letters from J Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler Special Assistant to the President 10/15/57 and 1/17/55 (Eisenhower Library.) " 1960FBI Manual Section122 pp 5-6 1'P1960FBI Manual Section122 pp 5-6 14"Racial Tensions and Civil Rights, 3/1/56 statement used by the FBI Director at Cabinetbriefing 3/9/56 51 c FBI Political Intelligence for the White House Numerous items of political intelligence were supplied by the FBI to the White Ilouse in each of the three administrations (hiring the Cold War era apparently satisfying the desires of Presidents and their staff's. President Truman and his aides received regular letters from Di rector Hoover labeled "Personal and Confidential containing tidbits of political intelligence The letters reported on such subjects as inside information about the negotiating position of a non-Commu nist labor union the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's appointments '52 a report from a "confidential source that a "scandal was brewing which would be "very embarrassing to the Democratic administration 153a report from a "very confidential source about a meeting of news paper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories expos ing organized crime and corrupt politicians ' the contents of an in-house communication from Yeleslceek magazine reporters to their editors about a story they had obtained from the State Department," and criticism of the government's internal security programs by a former Assistant to the Attorney General. Letters discussing Communist "influence provided a considerable amount of extraneous information about the legislative process in chiding lobbying activities in support of civil rights legislation' and the political activities of Senators and Congressmen. President Eisenhower and his aides received similar tid-bits of po litical intelligence including an advance text of a speech to be deliv ered by a prominent labor leader, reports from Bureau "sources on the meetings of an NAACP delegation with Senators Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen of Illinois 160the report of an "informant on the role of the United Auto Workers Union at an NAACP confer ence,161summaries of data in FBI files on thirteen persons (including Norman Thomas Linus Pawling and Bertrand Russell) who had filed suit to stop nuclear testing,l6= a report of a "confidential source on plans of Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt to hold a reception for the head of "'See p 37 for discussion of White House wiretap requests in 1945-1948 " Letter from J Edgar Hoover to GeorgeE Allen Director Reconstruction Finance Corporation 12/13/46 (Harry S Truman Library.) "Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Maj Gen Harry H Vaughn Military Aide to the President 2/15/47 (Harry S Truman Library.) "Letter from Hoover to Vaughn 6/25/47 (Harry S Truman Library.) '" Letter from J Edgar Hooverto Matthew J Connelly Secretary to the Presi dent 1/27/50 (Harry S Truman Library.) 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark 4/1/46 (Harry S Truman Library.) Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Maj Gen Harry H Vaughn Military Aide to the President 11/13/47 (Harry S Truman Library.) 15Letters from J Edgar Hooverto Brig Gen Harry IT Vaughn Military Aide to the President 1/11/46 and 1/17/46 (Harry S Truman Library.) "Letter from J Edgar Hoover to GeorgeE Allen Director Reconstruction Finance Corporation 5/29/49 (Harry S Truman Library.) 'Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson Special Assistant to the President 4/21/55 (EisenhowerLibrary.) " Letter from Hooverto Anderson 3/6/56 (EisenhowerLibrary.) ' Letter from Hooverto Anderson 3/5/56 (EisenhowerLibrary.) "'Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson Special Assistant to the President 4/11/58 (EisenhowerLibrary.) 52 a civil rights group," and reports on the activities of Robert Welch and the John Birch Society.1 The FBI also volt steered to the White House information from its most "reliable sources on purely political or social contacts with for eign government officials by a Deputy Assistant to the President, Bernard Baruch," Supreme Court Justice \Villiam O Douglas,' and Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt. Director IIooyer sent to the White I-louse a report front a "confiden tial informant on the lobbying activities of a California group called Women for Legislative Action because its positions "paralleled the Comlminist line." As in the prior administrations requests also flowed from the Eisen hower White House to the FBI." For example a presidential aide asked the FIBI to check its files on Rey Carl _McIntyre of the Inter national Council of Christian Churches.'' The pattern continued during the Kennedy administration A sum mary of material in FBI files on a prominent entertainer was volun teered to Attorney General Kennedy because IToov-er thought it "may be of interest. 1 Attorney General Kennedy sent to the President an FBI memorandum on the purely personal life of Dr Martin Luther King Jr " Director Hoover supplied Attorney General Kennedy with background information on a woman who told an Italian newspaper that she had once been engaged to marry President Kennedy ' and on the husband of a woman who was reported in the press to have stated that the President's daughter would enroll in a cooperative nursery with which she was connected." The FBI Director also passed on "'Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler Special Assistant to the President 2/13/58 (Eisenhower Library.) The group was described as the "successor to a group cited by the House Fn-American Activities Committee as a "communistfront. Letters from J Edgar Hoover to Gordon Gray Special Assistant to the President 9/11/59 and 9/16/59 "Letter from Hoover to Cutler 6/6/58 (Eisenhower Library) This involved contact with a foreignofficialwhoselater contacts with U.S officialswerereported by the FBI under the Kennedy Administration in connection with the "sugar lobby. seepp 64-65 'Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson Special Assistant to the President 11/7/55 (Eisenhower Library.) "'Letters from J Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler Administrative Assistant to the President 4/21/53 and 4/27/53 (Eisenhower Library.) 189Letterfrom Hoover to Cutler 10/1/57 (Eisenhower Library.) "'Letter from Hoover to Gray 11/9/59 (Eisenhower Library.) Hoover added that membershipin the group "does not of itself connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party. 'Requests raider the Rooseveltand Truman administrations including wire tap requests are discussedat pp 33and 37 'Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Thomas E Stephens Secretary to the President 4/13/54 (Eisenhower Library.) 1'2Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to R F Kennedy 2/10/61 "Personal. (John F Kennedy Library.) 'Memorandum from the Attorney General to the President 8/20/63 attach ing memorandumfrom Hooverto Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach 8/13/63 (John F Kennedy Library.) " Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to R F Kennedy 2/6/61 "Personal. (John F Kennedy Library.) Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to R F Kennedy 2/8/61 "Personal. (John F Kennedy Library.) 53 information from a Bureau "source regarding plans of a group to publish allegations about the President's personal life." In 1962 the FBI complied unquestioningly with a request from At torney General Kennedy to interview a Steel Company executive and several reporters who had written stories about the Steel executive The interviews were conducted late at night and early in the morning because according to the responsible FBI official the Attorney Gen eral indicated the information was needed for a White house meeting the next day.' Throughout the period the Bureau also disseminated reports to high executive officials to discredit its critics The FBI's inside infor mation on plans of the Lawyers Guild to denounce Bureau surveil lance in 1949 gave the Attorney General the opportunity to prepare a rebuttal well in advance of the expected criticism.1 s When the Knox ville Area Hunlan Relations Council charged in 1960 that the FBI was practicing racial discrimination the FBI (lid "name checks on mem ber of the Council's board of directors and sent the results to the At torney General The name checks dredged up derogatory allegations from as far back as the late thirties and early forties. rI IRS Inrestig(tions of Po/it/col 0egnnizations The IRS program that came to be used against the domestic dissi dents of the 1960s was first used against Communists in the 1950s As part of its COI\ TELPRO against the Communist Party the FBI arranged for IRS investigations of Party members and ob tained their tax returns. In its efforts against the Communist Party the FBI had unlimited access to tax returns it never told the IRS why it wanted them and IRS never attempted to find out.18 In 1961 responding to White House and congressional interest in right-wing organizations the IRS began comprehensive investiga tions of right-wing groups to identify contributors and ascertain whether or not some of them were entitled to their tax exempt status." Left-wing groups were later added in an effort to avoid charges that such IRS activities were all aimed at one part of the political spectrum Both right and left-wing groups were selected for review and investi gation because of their political activity and not because of any infor mation that they had violated the tax laws.' While the IRS efforts begun in 1961 to investigate the political activities of tax exempt organizations were not as extensive as later 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to R F Kennedy 11/20/63 (John F Kennedy Library.) 'Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedyto the President 4/12/62 en closing memorandum from Director FBI to the Attorney General 4/12/62 testimony of Courtney Evans former Assistant Director FBI 12/1/75 li 39 Letter from Attorney GeneralMcGrath to President Truman 12/7/49 letter from J Edgar Hooverto Maj Gen Ilarry H Vaughn Military Aideto the Presi dent.1/14/50 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hooverto Attorney GeneralWilliam P Rogers 5/25/60 Memorandumfrom A II Belmontto L V Boardman 8/25/56 p 4 LeonGreentestimony 9/12/75 pp (i S .MemorandumWilliam Loeb Assistant Commissioner Complianceto Dem J Barron Director of Audit 11/30/61 Memorandum Attorney Assistant to Commissionto Director IRS Audit Division 4/2/62 54 programs in 1969-1973 they were a significant departure by the IRS from normal enforcement criteria for investigating persons or groups on the basis of information indicating noncompliance By directing tax audits at individuals and groups solely because of their political beliefs the Ideological Organizations Audit Project (as the 1961 pro gram was known) established a precedent for a far more elaborate program of targeting "dissidents." Accountability awl Contpol During the Cold War period there were serious weaknesses in the system of accountability and control of domestic intelligence activity On occasion the executive chose not to comply with the will of Congress with respect to internal security policy and the Congressional attempt to exclude U.S foreign intelligence agencies from domestic activities was evaded Intelligence agencies also conducted covert programs in violation of laws protecting the rights of Americans Problems of ac countability were compounded by the lack of effective congressional oversight and the vagueness of executive orders which allowed intelli gence agencies to escape outside scrutiny a The Em.civenry hetcn-tion Act In 1946 four years before the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was passed the FBI advised Attorney General Clark that it had secretly compiled a security index of "potentially dangerous per sons.1 The Justice Department then made tentative plans for emer gency detention based on suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Department officials deliberately avoided going to Congress advising the FBI in a "blind memorandum The present is no time to seek legislation To ask for it would only bring on a loud and acrimonious discussion. In 1950 however Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act which established standards and procedures for the detention in the event of war invasion or insurrection "in aid of a foreign enemy, of any person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in or probably will conspire with others to engage in acts of espionage or sabotage The Act did not authorize the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and it provided that detained persons could appeal to a review board and to the courts. Shortly after passage of the Detention Act according to a Bureau document Attorney General J Howard McGrath told the FBI to '4 IRS referred to it as Tax Political ActionGroupsProject It was apparently labeledas aboveby the Joint Committeeon Internal RevenueTaxation " Seepp 94 96 for discussionof later IRS programs "'Memorandum from .1 Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark 3/8/46 See footnote 67 for the origins of the Security Index in contravention of Attorney GeneralBiddle'spolicy " Memorandumfrom Assistant Attorney General1 L Caudleto Attorney Gen eral Clark 7/11/46 'Quoted in internal FBI memorandumfrom D M Ladd to J Edgar Hoover 1/22/48 'Internal Security Act of 1950 Title II Emergency Detention 64 Stat 987 (1050) 55 disregard it and to "proceed with the program as previously outlined. DDepartment officials stated that the Act was "in conflict with their plans and was "unworkable. FBI officials agreed that the statutory procedures such as "recourse to the courts instead of suspension of habeas corpus would "destroy their program.'" _Moreover the Secu rity Index used broader standards to determine "potential danger ousness than those prescribed innthe statute and unlike the Act Department plans provided for issuing a _Master Search Warrant and a Master Arrest Warrant." Two subsequent Attorneys General endorsed the decision to ignore the Emergency Detention Act."' b Il'ithholdipy I~~toinz~~tion Not only did the FBI and the .Justice Department jointly keep their noncompliance with the Detention Act secret from Congress but the FBI withheld important aspects of its program from the Attorney General FIII personnel had been instructed in 1949 that no mention must be made in any investigative report relating to the classifications of top functionaries and key figures nor to the Detcom and Comsab Programs nor to the Security Index or the Communist Index These investigative proce dures and administrative aides are confidential and should not be known to any outside agency. FBI documents indicate that only the Security Index was made known to the Justice Department In 19,io the FBI tightened formal standards for the Security Index reducing its size from 26,174 to 12,870 by 1958.'94However there is no indication that the FBI told the Department that it kept the names of persons taken off the Security Index on a Communist Index because the Bureau believed such persons remained "potential threats.'a The secret Communist Index was renamed the Reserve Index in 1960 and expanded to include "influential persons deemed likely to "aid subversive elements in an emergency because of their "subversive as sociations and ideology. Such individuals fell under the following categories Professors teachers and educators labor union organizers and leaders writers lecturers newsmen and others in the mass media field lawyers doctors and scientists other po tentially influential persons on a local or national level indi viduals who could potentially furnish financial or material aid Memorandumfrom A H Belmontto D M Ladd 10/15/52 'Memorandum from D M Ladd to J Edgar Hoover 11/13/52 'D'Memorandumfrom Attorney General James McGraneryto J Edgar Hoover 11/25/52 memorandumfrom Attorney General Herbert Brownell to J Edgar Hoover 4/27/53 SACLetter No 97 Series 1949 10/19/49 Field officesgave specialattention to "key figures and "top functionaries of the CommunistParty The "Comsab program concentrated on potential Communistsaboteurs and the "Detcom pro gram was the FBI's own"priority arrest list The CommunistIndex was "a com prehensive compilationof individuals of interest to the internal security. Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Brownell 3/9/55 memorandumfrom .1 F Bland to A H Belmont 7/30/58 ""MemorandumfromA H Belmontto L V Boardman 1/14/55 56 Persons on the Reserve Index would receive "priority consideration for "action after detention of Security Index subjects The breadth of this list is illustrated by the inclusion of the names of author Norman Mailer and a professor who merely praised the Soviet Union to his class.'" In addition to keeping these programs secret the FBI withheld information about espionage from the .Justice Department on at least two occasions In 1946 the FBI had "identified over 100 persons whom it "suspected of being in the Government Conn-wiz-listUnderground. NNeitherthis number nor any names from this list were given to the Department because Director Hoover feared "leaks, and because the Bureau conceded in its internal documents that it did "not have evidence whether admissible or otherwise reflecting actual member ship in the Communist Party. '96Thus the Bureau's "suspicions were not tested by outside review by the Justice Department and the investi gations could continue In 1951 the FBI again withheld from the Department names of certain espionage subjects "for security reasons, since disclosure "would destroy chances of penetration and control. 197 Even the Presidents Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty could not get highly relevant information from the Bureau FBI As sistant Director D M Ladd told the Commission iii 1946 that there was a "substantial amount of Communist "infiltration of the gov ernment. Bttt Ladd declined to answer when Connoission members asked for more details of FBI intelligence operations and the infor mation which served as the basis for his characterization of the ex tent of infiltration. The Commission prepared a list of questions for the FBI and asked that Director IIouver appear in person Instead Attorney General Clark made an "informal appearance and supplied a memorandum stating that the number of "subversives in govern muenthad 'not vet reached serious proportions, but that the possibility of "even one disloyal person in government service constituted a "serious threat. 119Thus the President's Commission chose not to insist upon making a serious evaluation of FBI intelligence operations or the extent of the danger "I'lie record suggests that execui iye officials were forced to make de cisions regarding security policy without full knowledge They had to depend on the FBI's estimate of the problem rather than being able to make their own assessment on the basis of complete informa tion It is also apparent that by this time outside officials were some tinies unwilling to oppose Director I IooVer or to inquire fully into FBI operations. ( (7.1 Dome .1(tieity (1) 1"uqna Contcol.s on ("I.1. The vagueness of Congress's pro hibitions of -internal security functions by the CIA left room for the " Memorandumfrom A H Belmont to Mr Parsons 6/3/G0 "'Memorandum from D M Ladd to T Edgar Hoover 9/1/46 memorandum from Hooverto AttorneyGeneralClark 0/5/46 107MemorandumfromA H BelmonttoD M Ladd 4/17/51 "'Minutes of the President's Temporary Commissionon Employee Loyalty 1/17/47 (Harry S Truman Library.) "'Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Mr Vanech Chairman Presi dent's TemporaryCommission3/14/47 (Truman Lilrrnrv.) C0See finding (G) for a full discussion of the problem of FBI accountability Agency's subsequent domestic activity A restriction against "police law enforcement or internal security functions first appeared in President Truman's order establishing the Central Intelligence Group in 194(1.20 General Vandenburg then 1)irector of Central Intelligence testified in 1947 that this restriction was intended to "draw the lines very sharply between the CI(l and the FIJI and to "assure that the Central Latelligence Group can never become a Gestapo or security police. 202 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal testified that the CIA would be "limited definitely to purposes outside of this country except the col lection of information gathered by other government agencies. The FIJI would be relied upon "for domestic activities. 203 In the IIouse floor debate Congressman Holifield stressed that the work of the CIA is strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence what is known as clinnlestine intelligence They have no right iii the domestic field to collect information of a clandestine military nature They can evaluate it yes.20-1 Consequently the National Security _pct of 1947 provided specifically that the CIA shall have no police subpoena law-enforcement powers or internal security functions.VO IIowever the 1947 Act also contained a vague and undefined duty to protect intelligence "sources and methods which later was used to justify domestic activities ranging from electronic surveillance and break-ins to penetration of protest groups.206 (2) Drug Testing and Cocci 1'iogrunas.-In the early 1950s the CIA began a program of surreptitiously testing chemical and biologi cal materials which included drug testing on unwitting Americans The existence of such a program was kept secret because as the CIA's Inspector General wrote in 1957 it was necessary to "protect oper ations from exposure to "the American public as well as "enemy forces. Public knowledge of the CIA's "unethical and illicit activ ities was thought likely to have serious "political repercussions. 207 CIA drug experimentors disregarded instructions of their superiors within the Agency and failed to take "reasonable precautions when "'Presidential Directive Coordinationof Federal Foreign Intelligence Activi ties 1/22/46 11 Fed Reg 1337 Fears that a foreign intelligenceagency would intrude into domestic matters went back to 1944 when General William Dono van head of the Officeof Strategic Services (the CIA's wartime predecessor) proposedthat OSSbe transformed from a wartime basis to a permanent "central intelligence service. Donovan's plan was leaked to the Chicago Tribune al legedlyby FBI Director Hoover and it was denouncedas a "super spy system which world "pry into the lives of citizens at home. [Corey Ford Donovanof the OSS (Boston Little Brown 1970) pp 303-304.1 'Hearings before the Senate Armed ServicesCommitteeon S 758 80th Cong (1947) p 497 'Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments onH.R 2319 80thCong (1947) p 127 93Cong Rec 9430(1947) 2'"I U.S.C 403(d) (3) 0Seepp 102-103 "'Inspector General's Report on the Technical Services Division Central Intelligence Agency 1957 58 they undertook the test which resulted in the death of Dr Frank Olsen.- $ The CIA made extensive use of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan gerous Drugs in conducting its program of drug testing on unwitting SilbjeCts Military intelligence also administered chugs to volunteer subjects who were unaware of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were participating. The CIA's drug research was conducted in part through arrange ments with universities hospitals and "private research organiza tions in a manner which concealed "from the institution the interests of the ('IA. although "key individuals were made witting of Agency sponsorship. There were similar covert relationships with American private institutions in other CLL intelligence activities. ~) In-ti'usize Techniques Throughout the cold war period the intelligence agencies used covert techniques which invaded personal privacy to execute their vague uncontrolled and overly broad mandate to collect intelligence Intelligence techniques were not properly controlled by responsible authorities some of the techniques were misused by senior adminis tration officials On the other hand the nature of the programs and in some cases their very existence was often concealed from those authorities a Communications Iiiteeeeptioa CIA and NSA During the 1950s the Central Intelligence Agency instituted a major program for opening mail between the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through postal facilities in New York City.2'2 Two other short-term CIA projects in the fifties also involved the opening of international mail within the United States through access to Customs Service facilities.213 Moreover in the late 1940s the Department of Defense made arrangements with several communi cations companies to receive international cable traffic reinstating a relationship that had existed during World War II.214 These pro grams violated not only the ban on internal security functions by foreign intelligence agencies iii the 1947 Act but also specific statutes protecting the privacy of the mails and forbidding the interception of communications." 'Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Inspector General 1/5/54 "'U.S Army Intelligence Center Staff Study Material Testing Program EA 1729 10/15/59 "'CIA Inspector General'sReport 1963 'This issue is examined more fully in the Committee's Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence Activities "'Memorandum from James Angleton Chief Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Operations 11/21/55 (attachment) "'CIA Memorandumre Project SETTER undated (New Orleans) Memo randum from "Identity #13 to Deputy Director of Security 10/9/57 (New Orleans) RockefellerCommissionStaff Summaryof CIAOfficeOfficerInterview 3/1S/75 (Hawaii) "'Robert Andrews Special Assistant to the General Counsel Department of Defense testimony 9/23/75 pp.3-1--40 "518 I'.S.C 1701 1703 (mail) 47 L.S.C 605 (Federal CommunicationsAct of 1934) 59 While their original purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence the programs frequently slid not distinguish between the messages of for eigners and of Americans. Furthermore by the late fifties and early sixties the CIA_ and NSA were sharing the "take with the FBI for domestic intelligence purposes. In this period the CIA opened mail to and from the Soviet Union largely at random intercepting letters of Americans unrelated to for eign intelligence or counterintelligence.218 After the FBI learned of the CIA program it levied requests In certain categories Apart from foreign counterintelligence criteria the Bureau expressed interest in letters from citizens professing "pro-Communist sympathies Y19 and "data re U.S peace groups going to Russia. 22 The secret arrangements with cable companies to obtain copies of in ternational traffic were initially authorized by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Attorney General Tone ('lark although it is not clear that they knew of the interception of American as well as foreign messages.= They developed no formal legal rationale and their later successors were never consulted to renew the authorization.222 The CL1 sought no outside authorization before instituting its mail opening program Several Post Office officials were misled into believ ing that the ('LL's request for access to the mail only involved exarning the exterior of the envelopes.223President hennedy's Postmaster Gen eral J Edward I)ay testified that he told CIA Director Allen Dulles he did not want to "know anything about what the CIA was doing." Beyond undocumented assumptions by CIA officials there is no evi dence that the President or the Attorney General was ever informed about any aspect of CIA mail-opening operations in this period.22 2 ("IA memorandum For the Record from Thomas B Abernathy 8/21/61 I)r LouisTordella former DeputyDirector National Security Agency testimony 10/21/75 pp 17-20 High FBI officialsdecided to use the CIA mail opening program for bur internal security objectives in 1955 They did not want the Bureau to "assume this coverage itself because its "sensitive nature created "inherent dangers and due to its "complexity size and expense. Instead the Bureau would hold ("IA responsible to share their coveragewith us. (Memorandumfrom A H Bel mont to Mr Boardman 1/22/58.) The initial FBI request to NSAinvolved"com mercial and personal communicationsbetween persons in Cuba and the United States. (MemorandumfromW R wannall to W C Sullivan Assistant Director DomesticIntelligenceDivision 5/18/62.) -'aAbernathy memorandum S/21/61 Memorandumfrom W A Branigan to W C Sullivan (attachment) 8/21/61 Memorandumfrom W A Branigan to W C Sullivan 2/15/62 SelectCommitteeMemorandum Subject Reviewof Documentsat DODRe garding LP MEDLEY 9/17/75 ("LP MEDLEY was the CIA's codename for this program the NSAcodenamewas SHAMROCK.) Secretary Forrestal's immediate successor Louis Johnson renewed the ar rangement in 1949 To the knowledgeof those interviewed by the Committee this was the last instance in which the companies raised any question as to the authority for the arrangements (Andrews 9/23/75 pp 34 40.) Richard Helms Testimony 10/22/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 84 Memorandum from Richard Helms to SheffieldEdwards Director of Security 5/17/54 J Edward Day Testimony 10/22/73 Hearings Vol 4 p 45 However a contemporaneousCLAmemorandumstated that "no relevant details were with held from Day whenhe was briefed in 1961by CIA officials (Memorandumfrom Richard Helms to Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff 2/16/61.) 22Helms 10/22/75 Iearings Vol 4 pp 87-89 60 b J?BI Coco tTeehiaipies (1) Electi onzc AS'urreillance The Question of Authority/ In 1946 Attorney General Tom Clark asked President Truman nto renew the authorization for war rantless wiretapping issued by President Roosevelt in 1940 Clark's meniorandiun however did not refer to the portion of the Roosevelt directive which said wiretaps should be limited "insofar as possible to aliens. It stressed the danger from "subversive activity here at home, and requested authority to wiretap "in cases vitally affecting the domestic security. ^-26The President gave his approval Truman's aides later discovered Attorney General Clark's omission and the President considered but decided against returning to the terms of Roosevelt's authorization. In 1954 the Supreme Court denounced the Fourth Amendment violation by police who placed a microphone in a bedroom in a local gambling case." Soon thereafter despite this decision and despite his predecessor's ruling that trespassory installation of bums was in the "area of the Fourth Amendment Attorney General Herbert Brownell authorized the "unrestricted use iii the "national interest of "trespass in the installation of microphones." From 1954 until 1965 when Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach reconsidered the policy and imposed stricter regulations,=30 the FBI had unsupervised discretion to use microphone surveillance and to conduct surreptitious entries to install microphones Thus the safe guard of approval by the Attorney General for each wiretap had been undercut by the FBI's ability to intrude into other often more inti mate conversations by microphone "bugging. Extensity hind/ying Lr May 1961 Director Hoover advised Peputy Attorney General Byron White that the FBI was using "micro phone surveillances involving "trespass for "intelligence purposes. in the "internal security field. IIe called White's attention to the 1954 Brownell memorandum although he said microphones were used "on a restricted basis and cited as examples only "Soviet intelligence agents and Communist Party leaders. 231 In fact the FBI had already used microphone surveillance for broader coverage than Communists or spies Indeed it had "bugged a hotel room occupied by a Congressman in February 1961 There is no evidence that Attorney General Kennedy or Deputy Attorney 'Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman 7/17/46 Memorandumfrom G M Elsey Assistant Counselto the President to S J Spingarn memorandumfrom Elsey to the President 2/2/50 (Spingarn Papers Harry S Truman Library) Irvine v California 347I'S 128 (1954) Memorandumfrom Attorney General Brownellto J Edgar Hoover 5/20/54 In 1952Attorney General J Howard McGrath refused to authorize microphone surveillanceinvolvingtrespass becauseit was "in the area of the Fourth Amend ment. (Memorandum from Attorney General McGrath to J Edgar Hoover 2/26/52.) See p 105 (The Chief Counselto the Select Committeedisqualifiedhimself from participating in Committeedeliberations concerningeither Mr Katzenbach or former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall because of a previous attorney-client relationship with those two persons.) 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Byron White 5/4/61 61 General White were specifically informed of this surveillance But the Attorney General received information which came from the "bug and authorized a wiretap of the Congressman's secretary.'33 Furthermore FBI records disclose that the FBI conducted war rantless microphone surveillances in 1960 1963 directed at a "black separatist group. "black separatist group functionaries and a "(white) racist organization."'3{ There may have been others for purely domestic intelligence purposes.'3 The FBI maintained no "central file or index to record all micro phone surveillances in this period and FBI records (lid not distinguish "bugs involving trespass.V3G (2) "Black Ban .Jobs. There is no indication that any Attorney General was informed of FBI "black bag jobs and a "Do Not File procedure was designed to preclude outside discovery of the FBI's use of the technique No permanent records were kept for approvals of "black bag lobs, or surreptitious entries conducted for purposes other than installing a "bug. The FBI has described the procedure for authorization of sur reptitious entries as requiring the approval of Director Iloover or his Assistant Clyde Tolson The authorizing memorandum was filed in the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File' procedure and there =33In the course of an investigation authorized by _AttorneyGeneral Kennedy into lobbyingefforts on behalf of a foreign country regarding sugar quota legis lation the FRI determined that CongressmmnHarold I) ('ooley chairman of the house Agriculture Committee planned to meet with representatives of a foreign country iu a hotel room (FBI memorandum 2/15/61 Memorandum from V R waunall to W C Sullivan 12/22/66.) At the instruction of Director IIoover the Bureau installed a microphoneiii the hotel room to record this meeting (FBI inemor mainni2/I'i/61 Menro randum from D E Mooreto A H Belmont 2/16/61.) The results of the meeting were subsequently disseminated to the Attorney General (Memorandumfrom 7 Edgar Hooverto AttorneyGeneralKennedy 2/18/61.) A reviw of this case by FBI officialsin 1966concludedthat "our tiles contain no clear indication that the Attorney General was specificallyadvised that a microphonesurveillance was being utilized (Memorandum from Wannall to Sullivan 12/21/66.) It was noted however that on the morning of Febru ary 17 1961 after the microphonewas iii place but an hour or two before the meeting actually occurred Director Hoover spoke with Attorney General Kennedy and according to Hoover's contemporaneous memorandum advised him that the Cooleymeetingwas to take place that day and that "we are trying to cover it (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Messrs Tolson Parsons Mohr Belmont and DeLoach 2/17/61.) "'According to records compiledby the FBI there was FBI microphonesur veillance of one "black separatist group in 1960 one "black separatist group and one "black separatist group functionary in 1961 two ''black separatist groups, one "black separatist group functionary, and one "(white) racist organization in 1962 and two "black separatist groups and one "black separatist group functionary in 1963 (Memorandumfront FBI to Select Cotn mittee 10/23/75.) 2 The Select Committeehas determined that the FBI on at least oneoccasion maintained no records of the approval of a microphonesurveillance authorized by an Assistant Director (FBI Memorandum 1/30/75 Subject Special Squad at DemocraticNational Convention Atlantic City NewJersey 8/22-28/64.) "'Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee 10/17/75 This memorandumalso states that on the basis of the recollectionsof agents and a review of headquarters files the FBI has "heeu able to identify the following number of "surreptitious entries for microphone installations in "internal security intelligence and counterintelligence investigations 1960 49 1961 63 1962 75 1963 79 and the followingnumber of such entries "in criminal investigations (as opposed to intelligence) 1960 11 1961 69 1962 106 1963 84 62 after destroyed In the field office the Special Agent in Charge main tained a record of approval in his office safe At the next yearly field office inspection an Inspector would review these records to ensure that the SAC had secured FBI headquarters approval in conducting surreptitious entires upon completion of the review these records were destroyed.V3i The only internal FBI memorandum found discussing the policy for surreptitious entries confirms that this was the procedure and states that "we do not obtain authorization from outside the Bureau because the tecluligne was "clearly illegal. The memorandum indi cates that "black bag jobs were used not only "in the espionage field but also against "subversive elements not directly connected to es pionage act ivity It added that the techniques resulted "on numerous occasions in obtaining the "highly secret and closely guarded mem bership and mailing lists of "subversive. groups.2t8 (i) .11(01Openimj. The FBI did not seek outside authorization when it reinstituted mail opening programs in the fifties and early sixties Eight programs were conducted for foreign intelligence and counterespionage purposes and Bureau officials who supervised these programs have testified that legal considerations were simply not raised at the time.'{ Beyond their original purpose the FBI nulil opening programs produced some information of an essentially domestic nature For example during this period one program supplied "considerable data about American citizens who expressed pro-Communist sympathies or made "anti-U.S statements."2") Some of the mail-opening by product regarding Americans was disseminated to other agencies for law enforcement purposes with the source disguised." c Use of FBI Wiretaps The authorization for wiretapping issued by President Truman in 1946 allowed the Attorney General to approve wiretaps in the investi gation of "subversive activity to protect the "domestic security.' "'Memorandumfrom the FBI to the Senate Select Committee 9/23/75 "'Memorandum from C Sullivan to C D 1)eLoach 7/19/66 Subject "Black Bag Jobs Initials on this memorandumindicate that it was prepared by F J Baumgardner an FBI Intelligence DivisionSection('Lief and approved by J A Sizoo principal deputy to Assistant Director W C Sullivan This memorandumwas located in Director Hoover's "Officialand Confidential files and it appears that the memorandumwas shifted from Hoover's"Personal Files shortly before his death (Helen Gandy deposition 11/12/75 pp 4-6.) The FBI compiled a list of the "domestic subversive targets based "upon recollectionsof SpecialAgentswho have knowledgeof such activities and review of those files identified by recollectionas being targets of surreptitious entries. The list states ...atleast fourteen domesticsubversivetargets were the subject of at least 235entries from 1942to April 1965 In addition at least three domestic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October 1952to June 1966 Onewhite hate group was the target of an entry in March 1966. The Bureau admits that this list is "incomplete. (Memorandumfrom the FBI to the Senate SelectCommittee 9/23/75.) "19Depositionof William R Branigan SectionChief FBI IntelligenceDivision 10/9/75 pp 13 39 -10Testimony of Assistant Director IV Raymond Wauuall FBI Intelligence Division 10/24/75 Hearings vol 4 pp 145-49 ~10Memorandumfrom San Francisco fieldofficeto FBI Headquarters 3/11/60 Mennlrandlnnfrom S B Donahoeto AyC Sullivan 9/15/61 Menmrauduul front San Francisco field officeto FBI headquarters 7/28/61 "Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman 7/17/46 63 A wiretap on an official of the Nation of Islam originally authorized by Attorney General I-Ierbert Brownell in 1957 continued thereafter without re-authorization until 1965.243Attorney General Robert Ken nedy approved FBI requests for wiretaps on an Alabama Klan leader in 1963 "i and on black separatist group leader Malcolm X in 196-1 24 Kennedy also authorized wiretap coverage requested by the Warren ('onunission in 1964.24 Kennedy's approval of FBI requests for wire taps on I)r Martin Luther King and several of his associates are dis cussed in greater detail elsewhere in the Committee's report."4 In addition Attorney General Kennedy approved wiretaps on four American citizens during investigations of "classified information leaks. The taps failed to discover the sources of the alleged "leaks and involved procedural irregularities In 1961 Attorney General Kennedy told Director Hoover that the President wanted the FBI to determine who was responsible for an apparent "leak to Newsweek reporter Lloyd Norman author of an article about American mili tary plans in Germany.248 But the Attorney General was not asked to approve a wiretap on Norman's residence until after it was installed According to contemporaneous Bureau memoranda wiretaps in 1962 on the residence of New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin and his secretary to determine the source of an article about Soviet missile sites were also instituted without prior written approval of the Attorney General and one of them the tap on the secretary was instituted without the Attorney General's prior knowledge.249 Kennedy's written approval was obtained however three clays after the Baldwin tap was installed and four days after the tap on the secretary was installed.='0 The pattern including ex post facto approval was repeated for wiretaps of a former FBI agent who disclosed "confidential Bureau information in a public forum The first tap lasted for eight days in 1962 and it was reinstituted in 1963 for an undetermined period.25 Attorney General Kennedy was advised that the FBI desired to place the initial coverage but he was not informed that it had been effected the day before and he did not grant written approval until the day 3"Memorandumfrom Hooverto Brownell 12/31/56 " Memorandumfrom Hooverto Kennedy 10/9/63 2Memorandum from Hooverto Kennedy 4/1/64 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Kennedy 2/24/64 2 See Findings C and G and CommitteeReport on the FBI and Dr Martin Luther King Jr "Memorandum from R D Cotter to W C Sullivan 12/15/66 On the same (lay and without specificauthorization from the Attorney General the FBI placed a wiretap on Norman's residence Attorney General Kennedy was informed of the wiretap two days later and approved it the following day (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy 6/29/61.) The tap continued for four days until Norman went on vacation (Memorandum from S B Donahoeto W C Sullivan 7/3/61.) At no time did this or any other aspect of the FBI's investigation produce any evidence that Norman had actu ally obtained classifiedinformation An FBI summary stated "The majority of those interviewed thought a competent well-informedreporter could have writ ten the article without having reviewed or received classified information. (Memorandumfrom Cotter to Sullivan 12/15/66.) "4eMemorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto Attorney General Kennedy 7/27/62 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy 7/31/62 The tap on the secretary lasted three weeks and the tap on Baldwin a month Memorandafrom W R Wannall to W C Sullivan 8/13/62 and 8/28/62 "i UUnaddressedmemorandumfromA H Belmont 1/9/63 64 it was terminated." It appears that only oral authorization was obtained for reinstituting the tap in 1:)63.2'3 In February 1961 attorney General Kennedy requested the FBI to initiate an investigation for the purpose of developing intelligence data which would provide President Kennedy a picture of what was behind pressures exerted on behalf of [a foreign country] regarding sugar quota deliberations in Con gress in connection with pending sugar legislation. This investigation lasted approximately nine weeks and was rein stituted for a three-month period in mid-1962 According to an FBI memorandum the Attorney General author ized the wiretaps in 1961 on the theory that "the administration has to act if money or gifts are being passed by the [representatives of a foreign country].' Specifically he approved wiretaps on several American citizens three officials of the Agriculture Department (resi dences only) X16the clerk of the House Committee on Agriculture who was also secretary to the chairman (residence only) and a reg istered agent of the foreign country (both residence and business tele phones). After passage of the Administration's own sugar bill in April 1961 these wiretaps were discontinued.= The investigation was reinstituted in June 1962 when the Bureau learned that representatives of the same foreign country again might be influencing congressional deliberations concerning an amendment to the sugar quota legislation.'''' Attorney General Kennedy approved wiretaps on the office telephone of an attorney believed to be an agent of the foreign country and again on the residence telephone of the Clerk of the ITouse Agriculture Connnittee."l The latter tap continued for one month but the former apparently lasted for three months.'62 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto Attorney GeneralKennedy 10/19/62 "'Unaddressed memorandum from "hwg (Director Hoover's secretary was Helen W Gandy) 1/9/63 This memorandumreads "Mr Belmontcalled to say (Courtney) Evans spoketo the Attorney General replacing the tech on [former FBI agent] again and the Attorney General said by all means do this Mr Bel monthas instructed NewYorkto doso. (Assistant Director CourtneyEvans was the FBI's normal liaison with _AttorneyGeneral Kennedy.) Memorandumfrom W R Wanall to W C Sullivan 12/22/66 The Sugar Lobbyinvestigation is alsodiscussedat footnote233 Memorandumfrom A II Belmont to Mr Parsons 2/14/61 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy 2/14/61 2 Memoradumfrom Hooverto the AttorneyGeneral 2/16/61 '"' Memorandumfrom II)loverto the AttorneyGeneral 2/16/61 'According to a memorandumof a meeting bet veen Attorney General Ken nedy and Courtney Evans Kennedy stated that "now the law was passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing this extensive investigation. (Memorandumfrom C A Evans to Mr Parsons 4/14/6n.) The investigation did discover possibly unlawful influence was being exerted by representatives of the foreigncountry involved hut it (lidnot reveal that moneywas actually being passed to any Executive or congressionalofficial (Memorandumfrom Wannall to Sullivan 12/22/66.) ' FBI letterhead memoranda 6/15 18 19/62 MemorandumfromJ Edgar Hooverto the Attorney General 6/26/62 "'The wiretap on the House CommitteeClerk had "produced no information of value. While there is no indication that the other wiretaps including five directed at foreign targets produced evidenceof actual payoffs they slid reveal that possibly unlawful influence was again being exerted by the foreign gov ernment and internal Bureau permission was ohtaimedto continue them for sixty days beyondthe initial thirty-day period (Memorandumfrom W R Wan nall to W C Sullivan 8/16/62.) 65 These wiretaps in 1961 and 1963 were arguably related to "for eign intelligence" but not to "subversive activity unless that term is interpreted beyond its conventional meaning." More important they generated information which was potentially useful to the Ken nedy administration for purely political purposes relating to the legislative process.V6 The wiretap authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on another high executive official in this period did not relate to political con siderations but to concern about possible disclosure of classified in formation to a foreign governnlent.2fi There is no indication that the wiretap authorized by Attorney General Katzenbach in 1965 on the editor of an anti-communist newsletter was related in any way to the boot he had written in 1964 alleging personal impropriety by Attor ney General Kennedy.2 qGI)omr.etir <'m'rrt _1(tion In its COI NTELPRO operation the FBI went beyond excessive information-gathering and dissemination to the use of secret tactics designed to "disrupt. and "neutralize. domestic intelligence targets At the outset the target was the Communist Party F.S.A But consistent with the pattern revealed in other domestic intelligence ac tivities the program widened to other targets increasingly concentrat ing on domestic dissenters The expansion of COINTELPRO began in the Cold War period and accelerated in the latter part of the 1960s e COI.1'7'ELPRO ('onnnee st i'ty The COI\TELPI O program authorized by Director I[oover against the Conuuunist Party iii 1956 had its roots in two lines of Bureau policy going hack to the 19-lOsThe first was the accepted hBI 'A White House "briefingpaper, prepared in February 1961 stated "It is thought by someinformed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renew-alin the 1-.S Congress iii March 1961 will be all important to the future of U.S./(foreign country) relations. (Memorandum from Richard M IRissellJr to McGeorgeBundy 2/17/61.) Another White House "briefing memorandum in Tune 1962stated "The action taken by the House of Representatives in passing the HouseAgriculture Committeebill (The Cooley bill) has created a furor in the (foreign country) . Officialsof that country said that the legislation "would be disastrous to its "economy. (Memorandum from William H Brubeek to McGeorgeBundy and Myer Feldman 6/23/62.) (.IFKLibrary.) See Finding on Political Abuse pp 233 234 The wiretapping of American citizens in these instances could only serve "intelligence, rather than law en forcementpurposes since any criminal prosecution (i.e. for bribery) wouldhave been "tainted by the warrantless wiretaps [('oplon v United Statcs 1S5F 2d 629 (19:50)191F 2d749(1951).1 'The circumstances indicating this possibility and the eventual determina tion that the allegation was unfounded are set forth in a memorandum from Director Hoover to attorney General Kennedy in 1964 (Hoover to Kennedy 5/4/64 and enclosure (John F KennedyLibrary) ) The FBI requested the wiretap on the editor and an accompanyingtap oil a Washington attorney in contact with the editor because of its concern about possible "leaks of information about FBI loyalty-security investigations of government officials Director Hoover advised that publication of this "classi fied information constituted "a danger to the internal security of the United States. (Memorandumfrom Hooverto Katzenbach 4/19/65.) However in 1964 Director IIoover 11:1(1volunteered to Attorney General Kennedy information about the publication of the hook alleging impropriety The author himself had supplied information about the hook to the FBI (Memoranda from Hoover to AttorneyGeneralKennedy 7/8/64 and 7/15/61.) 68-7860 76 6 66 practice of attempting to disrupt "subversive organizations A former head of the FIII Intelligence Division has testified We were engaged in COINTELPRO tactics to divide con fuse weaken in diverse ways an organization We were engaged in that when I entered the Bureau in 1941.26 The memorandum recommending the institution of COINTELPRO stated that the Bureau was already seeking to "foster factionalism and "cause confusion within the Communist Party.269 The second line of pre-existing Bureau policy involved propaganda to discredit the Communist Party publicly For example in 1946 an earlier head of the FBI Intelligence Division proposed that efforts be made to release "educational material through "available channels to influence "public opinion. The "educational purpose was to under mine Communist support among "labor unions, "persons prominent in religious circles, and "the Liberal elements, and to show "the basi cally Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country. 269By 1956 a propaganda effort was underway to bring the Party and its leaders "into disrepute before the American public. 270 The evidence indicates that the FBI did not believe that the Com munist Party when the COINTELPRO program was formalized in 1956 constituted as serious a threat in terms of actual espionage as it had in the 1940s.2i Nevertheless the FBI systematized its covert action program against the Communist Party in part because the surfacing of informants in legal proceedings had somewhat limited the Bureau's coverage of Party activities ,and alsoto take advantage of internal conflicts within the Party. Covert "disruption was also designed to make sure that the Party would not reorganize under a new label awl thus would remain an easier target for prosecution.273 Testimony of William C Sullivan Assistant Director for the DomesticIn telligence Division (1961 1970) and Assistant to the Director (1970-1971) 11/1/75 pp 42-43 Memorandumfrom A H Belmontto L V Boardman 8/28/56 'Memorandum from D M Ladd to J Edgar Hoover 2/27/46 Accordingto this memorandum the underlying reason for such Bureau propaganda was to anticipate and counteract the "floodof propaganda from Leftist and so-called Liberal sources which would "be encountered in the event of extensive arrests of Communists if war with the SovietUnionbrokeout 5f0Belmontto Boardman 8/28/56 'A Bureau monographin mid-1955"measured the CommunistParty threat as"Influenceover the masses ability to create controversy leading to confusion and disunity penetration of specific channels in American life where public opinionis molded and espionageand sabotage potential. [Emphasis supplied.] (Letter from J Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson Special Assistant to the President 7/29/55 and enclosedFBI monograph "The Menaceof Communism in the United States Today. pp iv v.) The FBI officialwho served as Director Hoover's liaison with the CIA in the 1950sstated that "the CommunistParty provided a pool of talent for the Soviet [intelligence] services in the "30s and into the 40s. During that period the Soviets recruited agents "from the Party to penetrate "the U.S Government and "scientificcircles. He added however that "primarily becauseof the action and counter-action taken by the FBI during the late 40s the Soviet services changed their tactics and considerably reduced any programs or projects de signedto recruit CP members realizing or assumingthat they were getting heavy attention from the Bureau. (Testimony of former FBI liaison with CIA 9/22/75 p 32 ) 2 Belmontto Boardman 8/28/65 'Belmont to Boardman 9/5/56 memorandum from FBI headquarters to SAC NewYork 9/6/56 67 In the years after 1956 the purpose of the Communist Party COIN TELPRO changed somewhat Supreme Court decisions substantially curbed criminal prosecution of Communists. Subsequently the FBI "rationale for COINTELPRO was that it had become "impossible to prosecute Communist Party members and some alternative was needed "to contain the threat. 275 b Early Expansion of COLVTELPRO From 19.)Guntil 196(1 the COINTELPRO program was primarily aimed at the Communist Party organization But in March 1960 participating FBI field offices were directed to make efforts to pre vent Communist "infiltration' of "legitimate mass organizations such as Parent-Teacher Associations civil organizations and racial and religious grmips. The initial technique was to notify a leader of the organization often by "anonymous communications. about the al leged Communist in its nmidst.27 In some cases both the Communist and the "infiltrated organization were targeted This marked the beginning of the progression from targeting Com munist Party members to those allegedly under Communist "influ ence, to persons taking positions supported by the Communists For example in 1964 targets under the Communist Party COI\TELPRO label included a group with some Communist participants urging in creased employment of minorities 21 and a non-Communist group in opposition to the House Committee on Un-American Activities.278 In 1961 a COINTELPRO operation was initiated against the So cialist Workers Party The originating memorandum said it was not a "crash program and it was never given high priority.2 The SWP's support for "such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South were noted as factors in the FBI's decision to target the organization The Bureau also relied upon its assessment that the SWP was "not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx Lenin and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky and that it was "in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups. 2 The S 'P had been designated as "sub versive on the "Attorney General's list since the 1940s.2R1 D INTELLIGENCE1NO DOMESTrCDISSENT 1964 1976 1 JIani Developments of the 1964 1976 Period Beginning in the mid-sixties the United States experienced a period of domestic unrest and protest unparalleled in this century Violence erupted in the poverty-stricken urban ghettos and opposition to American intervention in Vietnam produced massive demonstrations E.g. Yatesv UnitedStates 354U.S 298 (1957) "'Deposition of Supervisor Internal Security Section FBI Intelligence Division 10/16/75 pp 10 14 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York field office 3/31/60 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco field office4/16/64 "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland field office 11/6/64 "'Forty-five actions were approved by FBI Headquarters under the SWP COINTELPROfrom 1961until it was discontinued in 1969 The SWP program was then subsumed under the New Left COINTELPRO see pp 88-89 "Memorandum from Director FBI to New York field office 10/12/61 "'Memorandum from the Attorney General to Heads of Departments and Agencies4/29/53 68 A small minority deliberately used violence as a method for achieving small minority deliberately used violence as a method for achieving political goals ranging from the brutal murder and intimidation of black Americans in parts of the South to the terrorist bombing of of fice buildings and government-supported unversity facilities But tLree Presidential commissions found that the larger outbreaks of vio lence in the ghettos and on the campuses were most often spontaneous reactions to events in a climate of social tension and upheaval.282 During this period thousands of young Americans and members of racial minorities came to believe in civil disobedience as a vehicle for protest and dissent The government could have set an example for the nation's citizens and prevented spiraling lawlessness by respecting the law as it took steps to predict or prevent violence But agencies of the -United States sometimes abetted by public opinion and government officials all too often disregarded the Constitutional rights of American in their con duct of domestic intelligence operations The most significant developments in domestic intelligence activity during this period may be summarized as follows Scope of Domestic Intelligence FBI intelligence reports on protest activity and domestic dissent accumulated massive information on lawful activity and law-abiding citizens for vaguely defined "pure intelligence and "preventive intelligence purposes related only remotely or not at all to law enforce ment or the prevention of violence The FBI exaggerated the extent of domestic Communist influence and COMINFIL investigations improperly included groups with no significant connections to Communists The FBI expanded its use of informers for gathering intelligence about domestic political groups sometimes upon the urging of the Attorney General No significant limits were placed on the kind of political or personal information collected by informers recorded in FBI files and often disseminated outside the Bureau Army intelligence developed programs for the massive collection of information about and surveillance of civilian political activity in the -United States and sometimes abroad In contrast to previous policies for centralizing domestic intelligence investigations the Federal Government encouraged local police to establish intelligence programs both for their own use and to feed into the Federal intelligence-gathering process This greatly expanded the domestic intelligence apparatus making it harder to control The Justice Department established a unit for storing and evaluat ing intelligence about civil disorders which was designed to use non intelligence agencies as regular sources of information which in fact drew on military intelligence as well as the FBI and which trans mitted its computer list of citizens to the CIA and the IRS Domestic Intelligence Authority Intelligence gathering related to protest activity was generally increased in response to vague requests by Attorneys General or other "-Report of the National AdvisoryCommissionon Civil Disorders (1968) ch 2 Report of the National Commissionon the Causes and Prevention of Vio lence (1969) Report of the President's Commissionon CampusUnrest (1970) 69 officials outside the intelligence agencies such increases were some times ratified retroactively by such officials The FBI's exclusive control over civilian domestic intelligence at the Federal level was consolidated by formal agreements with the Secret Service regarding protective intelligence and with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms regarding terrorist bombings Domestic Cocert Action The FBI developed new covert programs for disrupting and dis crediting domestic political groups using the techniques origi nally applied to Communists The most intensive domestic intelli gence investigations and frequently COINTELPRO operations were targeted against persons identified not as criminals or criminal suspects but as "rabble rousers, "agitators. "key activists. or "key black extremists because of their militant rhetoric and group leader ship The Security Index was revised to include such persons Without imposing adequate safeguards against misuse the Internal Revenue Service passed tax information to the FBI and CIA in some cases in violation of tax regulations At the urging of the White House and a Congressional Committee the IRS established a program for investigating politically active groups and individuals which included auditing their tax returns Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent A 1966 agreement concerning "coordination between the CIA and the FBI permitted CIA involvement in internal security functions Ender pressure from the Johnson and Nixon White Houses to deter mine whether there was "foreign influence. behind anti-war protests and black militant activity the CIA began collecting intelligence about domestic political groups The CIA also conducted operations within the 1nited States under overly broad interpretations of its responsibility to protect the physical security of its facilities and to protect intelligence "sources and "methods. These operations included surreptitious entry recruit ment of informers in domestic political groups and at least one instance of warrantless wiretapping approved by the Attorney General In the same period the National Security Agency monitored inter national communications of Americans involved in domestic dissent despite the fact that its mission was supposed to be restricted to collecting foreign intelligence and monitoring only foreign communi cations Intrusive Techniques As domestic intelligence operations broadened and focused upon dissenters the Government increased the use of many of its most intrusive surveillance techniques During the period from 1964 to 1972 the standards and procedures for warrantless electronic surveil lance were tightened but actual practice was sometimes at odds with the articulated policy Also (luring these years CIA mail opening expanded at the Bureau's request and NSA monitoring expanded to target domestic dissenters However the FBI cut back use of certain techniques under the pressure of Congressional probes and changing public opinion 70 Accountability and Control During this period several sustained domestic intelligence efforts illustrated deficiencies in the system for controlling intelligence agen cies and holding them accountable for their actions In 1970 presidential approval was temporarily granted for a plan for interagency coordination of domestic intelligence activities which included several illegal programs Although the approval was sub sequently revoked some of the programs were implemented separate ly by various agencies Throughout the administrations of Presidents Johnson and Nixon the investigative process was misused as a means of acquiring political intelligence for the White House At the same time the Justice De partment's Internal Security Division which should have been a check against the excesses of domestic intelligence generally failed to re strain such activities For example as late as 1971-1973 the FBI con tinued to evade the will of Congress partly with Justice Department approval by maintaining a secret "Administrative Index of suspects for round-up in case of national emergency Reconsideration of FBI Authority Partly in reaction to congressional inquiries the FBI in the early 1970s began to reconsider the extent of its authority to conduct do mestic intelligence activities and requested clarification from the At torney General and an executive mandate for intelligence investiga tions of "terrorists and "revolutionaries In the absence of any new standards imposed by statute or by the Attorney General the FBI continued to collect domestic intelligence under sweeping authorizations issued by the Justice Department in 1974 for investigations of "subversives, potential civil disturbances and "potential crimes These authorizations were explicitly based on broad theories of inherent executive power Attorney General Edward H Levi recently promulgated guidelines which represent the first significant attempt by the Justice Department to set standards and limits for FBI domestic intelligence investigations 2 Scope of Domestic Intelligence During this period the FBI continued the same broad investigations of the lawful activities of Americans that were based on the Bureau's vague mandate to collect intelligence about "subversion. In addition the Bureau joined by CIA NSA and military in telligence agencies took on new and equally broad assignments to investigate "racial matters, the "New Left, "student agitation, and alleged "foreign influence on the antiwar movement a Domestic Protest and Dissent FBI "We are an intelligence agency, stated a policy directive to all FBI offices in 1966 "and as such are expected to know what is going on or is likely to happen. 283Written in the context of demonstrations over the Vietnam war and civil rights this order illustrates the general attitude among Bureau officials and high administration officials who established intelligence policy in a country in ferment the FBI could and should know everything that might someday be useful in some undefined manner SACletter 67-27 5/3/66 71 (1) Racial Intelligence. During the 1960s the FBI partly on its own and partly in response to outside requests developed sweeping programs for collecting domestic intelligence concerning racial mat ters These programs had roots in the late 1950s.284By the early 1960s they had grown to the point that the Bureau was gathering intelli gence about proposed "civil demonstrations and the related activities of "officials committees legislatures organizations etc., in the "racial field. 2S' In 1965 FBI field offices were directed to supply "complete infor mation (including "postponement or cancellation") regarding planned racial activity such as demonstrations rallies marches or threatened opposition to activity of this kind Field offices reported their full "coverage of "meetings and "any other pertinent information concerning racial activities." In late 1966 field offices were instructed to begin preparing semi monthly summaries of "existing racial conditions in major urban areas, relying upon "established sources, and "racial, "criminal, and "security informants. These reports were to describe the "general programs of all "civil rights organizations and "black nationalist organizations, as well as subversive or "hate-type groups The infor mation to be gathered was to include "readily available personal back ground data on "leaders and individuals in the civil rights move ment and other "leaders and individuals involved, as well as any data in Bureau files on "subversive associations they might have the "objectives sought by the minority community the community reac tion to "minority demands and "the number character and inten sity of the techniques used by the minority community such as pick eting or sit-in demonstrations to enforce their demands. 287 Thus the FBI was mobilized to used all its available resources to discover everything it could about "general racial conditions. While the stated objective was to arrive at an "evaluation of potential for violence the broad sweep of the directives issued to the field resulted in the collection and filing of vast amounts of information unrelated to violence Some programs concerning "general racial matters were directed to concentrate on groups with "general "propensity for violence and civil disorder. 288But even these programs were so overboard in their appli cation as to include Dr Martin Luther King Jr and his non-violent Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the "radical and vio lence-prone "hate group category The stated justification unsup ported by any facts was that Dr King might "abandon his supposed obedience to white liberal doctrines (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. 289 Another leading civil rights group the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was investigated under the "Racial Matters Program be cause the Bureau concluded that it was moving "away from a legiti Seep 50 1964FBI Manual Section122 p 1 '1965 FBI Manual Section122 pp 6-8 7B4FBI Manual Section122 revised12/13/66 pp 5-9 MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SACs 8/25/67 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs3/4/68 72 mate civil rights organization and "assuming a militant black nation alist posture. The FBI reached this conclusion on the grounds that "some leaders in their public statements had condoned "violence as a means of attaining Negro rights. The investigation was intensified even though it was recognized there was no information that its mem bers "advocate violence or "participate in actual violence. 290 The same overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of intelli gence about "white militant groups. Among the groups investigated were those "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools. As soon as a new organization of this sort was formed the Bureau used its inform ants and "established sources to determine "the aims and purposes of the organization its leaders approximate membership, and other "background data bearing upon "the militancy of the group.200 (2) "Ne?r Left Ivtellagence. The FBI collected intelligence under its VIDEM (Vietnam Demonstration) and STAG (Student Agita tion) Programs on "anti-Government demonstrations and protest ral lies which the Bureau considered "disruptive. Field offices were warned against "incomplete and nonspecific reporting which neg lected such details as "number of protesters present identities of orga nizations and identities of speakers and leading activists. 291 The FBI attempted to define the "New Left, but with little success The Bureau agent who was in charge of New Left intelligence conceded that It has never been strictly defined as far as I know It's more or less an attitude I would think He also stated that the definition was expanded continually.292 Field offices were told that the New Left was a "subversive force dedicated to destroying our "traditional values. Although it had "no definable ideology, it was seen as having "strong Marxist existential ist nihilist and anarchist overtones. Field officeswere instructed that "proper areas of inquiry regarding the subjects of "New Left in vestigations were "public statements the writings and the leadership activities which might establish their "rejection of law and order and thus their "potential threat to security Such persons would also be placed on the Security Index (for detention in a time of emergency) because of these "anarchistic tendencies, even if the Bureau could not prove "membership in a subversive organization. 293 A Bureau memorandum which recommended the use of disruptive techniques against the "New Left paid particular attention to one of its "anarchistic tendencies 'SAC Letter 68-16 3/12/68 Subject Congressof Racial Equality SACLetter 68-25 4/30/68 SAC Memorandum 1 72 5/23/72 Subject Reporting of Protest Dem onstrations ' Supervisor FBI Intelligence Division deposition 10/28/75 pp 7-8 R93SACLetter 68 21 4/2/68 This directive did caution that "mere dissent and opposition to Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner was "not sufficientto warrant inclusion in the Security Index. Moreover "anti Vietnam or peacegroupsentiments were not in themselves supposedto "justify an investigation. The failure of this admonitionto achieveits stated objectiveis discussed in the findingson "Overbreadth and "Covert Action to Disrupt. 73 the New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigations and drive us off the college campuses 234 Later instructions to the field stated that the term "New Left did not refer to "a definite organization, out to a "loosely-bound free wheeling college-oriented movement and to the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft protest organizations. These instructions directed a "comprehensive study of the whole movement for the purpose of assessing its "dangerousness. Quarterly reports were to be prepared and "subfiles opened under the following headings Organizations ("when organized objectives locality which active whether part of a national organization") Membership (and "sympathizers" use "best available in formants and sources") Finances (including identity of "angels and funds from "foreign sources") Communist Influence Publications ("describe publications show circulation and principal members of editorial staff") Violence Religion ("support of movement by religious groups or in dividuals) Race Relations Political Activities ("details relating to position taken on political matters including efforts to influence public opin ion the electorate and Government bodies") Ideology Education ("courses given together with any educational out lines and assigned or suggested reading") Social Reform ("demonstrations aimed at social reform") Labor ("all activity in the labor field'') Public Appearances of Leaders ("on radio and television and "before groups such as labor church and minority groups, including "summary of subject matter discussed") Factionalism Security Measures International Relations ("travel in foreign countries, "at tacks on -United States foreign policy") Mass Media ("indications of support of New Left by mass media") Through these massive reports the FBI hoped to discover "the true nature of the New Left movement. 295Few Bureau programs better reflect "pure intelligence objectives which extended far beyond even the most generous definition of "preventive intelligence. 296 'Memorandum from C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 5/9/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 10/28/68 and enclosure Subject NewLeft Movement Report Outline 'A further reason for collecting information on the New Left was put for ward by assistant Director Brennan head of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1970-1971 Since New Left "leaders had "publicly professed their desire to overthrow the Government the Bureau should file the names of anyone who "joined iii membership for "future reference in case they ever "obtained a sensitive Government position. (Charles Brennan testimony 9/25/75 Hear ings Vol 2 pp 116-117.) 74 Apart from the massive general reports required on the "New Left, examples of particular investigations included a stockholders group planning to protest their corporation's war production at the annual stockholders meeting 297a university professor who was "an active participant in New Left demonstrations, publicly surrendered his draft card and had been arrested in antiwar demonstrations but not convicted 298and two university instructors who helped support a student "underground newspaper whose editorial policy was de scribed as "left-of-center anti-establishment and opposed [to] the University administration. 299 The FBI also investigated emerging "New Left groups such as "Free Universities attached to various college campuses to determine whether they were connected "in any way with "subversive groups. For example when an article appeared in a newspaper stating that one "Free University was being formed and that it was "anti-institu tional, the FBI sought to determine its "origin, the persons respon sible for its "formation, and whether they had "subversive back grounds. 300The resulting report described in detail the formation curriculum content and associates of the group It was disseminated to military intelligence and Secret Service field offices and headquar ters in Washington as well as to the State Department and the Justice Department.301 b FBI Informants The FBI Manual has never significantly limited informant report ing about the lawful political activities or personal lives of American citizens except for prohibiting reports about legal defense "plans or strategy, "employer-employee relationships connected with labor unions and "legitimate campus activities. 302In practice FBI agents imposed no other limitations on the informants they handled and on occasion disregarded the prohibitions of the Manual. (1) Infiltration of the Klan. In mid-1964 Justice Department of ficials became increasingly concerned about the spread of Ku Klux Klan activity and violence in the Deep South Attorney General Ken nedy advised President Johnson that because of the "unique difficulty presented by a situation where "lawless activities had the "sanction of local law enforcement agencies, the FBI should apply to the Klan the same "techniques used previously "in the infiltration of Commu nist groups. 304 Former Attorney General Katzenbach under whose tenure FBI activities against the Klan expanded vigorously defended this deci "Memorandum from Minneapolisfield officeto FBI Headquarters 4/1/70 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh field office 5/1/70 2 Memorandumfrom Mobilefield officeto FBI Headquarters 12/9/70 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit field offices 2/17/66 'Memorandum from Detroit field officeto FBI Headquarters 4/15/66 '02FBI Manual Section107 f0See Findings on use of informants in "Intrusive Techniques, p 192 'Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President June 1964 quoted in victor Navasky Kennedy Justice (New York Atheneum 1971) pp 105-106 The President asked former CIA Director Allen Dulles to evaluate the situation in Mississippi Upon his return from a survey of the state Dulles en dorsed the Attorney General's recommendationthat the FBI be used to "control the terrorist activities. ("Dulles Requests More FBI Agents for Mississippi, NewYorkTimes 6/27/64.) 75 sion as necessary to "deter violence by sowing "deep mistrust among Klan members and making them aware that they were "under con stant observation. 303The FBI Manual did in fact advise Bureau agents against "wholesale investigations of persons who "mererly at tend meetings on a regular basis. 306But FBI intelligence officials chafed under this restriction and sought expanded informant cover age.30i Subsequently the Manual was revised in 1967 to require the field to furnish the "details of Klan "rallies and "demonstrations. 308 By 1971 the Special Agents in Charge of field offices had the discre tion to investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence, but also anyone else who in the SAC's "judgment was an "ex tremist. 309 (2) "Listening Posts in the Blank Community. Two special in formant programs illustrates the breadth of the Bureau's infiltration of the black community In 1970 the FBI used its "established inform ants to determine the "background aims and purposes leaders and Key Activists in every black student group in the country "regard less of [the group's] past or present involvement in disorders. 310Field officeswere instructed to "target informants against these groups and to "develop such coverage where informants were not already avail able.311 In response to Attorney General Clark's instructions regarding civil disorders intelligence in 1967 the Bureau launched a "ghetto informant program which lasted until 1973.312The number of ghetto informants expanded rapidly 4,067 in 1969 and 7,402 by 1972.313The original concept was to establish a "listening post 314by recruiting a person "who lives or works in a ghetto area to provide information re garding the "racial situation and "racial activities. 315Such inform ants could include "the proprietor of a candy store or barber shop. As the program developed however ghetto informants were utilized to attend public meetings held by extremists to iden tify extremists passing through or locating in the ghetto area to identify purveyors of extremist literature as well as given specific assignments where appropriate.316 'Testimony of Nicholas deB Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings vol 6 p 207 "081965FBI manual Section 122 pp 1-2 "FBI Executives conference memorandum 3/24/66 Subject Establishment of a Special Squad Against the Ku Klux Klan D0 1967FBI manual Section122 p 2 30 1971FBI manual Section122 p 2 'Memorandum from FBI Executive Conference to Mr Tolson 10/29/70 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs 11/4/70 "Memorandum from G C Moore to William C Sullivan 10/11/67 For At torney GeneralClark's order seepp 83-84 "Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee 8/20/75 and enclosures.) 314Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto E S Miller 9/8/72 'Memorandum from G C Mooreto C D Brennan 10/27/70 'Memorandum from Mooreto Miller 9/27/72 This program continued until 1973 when the FBI decidedto rely on its regular extremist informants "for 'by product information on civil unrest. The most "productive ghetto informants were "converted into regular informants (FBI Inspection Division Memoran dum 11/24/72 Memorandumfrom Director Clarence M Kelley to all SACs 7/31/73.) 76 Material to be furnished by ghetto informants included names of "Afro-American type book stores and their "owners operators and clientele. 317 (3) Infiltration of the "Aeu Left". The FBI used its "security informant program to report extensively on all activities relating to opposition to the Vietnam war Moreover informants already in groups considered "subversive by the FBI also reported on the activities of other organizations and their members if the latter were being "infil trated by the former groups.318 The agent who handled one informant in an antiwar group believed to be infiltrated by "subversive groups and/or violent elements testified that the informant told him "everything she knew about the chapter she joined.313 Summaries of her reports indicate that she 'reported extensively about personal matters and lawful political activity.320 This informant estimated that her reports identified as many as 1,000 people to the FBI over an 18-month period The vast majority of these persons were members of peaceful and law-abiding groups including the United Church for Christ which were engaged in joint social welfare projects with the antiwar group which the informant had infiltrated. Other FBI informants reported for example on the Women's Liberation Movement identifying its members at several mid-western universities 322and reporting statements made by women concerning their personal reasons for participating in the women's movement.323 Moreover as iii the case of informants in the black community efforts were made to greatly increase the number of informants who could report on antiwar and related groups In 1969 the Justice Department specifically asked the FBI to use not only "existing sources, but also "any other sources you may be able to develop to collect information about "serious campus disorders. 324The Bureau ordered its field offices in 1970 to "make every effort to obtain "informant coverage of every "New Left commune. 323Later that year after Director Hoover lifted restrictions against recruiting 18 to 21-year-old informants field offices were urged to take advantage of this "tremendous opportunity to expand coverage of New Left "collectives communes and staffs of their underground news papers. 326 avPhiladelphia Field Officememo8/12/68 re Racial Informant 319FBI Manual Section87 "'Testimony of FBI 'Special Agent 11/20/75 p 55 3 Staff reviewofinformant report summaries 31Mary Jo Cook testimony 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 111 119-120 322Report of Kansas City Field Office 10/20/70 'Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/28/69 'Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J Walter Yeagley to J Edgar Hoover 3/3/69 This memorandum stated that the Department was considering "conducting a grand jury investigation under the antiriot act and other statutes 329Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACS 4/17/70 This directive defined a "commune as "a group of individuals residing in one location who practice communal living i.e. they share income and adhere to the philosophy of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-orientedviolentrevolution. 'SAC Letter 70-48 9/15/70 This directive implementedone provision of the "Huston Plan, which had been disapproved as a domesticintelligence package Seepp 113 116 77 Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity In the early 1960s after several commitments of troops to control racial disturbances and enforce court orders in the South Army intelligence began collecting information on civilian political activity in all areas where it believed civil disorders might occur The growth of the Army's domestic intelligence program typifies once again the general tendency of information-gathering operations to continually broaden their coverage Shortly after the Army was called upon to quell civil disorders in Detroit and to cope with an antiwar demonstration at the Pentagon in 1967 the Army Chief of Staff approved a recommendation for "continuous counterintelligence investigations to obtain informa tion on "subversive personalities groups or organizations and their "influence on urban populations in promoting civil disturbances.327 The Army's "collection plan for civil disturbances specifically targeted as "dissident elements (without further definition) the "civil rights movement and the "anti-Vietnam/anti-draft move ments. 328As revised later Army intelligence-gathering extended beyond "subversion and "dissident groups to "prominent persons who were "friendly with the "leaders of the disturbance or "sympathetic with their plans. 329 Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence In reaction to civil disorders in 1965-1966 Attorney General Katz enbach turned for advice to the newly created President's Commis sion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice After hold ing a conference with police and National Guard officials the Presi dent's Commission urged police not to react with too much force to dis order "in the course of demonstrations, but to make advance plans for "a true riot situation. This meant that police should establish "pro cedures for the acquisition and channeling of intelligence for the use of "those who need it. 330Former Assistant Attorney General Vinson recalled the Justice Department's concern that local police did not have "any useful intelligence or knowledge about ghettos about black communities in the big cities. 331 During the winter of 1967-1968 the Justice Department and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reiterated the mes sage that local police should establish "intelligence units to gather and disseminate information on "potential civil disorders These units would use "undercover police personnel and informants and draw on "community leaders agencies and organizations in the ghetto. 332The Commission also urged that these local units be linked 'See Memorandum for the Record from Milton B Hyman Officeof the General Counsel to the Army General Counsel 1/23/71 in Military Surveil lance Hearings before the Subcommitteeon Constitutional Rights Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess (1974) p 203 "Federal Data Rank. Computers and the Rill of Rights Hearings before the Senate Subcommitteeon Constitutional Rights (1971) at pp 1120-1121 Federal Data Ranks He+urinesat pp 1123-1138 'President's Commissionon Law Enforcementand Administration of Justice The Challengeof Crimein a Free Society (1967) pp 118-119 aaiFred M Vinsontestimony 1/27/76 p 32 "'Report of the National Advisory Commissionon Civil Disorders (1968) p 487 (Bantam Booksed.) 78 to "a national center and clearinghouse in the Justice Department.333 One consequence of these recommendations was that the FBI because of regular liaison with local police became a channel and repository for much of this intelligence data Local police intelligence provided a convenient manner for the FBI to acquire information it wanted while avoiding criticism for using covert techniques such as developing campus informants For exam ple in 1969 Director Hoover decided "that additional student in formants cannot be developed by the Bureau.33} Field offices were instructed however that one way to continue obtaining intelligence on "situations having a potential for violence was to develop "in depth liaison with local law enforcement agencies. 335Instead of re cruiting student informants itself the FBI would rely on local police to do so These Federal policies contributed to the proliferation of local police intelligence activities often without adequate controls One result was that still more persons were subjected to investigation who neither engaged in unlawful activity nor belonged to groups which might be violent For example a recent state grand jury report on the Chicago Police Department's "Security Section described its "close working relationship with Federal intelligence agencies including Army intelligence and the FBI The report found that the police intelligence system produced "inherently inaccurate and distortive data which contaminated Federal intelligence One police officer testified that he listed "any person who attended two "public meet ings of a group as a "member. This conclusion was forwarded "as a fart to the FBI Subsequently an agency seeking "background information on that person from the Bureau in an employment investigation or for other purposes would be told that the individual was "a member. The grand jury stated Since federal agencies accepted data from the Security Sec tion without questioning the procedures followed or methods used to gain information the federal government cannot escape responsibility for the harm done to untold numbers of innocent persons.336 e The Justice Department's In.terdvmsion Information Unit (IDIU) Joseph Califano President Johnson's assistant in 1967 testified that the Newark and Detroit riots were a "shattering experience for Justice Department officials and "for us in the White House. They were concerned about the "lack of intelligence about "black groups. Consequently "there was a desire to have the Justice Department have better intelligence for lack of a better term about dissident groups. This desire "precipitated the intelligence unit established by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in late 1967 According to Califano " Report of the National AdvisoryCommissionp 490 SACLetter 69-16 3/11/69 This order "recognizedthat with the graduation of senior classes you will lose a certain percentage of your existing student in formant coverage. But this would "not be accepted as an excuse for not devel opingthe necessaryinformation. SACLetter 69-44 8/19/69 3t "Improper Police Intelligence Activities. A Report by the Extended March 1975CookCounty (Illinois) Grand Jury 11/10/75 79 the President and the White House staff were insisting "There must be a way to predict violence We've got to know more about this. 337 In September 1967 Attorney General Clark asked Assistant Attorney General John Doar to review the Department's "facilities for civil disorders intelligence.33s Doar recommended creating a Departmental "intelligence unit to analyze FBI information about "certain persons and groups (without further definition) in the urban ghettos He proposed that its "scope be very broad initially so as to "measure the influence of particular groups. Doar recommended that in addi tion to the FBI agencies who should "funnel information to the unit should include Community Relations Service Poverty Programs Neighborhood Legal Services Program Labor Department Programs Intelligence Unit of the Internal Revenue Service Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department Narcotics Bureau (then in the Treasury Department) Post Office Department Doar recognized that the Justice Department's Community Relations Service designed to conciliate racial conflicts risked losing its "credi bility and thereby its ability to help prevent riots but he assured the Attorney General that the "confidentiality of its information could be protected.339 A later study for Attorney General Clark added the following agencies to Doar's list President's Commission on Civil Disorders New Jersey Blue Ribbon Commission (and similar state agencies) State Department Army Intelligence Office of Economic Opportunity Department of Housing and Urban Development (surveys and Model City applications) Central Intelligence Agency National Security Agency This study recommended that FBI reports relating "to the civil dis turbance problem under the headings "black power new left pacifist pro-Red Chinese anti-Vietnam war pro-Castro etc. be used to de 'Joseph Califano testimony 1/27/76 pp 6-9 Califano states in retro spect that the attempt to "predict violence was "not a successfulundertaking, that "advance intelligence about dissident groups would not "have been of much help. and that what is "important is "physical intelligence about geography hospitals power stations etc. (Califano 1/27/76 pp 8 11-12.) asIn 1966 the Justice Department had started an informal "Summer Project, staffed by a handful of law students to pull together data from the newspapers the U.S Attorneys and "some Bureau material for the purpose according to former Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson Jr. of findingout "what's going on in the black community. (Vinson 1/27/76 p 33.) 'Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General John Doar to Attorney General Clark 9/27/67 80 velop "a master index on individuals or organizations and by cities. 340 Attorney General Clark approved these recommendations and estab lished the Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU) for reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all infor mation that may come to this Department relating to orga nizations and individuals who may play a role whether purposefully or not either in instigating or spreading civil disorders or in preventing or checking them.341 In early instructions Clark had stated that the Department must "endeavor to increase such intelligence from "external sources. 342 In fact according to its first head the IDIU did use intelligence from the Army the Internal Revenue Service and "other investiga tive agencies. Sometimes IDIU information was used to "determine whether or not the Community Relations Service should "mediate a dispute.343 The Unit developed a computer system which could gen erate lists of all "members or affiliates of an organization their loca tion and travel "all incidents relating to "specific issues and "all information on a "planned specific demonstration 344 By 1970 the IDIU computer was receiving over 42,000 "intelligence reports a year relating to "civil disorders and campus disturbances from the FBI the U.S Attorneys Bureau of Narcotics Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department and other intelligence gathering bodies within the Executive Branch.34s IDIU computer tapes which included 10-12,000 entries on "numer ous anti-war activists and other dissidents, were provided to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1970 by Assistant Attorney General ,Terris Leonard then the Attorney General's Chief of Staff for Civil Disturbance and head of the Civil Rights Division.346 This list of per sons was sent to the Internal Revenue Service where the Special Services staff opened intelligence files on all persons and organiza tions listed Many of them were later investigated or audited in some cases merely because they were on the list In 1971 the IDIU computer included data on such prominent per sons as Rev Ralph Abernathy Caesar Chavez Bosley Crowther 'Memorandum from Messrs Maroney Nugent McTiernan and Turner to Attorney GeneralClark 12/6/67 'Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Assistant Attorneys General John Doar Fred Vinson Jr. Roger W Wilkins and J Walter Yeagley 12/18/67 'Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin T Maroney et al. 11,/9/67 'Testimony of Kevin T Maroney (Deputy Assistant Attorney General) 1/27/76 pp 59-60 'Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagleyto Deputy Attorney GeneralRichard Kleindienst 2/6/69 Justice Department memorandumfrom James T Devine 9/10/70 Subject Interdivisional Information Unit 3 Statement of Deputy Attorney General Laurence H Silberman Justice Department 1/14/75 Accordingto this statement a Justice Department inquiry in 1975concludedthat Leonard "initiated the transaction by requesting the CIA to check against its own sources whether any of the individuals on the IDIU list were engaged in foreign travel or received foreign assistance or funding. 81 (former New York Times film critic) Sammy Davis Jr. Charles Evers James Farmer Seymour Hersh and Coretta King Organiza tions on which information had been collected included the NAACP the Congress of Racial Equality the Institute for Policy Studies VISTA United Farm Workers of California and the Urban League Ordinary private citizens who were not nationally prominent were also included One was described as "a local civil rights worker, another as a "student at Merritt College and a member of the Peace and Freedom Party as of mid-68, and another as "a bearded militant who writes and recites poetry. 3 Thus beginning in 1967-1968 the IDIU was the focal point of a massive domestic intelligence apparatus established in response to ghetto riots militant black rhetoric antiwar protest and campus dis ruptions Through IDIU the Attorney General received the benefits of information gathered by numerous agencies without setting limits to intelligence reporting or providing clear policy guidance Each component of the structure FBI Army IDIU local police and many others set its own generalized standards and priorities result ing in excessive collection of information about law abiding citizens f COMINFIL Investigations. Overbreadth In the late 1960's the Communist infiltration or association concept continued to be used as a central basis for FBI intelligence investiga tions In many cases it led to the collection of information on the same groups and persons who were swept into the investigative net by the vague missions to investigate such subjects as "racial racial matters or the "New Left As it had from its beginning the COMINFIL concept pro duced investigations of individuals and groups who were not Commu nists Dr Martin Luther King Jr is the best known example.348 But the lawful activities of many other persons were recorded in FBI files and reports because they associated in some wholly innocent way with Communists a term which the Bureau required its agents to "interpret in its broad sense to include "splinter and "offshoot groups.349 During this period when millions of Americans demonstrated in favor of civil rights and against the Vietnam war many law-abiding citizens and groups came under the scrutiny of intelligence agencies Under the COMINFIL program for example the Bureau compiled extensive reports on moderate groups like the NAACP.'5 3 Staff Memorandumfor the Subcommitteeon Constitutional Rights United States Senate 9/14/71 30Seedetailed report onMartin Luther King Jr FBI Manual Section87 'The Bureau frequently disseminated reports on the NAACP to military intelligence because (as one report put it) of the latter's "interest in matters pertaining to infiltration of the NAACP. (Report from Los AngelesField Office to FBI Headquarters 11/5/65.) All the national officersand board members were listed and any data in FBI files on their past "association with "sub versives was included Most of this information went back to the 1940's (Re port from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/15/65.) When changes occurredin the NAACP'sleadership and board the Bureau onceagain went back to its files to dredge up "subversive associations from the 1940's (Report from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/15/66.) Chapter member ship information was sometimesobtained by "pretext telephonecall utilizing the pretext of beinginterested in joining that branch of the NAACP. (Memoran dum from Los Angels field officeto FBI Headquarters 11/5/65.) As discussed previously the Bureau never foundthat the NAACPhad abandonedits consistent anti-Communistpolicy (Seep 49) 68-7660 76 7 82 The FBI significantly impaired the democratic decisionmaking process by its distorted intelligence reporting on Communist infil tration of and influence on domestic political activity In private re marks to Presidents and in public statements the Bureau seriously exaggerated the extent of Communist influence in both the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements.351 3 Domestic Intelligence Authority During this period there were no formal executive directives out lining the scope of authority for domestic intelligence activity of the sort previously issued by Presidents Roosevelt Truman Eisenhower and Kennedy.352 However there was a series of high-level requests for intelligence concerning racial and urban unrest directed to the FBI and military intelligence agencies As with the earlier formal Presidential directives on subjects like "subversion, these instructions provided no significant guidelines or controls a FBI Intelligence Since the early 1960s the Justice Department had been making sporadic requests for intelligence related to specific racial events For example the FBI was requested to provide a tape recording of a speech by Governor-elect George Wallace of Alabama in late 1962 353 and for "photographic coverage of it civil rights demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.354 On its own initiative the FBI supplied the Civil Rights Division with in formation from a "confidential source about plans for a demonstra tion in Virginia including background data on its "sponsor and the intention to make "a test case. 355The Civil Rights Division pre pared regular summaries of information from the Bureau on "dem onstrations and other racial matters. 356 ffiSee examplesof the exaggeration of Communistinfluenceset forth in Find ings on Political Abuse Such distortion continues today An FBI Intelligence Division Section Chief told the Committee that he could not "think of very many major demonstrations in this country in recent years "that were not caused by the CommunistParty or the Socialist Workers Party In response to questioning the Section Chief listed eleven specific demonstrations since 1965 Three of these turned out to be principally SDS demonstrations although some individual Communists did participate in one of them Six others were organizedby the National (or New) MobilizationCommittee which the Section Chiefstated was subject to Communistand Socialist Workers Party "influence. But the Section Chief admitted that the mobilization Committee "probably included a wide spectrum of persons from all elements of American society (R L Shackleforddeposition 2/13/76 pp 3 8.) The FBI has not allegedthat the Socialist Workers Party is dominated or controlled by any foreign government (Shackelfordtestimony 2/6/76 pp 73 77 114.) 'E See SectionsB 3 and C 2 '53Memorandum from Director FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall (Civil Rights Division) 12/4/62 554Memorandumfrom St J B (St John Barrett) to Burke Marshall 6/18/63 355Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy 7/11/63 36Memorandumfrom Carl W Gabel to Burke Marshall 7/19/63 This memo randum describedtwenty-onesuch "racial matters in ten states includingstates outside the South such as Ohio New Jersey Pennsylvania Indiana and Nevada While someof the items in this and later summaries related to violent or poten tially violent protest demonstrations they went beyond those limits to include entirely peacefulprotest activity and group activities (such as conferences meet ings leadership changes) unrelated to demonstrations (Memorandafrom Gabel to Marshall 7/22 and 7/25 8/2 and 8/22/63.) The Justice Department's role in expanding FBI intelligenceoperations against the Klan is discussedat pp 83 A formal directive for a similar purpose was sent by Attorney Gen eral Kennedy to U.S Attorneys throughout the South in May 1963 It instructed them to "make a survey to ascertain "any places where racial demonstrations are expected within the next 30 days and to make "assessments of situations in their districts The FBI was "asked to cooperate. 35 President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate and report on the origins and extent of the first small-scale Northern ghetto disturbances in the summer of 1964.358After the FBI submitted a report on the Watts riot in Los Angeles in 1965 however Attorney General Kat zenbach advised President Johnson that the FBI should investigate "directly only the possible "subversive involvement. Katzenbach did not believe that the FBI should conduct a "general investigation of "other aspects of the riot, since these were local law enforcement mat ters The President approved this "limited investigation. 35sNone theless internal Bureau instructions in 1965 and 1966 went far beyond this limitation.36o By 1967 new Attorney General Ramsey Clark re versed the Department's position on such limitations After the riots in Newark and Detroit in the summer of 1967 President Johnson announced that the FBI had "standing instruc tions for investigating riots "to search for evidence on conspiracy. 361 This announcement accompanied the creation of a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to investigate the "basic factors and causes leading to the riots including the "influence of groups or persons "dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence. The President ordered the FBI in particular to "provide investigative information and assistance to the Commission.362 Director Hoover also agreed to investigate "allegations of subversive influence involve ment of out-of-state influences and the like. 363 In September 1967 Attorney General Clark directed the FBI to use the maximum resources investigative and intelligence to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size effectiveness or affiliation to plan promote or aggravate riot activity.36} '67Telegram from Attorney General Kennedyto U.S Attorneys 5/27/63 The basis for the inquiry was explainedin the mostgeneral terms "Keeping the peacein this country is essentially the responsibilityof the state government Where lawlessconditionsarise however with similar characteristics from coast to coast the matter is one of national concerneven though there is no direct con nection between the events and even though no Federal law is violated. (Text of FBI Report on Recent Racial Disturbances NewYork Times 9/27/64.) "'Memorandum from Attorney General Katzenbach to President Johnson 8/17/65 ' Seep 71 'BRemarks of the President 7/29/67 in Report of the National AdvisoryCom missionon CivilDisorders (1968) p 537(Bantam Booksed.) 'Executive Order 113657/29/67 ' Memorandumfrom C D DeLoachto Mr Tolson 8/1/67 Subject Director's TestimonyBefore National Advisory Commissionon Civil Disorders This mem orandum indicates that following this testimony Director Hoover ordered his subordinates to intensify their collectionof intelligenceabout "vociferousrabble rousers. The creation thereafter of a "Rabble Rouser Index is discussed at pp 89-90 'Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to J Edgar Hoover 9/14/67 84 Justice Department executives were generally aware of and in some cases sought to widen the scope of FBI intelligence collection In a lengthy review of Bureau reports John Doar Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division expressed concern that the FBI had not "taken a broad spectrum approach to intelligence col lection since it had "focused narrowly on "traditional subversive groups and on persons suspected of "specific statutory violations. 365 Reiterating this viewpoint Attorney General Clark told Director Hoover that "existing intelligence sources may not have "regularly monitored possible riot conspirators in "the urban ghetto. He added that it was necessary to conduct a "broad investigation and that sources or informants in black nationalist organizations SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and other less publicized groups should be developed and ex panded to determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups 366 Clark described his directive as setting forth "a relatively new area of investigation and intelligence reporting for the FBI. 367 In response to the Attorney General's instructions the FBI advised its field offices of the immediate "need to develop additional penetra tive coverage of the militant black nationalist groups and the ghetto areas. 368 b Army Intelligence On January 10 1968 a meeting took place at the White House for the purpose of "advance planning for summer riots. The White House memorandum of the meeting reported The Army has undertaken its own intelligence study and has rated various cities as to their riot potential They are mak ing contingency plans for troop movements landing sites facilities etc It added that the Attorney General and the Deputy Secretary of De fense "had agreed to coordinate their efforts. 366The Army General Counsel's memorandum of the meeting stated that Attorney General Clark had "stressed the difficulty of the intelligence effort, especially because there were "only 40 Negro FBI agents out of the total of about 6,300 Clark added that "every resource was needed in "the in telligence collection effort, although he asked the Defense Depart ment to "screen its "incoming intelligence and send "only key items to the Justice Department 3'0 Memorandumfrom Assistant Attorney General John Doar to Attorney Gen eral Clark 9/27/67 B Memorandumfrom Clark to Hoover 9/14/67 'Clark to Hoover 9/14/67 The Department's establishment of a special unit for intelligenceevaluation is discussedat pp 115-416 aesSACLetter 67-72 10/17/67 The scopeof the "ghetto informant program is describedat pp 75-76 BDMemorandumfrom Joseph Califanoto the President 1/18/68 Those present were Attorney General Clark Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze Acting Army General CounselRobert Jordan and Presidential assistants Matthew Nimetzand Califano "0Memorandumfrom the Army General Counselto the Under Secretary of the Army 1/10/68 Former Army Chief of Staff Harold K Johnson has said that there were several other meetingsat the White Housewhere the Armywas urged to take a greater role in the civil disturbance collectioneffort (Staff summary of Harold K Johnsoninterview 11/18/75.) 85 There is no record that at this or any other similar meeting in this period the Attorney General or White House aides explicitly ordered the Army to conduct intelligence investigations using infiltration or other covert surveillance techniques However even though Army col lection plans which were circulated to the Justice Department and the FBI 371did not mention techniques of collection the information they described could only be obtained by covert surveillance No objections were voiced by the Justice Department Not until 1969 was there a formal civilian decision specifically authorizing Army surveillance of civilian political activity At that time Attorney General John Mitchell and Secretary of Defense Mel vin Laird considered the matter and over the objections of the Army General Counsel decided that the Army would participate in intelli gence collection concerning civil disturbances.312 The Army's collec tion plan was not rescinded until June 1970 after public exposure and congressional criticism.373 c FBI Interagency Agreements After the assassination of President Kennedy the FBI and the Secret Service negotiated an 'agreement which recognized that the Bureau had "general jurisdiction over "subversion. The term was defined more narrowly than it had been defined by practice in the past as "knowingly or wilfully advocat [ing] overthrow of the Government by "force or violence or by "assassination. Except for "temporary action to "neutralize a threat to the President the Secret Service agreed to "conduct no investigation of "members of subversive groups without notifying the FBI The Bureau on the other hand would not investigate individuals "solely to determine their "danger ousness to the President. 374 anFederal Data Banks Hearings at p 1137 On at least one occasion Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher thanked an Army intelligence officerfor spot reports and daily summaries (Letter from Deputy Assistant General Chris topher to Maj Gen William P Yarborough Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli gence 5/15/68.) The Justice Department's intelligence analysis unit received "army intelligencereports during 1968on personsand groupsinvolvedin "racial agitation. (Memorandumfrom Assistant Attorney GeneralJ Walter Yeagleyto Deputy Attorney General Richard G Kleindienst 2/6/69.) "2Memorandumfrom Secretary of DefenseMelvinLaird and Attorney General John N Mitchell to the President 4/1/69 Subject Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances This reflected a failure on the part of the Army General Counsel to persuade the Justice Department to relieve the Army of its domestic intelligence-gatheringrole (Memorandumfrom Robert E Jordan Army General Counsel to the Secretary of the Army Subject Review of Civil Disturbance IntelligenceHistory in Military Surveillance Hearings p 296.) "'Letter from Robert E Lynch Acting Adjutant General of the Army to sub ordinate commands 6/9/70 Subject Collection Reporting Processing and Stor age of CivilDisturbance Information See discussion of the termination of this program in Section III ["Ter minations Sub-finding'under"Accountabilityand Control"] "'Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection 2/3/65 The FBI was to report to Secret Service information about "subversives ultra-rightists racists and fascists who expressed "strong or violent anti-U.S sentiment or made "state ments indicating a propensity for violenceand antipathy toward goodorder and government. These reporting standards were modifiedin 1971to require the FBI to refer to Secret Service "Information concerning civil disturbances anti-U.S demon strations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establish (Continued) 86 After Congress enacted antibombing legislation in 1970 the FBI was assigned primary responsibility for investigating "offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups. 375When these guidelines were developed the FBI shifted supervision of bombing cases from its General Investigative Division to the Intelligence Division because as one official put it the specific criminal investigations were "so inter related with the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap constantly occurs. 376 The agreement with Secret Service and the "guidelines covering bombing investigations did not give the FBI any additional domestic intelligence-gathering authority They simply provided for dissemina tion of information to Secret Service and allocated criminal investiga tive jurisdiction between the FBI and the Alcohol Firearms and Tobacco Division Nevertheless both presupposed that the FBI had broad authority to investigate "subversives or "terrorist/revolution ary groups. 4 Domestic Covert Action a COINTELPRO The FBI's initiation of COINTELPRO operations against the Ku Klux Klan "Black Nationalists and the "New Left brought to bear upon a wide-range of domestic groups the techniques previously devel oped to combat Communists and persons who happened to associate with them The start of each program coincided with significant national events The Klan program followed the widely-publicized disappearance in 1964 of three civil rights workers in Mississippi The "Black Na tionalist program was authorized in the aftermath of the Newark and Detroit riots in 1967 The "New Left program developed shortly after student disruption of the Columbia University campus in the spring of 1968 While the initiating memoranda approved by Director Hoover do not refer to these specific events it is clear that they shaped the context for the Bureau's decisions These programs were not directed at obtaining evidence for use in possible criminal prosecutions arising out of those events Rather they were secret programs "under no circumstances to be "made known outside the Bureau 377 which used unlawful or improper acts to "disrupt or "neutralize the activities of groups and individuals targeted on the basis of imprecise criteria (1) Klan and "White Hate COINTELPRO. The expansion of Klan investigations in response to pressure from President Johnson and Attorney General Kennedy,378 was accompanied by an internal (Continued) ments and "information concerningpersons who may be consideredpotentially dangerous to individuals protected by the [Secret Service] because of their . participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States. With respect to organizations the FBI reported information on their "officers, "size, "goals, "source of financial support, and other "background data. (AgreementBetweenthe Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States SecretServiceConcerningProtective Responsibilities 11/26/71.) 'Investigative Guidelines Title XI Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 Regulationof Explosives 37eFBI Inspection Report Domestic Intelligence Division August 17 Septem ber 9 1971 pp 224-38 'Memoranda from FBI headquarters to all SAC's 9/2/64 8/25/67 5/9/68 978Seepp 74-75 87 Bureau decision to shift their supervision from the General Investiga tive Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division One internal FBI argument for the transfer was that the Intelligence Division was "in a position to launch a disruptive counterintelligence program against the Klan with the "same effectiveness it had against the Communist Party. Accordingly in September 1964 a directive was sent to seventeen field offices instituting a COINTEIPRO against the Klan and what the FBI considered to be other "White Hate organizations (e.g. American Nazi Party National States Rights Party) "to expose dis rupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of the groups "their leaders and adherents. 380 During the 1964 1971 period when the program was in operation 287 proposals for COPNTELPRO actions against Klan and "White Hate groups were authorized by FBI headquarters.38 Covert tech niques used in this COINTELPRO included creating new Klan chap ters to be controlled by Bureau informants and sending an anonymous letter designed to break up a marriage.'' (2) "Black Nationalist COINTELPRO. The stated strategy of the "Black Nationalist COINTELPRO instituted in 1967 was "to expose disrupt misdirect discredit or otherwise neutralize such groups and their "leadership spokesmen members and supporters. The larger objectives were to "counter their "propensity for violence and to "frustrate their efforts to "consolidate their forces or to "re cruit new or youthful adherents. Field offices were instructed to exploit conflicts within and between groups to use news media con tacts to ridicule and otherwise discredit groups to prevent "rabble rousers from spreading their "philosophy publicly and to gather information on the "unsavory backgrounds of group leaders.383 In March 1968 the program was expanded from twenty-three to forty-one field offices and the following long-range goals were set forth prevent the "coalition of militant black nationalist groups prevent the rise of a "messiah who could "unify and electrify the movement naming specifically Dr Martin Lu ther King Jr. Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammed prevent violence by pinpointing "potential trouble makers and "neutralizing them before they "exercise their potential for violence prevent groups and leaders from gaining "respectabil ity by discrediting them to the "responsible Negro com munity the "responsible white community "liberals with 'Memorandum from J H Gale to Mr Tolson 7/30/64 (Gale was Assistant Director for the Inspection Division) 30Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACS9/2/64 38The average of 40 "White Hate actions per year may be compared to an average of over 100 per year against the Communist Party from 1956-1971 (totalling 1636) Exhibit 11 Hearings vol 6 p 371 These techniques and those used against the other target groups referred to below are discussed in greater detail in the COINTELPROdetailed report and in the CovertActionsection of the Findings Part III p 211 331Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACS8/25/67 88 "vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalists and "Negro radicals and (5) "prevent these groups from recruiting young people. 384 After the Black Panther Party emerged as a group of national stat ure FBI field offices were instructed to develop "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP. Particular attention was to be given to aggravating conflicts between the Black Panthers and rival groups in a number of cities where such conflict had already taken on the character of "gang war fare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals. '85 During 1967-1971 FBI headquarters approved 379 proposals for COINTELPRO actions against "black nationalists. 38 These opera tions utilized dangerous and unsavory techniques which gave rise to the risk of death and often disregarded the personal rights and dignity of the victims (3) "New Left COINTELPR'O. The most vaguely defined and haphazard of the COINT'ELPRO operations was that initiated against the "New Left in May 1968 It was justified to the FBI Director by his subordinates on the basis of the following considera tions The nation was "undergoing an era of disruption and violence which was "caused to a large extent by individ uals "generally connected with the New Left. Some of these "activists were urging "revolution and calling for "the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. The problem was not just that they committed "unlawful acts, but also that they "falsely alleged police brutality and that they "scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bu reau in an attempt to "hamper FBI investigations and to "drive us off the college campuses. 38 Consequently the COINTELPRO Was intended to "expose disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of "this group and "persons connected with it. 388The lack of any clear definition of "New Left meant as an FBI supervisor testified that "legitimate and nonvio lent antiwar groups were targeted because they were "lending aid and comfort to more disruptive groups.389 Further directives issued soon after initiation of the program urged field offices to "vigorously and enthusiastically explore "every avenue of possible embarrassment of New Left adherents Agents were instructed to gather information on the "immorality and the "scurrilous and depraved behavior "habits and living conditions of the members of targeted groups.390 This message was reiterated several months later when the offices were taken to task for their failure to remain alert for and seek specific data depicting the "de praved nature and moral looseness of the New Left and to "use this Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 3/4/68 'B6MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to SACs11/25/68 9eThe average was over 90per year (Exhibit 11 Hearings Vol 6 p 371.) 'Memorandum from C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 5/9/68 'C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 5/9/68 Supervisor FBI IntelligenceDivision 10/28/75 p 39 ' Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 5/23/68 89 material in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them. 391 In July 1968 the field offices were further prodded by FBI head quarters to prepare leaflets using "the most obnoxious pictures of New Left leaders at various universities instigate "personal conflicts or animosities between New Left leaders create the impression that leaders are "informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies (the "snitch jacket. technique) send articles from student or "underground news papers which show "depravity ("use of narcotics and free sex") of New Left leaders to university officials donors legislators and parents have members arrested on marijuana charges send anonymous letters about a student's activities to parents neighbors and the parents employers send anonymous letters about New Left faculty mem bers (signed "A Concerned Alumni or "A Concerned Tax payer") to university officials legislators Board of Regents and the press use "cooperative press contacts exploit the "hostility between New Left and Old Left groups disrupt New Left coffee houses near military bases which are attempting to "influence members of the Armed forces use cartoons photographs and anonymous letters to "ridicule the New Left use "misinformation to "confuse and disrupt New Left activities such as by notifying members that events have been cancelled.39 During the period 1968-1971 291 COINTELPRO actions against the "New Left were approved by headquarters.393 Particular emphasis was placed upon preventing the targeted individuals from public speaking or teaching and providing "misinformation to con fuse demonstrators b FBI Target Lists The FBI's most intensive domestic intelligence investigations and COINTELPRO operations were directed against persons identified not as criminals or criminal suspects but in vague terms such as "rabble rouser, "agitators, "key activists, or "key black extremists. The Secruity Index for detention in time of national emergency was revised to include such persons (1) "Dabble Rouser/Agitator Inde.r. Following a meeting with the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in August 1967 Director Hoover ordered his subordinates to intensify collection of 7'1MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SACs 10/9/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 7/6/68 ''Approximately 100per year (Exhibit 11 Hearings Vol 6 p 371.) 90 intelligence about "vociferous rabble-rousers."" He also directed "that an index be compiled of racial agitators and individuals who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord. 394 The already vague standards for the Rabble Rouser Index were broadened in November 1967 to cover persons with a "propensity for fomenting any disorders affecting the "internal security" as opposed to only racial disorders and to include persons of local as well as national interest This included "black nationalists white suprema cists Puerto Rican nationalists anti-Vietnam demonstration leaders and other extremists. A rabble rouser was defined as a person who tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to their emotions prejudices et cetera a demagogue." In March 1968 the Rabble Rouser Index was renamed the Agitator Index and field offices were ordered to obtain a photograph of each person on the Index 906However expanding the size of the Agitator Index lessened its value as an efficient target list for FBI intelligence operations Consequently the Bureau developed a more refined tool for this purpose the Key Activist Program (2) "Key Activist Program. Instructions were issued to ten ma jor field offices in January 1968 to designate certain persons as "Key Activists, who were defined as individuals in the Students for Democratic Society and the anti-Vietnam war groups [who] are extremely active and most vocal in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of unlaw ful and disruptive acts There was to be an "intensive investigation of each Key Activist which might include "high-level informant coverage and "technical surveillances and physical surveillances. 39 The "New Left COINTELPRO was designed in part to "neutral ize the Key Activists who were "the moving forces behind the New Left. 338One of the first techniques employed in this program was to obtain the Federal income tax returns of Key Activists for use in disrupting their activities.399 In October 1968 the Key Activist Pro gram was expanded to virtually all field offices The field agents were in structed to recommend additional persons for the program and to "consider if the individual was rendered ineffective would it curtail [disruptive] activity in his area of influence. While the FBI consid ered Federal prosecution a "logical result of these investigations and "the best deterrent, Key Activists were not selected because they were suspected of committing or planning to commit any specific Federal crime 400 'Memorandum from C D DeLoachto Mr Tolson 8/1/67 (At the meeting a Commissionmemberhad asked the Bureau to "identify the numberof militant Negroesand whites.") "'Memorandum from C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 8/3/67 SAC Letter 67-56 9/12/67 SACLetter No 67-70 11/28/67 " Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs3/21/68 "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs 1/30/68 Memorandumfrom C D Brennan to W C Sullivan :5/9/68 399Memorandumfrom C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 5/24/68 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs 10/24/68 91 (3) "Key Black Extremist Program. A "Key Black Extremist target list for concentrated investigation and COINTELPRO actions was instituted in 1970 Key Black Extremists were defined as leaders or activists [who] are particularly extreme agitative anti-Government and vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence 401 Field offices were instructed to place all Key Black Extremists in the top priority category of the Security Index and in the Black Nation alist Photograph Album which concentrated on "militant black nationalists who traveled extensively In addition the following steps were to be taken All aspects of the finances of a KBE must be deter mined Bank accounts must be monitored. Continuing consideration must be given by each office to develop means to neutralize the effectiveness of each KBE Obtain suitable handwriting specimens. Particular efforts should be made to obtain records of and/or reliable witnesses to inflammatory statements. Where there appears to be a possible violation of a statute within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau [it should be] vigorously investigated.. Particular attention must be paid to travel by a KBE and every effort made to determine financial arrangements for such travel. The Federal income tax returns of all KBEs must be checked annually.. Reports on all Key Black Extremists were to be submitted every ninety days and the field was urged to use "initiative and imagination to achieve "the desired results.7 403Once again the "result was not limited to prosecution of crimes and the targets were not chosen because they were suspected of committing crimes (4) Security Index. The Agitator Index was abolished in 1971 because "extremist subjects were "adequately followed through the Security Index.404 In contrast to the other indices the Security Index was not reviewed by the FBI alone It had from the late 1940's been largely a joint FBI-Justice Department program based on the De partment's plans for emergency detention.405 According to FBI mem oranda moreover President Johnson was directly involved in the updating of emergency detention plans.4o0 After a large-scale March on the Pentagon against the Vietnam War in October 1967 President Johnson ordered a comprehensive review of the government's emergency plans Attorney General Clark was appointed chairman of a committee to review the Presidential Emer gency Action Documents (PEADs) prepared under the Emergency Detention Program One result of this review in which the FBI took part was a decision to bring the Detention Program into line with the 401Memorandumfrom G C Mooreto C D Brennan 12/22/70 "'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs 12/23/70 f0SMemorandumfrom C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 4/30/68 408Seelip.54-55 S00C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 4/30/68 92 Emergency Detention Act of 1950 reversing the previous decision to "disregard as "unworkable the procedural requirements of the Act which were tighter than the standards which had been applied by FBI and Justice.4o The Bureau also had to revise its criteria for inclusion of names on the Security Index which since 1950 had disregarded the statutory standards However the definition chosen of a "dangerous individual was so broad that it enabled the Bureau to add persons not previously eligible A "dangerous individual was defined as a person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in or probably will conspire with others to engage in acts of espionage and sabotage including acts of terrorism or assassination and any inter ference with or threat to the survival of and effective opera tion of the national state and local governments and of the national defense effort [Emphasis added.] 408 The emphasized language greatly broadened the Security Index stand ards It gave FBI intelligence officials the opportunity to include on the Security Index "racial militants "black nationalists and in dividuals associated with the "New Left who were not affiliated with the "basic revolutionary organizations as the Bureau characterized the Communist Party which had previously been the focus of the Security Index.409 Once again the limitations which a statute was intended to impose were effectively circumvented by the use of elastic language in a Presidential directive Moreover the Bureau adopted a new "priority ranking for appre hension in case of an emergency Top priority was now given not only to leaders of "basic subversive organizations, but also to "leaders of anarchistic groups. 410It was said to be the "anarchistic tendencies of New Left and racial militants that made them a "threat to the internal security. 411 Initially the Justice Department approved informally these changes in the criteria for "the persons listed for apprehension. 412After several months of "study, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel formally approved the new Security Index criteria This was the first time since 1955 that the Department had fully considered the matter and the previous policy of disregarding the procedures of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was formally abandoned If an emergency occurred the Attorney General would abide by "the requirement that any person actually detained will be entitled to a hearing at which time the evidence will have to satisfy the standards of [the Act]. However the Office of Legal Counsel declared that the Security Index criteria themselves could be as they were less precise than those of the Act because of the "needed flexibility and discretion at the operating level in order to carry on an effective surveillance 407See pn 54 55 and Report on FBI Investigations 108Presidential EmergencyAction Document6 as quoted in Brennan to Sulli van 4/30/68 40BMemorandumfromC D Brennan to W C Sullivan 4/30/68 410C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 4/30/68 41C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 4/30/68 412Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to J Walter Yeagley 5/1/68 Yeagley to Hoover 6/17/68 93 program.7 413Thus while the plan to ignore Congress procedural limitations was abandoned Congress substantive standards were dis regarded as insufficiently "flexible. c Internal Revenue Service Programs (1) Misuse by FBI and CIA. IRS information was used as an instrument of domestic intelligence mainly by the FBI For example in 1965 the Bureau obtained the tax returns of Ku Klux Klan mem bers in order to develop "discrediting or embarrassing information as part of the Bureau's COINTELPRO against the Klan.414 The procedure by which FBI obtained access to tax returns and related information held by IRS was deemed "illegal when it was discovered by the Chief of the IRS Disclosure Branch in 1968.415The FBI had not followed the procedures for obtaining returns which required written application to the IRS Disclosure Branch Instead the Bureau had arranged to obtain the returns and information surreptitiously through contacts inside the IRS Intelligence Division The procedure for FBI access was regularized by the IRS after 1968 a formal request on behalf of the Bureau was made to the IRS Disclosure Branch by the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department During this same period the CIA was obtaining tax returns in a manner similar to the FBI although in much smaller numbers Yet even after procedures were changed for the FBI's access to tax in formation in 1968 the IRS did not re-examine the CIA's practices 416 Therefore CIA continued to receive tax return information without filing requests as required by the regulations Between 1968 and 1974 either directly or through the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department the FBI requested at least 130 tax returns for domestic intelligence purposes This included the returns of 46 "New Left activists and 74 "black extremists,7 417as part of Bureau COINTELPRO operations to "neutralize these indi viduals.418 These requests were not predicated upon any specific in formation suggesting delinquency in fulfilling tax obligations Even after a formal request was required before supplying the FBI with tax returns the IRS accepted the Justice Department's undocu 41Amongthe criteria specificallyapproved by the Justice Department which went beyond the statutory standard of reasonable likelihood of espionage and sabotage were the expanded references to persons who have "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs and are "likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts which constitute "interference with the "effectiveoperation of the national state and local governmentsand of the defense effort. (Assistant Attorney General Frank M Wozencraft Officeof Legal Counsel to Assistant Attorney General J Walter Yeagley Internal Security Division 9/9/68.) The standards as approved were transmitted to the FBI and its Manual was revised accordingly (Yeagley to Hoover 9/19/68 Hoover to Yeagley 9/26/68 FBI Manual Section 87 p 45 revised 10/14/68.) The FBI still maintained its Reserve Index unbeknownstto the Department 414Oneof the expresspurposeswas to use tax information to "expose the Klan members"within the Klan organization [or] publicly by showingincomebeyond their means. (Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to W C Sullivan 5/10/65.) Disclosureof tax information "publicly or "within the Klan organiza tion is prohibitedbystatute 415Memorandumfrom D O Virdin to H E Snyder 5/2/68 Subject Inspection of Returns by FBI 414DonaldO Virdin testimony 9/16/75 pp 69-73 411Staff Memorandum Review of Materials in FBI Administrative File on "IncomeTax Returns Requested. 41BMemorandumfrom C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 12/6/68 94 mented assertions that tax information was "necessary in connection with an "official matter involving "internal security.7 419Yet in mak ing such assertions the Justice Department's Internal Security Divi sion relied entirely on the Bureau's judgment Thus while the IRS is required by the statute to release tax information only where neces sary it in effect delegated its responsibility to the Internal Security Division which in turn delegated the decision to the FBI Although most FBI requests for tax information were for targets of various COINTELPRO operations the Justice Department official who made the requests on behalf of the Bureau said he was never informed of the existence of COINTELPRO.42 Even after 1968 the Bureau sometimes used tax information in improper or unlawful ways For example the Bureau attempted to use such information to cause IRS to audit a mid-western college pro fessor associated with "new left activities at the time he was planning to attend the 1968 Democratic Party National Convention in Chicago The FBI agent in charge of the operation against the professor ex plained its purpose in a memorandum if IRS contact with [the Professor] can be arranged within the next two weeks their demands upon him may be a source of distraction during the critical period when he is engaged in meetings and plans for disruption of the Democratic Na tional Convention Any drain upon the time and concentra tion which [the Professor] a leading figure in Demcon planning can bring to bear upon this activity can only accrue to the benefit of the Government and general public.421 Among the tax returns which the CIA obtained informally from IRS in an informal and illegal manner were those of the author of a book the publication of which the CIA sought to prevent,422 and of Ramparts magazine which had exposed the CIA's covert use of the National Student Association. In the latter case CIA memoranda indicate that its officials were unwilling to risk a formal request for tax information without first learning through informal disclosure whether the tax returns contained any information that would be helpful in their effort to deter this "attack on the CLA and on "the administration in general. 424 (2) The Special Service Staff IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups. In 1969 the IRS established a Special Service Staff to gather intelligence on a category of taxpayers defined essentially by political criteria The SSS attempted to develop tax cases against the targeted taxpayers and initiated tax fraud investigations against some who would otherwise never have been investigated The SSS originated as a result of pressure from the permanent Sub committee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations 425and from President Nixon acting through White House 41BLeonGreendeposition 9/12/75 pp 6-8 420Statement of J W Yeagleyto Senate Select Committee September1975 'Memorandum from MidwestCity Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/1/68 'CIA memorandum Subject BUTANE Victor Marchetti 'CIA memorandum Subject IRS Briefingon Ramparts 2/2/67 'CIA memorandum Subject IRS Briefingon Ramparts 2/2/67 S26LeonC Greentestimony 9/12/75 p 36 95 assistants Tom Charles Huston and Dr Arthur Burns.426 According to the IRS Commissioner's memorandum Dr Burns expressed to him the President's concern over the fact that tax-exempt funds may be supporting activ ist groups engaged in stimulating riots both on the campus and within our inner cities.427 The administration did not supply any facts to support the assertion that such groups were violating tax laws After the SSS was established the FBI and the Justice Depart ment's Interdivisional Information Unit (IDIU) became its largest sources of names An Assistant IRS Commissioner requested the FBI to provide information regarding "various organizations of predomi nantly dissident or extremist nature and/or people prominently identi fied within those organizations. 428The FBI agreed believing as one intelligence official put it that SSS would "deal a blow to "dis sident elements. 429 Among the material received by SSS from the FBI was a list of 2,300 organizations categorized as "Old Left, "New Left, and "Right Wring. 430The SSS also received about 10,000 names on IDIU com puter printouts.431 SSS opened files on all these taxpayers many of whom were later subjected to tax audits and some to tax fraud investi gations There is no reason to believe that the names listed by the FBI or the IDIU were selected on the basis of any probable noncompliance with the tax laws Rather these groups and individuals were targeted because of their political and ideological beliefs and activities.432 The SSS by the time it was disbanded in 1973 had gone over approximately half of the IDIU index and established files on those individuals on whom it had no file Names on the SSS list included Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling Senators Charles Goodell and Ernest Gruening Congressman Charles Diggs journalists Joseph Alsop and Jimmy Breslin and attorney Mitchell Rogovin Organiza tions on the SSS list included political groups ranging from the John Birch Society to Common Cause religious organizations such as the B'nai Brith Antidefamation League and the Associated Catholic Charities professional associations such as the American Law Insti tute and the Legal Aid Society private foundations such as the Car negie Foundation publications ranging from "Playboy to "Com monwealth and government institutions including the United States Civil Rights Commission.433 SSS officials have conceded that some cases referred to the field for tax investigations would not have qualified for referral but for the ideological category in which they fell While IRS field offices closed out many cases because of the lack of tax grounds upon which legal "Investigation of the Special Service Staff of the IRS by the staff of the Joint Committeeon Internal Revenue Taxation 6/5/75 pp 17-18 Memorandumof IRS CommissionerThrower 6/16/69 Memorandumfrom D W Baconto Director FBI 8/8/69 Memorandumfrom D J Brennan Jr. to W C Sullivan 8/15/69 430SSSBi-weeklyReport 6/15/70 'n SSSBi-weeklyReport 8/29/69 432For a discussionof IDTITstandards see pp 78-81 122-123 'Donald Alexander testimony 10/2/25 Hearings Vol 3 pp 29-30 96 action could be taken referral from the SSS probably resulted in the examination of some cases despite the lack of adequate grounds Inter views wtih IRS field personnel confirm that this did occur in several inst.ances.433a Upon discovering that its functions were not tax-related new IRS Commissioner Alexander ordered the Special Service Staff abolished He testified Mr ALEXANDERI ordered the Special Service staff abol ished That order was given on August the 9th 1973 It was implemented by manual supplements issued on August the 13th 1973 We held the files I ordered the files be held intact I'm not going to give any negative assurances to this Com mittee--in order that this Committee and other Committees could review these files to see what was in them and see what sort of information was supplied to us on this more than 11,000 individuals and organizations as to whom and which files were maintained I suggested Mr Chairman that at the end of all of these inquiries I would like to take those files to the Ellipse and have the biggest bonfire since 1814 The CHAIRMANWell I concur in that judgment I would only say this to you in a way it might be a more important bonfire than the Boston Tea Party when it comes to protect ing individual rights of American citizens I am glad you feel that way I am glad you took that action.434 5 Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent In the late 1960's CIA and NSA acting in response to presidential pressure turned their technological capacity and great resources to ward spying on certain Americans The initial impetus was to deter mine whether the antiwar movement and to a lesser extent the "black power movement were controlled by foreigners Despite evi dence that there was no significant foreign influence the intelligence gathering which culminated in CIA's "Operation CHAOS followed the general pattern of broadening in scope and intensity The pro cedure for one aspect of these programs was established by an informal agreement between the CIA and FBI in 1966 which permitted CIA to engage in "internal security activities in the United States a Origins of CIA Involvement in "Internal Security Func tions The National Security Act of 1947 explicitly prohibited the CIA from exercising "police subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal security functions. But the Act did not address the question of the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine intelligence activity within the United States for what Secretary Forrestal called "pur poses outside of this country. 435 Under Director Hoover the FBI interpreted the term "internal security functions broadly to encompass almost "anything that CIA 4 Green 9/12/75 pp 65 66 73 74 Statement of Auditor San Francisco Dis trict 7/30/75 p 1 statement of Collector Los AngelesDistrict 80/75 'Donald Alexander testimony 10/2/75 Hearings Vol 3 pp 10 11 Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on H.R 2319 80th Cong (1947) p 127 97 might be doing in the United States. 436Throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's Director Hoover's position led to jurisdictional conflicts between the CIA and the FBI The Bureau insisted on being informed of the CIA's activity in the United States so that it could be coordinated with the Bureau As the FBI liaison with the CIA in that period recalled "CIA would take action it would come to our attention and we would have a flap." In 1966 the FBI and CIA negotiated an informal agreement to regu larize their coordination This agreement was said to have "led to a great improvement and almost eliminated the "flaps. 438 Under the agreement the CIA would "seek concurrence and coordi nation of the FBI before engaging in clandestine activity in the United States and the FBI would "concur and coordinate if the pro posed action does not conflict with any operation current or planned including active investigation of the FBI. 436When an operative recruited by the CIA abroad arrived in the United States the FBI would "be advised and the two agencies would "confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. The CIA would continue its "handling of the agent for "foreign intelligence purposes The FBI would also become involved where there were "internal security factors, although it was recognized that the CIA might continue to "handle the agent in the United States and provide the Bureau with "information bearing on "internal security matters. 440 As part of their handling of "internal security factors, CIA opera tives were used after 1966 to report on domestic "dissidents for the FBI There were infrequent instances in which according to the for mer FBI liaison with CIA CIA had penetrations abroad in radical revolutionary organizations and the individual was coming here to attend it conference a meeting and would be associating with leading dissidents and the question came up can he be of any use to us can we have access to him during that period In most instances because he was here for a relatively short period we would levy the requirement or the request upon the CIA to find out what was taking place at the meetings to get his assessment of the individuals that he was meeting and any other general intelligence that he could collect from his asso ciations with the people who were of interest to us.441 The policies embodied in the 1966 agreement and the practice under it clearly involved the CIA in the performance of "internal security " Former FBI Liaison with CIA testimony 9/22/75 p 9 'Former FBI liaison with CIA testimony 9/22/75 pp 9-11 "8Liaison 9/22/75 p 11 For a discussion of liaison problemsbetween FBI and CIAin 1970seenp 112-113 'Liaison 9/22/75 p 52 "Central Intelligence Agency Operations in the United States, FBI CIA Memorandumof Understanding 2/7/66 " Liaison 9/22/75 p 55 'Liaison 9/22/75 pp 57 58 These "internal security aspects of the 1966 FBI CIA agreement were not the only pre-CHAOSarrangements bringing the CIA into liaison with the FBI For example as early as 1963the FBI Manual was revised to state that information concerning "proposed travel abroad by domestic "subversives was to be "furnished by the Bureau to the Department of State and the "Central Intelligence Agency and field officeswere advised to recommendthe "extent of foreign investigation which was required (FBI Manual Section 87 p 33a revised 4/15/63.) 68-7860 76 8 98 functions. At no time did the Executive branch ask Congress to amend the 1947 act to modify its ban against CIA exercising "internal secu rity functions. Nor was Congress asked to clarify the ambiguity of the 1947 act about the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States a matter dealt with even today by Executive Order.442 Moreover National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 pro vided authority within the Executive Branch for the Director of Cen tral Intelligence to coordinate and for the CIA to conduct counter intelligence activities abroad to protect the United States against not only espionage and sabotage but also "subversion. 443 However NSCID 5 did not purport to give the CIA authority for counter intelligence activities in the United States as provided in the FBI CIA agreement of 1966 b CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups In the late 1960s the CIA increasingly was drawn into collecting intelligence about domestic political groups particularly the anti-war movement in response to FBI requests and to pressure from Presidents Johnson and Nixon A principal assistant to President Johnson testi fied that high governmental officials could not believe that a cause that is so clearly right for the country as they per ceive it would be so widely attacked if there were not some [foreign] force behind it.444 The same pressures and beliefs led to CIA investigations of "militant black nationalists and radical students (1) CIA Response to FBI Requests. The FBI was the main chan nel for mobilizing foreign intelligence resources and techniques against domestic targets The FBI regularly notified the CIA that it wished coverage of Americans overseas."" Indeed the CIA regarded the mention of a name in any of the thousands of reports sent to it by the FBI as a standing requirement from the FBI for information about those persons.445 FBI reports flowed to the CIA at a rate of over 1,000 a month. From 1967 to 1974 the CIA responded with over 5,000 reports to the FBI These CIA disseminations included some reports of information acquired by the CIA in the course of its own operations not sought in response to a specific FBI request.447 The FBI's broad approach to the investigations of foreign influ ence which it coordinated with the CIA is shown by a memorandum '42President Ford's Executive Order 119052/18/76 This order discussedmore fully in Part IV Recommendationsin effectreinforces the 1966FBI CIA agree ment and definesCIA counterintelligenceduties abroad to include "foreign sub version directedagainst the UnitedStates 443The National Security CouncilIntelligenceDirectives or NSCIDs have been promulgated by the National Security Councilto provide the basic organization and direction of the intelligence agencies " Joseph Califano testimony 1/27/76 p 70 " Richard Obertestimony 10/30/75 p 88 4 Ober 10/28/75 p 45 4 MemorandumfromRichard Oberto James Angleton 6/9/70 p 9 "'Letter from Director W Colbyto VicePresident Rockefeller 8/8/75 p 6 of attachment 99 prepared in the Intelligence Division early in 1969 summarizing its "coverage of the New Left Foreign influence of the New Left movement offers us a fertile field to develop valuable intelligence data To date there is no real cohesiveness between international New Left groups but despite the factionalism and confusion now so preva lent there is great potential for the development of an inter national student revolutionary movement [Emphasis added.] The memorandum expressed concern that "old line leftist groups were .. making a determined effort to move into the New Left movement [and were] influencing the thinking of the New Left . against the police in general and the FBI in particular to drive us off the campuses as well as attacks against the new administration to degrade President Nixon."a There was no mention of or apparent concern for direct influence or control of the "New Left by agents of hostile foreign powers In stead the stress was almost entirely upon ideological links and sim ilarities and the threat of ideas considered dangerous by the FBI The enlistment of both CIA and NSA resources in domestic intel ligence is illustrated by the "Black Nationalist investigations In 1967 FBI Headquarters instructed field officesthat penetrative investigations should be initiated at this time looking toward developing any information regarding contacts on the part of these individuals with foreign elements and looking toward developing any additional information having a bearing upon whether the individual involved is cur rently subjected to foreign influence or direction.. During your investigative coverage of all militant black nationalists be most alert to any foreign travel Advise the Bureau promptly of such in order that appropirate overseas investigations may be conducted to establish activities and contacts abroad [Emphasis added.] 449 The FBI passed such information to the CIA which in turn began to place individual black nationalists on a "watch list for the inter ception of international communications by the National Security Agency After 1969 the FBI began submitting names of citizens en gaged in domestic protest and violence to the CL1 not only for investi gation abroad but also for placement on the "watch list of the CIA's mail opening project Similar lists of names went from the FBI to the National Security Agency for use on a "watch list for monitoring other channels of international communication (2) Operation CHAOS. The CIA did not restrict itself to servic ing the FBI's requests Under White House pressure the CIA devel oped its own program Operation CHAOS as an adjunct to the 'Memorandum from C D Brennan to W C Sullivan re New Left Move ment 2/3/69 "s SACLetter No 67-66 11/7/67 100 CIA's foreign counterintelligence activities although CIA officials recognized from the outset that it had "definite domestic counterin telligence aspects. 450 Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that he established the program in response to President Johnson's persistent interest in the extent of foreign influence on domestic dissidents According to Helms the President would repeatedly ask "How are you getting along with your examination and "Have you picked up any more information on this subject 451 The first CHAOS instructions to CIA station chiefs in August 1967 described the need for "keeping tabs on radical students and U.S Negro expatriates as well as travelers passing through certain select areas abroad. The originally stated objective was "to find out [the] extent to which Soviets Chicoms (Chinese Communists) and Cubans are exploiting our domestic problems in terms of espionage and sub version. 452 Following the consistent pattern of intelligence activities those original instructions gradually broadened without any precision in the kind of foreign contacts which were to be targeted by CIA operations For example President Johnson asked the CIA to conduct a study of "International Connections of the U.S Peace Movement fol lowing the October 1967 demonstration at the Pentagon 453 In response CIA headquarters sent a directive to CIA sta tions seeking information on "illegal and subversive connec tions between U.S activists and "communist communist front or other anti-American and foreign elements abroad Such connections might range from casual contacts based merely on mutual interest to closely controlled channels for party directives. [Emphasis added.] 454 In mid-1968 the DDP described CHAOS to CIA stations as a "high priority program concerning foreign "contacts with the "Radical Left. which was defined as "radical stu dents antiwar activists draft resisters and deserters black nationalists anarchists and assorted New Leftists. 455 In 1969 President Nixon's White House required the CIA to study foreign communist support of American protest groups and stressed that "support should be "liberally con strued to include "encouragement by Communist coun tries 456 In the fall of 1969 CIA stations were asked to report on any foreign support guidance or "inspiration to protest activities in the United States.hJ7 'Memorandum from Thomas Karamessines to James Angleton 8/15/67 p 1 Helms RockefellerCommission4/28/75 pp 2434-2435 'CIA Headquarters cable to several field stations August 1967 p 1 'Memorandum from Richard Helms to President Johnson 11/15/67 'VIA Cable from Acting DDP to various field stations November 1967 pp 1-2 'CIA Cable from Thomas Karamessines to various field stations July 1968 P.1'Memorandum from Tom Huston to the Deputy Director CIA 6/20/69 p 1 "7Cablefrom CIAheadquarters to stations November1969 101 Thus this attempt to ascertain and evaluate "foreign links was so broadly defined that it required much more than background infor mation or investigation of a few individuals suspected of being agents directed by a hostile power Instead at a time when there was considerable international communication and travel by Americans engaged in protest and dissent a substantial segment by American protest groups was encompassed by CIA collection requirements to investigate foreign "encouragement, "inspiration, "casual contacts or "mutual interest. Once again the use of elastic words in mandates for intelligence activity resulted in overbroad coverage and collection In addition to their intelligence activity directed at Americans abroad CHAOS undercover agents while in the United States in preparation for overseas assignment or between assignments provided substantial information about lawful domestic activities of dissident American groups as well as providing leads about possible foreign ties.458In a few instances the CIA agents appear to have been encour aged to participate in specific protest activity or to obtain particular domestic information." The CHAOS program also involved obtain ing information about Americans from the CIA mail opening project and other domestic CIA components 460and from a National Security Agency international communications intercept program.46 CIA officials recognized that the CIA's examination of domestic groups violated the Agency's mandate and thus accorded it a high degree of sensitivity As CIA Director Richard Helms wrote in 1969 when he transmitted to the White House the CIA's study of "Restless Youth In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject we have included a section on American students This is an area not within the charter of this Agency so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.462 The reaction to such admissions of illegality was neither an instruction to stop the program or an attempt to change the law Rather the White House continued to ask for more information and continued to urge the CIA to confirm the theory that American dissidents were under foreign control.463 Director Richard Helms testified that the only manner in which the CIA could support its conclusion that there was no significant foreign influence on the domestic dissent in the face of incredulity at the White House was to continually expand the coverage of CHAOS Only by being able to demonstrate that it had investigated all anti-war persons and all contacts between them and any foreign 'Charles Marculestestimony RockefellerCommission3/10/75 pp 1538-1547 1566-1567 Ober 9/24/75 p 46 (For security reasons the CHAOSagent case officertestifiedas "CharlesMarcules".) 4 MarculesContact Report 4/17/71 Marcules RockefellerCommission3/10/ 75 pp 1556-1558 f MemorandumfromRichard Oberto Chief CI Project 2/15/72 161Oher 10/30.75nn 16-17 'e Letter from Richard Helmsto Henry Kissinger 2/18/69 'Richard Helmsdeposition RockefellerCommission4/24/75 p 223 102 person could CIA "prove the negative that none were under foreign domination.464 In 1972 the CIA Inspector General .found "general concern among the overseas stations "over what appeared to constitute a monitoring of the political views and activities of Americans not known to be or suspected of being involved in espionage. Several stations had "doubts as to the nature and legitimacy of the program because requests for reports on "prominent persons were based on "nebulous allegations of "subversion. 465This led to "a reduction in the intensity of attention to political dissidents, 466although the program was not terminated until March 1974.467 By the end of the CHAOS program 13,000 different files were accu mulated including more than 7,200 on American citizens Documents in these files included the names of more than 300,000 persons and groups indexed by computer.968 In addition to collecting information on an excessive number of persons some of the kinds of information were wholly irrelevant to the legitimate interests of the CIA or any other government agency For example one CIA agent supplying information on domestic activities to Operation CHAOS submitted detailed accounts of the activities of women who were interested in "women's liberation. 469 c CIA Security Operations Within the United States Pro tecting "Sources and "Methods The National Security Act of 1947 granted the Director of Central Intelligence a vaguely-worded responsibility for "protecting intelli gence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. 470The legislative history of this provision suggests that it was initially intended to allay concerns of the military services that the new CIA would not operate with adequate safeguards to protect the military intelligence secrets which would be shared with the CIA.471 However this authority was later read by the CIA to authorize infiltration of domestic groups in order to protect CIA personnel and facilities from possibly violent public demonstrations It was also read to permit electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry to protect sensitive information The CIA undertook a series of specific security investigations within the ITnited States in some cases to find the source of news leaks and in others to determine whether government employees were involved in espionage or otherwise constituted "security risks. These investiga tions were directed at former CIA employees employees of other government agencies newsmen and other private citizens in this countrv.472 Among the techniques used were physical surveillance ' Helms deposition RockefellerCommission4/24/75 p 234 Ober deposition RockefellerCommission3/28/75 pp 137-138 'Memorandum from Inspector General to Executive Director-Comptroller 11/9/72 p 1 'Memorandum from Executive Director-Comptrollerto DDP 12/20/72 ' Cablefrom CIADirector William Colbyto Field Stations March1974 i 8RockefellerCommissionReport p 23 ' 0Agent1 ContactReport VolumeII Agent1file " 50i S.C 403(d) (3) Lawrence Houston testimony Rockefeller Commission 3/17/75 pp 1654 1655 " RockefellerCommissionReport pp 162-166 103 mail and tax information coverage electronic surveillance and sur reptitious entry Attorney General Robert Kennedy appears to have authorized CIA wiretapping in one of these investigations With this exception however there is no suggestion that the CIA's security investigations were specifically approved by the Attorney General. The CIA Office of Security established two programs directed at protest demonstrations which involved the CIA in domestic affairs on the theory that doing so was necessary to safeguard CIA facilities in the United States.' Project MERRIMACK (1967 to 1973) in volved the infiltration by CIA agents of Washington-based peace groups and Black activist groups The stated purpose of the program was to obtain early warning of demonstrations and other 'physical threats to the CIA However the collection requirements were broad ened to include general information about the leadership funding activities and policies of the targeted groups Project RESISTANCE (1967 to 1973) was a broad effort to obtain general background information about radical groups across the coun try particularly on campuses The CIA justified this program as a means of predicting violence which might threaten CIA installations recruiters or contractors and gathering information with which to evaluate applicants for CIA employment Much of the reporting by CIA field officesto headquarters was from open sources such as news papers But additional information was obtained from cooperating police departments campus officials and other local authorities some of whom in turn were using collection techniques such as informants These programs illustrated fundamental weaknesses and contra dictions in the statutory definition of CIA authority in the 1947 Act While the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with responsi bility to protect intelligence "sources and methods, the CIA is for bidden from exercising law enforcement and police powers and "internal security functions. The CIA never went to Congress for a clarification of this ambiguity nor did it seek interpretation from the chief legal officer of the United States the Attorney General except on the rarest of occasions.47 " Accordingto a "memorandumfor the record sent by CIA General Counsel LawrenceR Houston to Deputy Attorney General William P Rogersin 1954 an agreement was reached at that time allowing the CIA to investigate on its own any "actual or probable violation of criminal statutes involving the CIA's "covert operations and to determine for itself without consulting the Justice Department whether there were "possibilities for prosecution. The Justice Department would not be informed if the CIA decided that there should be no prosecutionon the ground that it might lead to "revelation of highly classified information. (Memorandum from Houston to Rogers 3/1/54 and enclosed memorandumfrom Houston to the Director of Central Intelligence 2/23/54.) This practice was reviewed and re-confirmedinternally within the CIA on at least two subsequent occasions (Memorandumfrom Houston to the Assistant to the Director CIA 1/6/60 memorandumfrom Houston to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 6/10/64.) It was not terminated until 1975 (Memo randum from John S Warner CIA General Counsel for the record 1/31/75.) 'These CIA activities Projects MERRIMACKand RESISTANCE were de scribed in great detail by the Rockefeller Commission (Rockefeller Commission Report Cbs 12and 13.) " The RockefellerCommissionReport describes two cases in which tele phones of three newsmenwere tapped [One] occurred in 1962 apparently with the knowledge and consent of Attorney General Kennedy. (Rockefeller CommissionReport p 164.) 104 d NSA Monitoring The National Security Agency was created by Executive Order in 1952 to conduct "signals intelligence, including the interception and analysis of messages transmitted by electronic means such as tele phone calls and telegrams. In contrast to the CIA there has never been a statutory "charter for NSA The executive directives which authorize NSA's 'activities prohibit the agency from monitoring communication between persons within the United States and communication concerning purely domestic affairs The current NSA Director testified {The] mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence ob tained from foreign electrical communications ...479 However NSA has interpreted "foreign communications to include communication where one terminal is outside the United States Under this interpretation NSA has for many years intercepted communica tions between the United States andva foreign country even though the sender or receiver was an American During the past decade NSA increasingly broadened its interpretation of "foreign intelligence to include economic and financial matters and "international terrorism. 480 The overall consequence as in the case of CIA activities such as Project CHAOS was to break down the distinction between "foreign and "domestic intelligence For example in the 1960s NSA began adding to its "watch lists, at the request of various intelligence agen cies the names of Americans suspected of involvement in civil dis turbance or drug activity which had some foreign aspects Second Operation Shamrock which began as an effort to acquire the tele grams of certain foreign targets expanded so that NSA obtained from at least two cable companies essentially all cables to or from the United States including millions of the private communications of Americans 6 Intrusive Techniques As domestic intelligence activity increasingly broadened to cover domestic dissenters under many different programs the government intensified the use of covert techniques which intruded upon individual privacy Informants were used to gather more information about more Americans often targeting an individual because of his political views and "regardless of past or present involvement in disorders. 483The CIA's mail opening program increasingly focused upon domestic groups including "protest and peace organizations which were cov ered at the FBI's request.484 Similarly NSA largely in response to Army CIA and FBI pressures expanded its international intercep tion program to include "information on U.S organizations or indi viduals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil "8Memorandumfrom President Truman to Secretary of Defense 10/24/52 " General Lew Allen testimony 10/29/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 6 48 Allen 10/29/75 Hearings vol 2 p 11 The programs of NSAare discussed further in the succeedingsection "Intrusive Techniques, p 183 453Memorandumfrom FBI Executive Conferenceto Mr Tolson 10/29/70 See pp 74-76 184Memorandumfrom Hooverto Angleton 3/10/72 105 disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the United States. 485 During this period Director Hoover ordered cutbacks on the FBI's use of a number of intrusive techniques Frustration with Hoover's cutbacks was a substantial contributing factor to the effort in 1970 coordinated by White House Aide Tom Charles Huston and strongly supported by CIA Director Helms NSA Director Gaylor and Hoover's Intelligence Division subordinates to obtain Presidential authorization for numerous illegal or questionable intelligence techniques a Warrantless Electronic Surveillance (1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance 196.5 196'8. In March 1965 Attorney General Nicholas deB Katzen bach established a new requirement for the FBI's intelligence opera tions the Bureau had to obtain the written approval of the Attorney General prior to the implementation of any microphone surveillance He also imposed a six month limitation on both wiretaps and micro phone surveillances after which time new requests had to be sub mitted for the Attorney General's re-authorization.48 Upon Katzenbach's recommendation President Johnson issued a directive in June 1965 forbidding all federal government wiretapping "except in conjunction with investigations related to national security. 487This standard was reiterated by Attorney General Katzen bach for both wiretapping and microphone surveillances three months later and again in July 1966.487a While the procedures were tightened the broad "national security standard still allowed for questionable authorizations of electronic surveillance In fact Katzenbach told Director Hoover that he would "continue to approve all such requests in the future as I have in the past. He saw "no need to curtail any such activities in the national security field. 488 In line with that policy Katzenbach approved FBI requests for wiretaps on the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee,489 Students for a Democratic Society,49 the editor of an anti-communist newsletter,49 a Washington attorney with whom the editor was in frequent contact,492 a Klan official,493and a leader of the black Revolu tionary Action Movement.494 According to FBI records Katzenbach also initialed three memoranda informing him of microphone surveil lances of Dr Martin Luther King Jr." 'Memorandum from NSA MINARET Charter 7/1/69 '8 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Katzenbach 3/30/65 'Memorandum from President Johnson to Heads of Departments 6/30/65 '87aMemorandumfrom Katzenbach to Hoover 9/27/65 Supplemental Memo randum to the SupremeCourt in Black v UnitedStates July 13 1966 Katzenbach also stated to Hoover that while he believed such techniques could be properly used in cases involvingorganizedcrime he would not approve any such requests in the immediate future "in light of the present atmosphere. 4eeMemorandumfrom Katzenbachto Hoover 9/27/65 'BDMemorandumfrom Hooverto Katzenbach 6/15/65 '90Memorandumfrom Hooverto Katzenbach 5/25/65 401Memorandumfrom Hoover to Katzenbach 4/19/65 see footnote 266 492Memorandumfrom Hoover to Katzenbach 6/7/65 see footnote 266 'e Memorandumfrom Hooverto Katzenbach 9/28/64 494Memorandumfrom Hooverto Katzenbach 3/3/65 "'Memoranda from Hoover to Katzenbach 5/17/65 10/19/65 12/1/65 106 There were no similar electronic surveillance authorizations by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in cases involving purely domestic "national security considerations.4 Clark has stated that his policy was "to confine the area of approval to international activities directly related to the military security of the United States.497 (2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968.-In response to a 1967 Supreme Court decision that required judicial warrants for the use of electronic surveillance in criminal cases,498Congress enacted the Omni bus Crime Control Act of 1968 This Act established warrant proce dures for wiretapping and microphone surveillances but it included a provision that neither it nor the Federal Communications Act of 1934 "shall limit the constitutional power of the President. 499Although Congress did not purport to define the President's power.' the Act suggested five broad categories in which warrantless electronic sur veillance might be permitted The first three categories related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters to protect the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essen tial to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against for eign intelligence activities The last two categories dealt with domestic intelligence interests to protect the United States against overthrow of the government by force or other unlawful means or against any other clear and present danger to the struc ture or existence of the government Thus although Congress suggested criteria for warrantless electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes it left to the courts the task of defining the scope of the national security exception if any to the warrant requirement Between 1969 and 1972 the Nixon administration used these criteria to justify a number of questionable wiretaps One New Left organiza tion was tapped because among other factors its members desired to "take the radical politics they learned on campus and spread them among factory workers. 501Four newsmen were wiretapped or bugged during this period as were sixteen executive branch officials one 'For example Clark turned down FBI requests to wiretap the National Mobilization Committee Officefor Demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 (Memoranda from Hoover to Clark 3/11/68 3/22/68 6/11/68) Clark decidedthat there was not "an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to the national security. (Clark to Hoover 3/12/68) (These memoranda appear at Hearings vol 6 pp 740-755 'Clark has stated that he denied requests "to tap Abba Eban when he was on a visit to this country an employeeof the United Nations Secretariat the Organization of Arab Students in the US. the Tanzanian Missionto the U.N. the officeof the Agricultural Counselorat the SovietEmbassyand a correspondent of TASS. [Statement of Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark Hearings before the Subcommitteeon Administrative Practice and Procedure Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (1974).1 Katz v United States 397 U.S 347 (1967) This ease explicitly left open the question of warrantless electronic surveillance in "situation(s) involving the national security. (397U.S. at 358n 23.) 40915U.S.C 2511(3) 60 See United States v United States District Court 407U.S 297 (1972) 'Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell 3/16/70 107 former executive official and a relative of an executive official. 502 There were numerous wiretaps and some microphones used against the Black Panther Party and similar domestic groups.J03 Attorney Gen eral John Mitchell approved FBI requests for wiretaps on organiza tions involved in planning the November 1969 antiwar "March on Washington, including the moderate Vietnam Moratorium Com mittee." (3) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surreillance 1972.---The issue of national security electronic surveil lance was not addressed by the Supreme Court until 1972 when it held in the so-called Keith case that the President did not have the "con stitutional power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance to protect the security of the nation from "domestic threats.504 The Court still remained silent however on the legality of warrantless electronic surveillance where there was a "significant connection with a foreign power its agents or agencies. 505As a result of this decision the Jus tice Department eliminated as criteria for the use of warrantless elec tronic surveillance the two categories described by Congress in the 1968 Act dealing with domestic intelligence interests.506 b CIA Mail Opening Although Director Hoover terminated the FBI's own mail opening programs in 1966 the Bureau's use of the CIA program continued In 1969 upon the recommendation of the official in charge of the CIA's CHAOS program the FBI began submitting names of domestic po litical radicals and black militants to the CIA for inclusion on its mail opening "Watch List. 5 7By 1972 the FBI's list of targets for CIA mail opening included New Left activists extremists and other subversives Extremist and New Left organizations Protest and peace organizations such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace Subversive and extremist groups such as the Black Pan thers White Panthers Black Nationalists and Liberation Groups Students for a Democratic Society Resist Revolu tionary Union and other New Left Groups 60^See Findings C and E pp 183 and 225 503For example at one time in March 1971the FBI was conductingone micro phone surveillance of Black Panther Party leader Huey Newton seven wire taps of Black Panther Party officesincluding Newton's residence one wiretap on another black extremist group one wiretap on Jewish DefenseLeague head quarters one wiretap on a "New Left extremist group and two wiretaps on "New Left extremist activities. (Memorandumfrom W R Wannall to C D Brennan 3/29/71 printed in Hearings vol II pp 270-271.) 503Memoranda from Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell 11/5/69 and 11/7/69 This and other aspects of electronic surveillance in this period are discussed in Findings C and E in greater detail pp 183 and 225 United States v United States District Court 407U.S 297 (1972) 6 United States v United States District Court 407 U.S. at 309 (1972) 506Memorandumfrom William Olson to Elliott Richardson June 1973 Until 1075 however the Justice Department stretched the term "connection with a foreign power to include domesticgroups such as the Jewish Defense League whose protest actions against a foreign nation were believed to threaten the United States relations with that nation [Zweibonv Mitchell 516 F 2d 594 (D.C Cir 1975).] 60Memorandumfrom FBI/CIA Liaison Agent to D J Brennan 1/16/69 108 Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S or subversive sympathies.5 Thus the mail opening program that began fourteen years earlier as a means of discovering hostile intelligence efforts in the United States had expanded to encompass communications of domestic dissidents of all types c Expansion of NSA Monitoring Although NSA began to intercept and disseminate the communica tions of selected Americans in the early 1960s the systematic inclu sion of a wide range of American names on the "Watch List did not occur until 1967 The Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence requested "any informa tion on a continuing basis that NSA might intercept concerning Indications that foreign governments or individuals or organizations acting as agents of foreign governments are controlling or attempting to control or influence the activities of U.S "peace groups and "Black Power organizations Identities of foreign agencies exerting control or influ ence on U.S organizations Identities of individuals and organizations in U.S in contact with agents of foreign governments Instructions or advice being given to U.S groups by agents of foreign governments.5os Two years later NSA issued an internal instruction intended to ensure the secrecy of the fact that it was monitoring and disseminat ing communications to and from Americans This memorandum described the "Watch List program in terms which indicated that it had widened beyond its originally broad mandate In addition to describing the program as covering foreigners who "are attempting to "influence coordinate or control U.S groups or individuals who "may foment civil disturbance or otherwise undermine the national security of the U.S., the memorandum indicated that the program intercepted communications dealing with Information on U.S organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the U.S.511 This standard which was clearly outside the foreign intelligence mandate of NSA resulted in sweeping coverage Communications such as the following were intercepted disseminated and stored in Government files discussion of a peace concert the interest of the wife of a U.S Senator in peace causes a correspondent's report from Southeast Asia to his magazine in New York an anti-war activist's request for a speaker in New York According to testimony before the Committee the material which resulted from the "Watch List was of little intelligence value most Routing Slip from J Edgar Hoover to James Angleton (attachment) 3/10/72 60BDODCable Yarboroughto Carter 10/20/67 "0NSA's name for example was to be kept off any of the disseminated "product. 'MINARET Charter 7/1/69 109 intercepted communications were of a private or personal nature or involved rallies and demonstrations that were public knowledge.J12 d FBI Cutbacks The reasons for J Edgar Hoover's cutback in 1966 on FBI use of several covert techniques are not clear Hoover's former assistants have cited widely divergent factors Certainly by the mid-1960s Hoover was highly sensitive to the possibility of damage to the FBI from public exposure of its most intrusive intelligence techniques This sensitivity was reflected in a memorandum to Attorney General Katzenbach in September 1965 where Hoover referred to "the present atmosphere of "Congressional and public alarm and opposition to any activity which could in any way be termed an invasion of privacy. J1 The FBI Director was particularly concerned about an inquiry by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Com mittee chaired by Senator Edward Long (1) The Long Subcommittee Investigation. The Senate Subcom mittee was primarily investigating electronic surveillance and mail cover The Bureau was seen as a major subject of the inquiry al though the Internal Revenue Service and other Executive agencies were also included In February 1965 President Johnson asked Attorney General Katzenbach to coordinate all matters relating to the investigation and Katzenbach then met with senior FBI officials to discuss the problems it raised.J1 According to a memorandum by A H Belmont one of the FBI Director's principal assistants Katzenbach stated that he planned to see Senator Edward Long the Subcommittee chairman for the purpose of "impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme inter est to the national security. According to Belmont the Attorney General added that he "might have to resort to pressure from the President and that he did not want the Subcommittee to "under mine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau. FBI officials had assured Katzenbach that their activities were in deed "tightly controlled and restricted to "important security matters. 518 The following note on the memorandum of this meeting provides a sign of Director Hoover's attitude at that time I don't see what all the excitement is about. I would have no hesitancy in discontinuing all techniques technical cover age microphones trash covers mail covers etc While it might handicap us I doubt they are as valuable as some "'W R Wannall (FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence) 10/3/75 p 13 "The feelingis that there was very little in the way of goodproduct as a result of our living suppliednamesto NSA. Memorandumfrom Hooverto Kntzenhach 9/14/65 This memorandumdealt specificallywith electronic surveillance and did not mention mail openings or "Black Bag .robs. Hoover said the FBI had "discontinued microphonesurveil lances (hugs) a restriction which Attorney General Patzenbach said went too far (Fatzenhaoh to Hoover 9/27/65.) 'Memorandum from A H Belmont to Mr Tolson 2/27/65 Katzenhach testi monv 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 204 ~ MemorandumfromA H Belmontto C Tolson 2/27/65 110 believe and none warrant the FBI being used to justify them.'17 Several days later according to a memorandum of the FBI Director the Attorney lTeneral "advised that lie had talked to Senator Long, and that the Senator "said lie bid not want to get into any national security area. '1J Iiatzenbach has confirmed that he "would have been concerned in these circumstances about the Subcommittees demands for information about "matters of a national security nature and that he was "declining to provide such information to Long.513 Again in 1966 the FBI took steps to in the words of Bureau of ficial Cartha DeLoach "neutralize the "threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee.7520 This time the issue involved war rantless electronic surveillance by the FBI particularly in organized crime matters DeLoach and another ranking Bureau official visited Senator Long to urge that he issue a statement that "the FBI had never participated in uncontrolled usage of wiretaps or microphones and that FBI usage of such devices had been completely justified in all instances. 521The Bureau prepared such a statement for Senator Long to release as his own which apparently was not used.522 At another meeting with DeLoach Senator Long agreed to make "a commitment that he would in no way embarrass the FBI. When the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel asked if a Bureau spokesman could appear and "make a simple statement, DeLoach replied that this would "open a Pandora's box in so far as our enemies in the press were concerned. Senator Long then stated that he would call no FBI witnesses.523 (2) Director Hoover's Restrictions. The Director subsequently issued instructions that the number of warrantless wiretaps installed at any one time be cut in half One of his subordinates speculated that this was done out of a concern that the Subcommittee's "inquiry might get into the use of that technique by the FBI. 524 In July 1966 after hundreds of FBI "black bag job operations had been approved over many years Director Hoover decided to eliminate warrantless surreptitious entries for purposes other than microphone installations.525 In response to an Intelligence Division analysis that such break-ins were an "invaluable technique, although "clearly illegal, Hoover stated that "no more such techniques must be used. 526Bureau subordinates took Hoover's "no more such tech 617HooverNoteonBelmontMemorandumto Tolson 2/27/65 618MemorandumfromHooverto Tolson et al. 3/2/65 E,8Katzenbachtestimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 205-206 620Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Tolson 1/21/66 621Memorandumfrom DeLoaehto Tolson 1/10/66 6rMemorandumfrom M A Jones to RobertWick 1/11/66 623Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Tolson 1/21/66 62sC D Brennan deposition 9/23/75 p 42 "According to FBI records and the recollectionsof Bureau agents the fol lowing number of microphonesurveillances involving "surreptitious entry were installed in "internal security intelligence and counterintelligence investiga tions 1964 80 1965:59 1966:4 1967 0 1968:9 1969:8 1970 15 1971:6 1972 22 1973 18 1974 9 1975 13 The similar figuresfor "criminalinvestiga tions (including installations authorized by judicial warrant after 1968) are 19(x483 1965 41 1966 0 1967 0 1968 0 1969 3 1970 8 1971 7 1972 19 1973 27 1974 22 1975 11 (Memorandumfrom FBI to Select Committee 10/17/75.) "Hoover note on memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach 7/19/66 This memorandum cited as a "prime example of the utility of a "black bag jobs a break in to steal records of three high-ranking Klan officialsrelating to finances 111 niques language as an injunction against the Bureau's mail opening program as wel1.52 Apparently a termination order was issued to field offices by telephone FBI mail-opening was suspended al though the Bureau continued to seek information from CIA's illegal mail-opening program until its suspension in 1973 A year and a half before Hoover's cutbacks on wire-tapping "black bag jobs, and mail-opening he prohibited the FBI's use of other covert techniques such as mail covers and trash covers.52S FBI intelligence officials persisted in requesting authority for "black bag techniques In 1967 Director Hoover ordered that "no such rec ommendations should be submitted. 529At about this time Attorney General Ramsey Clark was asked to approve a "breaking and enter ing operation and declined to do so.J30There was an apparently un authorized surreptitious entry directed at a "domestic subversive tar get as late as April 1968.531A proposal from the field to resume mail opening for foreign counterintelligence purposes was turned down by FBI officials in 1970.532 7 Accountability and Control a The Huston Plan A Domestic Intelligence Network In 1970 pressures from the White House and from within the in telligence community led to the formulation of a plan for coordination and expansion of domestic intelligence activity The so-called "Huston Plan called for Presidential authorization of illegal intelligence tech niques expanded domestic intelligence collection and centralized eval uation of domestic intelligence President Nixon approved the plan and then five days later revoked his approval Despite the revocation of official approval many major aspects of the plan were implemented and some techniques which the intelligence community asked for permission to implement had already been underway In 1970 there was an intensification of the social tension in America that had provided the impetus in the 1960s for ever-widening domestic intelligence operations The spring invasion of Cambodia by United States forces triggered the most extensive campus demonstrations and student "strikes in the history of the war in Southeast Asia Domestic strife heightened even further when four students were killed by Na and membership which "we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization. "'Warman 10/13/75 pp 45-46 There is to this day no formal order pro hibiting FBI mail-opening although Assistant Director Wannall contendedthat general FBI Manual instructions now applicableforbid any unlawful technique These techniques were not prohibited by law Their use was banned in all cases including serious criminal investigations and foreign counterintelligence matters (Memorandumfrom W C Sullivan to A H Belmont 9/30/64.) Mail covers which may be used to identify from their exteriors certain letters which can then be opened with a judicial warrant were reinstituted with Justice De partment approval in 1971 (Memorandumfrom Hoover to Mitchell 7/27/71 Memorandumfrom Assistant Attorney General Will Wilsonto Hoover 9/31/71.) 52 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Tolsonand DeLoach 1/6/67 L0"OnceMr Hoover apparently at the request ofthe National SecurityAgency sought approval to break and enter into a foreign missionat the United Nations to procure cryptographic materials to facilitate decodingof intercepted trans missions The request was presented with someurgency rejected and presented again on perhaps several occasions It was never approved and constituted the onlyrequest of that kind. [Statement of former Attorney GeneralRamsey Clark Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommitteeon Administrative Practice and Procedure (1974).1 MemorandumfromFBI to Senate SelectCommittee 2/23/75 5 Memorandumfrom W A Branigan to W C Sullivan 3/31/70 112 tional Guardsmen at Kent State University Within one twenty-four hour period there were 400 bomb threats in New York City alone To respond White House Chief of Staff H R Haldeman assigned prin cipal responsibility for domestic intelligence plamuiing to staff assist ant Tom Charles Huston." Since June 1969 Huston had been in touch with the head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division Assistant Director William C Sullivan Huston initially contacted Sullivan on President Nixon's be half to request "all information possibly relating to foreign influences and financing of the New Left. 534Huston also made similar requests to CIA NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency The quality of the data provided by these agencies especially the FBI had failed to satisfy Huston and Presidential assistant John Ehrlichman.535 There after Huston's continued discussions with Assistant Director Sulli van convinced him that the restraints imposed upon domestic intelli gence techniques by Director Iloover impeded the collection of im portant information about dissident activity.536 (1) Intelligence Community Pressu.res. The interest of the White House in better intelligence about domestic protest activity coincided with growing dissatisfaction among the foreign intelligence agencies with the FBI Director's restrictions on their performance of foreign intelligence functions in America.537 The CIA's concerns crystallized in March 1970 when as a result of a "flap over the CIA's refusal to disclose information t.o the FBI Hoover issued an order that "direct liaison at FBI head quarters with CIA "be terminated and that "any contact with CIA in the future was to take place "by letter only. 538This order did not bar interagency communication secure telephones were installed and working-level contacts continued But the position of FBI "liaison agent with CIA was eliminated.539 CIA Director Helms subsequently attempted to reopen the question of FBI cooperation with CIA requests for installing electronic surveillances and covering mail.54 Hoover replied that he agreed with Helms that there should be expanded "exchange of information be tween our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist mat ters. However he refused the request for aid with electronic sur veillance and mail coverage Hoover cited the "widespread concern Memorandumfrom John R Brownto H R Haldeman 4/30/70 'Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach 6/20/69 Memorandumfrom Hus ton to Hoover 6/20/69 "5TomCharles Huston testimony 5/23/75 p 19 X36 Huston 5/23/75 pp 23 28 '17Helms deposition 9/10/75 p 3 Bennett deposition 8/5/75 p 12 Gayler deposition 6/19/75 pp 6-7 As early as 1963 the FBI Director had successfully opposeda proposal to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board by CIA Director John McCone for expanded domestic wiretapping for foreign intelligence purposes (Memorandum from W C Sullivan to C D DeLoach 3/7/70) In 1969 CIA Director Richard Helms was told by the Bureau when he asked it to institute electronic surveillance on behalf of the CIA that he should "refer such requests directly to Attorney General for approval. (Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach 3/30/70.) The administrators of NSA also failed to persuade Director Hoover to lift his restraints on foreign intelligenceelectronic surveillance (Staff summary of Louis Tordella interview 6/16/75.) cseNoteby Hooveronletter from Helmsto Hoover 2/26/70 "9Former FBI Liaisonwith CIAtestimony 9/22/75 p 3 "'Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach 3/30/70 pp 1-2 4 113 by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type of coverage. Their use in "domestic investigations posed legal problems not encountered "in similar operations abroad. Hoover added "The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people. 541 (2) The Interagency on in?ttec Report In the following months Tom Charles Huston arranged a meeting between President Nixon and the directors of the FBI CIA NSA and DL\ on June 5 1970. The President's emphasis was upon Unproved coordination among the agencies to strengthen their capabilities to collect intelligence about "revolutionary activism and "the support ideological and other wise of foreign powers for these activities The talking paper prepared by Huston for the President to read at the meeting declared "We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country one which we know too little about.5"3 From this meeting emanated the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) prepared jointly by representa tives of the FBI CIA NSA and DIA and submitted to the President a month later.5i The report presented the President a series of options and Huston recommended that the President approve the following "coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S citizens using international facilities "intensification of "electronic surveillances and pene trations directed at individuals and groups "who pose a major threat to the internal security and at "foreign na tionals in the United States "of interest to the intelligence community removal of restrictions on "legal mail coverage and relaxation of "restrictions on covert coverage [mail open ing] on "selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest modification of "present restrictions on "surreptitious entry to allow "procurement of vitally needed foreign cryp tographic material and "to permit selective use against "high priority internal security targets relaxation of "present restrictions on the "develop ment of campus sources to permit "expanded coverage of violence-prone and student-related groups "increased coverage by CIA "of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad appointment of a "permanent committee consisting of the FBI CIA NSA DIA and the military counterintelli gence agencies to evaluate "domestic intelligence and to "carry out the other objectives specified in the report. 545 Huston also raised and dismissed questions about the legality of two collection techniques in particular "Covert [mail opening] cov 6 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Helms 3/31/70 Huston deposition 5/23/75 p 32 '2 Presidential TalkingPaper 6/5/70 fromthe NixonPapers The report was written by the Research Section of the FBI DomesticIntel ligenceDivision on the basis of committee decisionsand FBI Director Hoover's revisions (Staff Summaryof Richard Cotterinterview 9/15/75.) '''' The seven recommendationswere made in an attachment to a memorandum from Huston to Haldeman 7/70 68-7860 76 9 114 erage is illegal and there are serious risks involved, he wrote "How ever the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh the risks. 545 As for surreptitious entry Huston advised Use of this technique is clearly illegal it amounts to burglary It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrass ment if exposed However it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be ob tained in any other fashion. 54 Huston testified that his recommendations "reflected what I under stood to be the consensus of the working group of intelligence officials on the interagency committee.548 Just over a week later the FBI CIA NSA and DIA were advised by Huston that "the President has made the following decisions" to adopt all of Huston's recommendations.545 Henceforth with Presi dential authority the intelligence community could intercept the international communications of Americans eavesdrop electronically on anyone deemed a "threat to the internal security read the mail of American citizens break into the homes of anyone regarded as a security threat and monitor the activities of student political groups at home and abroad There is no indication that the President was informed at this time that NSA was already covering the international communications of Americans and had been doing so for domestic intelligence purposes since at least 1967 Nor is there any indication that he was told that the CIA was opening the mail of Americans and sharing the contents with the FBI and the military for domestic intelligence purposes In effect the "Huston plan supplied Presidential authority for operations pre viously undertaken in secret without such authorization For instance the plan gave FBI Assistant Director Sullivan the "support from "responsible quarters which he had believed necessary to resume the "black bag jobs and mail-opening programs Director Hoover had terminated in 1966.55 Nevertheless the FBI Director was not satisfied with Huston's memorandum concerning the authorization of the plan.551 Hoover went immediately to Attorney General Mitchell who had not known of the prior deliberations or the President's "decisions. 552In a memo randum Director Hoover said he would implement the plan but only with the explicit approval of the Attorney General or the President 646Memorandumfrom Huston to Haldeman 7/70 "'Memorandum from Huston to Haldeman 7/70 In using the word "bur glar, Huston said he sought to "escalate the rhetoric to make it as bold as possible. He thought that as a staff man he should give the President "the worst possible interpretation of what the recommendation would result in. (Huston deposition 5/22/75 P 69.) s4sHuston deposition 5/22/75 p 8 "'Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Intelligence Directors 7/23/70 n'oMemorandumfrom Sullivanto DeLoach 4/14/70 An assistant to the head of the DefenseIntelligence Agencyrecalls agreeing with his superior that the memorandumfrom Huston to the intelligencedirectors showed that the white House had "passed that one down about as low as they could go and that the absence of signatures by the President or his ton aides indicated "what a hot potato it was. (Staff summary of James Stillwell inter view 5/21/75.) 552Mitchelltestimony 10/24/75 Hearings vol 4 p 122 115 Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of the various investigative restraints referred to above and to the creation of a permanent interagency committee on do mestic intelligence the FBI is prepared to implement the instructions of the White House at your direction Of course we would continue to seek your specific authorization where appropriate to utilize the various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases.553 CIA Director Helms shortly thereafter indicated his support for the plan to the Attorney General telling him "we had put our backs into this exercise. 554Nonetheless Mitchell advised the President to with draw his approval.' Huston was told to rescind his memorandum and the White House Situation Room dispatched a message requesting its return.556 (3) Implementation. The President's withdrawal of approval for the "Huston plan did not in fact result in the termination of either the NSA program for covering the communications of Americans or the CIA mail-opening program These programs continued without the formal authorization which had been hoped for.'5T The directors of the CIA and NSA also continued to explore means of expanding their involvement in and access to domestic intelligence.55S A new group the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) was created by Attorney General Mitchell within the Justice Department to consider such expansion.'' NSA CIA Army counterintelligence and the FBI 5 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Mitchell 7/25/70 " Helmsmemorandumfor the record 7/28/70 b Mitchell 10/24/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 123 'Huston deposition 5/23/75 p 56 staff summary of David McManusinter view 7/1/75 'Director Helms thinks he told Attorney General Mitchell about the CIA mail program Helms also believes President Nixon may have known about the program although Helms did not personally inform him (Helms 10/22/75 Hearings Vol 4 pp 88-89.) Mitchelldenied that Helms told him of a CIA mail opening program and testified that the President had no knowledge of the program "at least not as of the time we discussed the Huston Plan. (Mitchell 9/24/75 Hearings Vol 4 pp 120 138.) "AIn March 1971 NSADirector NoelGayler and CIADirector Helmsmet with Attorney General Mitchell and Director Hoover Accordingto Hoover's memo randum of the meeting it had been arranged by Helms to discuss "a broadening of operations particularly of the very confidentialtype in coveringintelligence both domestic and foreign. Hoover was again "not enthusiastic because of "the hazards involved. Mitchellasked Helmsand Gaylerto prepare "an in-depth examination of the collectionmethods they desired (Memorandumfor the files by J Edgar Hoover 4/12/71.) It was less than two months after this meeting that according to a CIA memorandum Director Helms briefed Mitchell on the mail program (CIA memorandumfor the record 6/3/71.) Even beforethis meet ing NSADirector Gayler sent a memorandumto Attorney General Mitchelland Defense Secretary Melvin Laird describing "NSA's Contribution to Domestic Intelligence. This memorandum refers to a discussion with both Mitchell and Laird on howNSAcouldassist with "intelligencebearing on domesticproblems. The memorandum mentioned the monitoring of foreign support for subversive activities as well as for drug trafficking although it did not discuss specifically the NSA "Watch List of Americans (Memorandumfrom NSA Director Noel Gayler to the Secretary of Defenseand the Attorney General January 26 1971.) NSA officialBenson Buffham recorded that he personally showed this memo randum to Mitchell and had been told by the Military Assistant to Secretary Laird that the Secretary had read and agreed with it (Memorandumfor the record by BensonK Buffham 2/3/71.) susMemorandumfrom Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian to Attorney GeneralMitchell 12/4/70 116 each sent representatives to the IEC NSA Director Gayler provided the IEC with a statement of NSA's capabilities and procedures for supplying domestic intelligence.560 Although the IEC merely evalu ated raw intelligence data over 90 percent of which came to it through the FBI it had access to domestic intelligence from NSA coverage and the CIA's mail-opening and CHAOS programs which was channeled to the FBI.'61 Two of the specific recommendations in the "Huston Plan were thereafter implemented by the FBI the lowering of the age limit for campus informants from 21 to 18 and the resumption of "legal mail covers. J62Two men who had participated in developing the "Huston Plan were promoted to positions of greater influence within the Bureau.563 More important the Bureau greatly intensified its domestic intelligence investigations in the fall of 1970 without using "clearly illegal techniques The Ivey Black Extremist Program was inaugu rated and field offices were instructed to open approximately 10,500 new investigations including investigations of all black student groups "regardless of their present or past involvement in disorders. All members of "militant New Left campus organizations were also to be investigated even if they were not "known to be violence prone. The objective of these investigations was "to identify potential as well as "actual extremists. 564 The chief of the Domestic Intelligence Division in 1970 said the "Huston Plan had "nothing to do with the FBI's expanded intelli gence activities Rather both the "Huston Plan and the Bureau inten sification represented the same effort by FBI intelligence officials "to recommend the types of action and programs which they thought necessary to cope with the problem. 565Brennan admits that "the FBI was getting a tremendous amount of pressure from the White House, although he attributes this pressure to demands from "a vast majority of the American people who wanted to know "why something wasn't being done about violence and disruption in the country.566 b Political Intelligence The FBI practice of supplying political information to the White House and on occasion responding to White House requests for such information was established before 1964 However under the administrations of President Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon this practice grew to unprecedented dimensions.587 (1) Name Check Requests. White House aides serving under Presi dents Johnson and Nixon made numerous requests for "name checks "'Memorandum from Gaylerto Laird and Mitchell 1/26/71 "'For a discussion of the FBI as "consumer. see pp 107 109 "'The resumption of mail covers is discussed above at footnote 528 FBI field officeswere instructed that they could recruit 18 21 year-old informers in September 1970 (SAC Letter No 70 48 9/15/70.) See p 76 seaThe head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division William C Sullivan was promoted to he Assistant to the Director for all investigative and intelli gence activities His successor in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division was CharlesD Brennan "'Executives Conferenceto Tolson 10/29/70 Memorandumfrom FBI Head quarters to all SACs 11/4/70 60Brennan deposition 9/23/75 Dn29-21 " Brennan testimony 9/25/75 Hearings vol 2 p 108 xTThe Involvementof the Central Intelligence Agencyin improper activities for the white House is describedin the RockefellerCommissionReport Ch 14 117 of FBI files to elicit all Bureau information on particular critics of each administration Johnson aides requested such reports on critics of the escalating war in Vietnam i President Johnson's assistants also requested name checks on members of the Senate staff of Presi dential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964,569on Justice and Treasury Department officials responsible for a phase of the criminal investi gation of Johnson's former aide Bobby Baker,569a on the authors of books critical of the Warren Commission report,570 and on prominent newsmen.571 President Nixon's aides asked for similar name checks on another newsman the Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action and the producer of a film critical of the President.572 According to a memorandum by Director Hoover Vice President Spiro Agnew received ammunition from Bureau files that could be used in "destroying [the] credibility of Southern Christian Lead ership Conference leader Reverend Ralph Abernathy.573 (2) Democratic National Convention Atlantic City 1964.-On August 22 1964 at the request of the White House the FBI sent a "special squad to the Democratic National Convention site in Atlantic City New Jersey The squad was assigned to assist the Secret Service in protecting President Lyndon Johnson and to ensure that the convention itself would not be marred by civil disruption But it went beyond these functions to report political intelligence to the White House Approximately 30 Special Agents headed by Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach "were able to keep the White House fully apprised of all major developments during the Con vention's course by means of "informant coverage by use of various confidential techniques by infiltration of key groups through use of undercover agents and through utilization of agents using appro priate cover as reporters. 574Among these "confidential techniques were a wiretap on the hotel room occupied by Dr Martin Luther King Jr. and microphone surveillance of a storefront serving as head quarters for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and another civil rights organization.575 m Letter fromJ Edgar Hooverto MarvinWatson 6/4/65 Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers 10/27/64 cited in FBI summary memorandum subject Senator Barry Goldwater 1/31/75 Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Tolson 1/17/67 "'Memorandum from Hoover to Marvin Watson 11/8/66 "i SeeFinding onPolitical Abuse p 225 '72Letter from J Edgar Hoover to John D Ehrlichman 10/6/69 House Judiciary Committee Hearings Statement of Information (1974) Book VII p 1111 Book VIII p 18.3 Director Hoover volunteered information from Bureau files to the Johnson White House on the author of a play satirizing the President (Memorandumfrom Hoover to Watson 1/9/67.) 6Y8Memorandumfrom Hoover to Tolson et al. 5/18/70 Agnewadmits having received such information but denies having asked for it (Staff summary of Spiro Agnewinterview 10/15/75.) 674Memorandumfrom C P DeLoach to Mr Mohr 8/29/64 6uDeLoachmemorandum 8/29/64 Cartha DeLoachtestimony 12/3/75 Hear ings Vol 6 p 177 A 1975 FBI Inspection Report has speculated that the SNCCbug may have been planted because the Bureau had information in 1964 that "an apparent member of the Communist Party USA was engaging in ennsirlerableactivity much in a leadership capacity in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. (FBI summary memorandum 1/30/75.) It is unclear however whether this hue was even approvedinternally by FBI Headquarters as ordinarily required by Bureau procedures DeLoach stated in a contempo raneous memorandumthat the microphonesurveillance of SNCCwas instituted (Continued) 118 Neither of the electronic surveillances at Atlantic City were spe cifically authorized by the Attorney General At that time Justice Department procedures did not require the written approval of the Attorney General for bugs such as the one directed against SNCC in Atlantic City Bureau officials apparently believed that the wiretap on King was justified as an extension of Robert Kennedy's October 10 1963 approval for surveillance of King at his then-current address in Atlanta Georgia or at any future address to which he might move.576The only recorded reason for instituting the wiretap on Dr King in Atlantic City however was set forth in an internal memo randum prepared shortly before the Convention Martin Luther King Jr. head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) an organization set up to promote integration which we are investigating to deter mine the extent of Communist Party (CP) influence on King and the SCLC plans to attend and possibly may indulge in a hunger fast as a means of protests Walter Jenkins an Administrative Assistant to President Johnson who was the recipient of information developed by the Bureau stated that he was unaware that any of the intelligence was obtained by wiretapping or bugging.578 DeLoach moreover has testified that he is uncertain whether he ever informed Jenkins of these sources 57 Walter Jenkins and presumably President Johnson received a significant volume of information from the electronic surveillance at Atlantic City much of it purely political and only tangentially re lated to possible civil disturbances The most important single issue for President Johnson at the Atlantic City Convention was the seat ing challenge of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to the regular Mississippi delegation.58 From the electronic surveillances of King and SNCC the White House was able to obtain the most intimate details of the plans of individuals supporting the MFDP's challenge unrelated to the possibility of violent demonstrations Jenkins received a steady stream of reports on political strategy in the struggle to seat the MFDP delegation and other political plans and discussions by the civil rights groups under surveillance.581 More over the 1975 Inspection Report stated that "several Congressmen (Continued) "with Bureau approval. (Memorandumfrom DeLoach to Mohr 8/29/64.) But the Inspection Report concludedthat "a thorough review of Bureau recordsfails to locate any memorandumcontaining [internal] authorization for same. (FBI summary memorandum 1/30/75.) 'Mr DeLoach cited the fact that in the summer of 1964"there was an on going electronic surveillance on Dr Martin Luther King as authorized by Attorney General Kennedy. (Cartha DeLoachtestimony 11/26/75 p 110) The Inspection Report noted that the Special Agent in Charge of the Newark office was instructed to institute the wiretap on the ground that "the Bureau had au thority from the Attorney General to cover any residences which King may use with a technical installation. (FBI summary memorandum1/30/75 Sub ject "Special Squad at Democratic National Convention Atlantic City New Jersey August22-28 1964.") s Memorandumfrom W C Sullivanto A H Belmont 8/21/64 meStaff ,summaryof Walter Jenkins interview 12/1/75 S9DeLoaeh 11/26/75 p 114 580TheodoreWhite Makingof the President 1964(NewYork Athenium 1965) pp 277-280 Walter Jenkins also confirmed this characterization (Staff sum mary of Jenkins interview 12/1/75) Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Mohr 8/29/64 119 Senators and Governors of States were overheard on the King tap.582 According to both Cartha DeLoach and Walter Jenkins the Bu reau's coverage in Atlantic City was not designed to serve political ends DeLoach testified I was sent there to provide information which could reflect on the orderly progress of the convention and the danger to distinguished individuals and particularly the danger to the President of the United States as exempli fied by the many many references [to possible civil disturb ances] in the memoranda furnished Mr Jenkins....583 Jenkins has stated that the mandate of the FBI's special unit did not encompass the gathering of political intelligence and speculated that the dissemination of any such intelligence was due to the inability of Bureau agents to distinguish dissident activities which represented a genuine potential for violence.584Jenkins did not believe the White House ever used the incidental political intelligence that was received However a document located at the Lyndon B Johnson Presidential Library suggests that at least one political use was made of Mr De Loach's reports.585 Thus although it may have been implemented to prevent violence at the Convention site the Bureau's coverage in Atlantic City which included two electronic surveillances undeniably provided useful po litical intelligence to the President as well.586 (3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage. Through the FBI's coverage of certain foreign officials in Washington D.C. the Bureau was able to comply with President Johnson's request for re ports of the contacts between members of Congress and foreign officials opposed to his Vietnam policy According to a summary memorandum prepared by the FBI On March 14 1966 then President Lyndon B Johnson in formed Mr DeLoach [Cartha DeLoach Assistant Director of the FBI] that the FBI should constantly keep abreast of the actions of [certain foreign officials] in making contact with Senators and Congressmen and any citizen of a prom inent nature The President stated he strongly felt that much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy particularly the hearings in the Senate had been generated by [certain foreign officials].587 yesMemorandumfrom H V Bassett to Mr Callahan 1/29/75 DeLoach 11/26/75 P 139 584Staff summary of Jenkins interview 1/21/75 "8Exhibit 68-2 Hearings Vol VI p 713 88FBI memoranda indicate that in 1968Vice President Hubert Humphrey's Executive Assistant Bill Connell asked the Bureau to send a "special team to the forthcoming Democratic National Convention since President Johnson "al legedlytold the VicePresident that the FBI had beenof great serviceto him and he had been given considerable information on a timely basis throughout the entire convention. (Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Tolson 8/7/68) After talk ing with Connell Director Hoover advised the SACin Chicagothat the Bureau was "not going to get into anything political but anything of extreme action or violencecontemplatedwe want to let Connellknow. (Memorandumfrom Hoover to Tolson et al. ,/15/68.) Democratic Party Treasurer John Criswell made a similar request stating that Postmaster General Marvin Watson "had informed him of the great service performed by the FBI during the last DemocraticCon vention. (Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Tolson 8/22/68.) 66fFBI summary memorandum 2/3/75 120 As a result of the President's request the FBI prepared a chronolog ical summary apparently based in part on existing electronic surveil lances of the contacts of each Senator Representative or legislative staff member who communicated with selected foreign officials during the period July 1 1964 to March 17 1966 This 67-page summary was transmitted to the White House on March 21 1966 with a note that certain foreign officials were "making more contacts with four named Senators "than with other United States legislators. 589A second sum mary prepared on further contacts between Congressmen and foreign officials was transmitted to the White House on May 13 1966 From then until the end of the Johnson Administration in January 1969 biweekly additions to the second summary were regularly disseminated to the White House.599 This practice was reinstituted during the Nixon Administration On July 27 1970 Larry Higby Assistant to H R Haldeman in formed the Bureau that Haldeman "wanted any information pos sessed by the FBI relating to contacts between [certain foreign offi cials] and Members of Congress and its staff. Two days later the Bureau provided the White House with a statistical compilation of such contacts from January 1 1967 to the present Unlike the case of the information provided to the Johnson White House however there is no indication in related Bureau records that President Nixon or his aides were concerned about critics of the President's policy The Bu reau's reports did not identify individual Senators they provided overall statistics and two examples of foreign recruitment attempts (with names removed).J90 In at least one instance the FBI at the request of the President and with the approval of the Attorney General instituted an electronic surveillance of a foreign target for the express purpose of intercept ing telephone conversations of an American citizen An FBI memo randum states that shortly before the 1968 Presidential election Pres ident Johnson became suspicious that the South Vietnamese were trying to sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that Presidential candidate Nixon would win the election and then take a harder line toward North Vietnam To determine the validity of this suspicion the White House instructed the FBI to institute physical surveillance of Mrs Anna Chennault a prominent Republican as well as electronic surveillance directed against a South Vietnamese target.591 The electronic surveillance was authorized by Attorney General Ramsey Clark on October 29 1968 installed the same day and con tinued until January 6 1969.592Thus a "foreign electronic surveil lance was instituted to target indirectly an American citizen who could not be legitimately surveilled directly Also as part of this investiga tion President Johnson personally ordered a check of the long distance toll call records of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew.593 FBI summarymemorandum 2/3/75 FBI summary memorandum 2/3/75 6B0FBI summary memorandum 2/3/75 See Findings on Political Abuse " FBI summarymemorandum 2/1/75 'Memorandum from Director FBI to Attorney General 10/2;x/68 memo randum from Director FBI to Attorney General 10/30/68 memorandumfrom Director FBI to Attorney General 3/27/69 Attorney General Clark testified that he was unaware of any surveillance of Mrs Chennault (Clark 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 251-252.) SeeFindings onPolitical Abuse p 225 121 (4) The Surccillance of Joseph limit (1969) . There is no substan tial indication of any genuine national security rationale for the elec tronic surveillance overseas of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969 John Erlichman testified before the Senate Watergate Committee that the national security was involved but did not elaborate further.504 Beyond this general claim however there is little evidence that any national security issue was involved in the case Former Deputy Attor ney General and Acting FBI Director William Ruckelshaus testified that after reviewing the matter he "could never see any national se curity justification for the surveillance of Kraft Ruckelshaus stated that the Administration's "justification for bugging Kraft's hotel room was that he was "asking questions of some members of the North Vietnamese Government. Ruckelshaus believed that this was not an adequate national security justification for placing "any kind of sur veillance on an American citizen or newsman. 69 Mr Kraft agreed that he was in contact with North Vietnamese officials while he was abroad in 1969 but noted that this was a common practice among journalists and that "at the time he never knowingly published any classified informations s The documentary record also reveals no national security justifica tion for the FBI's electronic surveillance of Mr Kraft overseas The one memorandum which referred to "Possible Leaks of Informa tion by Kraft does not indicate that there clearly was a leak of na tional security significance or that Mr Kraft was responsible for such a leak if it occurred.59 Furthermore the hotel room bug did not pro duce any evidence that Kraft received or published any classified information.59s John Ehrlichman testimony Senate Watergate Committee 7/24/73 p 2535 Accordingto the transcript of the White House tapes President Nixon stated to John Dean onApril 16,1973 "What I mean is I think in the case of the Kraft stuff what the FBI did they were both fine I have checkedthe facts There were some done through private sources Most of it was done through the Bureau after we got Hoover didn't want to do Kraft What it involved apparently John was this the leaks from the NSC [National Security Council) They were in Kraft and others columns and we were trying to plug the leaks and we had to get it done and finally we turned it over to Hoover And then when the hullabaloo developed we just knockedit off altogether (Submissionof Recorded Presidential Conversa tions to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by President Richard Nixon 4/30/74.) The President's statement was made in the context of coaching John Dean on what to say to the Watergate Grand Jury William Ruckleshaus testimony before the Subcommitteeon Administrative Prnetice and Procedure 5/9/74 p 320 'Kraft testified that Henry Kissinger then the President's Special Adviser for National Security informedhim that he had no knowledgeof either the wire tap or the hotel roombug Kraft also stated that former Attorney General Elliot Richardson indicated to him that "there was no justification for these activities. (Joseph Kraft testimony Senate Subcommitteeon Administrative Practice and Procedure 5/10/74 p 381.) 69Letter from W C Sullivanto Mr Hoover 7/12/69 'While the summaries sent to Hoover by Sullivan did show that Kraft con tacted North Vietnameseofficials(Letter from Sullivan to Hoover 7/12/69) the Bureau did not discover any improprieties or indiscretions on his part When Ruckelshaus was asked if his review of these summaries revealed to him that Kraft engagedin any conduct while abroad that poseda danger to the national security he replied "Absolutelynot. (Ruckelshaus testimony before the Sub committeeon Administrative Practice and Procedure 5/9/74 p 320) 122 Similarly there is no evidence of a national security justification for the physical surveillance and proposed electronic surveillance of Kraft in the fall of 1969 A Bureau memorandum suggests that the Attorney General requested some type of coverage of Kraft,399 but the record reveals no purpose for this coverage The physical surveillance was discontinued after five weeks because it had "not been produc tive. Apparently the Attorney General himself was unconvinced that a genuine national security justification supported the Kraft surveillance he refused to authorize the requested wiretap and it was consequently never implemented.600 (5) The "17 lViretaps. The relative ease with which high admin istration officials could select improper intelligence targets was demon strated by the "17 wiretaps on Executive officials and newsmen in stalled between 1969 1971 under the rationale of determining the source of leaks of sensitive information.600a In three cases no national security claim was even advanced While national security issues were at least arguably involved in the initiation of the other taps the pro gram continued in two instances against persons who left the govern ment and took positions as advisors to Senator Edmund Muskie then the leading Democratic Presidential prospect 601 The records of these wiretaps were kept separate from the FBI's regular electronic surveillance files 662their duration in many cases went beyond the period then required for re-authorization by the At torney General and in some cases the Attorney General did not au thorize the tap until after it had begu n.603In 1971 the records were removed from the FBI's possession and sent to the White House Thus misuse of the FBI had progressed by 19.71from the regular receipt by the White House of political "tid-bits and occasional re quests for name checks of Bureau files to the use of a full array of intelligence operations to serve the political interests of the admin istration The final irony was that the Nixon administration came to distrust Director Hoover's reliability and consequently to develop a White House-based covert intelligence operation. c The Justice Department's Internal Security Division FBI intelligence reports flowed consistently to the Justice Depart ment especially to the IDIU established by Attorney General Clark in 1967 and to the Internal Security Division Before 1971 the Justice Department provided little guidance to the FBI on the proper scope of domestic intelligence investigations.605 For example in response to a Bureau inquiry in 1964 about whether a group's activities came "within the criteria of the employee security program or were "in 6BB Memorandumfrom W C Sullivan to Mr DeLoach 11/4/69 800Memorandumfrom Sullivanto DeLoach 12/11/69 800aFor discussionof dissemination of political intelligencefrom the "17 wire taps see Finding on Political Abuse p 225 801Sen Edmund Muskie testimony Senate Foreign Relations Committee 9/10/73 Executive Session pp 50-51 602Memorandumfrom W C Sullivanto C D DeLoach 5/11/69 "'Report of the House Judiciary Committee 5/20/74 pp 146-1M 604The creation of the "plumbers unit in the White House led inexorably to Watergate See Report of the House Judiciary Committee 8/20/74 pp 157-162 166-170 'An example of a generalized Departmental instruction is Attorney General Clark's order of September 1967 (see p 79) regarding civil disorders 123 violation of any other federal statute, 60Gthe Internal Security Divi sion replied that there was "insufficient evidence for prosecution and that the group's leaders were "becoming more cautious in their ut terances. 60 Nevertheless the FBI continued for years to investigate the group with the knowledge and approval of the Division (1) The "New Internal Security Division,. When Robert Mardian was appointed Assistant Attorney General in late 1970 the Internal Security Division assumed a more active posture In fact one of the alternatives to implementation of the "Huston Plan suggested to Attorney General John Mitchell by White House aide John Dean was the invigoration of the Division.603 This included Mardian's es tablishment of the IEC to prepare domestic intelligence estimates Equally significant however was Mardian's preparation of a new Executive Order on federal employee security The new order assigned to the moribund Subversive Activities Control Board the function of designating groups for what had been the "Attorney General's list.. 609This attempt to assign broad new functions by Executive fiat to a Board with limited statutory responsibilities clearly disregarded the desires of the Congress.610 According to Mardian there was a "problem because the list had "not been updated for 17 years. He expected that the revitalized SACB would "deal specifically with the revolutionary/terrorist or ganizations which have recently become a part of our history. en Assistant Attorney General Mardian's views coincided with those of FBI Assistant Director Brennan who had seen a need to compile massive data on the "New Left for future employee security pur poses.612Since FBI intelligence investigations were based in part on the standards for the "Attorney General's list, the new Executive Order substantially redefined and expanded FBI authority The new order included groups who advocated the use of force to deny individ ual rights under the "laws of any State or to overthrow the govern ment of "any State or subdivision thereof. 613The new order also continued to use the term "subversive, although it was theoretically more restrictive than the previous standard for the Attorney Gen eral's list because it required "unlawful advocacy 'Memorandum from FBI Director to Yeagley 1/31/64 "'Memorandum from Yeagley to FBI Director 3/3/64 There was no reau thorization of the continuing investigation between 1966and 1974 "Memorandum from Dean to Mitchell 9/18/70 'Executive Order 11605 7/71 "By 1971 the SACBhad the limited function of making findings that spe cificindividuals and groups were Communist Its registration of Communisthad beendeclaredunconstitutional [Albertsonv SubversiveActivitiesControlBoard 382 U.S 70 (19651.1 "'Robert C Mardian address before the AtomicEnergy CommissionSecurity Conference Washington D.C 10/27/71 Mardian added that the "problem was that without an updated formal list of subversive organizations federal agen cies were required "to individually evaluate information regarding membership in allegedly subversive organizations based on raw data furnished by the Fed eral Bureau of Investigation or other governmental sources. 81Brennan testimony 9/25/75 Hearings vol 2 116-117 'Executive Order 11605 7/71 By contrast the prior order had been limited to groups seeking forcible violation of rights "under the Constitution of the United States or seeking "to alter the form of governmentof the United States by unconstitutional means. Executive Order 10450 (1953) 124 Mardian made it clear that under the order the FBI was to provide intelligence to the Subversive Activities Control Board We have a new brand of radical in this country and we are trying to address ourselves to the new situation With the in vestigative effort of the FBI we hope to present petitions to the Board in accordance with requirement of the Execu tive Order.614 FBI intelligence officials learned that the Internal Security Division intended to "initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party Progressive Labor Party Young Socialist Alliance and Ku Klux Klan. They also noted "The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and generally coincides with the basis for our investiga tion of extremist groups. 615Mardian had in effect provided a new and wider "charter for FBI domestic intelligence.616 (2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship. In 1971 Director Hoover expressed growing concern over the close relationship developing between his FBI subordinates in the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Internal Security Division under Mardian For example when FBI intelligence officials met with Mardian's principal deputy A William Olsen to discuss "proposed changes in procedure for the Attorney General's authorization of electronic surveillance Hoover reiterated instructions that Bureau officials be "very careful in our dealings with Mardian Moreover to have a source of legal advice independent of the Justice Department the FBI Director created a new position of Assistant Director for Legal Counsel and required that he attend "at any time officials of the Department are being contacted on any policy consideration which affects the Bureau. 61 In the summer of 1971 William C Sullivan openly challenged FBI Director Hoover possibly counting on Mardian and Attorney General Mitchell to back him up and oust Hoover.616 Sullivan charged in one memorandum to Hoover that other Bureau officials lacked "objectiv ity and "independent thinking and that "they said what they did because they thought this was what the Director wanted them to say. 619 Shortly thereafter Director Hoover appointed W Mark Felt for merly Assistant Director for the Inspection Division to a newly cre ated position as Sullivan's superior Apparently realizing that he was on his way out Sullivan gave Assistant Attorney General Mardian the FBI's documents recording the authorization for and dissemination "'Hearings on the appropriation for the Department of Justice before the House Subcommitteeon Appropriations 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1972) p 673 "'Inspection Report FBI Domestic Intelligence Division August 17 Sep tember9 1971 'The hostile Congressionalreaction to this Order which shifted duties by Executive fiat to a Board created by statute for other purposes led to the death ofthe SACBwhennoappropriation was granted in 1972 FBI Executives ConferenceMemorandum 6/2/71 The first assistant Direc tor for Legal Counselwas Dwight Dalbey who had for years been in charge of the legal training of Bureau agents Dalbey'selevationearly in 1971and Hoover's requirement that he review all legal aspects of FBI policy including intelligence matters wasa major changein Bureau procedure (Memorandumfrom Hooverto AllBureau Officialsand Supervisors 3/S/71.) 618FBI Summaryof Interview with RobertMardian 5/10/73 pp 1 3 619Memorandumfrom Sullivan to Hoover 6/16/71 125 of information from the "17 wiretaps placed on Executive officials and newsmen in 1969-1971 The absence of these materials was not dis covered by other FBI officials until after Sullivan was forced to resign in September 1971.626Mardian eventually took part in the transfer of these records to the White House." Thus the Attorney General's principal assistant for internal secu rity collaborated with a ranking FBI official to conceal vital records ultimately to be secreted away in the White House This provides a striking example of the manner in which channels of legitimate author ity within the Executive Branch can be abused d The FBI's Secret "Administrative Index In the fall of 1971 the FBI confronted the prospect of the first seri ous Congressional curtailment of domestic intelligence investiga tions repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 and set a course of evasion of the will of Congress which continued partly with Justice Department approval until 1973 An FBI Inspection Report viewed the prospect of the repeal with out great alarm In the event the Act was repealed the FBI intended to continue as before under "the Government's inherent right to pro tect itself internally. 62 After the repeal took place Bureau officials elaborated the following rationale for keeping the Security Index of "potentially dangerous subversives Should this country come under attack from hostile forces foreign or domestic there is nothing to preclude the President from going before a joint session of Congress and requesting necessary authority to apprehend and detain those who would constitute a menace to national defense At this point it would be absolutely essential to have an immediate list such as the SI for use in making such apprehensions.623 [Em phasis added.] Thus FBI officials hoped there would be a way to circumvent the repeal "in which the essence of the Security Index and emergency detention of dangerous individuals could be utilized under Presiden tial powers. 624 Assistant Director Dwight Dalbey the FBI's Legal Counsel recom mended writing to the Attorney General for "a reassessment in order to "protect the Bureau in case "some spokesman of the extreme left claimed that repeal of the Detention Act eliminated FBI authority for domestic intelligence activity Dalbey agreed that since the Act "could easily be put back in force should an emergency convince Con Memorandumfrom T J Smithto E S Miller 5/13/73 pp 1 8 'FBI Summary of Interview with Robert Mardian 5/10/73 pp 2-3 The Watergate Special Prosecutor investigated these events and did not find suffi cient evidenceof criminal conductto bring an indictment However they occurred at the time of intense White House pressure to develop a criminal prosecution against Daniel Ellsberg over the Pentagon Papers matter The dismissal of charges against Ellsherg in 1973was largely due to the belated discoveryof the fact that Ellsherg had been overheard on a wiretap indi-hatedin these records which were withheld from the court preventing its determination of the perti nency of the material to the Ellsherg case InspectionReport DomesticIntelligenceDivision 8/17-9/9/71 p 98 80Memorandumfrom R D Cotter to E S Miller 9/21/71 624Memorandumfrom Cotterto Miller 9/17/71 126 gress of its need, the Bureau should "have on hand the necessary action information pertaining to individuals. 625Thereupon a letter was sent to Attorney General Mitchell proposing that the Bureau be allowed to "maintain an administrative index of individuals who "pose a threat to the internal security of the country. Such an index would be an aid to the Bureau in discharging its "investigative re sponsibility. However the letter made no reference to the theory pre vailing within the FBI that the new "administrative index would serve as the basis for a revived detention program in some future emergency.625a Thus when the Attorney General replied that the repeal of the Act did not prohibit the FBI from compiling an "administrative index to make "readily retrievable the "results of its investigations, he did not deal with the question of whether the index would also serve as a round-up list for a future emergency The Attorney General also stated that the Department did not "desire a copy of the new index abdicat ing even the minimal supervisory role performed previously by the Internal Security Division in its review of the names on the Security Index 626FBI officials realized that they were "now in a position to make a sole determination as to which individuals should be included in an index of subversive individuals. 627 There were two major consequences of the new system First the new "administrative index (ADEX) was expanded to include an elastic category "the new breed of subversive. 628Second the pre vious Reserve Index which had never been disclosed to the Justice Department was incorporated into the ADEX It included "teachers writers lawyers etc. who did not actively participate in subversive activity "but who were nevertheless influential in espousing their respective philosophies. It was estimated that the total case load under the ADEX would be "in excess of 23,000. 629 One of the FBI standards for placing someone on the ADEX list demonstrates the vast breadth of the list and the assumption that it could be used as the basis for detention in an emergency An individual who although not a member of or participant in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered an activist in affiliated fronts has exhibited a revolutionary ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented 'Memorandum from D J Dalbey to C Tolson 9/24/71 625 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Mitchell 9/30/71 "Memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover 10/22/71 Memorandumfrom T J Smith to E S Miller 11/11/71 It was noted that in the past the Department had "frequently removedindividuals from the Security Index becauseof its strict "legal interpretation. e This new breedwas describedas follows "He may adhere to the old-line revolutionary concepts but he is unaffiliated with any organization He may belongto or followoneNewLeft-typegroup today and another tomorrow He may simplybelongto the looselyknit group of revolu tionaries who have no particular political philosophybut who continuouslyplot the overthrow of our Government He is the nihilist who seeks only to destroy America. "On the other hand he may be one of the revolutionary black extremists who while perhaps influenced by groups such as the Black Panther Party is also unaffiliated either permanently or temporarily with any black organization but with a seething hatred of the white establishment will assassinate explode or otherwise destroy white America. (T J Smith to E S Miller 11/11/71.) 'sMemorandumfrom T J Smith to E S Miller 11/11/71 127 by national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabo tage including acts of terrorism assassination or any inter ference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national state and local governments and of the defense efforts [Emphasis added.]630 These criteria were supplied to the Justice Department in 1972 and the Attorney General did not question the fact that the ADEX was more than an administrative aid for conducting investigations as he had previously been told.631 A Bureau memorandum indicates that "representatives of the De partment in fact agreed with the view that there might be "cir cumstances where it would be necessary "to quickly identify persons who were a threat to the national security and that the President could then go to Congress "for emergency legislation permitting ap prehension and detention. 632 Thus although the Attorney General did not formally authorize the ADEX as a continuation of the previous detention list there was informal Departmental knowledge that the FBI would proceed on that basis One FBI official later recognized that the APEX could be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. 633 8 Reconsideration of FBI Authority In February 1971 the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee began a series of hearings on federal data banks and the Bill of Rights which marked a crucial turning point in the development of domestic intelligence policy The Subcommittee chaired by Senator Sam J Ervin of North Carolina reflected growing concern among Americans for the protection of "the privacy of the individual against the information power of government. 634 Largely in response to this first serious Congressional inquiry into domestic intelligence policy the Army curtailed its extensive surveil lance of civilian political activity The Senate inquiry also led after Director Hoover's death in 1972 to reconsideration by the FBI of the legal basis for its domestic intelligence activities and eventually to a request to the Attorney General for clarification of its authority.635 830Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 11/15/71 "Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell 2/10/72 cf memorandum from Hooverto Mitchell 9/30/71for the previousstatement 833Memorandumfrom T J Smithto E S Miller 8/29/72 "Memorandum from Domestic Intelligence Division Position Paper Scope of Authority Jurisdiction and Responsibilityin DomesticIntelligence Investiga tions 7/31/72 e34Federal Data Banks Hearings OpeningStatement of Senator Ervin Febru ary 23 1971p 1 SenatorErvin declared that a major objectiveof the inquiry was to lookinto "programsfor taking officialnote ofLaw-abidingpeoplewhoare active politically or who participate in community activities on social and political issues. The problem as Senator Ervin saw it was that there were citizens whofelt "intimidated by these programsand were "fearful about exercisingtheir rights under the First Amendmentto sign petitions or to speak and write freely on current issues of Governmentpolicy. The ranking minority member of the Subcommittee Senator RomanHruska endorsedthe need for a "penetrating and searching inquiry (Hearings pp 4 7.) eaAlso during March 1971 an FBI officein Media Pennsylvania was broken into a substantial number of documentswere removedand soonbegan to appear in the press One of these was captioned COINTELPRO The Bureau reacted by ordering its field officesto "discontinue COINTELPRO operations "for (Continued) 128 a Developments iv972 192'4 There is no indication that FBI "guidelines material or the FBI Manual provisions themselves were submitted to or requested by the Justice Department prior to 1972.636Indeed when Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst testified in February 1972 at the hear ings on his nomination to be Attorney General he stated that he was "not sure what guidelines were used by the FBI Kleindienst also stated that he believed FBI investigations were "restricted to criminal conduct or the likelihood of criminal conduct. 637Director Hoover noted on a newspaper report of the testimony "Prepare succinst memo to him on our guidelines. 638 After Hoover's death in 1972 a sharp split developed within the Domestic Intelligence Division over whether or not the Bureau should continue to rely on the various Executive Orders as a basis for its authority.639 Acting Director Gray postponed making any formal decisions on this matter he did not formally request advice from the Attorney General.6"0 Meanwhile the Domestic Intelligence Division proceeded (Continued) security reasons because of their sensitivity. It was suggested however that "counter-intelligenceaction would be considered in exceptional instances so long as there were "tight procedures to insure absolute secrecy. (Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan 4/27/71 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 4/28/71.) For actions taken thereafter see COIXTELPROreport G3 After repeal of the EmergencyDetention Act in the fall of 1971 the FBI's Assistant Director for Legal Counsel recommendedthat the Bureau's request for ,approvalof its new ADEXalso include a more general request for re-affirma tion of FBI domesticintelligence authority to investigate "subversive activity. (Memorandumfrom D J Dalbeyto Mr Tolson 9/24/71.) The letter to the Attor ney General reviewed the line of "Presidential directives from 1939to 1953 (Memorandumfrom Hooverto Mitchell 9/30/71.) The Attorney General replied with a general endorsement of FBI authority to investigate "subversive activ ities. (Memorandumfrom Mitchellto Hoover 10/22/71.) Richard Kleindienst testimony Senate Judiciary Committee 2/24/72 p 04 FBI routing slip attached to Washington Post article 2/24/72 The FBI's summary of its "guidelines, submitted to the Attorney General stated that its investigations were partly based on criminal statutes but that "subversiveactiv ity often does not clearly involve a specificsection of a specificstatute. Thus investigations were also based on the 1939Rooseveltdirectives which were said to have been "reiterated and broadenedby subsequentDirectives. (Attach ment to Hoovermemorandumto Kleindienst 2/25/72.) (Emphasisadded.) &39 The background for this developmentmay be summarized as follows In May1972 FBI intelligenceofficialsprepared a "positionpaper for ActingDirec tor L Patrick Gray This paper merelyrecited the various Presidential directives Executive Orders delimitation agreements and general authorizations from the Attorney General with no attempt at analysis (FBI DomesticIntelligence Divi sion Position Paper Investigations of Subversion 5/19/72.) Assistant Director E S Miller head of the DomesticIntelligenceDivision withdrew this paper at a conferencewith Gray and other top Bureau officials Miller then initiated work on a more extensive position paper which was completedin July It concluded that domesticintelligenceinvestigations could practicably he based on the "con cept that their purpose was "to prevent a violation of a statute. The paper also indicated that the ADEXwouldbe revised so that it could not be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the EmergencyDetention Act. (FBI Domestic Intelligence Division Position Paper Scopeof FBI Authority 7/31/72 T J Smithto E S Miller 8/1/72.) 80Gray did order that the Bureau shouldindicate its "jurisdictional authority to investigate in every case "by citing the pertinent provision of the U.S Code or other ,authority. and also that the Bureau should "indicate whether or not an investigation was directed by DJ (Department of Justice) or we openedit without any request from DJ. In the latter ease the Bureau was to "cite our reasons. (FBI routing slip 8/27/72.) 129 on its own to revise the pertinent Manual sections and the ADEX standards.641 The list was to be trimmed to those who were "an actual danger now, reducing the number of persons on the ADEX by two thirds.6} A revision of the FBI Manual was completed by May 1973 It was described as "a major step away from "heavy reliance upon Presiden tial Directives to an approach "based on existing Federal statutes.648 Although field offices were instructed to "close investigations not meeting the new criteria headquarters did not want "a massive review on crash basis of all existing cases. After a series of regional conferences with field office supervisors the standards were revised to allow greater flexibility. For the first time in FBI history a copy of the Manual section for "domestic sub versive investigations was sent to the Attorney General.646 After Clarence M helley was confirmed as FBI Director he au thorized a request for guidance from Attorney General Elliot Rich ardson.617 Kelley advised that it "would be folly to limit the Bureau One officialobserved that there were "some individuals now included in ADEX even though they do not realistically pose a threat to the national secu rity. He added that this wouldleave the Bureau "in a vulnerable position if our guidelineswereto be scrutinizedby interested CongressionalCommittees. (Mem orandumfromT J Smith to E S Miller 8/29/72.) 'Memorandum from Smith to Miller 8/29/72 The anticipated reduction was from 15.259(the current figure) to 4,786 (the top two priority categories) The Justice Department was advised of this change (Memorandumfrom Gray to Kleindienst 9/18/72 ) 043Draft copies were distributed to the field for suggestions (E S Miller to Mr Felt 5/22/73.) Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 6/7/73 The memorandum to the field stated looking back on past Bureau policy that since the FBI's au thority to investigate "subversiveelements had never been"seriouslychallenged until recently, Bureau personnel (and "the general public") had accepted "the FBI's right to handle internal security matters and investigate subversiveactiv ities without reference to specificstatutes. But the "rationale based on "Presi dential Directives wasnolonger "adequate. The field was advised that the "chief statutes upon which the new criteria were based were those dealing with rebellion or insurrection (18 U.S.C 2583) seditious conspiracy (18 U.S.C 2584) and advocating overthrow of the govern ment (18 U.S.C 2528) The ADEXwas to be "strictly an administrative device and shouldplay no part "in investigative decisionsor policies. The revision also eliminated "overemphasis onthe CommunistParty 69For example the field officessaw the need to undertake "preliminary in quiries beforeit was known"whether a statutory basis for investigation exists. This specificallyapplied where a person had "contact with known subversive groups or subjects, but the Bureau did not know "the purpose of the contact. These preliminary investigations could go on for at least 90 days to determine whether "a statutory basisfor a full investigation exists. Moreover at the urging of the fieldsupervisors the period for a preliminary investigation of an allegedly "subversiveorganization was expandedfrom 45to 90days (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all 'SACS8/8/73.) 640This was apparently "in connectionwith a request made earlier by Senator Edward M Kennedy who had requested to see this section at the time of the confirmation hearings for Attorney General Kleindienst in 1972 (Kleindienst Senate Judiciary Committee 2/24/72 p 64 memorandumfrom Kelley to Rich ardson 8/7/73.) 'In a memorandum to the Attorney General Director Kelley cited Senator Sam J Ervin's view that the FBI should be prohibited by statute "from investi gating any person without the individual's consent unless the Governmenthas reason to believe that the person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Kelley then summarized the position paper prepared by the Domestic (Continued) 68-7860 76 10 130 to investigations only when a crime "has been committed, since the government had to "defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it. Consequently he urged that the President exer cise his "inherent Executive per to expand by further defiling the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance informa tion about the plans of "terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. 48 [Emphasis added.] Director Kelley's request initiated a process of reconsideration of FBI intelligence authority by the Attorney General." The general study of FBI authority was superceded in December 1973 when Acting Attorney General Robert Bork in consultation with Attorney General-designate William Saxbe gave higher priority to a Departmental inquiry into the FBI's COINTELPRO practices Re sponsibility for this inquiry was assigned to a committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson.650 Even at this stage the Bureau resisted efforts by the Department to look too deeply into its operations Director Kelley advised the Acting Attorney General that the Department should exclude from its review the FBI's "extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection tech niques. eai (Continued) Intelligence Division and the Bureau's current policy of attempting to rely on statutory authority However he observed that the statutes upon which the FBI was relying were either "designedfor the Civil War era not the Twentieth Century (the rebellionand insurrection laws) or had been "reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court (the Smith Act dealing with advocacy of over throw) Moreover it was difficult to fit into the statutory framework groups "such as the Ku Klux Klan which do not seek to overthrow the Government but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights. Kelley stated that while the FBI had "statutory authority, it still needed "a definite requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelli gencedata he requiresin the pursuit of his responsibilitiesbased on our statutory authority. (Emphasis added.) While the statutes gave "authority, an Execu tive Order "would define our national security objectives. The FBI Director added "It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own require ments in an Executive Order instead of having Congresstell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President. 848Jemorandum from Kelleyto Richardson 8/7/73 "'Even before Kelley's request Deputy Attorney General-DesignateWilliam Ruckelshaus (who had served for two months as Acting FBI Director between Gray and Kelley) sent a list of questions to the Bureau to begin "an in-depth examination of someof the problemsfacing the Bureau in the future. (Memo randum from Ruckelshaus to Kelley 7/20/73.) The Ruckelshaus study was interrupted by his departure in the "Saturday Night Massacre of October1973 0 Memorandumfrom Bork to Kelley 12/5/73 661These techniques were handled within the Bureau "on a strictly need-to know basis and Kelley believed that they should not he included in a study "which will he beyond the control of the FBI. (Memorandumfrom Kelley to Bork 12/11/73.) One Bureau memorandumto the Petersen committeeeven suggested that the Attorney General did not have authority over the FBI's foreign counterintelli gence operations since the Bureau was acemmtahlein this area directly to the united States Intelligence Board and the National Security Council (Petersen Committee Report pp 34-35.) The Petersen Committee sharply rejected this view especially because the ad hoe equivalent of the T'.S Intelligence Board had improvedthe discredited "Huston plan in 1970 The Committeedeclared "There can he no doubt that in the area of foreign counterintelligence as in all its other functions the FBI is subject to the powerand authority of the Attorney General. (Petersen CommitteeReport p 35.) 131 As a result the Petersen committee's review of COINTELPRO did not consider anything more than a brief FBI-prepared summary of foreign counterintelligence operations.65 Moreover the inquiry into domestic COIX TELPRO cases was based mainly on short summaries of each incident compiled by FBI agents with Department attorneys making only spot-checks of the underlying files to assure the accuracy of the summaries Thus the inquiry was unable to consider the complete story of COI\ TELPRO as reflected in the actual memoranda discussing the reasons for adopting particular tactics and the means by which they were implemented.653 Thus at the same time that the Bureau was seeking guidance and clarification of its authority vestiges remained of its past resistance to outside scrutiny and its desire to rely on Executive authority rather than statute for the definition of its intelligence activities b Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority In the absence of any new standards imposed by statute or by the Attorney General the FBI continued to collect domestic intelligence under sweeping authorizations issued by the Justice Department in 1974 for investigations of "subversives, potential civil disturbances and "potential crimes. These authorizations were explicitly based on conceptions of inherent Executive power broader in theory than the FBI's own claim in 1973 that its authority could be found in the criminal statues Attorney General Levi has recently promulgated guidelines which stand as the first significant attempt by the Justice Department to set standards and limits for FBI domestic intelligence investigations.G55 (1) Executive Order 10450 As Amended. The Federal employee security program continued to serve as a basis for FBI domestic intel ligence investigations An internal Bureau memorandum stated that the Justice Department's instruction regarding the program specifically requires the FBI to check the names of all civil applicants and incumbents of the Executive Branch against our records In order to meet this responsibility FBIHQ records must contain identities of all persons connected with subversive or extremist activities together with necessary identifying information.656 FBI field offices were instructed in mid-1974 to report to Bureau headquarters such data as the following Identities of subversive and/or extremist groups or move ments (including front groups) with which subject has been identified period of membership positions held and a sum mary of the type and extent of subversive or extremist activi ties engaged in by subject (e.g. attendance at meetings or "'FBI Memorandum "Overall Recommendations Counterintelligence Activity, Appendixto Petersen CommitteeReport Henry Petersen Testimony 12/8/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 270-71 'Attorney General's Guidelines "Domestic Security Investigations, "Re porting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest, and "White House Personnel Security and Background Investigations. "Memorandum from A B Fulton to Mr Wannall 7/10/74 See pp 42 44 for discussionof the initiation of the program 132 other functions fundraising or recruiting activities on behalf of the organization contributions etc.) .6 In June 1974 President Nixon formally abolished the "Attorney General's list, upon the recommendation of Attorney General Saxbe However the President's order retained a revised definition of the types of organizations association which would still be considered in evaluating prospective federal employees.GJ6The Justice Department instructed the FBI that it should "detect organizations with a poten tial for falling within the terms of the order and investigate "indi viduals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of such organizations The Department instructions added It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investiga tion is initiated but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the orga nization may fall within the prescription of the Order.. It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature then the investigation should cease but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue [Emphasis added.] The Department applied "the same yardstick to investigations of individuals "when information is received suggesting their involve ment. 659 (2) Civil Disorders Intelligence. The Justice Department also instructed the FBI in 1974 that it should not as the Bureau had sug gested limit its civil disturbance reporting "to those particular situ ations which are of such a serious nature that Federal military personnel may be called upon for assistance. The Department advised that this suggested "guideline was "not practical since it "would place the burden on the Bureau to make an initial decision as to "whether military personnel may ultimately be needed, and this responsibility rested "legally with the President Instead the FBI was ordered to "continue to report on 857Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 8/16/74 "'Executive Order 11785 6/4/74 The new standard "Knowing member ship with the specificintent of furthering the aims of or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic oreanization association movement group or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commissionof acts of force or violenceto prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the united States or of any state or whichseeksto overthrowthe Govern ment of the United States or any State or subdivisions thereof by unlawful means. [Emphasisadded.] 650Memorandumfrom Glen E Pommerening Assistant Attorney General for Administration to Kelley 11/17/74 With respect to one organization the Department advised the Bureau that "despite the abolition of the Attorney General's list the group "would still come within the criteria of the employeesecurity program if it "may have engaged in activities of the sort proscribed by the revised executive order (Memorandumfrom Henry E Petersen to ClarenceKelley 11/13/74.) 133 all significant incidents of civil unrest and should not be restricted to situations where in the judgment of the Bureau military personnel eventually may be used.66 Moreover under this authority the Bureau was also ordered to "continue reporting on all disturbances where there are indications that extremist or ganizations such as the Communist Party Ku Klux Klan or Black Panther Party are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them The instructions specifically declared that the Bureau "should make timely reports of significant disturbances even when no specific viola tion of Federal law is indicated. This was to be done at least in part through "liaison with local law enforcement agencies.661 Even after the Justice Department's IDII dismantled its com puterized data bank its basic functions continued to be performed by a Civil Disturbance Unit in the officeof the Deputy Attorney Gen eral and the FBI was under instructions to disseminate its civil dis turbance reports to that Unit.662 FBI officials considered these instructions "significant because they gave it "an official written mandate from the Department. The Department's desires were viewed as "consistent with what we have already been doing for the past several years, although the Bureau Manual was rewritten to "incorporate into it excerpts from the Department's letter. 663 (3) "Potential Crimes. The FBI recently abolished completely the administrative index (ADEX) of persons considered "dangerous now. However the Justice Department has advanced a theory to support broad power for the Executive Branch in investigating groups which represent a "potential threat to the public safety or which have a "potential for violating specific statutes For example the Depart ment advised the FBI that the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division had "recommended continued investigation of one group on the basis of "potential violations of the antiriot statutes.665 These same aw;o "On the other hand. the instructions stated ambiguously "the FBI should not report every minor local disturbance where there is no apparent interest to the President the Attorney General or other Governmentofficialsand agencies. (Memorandumfrom Petersen to Kelley 10/22/74.) 681Memorandumfrom Petersen to Kelley 10/22/74 The FBI was expected to "be aware of disturbances and patterns of disorder, although it is not to report "each and every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature. 662Memorandumfrom Petersen to Kelley 10/22/74 Frank Nyland testimony 1/27/76 pp 46-588 'Memorandum from J G Deegan to W R Wannall 10/30/74 From a legal viewpoint the Justice Department's instructors dealing with the col lection of intelligence on potential civil disturbances were significant because they relied for authority on (1) the President's powersunder Article IV section 4 of the Constitution to protect the states upon application of the legislature or the executive against "domestic violence (2) the statute (10 U.S.C 331 et seq.) authorizing the use of troops and (3) the Presidential directive of 1969 designating the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the Government's response to civil disturbances (Memorandumfrom Petersen to Kellev 10/22/74 Memorandumfrom Melvin Laird and John Mitchell to the President 4/1/69.) '18 U.S.C 2101-2102 134 instructions added that there need not be a "potential for violation of any specific statute.666 (4) Claim of Inhez eut Executive Pozcei'. The Department's theory of executive power was set forth in 1974 testimony before the House Internal Security Committee According to Deputy Assistant Attorney General hevin Maroney "the primary basis for FBI domestic intel ligence authority rests in "the constitutional powers and responsibili ties vested in the President under Article II of the Constitution. These powers were specified as the President's duty undertaken in his oath of office to "preserve protect and defend the Constitution of the United States G67the Chief Executive's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed 663the President's responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the military and his "power to conduct our foreign relations. 666 The chairman of the Internal Security Committee Rep Richard H Ichord stated at that time that except in limited areas the Congress "has not directly imposed upon the FBI clearly defined duties in the acquisition use or dissemination of domestic or internal security intelligence. 670 Subsequently the FBI Intelligence Division revised its 1972 1973 position on its legal authority and in a paper completed in 1975 it returned to the view "that the intelligence-gathering activities of the FBI have had as their basis the intention of the President to delegate Memorandumfrom Petersen to Kelley 11/13/74 This memorandumadded "[W]ithout a broad range of intelligence information the President and the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch could not properly and ade quately protect our nation's security and enforce the numerous statutes pertain ing thereto [T]he Department and in particular the Attorney General must continueto beinformedof those organizationsthat engagein violencewhich represent a potential threat to the public safety. [Emphasis added.] The opinion of the Supreme Court in the United States v United States District Court 407 U.S 297 (1972) the domestic security wiretapping case stated "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Governmentagainst thosewhowouldsubvert or overthrowit byunlawful means.: "6A 19th century Supreme Court opinionwas cited as having interpreted the word "laws broadly to encompassnot only statutes enacted by Congress but also "the rights duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself our international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of Gov ernment under the Constitution. [In Re Neagle 135 U.S 1 (1890).] The latter power was said to relate "more particularly to the Executive's powerto conductforeignintelligenceactivities here and abroad. (KevinMaroney testimony "Domestic Intelligence Operations.for Internal Security Purposes, Hearings before the House Committeeon Internal Security 93d Cong. 2d Sess (1974) pp 3332-3335.)Mr Maroney added "We recognize the complexity and difficulty of adequately spelling out the FBI's authority and responsibility to conduct domestic intelligence-typeinvesti gations The conceptnational security is admittedly a broad one while the terns subversiveactivities is even more difficultto define. Mr Maroneyalso cited the followingfrom the Supreme Court's opinionin the domestic security wiretapping case "The gathering of security intelligence is often long-rangeand involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify Often too the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancementof the Government'spre paredness for some possible future crisis or emergency Thus the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more con ventional types of crime. [United States v United States District Court 407 U.R 297 322 (1972).1 "'House Committee on Internal Security Hearings 1974 pp 3330-3331 135 his Constitutional authority, as well as the statutes "pertaining to the national security. 67n The Attorney General has continued to assert the claim of inherent executive power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens although this power has been exercised sparingly.E The Justice Department has also claimed that this inherent executive power permits warrantless surreptitious entries."73 However the Exec utive Branch has recently joined a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives in sponsoring a legislative proposal requiring judicial warrants for all electronic surveillance by the FBI (5) Attorney General Levi's Guidelines. During 1975 the Con gress and the Executive Branch began major efforts to review the field of domestic intelligence A Presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller inquired into the CIA's improper sur veillance of Americans. Attorney General Edward H Levi estab lished a committee in the Justice Department to develop "guidelines for the FBI."5 and the Justice Department began to work on draft legislation to require warrants for national security electronic sur veillance.s'0 These efforts have begun to bear fruit in recent months President Ford has issued an Executive Order regulating foreign intelligence activities 677Attorney General Levi has promulgated several sets of "guidelines for the FBL And the administration has endorsed a specific bill to establish a warrant procedure for all national security wiretaps and bugs in the United States.' Raymond Wannall Assistant Director for the Intelligence Division Memorandumon the -Basis for FBI National Security Intelligence Investiga tions, 2/13/75 "'After several recent transformations the policy of the Attorney General was established as authorizing warrantless surveillance "only when it is shown that its subjects are the active consciousagents of foreign powers and this standard "is applied with particular stringency where the subjects are American citizens or permanent resident aliens. (Justice Department memorandumfrom Ron Carr Special Assistant to the Attorney General to Mike Shaheen Counsel on ProfessionalResponsibility 2/26/76.) 6 In May 1975 for the first time in American history the Department of Justice publiclyasserted the power of the Executive Branch to conductwarrant less surreptitious entries unconnectedwith the use of electronicsurveillance This occurredin a letter to the United States Court of Appealsfor the District of Co lumbia concerningan appeal by John Ehrlichman Ehrlichman was appealing a convictionarising from the break-in at the officeof Daniel Ellsherg's psychiatrist after publicationof the 'PentagonPapers' in 1971 The Justice Department's position was that "warrantless searches involving physical entries into private premises can he "lawful under the Fourth Amend ment. if they are "verycarefully controlled "There must be solid reason to believethat foreign espionageor intelligenceis involved In addition the intrusion into any zone of expected privacy must be Pent to the minimumand there must he personal authorization 1wthe President or the AttorneyGeneral. (Letter fromJohn C Kenney ActingAssistant Attorney General to Hugh E Cline Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the I)iet,"ictof Columbia 5/9/75 ) RockefellerCommissionReport 6PLevi 12/11/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 316-317 6' Levi 11/6/75 Hearings Vol 5 p 90 6 ExecutiveOrder 115500 6TAttorney General's Guidelines "Domestic Security Investigations "White house Personnel Security and Background -Investigations and "Reporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest 3/10/76 " S 3197introduced3/23/76 136 These Executive initiatives are a major step forward in creating safeguards and establishing standards but they are incomplete with out legislation.60 Among the issues left open by the President's Executive Order for example are (1) the definition of the term "foreign subversion used to characterize the counter-intelligence responsibilities of the CIA and the FBI and (2) clarification of the vague provisions in the National Security Act of 1947 relating to the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect "sources and "methods and (3) amplification of the 1947 Act's prohibition against the CIA's exercise of "law enforcement powers or "internal security functions. Although they represent only a partial answer to the need for per manent restraints the initiatives of the Executive Branch demon strate a willingness to seriously consider the need for legislative action The Attorney General has recognized that Executive "guide lines are not enough to regulate and authorize FBI intelligence activities.cs1 The Committee's conclusions and recommendations in Part IV of this report indicate the areas most in need of legislative attention "80The major questions posed by the President's Executive Order and the Attorney General's guidelines for the FBI are discussed in the recommendation section of this report as are the problems with the national security electronic surveillancebill 681LeviTestimony 12/11/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 345 III FINDINGS The Committee makes seven major findings Each finding is accom panied by subfindings and by an elaboration which draws upon the evidentiary record set forth in our historical narrative (Part II here in) and in the thirteen detailed reports which will be published as sup plements to this volume We have sought to analyze in our findings characteristics shared by intelligence programs practices which in volved abuses and general problems in the system which led to those abuses The findings treat the following themes that run through the facts revealed by our investigation of domestic intelligence activity (A) Violating and Ignoring the Law (B) Overbreadth of Domestic In telligence Activity (C) Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques (D) Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups (E) Political Abuse of Intelligence Information (F) Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention (G) Deficiencies in Con trol and Accountability Viewed separately each finding demonstrates a serious problem in the conduct and control of domestic intelligence operations Taken together they make a compelling case for the necessity of change Our recommendations (in Part IV) flow from this analysis and pro pose changes which the Committee believes to be appropriate in light of the record A VIOLATING AND IGNORING THE LAW MAJORFINDING The Committee finds that the domestic activities of the intelligence community at times violated specific statutory prohibitions and infringed the constitutional rights of American citizens.1 The legal questions involved in intelligence programs were often not considered On other occasions they were intentionally disregarded in the be lief that because the programs served the "national security the law did not apply While intelligence officers on occasion failed to disclose to their superiors programs which were illegal or of questionable le gality the Committee finds that the most serious breaches of duty were those of senior officials who were responsible for controlling intelligence activities and generally failed to assure compliance with the law Sub findings (a) In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security of the United States the intelligence community engaged in some ac This section discussesthe legal issues raised by particular programs and ac tivities only a discussionof the aggregate effectupon constitutional rights of all domestic surveillance practices is at p 290 of the Conclusionssection (137) 138 tivities which violated statutory law and the constitutional rights of American citizens Legal issues were often overlooked by many of the intelligence officers who directed these operations Some held a pragmatic view of intelligence activities that did not regularly attach sufficient signifi cance to questions of legality The question raised was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical but whether it worked On some occasions when agency officials did assume or were told that a program was illegal they still permitted it to continue They justified their conduct in some cases on the ground that the failure of "the enemy to play by the rules granted them the right to do likewise and in other cases on the ground that the "national security per mitted programs that would otherwise be illegal Internal recognition of the illegality or the questionable le gality of many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of se curity rather than to their termination Partly to avoid exposure and a public "flap, knowledge of these programs was tightly held within the agencies special filing procedures were used and "cover stories were devised On occasion intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly their programs and practices to their own General Counsels and to Attorneys General Presidents and Congress The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI did not keep and in the case of the FBI were not designed to keep the activities of those agencies within legal bounds Their primary concern was efficiency not legality or propriety When senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities knew or had a basis for suspecting that questionable activities had occurred they often responded with silence or approval In certain cases they were presented with a par tial description of a program but did not ask for details thereby abdicating their responsibility In other cases they were fully aware of the nature of the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it Elaboration of findings The elaboration which follows details the general finding of the Committee that inattention to and disregard of legal issues was an all too common occurrence in the intelligence community While this section focuses on the actions and attitudes of intelligence officials and certain high policy officials the Committee recognizes that a pattern of lawless activity does not result from the deeds of a single stratum of the government or of a few individuals alone The imple mentation and continuation of illegal and questionable programs would not have been possible without the cooperation or tacit approval of people at all levels within and above the intelligence community through many successive administrations The agents in the field for their part rarely questioned the orders they received Their often uncertain knowledge of the law coupled with the natural desire to please one's superiors and with simple bureaucratic momentum clearly contributed to their willingness to participate in illegal and questionable programs The absence of any prosecutions for law violations by intelligence agents inevitably af 139 fected their attitudes as well Under pressure from above to accom plish their assigned tasks and without the realistic threat of prosecu tion to remind them of their legal obligations it is understandable that these agents frequently acted without concern for issues of law and at times assumed that normal legal restraints and prohibitions did not apply to their activities Significantly those officials at the highest levels of government who had a duty to control the activities of the intelligence community sometimes set in motion the very forces that permitted lawlessness to occur even if every act committed by intelligence agencies was not known to them By demanding results without carefully limiting the means by which the results were achieved by over-emphasizing the threats to national security without ensuring sensitivity to the rights of American citizens and by propounding concepts such as the right of the "sovereign to break the law ultimate responsibility for the consequent climate of permissiveness should be placed at their door. Sub finding (a) In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security of the United States the intelligence community engaged in some activi ties which violated statutory law and the constitutional rights of American citizens From 1940 to 1973 the CIA and the FBI engaged in twelve covert mail opening programs in violation of Sections 1701 1703 of Title 18 of the United States Code which prohibit the obstruction intercep tion or opening of mail Both of these agencies also engaged in war rantless "surreptitious entries" break-ins against American citizens within the United States in apparent violation of state laws prohibit ing trespass and burglary Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was violated by ASA's program for obtaining millions of telegrams of Americans unrelated to foreign targets and by the Army Security Agency's interception of domestic radio communi cations All of these activities as well as the FBI's use of electronic surveil lance without a substantial national security predicate also infringed the rights of countless Americans under the Fourth Amendment protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures. The abusive techniques used by the FBI in COINTELPRO from 1956 to 1971 included violations of both federal and state statutes pro hibiting mail fraud wire fraud incitement to violence sending obscene material through the mail and extortion More fundamentally the harassment of innocent citizens engaged in lawful forms of polit ical expression did serious injury to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the right of the people to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of grievances The Bureau's maintenance of the Security Index which targeted thousands of American citizens for detention in the event of national emergency clearly overstepped the permissible bounds established by Congress in the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 and represented in contra vention of the Act a potential general suspension of the privilege 'The accountability of senior administration officialsis noted here to place the details which follow in their proper contest and is developed at greater length in Finding G p 265 140 of the writ of habeas corpus secured by Article I Section 9 of the Constitution A distressing number of the programs and techniques developed by the intelligence community involved transgressions against human decency that were no less serious than any technical violations of law Some of the most fundamental values of this society were threatened by activities such as the smear campaign against Dr Martin Luther King Jr. the testing of dangerous drugs on unsuspecting American citizens the dissemination of information about the sex lives drinking habits and marital problems of electronic surveillance targets and the COINTELPRO attempts to turn dissident organizations against one another and to destroy marriages funding (b) Legal issues were often overlooked by many of the intelligence officers who directed these operations Some held a pragmatic view of intelligence activities that did not regularly attach sufficient sig nificance to questions of legality The question raised was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical but whether it worked Legal issues were clearly not a primary consideration if they were a consideration at all in many of the programs and techniques of the intelligence community When the former head of the FBI's Ra cial Intelligence Section was asked whether anybody in the FBI at any time during the 15-year course of COINTELPRO discussed its constitutionality or legal authority for example he replied "No we never gave it a thought. 3 This attitude is echoed by other Bureau officials in connection with other programs The former Section Chief of one of the FBI's Counterintelligence sections and the former Assistant Director of the Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division both testified that legal considerations were simply not raised in policy decisions concerning the FBI's mail opening programs. Similarly when the FBI was presented with the opportunity to assume responsi bility for the CIA's New York mail opening operation legal factors played no role in the Bureau's refusal rather the opportunity was declined simply because of the attendant expense manpower require ments and security problems.5 One of the most abusive of all FBI programs was its attempt to discredit Dr Martin Luther King Jr Yet former FBI Assistant Director William C Sullivan testified that he "never heard anyone raise the question of legality or constitutionality never. B Former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms testified publicly that he never seriously questioned the legal status of the twenty-year CIA New York mail opening project because he assumed his predecessor Allen Dulles had "made his legal peace with [it]." GeorgeC Mooretestimony 11/3/75 p 83 Branigan testimony 10/9/75 pp 13 139 140 Wannall testimony 10/24/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 149 Branigan 10/9/75 p 89 6William C Sullivantestimony 11/1/75 pp 49 50 Richard Helms 10/22/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 94 This testimony is partially contradicted however by the fact that in 1970Helms signed the Huston Report in which "covert mail coverage" defined as mail opening was specifically describedas illegal (SpecialReport June 1970p 30.) 141 . [F]rom time to time, he said "the Agency got useful informa tion out of it, 8 so he permitted it to continue throughout his seven year tenure as Director The Huston Plan that was prepared for President Richard Nixon in June 1970 constituted a virtual charter for the use of intrusive and illegal techniques against American dissidents as well as foreign agents Its principal author has testified however that during the drafting sessions with representatives of the FBI CIA NSA and Defense Intelligence Agency no one ever objected to any of the rec ommendations on the grounds that they involved illegal acts nor was the legality or constitutionality of any of the recommendations ever discussed.9 William C Sullivan who participated in the drafting of the Huston Plan and served on the I?nited States Intelligence Board and as FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence for 10 years stated that in his entire experience in the intelligence community he never heard legal issues raised at all We never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning be cause we were just naturally pragmatists The one thing we were concerned about was this Will this course of action work will it get us what we want will we reach the ob jective that we desire to reach As far as legality is con cerned morals or ethics [it.] was never raised by myself or anybody else I think this suggests really in government that we are amoral In government I am not speaking for everybody the general atmosphere is one of amorality.10 Sub finding (c) On some occasions when agency officials did assume or were told that a program was illegal they still permitted it to continue They justified their conduct in some cases on the ground that the failure of "the enemy to play by the rules granted them the right to do likewise and in other cases on the ground that the "national security permitted programs that would otherwise be illegal Even when agency officials recognized certain programs or tech niques to be illegal they sometimes advocated their implementation or permitted them to continue nonetheless This point is illustrated by a passage in a 1954 memorandum from an FBI Assistant Director to J Edgar Hoover which recommended that an electronic listening device be planted in the hotel room of a suspected Communist sympathizer "Although such an installation will not be legal it is believed that the intelligence information to be obtained will make such an installation necessary and desirable." Hoover approved the installation. More than a decade later a memorandum was sent to Director Hoover which described the current FBI policy and procedures for "black bag jobs (warrantless break-ins for purposes other than micro phone installation) This memorandum read in part aHelms 10/22/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 103 "Huston 9/23/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 21 ' Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 92 93 "Memorandum from Mr Boardman to the Director IBI 4/30/54 "Ibid 142 Such a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal therefore it would be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it Despite this "black bag jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable technique in combatting sub versive activities aimed directly at undermining and de stroying our nation.13 In other words breaking the law was seen as useful in combating those who threatened the legal fabric of society Although Hoover terminated the general use of "black bag jobs in July 1966 they were employed on a large scale before that time and have been used in isolated instances since then Another example of disregard for the law is found in a 1969 memo randum from William C Sullivan to Director Hoover In June of that year Sullivan was requested by the Director apparently at the urging of White House officials to travel to France for the purpose of electronically monitoring the conversations of journalist Joseph Kraft.11 With the cooperation of local authorities Sullivan was able to have a microphone installed in Kraft's hotel room and informed Hoover of his success "Parenthetically, he wrote in his letter to the Director "I might add that such a cover is regarded as illegal. 15 The attitude that legal standards and issues of privacy can be over ridden by other factors is further reflected in a memorandum written by Richard Helms in connection with the testing of dangerous drugs on unsuspecting American citizens in 1963 Mr Helms wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude on an individual's private and legal prerogatives I believe it is necessary that the Agency main tain a central role in this activity keep current on enemy capabilities in the manipulation of human behavior and maintain an offensive capability I therefore recommend your approval for continuation of this testimony pro gram . ,1Sa The history of the CIA's New York mail opening program is re plete with examples of conscious contravention of the law The origi nal proposal for large-scale mail opening in 1955 for instance ex plicitly recognized that "[t]here is no overt authorized or legal cen sorship or monitoring of first class mails which enter depart or transit the United States at the present time. 16A 1962 memorandum on the project noted that its exposure could "give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by Government agencies and that "existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation 17 And again in 1963 a CIA officer wrote "There is no legal basis for monitoring postal communications in the United States except during time of war or national emergency ... 13 Memorandumfrom W C Sullivanto C D DeLoach 7/19/66 Report of the House Judiciary Committee 8/20/74 p 150 "Memorandum from William C Sullivan to J Edgar Hoover 6/30/69 U Memorandumfrom Richard Helmsto the Deputy Director of Central Intelli gence 12/17/63 "Blind memorandum 11/7/55 Memorandumfrom Deputy Chief CounterintelligenceStaff to Director Of ficeof Security 2/1/62 "Memorandum from Chief Cl/Project to Chief Division 9/26/63 143 Both the former Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff and the former Director of Security who were in charge of the New York project testified that they believed it to be illegal.10 One Inspector General who reviewed the project in 1969 also flatly stated "[Off course we knew that this was illegal [E]verybody knew that it was [illegal] 20 In spite of the general recognition of its illegality the New York mail opening project continued for a total of 20 years and was not terminated until 1973 when the Watergate-created political climate had increased the risks of exposure.' With the full knowledge of J Edgar Hoover moreover the FBI continued to receive the fruits of this project for three years after the FBI Director informed the President of the United States that "the FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal ... The Bureau's own mail opening programs had been terminated in 1966 but it continued intentionally and knowingly to benefit from the illegal acts of the CIA until 1973 The Huston Plan is another disturbing reminder of the fact that intelligence programs and techniques may be advocated and author ized with the knowledge that they are illegal At least two of the options that were presented to President Nixon were described as unlawful on the face of the Report Of "covert mail coverage (mail opening) it was written that "[t]his coverage not having the sanction of law runs the risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government agency. 23 The Report also noted that surreptitious entry "involves illegal entry and trespass. 2dThus the intelligence community presented the nation's highest executive official with the option of approving courses of action described as illegal The fact that President Nixon did authorize them even if only for five days is more disquieting still.25 When President Nixon eventually revoked his approval of the Hus ton Plan the intelligence community nevertheless proceded to initiate some programs suggested in the Plan Intelligence agencies also con tinued to employ techniques recommended in the Plan such as mail opening which had been used previously without presidential ap proval.' "Angleton 9/24/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 61 Howard Osborn deposition 8/28/75 p.90 20GordonStewart 9/30/75 p 28 See e.g. Howard Osborn deposition 8/2S/75 p 89 22SpecialReport June 1970p 31 SpecialReport June 1970p 30 "iSpecialReport June 1970p 32 "5President Nixonstated that he approvedthese activities in part becausethey "had beenfound to be effective. (Responseof Richard M Nixonto Senate Select CommitteeInterrogatory 19 3/9/76 p 13.) "For a description of the techniques which continued or were subsequently instituted seepp 115-416 A memorandumfrom John Dean to John Mitchell suggests that after Presi dent Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan the White Houseitself supported the continued pursuit of some of the objectives of the Huston Plan Through an interagency unit known as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (Memorandum from John Dean to the Attorney General 9/18/70.) In this memorandum Dean suggested the creation of such a unit for "both operational and evaluation purposes. Hewrotein part "[Tike unit can serve to make appropriate recommendationsfor the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies In (Continued) 144 The recent history of Army intelligence provides an additional ex ample of continuing an activity described as illegal Beginning in 1967 the Army Security Agency monitored the radio communications of amateur radio operators in this country to determine if dissident elements planned disruptive activity at particular demonstrations and events Because Army officials questioned whether such monitoring was legal under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 they requested a legal opinion from the Federal Communications Commission At a meeting held in August 1968 the FCC advised the Army that such monitoring was illegal under the Act FCC repre sentatives also stated that the matter had been raised with Attorney General Ramsey Clark and that he had disapproved the program.27 The FCC agreed however to submit a written reply to the Army stating only that it could not "provide a positive answer to the Army's proposal. 28 Despite having been told that their monitoring activity was illegal and that the Attorney General himself disapproved it the Army Security Agency continued to monitor the radio communications of American citizens for another two years.29 Several factors may explain the intelligence community's frequent disregard of legal issues Some intelligence officials expressed the view that the legal and ethical restraints that applied to the rest of society simply did not apply to intelligence activities This concept is reflected in a 1959 memorandum on the Army's covert drug testing program "In intelli gence the stakes involved and the interest of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values ... 30 As William C Sullivan also pointed out many intelligence officers had been imbued with a "war psychology. "Legality was not ques tioned, he said "it was not an issue. 31In war one simply did what (Continued) regard to this point I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions rather the most appropriate pro cedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need based on an assessment of the recommendationsof this unit and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence. (Dean memorandum 9/18/70.) 'Memorandum for the record by Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli gence 8/16/68 Staff summary of Sal Tindenbaum (former Executive Assistant to the AttorneyGeneral) interview 5/8/75 Memorandumfor the record by Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli gence 8/16/68 29TheArmy's general domestic surveillance program provides an example of evasion of a departmental order which had been issued out of concern with legal issues The practice of collectingvast amounts of information on American citizens was terminated in 1971 when new Department of Defense restrictions came into effect calling for the destruction of all files on "unaffiliated persons and organizations Rather than destroying the files however several Army intelligence units simply turned their intelligence files on dissident individual and groups over to local polleeauthorities and one Air Force counterintelligence unit in San Diegobegan to create new filesthe next year (Hearings before Suh commi_tteeon Constitutional Rights Committee nn the Judiciary U.S Senate 92nd Congress 1st session 1971 D 1297 "Ex-FRI Aid Accusedin Police Spy Hearings (rhicnnoTribune 6/21/75.113.) ' T'SATNTCStaff Study Material Testing Program EA 1729 10/15/59 Sullivan attributes much of this attitude to the moldinginfluenceof World War II upon youngintelligence agents who later rose to positions of influencein 145 one was "expected to do as a soldier. 32"It was my assumption, said one FBI official connected with the Bureau's mail opening programs that what we were doing -as justified by what we had to do." Since the "enemy did not play by the rules moreover intelligence officials often believed they could not afford to do so either.34 One FBI intelligence officer appeared to attribute the disregard of the law in the Bureau's COINTELPRO operations to simple restless ness on the part of "action-oriented FBI agents George C Moore the Racial Intelligence Section Chief testified that .. the FBI's counterintelligence program came up because if you have anything in the FBI you have an action-oriented group of people who see something happening and want to do something to take its place.36 Others in the intelligence community have contended that ques tionable and illegal acts were justified by a law higher than the United States Code or the Constitution An FBI Counterintelligence Section Chief for example stated the following reason for believing in the necessity of techniques such as mail opening The greater good the national security this is correct This is what I believed in Why I thought these programs were good it was that the national security required this this is correct.37 Similarly when intelligence officials secured the cooperation of tele graph company executives for Project SHAMROCK in which NSA received millions of copies of international telegraph messages with out the sender's knowledge they assured the executives that they would not be subjected to criminal liability because the project was "in the highest interests of the nation. 38 the intelligence community (Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 94-95.) Disregard of the "nicetiesof law, he stated continuedafter the war had ended "Alongcame the ColdWar We pursued the same course in the Korean War and the Cold War continued then the Vietnam War We never freed ourselves from that psychologythat we were indoctrinated with right after Pearl Harbor you see I think this accounts for the fact that nobody seemedto be concerned about raising the questionis this lawful is this legal is this ethical It was just like a soldier in the battlefield When he shot down an enemy he did not ask himself is this legal or lawful is it ethical It is what he was expected to do as a soldier. "We did what we were expected to do It becamepart of our thinking a part of our personality. (Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 95 96.) Unfortunately it made too little differencewhether the "enemy was a foreign spy a civilrights leader or a Vietnamprotester SuPivan 11/1/75 p 96 Branigan 10/9/75 n 41 Staff summaryof William C Sullivaninterview 6/10/75 3eMooredeposition 11/3/75 p 79 "Branigan deposition 1/9/75 p 41 Richard Helms referred to another kind of "greater good when asked to speculate about the possible motivation of a CIA scientist who did not heed President Nixon's directiveto destroy all biologi cal and chemical toxins Noting that the scientist might have "had thoughts about immunization or treatment of disease where [the toxin he had devel opedl might be useful, Helms said that the retention of this biologicalagent could be explained as "yielding to that human impulse of the greater good. (Meliard Helmstestimony 9/15/75 p 96.) 'Robert Andrewstestimony 9/23/75 p 34 See NSAReport "SHAMROCK. By cooperating with the Governmentin SHAMROCKexecutives of three com panies choseto ignorethe adviceof their respectivelegal counselswhohad recom (Continued) 68-7860 76 11 146 Perhaps the most novel reason for advocating illegal action was proffered by Tom Charles Huston Huston explained that he believed the real threat to internal security was potential repression by right wing forces within the United States He argued that the "New Left was capable of producing a climate of fear that would bring forth every repressive demagogue in the country Huston believed that the intelligence professionals if given the chance could protect the people from the latent forces of repression by monitoring the New Left including by illegal means.39 Illegal action directed against the New Left in other words should be used by the Government to forestall potential repression by the Right In attempting to explain why illegal activities were advocated and defended the impact of the attitudes and actions of government officials in supervisory positions Presidents Cabinet officers and Congressmen should not be discounted Their occasional endorsement of such activities as well as the atmosphere of permissiveness created by their emphasis on national security and their demands for results clearly contributed to the notion that strict adherence to the law was unimportant So too did the concept propounded by some senior officials that a "sovereign president may authorize violations of the law Whatever the reasons however it is clear that a number of intelli gence officers acted in knowing contravention of the law Subinding (d) Internal recognition of the illegality or questionable legality of many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of security rather than to their termination Partly to avoid exposure and a public "flap, knowledge of these programs was tightly held within the agen cies special filing procedures were used and "cover stories were devised When intelligence agencies realized that certain programs and tech niques were of questionable legality they frequently took special security precautions to avoid public exposure criticism and embarrass ment The CIA's study of student unrest throughout the world in the late 1960s for example included a section on student dissent in the United States an area that was clearly outside the Agency's statutory charter DCI's Hichard Helms urged the President's national secu rity advisor Henry Kissinger to treat it with extreme sensivity in light of the acknowledged jurisdictional violation "Herewith is a survey of student dissidence world-wide as re quested by the President In an effort to round out our discus sion of this subject we have included a section on American students This is an area not within the charter of this Agency so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned. 40 Concern for the FBI's public image prompted security measures which protected numerous questionable activities For example in (Continued) mended against participation because they considered the program to he in violation of the law and FCC regulations (Memorandumfor the record Armed Forces Security Agency Subject SHAMROChOperation 8/25/50.) "Tom Charles Huston deposition 5/22/75 p 43 Staff Summary of Tom Charles Hustoninterview 5/22/75 '0Letter from Richard Helmsto Henry Kissinger 2/18/69 147 approving or denying COINTELPRO proposals many of which were clearly illegal a main consideration was preventing "embarrassment to the Bureau." A characteristic caution to FBI agents appears in the letter which initiated the COINTELPRO against "Black Nationalists You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appro priate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program Examples of attention to such security are that anonymous letters had to be written on commercially purchased stationery newsmen had to be so completely trustworthy that they were guaranteed not to reveal the Bureau's interest and inquiries of~law enforcement officials had to be made under the pretext of a criminal investigation A similar preoccupation with security measures for improper activ ities affected both the NSA and the Arniy Security Agency NSA's guidelines for its watch list activity provided that NSA's name should not be on any of the disseminated watch list material involving Americans The aim was to "restrict the knowledge that such information is being collected and processed by NSA.43 The Army Security Agency's radio monitoring activity which con tinued even after the Army was told that the FCC and the Attorney General regarded it as illegal also had to be conducted in secrecy if a public outcry was to be avoided When Army officials decided to per mit radio monitoring in connection with the military's Civil Dis turbance Collection Plan their instruction provided that all ASA personnel had to be "disguised either in civilian clothes or as members of regular military units.'4 The perceived illegality and consequent "flap potential" of the CIA's New York mail opening project led Agency officials to for mulate a drastic strategy to follow in the event of public exposure A review of the project by the Inspector General's Office in the early 1960s concluded that it would be desirable to fabricate a "cover story. A formal recommendation was therefore made that "[a]n emergency plan and cover story be prepared for the possibility that the operation might be blown. 45In response to this recommendation the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff agreed that "a flap will put us out of business immediately and may give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by government agencies, but he argued SeeCOINTELPROReport Sec V "Outsidethe Bureau memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 8/25/67 Buffham 9/12/75 p 20 MINARETCharter 7/1/69 At other times however NSA's special security measures were applied to protect documentswhich concernedfar more than NSA Thus at Richard Helms suggestion Huston Plan working papers and documentswere all stamped with legendsdesignedto protect NSA'slawful communicationsactivity although only a small portion of the documentsactually concernedNSA (Unaddressed memo randum Subject "Interagency Committee on Intelligence Working Subcom mittee Minutesof the First _Meeting,6/10/70.) Department of ArmyMessageto SubordinateCommands3/31/68 "CIA memorandum Subject Inspector General's Survey of the Officeof Security Annex II undated 148 Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the violation and existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation it must be recognized that no cover story is available to any Govern ment Agency Therefore it is important that all Federal law enforcement and US Intelligence Agencies vigorously deny any association direct or indirect with any such activity as charged Unless the charge is supported by the presenta tion of interior items from the Project it should be relatively easy to "hush up the entire affair or to explain that it consists of legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the request of authorized Federal agencies Under the most unfavorable circumstances .. it might be necessary after the matter has cooled off during an extended period of investi gation to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tamper ing with the mails Such cases by their very nature do not have much appeal to the imagination of the public and this would be an effective way to resolve the initial charge of censorship of the mails. This strategy of complete denial and transferring blame to a scape goat was approved by the Director of Security in February 1962. Another extreme example of a security measure that was adopted be cause of the threat that illegal activity might be exposed was the out right destruction of files The FBI developed a special filing system or more accurately a destruction system for memoranda written about illegal techniques such as break-ins, and highly questionable operations such as the mi crophone surveillance of Joseph Kraft. Under this system which was referred to as the "DO NOT FILE procedure authorizing doc uments and other memoranda were filed in special safes at headquarters and field offices until the next annual inspection by the Inspection Di vision at which time they were to be systematically destroyed.50 "Memorandum from Deputy Chief CI Staff to Director Officeof Security 2/1/62 Memorandumfrom SheffieldEdwards Director of Security to Deputy Di rector for Support 2/21/62 "Memorandum from W C Sullivan to C D DeLoach 7/19/66 The samedocu ment that describesthe application of the "DONOT FILE procedure to "black bag jobs also notes that beforea break-in couldbe approvedwithin the FBI the Special Agent in Charge of the field officehad to assure headquarters that it could be accomplishedwithout "embarrassment to the Bureau. (Sullivan memo randum 7/19/66.) An isolated instance of file destruction apparently occurredin the Los Angeles officeof the Internal Revenue Service in December1974 at a time when Con gressional investigation of the intelligenceagencieswas imminent This officehad collectedlarge amounts of essentially political information regarding black mil itants and political activists LI violation of internal documentdestruction pro cedures the files were destroyed prior to their proposed review by IRS author ities See IRS Report Sec IV "The Information Gathering and Retrieval Sys tem Staff Summaryof interview with Chief IRS Division LosAngeles 8/1/75 99For example letters from W C Sullivan to J Edgar Hoover 6/30/69 7/2/69 7/3/69 7/7/69 These letters were sent to Hoover from Paris where Sullivan coordinated the Kraft surveillance All of them bear the notation "DO NOT FILE. a0Memorandumfrom W C Sullivan to C D DeLoach 7/19/66 149 Subfindin.g (e) On occasion intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly pro grams and practices to their own General Counsels and to Attorney Generals Presidents and Congress (i) Concealment f pornExecutive Branch Officials Intelligence officers frequently concealed or misrepresented illegal activities to their own General Counsel and superiors within and out side the agencies in order to protect these activities from exposure For example during the entire 20-year history of the CIA's mail opening project the Agency's General Counsel was never informed of its existence According to one Agency official this knowledge was purposefully kept from him Former Inspector General Gordon Stew art testified Well I am sure that it was held back from [the General Counsel] on purpose An operation of this sort in the CIA is run if it is closely held it is run by those people immediately concerned and to the extent that it is really possible accord ing to the practices that we had in the fifties and sixties those persons not immediately concerned were supposed to be ignorant of it.b The evidence also indicates that two Directors of Central Intelli gence under whom the New York mail operations continued John McCone and Admiral Raborn were never informed of its existence 5 In 1954 Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield was informed that the CIA operated a mail cover project in New York but he was not told that the Agency opened or intended to open any mail. In 1965 the CIA briefly considered informing Postmaster General John A Gro nouski about the project when its existence was felt to be jeopardized by a congressional subcommittee that was investigating the use of mail covers and other investigative techniques by federal agencies Accord ing to an internal memorandum however the idea was quickly re jected "in view of various statements by Gronouski before this sub committee. 54Since Gronouski had agreed with the subcommittee that tighter administrative controls on mail covers were necessary and gen erally supported the principle of the sanctity of the mail it is reason able to infer that CIA officials assumed he would not be sympathetic to the technique of mail opening. u1GordonStewart 9/30/75 p 29 McCone 10,/9/75 pp 3-4 Angleton 9/17/75 p 20 Osborn 10/21/75 Hear ings vol 4 p 38 "Memorandum from Richard Helms to Director of Security 5/17/74 Helms 10/22/75 Hearings vol 4 p 84 By the CIA's own account moreover at most only three Cabinet-levelofficialsmay have been told about the mail openingas pects of this project Each of these three Postmasters General J Edward Day and Winton M Blount and Attorney General John Mitchell dispute the Agen cy's claim (Day 10/22/75 Hearings vol 4 p 45 Blount 10/22/75 Hearings vol 4 p 47 Mitchell 10/2/75 pp 13-14.) 54Blindmemorandumfrom "CIAOfficer. 4/23/65 "Ibid.Mr Gronouski testified as follows about the CIA's successful attempt to keepknowledgeof the NewYorkproject fromhim "When this news [about CIA mail opening] broke tin 19751I thought it was incredible that a person in a top position of responsibility in Governmentin an agency should have something of this sort that is very illegal going on within his own agency and did not know about it It is not that I did not try to know about these things I think it is incumbent upon anybodyat the top officeto try to know everything that goes on in his organization. (Gronouski 10/22/75 Hearings vol 4p 44.) 150 The only claim that any President may have known about the proj ect was made by Richard Helms who testified that "there was a pos sibility that he "mentioned it to President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 or 1968.66No documentary evidence is available that either supports or refutes this statement During the preparation of the Huston Plan neither CIA nor FBI representatives informed Tom Charles Huston President Nixon's representative that the mail opening project existed The final interagency report on the Huston Plan signed by Richard Helms and J Edgar Hoover was sent to the President with the statement contrary to fact that all mail opening programs by federal agencies had been discontinued.s In connection with another CIA mail opening project middle-level Agency officials apparently did not even tell their own superiors with in the CIA that they intended to open mail as opposed to merely in specting envelope exteriors The ranking officials testified that they approved the project believing it to be a mail cover program only. No Cabinet officials or President knew of this project and the approval of the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector (for what he also believed to be a mail cover operation) was secured through conscious deception."0 A pattern of concealment was repeated by the FBI in their mail opening programs There is no claim by the Bureau that any Post master General Attorney General or President was ever advised of the true nature and scope of its mail projects One FBI official testified that it was an unofficial Bureau policy not to inform postal officials with whom they dealt of the actual intention of FBI agents in receiv ing the mail and there is no indication that this policy was ever violated.00 At one point in 1965 Assistant Director Alan Belmont and Inspector Donald Moore apparently informed Attorney General Nicholas deB Iiatzenbach that FBI agents received custody of the mail in connection with espionage cases on some occasions. But Moore testified that the Attorney General was not told that mail was actually opened When asked if he felt any need to hold back from Katzenbach the fact of mail openings as opposed to the fact that Bu reau agents received direct access to the mail Moore replied It is perhaps difficult to answer Perhaps I could liken it to a defector in place in the KGB You don't want to tell anybody his name the location the title or anything like that Not that you don't trust them completely but the fact Helms 10/23/75 pp 28 30-31 "Special Report p 29 Richard Helms testified as follows about this inaccu rate statement the only explanation I have for it was that this applied entirely to the FBI and had nothing to do with the CIA that we never advertised to this Com mittee or told this Committeethat this mail operation was going on and there was nointention of attesting to a lie.... "And if I signed this thing then maybe I didn't read it carefully enough. "There was no intention to mislead or lie to the President. (Helms 10/22/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 95) Howard Osborn 8/28/75 pp 58 59 Thomas Karamessines 10/8/75 p 12 Richard Helms 9/10/75 p 127 "For example Chief Security Support Division memorandum 12/24/74 Memorandumfrom C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the file 3/26/69 memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the file 9/15/69 DonaldE Moore 10/1/75 p 79 "Moore 10/1/75 p 31 Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings vol 6 pp 204 205 151 is that any time one additional person becomes aware of it there is a potential for the information to go furthers Another Bureau agent speculated that the Attorney General was not told because mail opening "was not legal as far as I knew." Similarly there is no indication that the FBI ever informed any Attorney General about its use of "black bag jobs (illegal break-ins for purposes other than microphone installations) the full scope of its activities in COI\ TELPRO or its submission of names for inclu sion on either the CIA's "Watch List for mail opening or before 1973 on the NSA's "Watch List for electronic monitoring of international communications. After J Edgar Hoover disregarded Attorney General Biddle's 1943 order to terminate the Custodial Detention List by merely chang ing its name to the Security Index moreover Bureau headquarters instructed the field officers that the new list should be kept "strictly confidential and that it should never be mentioned in FBI reports or "discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau except for military intelligence agencies For several years thereafter the Attor ney General and the Justice Department were not informed of the FBI's decisions An incident which occurred in 1967 in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO operations is particularly illustrative of the lengths to which intelligence agencies would go to protect illegal programs from scrutiny by executive branch officers outside the intelligence com munity As one phase of its disruption of the United Klans of America the Bureau sent a letter to Klan officers purportedly prepared by the highly secret "National Intelligence Committee (NIC) of the Klan. The fake letter purported to fire the North Carolina Grand Dragon for personal misconduct and misfeasance in office and to suspend Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton for his failure to remove the Grand Dragon Shelton complained to the FBI and the Post Office about this apparent violation of the mail fraud statutes without realizing that the Bureau had in fact sent the letters The Bureau after solemnly assuring Shelton that his complaint was not within the FBI's jurisdiction approached the Chief Postal Inspector's office in Washington to determine what action the Post Office planned to take regarding Shelton's allegation The FBI was advised that the matter had been referred to the Justice Department's Criminal Divisions At no time did the Bureau inform either the Post Office or the Justice Department that FBI agents had authored the letter When no investi gation was deemed to be warranted by the Criminal Division FBI Headquarters directed the Bureau's Charlotte North Carolina office to prepare a second phony NIC letter to send to Klan officials. This "Moore 10/1/75 p 48 See Mail Report Sec IV "Nature and Value of the Product Received. FBI agent testimony 10/10/75 p 30 See NSAReport See H "Summary of NSAWatch List Activity. " Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto FBI Field Offices8/14/43 "Memorandum from Atlanta Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/7/67 "'Memorandum from Birmingham Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/14/67 'Postal officialstold Bureau liaison that since Shelton's allegations "appear to involve an internal struggle for control of Ku Klux Klan activities in North Carolina and since the evidenceof mail fraud was somewhattenuous in nature the Post Officedid not contemplateany investigation. (Memorandumfrom Spe cial Agent to D J Brennan 7/11/67.) Had the FBI informed the Post Office that Bureau agents had written the letter it would have been apparent that Shelton's allegations were not based on an "internal struggle within the KKK Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office8/21/67 152 letter was not mailed however because the Charlotte office proposed and implemented a different idea the formation of an FBI-controlled alternative Klan organization which eventually attracted 250 members. The Huston Plan itself was prepared without the knowledge of the Attorney General Neither the Attorney General nor anyone in his officewas invited to the drafting sessions at Langley or consulted dur ing the proceedings Huston testified that it never occurred to him to confer with the Attorney General before making the recommen dations in the Report in part because the plan was seen as an in telligence matter to be handled by the intelligence agency directors. Similarly the CIA's General Counsel was not included or consulted in the formulation of the Huston Plan As James Angleton testified "the custom and usage was not to deal with the General Counsel as a rule until there were some troubles He was not a part of the process of project approval. 73 (ii) Concealment from Congress At times knowledge of illegal programs and techniques has been concealed from Congress as well as executive branch officials On two occasions for example officials of the Army Security Agency ordered its units in apparent violation of that Agency's jurisdiction to con duct general searches of the radio spectrum without regard to the source or subject matter of the transmissions AS A did not report these incidents to ranking Army officials even when specifically asked to do so as part of the Army's preparation for the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 197174 Events surrounding the 1965 and 1966 investigation by Senator Ed ward Long of Missouri into federal agencies use of mail covers and other investigative techniques clearly showed the desire on the part of CIA and FBI officials to protect their programs from congressional review.75 Fearing that the New York mail opening program might be discovered by this subcommittee the CIA considered suspending the operation until the investigation had been completed An internal CIA memorandum dated April 23 1965 reads in part Mr Karamessines [Assistant Deputy Director for Plans] felt that the dangers inherent in Long's subcommittee activi i0Memorandumfrom Charlotte Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/22/67 z Huston 9/23/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 24 When J Edgar Hoover informed Attorney General John Mitchell about the Report on July 27 1970 Mitchell objected to its proposals and influenced the President to withdraw his original approval Accordingto John Mitchell he believed that the proposals "were inimical to the best interests of the country and certainly should not be somethingthat the President of the United States should be approving. (John Mitchell testimony 10/24/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 23.) James Angleton 9/24/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 77 See Military Surveillance Report See I "Improper Surveillanceof Private Citizens by the Military" Inspector General Report Department of the Army 1/3/72 ' The Johnson Administration itself attempted to restrict the Long Subcom mittee's investigation into national security matters although there is no indica tion that this attempt was motivated by a desire to protect illegal activities (E.g. Memorandumfrom A H Belmont to Mr Tolson 2/27/65 memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Messrs Tolson Belmont Gale Rosen Sullivan and DeLoach 3/2/65 ) 153 ties to the security of the Project's operations in New York should be thoroughly studied in order that a determination can be made as to whether these operations should be partially or fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations are completed 6 When it was learned that Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague had been contacted about the Long investigation and believed that it would "soon cool off however it was decided to continue the opera tion without suspension. The FBI was also concerned that the subcommittee might expose its mail opening programs Bureau memoranda indicate that the FBI in tended to "warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense.' : J Edgar Hoover per sonally contacted the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and urged him to see Long not later than Wednesday morning to cau tion him that [the Chief Counsels must not go into the kind of ques tion he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Depart ment" questioning that had threatened to reveal the FBI's mail project the previous week. When the Long subcommittee began to investigate electronic sur veillance practices several months later Bureau officials convinced Senator Edward Long that there was no need to pursue such an in vestigation since they said the FBI's operations were tightly con trolled and properly implemented.82 According to Bureau documents FBI agents wrote a press release for the Senator from Missouri with his approval that stated his subcommittee had conducted exhaustive research into the activities procedures and techniques of this agency [and] based upon careful study .. we are fully satisfied that the FBI has not participated in highhanded or uncontrolled usage of wiretaps microphones or other electronic equipment. Not only was this release written by the FBI itself it was misleading The "exhaustive research apparently consisted of a ninety-minute briefing by FBI officials describing their electronic surveillance prac tices neither the Senator nor the public learned of the instances of improper electronic surveillances that had been conducted by the FBI.64 When Senator Edward Long later asked certain FBI officials to testify about the Bureau's electronic surveillance policy before the Subcommittee they refused arguing ".. to put an FBI witness on the 'CBlind memorandumfrom "CIAOfficer, 4/23/65 Ibid 8MemorandumfromA H Belmontto Mr Tolson 2/27/65 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto Messrs Tolson Belmont Gale Rosen Sullivan and DeLoach 3/1/65 80Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto Messrs Tolson Belmont Gale Rosen Sullivan and DeLoach3/1/65 FMail Report Part IV See VII "Concernwith Exposure. At the time of his testimonybeforethe Long Subcommittee ChiefPostal Inspector Montagueknew of ongoing FBI projects in which Bureau agents received custody of the mail but he was apparently unaware that these projects involvedmail openings "For example Memorandumfrom C D DeLoachto Mr Tolson 1/10/66 RMemorandumfrom M A Jones to Mr Wick Attachmen'r 1/11/66 See pp 62 65 105 205 206 for a description of some of these improper surveillances 154 stand would be an attempt to open a Pandora's box insofar as our enemies in the press were concerned.... S5 After the press release had been delivered to Senator Long and the refusal to testify had been accepted one FBI official wrote to the Associate Director that while some problems still existed "we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcom mittee . , ss Subfinding (f ) The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI did not keep and in the case of the FBI were not designed to keep the activities of those agencies within legal bounds Their primary concern was efficiency not legality or propriety The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI were ineffective in ensuring that the activities of these agencies were kept within legal bounds This failure was sometimes due to structural deficiencies which kept knowledge of questionable programs tightly compartmented and shielded from those who could evaluate their legality As noted above for example the CIA's General Counsel was not informed about either the New York mail opening project or CIA's participation in the Huston Plan deliberations The role of the CIA's General Counsel was essentially a passive one he did not initiate inquiries but responded to requests from other Agency components As James Angleton stated the General Counsel was not a part of the normal project approval process and generally was not consulted until "something was going wrong. s When the General Counsel was consulted he often exerted a posi tive influence on the conduct of CIA activities For example the CIA stopped monitoring telephone calls to and from Latin America after the General Counsel issued an opinion describing the telephone inter cepts as illegal. But internal CIA regulations have never required employees who know of illegal improper or questionable activities to report them to the General Counsel rather employes with such knowledge are instructed to inform either the Director of Central Intelligence or the Inspector General The Director and the Inspector General may refer the matter to the General Counsel but until recently they were not obligated to do so. As Richard Helms stated "Some times we did [consult the General Counsel] sometimes we did not I think the record on that is rather spotty quite frankly. s9 Indeed the record suggests that those programs that were most questionable such as the New York mail opening project and Project CHAOS were not referred to the General Counsel because they were Memorandumfrom C D DeLoachto Mr Tolson 1/21/66 DeLoachmemorandum 1/21/66 This incident also illustrates that Congress has at times permitted itself to be "neu'tralized. The general reluctance of Congress to discharge its responsibilities toward intelligence agencies is dis cussedat pp 277-281 SiJames Angleton9/17/75 n 48 "Memorandum from Lawrence Houston to Acting Chief Division D 1/29/73 Proposed regulations drafted in response to Executive Order 11905(March 1976) require the Inspector General to refer all legal matters to the Officeof GeneralCounsel (Draft Reg HR 1-3.) Helmsdeposition 9/10/75 p 59 155 considered extremely sensitive.00 Even when questionable activities were called to the attention of the General Counsel moreover the in ternal Agency regulations did not guarantee him unrestricted access to all relevant information Thus the General Counsel was not in a position to conduct a complete evaluation of the propriety of par ticular programs Part of the failure of internal inspection to terminate improper pro grams and practices may be attributed to the fact that the primary focus of the CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the FBI's In spection Division has been on efficiency and effectiveness rather than on propriety The CIA's Inspector General is charged with the responsibility among other matters of investigating activities which might be con strued as "illegal improper and outside the CIA's legislative charter. "5 In at least one case the Inspector General did force the suspension of a suspect activity the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human subjects which was sus pended in 1963. 2 An earlier Inspector General's review of the larger more general program for the testing of behavorial control agents however had labeled that program "unethical and illegal and it none theless continued for another seven years." In general as the Rocke feller Commission pointed out "the focus of the Inspector General component reviews was on operational effectiveness Examination of the legality or propriety of CIA activities was not normally a primary concern. Two separate reviews of the New York mail opening proj ects by the Inspector General's office for example considered issues of administration and security at length but did not even mention legal considerations. Internal inspection at the FBI has traditionally not encompassed legal or ethical questions at all According to W Mark Felt the As sistant FBI Director in charge of the Inspection Division from 1964 to 1971 his job was to ensure that Bureau programs were being operated efficiently not constitutionally "There was no instruction to me, he stated "nor do I believe there is any instruction in the Inspector's manuals that inspectors should be on the alert to see that constitu tional values are being protected. 96He could not recall any program which was terminated because it might have been violating someone's civil rights.9"Gordon Stewart deposition 4/30/75 p 29 Rockeller CommissionReport p 146 Report on the Officesof the General Counseland Inspector General The General Counsel'sResponsibilities 9/30/75 p 29 Regulation HR 7 la (6) "Memorandum for the Record by J S Earman Inspector General 11/29/63 Memorandumfrom Helmsto DCI 11/9/64 9319557 I.G Inspectionof the TechnicalServicesDivision "sRockefellerCommissionReport 6/6/ 75 p S9 9eMemorandumfrom L K White Deputy Director for Support to ActingIn spector General Attachment 3/9/62 blind memorandum undated (1969) The Inspector General under whoseauspices the secondreview was conductedstated "[O]f course we knew that this was illegal, but he believed that it was "un necessary to raise the matter of its illegality with Director Helms "sinceevery body knew that it w-as[illegal] and it didn't seem that I would be telling Mr Helms anything that he didn't know. (Gordon Stewart 9/30/75 p 32.) p.32.) 0 W Mark Felt testimony 2/3/75 p 65 9qFelt 2/3/75 p 57 156 A number of questionable FBI programs were apparently never in spected Felt could recall no inspection for instance of either the FBI mail opening programs or the Bureau's participation in the CIA's New York mail opening project.0 Even when improper programs were inspected the Inspection Division did not attempt to exercise oversight in the sense of looking for wrongdoing Its responsibility was simply to ensure that FBI policy as defined by J Edgar Hoover was effectively implemented and not to question the propriety of the policy.99 Thus Felt testified that if in the course of an inspection of a field office he discovered a microphone surveillance on Martin Luther hing Jr. the only questions he would ask were whether it had been approved by the Director and whether the procedures had been prop erly followed.'oo When Felt was asked whether the Inspection Division con ducted any investigation into the propriety of COINTELPRO the following exchange ensued Mr FELT Not into the propriety Q So in the case of COINTELPRO as in the case of NSA interceptions your job as Inspector was to determine whether the program was being pursued effectively as op posed to whether it was proper Mr FELT Right with this exception that in any of these situations Counterintelligence Program or whatever it very frequently happened that the inspectors in reviewing the files would direct that a certain investigation be discontinued that it was not productive or that there was some reason that it be discontinued But I don't recall any cases being discontinued in the Counterintelligence program.10 As a result of this role definition the Inspection Division became an active participant in some of the most questionable FBI programs For example it was responsible for reviewing on an annual basis all memo randa relating to illegal break-ins prior to their destruction under the "DO NOT FILE procedure Improper programs and techniques in the FBI were protected not only by the Inspection Division's perception of its function but also by the maxim that FBI agents should never "embarrass the Bureau. This standard which served as a shield to outside scrutiny was explicitly reflected in the FBI Manual Any investigation necessary to develop complete essential facts regarding any allegation against Bureau employees must be instituted promptly and every logical lead which will establish the true facts should be completely run out unless such action would embarrass the Bureau in which event the Bureau will weigh the facts along with the recom mendations of the division head [Emphasis added.]'02 0aFelt 2/3/75 pp 54 55 99Felt 2/3/75 pp 59-60 100Felt 2/3/75 p 60 101Felt 2/3/75 pp 56 57 'When asked about this Manual provision Attorney General Edward Levi stated "I do believe .. some further explanation is in order First the Bureau in forms me that the provisionhas not been interpreted to mean that an investiga 157 Such an instruction coupled with the Inspection Division's inatten tion to the law could only inhibit or prevent the termination and ex posure of illegal practices Sub finding (g) When senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities knew or had a basis for suspecting that ques tionable activities had occurred they often responded with silence or approval In certain cases they were presented with a partial descrip tion of a program but did not ask for details thereby abdicating their responsibility In other cases they were fully aware of the nature of the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it On several occasions senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities were supplied with partial details about questionable or illegal programs but they did not ask for additional information and the programs continued Sometimes the failure to probe further stemmed from the admin istration official's assumption that an intelligence agency would not engage in lawless conduct Former Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague for example was aware that the FBI received custody of the mail in connection with several of its mail opening programs indeed he had approved such custody in one case but he testified that he believed these were mail cover operations only.103 Montague stated that he did not ask FBI officials if the Bureau opened mail because he never thought that would be necessary I trusted them the same as I would another [Postal] Inspector I would never feel that I would have to tell a Postal person that you cannot open mail By the same token I would not consider it necessary to emphasize it to any great degree with the FBI.104 A former FBI official has also testified as noted above that he informed Attorney General Katzenbach about selected aspects of the FBI mail opening programs This official did not tell Katzenbach that mail was actually opened but he testified that he "pointed out [to the Attorney General] that we do receive mail from the Post Office in certain sensitive areas. 105While Katzenbach stated that he never knew mail was opened or that the FBI gained access to mall on a regular basis in large-scale operations,3o0 the former Attorney tion should not take place and that any interpretation that an investigation wouldnot be instituted becauseof the possibilityof embarrassmentto the Bureau was never intended and in fact has never been the policyof this Bureau. I am told that what was intended to be conveyedwas that in such eventuality FBI Headquarters desired to be advised of the matter before investigation is in stituted so that Headquarters would be on notice and could direct the inquiry if necessary. "Second the manual provisiondates back to March30 1955. "Third I am informed by the Bureau that 'immediatesteps are beingtaken to remove that phraseologyfrom our Manual of Rules and Regulations. (Letter from Attorney GeneralLevi to Senator Richard Schweiker 11/10/75.) 103Henry Montaguetestimony 10/2/75 pp 55 71 10Henry Montague 10/2/75 pp 15-16 106DonaldMoore 10/1/75 p 31 108NicholasKatzenbach 10/11/75 p 35 158 General acknowledged that he did learn that "in some cases the out side of mail might have been examined or even photographed by persons other than Post Office employees''." However neither at this time nor at any other time did the Justice Department make any inquiry to determine the full scope of the FBI mail operations Similarly former Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach and Ram sey Clark testified that they were familiar with the FBI's efforts to disrupt the Ku Klux Klan through regular investigative techniques but said they were unaware of the offensive tactics that occurred in COI\TELPRO Katzenbach said he did not believe it neces sary to explore possible irregularities since "[i]t never occurred to me that the Bureau would engage in the sort of sustained improper activity which it apparently did. 108 Both Robert Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenbach were also aware of some aspects of the FBI's investigation of I)r Martin Luther King Jr. yet neither ascertained the full details of the Bureau's campaign to discredit the civil rights leader Kennedy intensified the original "com munist influence investigation in October 1963 by authorizing wire taps on King's home and office telephones.109 Kennedy requested that an evaluation of the results be submitted to him in thirty days in order to determine whether or not to maintain the taps but the evalua tion was never delivered to him and he did not insist on it.110Since he never ordered the termination of the wiretap the Bureau could and did install additional wiretaps on King by invoking the original authorization."l According to Bureau memoranda apparently ini tialled by Attorney General Katzenbach Katzenbach received after the fact notification in 1965 that three bugs had been planted in Dr King's hotel rooms. A transmittal memorandum written by 10iKatzenbachstatement 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 205 1 sKatzenbach testimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 207 Ramsey Clark 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 235 Katzenbach's and Clark's knowledgeof disrup tive operations is discussed at greater length in Finding G "Deficieucesin Con trol and Accountability p 265 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 10/7/63 memorandumfromJ Edgar Hooverto the Attorney General 10/18/63 " Memorandumfrom C A Evans to Mr Belmont 10/21/63 In May 1961 Robert Kennedyalso becameaware of the CIA'suse of organized crime figures in connectionwith "clandestine efforts against the Cuban govern ment (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 5/22/61.) But he did not instruct the CIA to terminate its involvementwith underworld figureseither at that time or in May 1962 when he learned at a briefingby CIA officialsthat an assassination attempt had occurred Accordingto the CIA's Gen eral Counsel who participated in the 1962briefing Kennedyonly said if we were going to get involvedwith Mafiapersonnelagain he wanted to be informed first. (LawrenceHoustondeposition 6/2/75 p 14.) The CIA's use of underworld figures clearly posedproblems for the FBI's on going investigation of organized crime in the United States which had in large part been initiated by Attorney General Kennedy himself (Senate Select Com mittee "AllegedAssassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. pp 125-129.) illThe FBI instituted additional wiretaps on King on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1965 Since Justice Department policy before March 1965 imposed no limit on the duration of wiretaps and they were approved by the Attorney General the Bureau claimed that the King taps were justified as a con tinuation of the tap originally authorized by Kennedy in October1963 (For ex ample memorandumfrom FBI headquarters to Atlanta Field Office 4/19/65 Martin Luther King Report Sec IC "Wiretap Surveillanceof Dr King and the SCLC. Katzenbach's initials appear on memoranda addressed to the Attorney Gen eral advising him of these bugs but he cannot recall seeingor initialing them 159 Katzenbach also indicates that he may have instructed the FBI to be "very cautious"in conducting these surveillances.73 There is no indication however that he requested further details about any of them or prohibited the FI3I from future use of this technique against Dr King While there is no evidence that the full extent of the FBI's campaign to discredit Dr hing was authorized by or known to anyone outside of the Bureau there is evidence that officials responsible for supervis ing the FBI received indications that some such efforts were being undertaken For example former Attorney General Katzenbach and former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall both testified that in late 1964 they learned that the Bureau had offered tape record ings of I)r hing to certain newsmen in Washington D.C They fur ther stated that they informed President Johnson of the FBI's oilers The Committee has discovered no evidence however that the President or Justice Department officials made any further effort to halt the discrediting campaign at this time or at any other time in deed the Bureau's campaign continued for several years after this incident On some occasions administration officials did not request further details about intelligence programs because they simply did not want to know Former Postmaster General J Edward Day testified that when Allen Dulles and Richard Helms spoke to him about a CIA project in 1961 he interrupted then before they could tell him the purpose of their visit (which Helms said was to say mail was being opened) I)ay stated Mr Dulles after some preliminary visiting and so on said that he wanted to tell me something very secret and I said "Do I have to know about it And he said "No. I said "My experience is that where there is something that is very secret it is likely to leak out and anybody that knew about it is likely to be suspected of having been part of leak ing it out so I would rather not know anything about it. What additional things were said in connection with him building up to that I don't know But I am sure that I was not told anything about opening mail. 15 By his own account therefore Mi Day did not learn the true nature of this project because he "would rather not know anything about it. Although rarely expressed in such unequivocal terms this attitude appears to have been all too common among senior government officials (Memorandafrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 5/17/65 10/19/65 12/1/65 Katzenbach 12/1/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 211 p 46.) He stated how ever that if he had read these documents he wouldhave "done somethingabout it. (Katzenbach Hearings Vol 6 p 230.) " A transmittal slip which the FBI claims had been attached to the 12/1/65 memorandum notes that "these are particularly delicate surveillances and that "we should be very cautious in terms of the non-FBI peoplewho may from time to time necessarily he involved in some aspect of installation. (Memo randum from Nicholas Katzenbach to J Edgar Hoover 12/10/65.) This mes sage is signed by Katzenhach but he testified that he is unsure it related to the King surveillances Iiatzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 229.) "'Katzenbach 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 210 Burke Marshall testimony 3/3/76 pp 39-13 J Edward Day testimony 10/22/75 Hearings vol 4 p 45 160 Even when administration officials were fully apprised of the illegal or questionable nature of certain programs and techniques they some times permitted them to continue An example of acquiescence is pre sented in the case of William Cotter a former Chief Postal Inspector who knew that the CIA opened mail in connection with its New York project but took no direct action to terminate the project for a period of four years.116 Cotter had learned of this project in his capacity as a CIA official in the mid-1950's and he knew that it was continuing when he was sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector in April 1969.111 Be cause the primary responsibility of his position was to insure the sanctity of the mails he was understandably "very very uncomfort able with [knowledge of the New York] project, 118but he felt con strained by the letter and spirit of the secrecy oath which he had signed when he left the CIA in 1969 "attesting to the fact that I would not divulge secret information that came into my possession during the time that I was with the CIA. 119Cotter stated "After coming from eighteen years in the CIA I was hypersensitive perhaps to the pro tection of what I believed to be a most sensitive project ... 120For several years he placed the dictate of the secrecy oath above that of the law he was charged with enforcing Former White House adviser John Ehrlichman also stated that he learned of a program of intercepting mail between the United States and Communist countries "because I had seen reports that cited those kinds of sources in connection with this the bombings the dissident activities. 121Yet he cannot recall any White House inquiry that was made into such a program nor can he recall raising the matter with the President.122 When President Nixon learned of the illegal techniques that were recommended in the Huston Plan lie initially endorsed rather than disavowed them The former President stated that "[t]o the extent that I reviewed the Special Report of Interagency Committee on In telligence I would have been informed that certain recommendations or decisions set forth in that report were or might be construed to be illegal. 123He nonetheless approved them in part because they repre sented an efficient method of intelligence collection As President Nixon explained "[M]y approval was based largely on the fact that the pro cedures were consistent with those employed by prior administrations and had been found to be effective by the intelligence agencies. 124 Mr Nixon also apparently relied on the theory that a "sovereign President can authorize the violation of criminal laws in the name of "national security when the President in his sole discretion deems it appropriate He recently stated lleIn 1973 however Mr Cotter was instrumental in effectingthe termination of the CIA'sNewYorkproject (Cotter 8/7/75 p 45.) 114Cotter 8/7/75 p 45 1 Ibid 118Cotter 10/22/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 74 120Ibid 1nJohn Erlichman testimony President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States 4/17/75 p 95 'Erlichman testimony President's Commissionon CIA Activities Within the United States 4/17/75 p 98 'Answer of Richard M Nixon to Senate Select CommitteeInterrogatory 23 3/9/70 p 13 124Answer of Richard M Nixon to Senate Select CommitteeInterrogatory 19 3/9/76 p 13 161 It is quite obvious that there are certain inherently govern mental actions which if undertaken by the sovereign in protec tion of the interest of the nation's security are lawful but which if undertaken by private persons are not [I]t is naive to attempt to categorize activities a Presi dent might authorize as "legal or "illegal without refer ence to the circumstances under which he concludes that the activity is necessary In short there have been and will be in the future cir cumstances in which Presidents may lawfully authorize ac tions in the interests of the security of this country which if undertaken by other persons or even by the President under (liilerent circumstances would be illegal. As the former President described this doctrine it could apply not only to actions taken openly which are subject to later challenge by Congress and the courts but also to actions such as those recommended in the Huston Plan which are covertly endorsed and implemented The dangers inherent in this theory are clear for it permits a Presi dent to create exceptions to normal legal restraints and prohibitions without review by a neutral authority and without objective stand ards to guide him.126The Huston Plan itself serves as a reminder of these dangers Significantly President Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan was based on the possibility of "media criticism if the use of these techniques was revealed The former President stated Mr Mitchell informed me that it was Director Hoover's opin ion that initiating a program which would permit several government intelligence agencies to utilize the investigative techniques outlined in the Committee's report would signifi cantly increase the possibility of their public disclosure Mr Mitchell explained to me that Mr Hoover believed that al though each of the intelligence gathering methods outlined in the Committee's recommendations had been utilized by one or more previous Administrations their sensitivity would likely generate media criticism if they were employed Mr Mitchell further informed me that it was his opinion that the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions such as unauthorized entry into foreign embassies to install a microphone transmit ter was greater than the possible benefit to be derived Based upon this conversation with Attorney General Mitchell I de cided to revoke the approval originally extended to the Com mittee's recommendations.12 In more than one instance administration officials outside the in telligence community have specifically requested intelligence agencies to undertake questionable actions NSA's program of monitoring tele phonic communications between New York City and a city in South America for example was undertaken at the specific request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs a law enforcement agency Answer of Richard M Nixon to Senate Select CommitteeInterrogatory 34 3/9/76 pp 16-17 President Ford has recently rejected this doctrine of Presidential power Answer of Richard M Nixon to Senate Select CommitteeInterrogatory 17 3/9/76 pp 11-12 68-7860 76 12 162 BNDD officials had been concerned about drug deals that were appar ently arranged in calls from public telephones in New York to South America but they felt that they could not legally wiretap these tele phone booths.128In order to avoid tapping a limited number of phones in New York BNDD submitted the names of 450 American citizens for inclusion in NSA's Watch List and requested NSA to monitor a communications link between New York and South America which necessitated the interception of thousands of international telephone calls.129 The legal limitations on domestic wiretapping apparently did not concern certain officials in the White House or Attorneys General who requested the FBI to do their bidding In some instances they specif ically requested the FBI to institute wiretaps on American citizens with no substantial national security predicate for doing so.Y30 On occasion Attorneys General have also encouraged the FBI to circumvent the will of both Congress and the Supreme Court As noted above after Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 to regulate the FBI program for listing people to be detained in case of war or other emergency Justice Department officials concluded that its procedural safeguards and substantive standards were "unwork able Attorney General J Howard McGrath instructed the FBI to disregard the statute and "proceed with the (Security Index] program as previously outlined.7 131Two subsequent Attorneys General James McGranery and Herbert Brownell endorsed the decision to ignore the Emergency Detention Act.'32 In 1954 the Supreme Court denounced the use of microphone sur veillances by local police in criminal cases 133the fact that a micro phone had been installed in a defendant's bedroom particularly out raged the court Within weeks of this decision however Attorney General Herbert Brownell reversed the existing Justice Department policy prohibiting trespassory microphone installations by the FBI and (rave the Bureau sweeping new authority to engage in bugging for intelligence purposes even when it meant planting microphones in bedrooms.13 Brownell wrote J Edgar Hoover Obviously the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided whenever possible It may appear however that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important in telligence function considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and therefore may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.1 143MiltonIredell 9/18/75 p 99 129MemorandumfromIngersollto Gayler 4/10/70 130See Findings "Political Abuse and "Intrusive Techniques for examples 131Memorandumfrom A H Belmontto P M Ladd 10/15/52 132Memorandumfrom Attorney General James McGraneryto J Edgar Hoover 11/25/52 memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell to J Edgar Hoover 4/27/53 13Irvine v California 347 U.S 128 (1954) 'Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director FBI 5/20/54 13'Memorandumfrom the Attorney General to the Director FBL 5/20/54 136Ibid 163 Brownell did not even require the Bureau to seek the Attorney Gen eral's prior approval for microphone installations in particular cases.136In the face of the Irvine decision therefore he gave the FBI authority to bug whomever it wished wherever it wished in cases that the Bureau and not the Attorney General determined were "in the national interest. In short disregard of the law by intelligence officers was seldom corrected and sometimes encouraged or facilitated by officials out side the agencies Whether by inaction or direct participation these administration officials contributed to the perception that legal re straints did not apply to intelligence activities B THE OVERBREADTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY MAJOR FINDING The Committee finds that domestic intelligence activity has been overbroad in that (1) many Americans and domestic groups have been subjected to investigation who were not suspected of criminal activity and (2) the intelligence agencies have regularly collected information about personal and political activities irrelevant to any legitimate gov ernmental interest Sub findings Large numbers of law abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of Americans contributed to overbreadth Congress did not enact stat utes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity The executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone that the government's concern was not with political opinions but with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. Intelligence agencies superiors issued over-inclusive direc tives to investigate "subversion (a term that was never defined in presidential directives) and "potential rather than actual or likely criminal conduct as well as to collect general intelligence on law ful political and social dissent The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and over inclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations Intel ligence investigations extended beyond "subversive or violent targets to additional groups and individuals subiect to minimal "subversive influence or having little or no "potential for violence Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner approach to intelligence collection drawing in all available information about groups and individuals including their lawful political activity and details of their personal lives Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for exces sively long periods of time resulting in sustained governmental moni toring of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal conduct or "subversion. Elaboration of Findings The central problem posed by domestic intelligence activity has been its departure from the standards of the law This departure from law has meant not only the violation of constitutional prohibitions and explicit statutes but also the adoption of criteria unrelated to the law as the basis for extensive investigations of Americans (165) 166 In 1917-1924 the federal government often assisted by the private vigilante American Protective League conducted sweeping investiga tions of dissenters war protesters labor organizers and alleged "anar chists and "revolutionaries. These investigations led to mass arrests of thousands of persons in the 1920 "Palmer raids. Reacting to these and other abuses of investigative power Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone in 1924 confined the Bureau of Investigation in the Jus tice Department to the investigation of federal crimes Attorney Gen eral Stone articulated a clear and workable standard The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals It is concerned only with their conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. Nevertheless his restriction lasted for little more than a decade In the mid-1930s the FBI resumed domestic intelligence functions carrying out President Roosevelt's vague order to investigate "sub versive activities. The President and the Attorney General author ized FBI and military intelligence investigations of conduct explicitly recognized as "not within the specific provisions of prevailing stat utes. As a result ideas and associations rather than suspicion of criminal offenses once again became the focus of federal investigations The scope of domestic intelligence investigations consistently wid ened in the decades after the 1930s reaching its greatest extent in the late 1960s and early 1970s Domestic intelligence investigations were permitted under criteria which more nearly resembled political or social labels than standards for governmental action Rather than Attorney General Stone's stand ard of investigating "only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States, domestic intelligence used such labels as the fol lowing to target intelligence investigations "rightist or "extremist groups in the "anticommunist field persons with "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs or who were "espousing the line of revolutionary movements "general racial matters "hate organizations "rabble rousers "key activists "black nationalists "white supremacists "agitators "key black extremists These broad and imprecise labels reflect the ill-defined mission of domestic intelligence which resulted from recurring demands for progressively wider investigations of Americans Without the firm New YorkTimes 5/10/24 Attorney General Stone implementedthis policyby issuing a directive to Acting Director J Edgar Hoover of the Bureau of Inves tigation "The activities of the Bureau are to be limited strictly to investigations of violations of law under my direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly conductingthe work of the Department of Justice. (Memorandumfrom Attorney General Stone to J Edgar Hoover 5/13/24 cited in Alpheus Thomas Mason Harlan Fiske Stone Pillar of the Law [New York VikingPress 1956) p 151.] 167 guidance provided by law intelligence activities intruded into areas of American life which are protected from governmental inquiry by the constitutional guarantees of personal privacy and free speech and assembly Sub finding (a) Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance Some domestic intelligence activity has focused on specific illegal conduct or on instances where there was tangible evidence that illegal conduct was likely to occur But domestic intelligence has gone far beyond such matters in collecting massive amounts of data on Amer icans For example FBI Domestic Intelligence. The FBI has compiled at its head quarters over 480,000 files on its "subversion investigations and over 33,000 files on its "extremism investigations. During the twenty years from 1955 to 1975 the FBI conducted 740.000 investigations of "subversive matters and 190,000 investigations of "extremist mat ters. 3 The targets for FBI intelligence collection have included the Women's Liberation Movement the conservative Christian Front and Christian Mobiliz ers of Father Coughlin the conservative American Christian Action Council of Rev Carl McIntyre a wide variety of university church and political groups opposed to the Vietnam war those in the non-violent civil rights movement such as Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Coun cil the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Council on Racial Equality (CORE) Army Surveillance of Civilians. The Army's nationwide intel ligence surveillance program created files on some 100,000 Americans and an equally large number of domestic organizations encompassing virtually every group seeking peaceful change in the United States Including the John Birch Society Young Americans for Freedom the National Organization of Women the NAACP the Urban League the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'irth and Business Executives to End the War in Vietnam.3 CIA's CHAOS Program. The CIA's extensive CHAOS pro gram which compiled intelligence on domestic groups and individ uals protesting the Vietnam war and racial conditions amassed some Memorandumfrom FBI to SelectCommittee 10/6/75 'Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee Re Investigative Matters re ceived 11/12/75 These statistics include as separate "matters investigative leads pursued by different FBI officesin the same case Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights "Federal Data Banks Computers and Bill of Rights, 1971p 264 168 10,000 intelligence files on American citizens and groups and indexed 300,000 names of Americans in ('IA computer records. IRS.5'electice Tax Jocestigatioo$ of I>isseoters. Between 1969 and 1973 the Internal Revenue Service through a secret "Special Service Staff (SSS) targeted more than 10,000 individuals and groups for tax examinations because of their political activity. The FBI and the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department gave SSS lists of taxpayers deemed to be "activists or "ideological organizations the FBI in providing SSS with a list of over 2,000 groups and in dividuals classified as "Right Wing, "New Left, and "Old Left, expressed its hope that SSS tax examinations would "deal a blow to dissident elements. A smaller though more intensive selective en forcement program the "Ideological Organization Project, was es tablished in November 1961 in response to White House criticism of "right-wing extremist groups. On the basis of such political criteria 18 organizations were selected for special audit although there was no evidence of tax violation. In 1964 the IRS proposed to expand its program to make "10,000 examinations of [tax] exempt organizations of all types including the extremist groups. Although this program never fully materialized the "Ideological Organizations Project can be viewed as a precursor to SSS CIA and FBI Mail Opening. The 12 mail opening programs con ducted by the CIA and FBI between 1940 and 1973 resulted in the illegal opening of hundreds of thousands of first-class letters In the 1960s and early 1970s the international correspondence of large num bers of Americans who challenged the condition of racial minorities or who opposed the war in Vietnam was specifically targeted for mail opening by both the CIA and FBI The overbreadth of the longest CIA mail opening program the 20 year (1953 1973) program in New York City is shown by the fact that of the more than 28 million letters screened by the CIA the ex teriors of 2.7 million were photographed and 214,820 letters were opened 11This is further shown by the fact that American groups and individuals placed on the Watch List for the project included The Federation of American Scientists authors such as John Steinbeck and Edward Albee numerous American peace groups such as the American Friends Service Committee and Women's Strike for Peace and businesses such as Praeger Publishers 12 By one CIA estimate random selection accounted for 75 percent of the 200,000 letters opened including letters to or from American political figures such as Richard Nixon while a presidential candidate in 1968 and Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy.13 See CHAOSReport Sec II D "Operation of the CHAOSProgram and Re lated CIAProjects. 8See IRS Report Part II Sec II "Special Service Staff. Memorandumfrom D J Brennan to W C Sullivan 8/15/69 eMemorandumfromWilliamLoebto Dean Barron 11/30/61 0Memorandumfrom MitchellRogovinto DeanBarron 12/20/61 10Memorandumfrom Commissioner IRS to Myer Feldman 7/11/63 See Mail Report Part I "DomesticCIA and FBI Mail OpeningPrograms. 13See Mail Report Part II Sec II B(1) "SelectionCriteria. "See Mail Report Part II Sec II B(1) "Selection Criteria. 169 NSA's Match List and SHAMROCK Programs. The National Security Agency's SHAMROCK program by which copies of mil lions of telegrams sent to from or through the United States were obtained between 1947 and 1973 involved the use of a Watch List froth 1967-1973 The watch list included groups and individuals se lected by the FBI for its domestic intelligence investigations and by the CIA for its Operation CHAOS program In addition the SHAM ROCh Program resulted in NSA's obtaining not only telegrams to and from certain foreign targets but countless telegrams between Americans in the United States and American or foreign parties abroad." In short virtually every element of our society has been subjected to excessive government-ordered intelligence inquiries Opposition to gov ernment policy or the expression of controversial views was frequently considered sufficient for collecting data on Americans The committee finds that this extreme breadth of intelligence activ ity is inconsistent with the principles of our Constitution which pro tect the rights of speech political activity and privacy against un justified governmental intrusion Subfinding (b) The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of Americans contributed to overbreadth Congress did not enact statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity The Executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone that the government's concern was not with political opinions but with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. Intelligence agencies superiors issued overinclusive directives to investigate "subversion (a term that was never defined in presi dential directives) and "potential rather than actual or likely crim inal conduct as well as to collect general intelligence on lawful political and social dissent Congress has never set out a specific statutory charter for FBI domestic intelligence activity delineating the standards for opening intelligence investigations or defining the purpose and scope of do mestic intelligence activity." Nor have the charters for foreign intelligence agencies the Cen tral Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency articu lated adequate standards to insure that those agencies did not be come involved in domestic intelligence activity While the 1947 Na tional Security Act provided that the CIA shall have no "police subpoena law enforcement powers or internal security functions," "See "National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans NSA Report Sec II A "Summary of NSA Watch List Activity 'The FBI's statutory authority provides that the Attorney General may ap point officials "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States (2) to assist in the protection of the President and (3) to conduct such in vestigations regarding officialmatters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney Gen eral. (28 U.S.C 533.) Attorney General Edward H Levi told the Select Committee"that the statu tory basis for the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully satisfac tory. (Edward H Levi testimony 12/11/75 Hearings vol 6 p 313.) "B50U.S.C 403 (d) (3) 170 the Act was silent concerning whether the CIA was authorized to target Americans abroad or to gather intelligence in the United States on Americans or foreign nationals in connection with its foreign in telligence responsibilities By classified presidential directive the CIA was authorized to conduct counterintelligence operations abroad and to maintain central counterintelligence files for the intelligence com munity.1 Counterintelligence activity was defined in the directive to include protection of the nation against "subversion, a term which as in the directives authorizing FBI domestic intelligence activity was not defined In the absence of specific standards for CIA activity and given the susceptibility of the term "subversion to broad interpretation the CIA conducted Operation CHAOS a large scale intelligence pro gram involving the gathering of data on thousands of Americans and domestic groups to determine if they had "subversive connections" and illegally opened the mail of hundreds of thousands of Americans Moreover the Act does not define the scope of the authority granted to CIA's Director to protect intelligence "sources and methods. 18 This authority has been broadly interpreted to permit surveillance of present and former CIA employees in the United States as well as domestic groups thought to be a threat to CIA installations in the United States No statute at ,all deals with the National Security Agency That Agency one of the largest of the intelligence agencies was created by Executive Order in 1952 Although NSA's mission is to obtain foreign intelligence from "foreign communications this has been interpreted to permit NSA to_intercept communications where one terminal the sender or receiver was in the United States Conse quently when an American has used telephone or telegraph facilities between this country and overseas his message has been subject to interception by NSA NSA obtained copies of millions of private telegrams sent from to or through the United States in its SHAM ROCIi program and complied with requests to target the international communications of specific Americans through the use of a watch list In addition to the failure of Congress to enact precise statutory standards members of Congress have put pressure on the intelligence agencies for the collection of domestic intelligence without adequate regard to constitutional interests.19 Moreover Congress has passed statutes such as the Smith Act which although not directly authoriz ing domestic intelligence collection had the effect of contributing to the excessive collection of intelligence about Americans Three functional policies established by the Executive branch and acquiesced in by Congress were the basis for the overbreadth of in telligence investigations directed at Americans These policies cen tered on (1) so-called "subversion investigations of attempts by hostile foreign governments and their agents in this country to in fluence the course of American life (2) the investigation of persons and groups thought to have a "potential for violating the law or committing violence and (3) the collection of general intelligence on political and social movements in the interest of predicting and controlling civil disturbances National Security IntelligenceDirective No 5 "a0 U.C.C403 (d) (3) 1DSee Finding on Deficienciesin Control and Accountability pp 277-279 171 Each of these policies grew out of a legitimate concern Nazi Ger many Japan and the Soviet Union mounted intelligence efforts in this country before World War II and Soviet operations continued after the war In the 1960s and early 1970s racist groups used force to deprive Americans of their civil rights some American dissidents engaged in violence as a form of political protest and there were large-scale protest demonstrations and major civil disorders in cities stemming from minority frustrations The Committee recognizes that the government had a responsibility to act in the face of the very real dangers presented by these develop ments But appropriate restraints controls and prohibitions on in telligence collection were not devised distinctions between legitimate targets of investigations and innocent citizens were forgotten and the Government's actions were never examined for their effects on the con stitutional rights of Americans either when programs originated or as they continued over the years The policies of investigating Americans thought to have a "po tential for violence and the collection of general intelligence on po litical and social movements inevitably resulted in the surveillance of American citizens and domestic groups engaged in lawful political activity "Subversive was never defined in the presidential directives from Presidents Roosevelt to hennedy authorizing FBI domestic intelligence activity Consequently "subversive investigations did not focus solely on the activities of hostile foreign governments in this country Rather they targeted Americans who dissented from admin istration positions or whose political positions were thought to re semble those of "subversive groups An example of the ultimate re sult of accepting the concept of "subversive investigations is the Johnson White House instruction to the FBI to monitor public hear ings on Vietnam policy and compare the extent to which Senators views "followed the Communist Party line. 20 Similarly investigations of those thought to have the "potential for violating laws or committing violence and the collection of general intelligence to prepare for civil disturbances resulted in the surveil lance of Americans where there was not reasonable suspicion to believe crime or violence were likely to occur Broad categories of American society conservatives liberals blacks women young people and churches were targeted for intelligence collection Domestic intelligence expanded to cover widespread political pro test movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s For example in September 1967 Attorney General Ramsey Clark called for a "new area of investigation and intelligence reporting by the FBI regarding the possibility of "an organized pattern of violence by groups in the "urban ghetto. He instructed FBI Director Hoover .. we must make certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is pre planned or organized... As a part of the broad investigation which must be conducted sources or informants in black nationalist organizations SNCC and other less publicized groups should be developed and expanded to determine the "FBI summary memorandum 1/31/75 172 size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups.21 Such instructions did not limit investigation to facts pointing to par ticular criminal or violent activity but called for intensive intelligence surveillance of a broad category of black groups (and their connec tions with other groups) to determine their "size and purpose. Similarly the Army's broad domestic surveillance program re flected administration pressure on the Army for information on groups and individuals involved in domestic dissent.22 As a former Assistant Secretary of Defense testified the Army's sweeping collection plan "reflected the all-encompassing and uninhibited demand for informa tion directed at the Department of the Army. 23 Presidents Johnson and Nixon subjected the CIA to intensive pressure to find foreign influence on the domestic peace movements resulting in the establishment of Operation CHAOS 24 When the Nixon Administration called for an intensification of CIA's effort the CIA was instructed to broaden its targeting criteria and strengthen its collection efforts CIA was told that "foreign Communist support should be "liberally construed. 25The White House stated further that "it appears our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate and implied that any gaps in CIA's collection program resulting from "inadequate resources or a low priority of attention should be corrected.26 In short having abandoned Attorney General Stone's standard that restricted Government investigations to "conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States, the Government's far-reaching domestic intelligence policies inevitably produced investigations and surveillance of large numbers of law abiding Americans Sub finding (c) The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and over-inclu sive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations Intelligence investigations extended beyond "subversive or violent targets to additional groups and individuals subject to minimal "subversive in fluence or having little or no "potential for violence Having been given vague directions by their superiors and sub jected to substantial pressure to report on a broad range of matters the intelligence agencies themselves often established overinclusive targeting criteria The criteria followed in the major domestic intel ligence programs conducted in the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the breadth of intelligence targeting "General Racial Matters". The FBI gathered intelligence about proposed "civil demonstrations and related activities of "officials committees legislatures organizations etc. in the "racial field. 27 a Memorandumfrom Ramsey Clark to J Edgar Hoover 9/14/67 22See Military Surveillance Report Sec II C 23Robert F Froehkle testimony Senate Judiciary Subcommitteeon Constitu tional Rights 1971 citedhereinafter as 1971Hearings Seepp 99-101 Memorandumfrom Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA 6/20/69 p 1reMemorandumfrom TomCharles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA 6/20/69 p I'1964 FBI Manual Section122 p 1 173 FBI Field Offices were directed to report the "general programs of all "civil rights organizations and "readily available personal background data on leaders and individuals in the civil rights movement, as well as any "subversive association that might be recorded in Field Office files.28 In addition the FBI reported "the objectives sought by the minority community." These broad criteria were also reflected in the FBI's targeting of "white militant groups in the reporting of racial matters Those who were "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools were to be investigated.30 "New Left Intelligence. In conducting a "comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement (rather than investigating particular violations of law) the FBI defined its intelligence target as a "loosely bound free-wheeling college-oriented movement. 31Organizations to be investigated were those who fit criteria phrased as the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft organizations." The use of such imprecise criteria resulted in investigations of such matters as (1) two university instructors who helped support a student newspaper whose editorial policy was described by the FBI as "left of-center antiestablishment and opposed to the University Admin istration" 33 (2) a dissident stockholder's group planning to protest a large corporation's war production at the annual stockholder's meet ing 3F and (3) "Free Universities attached to college campuses whether or not there were facts indicating any actual or potential violation of law.3 "Rabble Rouser Index. Beginning in August 1967 the FBI con ducted intensive intelligence investigations of individuals identified as "rabble rousers. The program was begun after a member of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders asked the FBI at a meeting of the Commission "to identify the number of militant Negroes and Whites. 36This vague reference was subsequently used by the FBI as the basis for instructions implementing a broad new program persons were to be investigated and placed on the "rabble rouser index who were "racial agitators who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord. 37 Ultimately a "rabble rouser was defined as A person who tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to their emotions prejudices et cetera a demagogue.3s Thus rather than collecting information on those who had or were likely to commit criminal or violent acts a major intelligence program was launched to identify "demagogues. FBI Manual Section122 revised 12/13/66 p 8-9 FBI Manual Section122 revised12/13/66 p 8-9 SACLetter 68-25 4/30/68 31Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC'S10/28168 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's10/28/68 Memorandumfrom MobileField Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/9/70 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office4/23/70 Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/15/66 3 Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto ClydeTolson 8/1/67 Memorandumfrom Charles Brennan to William Sullivan 8/3/67 SACLetter 67-56 9/12/67 SACLetter No 67-70 11/28/67 174 Army Domestic Surveillance of "Dissidents.'' Extremely broad criteria were used in the Army's nationwide surveillance program conducted in the late 1960s Such general terms as "the civil rights movement and the "anti-Vietnam/anti-draft movements were used to indicate targets for investigation. In collecting information on these "movements and on the "cause of civil disturbances, Army intelligence was to investigate "instigators, "group participants, and "subversive elements" all undefined Under later revisions the Army collection plan extended even be yond "subversion and "dissident groups to "prominent persons who were "friendly with the "leaders of the disturbance or "sym pathetic with their plans. 40 These imprecise crtieria led to the creation of intelligence files on nearly 100,000 Americans including Dr Martin Luther hing Major General Edwin Walker Julian Bond Joan Baez Dr Benjamin Spock Rev William Sloane Coffin Congressman Abner Mikva Sen ator Adlai Stevenson III,41 as well as clergymen teachers journalists editors attorneys industrialists a laborer a construction worker rail road engineers a postal clerk a taxi driver a chiropractor a doctor a chemist an economist a historian a playwright an accountant an entertainer professors a radio announcer athletes business executives and authors all of whom became subjects of Army files simply because of their participation in political protests or their association with those who were engaged in such political activity." The IRS Computerized Intelligence Index. In 1973 IRS estab lished a central computer index the "Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System" for general intelligence data much of it unrelated to tax law enforcement More than 465,000 Americans were indexed in the IRS computer system including J Edgar Hoover and the IRS Commissioner as well as thousands of others also not suspected of tax violation Names in newspaper articles and other published sources were indexed wholesale into the IRS computer Under the system in telligence gathering preceded any specific allegation of a violation and possible "future value was the sole criterion for inclusion of information into the Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System CIA's Operation CHAOS. In seeking to fulfill White House re quests for evidence of foreign influence on domestic dissent the CIA gave broad instructions to its overseas stations These directives called for reporting on the "Radical Left which included according to the CIA "radical students antiwar activitists draft resisters and desert ers black nationalists anarchists and assorted 'New Leftists'. 43 CIA built its huge CHAOS data base on the assumption that to know whether there was significant foreign involvement in a domestic group "one has to know whether each and every one of these persons has any connection to foreigners. 44 CIA instructed its stations that even "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements were deemed to '1971 Hearings pp 1120-4121 1971Hearings pp 1123-1138 9 Stein testimony 1971Hearings p 266 ""Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights Report 1973 p 57 cited hereafter as 197,3Report "Book Cable from Thomas Karamessines to various European Stations June 1968 "Richard Ober testimony Rockefeller Commission 3/28/75 pp 88-89 175 "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements were deemed to constitute "subversive connections. 45Similarly CIA's request to NSA for materials on persons targeted by the NSA Watch List called for all information regardless of how innocuous it may seem. 49 The Conunittees investigation has shown that the absence of precise statutory standards and the use of overbroad criteria for domestic intelligence activity resulted in the extension of intelligence investiga tions beyond their original "subversive or violent targets Intelligence investigations extended to those thought to be subject to "subversive influence. Moreover those thought to have a "potential for violence were also targeted and in some cases investigations extended even to those engaged in wholly non-violent lawful political expression FBI "COMINFIL Investigations. Under the FBI's COMINFIL ("communist infiltration") program large ;umbers of groups and individuals engaged in lawful political activity have been subjected to informant coverage and intelligence scrutiny Although COMIN FIL investigations were supposed to focus on the Communist Party's alleged efforts to penetrate domestic groups in practice the target often became the domestic groups themselves FBI COMINFIL investigations reached into domestic groups iii virtually every area of American political life The FBI conducted COMINFIL investigations in such areas as "religion. "education, "veterans matters, "women's matters. "Negro question, and "cul tural activities. 4 The "entire spectrum of the social and labor move ment was covered.49 The overbreadth that results from the practice of investigating groups for indications of communist influence or infiltration is illus trated by the following FBI COMINFIL intelligence investigations NAACP. An intensive 25 year long surveillance of the NAACP was conducted ostensibly to determine whether there was Communist infiltration of the NAACP This surveillance however produced detailed intelligence reports on NAACP activities wholly unrelated to any alleged communist "attempts to infiltrate the NAACP and despite the fact that no evidence was ever found to contradict the FBI's initial finding that the NAACP was opposed to communism.499 Northernn Virginia Citizens Concerned About the ABM. In 1969 the FBI conducted an intelligence investigation and used informants to report on a meeting held in a public high school auditorium at which the merits of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System were debated by among others Department of Defense officials The investigation was apparently opened because a communist newspaper had commented on the fact that the meeting was to be held.49 National Con ference on Amnesty for Vietnam Veterans. In 1974 FBT informants reported on a national conference sponsored by 'Cable from CIA Headquarters to field stations November1967 pp 1-2 eMemorandumfromRichard Oberto NSA 9/14/71 1960FBI Manual Section87 pp 5-11 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955 p 195 See History of Domestic Intelligence Report Part II at note 139 "James Adams testimony 11/19/75 Hearings vol 6 pp 137-138 FBI docu ments indicate that another factor in the opening of the investigation was the role of the wife of a Communistin assisting in publicity work for the meeting (Memorandum from Washington Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/28/69 memorandum from Alexandria Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/3/69) See Findings 6(a) p 10 for the broad dissemination of reports that resulted from this inquiry 176 church and civil liberties groups to support amnesty for Vietnam vet erans The investigation was based on a two-step "infiltration theory Other informants had reported that the Vietnam Veterans Agamst the War (which was itself the subject of an intelligence investigation because it was thought to be subject to communist or foreign influence) mighty try to "control the conference.i0 Although the conference was thus twice removed from the original target it was nevertheless sub jected to informant surveillance FBI intelligence investigations to find whether groups are sub ject to communist or "subversive influence result in the collection of information on groups and individuals engaged in wholly legiti mate activity Reports on the NAACP were not limited to alleged com munist infiltration Similarly the investigation of the National Am nesty Conference produced reports describing the topics discussed at the conference and the organization of a steering committee which would include families of men killed in Vietnam and congressional staff aides. The reports on the meeting concerning the ABM system covered the past and present residence of the person who applied to rent the high school auditorium and plans for a future meeting in cluding the names of prominent political figures who planned to attend.52 The trigger for COMINFIL-type investigations that subversive "attempts to infiltrate groups were a substantial threat was great ly exaggerated According to the testimony of FBI officials the mention in a communist newspaper of the citizens meeting to de bate the ABM was sufficient to produce intelligence coverage of that meeting. A large public teach-in on Vietnam including representa tives of Catholic Episcopal Methodist and Unitarian churches as well as a number of spokesmen for antiwar groups was investigated because a Communist Party official had "urged party members to attend and one speaker representing the W E B DuBois Club was identified as a communist.' The FBI surveillance of the teach-in re sulted in a 41-page intelligence report based on coverage by 13 in formants and sources. And the FBI's investigation of all Free Uni versities near colleges and universities was undertaken because "sev eral allegedly had been formed by the Communist Party "and other subversive groups. Similarly the FBI's broad COtiIINFIL investigations of the civil rights movement in the South were based on the FBI's conclusion that the Communist Party had "attempted to take advantage of racial un rest and had "endeavored to pressure U.S Government officials "through the press labor unions and student groups." [Emphasis u0RaymondW Wannall testimony 12/2/75 Hearings vol 6 p 139 "Memorandum from Louisville Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/21/74 Memorandafrom Alexandria Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/5/69 Adams 11/19/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 138 Memorandumfrom Philadelphia Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/2/66 'Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/2/66 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office2/17/66 "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover Chairman Interdepartmental Intelli genceConference to McGeorgeBundy SpecialAssistant to the President for Na tional Security 7/25/61 enclosing IIC Report Status of U.S Internal Secu rity Programs SeeFindingson Political Abuse p 225for discussiononthe larger impact of suchFBI terminology 177 supplied.] No mention was made of the general failure of these "attempts. The Committee finds that COMINFII investigations have been based on an exaggerated notion of the threat posed by "subversives and foreign influence on American political expression There has been an unjustified belief that Americans need informants and government surveillance to protect them from "subversive influence in their unions churches schools parties and political efforts Investigations of 11-holly Non Violent Political Expression. Do-mestic intelligence investigations have extended from those who com mit or are likely to commit violent acts to those thought to have a "po tential for violence and then to those engaged in purely peaceful political expression This characteristic was graphically described by the White House official who coordinated the intelligence agencies recommendations for "expanded' (and illegal) coverage in 1970 He testified that intelligence investigations risked moving from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate And you just keep going down the line. Without precise standards to restrict their scope intelligence inves tigations did move beyond those who committed or were likely to commit criminal or violent acts For example I)r Martin Luther King Jr. was targeted for the FBI's COIN TELPRO operations against "Black Nationalist-Hate Groups on the theory without factual justification that Dr King might "abandon his adherence to nonviolence.5 The intensive FBI investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement was similarly predicated on the theory that the activities of women in that Movement might lead to demonstrations and violence. The FBI investigations of Black Student Unions proceeded from the concern of MlleFBI and its superiors over violence in the cities Yet the FBI opened intelligence investigations on "every Black Student TLnion and similar group regam dless of their past or present incolee ment in disorders. f1[Emphasis added.] The nationwide Army Intelligence surveillance of civilians was conducted in connection with civil disorders However the Army col lection plan focused not merely on those likely to commit violence but was "so comprehensive that any category of information related even remotely to people or organizations active in a community in which the potential for violence was present would fall within their scope. 6 The Committee finds that such intelligence surveillance of groups and individuals has greatly exceeded the legitimate interest of the government in law enforcement and the prevention of violence Where unsupported determinations as to "potential behavior are the basis for Toni Charles Huston testimony 9/23/75 Hearings vol 2 p 45 asMemorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all CAC's 3/4/68 "Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/28/69 (Hearings vol 6 Exhibit 54.) n Memorandumfrom Executives Conferenceto Tolson 10/29/70 Froehlke 1971Hearings p 384 68-7860 76 13 178 surveillance of groups and individuals no one is safe from the inquisitive eye of the intelligence agency ,s'ubfiaidinys (d) Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner approach to in telligence collection drawing in all available information about groups and individuals including their lawful political activity and details of their personal lives Intelligence agencies collect an excessive amount of information by pursuing a "vacuum cleaner approach that draws in all available information including lawful political activity personal matters and trivia Even where the theory of the investigation is that the sub ject is likely to be engaged in criminal or violent activity the over broad approach to intelligence collection intrudes into personal matters unrelated to such criminal or violent activity FBI officials conceded to the Committee that in conducting broad intelligence investigations to determine the "real purpose of an or ganization they sometimes gathered "too much information t The FBI's intelligence investigation of the "New Left, for example was directed towards a "comprehensive study of the whole movement' and produced intensive monitoring of such subjects as "support of movement by religious groups or individuals. "demonstrations aimed at social reform, "indications of support by mass media, "all activity in the labor field, and "efforts to influence public opinion the elec torate and Government bodies. 6 Similar overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of intelli gence on "white militant groups. In 1968 FBI field offices were in structed not to gather information solely on actual or potential violations of law or violence but to use informants to determine the "aims and purposes of the organization its leaders approximate membership and other "background data relating to the group's "militancy. 6 In 1971 the criteria for investigating individuals were widened Special Agents in Charge of FBI field officeswere instructed to investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence, but also anyone else "who in judgment of SAC should be subject of investi gation clueto extremist activities. 66 Even in searching for indications of potential violence in black urban areas or in collecting information about violence-prone Ku Klux Klan chapters there was marked overbreadth In black urban areas for example FBI agents were instructed to have their inform ants obtain the names of "Afro-American type bookstores and their "owners operators and clientele. 67The activities of civil rights and black groups as well as details of the personal lives of Klan members were reported on by an FBI intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan.cTa Under this approach the average citizen who merely attends a meeting signs a petition is placed on a mailing list or visits a book store is subject to being recorded in intelligence files A striking example of informant reporting on all they touch was provided by an FBI informant in an antiwar group with only 5n Adams 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 135 i Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 10/28/68 6SACLetter 65-25 4/30/68 0 11171Manual Section122 "Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Officeto FBI Headquarters S/12/68 7 Rowe 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 116 179 regular members and some 250 persons who gave occasional support The informant estimated she reported nearly 1,000 names to the FBI in an 18-month period 60-70 percent of whom were members of other groups (such as the Inited Church of Christ and the American Civil Liberties Union) which were engaging in peaceful lawful political activity together with the antiwar group or who were on the group's mailing list.Gs Similarly in the intelligence investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement informants reported the identities of individual women attending meetings (as well as reporting such matters as the fact that women at meetings had stated "how they felt oppressed sexually or otherwise.") .ss Such collection of "intelligence unrelated to specific criminal or violent activity constitutes a serious misuse of governmental power In reaching into the private lives of individuals and monitoring their lawful political activity matters irrelevant to any proper govern mental interest domestic intelligence collection has been unreasonably broad Sub finding (e) Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for excessively long periods of time resulting in sustained governmental monitoring of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal con duct or "subversion. One of the most disturbing aspects of domestic intelligence inves tigations found by the Committee was their excessive length Intel ligence investigations often continued despite the absence of facts in dicating an individual or group is violating or is likely to violate the law resulting in long-term government monitoring of lawful political activity The following are examples (i) The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the NAACP (1941 196'6). The investigation of the NAACP began in 1941 and continued for at least 25 years Initiated according to one FBI report as an investigation of protests by 15 black mess attendants about racial discrimination in the Navy, 0the investigation expanded to encompass NAACP chapters in cities across the nation Although the ostensible purpose of this investigation was to determine if there was "Com munist infiltration of the NAACP the investigation constituted a long-term monitoring of the NAACP's wholly lawful political activity by FBI informants Thus The FBI New York Field Office submitted a 137-page report to FBI headquarters describing the national office of the NAACP its national convention its growth and membership its officers and di rectors and its stand against Communism. An FBI informant in Seattle obtained a list of NAACP branch officers and reported on a meeting where signatures were gathered on a "petition directed to President Eisenhower and plans for two mem bers to go to Washington D.C. for a "Prayer Pilgrimage. 72 "Mary Jo Cooktestimony 12/2/75 Hearings vol 6 pp 112 120 "Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office10/20/70 memorandumNew YorkField Office5/28/69 memorandumfrom Baltimore Field Office5/11/70 to FRI Headquarters CIA agents in the United States also reported on Women's Liberation activities in the course of their preparation for overseas duty in Operation CHAOS (Agent 1 Contact Report Vol II Agent 1 file.) "Memorandum from Washington Field Officeto FBI headquarters 3/11/41 "Memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/12/57 Memorandumfrom Seattle Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/1/57 180 In 1966 the New York Field Office reported the names of all NAACP national officers and board members and summarized their political associations as far back as the 1940s.73 As late as 1966 the FBI was obtaining NAACP chapter member ship figures by "pretext telephone call utilizing the pretext of being interested in joining that branch of the NAACP. 7 Based on the reports of FBI informants the FBI submitted a detailed report of a 1956 NAACP-sponsored Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and described plans for a Conference delegation to visit Senators Paul Douglas Herbert Lehman Wayne Morse Hubert Humphrey and John Bricker.7 Later reports covered what transpired at several of these meetings with Senators.16 Most significantly all these reports were sent to the White House. The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the Socialist Workers Party (1940 to date) . The FBI has investigated the Socialist Work ers Party (SWP) from 1940 to the present day on the basis of that Party's revolutionary rhetoric and alleged international links Never theless FBI officials testified that the SWP has not been responsible for any violent acts nor has it urged actions constituting an indictable incitement to violence.77a FBI informants have been reporting the political positions taken by the SWP with respect to such issues as the "Vietnam War, "racial matters, "U.S involvement in Angola, "food prices, and any SWP efforts to support a non-SWP candidate for political office.78 Moreover to enable the FBI to develop "background information on SWP leaders informants have been reporting certain personal aspects of their lives such as marital status.79 The informants also have been reporting on SWP cooperation with other groups who are not the subject of separate intelligence investigations.SO The Effort to Prove Negatives. Intelligence investigations and programs have also continued for excessively long periods in ef forts to prove negatives CIA's Operation CHAOS began in 1967 From that year until the program's termination in 1974,81the CIA repeatedly reached formal conclusions that there was negligible for eign influence on domestic protest activity In 1967 the CIA concluded that Communist front groups did not control student organizations and that there were no significant links with foreign radicals 82in 1968 the CIA concluded that U.S student protest was essentially homegrown and not stimulated by an international conspiracy 83and in 1971 the CL1 found "there is no evidence that foreign governments organizations or intelligence services now control U.S New Left "Memorandum from NewYorkField Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/15/65 "Memorandum from Los AngelesField Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/15/66 MemorandumfromHooverto Anderson 3/5/56 78MemorandumfromHooverto Anderson 3/6/56 SeeFindingson"Political Abuse. 7TRobert Shackelfordtestimony 2/2/76 pp 89-90 'eShackelford 2/2/76 p 89 7 Shackelford 2/2/76 p 90 Shackleford 2/2/76 p 92 See Findings "Deficienciesin Control and Accountability p 265 82CIA memorandum "Student Dissent and Its Techniquesin the i .S. 1/5/68 CIA Report "Restless Youth, Conclusions p 1 9/4/68 181 Movements .. the U.S New Left is basically self-sufficient and moves under its own impetus.' 84 The result of these repeated findings was not the termination of CHAOS's surveillance of Americans but its redoubling Presidents Johnson and Nixon pressured the CIA to intensify its intelligence ef fort to find evidence of foreign direction of the U.S peace movement As Director Helms testified When a President keeps asking if there is any information "how are you getting along with your examination, "have you picked up any more information on this subject, it isn't a direct order to do something but it seems to me it behooves the Director of Central Intelligence to find some way to im prove his performance or improve his Agency's perform ance.' In an effort to prove its negative finding to a skeptical White House and to test its validity each succeeding year CIA expanded its pro gram increasing its coverage of Americans overseas and building an ever larger "data base on domestic political activity Intelligence was exchanged with the FBI NSA and other agencies and even tually CIA agents who had infiltrated domestic organizations for other purposes supplied general information on the groups activi ties.86 Thus the intelligence mission became one of continued surveil lance to prove a negative with no thought to terminating the pro gram in the face of the negative findings As in the CHAOS operation FBI intelligence investigations have often continued even in the absence of any evidence of "subversive activities merely because the subjects of the investigation have not demonstrated their innocence to the FBI's satisfaction The long term investigations of the NAACP and the Socialist Workers Party described above are typical examples A striking illustration of FBI practice is provided by the intelli gence investigation of an advisor of Dr Martin Luther King Jr The advisor was investigated on the theory that he might be a commu nist "sympathizer. The Bureau's New York office concluded he was not.87 Using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent, FBI head quarters directed that the investigation continue The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the New York office that [ ]88 is not sympathetic to the Party cause While there may not be any evidence that [ ] is a Communist neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist.S9 'CIA Report "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal Security Threat Foreign, 1/5/71 pp 1 3 'Richard Helms testimony Rockfeller Commission 4/28/75 pp 2134 2-135 Helms further testified "President Johnson was after this all the time .. this was somethingthat came up almost daily and weekly. Helms RockefellerCom mission 1/13/75 pp 163 164 See CHAOSReport SectionII D "Operations of the CHAOSProgram and Related CIAProjects, and II E "1969Expansionof CHAOS. Memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/14/64 Namedeleted byCommitteeto protect privacy "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office4/24/64 182 Where citizens must demonstrate not simply that they have no connection with an intelligence target but must exhibit "substantial evidence that they are in opposition to the target intelligence in vestigations are indeed open-ended C EXCESSIVE USE OF INTRUSIVE TECHNIQUES MAJORFINDING The intelligence community has employed surreptitious collection techniques mail opening surreptitious entries informants and "traditional and highly sophisticated forms of electronic surveil lance to achieve its overly broad intelligence targeting and collec tion objectives Although there are circumstances where these tech niques if properly controlled are legal and appropriate the Committee finds that their very nature makes them a threat to the personal privacy and Constitutionally protected activities of both the targets and of persons who communicate with or associate with the targets The dangers inherent in the use of these techniques have been com pounded by the lack of adequate standards limiting their use and by the absence of review by neutral authorities outside the intelligence agencies As a consequence these techniques have collected enormous amounts of personal and political information serving no legitimate governmental interest .S'ubfindings (a) Given the highly intrusive nature of these techniques, the legal standards and procedures regulating their use have been insufficient There have been no statutory controls on the use of informants there have been gaps and exceptions in the law of electronic surveil lance and the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening and surreptitious entries have been ignored (b) In addition to providing the means by which the Government can collect too much information about too many people certain techniques have their own peculiar dangers Informants have provoked and participated in violence and other illegal activities in order to maintain their cover and they have obtained membership lists and other private documents Scientific and technological advances have rendered traditional controls on electronic surveillance obsolete and have made it more difficult to limit intrusions Because of the nature of wiretaps micro phones and other sophisticated electronic techniques it has not always been possible to restrict the monitoring of communications to the per sons being investigated (c) The imprecision and manipulation of labels such as "national 1The techniques noted here do not constitute an exhaustive list of the sur reptitious means by which intelligence agencies have collectedinformation The FBI for example has obtaineda great deal of financialinformation about Amer ican ciitzens from tax returns filedwith the Internal RevenueService (See IRS Report Sec I "IRS Disclosures to FBI and CIA.") This section however is limited to problemsraised by electronic surveillance mail opening surreptitious entries informants and electronic surveillances (183) 184 security, "domestic security, "subversive activities, and "foreign intelligence have led to unjustified use of these techniques Elaboration of Findings The preceding section described how the absence of rigorous stand ards for opening controlling and terminating investigations sub jected many diverse elements of this society to scrutiny by intelligence agencies without their being suspected of violating any law Once an investigation was opened almost any item of information about a target's personal behavior or political views was considered worth collecting Extremely intrusive techniques such as those listed above have often been used to accomplish those overly broad targeting and collec tion objectives The paid and directed informant has been the most extensively used technique in FBI domestic intelligence investigations Informants were used in 83% of the domestic intelligence investigations analyzed in a recent study by the General Accounting Office.la As of June 30 1975 the FBI was using a total of 1,500 domestic intelligence infor mants.2 In 1972 there were over 7,000 informants in the ghetto infor mant program alone In fiscal year 1976 the Bureau has budgeted more than $7.4 million for its domestic intelligence informant program more than twice the amount allocated for its organized crime infor mant program.3 Wiretaps and microphones have also been a significant means of gathering intelligence Until 1972 the FBI directed these electronic techniques against scores of American citizens and domestic organiza tions during investigations of such matters as domestic "subversive activities and leaks of classified information The Bureau continues to use these techniques against foreign targets in the United States The most extensive use of electronic surveillance has been by the National Security Agency NSA has electronically monitored (with out wiretapping in the traditional sense) international communication links since its inception in 1952 because of its sophisticated technol ogy it is capable of intercepting and recording an enormous number of communications between the United States and foreign countries. All mail opening programs have now been terminated but a total of twelve such operations were conducted by the CIA and the FBI in ten American cities between 1940 and 1973.5 Four of these were oper ated by the CIA whose most massive project involved the opening of more than 215,000 letters between the United States and the Soviet Union over a twenty-year period The FBI conducted eight mail open ing programs three of which included opening mail sent between two points in the United States The longest FBI mail opening program ' Report to the HouseCommitteeon the Judiciary by the ComptrollerGeneral of the United States "FBI DomesticIntelligence Operations Their purposeand scope Issues that Need to be Resolved, 2/24/76 p 96 2FBI memorandumto the SelectCommittee11/28/75 'Memorandum FRI Overall Intelligence Program FY 1977 Compared to FY 1976undated The cost of the intelligenceinformant program comprisespayments to informants for services and expense as well as the costs of FBI personnel support and overhead 'See NSA Report Sec I "Introduction and Summary. See Mail Opening Reports Sec I "Summary and Principal Conclusions. 185 lasted with one period of suspension for approximately twenty-six years Tlw FIII has also conducted hundreds of warrantless surreptitious entries break-ills during the past twenty-five years Often these entries were conducted to install electronic listening devices at other times they ilnyolhed physical searches for information The widespread use of warrantless surreptitious entries against both foreign and do 'mastic targets was terminated by the Bureau ill 1t)66 hut the FRI has occasionally made such entries against foreign targets in more recent years All of these teclinitlttes have been turned against American citizens as well as against certain foreign targets On the theory that the executive's responsibility in the area of "national security and -for eign intelligence justified their use without the need of judicial super vision the intelligence community believed it was free to direct these techniques against individuals and organizations whom it believed threatened the country's security The standards governing the use of these techniques have been imprecise and susceptible to expansive inter pretation and in the absence of any judicial check on the application of these vague standards to particular cases it was relatively easy for intelligence agencies and their superiors to extend them to many cases where they were clearly inappropriate Lax internal controls on the use of some of these techniques compounded the problem These intrusive techniques by their very nature invaded the private communications and activities both of the individuals they were di rected against and of the persons with who'll the targets coutniuulicated or associated Consequently they provided the meters by which all types of information including personal and political information totally unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective were col lected and in some cases disseminated to the highest levels of the government .Cub/mdivy (a) Given the highly intrusive nature of these techniques the legal standards and procedures regulating their use have been insufficient There have been no statutory controls on the use of informants there have been gaps and exceptions in the law of electronic surveillance and the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening and surrepti tious entries have been ignored 1 The _1lsencc of ,'tatefo y Restraints on the 1'se of In fornrutt.s There are no statutes or published regulations governing the use of informants. Consequently the FIBI is free to use informants guided only by its own internal directives which can be changed at any time by FIT officials without approval front outside the I3ureauu. Title 2S of the United States Codeprovides only that appropriations for the Department of Justice are available for payment of informants 28U.S.( fi524 The Attorney General has announcedthat he will issue guidelines on the use of informants in the near future and our recommendationsprovidestandards for informant control and prohibitions on informant activity (See pp 32S.) In addition the attorney General's recently promulgated guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations limit the use of informants at 'the early stages of such inquiries and provide for review by the Justice Department of the initiation of "full investigations in which new informants may be recruited 186 Apart from court decisions precluding the use of informants to entrap persons into criminal activity there are few judicial opinions dealing with informants and most of those concern criminal rather than intelligence informants. The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the use of intelligence informants in the contexts revealed by the Conimittee's investigation offend First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association. In the absence of regulation through statute published regulation or cola t decision the FBI has used informants to report on virtually easpect of a targeted group or individual's activity including la ful political expression political meetings the identities of group members and their associates the "thoughts and feelings intentions and ambitions. of members. and personal matters irrelevant to any legitimate governmental interest Informants have also been used by the FBI to obtain the confidential records and documents of a group. Info'nmants could be used in any intelligence investigation FBI directives have not limited informant reporting to actual or likely violence or other violations of law Nor has any determination been made concerning whether the substantial intrusion represented by informant coverage is justified by the government's interest in ob taining information or whether less intrusive means would adequately serve the government's interest There has also been no requirement that the decisions of FBI officials to use informants be reviewed by anyone outside the FBI In short intelligence informant coverage has not been subject to the standards which govern the use of other intrusive techniques such as electronic surveillance even though in formants can produce a far broader range of information 2 Gaps and Exceptions ~n the Law of Electronic Surveillance Congress and the Supreme Court have both addressed the legal issues raised by electronic surveillance but the law has been riddled with gaps and exceptions The Executive branch has been able to apply vague standards for the use of this technique to particular cases In a criminal case involvingcharges of jury bribery United States v Haifa 385 U.S 293 (1966) the Supreme Court ruled that an informant's testimony concerningconversationsof a defendant couldnot be consideredthe product of a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment on the ground the defendant had consented to the presence of the informant In another criminal case Lewis v flitted States 385 F.S 206 (1966) the Court stated that "in the detection of many types of crimes the Governmentis entitled to use decoys and to concealthe identity of its agents. 'In a more recent case the California Supreme Court held that secret surveillance of classes and group meetings at a university through the use of undercover agents was "likely to pose a substantial restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights. 11'hitc v Davis 333 Par Rep 2(1 223 (1975) Citing a number of U.S Supreme Court opinions the California Supreme Court stated in its unanimousdecision "In view of this significant potential chilling effect the challenged surveil lance activities can only he sustained if [the Government] can demonstrate a compelling state interest which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendmentrights and which cannot be served by alternative means less instru siveonfundamental rights. 533Par Rep 2d at 232 Gary Rowetestimony 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 111 118 Cook 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 111 "The FBI Manual of Instructions proscribes only reporting of privileged communicationsbetweenan attorney and client legal "defenseplans or strategy. "employer-employeerelationships (where an informant is connected with a labor union) and "legitimate institution or campus activities at schools (FBI Manual Section 107.) 187 as it has seen fit and in the case of NSA monitoring the standards and procedures for the use of electronic surveillance were not applied at all When the Supreme Court first considered wiretapping it held that the warrantless use of this technique was constitutional because the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied only to physical trespass and did not extend to the seizure of conversation This decision the 1928 case of Olmstead A United States involved a crim inal prosecution and left federal agencies free to engage in the unrestricted use of wiretaps in both criminal and intelligence investi gations.13 Six years later Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act of 1934 which made it a crime for "any person, without authorization to intercept and divulge or publish the contents of wire and radio communications The Supreme Court subsequently construed this sec tion to apply to federal agents as well as to ordinary citizens and held that evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the interception of wire and radio conmiunications was not admissible in court.11 But Congress acquiesed in the Justice Department's position that these cases prohibited only the divulgence of contents of wire communica tions outside the executive branch. and Government wiretapping for intelligence purposes other than prosecution continued On the ground that neither the 1934 Act not the Supreme Court decisions on wiretapping were meant to apply to "grave matters in volving the defense of the nation, President Franklin Roosevelt authorized Attorney General Jackson in 1940 to approve wiretaps on "persons suspected of subversive activities against the Govern ment of the United States including suspected spies.''16 In the absence of any guidance from Congress or the Court for another quarter century the executive branch first broadened this standard in 1946 to permit wiretapping in "cases vitally affecting the domestic security or where human life is in jeopardy," and then modified it in 1965 to allow wiretapping in "investigations related to the national se curity. 18 Internal Justice Department policy required the prior approval of the Attorney General before the FBI could institute wire taps in particular cases,10but until the mid-1960's there was no require 13Olmsteadv UnitedStates 277U.S 438 (1928) "1'mardoneN t nit'r'dStates 3021-.5 397 (1937) 308U.S 338 (1939) For example letter from Attorney GeneralJackson to Rep Hatton Summers 3/19/41 SeeElectronicSurveillanceReport Sec II Memorandumfrom President Rooseveltto the AttorneyGeneral5/21/40 17Letter from AttorneyGeneralTomC Clark to President Truman 7/17/46 18DirectivefromPresident Johnsonto HeadsofAgencies6/30/65 "President Roosevelt's 1940order directed the Attorney General to approve wiretaps "after investigation of the need in each case. (Memorandumfrom President Rooseveltto Attorney General Jackson 5/21/40.) However Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled that Attorney General Jackson "turned it over to Edgar Hooverwithout himselfpassingoneach case in 1940and 1941 Biddle's practice beginningin 1941conformedto the President's order (Francis Biddle In Brief Authority (Garden City Doubleday 1962) p 167.) Since 1965 explicit written authorization has been required (Directive of President Johnson 6/30/65.) This requirement however has often been dis regarded In violationof this requirement for example no written authorizations were obtained front the Attorney General or from any one else for a series of four wiretaps implementedin 1971and 1972on YeomanCharles Radford two of his friends and his father-in-law SeeElectronics SurveillanceReport Sec VI (Continued) 188 me.nt of periodic reapproval by the Attorney General.= In the absence of any instruction to terminate them some wiretaps remained in effect for years.21 In 1967 the Supreme Court reversed its holding in the Olmstead case and decided that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did apply to electronic surveillances.27 It expressly declined however to extend this holding to cases involving the "national security. 22a Congress followed suit the next year in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 which established a warrant procedure for electronic sur veillance in criminal cases but included a provision that neither it nor the Federal Communications Act of 1934 "shall limit the constitutional power of the President. 23Although Congress did not purport to define the President's power the Act referred to five broad categories which thereafter served as the Justice Department's criteria for war rantless electronic surveillance The first three categories related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect the national security information against for eign intelligence activities The last two categories dealt with domestic intelligence interests to protect the United States against overthrow of the gov ernment by force or other unlawful means or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the government In 1972 the Supreme Court held in United States v United States District Court,23a that the President did not have the constitutional power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances to protect the (Continued) The first and third of these taps were implementedat the oral instruction of Attorney General John Mitchell (Memorandumfrom T J Smith E S Miller 2/26/73.) The remaining taps were implemented at the oral request of David Young and assistant to John Ehrliehman at the White House who merely in formed the Bureau that the requests originated with Ehrlichman and had the Attorney General's concurrence (Memorandumfrom T J Smith to E S Miller 6/14/73 20Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach instituted this requirement in March 19655(Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 3/3/65.) 21The FBI maintained one wiretap on an officialof the Nation of Islam that had originally been authorized by Attorney General Brownell in 1957for seven years until 1964without any subsequent re-authorization (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 12/31/65 initialed "Approved HB 1/2/57.") As Nicholas Katzenbach testified "The custom was not to put a time limit on a tap or any wiretap authorization Indeed I think the Bureau would have felt free in 1965to put a tap on a phoneauthorized by Attorney General Jackson before World War II. (Nicholas Katzenbach testimony 11/12/75 p 87.) 4 Katz v UnitedStates 389U.S 347 (1967) The Court wrote "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendmentin a situation involvingthe national security is a question not presented by this case. 389U.S at 358n 23 2318U.S.C 2511(3) "407U.S.297 (1972) 189 nation from domestic threats.24 The Court pointedly refrained how ever from any "judgment on the scope of the Presidents surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers within or with out this country. 25Only "the domestic aspects of national security came within the ambit of the Court's decision.2f To conform with the holding in this case the Justice Department thereafter limited warrantless wire tapping to cases involving a "sig nificant connection with a foreign power its agents or agencies.27 At no time however were the Justice Department's standards and procedures ever applied to NSA's electronic monitoring system and its "watch listing of American citizens.28 From the early 1960's until 1973 NSA compiled a list of individuals and organizations including 1200 American citizens and domestic groups whose communications were segregated from the mass of communications intercepted by the Agency transcribed and frequently disseminated to other agencies for intelligence purposes.22 The Americans on this list many of whom were active in the anti war and civil rights movements were placed there by the FBI CIA Secret Service Defense Department and NSA itself without prior judicial warrant or even the prior approval of the Attorney General In 1970 NSA began to monitor telephone communications links be tween the United States and South America at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) to obtain infor mation about international drug trafficking BNDD subsequently submitted the names of 450 American citizens for inclusion on the 'At the same time the Court recognizedthat "domesticsecurity surveillance may involve different policyand practical considerations apart from the surveil lance of ordinary crime, 407 L.S at 321 and thus did not hold that "the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III [of the 1968Act] are necessarily applicable to this case. (407U.S at 321.) The Court noted "Giventhe potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involvingthe domesticsecurity Congressmay wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimein Title III Different standards may be compatiblewith the Fourt Amend ment. (407U.S at 321.) Z'407U.S at 307 "407 U.S at 320 United States v United States District Court remains the only Supreme Court case dealing with the issue of warrantless electronic sur veillance for intelligence purposes Three federal circuit courts have considered this issue since 1972 however The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit both held that the President may constitutionally authorize warrantless electronic surveil lance for foreign counterespionage and foreign intelligence purposes [United States v Butenko 494F.2d 593 (3d Cir 1974) cert denied sub non Ivanov v United States 419 U.S 881 (1974) and United States v Brown 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) cert denied415U.S 960 (1974).] The District of ColumbiaCir cuit held unconstitutional the warrantless electronic surveillance of the Jewish Defense League a domestic organization whose activities allegedly affected U.S Soviet relations but which was neither the agent of nor in collaboration with a foreign power [Z?ccibonv Mitchell 516 F.2d 594 (D.C Cir. 1975) (en bane).] YTestimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedures 6/29/72 p 10 This language paralled that of the Court in United States v UnitedStates District Court 407U.S at 309n 8 AlthoughAttorney General John Mitchelland Justice Department officialson the Intelligence Evaluation Committeeapparently learned that NSAwas making a contribution to domestic intelligence in 1971 there is no indication that the FBI told them of its submissionof names of Americansfor inclusion on a NSA "watch list. When Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen learned of these practices in 1973 Attorney General Elliott Richardson ordered that they be terminated (See Report on NSA Sec I "Introduction and Summary.") ' SeeNSAReport Sec I "Introduction and Summary. 190 Watch List again without warrant or the approval of the Attorney General'3 The legal standards and procedures regulating the use of micro phone surveillance have traditionally been even more lax than those regulating the use of wiretapping The first major Supreme Court decision on microphone surveillance was Goldman v United States 316 U.S 129 (1942) which held that such surveillance in a criminal case was constitutional when the installation did not involve a trespass Citing this case Attorney General McGrath prohibited the trespas sory use of this technique by the FBI in 1952.31But two years later a few weeks after the Supreme Court denounced the use of a micro phone installation in a criminal defendant's bedroom 32 Attorney General Brownell gave the FBI sweeping authority to engage in bugging for intelligence purposes (C)onsiderations of internal security and the national safety are paramount, he wrote "and there fore may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest. 33 Since Brownell did not require the prior approval of the Attorney General for bugging specific targets he largely undercut the policy that had developed for wiretapping The FBI in many cases could obtain equivalent coverage by utilizing bugs rather than taps and would not be burdened with the necessity of a formal request to the Attorney General The vague "national interest standards established by Brownell and the policy of not requiring the Attorney General's prior approval for microphone installations continued until 1965 when the Justice Department began to apply the same criteria and procedures to both microphone and telephone surveillance 3 Ignoring the Prohibitions Against Warrantless Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entries Warrantless mail opening and surreptious entries unlike the use of informants and electronic surveillance have been clearly prohibited by both statutory and constitutional law In violation of these pro hibitions the FBI and the CIA decided on their own when and how these techniques should be used.35 Sections 1701 through 1973 of Title 18 of the United States Code forbid persons other than employees of the Postal Service "dead letter office from tampering with or opening mail that is not addressed to them Violations of these statutes may result in fines of up to $2000 'Memorandum from Iredell to Gayler 4/10/70 See NSA Report Sec I Introduction and Summary BNDD originally requested NSA to monitor the South Americanlink becauseit did not believeit had authority to wiretap a few publictelephonesin NewYorkCity from which drug deals were apparently being arranged (Iredell testimony 9/18/75 p 99.) 31Memorandumfrom the Attorney General to Mr Hoover 2/26/52 "Irvine v California 347U.S 128 (1954) "Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director FBI 5/20/54 'While such techniques might have been authorized by Attorneys General under expansive "internal security or "national interest theories similar to Brownell's authorization for installing microphonesby trespass the issue was never presented to them for decisionbefore1967 when Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned downa surreptitious entry request There is no indication that the legal questions were consideredin any depth in 1970or 1971at the time of the "Huston Plan and its aftermath See Huston Plan Report Sec III who what when and where 191 and imprisonment for not more than five years The Supreme Court has also held that both First Amendment and Fourth Amendment restrictions apply to mail opening The Fourth Amendment concerns were articulated as early as 1878 when the Court wrote The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers thus closed against inspec tion wherever they may be Whilst in the mail they can only be opened and examined under like warrant as is re quired when papers are subjected to search in one's own house hold.36 This principle was reaffirmed as recently as 1970 in United States v Faaz Lecaw( n 396 U.S 249 (1970) The infringement of citizens First _Amendment rights resulting from warrantless mail opening was first recognized by Justice Holmes in 1921 "The use of the mails, lie wrote in a dissent now embraced by prevailing legal opinion "is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues. 37This principle too has been affirmed in recent years.38 Breaking and entering is a common law felony as well as a viola tion of state and federal statutes When committed by Government agents it has long been recognized as "the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. 3 In the one judicial decision concerning the legality of warrantless "national security break-ins for physical search purposes United States District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell held such entries un constitutional This case United States v Ehelichman,40 involved an entry into the officeof a Los Angeles psychiatrist I)r Lewis Field ing to obtain the medical records of his client Daniel Ellsberg who was then under federal indictment for revealing classified docu ments The entry was approved by two Presidential assistants John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson who argued that it had been justi fied "in the national interest. Ruling on the defendants discovery motions Judge Gesell found that because no search warrant was obtained The search of Dr Fielding's office was clearly illegal under the unambiguous mandate of the Fourth Amendment [T]he Government must comply with the strict constitu tional and statutory limitations on trespassory searches and arrests even when known foreign agents are involved... To hold otherwise except under the most exigent circum stances would be to abandon the Fourth Amendment to the whim of the Executive in total disregard of the Amend ment's history and purpose. 3fiExParte.7ack.coi 96 U.S 727 733(1878) MilwaukeePub Co V Burleson 255U.S 407 437 (1921) (dissent) 38See Lamont v Postmaster General 381 U.S 301 (1965) Procunicr v Mar tine 416U.S 396 (1975) " United States v United States District Court 407 US 297 313 (1972) 376F Snpp 29 (D.D.e 197-4) 376F Supp at 33 192 In the appeal of this decision the Justice Department has taken the position that a physical search may be authorized by the Attorney General without a warrant for "foreign intelligence proposes.42 The warrantless mail opening programs and surreptitious entries by the FBI and CIA did not even conform to the "foreign intelligence standard however now were they specifically approved in each case by the Attorney General Domestic "subversives and "extremists were targeted for mail opening and domestic "subversives and "'White Hate groups were among those targeted for surreptitious entries.43 Until the Justice Department's recent statement in the Ehrlichman case moreover no legal justification had ever been advanced publicly for violating the statutory or constitutional prohibitions against physi cal searches or opening mail without a judicial warrant and none has ever been officially advanced by any Administration to justify war rantless mail openings Sub f puling (b) In addition to providing the means by which the Government can collect too much information about too many people certain tech niques have their own peculiar dangers Informants have provoked and participated in violence and other illegal activities in order to maintain their cover and they have obtained membership lists and other private documents Scientific and technological advances have rendered obsolete traditional controls on electronic surveillance obsolete and have made it more difficult to limit intrusions Because of the nature of wiretaps microphones and other sophisticated electronic techniques it has not always been possible to restrict the monitoring of communications to the persons being investigated a The Intrusive Nature of the Intelligence Informant Tech nique The FBI employs two types of informants (1) "intelligence informants who are used to report on groups and individuals in the course of intelligence investigations and (2) "criminal informants, who are used in connection with investigations of specific criminal activity FBI intelligence informants are administered by the FBI Intelligence Division at Bureau headquarters through a centralized system that is separate from the administrative system for FBI crimi nal informants For example the FBI's large-scale Ghetto Informant Program was administered by the FBI Intelligence Division The Committee's investigation centered on the use of FBI intelligence in formants The FBI's criminal informant program fell outside the scope of the Committee's mandate and accordingly it was not examined The Committee recognizes that FBI intelligence informants in violent groups have sometimes played a key role in the enforcement of "Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General John C Keeny to Hugh E Kline Clerk of the U.S Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 5/9/75 'The Supreme Court's decision hi United States v United States District Court 407 U.S 297 (19721 clearly established the principle that such warrant less invasions of the privacy of Americansare unconstitutional 193 the criminal law The Committee examined a number of such cases,44 and in public hearings on the use of FBI intelligence informants in cluded the testimony of a former informant in the Ku Klux Klan whose reporting and court room testimony was essential to the arrest and conviction of the murderers of Mrs Viola Liuzzo a civil rights worker killed in 1965.4 Former Attorney General Katzenbach testified that informants were vital to the solution of the murders of three civil rights workers killed in Mississippi in 1964.46 FBI informant coverage of the Women's Liberation Movement re sulted in intensive reporting on the identities and opinions of women who attended WLM meetings For example the FBI's New York Field Office summarized one informant's report in a memorandum to FBI Headquarters Informant advised that a WLM meeting was held on .47 Each woman at this meeting stated why she had come to the meeting and how she felt oppressed sexually or otherwise According to this informant these women are mostly con cerned with liberating women from this "oppressive society. They are mostly against marriage children and other states of oppression caused by men Few of them according to the informant have had political backgrounds.48 Individual women who attended WLM meetings at midwestern universities were identified by FBI intelligence informants A report by the Kansas City FBI Field Office stated Informant indicates members of Women's Liberation campus group who are now enrolled as students at University of Missouri Kansas City are 49 Informant noted that and 5onot currently students on the UMKC campus are reportedly roommates at .51 In one case an FBI informant involved in an intelligence investigation of the Detroit Black Panther Party furnished advance information regarding a planned ambush of Detroit police officerswhich enabled the Detroit Police De partment to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officersand resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons The informant also furnished information resulting in the locationand confiscationby Bureau agents of approximately fifty sticks of dynamite available to the Black Panther Party which likely resulted in the saving of lives and the prevention of property damage (Joseph Deegan testimony 2/13/76 p 54) Rowe 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 115 "Katzenbach testified that the case "could not have been solved without acquiring informants who were highly placed members of the Klan. (Katzen bach 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 215.) "Date and address deleted at FBI request so as not to reveal informant's identity 4eMemorandumfrom NewYorkField Officeto FBI Headquarters re Women's Liberation Movement5/28/69 p 2 1eNamesdeleted for security reasons a0Namesdeleted for security reasons "Names and addresses deleted for security reasons 68-7860 76 14 194 Informants were instructed to report "everything they knew about a group to the FBI to go to meetings write up reports on what hap pened who was there to try to totally identify the background of every person there what their relationships were who they were living with echo they were sleeping with to try to get some sense of the local structure and the local relationships among the people in the organization.52 Another intelligence informant described his mission as "total report ing. Rowe testified that he reported "anything and everything I observed or heard pertaining to any member of the group he infil trated.53 Even where intelligence informants are used to infiltrate groups where some members are suspected of violent activity the nature of the intelligence mission results in governmental intrusion into matters irrelevant to that inquiry The FBI Special Agents who directed an intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan testified that the informant . furnished us information on the meetings and the thoughts and feelings intentions and ambitions as best he knew them of other members of the Klan both the rank and file and the leadership. Intelligence informants also report on other groups not the sub ject of intelligence investigations which merely associate with or are even opposed to the targeted group For example an FBI in formant in the VVAWVhad the following exchange with a member of the Committee Senator HART (Mich.) did you report also on groups and individuals outside the [VVA\V] such as other peace groups or individuals who were opposed to the war whom you came in contact with because they were cooperating with the [VVAWV] in connection with protest demonstrations and petitions Ms CooK I ended up reporting on groups like the United Church of Christ American Civil Liberties Union the National Lawyers Guild liberal church organizations [which] quite often went into coalition with the VT W 55 This informant reported the identities of an estimated 1,000 in dividuals to the FBI although the local chapter to which she was assigned had only 55 regular members.56 Similarly an FBI infor mant in the Ku Klux Klan reported on the activities of civil rights and black groups that he observed in the course of his work in the Klan.J7 In short the intelligence informant technique is not a precise instru ment By its nature it extends far beyond the sphere of proper govern Cook 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 111 "Rowe 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 116 SpecialAgent 11/21/75 p 7 Cook12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 pp 119 120 Cook 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 120 67Rowe 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 116 195 mental interest and risks governmental monitoring of the private lives and the constitutionally-protected activity of Americans Nor is the intelligence informant technique used infrequently As reflected in the statistics described above FBI intelligence investigations are in large part conducted through the use of informants and FBI agents are instructed to "develop reliable informants at all levels and in all segments of groups under investigation. b Other Dangers in the Intelligence In fornzant Technique In the absence of clear guidelines for informant conduct FBI paid and directed intelligence informants have participated in violence and other illegal activities and have taken membership lists and other private documents 1 Participation in T7iolenceand Other Illegal Activity The Committee's investigation has revealed that there is often a fundamental dilemma in the use of intelligence informants in violent organizations The Committee recognizes that intelligence informants in such groups have sometimes played essential roles in the enforce ment of the criminal law At the same time however the Committee has found that the intelligence informant technique carries with it the substantial danger that informants will participate in or provoke violence or illegal activity Intelligence informants are frequently infiltrated into groups for long-term reporting rather than to collect evidence for use in prosecutions Consequently intelligence informants must participate in the activity of the group they penetrate to preserve their cover for extended periods 'Where the group is involved in violence or illegal activity there is a substantial risk that the infor ant must also become involved in this activity As an FBI Special Agent who handled an intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan testified "[you] couldn't be an angel and be a good informant.7o9 FBI officials testified that it is Bureau practice to instruct informants that they are not to engage in violence or unlawful activity and if they do so they may be prosecuted FBI Deputy Associate Director Adams testified we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject and have prosecuted I would say offhand around 20 informants.60 The Committee finds however that the existing guidelines dealing with informant conduct do not adequately ensure that intelligence informants stay within the law in carrying out their assignments The FBI Manual of Instructions contain no provisions governing informant conduct While FBI employee conduct regulations pro hibit an FBI agent from directing informants to engage in violent or other illegal activity informants themselves are not governed by these regulations since the FBI does not consider them as FBI employees ssFBI Manual Section107c(3) 59SpecialAgent 11/21/75 p 12 "Adams 12/2/75 Hearings vol 6 p 150 196 In the absence of clear and precise written provisions directly appli cable to informants FBI intelligence informants have engaged in vio lent and other illegal activity For example an FBI intelligence in formant who penetrated the Ku Klux Klan and reported on its activities for over five years testified that on a number of occassions he and other Klansmen had "beaten people severely had boarded buses and kicked people off had went in restaurants and beaten them with blackjacks chains pistols. 61This informant described how he had taken part in Klan attacks on Freedom Riders at the Birmingham Alabama bus depot where "baseball bats clubs chains and pistols were used in beatings.s Although the FBI Special Agents who directed this informant in structed him that he was not to engage in violence it was recognized that there was a substantial risk that he would become a participant in violent activity As one of the Agents testified .. it is kind of difficult to tell him that we would like you to be there on deck observing be able to give us information and still keep yourself detached and uninvolved and clean and that was the problem that we constantly had.83 In another example an FBI intelligence informant penetrated "right wing groups operating in California under the names "The Minutemen and "The Secret Army Oroganization. The informant reported on the activities of these "right wing paramilitary groups for a period of five years but was also involved in acts of violence or destruction In addition the informant actually rose to a position of leadership in the SAO and became an innovator of various harass ment actions For example he admittedly participated in firebombing of an automobile and was present conducting a "surveillance of a professor at San Diego State University when his associate and subordinate in the SAO took out a gun and fired into the home of the professor wounding a young woman. An FBI intelligence informant in a group of antiwar protesters planning to break into a draft board claimed to have provided tech nical instruction and materials that were essential to the illegal break testified to the committee Everything they learned about breaking into a building or climbing a wall or cutting glass or destroying lockers I taught them I got sample equipment the type of windows that we would go through I picked up off the job and taught them how to cut the glass how to drill holes in the glass so you cannot hear it and stuff like that and the FBI supplied me with the equipment needed The stuff I did not have the [the FBI] got off their own agents. The Committee finds that where informants are paid and directed by a government agency the government has a responsibility to B1Rowedeposition 10/17/75 p 12 61Rowe 12/2/75 Hearings vol 6 p 118 SpecialAgent 11/21/75 pp 16-17 a Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee 2/26/76 with enclosures esHardy 9/29/75 pp 16-17 197 impose clear restrictions on their conduct lrewritten practice or gen eral provisions aimed at persons other than the informants themselves are not sufficient In the investigation of violence or illegal activity it is essential that the government not be implicated in such activity Jembeeship Lists and Other PPiri'atc Docunieilt.s Obtah ucl by tin Goeepament i'/i10ugh Intelligence In formants The Committee finds that there are inadequate guidelines to regulate the conduct of intelligence informants with respect to private and confidential documents such as membership lists mailing lists and papers relating to legal matters The Fourth Amendment provides that citizens shall be "secure in their .. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires probable cause to believe there has been a violation of law before a search warrant may issue Moreover the Supreme Court in NAACP v Alabama,66 held that the First Amendment's protections of speech assembly and group association did not permit a state to compel the production of the membership list of a group engaged in lawful activity The Court dis tinguished the case where a state was able to demonstrate a "control ling justification for such lists by showing a group's activities in volved "acts of unlawful intimidation and violence. 668 There are no provisions in the FBI Manual which preclude the FBI from obtaining private and confidential documents through intelligence informants The Manual does prohibit informant report ing of "any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy, but the FBI interprets this as applying only to privileged communications between an attorney and client in connection with a specific court proceeding.6 The Committee's investigation has shown that the FBI through its intelligence informants and sources has sought to obtain member ship lists and other confidential documents of groups and individuals.68 For example one FBI Special Agent testified I remember one evening [an informant] called my home and said I will meet you in a half an hour I have a complete list of everybody that I have just taken out of the files but I have to have it back within such a length of time Well naturally I left home and met him and had the list duplicated forthwith and back in his possession and back in the files with nobody suspecting. 69 Similarly the FBI Special Agent who handled an intelligence informant in an antiwar group testified that he obtained confidential papers of the group which related to legal defense matters "She brought back several things .. various position papers taken by various legal defense groups general statements of the VVA legal thoughts on various trials the "357 U.S 449 (1953) Similarly in Bates v City of Little Rock 361 U.S 516 (1960) the SupremeCourt held compulsorydisclosureof group membership lists was an unjustified interference with members freedom of association B0361U.S at 465 FBI Manualof Instructions Section107 69Surreptitious entry has also provided a means for the obtaining of such lists and other confidentialdocuments SpecialAgent 11/19/75 pp 10-11 198 Gainesville (Florida) 8 the Camden (New Jersey) 9 various documents from all of these groups. S0 This informant also testified that she took the confidential mailing list of the group she had penetrated and gave it to the FBI. She also gave the FBI a legal manual prepared by the group's attorneys to guide lawyers in defending the group's members should they be arrested in connection with antiwar demonstrations or other political activity. Since this document was prepared as a general legal reference manual rather than in connection with a specific trial the FBI considered it outside the attorney-client privilege and not barred by the FBI Manual provision with respect to legal defense and strategy matters For the government to obtain membership lists and other private documents pertaining to lawful and protected activities covertly through intelligence informants risks infringing rights guaranteed by the Constitution The Committee ,finds that there is a need for new guidelines for informant conduct with respect to the private papers of groups and individuals c Electronic Surveillance In the absence of judicial warrant both the "traditional forms of electronic surveillance practiced by the FBI wiretapping and bug ging and the highly sophisticated form of electronic monitoring prac ticed by NSA have been used to collect too much information about too many people 1 Wiretapping and Bugging Wiretaps and bugs are considered by FBI officials to be one of the most valuable techniques for the collection of information relevant to the Bureau's legitimate foreign counterintelligence mandate W Ray mond Wannall the former Assistant Director in charge of the FBI's Intelligence Division stated that electronic surveillance assisted Bu reau officials in making "decisions as to operations against foreigners engaged in espionage "It gives us leads as to persons hostile intel ligence services are trying to subvert or utilize in the United States so certainly it is a valuable technique. 73 Despite its stated value in foreign counterintelligence cases how ever the dangers inherent in its use imply a clear need for rigorous controls By their nature wiretaps and bugs are incapable of a sur gical precision that would permit intelligence agencies to overhear only the target's conversations Since wiretaps are placed on particular telephones anyone who uses a tapped phone including members of the target's family can be overheard So too can everyone with whom the target (or anyone else using the target's telephone) commu nicates. Microphones planted in the target's room or officeinevitably intercept all conversations in a particular area anyone conferring in the room or office not just the target is overheard '0SpecialAgent 11/20/75 pp 15-16 Cook 12/2/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 112 Cookdeposition 10/14/75 p 36 '3W RaymondWannall testimony 10/21/7:5p 21 "Under the Justice Department's procedures for Title III (court-ordered) wiretaps however the monitoring agent is obligated to turn off the recording equipment when certain privileged communicationsbegin Manual for conduct of Electronic Surveillance under Title III of Public Law 90-351 Sec 8.1 199 The intrusiveness of these techniques has a second aspect as well It is extremely difficult if not impossible to limit the interception to conversations that are relevant to the purposes for which the surveil lance is placed Virtually all conversations are overheard no matter how trivial personal or political they might be When the electronic surveillance target is a political figure who is likely to discuss political affairs or a lawyer who confers with his clients the possibilities for abuse are obviously heightened The dangers of indiscriminate interception are perhaps most acute in the case of microphones planted in locations such as bedrooms When Attorney General Herbert Brownell gave the FBI sweeping au thority to engage in microphone surveillances for intelligence pur poses in 1954 he expressly permitted the Bureau to plant microphones in such locations if in the sole discretion of the FBI the facts war ranted the installation.i5 Acting under this general authority for ex ample the Bureau installed no fewer than twelve bugs in hotel rooms occupied by Dr Martin Luther King Jr. The King surveillances which occurred between January 1964 and October 1965 were ostensibly approved within the FBI for internal security reasons but they produced vast amounts of personal infor mation that were totally unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest indeed a single hotel room bug alone yielded twenty reels of tape that subsequently provided the basis for the dissemination of personal information about Dr King throughout the Federal estab lishment. Significantly FBI internal memoranda with respect to some of the installations make clear that they were planted in Dr King's hotel rooms for the express purpose of obtaining personal in formation about him. Extremely personal information about the target his family and his friends is easily obtained from wiretaps as well as microphones This fact is clearly illustrated by the warrantless electronic surveil lance of an American citizen who was suspected of leaking classified data to the press A wiretap on this individual produced no evidence that he had in fact leaked any stories or documents but among the items of information that the FBI did obtain from the tap (and de livered in utmost secrecy to the White House) were the following that "meat was ordered [by the target's family] from a grocer that the target's daughter had a toothache that the target needed grass clip pings for a compost heap he was building and that during a telephone conversation between the target's wife and a friend the "matters dis cussed were milk bills hair soap operas and church. 78 "Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director FBI 5/20/54 "Three additional bugs were planted in Dr King's hotel roomsin 1965after the standards for wiretapping and microphonesurveillance became identical According to FBI memoranda apparently initiated by Katzenbach Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach was given after the fact notification that these three surveillances of Dr King had occurred See p 273 and the King Re port Sec IV for further details Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardener to W C Sullivan 3/26/64 "For example memorandum from Baumgardner to w C Sullivan 2/4/64 "FBI memoranda Identifying details are being withheld by the Select Com mittee becauseof privacy considerations Even the FBI realized that this type of information was unrelated to criminal activity or national security for the last four months of this surveillance most of the summaries that were disseminated to the white house began "The followingis a summary of nonpertinent informa tion concerningcaptionedindividual as of 200 The so-called "seventeen wiretaps on journalists and government employees which collectively lasted from May 1969 to February 1971 also illustrate the intrusiveness of electronic surveillance According to former President Nixon these taps produced "just gobs of material gossip and bull. FBI summaries of information obtained from the wiretaps and disseminated to the White House suggest that the former President's private evaluation of them was correct This wiretapping program did not reveal the source of any leaks of classified data which was its ostensible purpose but it did generate a wealth of information about the personal lives of the targets their social contacts their vacation plans their employment satisfactions and dissatisfaction their marital problems their drinking habits and even their sex lives.86 Among those who were incidentally overheard on one of these wire taps was a currently sitting Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States who made plans to review a manuscript written by one of the targets.81 Vast amounts of political information were also obtained from these wiretaps.82 The "seventeen wiretaps also exemplify the particularly acute problems of wiretapping when the targeted individuals are involved in the domestic political process These wiretaps produced vast amounts of purely political information,82 much of which was obtained from the home telephones of two consultants to Senator Edmund Muskie and other Democratic politicians The incidental collection of political information from electronic surveillance is also shown by a series of telephone and microphone surveillances conducted during the Kennedy administration In an in vestigation of the possibly unlawful attempts of representatives of a foreign country to influence congressional deliberations about sugar quota legislation in the early 1960s Attorney General Robert Kennedy authorized a total of twelve warrantless wiretaps on foreign and do mestic targets Among the wiretaps of American citizens were two on American lobbyists three on executive branch officials and two on a staff member of a House of Representatives Committee.83 A bug was also planted in the hotel room of a United States Congressman the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee Harold D Cooley.84 Although this investigation was apparently initiated because of the Government's concern about future relations with the foreign coun try involved and the possibility of bribery, it is clear that the Ken "Transcript of Presidential Tapes 2/28/73 (House Judiciary CommitteeState ment of Information BookVII Part 4 p 1754) For example letters from Hoover to the Attorney General 7/25/69 and 7/31/69 letters from Hooverto IT ITHaldeman 6/25/70 Q3Letter from Hooverto Haldeman 6/25/70 Examplesof suchinformation are listed in the findingonPolitical Abuse "The 17 wiretaps. "Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 2/14/61 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 2/16/61 Memo randum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62 Memorandum from Wannall to W C Sullivan 12/22/66 "Memorandum from D E Moore to A H Belmont 2/16/61 Memorandumfrom W R Wannall to W C Sullivan 12/22/66 Memorandum from A H Belmont to Mr Parsons 2/14/61 This investigation did discover that representatives of a foreign nation were attempting to influenceCongres sional deliberations but it did not reveal that moneywas being passed to any member of Congress or Congressionalstaff aide 201 nedy administration was politically interested in the outcome of the sugar quota legislation as well.86 Given the nature of the techniques used and of the targets they were directed against it is not surprising that a great deal of potentially useful political information was gen erated from these "Sugar Lobby surveillances.87 The highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance also raises special problems when the targets are lawyers and journalists Over the past two decades there have been a number of wiretaps placed on the office telephones of lawyers.88 In the Sugar Lobby investigation for example Robert Kennedy authorized wiretaps on ten telephone lines of a single law firm.90 All of these lines were apparently used by the one lawyer who was a target and presumably by other attorneys in the firm as well Such wiretaps represent a serious threat to the attor ney-client privilege because once they are instituted they are capable of detecting all conversations between a lawyer and his clients even those relating to pending criminal cases Since 1960 at least six American journalists and newsmen have also been the targets of warrantless wiretaps or bugs 8 These surveillances were all rationalized as necessary to discover the source of leaks of classified information but since wiretaps and bugs are indiscriminate in the types of information collected some of these taps revealed the attitudes of various newsmen toward certain politicians and supplied advance notice of forthcoming newspaper and magazine articles deal ing with administration policies The collection of information such as this and the precedent set by wiretapping of newsmen generally inevitably tends to undermine the constitutional guarantee of a free and independent press 2 NSA Monitoring The National Security Agency (NSA) has the capability to monitor almost any electronic communication which travels through the air This means that NSA is capable of intercepting a telephone call or even a telegram if such call or telegram is transmitted at least par tially through the air Radio transmissions a fortiori are also within NSA's reach Since most communications today to an increasing extent even domestic communications are at some point transmitted through the air NSA's potential to violate the privacy of American citizens is un matched by any other intelligence agency Furthermore since the inter ception of electronic signals entails neither the installation of electronic surveillance devices nor the cooperation of private communications companies the possibility that such interceptions will be undetected is enhanced NSA has never turned its monitoring apparatus upon entirely do mestic communications but from the early 1960s until 1973 it did inter Memorandumfrom Wannall to W C Sullivan 12/22/66 87SeeFinding on Political Abuse p 233 Electronic Surveillance Report Sec II "Presidential and Attorney General Authorization. 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto the Attorney General6/29/61 memo randum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 7/31/62 memorandum from J Edgar Hooverto the Attorney General4/19/65 memorandumfrom J Ed gar Hooverto the Attorney General 6/4/69 memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 9/10/69 letter from W C Sullivan to J Edgar Hoover 7/2/69 202 cept the international communications of American citizens without a warrant at the request of other federal agencies Under current practice NSA_does not target any American citizen or firm for the purpose of intercepting their foreign communications As a result of monitoring international links of communication how ever it does acquire an enormous number of communications to from or about American citizens and firms.33 As a practical matter most of the communications of American citi zens or firms acquired by NSA as incidental to its foreign intelligence gathering process are destroyed upon recognition as a communication to or from an American citizen But other such communications which bear upon NSA's foreign intelligence requirements are processed and information obtained from them are used in NSA's reports to other intelligence agencies Current practice precludes NSA from identify ing American citizens and firms by name in such reports Nonetheless the practice does result in NSA's disseminating information derived from the international communications of American citizens and firms to the intelligence agencies and policymakers in the federal government In his dissent in Olmstead v United States,94 which held that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement did not apply to the seizure of conversations by means of wiretapping Justice Louis D Brandeis expressed grave concern that new technologies might outstrip the ability of the Constitution to protect American citizens He wrote Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government (and) the prog ress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping Ways may some day be developed by which the Government without removing papers from secret drawers can reproduce them in court and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security The question posed by Justice Brandeis applies with obvious force to the technological developments that allow NSA to monitor an enor mous number of communications each year His fears were firmly based for in fact no warrant was ever obtained for the inclusion of 1200 American citizens on NSA's "Watch List between the early 1960s and 1973 and none is obtained today for the dissemination with in the intelligence community of information derived from the inter national communications of American citizens and firms In the face of this new technology it is well to remember the answer Justice Brandeis gave to his own question Quoting from Boyd v United States 116 U.S 616 he wrote It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essense of the offense but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security per sonal liberty and private property ,94a 'NSA has long asserted that it had the authority to do this so long as one of the parties Tosuch communicationwas located in a foreign country D4277U.S 438 473 474(1928) 93a277U.S at 474 475 203 D Mail Opening By ignoring the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail open ing the CIA and the FBI were able to obtain access to the written com munications of hundreds of thousands of individuals a large propor tion of whom were American citizens The intercepted letters were presumably sealed with the expectation that they would only be opened by the party to whom they were addressed but intelligence agents in ten cities throughout the United States surreptitiously opened the seal and photographed the entire contents for inclusion in their intelligence files Mail opening is an imprecise technique In addition to relying on a "Watch List of names the CIA opened vast numbers of letters on an entirely random basis as one agent who opened mail in the CIA's New York project testified "You never knew what you would hit. 99 Given the imprecision of the technique and the large quantity of cor respondence that was opened it is perhaps not surprising that during the twenty year course of the Agency's New York project the mail that was randomly opened included that of at least three United States Senators and a Congressman one Presidential Candidate and numerous educational business and civil rights leaders.9e Several of the FBI programs utilized as selection criteria certain "indicators on the outside of envelopes that suggested that the com munication might be to or from a foreign espionage agent These "indicators were more refined than the "shotgun approach 97which characterized the CIA's New York project and they did lead to the identification of three foreign spies 98 But even by the Bureau's own accounting it is clear that the mail of hundreds of innocent American citizens was opened and read for every successful counterintelligence lead that was obtained by means of "indicators. 99 Large volumes of mail were also intercepted and opened in other FBI mail programs that were based not on indicators but on far less precise criteria Two programs that involved the opening of mail to and from an Asian country for example used "letters to or from a university scientific or technical facility as one selection criterion. According to FBI memoranda an average of 50 to 100 letters per day was opened and photographed during the ten years in which one of these two programs operated.101 96"CIAOfficer testimony 9/30/75 p 15 99Staffsummaryof "Master Index. review 9/5/75 B7JamesAngeltontestimony 9/17/75 p 28 9aWannall 10/21/75 p 5 99Inone of the programs based on "indicators a participating agent testified that he opened30to 60letters each day (FBI agent statement 9/10/75 p 23.) In a secondsuch program a total of 1.011letters were openedin one of the six cities in which it operated statistics on the number of letters opened in the other fivecities cannot be reconstructed (W Raymond Wannall testimony 10/21/75 p 5.) In a third such project 2.350letters were openedin one city and statistics for the other two cities in whichit operated are unavailable (Memorandumfrom W A Branigan to W C Sullivan 8/31/61 Memorandumfrom Mr Branigan to Mr Sullivan 12/21/61 memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/5/62.) 30 Letter from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee 10/29/75 Six other criteria were used in these programs See Mail Opening Report. Sec IV 101Memorandumfrom S B Donohoeto A H Belmont 2/23/61 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/11/60 Statistics relat ing to the number of letters opened in the other program which used this cri terion cannot be reconstructed 204 E Surreptitious Entries Surreptitious entries conducted in violation of the law have also permitted intelligence agencies to gather a wide range of information about American citizens and domestic organization as well as foreign targets.102 By definition this technique involves a physical entry into the private premises of individuals and groups Once intelligence agents are inside no "papers or effects are secure As the Huston Plan recommendations stated in 1970 "It amounts to burglary. 403 The most private documents are rendered vulnerable by the use of surreptitious entries According to a 1966 internal FBI memorandum which discusses the use of this technique against domestic organizations [The FBI has] on numerous occasions been able to obtain material held highly secret and closely guarded by subversive groups and organizations which consisted of membership lists and mailing lists of these organizations.404 A specific example cited in this memorandum also reveals the types of information that this technique can collect and the uses to which the information thus collected may be put Through a "black bag job we obtained the records in the possession of three high-ranking officials of a Klan organiza tion... These records gave us the complete membership and financial information concerning the Klan's operation which we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization and in fact to bring about its near disintegration 405 Unlike techniques such as electronic surveillance government entries into private premises were familiar to the Founding Fathers "Indeed, Judge Gesell wrote in the Ehrlichman case "the American Revolution was sparked in part by the complaints of the colonists against the issuance of writs of assistance pursuant to which the King's revenue officers conducted unrestricted indiscriminate searches of persons and homes to uncover contraband. 106Recognition of the intrusiveness of government break-ins was one of the primary reasons 'According to the FBI "there were at least 239 surreptitious entries (for purposes other than microphoneinstallation) conductedagainst at least fifteen domestic subversive targets from 1942to April 1968 In addition at least three domestic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October1952to June 1966. (FBI memorandumto the Senate Select Committee 10/13/76.) One target the Socialist Workers Party was the subject of possibly as many as 92 break-ins by the FBI between 1960and 1966alone The homeof at least one SWPmemberwas also apparently brokeninto (Sixth Supplementary Response to Requests for Production of Documents of Defendant Director of the FBI Socialist Workers Party v Attorney General 73 Civ 3160 (SDNY) 3/24/76.) An entry against one "white hate group was also reported by the FBI (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to the Senate Select Committee 10/13/75.) 'Memorandum from Tom Huston to H R Haldeman 7/70 p 3 '04Memorandumfrom W C Sullivanto C D DeLoach 7/19/66 106Ibid 108UnitedStates v Ehrlichman 376F Supp 29 32 (D.D.C 1974) 205 for the subsequent adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791,107and this technique is certainly no less intrusive today Sub funding (c) The imprecision and manipulation of labels such as "national se curity, "domestic security, "subversive activities and "foreign in telligence have led to unjustified use of these techniques Using labels such as "national security and "foreign intelligence intelligence agencies have directed these highly intrusive techniques against individuals and organizations who were suspected of no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security In the absence of precise standards and effective outside control the selection of American citizens as targets has at times been predicated on grounds no more substantial than their lawful protests or their non-conformist philosophies Almost any connection with any perceived danger to the country has sufficed The application of the "national security rationale to cases lacking a substantial national security basis has been most apparent in the area of warrantless electronic surveillance Indeed the unjustified use of wiretaps and bugs under this and related labels has a long history Among the wiretaps approved by Attorney General Francis Biddle under the standard of "persons suspected of subversive activities, for example was one on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce in 1941.108 This was approved in spite of his comment to J Edgar Hoover that the target organization had "no record of espionage at this time. 109 In 1945 Attorney General Tom Clark authorized a wiretap on a former aide to President Roosevelt.11 According to a memorandum by J Edgar Hoover Clark stated that President Truman wanted "a very thorough investigation of the activities of the former official so that "steps might be taken if possible to see that [his] activities did not interfere with the proper administration of government. 111 The memorandum makes no reference to "subversive activities or any other national security considerations The "Sugar Lobby and Martin Luther King Jr. wiretaps in the early 1960s both show the elasticity of the "domestic security stand ard which supplemented President Roosevelt's "subversive activities formulation Among those wiretapped in the Sugar Lobby investiga tion as noted above was a Congressional staff aide Yet the documen tary record of this investigation reveals no evidence indicating that the target herself represented any threat to the "domestic security. Similarly while the FBI may properly have been concerned with the activities of certain advisors to Dr King the direct wiretapping of Dr King shows that the "domestic security standard could be stretched to unjustified lengths The microphone surveillances of Congressman Cooley and Dr King under the "national interest standard established by Attorney Gen eral Brownell in 1954 also reveal the relative ease with which elec tronic bugging devices could be used against American citizens who See e.g. Olm.ateadv UnitedStates 277U.S 438 (192R) 108Memorandumfrom Francis Biddleto Mr Hoover 11/19/41 10BIbid 110Unaddressed Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover 11/15/45 found in Director Hoover's"Officialand Confidential files 111Ibid 206 posed no genuine "national security threat Neither of these targets advocated or engaged in any conduct that was damaging to the security of the United States In April 1964 Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved "tech nical coverage (electronic surveillance) of a black nationalist leader after the FBI advised Kennedy that he was "forming a new group which would be "more aggressive and would "participate in racial demonstrations and civil rights activities. The only indication of possible danger noted in the FBI's request for the wiretaps however was that this leader had "recommended the possession of firearms by members for their self-protection.112 One year later Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach approved a wiretap on the offices of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Com mittee on the basis of potential communist infiltration into that organi zation The request which was sent to the Attorney General noted that "confidential informants described SNCC as "the principal target for Communist Party infiltration among the various civil rights organizations and stated that some of its leaders had "made public appearances with leaders of communist-front organizations and had "subversive backgrounds. 113The FBI presented no substantial evi dence however that SNCC was in fact infiltrated by communists only that the organization was apparently a target for such infiltration in the future After the Justice Department adopted new criteria for the institu tion of warrantless electronic surveillance in 1968 the unjustified use of wiretaps continued In November 1969 Attorney General John Mitchell approved a series of three wiretaps on organizations involved in planning the antiwar "March on Washington. The FBI's request for coverage of the first group made no claim that its members en gaged or were likely to engage in violent activity the request was simply based on the statement that the anticipated size of the dem onstration was cause for "concern should violence of any type break out. 114 The only additional justification given for the wiretap on one of the other groups the Vietnam Moratorium Committee was that it "has recently endorsed fully the activities of the [first group] concerning the upcoming antiwar demonstrations. 115 In 1970 approval for a wiretap on a "New Left oriented campus group was granted by Attorney General Mitchell on the basis of an FBI request which included among other factors deemed relevant to the necessity for the wiretap evidence that the group was attempting "to develop strong ties with the cafeteria maintenance and other workers on campus and wanted to "go into industry and factories and take the radical politics they learned on the campus and spread them among factory workers. 116 nzMemorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto the Attorney General 4/1/64 113Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/15/65 " Memorandumfrom S Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 11/5/69 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell 11/7/69 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 3/16/70 The strongest evidencethat this group's conductwas inimical to the national security was reported as follows "The {group] is dominated and controlledby the pro-ChineseMarxist Leninist (excised)... "In carrying out the Marxist-Leninist ideologyof the (excised) membershave repeatedly sought to becomeinvolvedin labor disputes on the side of labor join 207 This approval was renewed three months later despite the fact that the request for renewal made no mention of violent or illegal activity by the group The value of the wiretap was shown according to the FBI by such results as obtaining "the identities of over 600 persons either in touch with the national headquarters or associated with it during the preceding three months.117 Six months after the original authorization the number of persons so identified had increased to 1,428 and approval was granted for a third three-month period."" The "seventeen wiretaps also show how the term "national secu rity as a justification for wiretapping can obscure improper use of this technique Shortly after these wiretaps were revealed publicly President Nixon stated they had been justified by the need to prevent leaks of classified information harmful to the national security.h19 Wiretaps for this purpose had in fact been authorized under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations President Nixon learned of these and other prior taps and at a news conference sought to justify the taps he had authorized by referring to past precedent He stated that in the period of 1961 to '63 there were wiretaps on news organiza tions on news people on civil rights leaders and on other people And I think they were perfectly justified and I'm sure that President Kennedy and his brother Robert Ken nedy would never have authorized them unless he thought they were in the national interest (Presidential News Con ference 8/22/73.) Thus questionable electronic surveillances by earlier administra tions were put forward as a defense for improper surveillances ex posed in 1973 In fact however two of these wiretaps were placed on domestic affairs advisers at the White House who had no foreign affairs responsibilities and apparently no access to classified foreign policy materials.lhl A third target was a White House speech writer who had been overheard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a re porter with background information on a Presidential speech con picket lines and engagein disruptive and sometimesviolent tactics against indus try recruiters oncollegecampuses.. "This faction is currently very active in many of the major demonstrationsand student violenceon collegecampuses.... (Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 3/16/70 The excised words have been deleted by the FBI.) " Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/16/70 The only other results noted by Hoover related to the fact that the wiretap had "obtained information concerningthe activities of the national headquarters of [the group and] plans for [the group's] support and participation in demon strations supporting antiwar groups and the (excised). It was also noted that the wiretap "revealed .. contacts with Canadian student elements "'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 9/16/70 The only other results noted by Hoover again related to obtaining information about the "plans and activities of the group Specificallymentioned were the "plans for the National Interim Committee (ruling body of [excised]) meeting which took place in New York and Chicago and the plans "for demonstrations at San Francisco Detroit Salt Lake City Minneapolis and Chicago. There was no indication that these demonstrations were expected to be violent (The excised wordshave beendeletedby the FBI) 119Publicstatement of President Nixon 5/22/73 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 7/23/69 memorandumfrom J Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 12/14/70 208 cerning domestic revenue sharing and welfare reform.122 The reinstatement of another wiretap in this series was requested by H R Haldeman simply because "they may have a bad apple and have to get him out of the basket. 123The last four requests in this series that were sent to the Attorney General (including the requests for a tap on the "bad apple") did not mention any national security justifi cation at all As former Deputy Attorney General William Ruckels haus has testified I think some of the individuals who were tapped at least to the extent I have reviewed the record had very little if any relationship to any claim of national security I think that as the program proceeded and it became clear to those who could sign off on taps how easy it was to institute a wire tap under the present procedure that these kinds of considera tions [i.e. genuine national security justifications] were con siderably relaxed as the program went on.12 None of the "seventeen wiretaps was ever reauthorized by the Attorney General although 10 of them remained in operation for periods longer than 90 days and although President Nixon himself stated privately that "[t]he tapping was a very very unproductive thing it's never been useful to any operation I've conducted ... 125 In short warrantless electronic surveillance has been defended on the ground that it was essential for the national security but the history of the use of this technique clearly shows that the imprecision and manipulation of this and similar labels coupled with the absence of any outside scrutiny has led to its improper use against American citizens who posed no criminal or national security threat to the country.'2s Similarly the terms "foreign intelligence and "counterespionage were used by the CIA and the FBI to justify their cooperation in the CIA's New York mail opening project but this project was also used to target entirely innocent American citizens As noted above the CIA compiled a WTatchList of names of per sons and organizations whose mail was to be opened if it passed through the New York facility In the early days of the project the names on this list which then numbered fewer than twenty might reason MemorandumfromW C Sullivanto C D DeLoach 8/1/69 'Memorandum from J Edgar Hoover to Messrs Tolson Sullivan and D C Brennan 10/15/70 Ruckelshaus testimony before the Senate Subcommitteeon Administrative Practice and Procedure 5/9/74 pp 311-12 'Transcript of the Presidential Tapes 2/28/73 (House Judiciary Committee Statement of Information BookVII Part W p 1754.) 'The term "national security was also used by John Ehrlichman and Charles Colsonto justify their roles in the break-in of Dr Fielding's officein 1971 A March 21 1973tape recordingof a meetingbetweenPresident Nixon John Dean and H R Haldeman suggests however that the national security "justification may have beendevelopedlongafter the event for the purposeof obscuringits im propriety When the President asked what could he done if the break-in was revealedpublicly John Dean suggested "Youmight put it on a national security grounds basis. Later in the conversation President Nixon stated "With the bombing thing coming out and everything coming out the whole thing was national security, and Dean said "I think we couldget by on that. (Transcript of Presidential tapes 3/21/73.) 209 ably have been expected to lead to genuine foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information But as the project developed the Watch List grew and its focus changed By the late 1960s there were approximately 600 names on the list many of them American citizens and organizations who were engaged in purely lawful and consti tutionally protected forms of protest against governmental policies Among the domestic organizations on the Watch List which was supplemented by submissions from the FBI were Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Ramparts the Student Non-Violent Coordi nating Committee the Center for the Study of Public Policy and the American Friends Service Committee.]" The FBI levied more general requirements on the CIA's project as well The focus of the original categories of correspondence in which the FBI expressed an interest was clearly foreign counterespionage but subsequent requirements became progressively more domestic in their focus and progressively broader in their scope The requirements that were levied by the FBI in 1972 one year before the termination of the project included the following . [plersons on the Watch List known communists New Left activists extremists and other subversives . Communist party and front organizations extremist and New Left organizations Protest and peace organizations such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace Communists Trotskyites and members of other Marxist Leninist subversive and extremist groups such as the Black Nationalists and Liberation groups Students for a Demo cratic Society and other New Left groups Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S or subversive sympathies." This final set of requirements evidently reflected the domestic turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s The mail opening program that began as a means of collecting foreign intelligence information and dis covering Soviet intelligence efforts in the United States had expanded to encompass detection of the activities of domestic dissidents of all types In the absence of effective outside control highly intrusive tech niques have been used to gather vast amounts of information about the entirely lawful activities and privately held beliefs of large num bers of American citizens The very intrusiveness of these techniques demands the utmost circumspection in their use But with vague or non-existent standards to guide them and with labels such as "national security and "foreign intelligence to shield them executive branch officials have been all too willing to unleash these techniques against American citizens with little or no legitimate justification ' Staffsummary of watch List review 9/5/75 128Routing slipfrom J Edgar Hooverto James Angelton (attachment) 3/10/72 68-7860 76 15 D USING COVERT ACTION TO DISRUPT AND DISCREDIT DOMESTIC GROUPS MAJOR FINDING The Committee finds that covert action programs have been used to disrupt the lawful political activities of individual Americans and groups and to discredit them using dangerous and degrading tactics which are abhorrent in a free and decent society Sub findings Although the claimed purposes of these action programs were to protect the national security and to prevent violence many of the victims were concededly nonviolent were not controlled by a foreign power and posed no threat to the national security The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citizens They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining groups "neutralize those who were already members and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas The tactics used against Americans often risked and some times caused serious emotional economic or physical damage Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages terminate funding or employment and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence (d) The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr Martin Luther King Jr. violated the law and funda mental human decency Elaboration of the Findings For fifteen years from 1956 until 1971 the FBI carried out a series of covert action programs directed against American citizens. These "counterintelligence programs (shortened to the acronym COINTELPRO) resulted in part from frustration with Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceed overtly against dissident groups.2 Before 1956the FBI engagedin activities to disrupt and discredit Communists and (before world war II) Fascists but not as part of a formal program The Bureau is the only agency which carried on a sustained effort to "neutralize domesticgroups although other agenciesmade sporadic attempts to disrupt dis sident groups (SeeMilitary SurveillanceReport IRS Report.) 2The Bureau personnel involvedin COINTELPROlink the first formal coun terintelligence program against the Communist Party USA to the Supreme Court reversal of the Smith Act convictions which "made it impossibleto prose cute Communist Party members at the time (COINTELPRO unit chief 10/16/75 p 14.) It should be noted however that the Court's reversal occurred in 1957 the year after the program was instituted This belief in the deficiencies of the law was a major factor in the four subsequent programs as well "The other COINTELPRO programs were opened as the threat arose in areas of extremism and subversion and there were not adequate statutes to proceed against the organization or to prevent their activities. (COINTELPRO Unit Chief 10/16/75 p 15.) (211) 212 They ended formally in 1971 with the threat of public exposure. Some of the findings discussed herein are related to the findings on lawlessness overbreadth and intrusive techniques previously set forth Some of the most offensive actions in the FBI's COINTEL PRO programs (anonymous letters intended to break up marriages or efforts to deprive people of their jobs for example) were based upon the covert use of information obtained through overly-broad inves tigations and intrusive techniques. Similarly as noted above COIN TELPRO involved specific violations of law and the law and the Constitution were "not [given] a thought under the FBI's policies. But COINTELPRO was more than simply violating the law or the Constitution In COINTELPRO the Bureau secretly 6 took the law into its own hands going beyond the collection of intelligence and beyond its law enforcement function to act outside the legal process altogether and to covertly disrupt discredit and harass groups and individuals A law enforcement agency must not secretly usurp the functions of judge and jury even when the investigation reveals crim inal activity But in COINTELPRO the Bureau imposed summary punishment not only on the allegedly violent but also on the non violent advocates of change Such action is the hallmark of the vig ilante and has no place in a democratic society Under COINTELPRO certain techniques the Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adopted for use against perceived domestic threats to the established political and social order. Some of the targets of COINTELPRO were law-abiding citizens merely advocating change in our society Other targets were members 3 For further information on the termination of each of the programs see The Accountabilityand ControlFindings p 265and the detailed reports on the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO Although the programs have been formally terminated Bureau witnesses agree that there is a "grey area between "counter-intelligence and investiga tive activities which are inherently disruptive These investigative activities continue (See COINTELPROReport "Commandand Control The Problemsof Oversight.") Information gained from electronic surveillance informant coverage bur glaries and confidentialfinancialrecordswas usedin COINTELPRO p.275.) Moore 11/3/75 p 83 Field officeswere instructed that no one outside the Bureau was to know that COINTELPROexisted although certain persons in the executive branch and in Congresswere told about and did not object to efforts to disrupt the CPL'SAand the Klan However no one was told about the other COINTELPRO programs or about the more dangerousand degrading techniquesemployed (See p 275.) Asthe Chiefof the Racial IntelligenceSectionput it "You can trace [the origins of COINTELPRO]up and back to foreign intel ligence particularly penetration of the group by the individual informant Be fore you can engage in counterintelligence you must have intelligence If you have goodintelligenceand knowwhat it's goingto do you can seeddistrust sow misinformation The same technique is used misinformation disruption is used in the domesticgroups although in the domesticgroups you are dealing in '67 and '68 with many many more across the country than you had ever dealt with as far as your foreign groups. (Moore 11/3/75 pp 32-33.) Former Assistant Director William C Sullivan also testified that the "rough tough dirty business of foreign counterintelligencewas "brought home against any organization against which we were targeted We did not differentiate. (Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 97-98.) 213 of groups that had been involved in violence such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Panther Party Some victims did nothing more than associate with targets.$ The Committee does not condone acts of violence but the response of Government to allegations of illegal conduct must comply with the due process of law demanded by the Constitution Lawlessness by citizens does not justify lawlessness by Government The tactics which were employed by the Bureau are therefore unacceptable even against the alleged criminal The imprecision of the targeting compounded the abuse Once the Government decided to take the law into its own hands those unacceptable tactics came almost inevitably to be used not only against the "kid with the bomb but also against the "kid with the bumper sticker. 9 Sub finding (a) Although the claimed purposes of these action programs were to protect the "national security and to prevent violence many of the victims were concededly nonviolent were not controlled by a foreign power and posed no threat to the "national security. The Bureau conducted five "counterintelligence programs aimed against domestic groups the "Communist Party USA program (1956 71) the "Socialist Workers Party program (1961 69) the "White Hate program (1964 1971) the "Black Nationalist-Hate Group program (1967 71) and the "New Left program (1968 71) While the declared purposes of these programs were to protect the "national security or prevent violence Bureau witnesses admit that many of the targets were nonviolent and most had no connections with a foreign power Indeed nonviolent organizations and individ uals were targeted because the Bureau believed they represented a "potential for violence 10and nonviolent citizens who were against the war in Vietnam were targeted because they gave "aid and comfort to violent demonstrators by lending respectability to their cause.1 The imprecision of the targeting is demonstrated by the inability of the Bureau to define the subjects of the programs The Black Nationalist program according to its supervisor included "a great number of organizations that you might not today characterize as black nationalist but which were in fact primarily black. 12Thus the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference was labeled as a Black Nationalist-"Hate Group. Furthermore the actual targets were chosen from a far broader group than the titles of the programs would imply The CPUSA program targeted not only Communist Party members but also spon sors of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American eFor example parents and spouse of targets receivedletters containing accu sations of immoral conduct by the target (Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/30/70 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office11/4/68.) 0Huston W23/75 Hearings Vol 2 p 45 10Moore 11/8/75 p 37 n NewLeft supervisor 10/28/75 p 69 "Black Nationalist Supervisor 10/17/75 p 12 214 Activities Committee 14and civil rights leaders allegedly under Com munist influence or not deemed to be "anti-Communist".15 The Socialist Workers Party program included non-SWP sponsors of antiwar demonstrations which were cosponsored by the SWP or the Young Socialist Alliance its youth group.16 The Black Nationalist program targeted a range of organizations from the Panthers to SNCC to the peaceful Southern Christian Leadership Conference and included every Black Student Union and many other black student groups. New Left targets ranged from the SDS 18 to the Inter University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,19 from Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left") to the New Mexico Free University and other "alternate schools, and from underground newspapers 22to students protesting university censorship of a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on them. Sub finding (b) The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citi zens They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining 14For example the entire Unitarian Societyof Clevelandwas targeted because the minister and some memberscirculated a petition calling for the abolition of HUAC and because the Church gave officespace to the "Citizens for Constitu tional Rights (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to ClevelandField Office 11/6/64.) SeeFindingon "Overbreadth p 181 "For instance the Bureau targeted two non-memberstudents who partici pated in an anti-war "hunger strike at Oberlin which was "guidedand directed by the YoungSocialists Alliance The students parents received anonymouslet ters purportedly from a friend of their sons Oneletter expressedconcernthat a group of "left wingstudents were "cynicallyusing the boy whichwouldlead to "injury to his health and "damage to his academic standing The other letter also stated that it was motivated by concern for "damage to the student's "health and personal future and "the belief that you may not be aware of John's current involvement in left-wing activities. (Memorandum from FBI headquarters to ClevelandField Office11/29/68.) 14One proposal sought to expose Black Student Union Chapters as "breeding grounds for racial militancy by an anonymousmailing to "all institutions where there are BSU chapters or incipient chapters (Memorandum from Portland Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/3/68.) "For example Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office10/31/68 "An anonymousletter was sent to "influential Michiganpolitical figures the mass media University of Michiganadministrators and the Board of Regents in an attempt to "discredit and neutralize the "communist activities of the IUCDFP The letter decried the "undue publicity given anti-war protest activities which "undoubtedly give 'aid and comfort to the enemy and encour age the Vietcongand the North Vietnamesein "refusing to cometo the bargain ing table The letter continued "I wonderif the strategy is to bleed the United States white by prolongingthe war in Vietnamand pave the way for a takeover byRussia (MemorandumfromDetroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/11/ 66 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/26/66.) 20Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office 6/18/68 The NewMexicoFree University was targeted becauseit taught such courses as "confrontation politics and "draft counselling (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to AlbuquerqueField Office3/19/69.) In another ease an "alter nate schoolfor students "aged fiveand beyond which was co-sponsoredby the ACLU was targeted because "from the staff being assembled it appears that the school will be a New Left venture and of a radical revolutionary nature The Bureau contacted a confidentialsource in the hank financingthe schoolso that he could "take steps to discourage its developments (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San AntonioField Office7/23/69 See e.g. Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office 11/14/69 "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office11/4/68 215 groups 'neutralize those who were already members and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas In achieving its purported goals of protecting the national security and preventing violence the Bureau attempted to deter membership in the target groups As the supervisor of the "Black Nationalist CO I\ TELPRO stated "Obviously you are going to prevent violence or a greater amount of violence if you have smaller groups. 2 The chief of the COINTELPRO unit agreed "We also made an effort to deter recruitment where we could This was done with the view that if we could curb the organization we could curb the action or the vio lence within the organization. 25As noted above many of the orga nizations "curbed were not violent and covert attacks on group membership contravened the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom to associate Nor was this the only First Amendment right violated by the Bureau In addition to attempting to prevent people from joining or continuing to be members in target organizations the Bureau tried to "deter or counteract what it called "propaganda 26 the expres sion of ideas which it considered dangerous Thus the originating document for the "Black Nationalist COINTELPRO noted that "consideration should be given to techniques to preclude leaders of the target organizations "from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media. 27 Instructions to "preclude free speech were not limited to "black nationalists they occurred in every program In the New Left pro gram for instance approximately thirty-nine percent of all actions attempted to keep targets from speaking teaching writing or publishing.23 The cases included attempts (sometimes successful) to prompt the firing of university and high school teachers 29to prevent targets from speaking on campus 30to stop chapters of target groups from 24Black Nationalist supervisor 10/17/75 p 24 ssCOINTELPROunit chief 10/12/75 p 54 28COINTELPROunit chief 10/12/75 p 54 27MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SAC's 8/25/67 3 The FBI was not the only intelligence agency to attempt to prevent the propagation of ideas with which it disagreed but it was the only one to do so in any organized way The IRS responded to Congressional and Administration pressure by targeting political organizations and dissidents for audit The CIA improperly obtained the tax returns of Ramparts magazine after it learned that the magazine intended to publish an article revealing Agencysupport of the National Student Association The CIA saw the article as "an attack on CIA in particular and the Administration in general. (CIA memorandumre "IRS BriefingonRamparts, 2/2/67.) "For instance a high school English teacher was targeted for inviting two poets to attend a class at his school The poets were noted for their efforts in the draft resistance movement The Bureau sent anonymousletters to two local newspapers the Board of Education and the schoolhoard (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office 6/19/69.) "In one ease the Bureau attempted to stop a "Communist speaker from appearing on campus The sponsoring organization went to court and won an order permitting the lecture to proceed as scheduled the Bureau then investi gated the judge whoissued the order (Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/26/60 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/27/60 10/28/ 10/31/60 Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner toA H Belmont 10/26/60.) 216 being formed 31to prevent the distribution of books newspapers or periodicals 32to disrupt or cancel news conferences 33to interfere with peaceful demonstrations including the SCLC's Poor Peo ple's Campaign and Washington Spring Project and most of the large anti-war marches 34 and to deny facilities for meetings or conferences.35 As the above cases demonstrate the FBI was not just "chilling free speech but squarely attacking it The tactics used against Americans often risked and sometimes caused serious emotional economic or physical damage Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages terminate funding or employment and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence The former head of the Domestic Intelligence Division described counterintelligence as a "rough tough dirty and dangerous busi ness.36 His description was accurate One technique used in COINTELPRO involved sending anony mous letters to spouses intended in the words of one proposal to "produce ill-feeling and possibly a lasting distrust between husband and wife so that "concern over what to do about it would distract the target from "time spent in the plots and plans of the organiza tion.37 The image of an agent of the United States Government scrawl ing a poison-pen letter to someone's wife in language usually reserved for bathroom walls is not a happy one Nevertheless anonymous let The Bureau tried on several occasionsto prevent the formation of campus chapters of SDS and the YoungSocialist Alliance (See e.g. Memorandumfrom San Antonio Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/1/69 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San AntonioField Office5/1/69.) For example an anonymousletter to a state legislator protested the distribu tion on campusof an undergroundnewspaper's "depravity (Memorandumfrom NewarkField Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/23/69 MemorandumfromFBI Head quarters to Newark Field Office6/4/69) and thhe Bureau anonymouslycontacted the landlady of premisesrented by two "NewLeft newspapersin an attempt to have themevicted (Memorandumfrom LosAngelesField Officeto FBI Headquar ters 9/9/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Los AngelesField Office 9/23/68.) "For example a confidentialsource in a radio station was contacted in two successfulattempts to cancel news conferences (Memorandumfrom FBI Head quarters to ClevelandField Office10/1/65 MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to ClevelandField Office10/4/65 Memorandumfrom Boston Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/5/64 Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardnerto WilliamC Sulli van 6/25/64.) For instance the Bureau used the standard counterespionagetechnique of "disinformation against demonstrators In one case the Chicago Field Office duplicated blank forms soliciting housing for demonstrators comingto Chicago for the Democratic National Convention filled them out with fictitious names and addresses and sent them to the organizers Demonstrators reportedly made "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses. (Memorandum from ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/9/68.) Thesameprogramwascarried out by the WashingtonField Officewhenhousingformswere distributed for dem onstrators comingto the 1969Presidential inaugural ceremonies (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Washington Field Office1/10/69.) Army intelligence agents occasionally took similar but wholly unauthorized action see Military Surveillance Report Section III "Domesttic Radio Monitoringby ASA 1967 1970. "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diegofieldoffice9/11/69 "Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 97-98 0 Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/14/69 217 ters were sent to among others a Klansman's wife informing her that her husband had "taken the flesh of another unto himself, the other person being a woman named Ruby with her "lust filled eyes and smart aleck figure 33and to a "Black Nationalist's wife saying that her husband "been maker it here with other women in his or ganization "and than he gives us this jive bout their better in bed then you. 3 A husband who was concerned about his wife's activities in a biracial group received a letter which started "Look man I guess your old lady doesn't get enough at home or she wouldn't be shucking and jiving with our Black lien in the group.90 The Field Office re ported as a "tangible result of this letter that the target and her husband separated.41 The Bureau also contacted employers and funding organizations in order to cause the firing of the targets or the termination of their support. For example priests who allowed their churches to be used for the Black Panther breakfast programs were targeted and anony mous letters were sent to their bishops 43a television commentator who expressed admiration for a Black Nationalist leader and criticized heavy defense spending was transferred after the Bureau contacted his employer 44and an employee of the Urban League was fired after the FBI approached a "confidential source in a foundation which funded the League.45 The Bureau also encouraged "gang warfare between violent groups An FBI memorandum dated November 25 1968 to certain Field Offices conducting investigations of the Black Panther Party ordered recip ient offices to submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelli gence measures aimed at crippling the BPP. Proposals were to be received every two weeks Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing upon differences between the Panthers and US Inc (an other "Black Nationalist group) which had reached such propor tions that "it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals. 45aOn May 26 1970 after U.S orga nization members had killed four BPP members and members of each organization had been shot and beaten by members of the other the Field Office reported Information received from local sources indicate Is] that in general the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physi cally afraid of US members and take premeditated precau tions to avoid confrontations "Memorandum from RichmondField Officeto FBI Headquarters 8/26/66 The wife who received this letter was described in the Field Officeproposal as "faithful an intelligent respectable young mother who is active in the AMEMethodistChurch. (Memorandumfrom St LouisField Officeto FBI Head quarters 2/14/69.) "Memorandum from St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/30/70 4 Memorandumfrom St Louis Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/19/70 When the targets were teachers the intent was to prevent the propagation of ideas In the ease of other employercontacts the purpose was to stop a source of funds "Memorandum from New Haven Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/12/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San DiegoField Office9/9/69 Memorandumfrom FBT Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office3/28/69 45Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office3/3/69 "0Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office11/25/68 218 In view of their anxieties it is not presently felt that the Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in an internecine struggle between the two organizations The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized It is intended that US Inc will be appropriately and dis creetly advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be brought together and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course.4 [Emphasis added.] A second Field Office noted Shootings beatings and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of Southeast San Diego Al though no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program 47 In another case an anonymous letter was sent to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers (lagroup according to the Field Offices proposal "to whom violent-type activity shooting and the like are second nature") advising him that "the brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you. The letter was intended to "intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups and cause "retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership." Another technique which risked serious harm to the target was falsely labeling a target an informant This technique was used in all five domestic COINTELPRO When a member of a nonviolent group was successfully mislabeled as an informant the result was alienation from the group.49 When the target belonged to a group known to have killed suspected informants the risk was substantially more serious On several occasions the Bureau used this technique against members of the Black Panther Party it was used at least twice after FBI docu ments expressed concern over the possible consequences because two members of the BPP had been murdered as suspected informants. The Bureau recognized that some techniques used in COINTELPRO were more likely than others to cause serious physical emotional or economic damage to the targets.51 Any proposed use of such tech niques for example encouraging enmity between violent rival Memorandumfrom Los AngelesField Officeto FBI headquarters 5/26/70 pp 1-2 Memorandumfrom San Diego Field Officeto FBI headquarters 9/15/69 Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officet FBI headquarters 1/12/69 Mem orandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office 1/30/69 See e.g. Memorandumfrom .San Diego Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/30/69 0Oneproposal to label a BPP membera "pig informer was rejected because the Panthers had recently murdered two suspected informers The victims had not beentargets of a Bureau effort to label them informants (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office2/18/71.) Nevertheless two similar proposals were implementeda month later (Memorandumfrom 1''BIHeadquar ters to Washington Field Office3/19/71 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office3/31/71.) At least four assaults two of them on women were reported as "results of Bureau actions (See COINTELPROReport SectionIV Wartimes Technique Brought Home.) 219 groups falsely labeling group members as informants and mailing anonymous letters to targets spouses accusing the target of infidelity was scrutinized carefully by headquarters supervisory personnel in an attempt to balance the "greater good to be achieved by the pro posal against the known or risked harm to the target If the "good was sufficient the proposal was approved For instance in discussing anonymous letters to spouses the agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO stated [Before recommending approval] I would want to know what you want to get out of this who are these people If it's somebody and say they did split up what would accrue from it as far as disrupting the New Left is concerned Say they broke up what then [The question would be] is it worth it 52 Similarly with regard to causing false suspicions that an individual was an informant the chief of the Racial Intelligence Section stated You have to be able to make decisions and I am sure that la beling somebody as an informant that you'd want to make certain that it served a good purpose before you did it and not do it haphazardly It is a serious thing As far as I am aware in the black extremist area by using that technique no one was killed I 'am sure of that.52a This official was asked whether the fact that no one was killed was the result of "luck or planning. He answered "Oh it just happened that way I am sure. 52b It is intolerable in a free society that an agency of the Government should adopt such tactics whether or not the targets are involved in criminal activity The "greater good of the country is in fact served by adherence to the rule of law mandated by the 'Constitution Sub finding (d) The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to de stroy Dr Martin Luther King Jr. violated the law and fundamental human decency The Committee devoted substantial attention to the FBI's covert action campaign against Dr Martin Luther King because it demon strates just how far the Government could go in a secret war against one citizen In focusing upon Dr King however it should not be forgotten that the Bureau carried out disruptive activities against hundreds of lesser-known American citizens It should also be borne in mind that positive action on the part of high Government officials outside the FBI might have prevented what occurred in this case.53 The FBI's claimed justification for targeting Dr King alleged Communist influence on him and the civil rights movement is ex amined elsewhere in this report.54 "ZNewLeft supervisor10/28/75 pp 72 74 "' Moore 11/3/75 p 62 " bMoore 11/3/75 p 64 Seepp 275 277and 205 206of this Report for a detailed discussionof which officialswere aware or should have been aware of what the Bureau was doing to Dr King and how their action or inaction might have contributed to what went on See Marin Luther King Report Section III "Concernin the FBI and the Kennedy Administration Over Allegations of CommunistInfluence in the Civil Rights MovementIncreases and the FBI Intensifies the Investigation Octo ber 1962 October1963. See generally Finding on Overbreadth p 175 220 The FBI's campaign against Dr Martin Luther King Jr began in December 1963 four months after the famous civil rights March on Washington,55 when a nine-hour meeting was convened at FBI Head quarters to discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader. 56Following the meeting agents in the field were instructed to "continue to gather information con cerning King's personal activities in order that we may consider using this information at an opportune time in a counterintelligence move to discredit him. 57 About two weeks after that conference FBI agents planted a micro phone in Dr King's bedroom at the Willard Hotel in Washington D.C.58 During the next two years the FBI installed at least fourteen more "bugs in Dr King's hotel rooms across the country.59 Physical and photographic surveillances accompanied some of the microphone coverage. The FBI also scrutinized Dr King's tax returns monitored his financial affairs and even tried to determine whether he had a secret foreign bank account.61 In late 1964 a "sterilized tape was prepared in a manner that would prevent attribution to the FBI and was "anonymously mailed to Dr King just before he received the Nobel Peace Prize.62 Enclosed in the package with the tape was an unsigned letter which warned Dr King "The August 1963march on Washington was the occasionof Dr Kings "I Have a Dream speech on the steps of the LincolnMemorial (See memorandum from William C Sullivan to Alan Belmont 8/30/63 characterizing the speechas "demagogic ) "Memorandum from William C Sullivan to Alan Belmont 12/24/63 Although FBI officialswere makingderogatory referencesto Dr Kingand passingpersonal information about Dr King to their superiors (Memorandumfrom Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach 8/13/63.) Prior to December 1963 the Committee had discovered no document reflecting a strategy to deliberately discredit him prior to the memorandumrelating to the December1963meeting "Memorandum from William C Sullivan to Alan Belmont 12/24/63 The microphone was installed on January 5 1964 (Memorandum from William C Sullivan to Alan Belmont 1/6/64.) just days after Dr King's pic ture appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year. (Time Magazine January 3 1964.)Reading of the Time magazine award the Director had written "They had to dig deep in the garbage to comeup with this one. (Noteon UP release 12/29/63.) "FBI memoranda make clear that microphones were one of the techniques being used in the effort to obtain information about Dr King's private life (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to WilliamC Sullivan 1/28/64.) The mi crophones were installed at the following places Washington Willard Hotel (Jan 1964) Milwaukee Shroeder Hotel (Jan 1964) Honolulu Hilton Hawai ian Village (Feb 1964) Detroit Statler Hotel (March 1964) Sacramento Senator Motel (Apr 1964) New York City Park Sheraton Hotel (Jan 1965) Americana Hotel (Jan and Nov 1965) Sheraton Atlantic Hotel (May 1965) Astor Hotel (Oct 1965) New York Hilton Hotel (Oct 1965) 00FBI summarymemorandum 10/3/75 memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 3/26/64 memorandumfrom William C Sullivan to Alan Belmont 2/22/64 and unsigned memorandum 2/28/64 "Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 3/27/64 memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/2/64 memo randum from F J Baumgardner to William Sullivan 7/14/65 'Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 104-105 staff summary of a special agent interview 7/25/75 Three days before the tape was mailed Director Hoover had publicly branded Dr King "the most notorious liar in the country and Dr King had respondedwith a criticism of the Bureau (Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr 11/18/64 telegram from Martin Luther King to J Edgar Hoover 11/19/64.) 221 "your end is approaching you are finished. The letter intimated that the tape might be publicly released and closed with the follow ing message King there is only one thing left for you to do You know what it is You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been selected for a specific reason it has definite practical significance) You are done There is but one way out for you .63 Dr King's associates have said he interpreted the message as an effort to induce him to commit suicide.64 At about the same time that it mailed the "sanitized tape the FBI was also apparently offering tapes and transcripts to newsmen.65 Later when civil rights leaders Roy Wilkins and James Farmer went to Washington to persuade Bureau officials to halt the FBI's discredit ing efforts,66 they were told that "if King want[s] war we [are] pre pared to give it to him. 67 Shortly thereafter Dr King went to Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize The Bureau tried to undermine ambassadorial receptions in several of the countries he visited,68 and when he returned to the This paragraph appears in a documentin the form of a letter which the FBI has suppliedto the Committeeand whichthe Bureau maintains was discoveredin the filesof former Assistant Director Sullivan (FBI memorandumto the Select Committee 9/18/75.) Sullivan stated that he did not recall the letter and sug gested that it may have been "planted in his files by his former colleagues (Sullivan 11/1/75 p 104.) CongressmanAndrew Younghas informed the Com mittee that an identical paragraph was contained in the letter which was actually received by Dr King with the tape and that the letter the committee had supplied by the Bureau appears to be an "early draft. (Young 2/19/76 p 36.) Sullivan said that the purpose of sendingthe tape was "to blackmailKing into silence to stop him from criticising Hoover to diminish his stature In other words if it causeda break betweenCoretta and Martin Luther King that would diminish his stature It would weaken him as a leader. (Sullivan 11/1/75 11/26/75 p 152.) Young 2/19/76 p 37 Time magazine had reported earlier in the year that Dr King had attempted suicide twice as a child [Time magazine Jan 4 1964.1 Several newsmenhave informed the Committeethat they were offered this kind of material or that they were aware that such material was available Some have refused to identify the individuals who made the offers and others have said they could not recall their identities Former FBI officialshave denied that tapes or transcripts were offeredto the press (e.g. DeLoachtestimony 11/26/75 p 152) and the Bureau maintains that their filescontain no documentsreflecting that this occurred Staff interviews of Roy Wilkins 11/23/75 and James Farmer 11/13/75 7Memorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 11/27/64 staff interview of James Farmer 11/13/75 Three days after Wilkins meeting with DeLoach Dr King asked to see the Director telling the press "the time has cometo bring this controversyto an end. (UPI release 12/1/64) Dr King and Hoovermet the following day the meeting was described as "amicable. (Memoranda from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr 12/1/64 and 12/2/64.) Despite the "amicable meeting the Bureau's campaign against Dr King continued "Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 11/30/64 memorandumfrom Legat to FBI Headquarters 12/10/64 Steps were also taken to thwart a meeting which Dr King was planning to have with a foreign leader during this same trip (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 11/10/64 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Legat 11/10/64) and to influencea pending USIA decisionto send Dr King on a ten-day lecture trip in Africa after receiving the NobelPrize (Memorandumfrom F J Baum gardner to William C Sullivan 11/12/64.) 222 United States took steps to diminish support for a banquet and a special "day being planned in his honor.69 The Bureau's actions against Dr King included attempts to prevent him from meeting with world leaders receiving honors or favorable publicity and gaining financial support When the Bureau learned of a possible meeting between Dr King and the Pope in August 1964 the FBI asked Cardinal Spellman to try to arrange a cancellation of the audience.70 Discovering that two schools (Springfield College and Marquette University) were going to honor Dr King with special degrees in the spring of 1964 Bureau agents tried to convince officials at the schools to rescind their plans.71 And when the Bureau learned in October 1966 that the Ford Foundation might grant three million dollars to Dr King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference they asked a former FBI agent who was a high official at the Ford Motor Company to try to block the award. A magazine was asked not to publish favorable articles about him.73 Religious leaders and institutions were contacted to undermine their support of him.74 Press conference questions were prepared and dis 9The Bureau was in touch with Atlanta Constitution publisher Ralph McGill and tried to obtain the assistance of the Constitution's editor EugenePatterson to undermine the banquet (Memorandum from William C Sullivan to Alan Belmont 12/21/64 staff summary of Eugene Patterson interview 4/30/75.) A governor's assistance was sought in the effort to "water down the "King day. (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 3/2/65.) "The Bureau had decided it would be "astounding for Dr King to have an audience with the Pope and that plans for any such meeting should be "nipped in the bud. (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 8/31/64.) When the Bureau failed to block the meeting and the press reported that the audiencewas about to occur the Director noted that this was "astound ing. (FBI Director's notation on UPI release 9/18/64) FBI officials took immediate steps to determine "if there could possibly have been a slip-up. (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 9/17/64.) 71The Bureau had decided that it would be "shocking indeed that the pos sibility exists that King may receivean Honorary Degreefrom the same institu tion (Marquette) which honored the Director with such a Degreein 1950. With respect to SpringfieldCollege where the Director had also beenofferedan honor ary degree the Bureau's decisionabout whomto contact includedthe observation that "it would not appear to be prudent to attempt to deal with the President of the collegebecausehe "is very closeto Sargent Shriver. (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 3/4/64 and 4/2/64 memorandum from Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 4/8/64.) TMemorandumfrom Cartha DeLoachto ClydeTolson 10/25/66and 10/26/66 At about the same time the Bureau leaked a story to the press about Dr King's intention to seek financial assistance from Teamsters Union President James R Hoffa because "fd]isclosure would he mutually embarrassing to both men and probably cause King's quest for badly needed funds to fail in this instance. (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 10/28/66.) The Bureau also tried to block the National ScienceFoundation (NSF) from dealing with the SCLC "It is incredible that an outfit such as the SCLCshould be utilized for the purposeof recruiting Negroesto take part in the NSF program particularly where funds of the U.S Governmentare involved. (Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 12/17/64.) 7 Memorandumfrom Special Agent to Cartha DeLoach 11/3/64 7 "It is shockingindeedthat King continuesto be honoredby religiousgroups. (Memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 2/1/65.) Contacts were made with representatives of the National Councilof Churches of Christ the Baptist World Alliance the AmericanChurch in Paris and Catholic Church (Memoranda from William C Sullivan to Alan Belmont 6/12/64 12/15/64 and 2/16/64 memorandumfrom F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 2/18/66 memorandum from Chicago Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/24/66 and 223 tributed to "friendly journalists.45 And plans were even discussed for sabotaging his political campaign in the event he decided to run for national office.76An SCLC employee was "anonymously informed that the SCLC was trying to get rid of her "so that the Bureau [would be] in a position to capitalize on [her] bitterness. 78Bureau officials contacted members of Congress,79 and special "off the record testimony was prepared for the Director's use before the House Appropriations Committee.80 The "neutralization program continued until Dr King's death As late as March 1968 FBI agents were being instructed to neutralize I)r King because he might become a "messiah who could "unify and electrify the militant black nationalist movement if he were to "abandon his supposed obedience to white liberal doctrines (non violence) and embrace black nationalism. 81Steps were taken to sub vert the "Poor People's Campaign which Dr King was planning to lead in the spring of 1968.82Even after Dr King's death agents in the field were proposing methods for harassing his widow,83 and Bu reau officials were trying to prevent his birthday from becoming a national holiday.84 The actions taken against Dr King are indefensible They repre sent a sad episode in the dark history of covert actions directed against law abiding citizens by a law enforcement agency memorandum from Begat Paris to FBI Headquarters 4/14/66 and 5/9/66.) The Director did disapprove a suggestionthat religiousleaders be permitted "to listen to sources we have (FBI Director's note on memorandumfrom Jones to ThomasBishop 12/8/64.) 7cMemorandumfrom Charles Brennan to William C Sullivan 3/8/67 The Bu reau also disseminated to "friendly media sources a newspaper article which was critical of Dr King's position on the Vietnam war The stated purposes were to "publicize King as a traitor to his country and his race, and to "re duce his income, (memorandumfrom GeorgeC Mooreto William C Sullivan 10/18/67.) "Backgroundinformation was also given to at least one wire serv ice (memorandum from Sizoo to William C Sullivan 5/24/65) Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYorkField Office5/18/67 There has been rumors about a "peace ticket headed by Dr King and Benjamin Spock "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 4/13/64 memorandum from New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/2/64 "Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr 8/14/65 memorandum from F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 1/10/67 "Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to William C Sullivan 1/22/64 memorandumfrom Nicholas Callahan to John Mohr 1/31/64 On one occasion the testimony leaked to other members of Congress prompting the Director to note "Someone on Rooney's Committee certainly betrayed the secrecy of the off the record testimony I gave re King. (Director's note on memorandum from Cartha DeLoachto John Mohr 3/16/64.) MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SACS3/4/68 82Memorandumfrom George C Moore to William C Sullivan 3/26/68 "Memorandum from Atlanta Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/18/69 'Memoranda From George C Moore to William C Sullivan 1/17/69 and from Jones to Thomas Bishop 3/18/69 Steps were even taken to prevent the issuance of "commemorativemedals. (Memorandum from Jones to Thomas Bishop 5/22/68.) E POLITICAL ABUSE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION MAJOR FINDING The Committee finds that information has been collected and dis seminated in order to serve the purely political interests of an intel ligence agency or the administration and to influence social policy and political action Sub findings White House officials have requested and obtained politically useful information from the FBI including information on the activi ties of political opponents or critics In some cases political or personal information was not specifi cally requested but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to ad ministration officials as part of investigations they had requested Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases be tween national security or law enforcement information and purely political intelligence The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their staffs without having been asked for it sometimes apparently to curry favor with the current administration Similarly the FBI has assembled intelligence on its critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts to influence social policy and political action Elaboration of Findings The FBI's ability to gather information without effective restraints gave it enormous power That power was inevitably attractive to politi cians who could use information on opponents and critics for their own advantage and was also an asset to the Bureau which depended on politicians for support In the political arena as in other facets of American life touched by the intelligence community the existence of unchecked power led to its abuse By providing politically useful information to the White House and congressional supporters sometimes on demand and some times gratuitously the Bureau buttressed its own position in the political structure At the same time the widespread and accurate belief in Congress and the administration that the Bureau had avail able to it derogatory information on politicians and critics created what the late Majority Leader of the House of Representatives Hale Boggs called a "fear of the Bureau Freedom of speech freedom of thought freedom of action for men in public life can be compromised quite as effectively by the fear of surveillance as by the fact of surveillance. 'Remarks by Rep Hale Boggs 4/22/71 CongressionalRecord Vol 117 Part 9 p 11565 (225) 68-7860 76 16 226 Information gathered and disseminated to the White House ranged from purely political intelligence such as lobbying efforts on bills an administration opposed and the strategy of a delegate challenge at a national political convention to "tidbits about the activities of poli ticians and public figures which the Bureau believed "of interest to the recipients Such participation in political machinations by an intelligence agency is totally improper Responsibility for what amounted to a betrayal of the public trust in the integrity of the FBI must be shared between the officials who requested such information and those who provided it The Bureau's collection and dissemination of politically useful in formation was not colored by partisan considerations rather its effect was to entrench the Bureau's own position in the political structure regardless of which party was in power at the time However the Bureau also used its powers to serve ideological purposes attempting covertly to influence social policy and political action In its efforts to "protect society, the FBI engaged in activities which necessarily affected the processes by which American citizens make decisions In doing so it distorted and exaggerated facts made use of the mass media and attacked the leadership of groups which it considered threats to the social order Law enforcement officers are of course entitled to state their opin ions about what choices the people should make on contemporary social and political issues The First Amendment guarantees their right to enter the marketplace of ideas and persuade their fellow citizens of the correctness of those opinions by making speeches writing books and within certain statutory limits supporting political candidates The problem lies not in the open expression of views but in the covert use of power or position of trust to influence others This abuse is aggravated by the agency's control over information on which the public and its elected representatives rely to make decisions The essence of democracy is the belief that the people must be free to make decisions about matters of public policy The FBI's ac tions interfered with the democratic process because attitudes within the Bureau toward social change led to the belief that such interven tion formed a part of its obligation to protect society When a govern mental agency clandestinely tries to impose its views of what is right upon the American people then the democratic process is undermined 4Cubfvdiiui (a) White House officials have requested and obtained politically use ful information from the FBI including personal life information on the activities of political opponents or critics Presidents and White House aides have asked the FBI to provide political or personal information on opponents and critics including "name checks of Bureau files.2 They have also asked the Bureau to 2A "name check is not an investigation but a search of existing FBI files through the use of the Bureau's comprehensivegeneral name index Requests for FBI "name checks were peculiarly damaging because no new investigation was done to verify allegations stored away for years in Bureau files A former FBI officialresponsible for compliance with such requests said that the Bu reau "answered by furnishing the White House every piece of information in our files on the individuals requested. Deposition of Thomas E Bishop former Assistant Director Crime Records Division 12/2/75 p 144.) 227 conduct electronic surveillance or more limited investigations of such persons The FBI appears to have complied unquestioningly with these requests despite occasional internal doubts about their pro priety.3 Precedents for certain political abuses go back to the very outset of the domestic intelligence program In 1940 the FBI complied with President Roosevelt's request to file the names of people sending critical telegrams to the white House. There is evidence of improper electronic surveillance for the White House in the 1940s.5And an aide to President Eisenhower asked the FBI to conduct a questionable name check. In 1962 the FBI complied unquestioningly with a re quest from Attorney General Kennedy to interview a steel executive and several reporters who had written stories about a statement by the executive. As part of an investigation of foreign lobbying efforts on sugar quota legislation in 1961 and 1962 Attorney General Ken nedy requested wiretaps on a Congressional aide three executive officials and two American lobbyists including a Washington law firm 8 Nevertheless the political misuse of the FBI under the Johnson and Nixon administrations appears to have been more extensive than in previous years Under the Johnson administration the FBI was used to gather and report political intelligence on the administration's partisan op ponents in the last days of the 1964 and 1968 Presidential election 'Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach who was FBI liaison with the White Houseduring part of the Johnson administration has stated "I simplyfollowed Mr Hoover's instructions in complyingwith White House requests and I never asked any questions of the White House as to what they did with the material afterwards. (DeLoach deposition 11/25/75 p 28.) On at least one occasion when a White House aide indicated that President Johnson did not want any record made by the FBI of a request for a "run-down on the links between Robert Kennedy and officialsinvolved in the Bobby Baker investigation the Bureau disregarded the order DeLoach stated that he "ignored the specific instructions in this instance becausehe "felt that any instructions we received from the White House should be a matter of record. (DeLoach deposition 11/25/75 p 89.) Former Assistant Director Bishop stated "Who am I to ask the President of the United States what statutory basis he has if he wants to know what in formation is in the files of the FBI It was a "proper dissemination because it was "not a disseminationoutside the executive branch and becausethere was "no law no policy of the Department of Justice no statute of the United States that says that was not permissible. But even if there had been a statute laying down standards Bishop said "it wouldn't have made a bit of difference when the Attorney General or the President asks for it. Bishoprecalledfrom his "ownknowledge instances where President Kennedy Johnson and Nixon had "called over and asked Mr Hoover for a memo on certain people. (Bishopdeposition 12/2/75 pp 153-154.) Memorandafrom StephenEarly Secretary to the President to Hoover 5/21/40 and 6/17/40 FBI memorandumto Senate Select Committee 3/26/76 See pp 36-37 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto ThomasE Stephens Secretary to the President 4/13/54 CourtneyEvans deposition 12/1/75 p 39 See pp 64-65 The tap authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on another high executive officialwas not related to political considerations nor appar ently was the tap authorized by Attorney General Katzenhach in 1965on the editor of an anti-communist newsletter who had published a hook alleging improprietyby Robert Kennedya year earlier 228 campaigns In the closing clays of the 1964 campaign Presidential aide Bill Moyers asked the Bureau to conduct "name checks on all persons employed in Senator Goldwater's Senate office and informa tion on two staff members was reported to the White House. Simi larly in the last two weeks of the 1968 campaign the Johnson White House requested an investigation (including indirect electronic sur veillance and direct physical surveillance) of Mrs Anna Chennault a prominent Republican leader and her relationships with certain South Vietnamese officials. This investigation also included an FBI check of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew's long distance telephone call records apparently at the personal request of President Johnson.' Another investigation for the Johnson White House involved ex ecutive branch officials who took part in the criminal investigation of former Johnson Senate aide Bobby Baker When Baker's trial began in 1967 it was revealed that one of the government witnesses had been "wired to record his conversations with Baker Presidential aide Marvin Watson told the FBI that Johnson was quite "exercised, and the Bureau was ordered to conduct a discreet "rim-clown on the former head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division and four Treasury Department officials who had been responsible for "wiring 'Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers 10/27/64 cited in FBI summary memorandum 1/31/75 10Bureau files indicate that the apparent "reason for the "White House interest was to determine "whether the South Vietnamese had secretly been in touch with supporters of Presidential candidate Nixon possibly through Mrs Chennault as President Johnson was apparently suspiciousthat the South Vietnamese were trying to sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that Nixon would win the election and then take a harder line towards North Vietnam. (FBI memorandum subject Mrs Anna Chennault 2/1/75.) The FBI has claimed that its investigation of Mrs Chennault was "consistent with FBI responsibilities to determine if her activities were in violation of certain provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and of the Neutrality Act. Direct electronic surveillance of Mrs Chennault was rejected according to a contemporaneous FBI memorandum because FBI executive Cartha DeLoach pointed out that "it was widely known that she was involved in Republican political circles and if it becameknown that the FBI was surveilling her this would put us in a most untenable and embarrassing position. (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson 10/30/68.) Electronic surveillance was however directed at the South Vietnamese offi cials and was approved by Attorney General Ramsey Clark Clark has testified that he did not know of the physical surveillance aspect of the FBI's investiga tion but that he did authorize the electronicsurveillanceof the SouthVietnamese officials (Clark testimony 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 252.) "FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated that a White House aide made the initial request for the check of telephone company records late one night Accordingto DeLoach the request was "to find out who either Mr Agnewor Mr Nixon when they had been in Albuquerque(NewMexico)several days prior to that had called from Albuquerque while they were there. When DeLoach refused to contact the telephonecompany"late in the evening, President Johnson "came on the phone and proceeded to remind me that he was Commanderin Chief and he should get what he wanted and he wanted me to do it immedi ately. DeLoach then talked with Director Hoover who told him to "stand your ground. The next day however Hoover ordered that the records be checked but the only calls identified were "made by Mr Agnew'sstaff. These were reported to the White House (DeLoach Deposition 11/25/75 pp 74-75.) Agnew's arrival and departure times in and out of Albuquerque were also "verified at the request of the White House. (FBI summary memorandum subject Mrs AnnaChennault 2/1/75) 229 the witness The Bureau was specifically insisted to include any asso ciations between those persons and Robert Kennedy. Several Johnson White House requests were directed at critics of the war in Vietnam at newsmen and at other opponents According to a Bureau memorandum White House aide Marvin Watson at tempted to disguise his and the President's interest in such requests by asking the FBI to channel its replies through a lower level White House staff member.13 In 1966 Watson asked the FBI to monitor the televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam policy and prepare a memorandum comparing statements of the President's Sen ate critics with "the Communist Party line." Similarly in 1967 when seven Senators made statements criticizing the bombing of North Vietnam Watson requested (and the Bureau delivered) a "blind mem orandum setting forth information from FBI files on each of the Senators Among the data supplied were the following items Senator Clark was quoted in the press as stating that the three major threats to America are the military-industrial complex the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency Senator McGovern spoke at a rally sponsored by the Chi cago Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy a pacifist group Senator McGovern stated that the "United States was mak ing too much of the communist take-over of Cuba. [Another Senator now deceased] has on many occasions publicly criticized United States policy toward Vietnam He frequently speaks before groups throughout the United States on this subject He has been reported as intentionally enter ing into controversial areas so that his services as a speaker for which he receives a fee will be in demand. The Johnson administration also requested information on contacts between members of Congress and certain foreign officials known to oppose the United States presence in Vietnam According to FBI "FBI Director Hoover brought the matter to the attention of the White House in a letter describing why the FBI had refused to "wire the witness (there was not adequate "security") and how the Criminal Division had then used the Bureau of Narcotics to do so (Memorandumfrom Hoover to Watson 1/12/67.) This was the instance where FBI executive Cartha DeLoach made a record after Watson told him that "the President does not want any record made. (Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Tolson 1/17/67 see also FBI summary memorandum 2/3/75.) "According to this memorandum Watson told Cartha DeLoachin 1967that "lie and the President wanted all "communicationsaddressed to him by the Director to be addressed instead to a lower level White House staff member Watson told DeLoach that the "reason for this change was that the staff measlier"did not have the direct connectionwith the President that he had and consequently people who saw such communicationswould not suspicion (sic) that Watson or the President had requested such information nor were inter ested in such information. (Memorandumfrom De Loach to Tolson 3/17/67.) "FBI summary memorandum subject Coverageof Television Presentation Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1/31/75 Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated regarding this incident "We felt that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the FBI but obviouslyMr Hoover felt that this was a request by the President and he desired it to he done. (DeLoach deposition 11/25/75 p 5s ) Blind FBI memorandum 2/10/67 230 records President Johnson believed these foreign officials had gen erated "much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy particu larly the hearings in the Senate. 16 White House requests were not limited to critical Congressmen Ordinary citizens who sent telegrams protesting the Vietnam war to the White House were also the subject of Watson requests for FBI name check reports.17 Presidential aide Jake Jacobsen asked for name checks on persons whose names appeared in the Congressional Record as signers of a letter to Senator Wayne Morse expressing support for his criticism of U.S Vietnam policy.18 On at least one occasion a request was channeled through Attorney General Ramsey Clark who supplied Watson (at the latter's request) with a summary of infor mation on the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.19 Other individuals who were the subject of such name check requests under the Johnson Administration included NBC Commentator David Brinkley,20 Associated Press reporter Peter Arnett,21 columnist Joseph Kraft,22 Life magazine Washington bureau chief Richard Stolley,23 Chiago Daily News Washington bureau chief Peter Lisagor,24 and Ben W Gilbert of the Washington Post.25 The John son White House also requested (and received) name check reports on the authors of books critical of the Warren Commission report some of these reports included derogatory information about the personal lives of the individuals. The Nixon administration continued the practice of using the FBI to produce political information In 1969 John Ehrlichman counsel to President Nixon asked the FBI to conduct a "name check on Joseph Duffy chairman of Americans for Democratic Action Data in Bureau files covered Duffy's "handling arrangements for an anti war teach-in in 1965 his position as State Coordinator of the group "President Johnson's request also went beyond "legislators, and included contacts by any "prominent U.S citizens. (FBI summary memorandum sub ject Information ConcerningContacts Between [Certain Foreign officials]and Membersor Staff of the United States CongressFurnished to the White House at the Request of the President 2/3/75.) The FBI's reports indicated that its information came"through coverage of the foreign officialsand that the Bureau in this case had "conducted no investigation of members of Congress. (FBI summary memorandum 2/3/75.) FBI "coverage apparently included electronic surveillance President Nixonalso requestedinformationon contacts betweenforeignofficials and Congressmenbut his request doesnot appear to have related to Presidential critics Rather the Nixon request grew out of concern about "an increase in [foreign] interest on Capitol Hill which had been expressed to President Nixon by at least one Senator and the FBI's report "included two examples of [foreign] intelligenceinitiatives directed against CapitolHill without identifying the [foreigners] or American involved. (FBI summary memorandum 2/3/75.) "Memoranda from Hoover to Watson 6/4/65 and 7/30/65 'Memorandum from Hoover to Watson 7/15/66 citing Jacobsen request "Memorandum from Clark to Watson 4/8/67 enclosing memorandum from Director FBI to the Attorney General 4/7/67 (LBJ Library.) 20Memoranda from Hoover to Watson 2/15/65 and 5/29/65 'Memorandum from Hoover to Watson 7/22/65 Memorandumfrom Hoover to Watson 1/27/67 2 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Watson 4/6/66 24Memorandumfrom Hoover to Watson 2/24/66 'sMemorandumfrom Hooverto Watson 4/6/66 29Memorandum from Hoover to Watson 11/8/66 DeLoach 12/3/75 Hear ings Vol 6 pp 180-182 231 "Negotiation Now in 1967 and his activity as chairman of Con necticut Citizens for McCarthy in 1968.26a Presidential aide H R Haldeman requested a name check on CBS reporter Daniel Schorr In this instance the FBI mistakenly con sidered the request to be for a full background investigation and began to conduct interviews These interviews made the inquiry public Sub sequently White House officials stated (falsely) that Schorr was under consideration for an executive appointment.27 In another case a Bureau memorandum states that Vice President Agnew asked the FBI for information about Rev Ralph David Abernathy then head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for use in "de stroying Abernathy's credibility. 28(Agnew has denied that he made such a request but agrees that he received the information.) 29 Several White House requests involved the initiation of electronic surveillance Apparently on the instructions of President Nixon's aide John Ehr]ichman and Director Hoover FBI Assistant Director Wil liam C Sullivan arranged for the microphone surveillance of the hotel room of columnist Joseph Kraft while he was visiting a foreign country.30 Kraft was also the target of physical surveillance by the FBI.31 There is no record of any specific "national security rationale for the surveillance Similarly although the "17 wiretaps were authorized ostensibly to investigate national security "leaks, there is no record in three of the cases of any national security claim having been advanced in their support Two of the targets were domestic affairs advisers.at the White House with no foreign affairs duties and no access to foreign policy materials.32 A third was a White House speechwriter who had been overheard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a reporter with back ground on a presidential speech concerning not foreign policy but revenue sharing and welfare reform.33 z Letter from J Edgar Hoover to John D Ehrlichman 10/6/69 letter from Clarence M Kelly to Joseph Duffy 7/14/75 enclosingFBI records transmitted under Freedomof Information Act 'House Judiciary CommitteeHearings Book VII White House Surveillance Activities (1974) p 1111 According to Director Hoover's memorandum of the conversation Agnew asked Hoover for "some assistance in obtaining information about Rev Aber nathy Hoover recorded "The Vice President said he thought he was going to have to start destroying Abernathy's credibility so anything I can give him wouldhe appreciated I told him I wouldbe glad to. (Memorandumfrom Hoover to Tolson et al 5/18/70.) Subsequently the FBI Director sent Agnewa report on Rev Abernathy containing not only the by-productof Bureau investigations hut also derogatory public record information (Letter from Hoover to Agnew 5/19/70.) Staffsummaryof SpiroAgnewinterview 10/15/75 3oMemorandafrom Sullivanto Hoover 6/30/69 and 7/2/69 atMemorandumfrom Sullivan to DeLoach 11/5/69 The Kraft surveillance is also discussedin Part II pp 121-122 32Coveragein these two cases was requested by neither Henry Kissinger nor Alexander Haig (as most of the "17 were) but by other White House officials AttorneyGeneralMitchellapprovedthe first at the request of "higher authority. (Memorandumfrom Hoover to Mitchell 7/23/69.) The second was specifically requested by H R Haldeman (Memorandumfrom Hooverto Mitchell 12/14/70 "This tap was also apparently requested by White House officialsother than Kissinger or Haig (Memorandumfrom Sullivan to DeLoach 8/1/69.) The "17 wiretaps are alsodiscussedat p 122 232 Subfinding (b) In some cases political or personal information was not specifically requested but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to admin istration officials as part of investigations they had requested Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases between na tional security or law enforcement information and purely political intelligence In some instances the initial request for or dissemination of infor mation was premised upon law enforcement or national security pur poses However pursuant to such a request information was furnished which obviously could serve only partisan or personal interests As one Bureau official summarized its attitude the FBI "did not decide what was political or what represented potential strife and violence We are an investigative agency and we passed on all data. 34 Examples from the Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson and Nixon ad ministrations illustrate this failure to distinguish between political and nonpolitical intelligence They include the FBI's reports to the White House in 1956 on NAACP lobbying activities the intelligence about the legislative process produced by the "sugar lobby wiretaps in 1961-1962 the purely political data disseminated to the White House on the credentials challenge in the 1964 Democratic Convention and dissemination of both political and personal information from the "leak wiretaps in 1969-1972 (i) The NAACP In early 1956 Director Hoover sent the White House a memoran dum describing the "potential for violence in the current "racial situation".36 Later reports to the White House however went far beyond intelligence about possible violence they included extensive inside information about NAACP lobbying efforts such as the fol lowing A report on "meetings held in Chicago in connection with a planned Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to be held in Washington under the sponsorship of the NAACP.36 An extensive report on the Leadership Conference based on the Bureau's 'reliable sources and describing plans of Conference delegations to visit Senators Paul Douglas Her bert Lehman Wayne Morse Hubert Humphrey and John Bricker The report also summarized a speech by Rov Wil kins other conference proceedings and the report of "an informant that the United Auto Workers was a "predomi nant organization at the conference.37 Another report on the conference included an account of what transpired at meetings between conference delegations and Senators Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen.38 34DeLoach 12/3/75 Hearings vol 6 p 180 'Memorandum from Hoover to Dillon Anderson Special Assistant to the President 1/3/56 This report was also provided to the Attorney General the Secretary of Defense and military intelligence Memorandumfrom Hooverto Anderson 3/2/56 "Memorandum from Hooverto Anderson 315/56 'HMemorandumfrom Hooverto Anderson 3/6/56 233 A report including the information that two New Jersey congressmen would sign a petition to the Attorney General.39 A presidential aide suggested that Hoover brief the Cabinet on "developments in the South. 40 Director Hoover's Cabinet briefing also included political intelligence He covered not only the NAACP conference but also the speeches and political activities of Southern Senators and Governors and the formation of the Federation for Con stitutional Government with Southern Congressmen and Governors on its advisory board. (ii) The Sugar Lobby The electronic surveillance of persons involved in a foreign country's lobbying activities on sugar quota legislation in 1961-1962 authorized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy for the White House also pro duced substantial political intelligence unrelated to the activities of foreign officials.42Such information came from wiretaps both on for eign officials and on American citizens as well as from the microphone surveillance of the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee when he met with foreign officials in a New York hotel room.43 The following are examples of the purely political (and personal) by product A particular lobbyist "mentioned he is working on the Sen ate and has the Republicans all lined up. 44 The same lobbyist said that "he had seen two additional representatives on the House Agriculture Committee one of 39Memorandumfrom Hooverto Anderson 3/7/56 A National SecurityCouncil staff member responsible for internal security matters summarized these re ports as providing information "regarding attempts being made by the Na tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People to send instructed delegations to high-ranking Government officials 'to tactfully draw out their positions concerning civil rights. (Memorandum from J Patrick Coyne to Anderson 3/6/56.) 40After consultingthe Attorney General this aide advised the Secretary to the Cabinet that the FBI had "reported developments in recent weeks in several southern States indicating a marked deterioration in relationships between the races and in someinstances fomented by communistor communist-frontorgani zations. (Memorandumfrom Andersonto Maxwell Rabb 1/16/56.) The Secre tary to the Cabinet who had "experiencein handling minority matters for the White House agreed that "each Cabinet Membershould be equipped with the plain facts. (Memorandumfrom Rabb to Anderson 1/17/56.) A National Secu rity Councilstaff memberwhohandled internal security matters reported shortly thereafter that the FBI Director was "prepared to brief the Cabinet along the general lines of his written communicationsto the White House (Memorandum fromJ Patrick Coyneto Anderson 2/1/56.) 41Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General 3/9/56 enclosingFBI memorandumdescribed as the "basic statement used bythe Director "in the CabinetBriefingthis morningon Racial Tensionand Civil Rights. For a further discussionof the exaggeration of Communistinflu enceonthe NAACPin this briefing seepp 250-157note 151a 42The electronic surveillances were generally related to foreign affairs con cerns Seepp 64-65 "The Americansinclude three Agriculture Department officials the secretary to the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee and two registered lobby ing agents for foreign interests For Attorney General Kennedy's relationship to the microphone surveillance of the Congressman see p 61 note 233 One of the wiretaps directed at a registered lobbyingagent was placed on the office telephoneof a Washingtonlaw firm (Seep 201) 44FBI memorandum 6/15/62 234 whom was dead set against us and who may reconsider and the other was neutral and may vote for us. "45 The Agriculture Committee chairman believed "he had ac complished nothing and that "he had been fighting over the Rules Committee and this had interfered with his attempt to organize. 4U The "friend of a foreign official "was under strong pres sure from the present administration and since the friend is a Democrat it would be very difficult for him to present a strong front to a Democratic Administration. 47 A lobbyist stated that Secretary of State Rusk "had received a friendly reception by the Committee and there appeared to be no problem with regard to the sugar bill. 4s A foreign official was reported to be in contact with two Con gressmen's secretaries "for reasons other than business. The official asked one of the secretaries to tell the other that he "would not be able to call her that evening and that one of his associates "was planning to take [the two secretaries and another Congressional aide] to Bermuda. 49 The FBI's own evaluation of these wiretaps indicates that they "un doubtedly contributed heavily to the Administration's success in passing the legislation it desired. (iii) The 1964 Democratic Convention Political reports were disseminated by the FBI to the White House from the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City These reports from the FBI's "special squad at the convention apparently resulted from a civil disorders intelligence investigation which got out of hand because no one was willing to shut off the partisan by-product.51 They centered on the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's credentials challenge Examples of the political intelligence which flowed from FBI surveillance at the 1964 convention include the following 52 "FBI memorandum 6/15/62 49Memorandumfrom Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy 2/18/61 This in formation came from the Bureau's "coverage (by microphonesurveillance) of the Congressman'shotelroommeeting 41FBI memorandum2/15/62 Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto Robert Kennedy 3/13/61 49Memorandumfrom J Edgar Hooverto Robert Kennedy 3/13/61 "'Memorandumfrom W R Wannall to W C Sullivan 12/22/66 Accordingto a Bureau memorandum of a meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and FBI Assistant Director CourtneyEvans Kennedystated in April1961that "now the law has passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing this extensive investigation. (Memorandumfrom Evans to Parsons 4/15/61.) 51There is no clear evidenceas to what President Johnson had in mind when as a contemporaneousFBI memorandumindicates he directed "the assignment of the special squad to Atlantic City. (DeLoach to Mohr 8/29/64) Cartha De Loach has testified that Presidential aide Walter Jenkins made the original re quest to him but that he said it should he discussed with Director Hoover and that "Mr Jenkins or the President to the best of my recollection later called Mr Hooverand asked that this be done. DeLoachclaimedthat the purpose was to gather "intelligence concerningmatters of strife violence etc. which might arise out of the credentials challenge (DeLoach 12/3/75 hearings Vol 6 p 175.) "The operations of the FBI in Atlantic City are describedin greater detail in SectionII pp 117-119 235 Dr Martin Luther King and an associate "were drafting a telegram to President Johnson to register a mild protest According to King the President pledged complete neutrality regarding the selecting of the proper Mississippi delegation to be seated at the convention King feels that the Credentials Committee will turn down the Mississippi Freedom Party and that they are doing this because the President exerted pressure on the committee along this line. 53 Another associate of Dr King contacted a member of the MFDP who "said she thought King should see Governor Endicott Peabody of Massachusetts Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City Governor Edmund G (Pat) Brown of California Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago and Governor John W King of New Hampshire. The purpose was "to urge them to call the White House directly and put pressure on the White House in behalf of the MFDP. 54 "MFDP leaders have asked Reverend King to call Gover nor Egan of Alaska and Governor Burns of Hawaii in an at tempt to enlist their support According to the MFDP spokes man the Negro Mississippi Party needs these two states plus California and New York for the roll call tonight. 55 An SCLC staff member told a representative of the MFDP "Off the record of course you know we will accept the Green compromise proposed. This referred to "the proposal of Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon. 55 In a discussion between Dr King and another civil rights leader the question of "a Vice-Presidential nominee came up and King asked what [the other leader] thought of Hugh [sic] Humphrey and [the other leader] said Hugh Hum phrey is not going to get it that Johnson needs a Catholic . and therefore the Vice-President will be Muskie of Maine. 5 An unsigned White House memorandum disclosing Dr King's strategy in connection with a meeting to be attended by President Johnson suggests that there was political use of these FBI reports.5S (iv) The "17 TViretaps The Nixon White House learned a substantial amount of purely po litical intelligence from wiretaps to investigate "leaks of classified information placed on three newsmen and fourteen executive officials during 1969-1971.59 The following illustrate the range of data supplied One of the targets "recently stated that he was to spend an hour with Senator Kennedy's Vietnam man as Senator Kennedy is giving a speech on the 15th. so 63Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Jenkins 8/24/64 Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Jenkins 8/25/64 Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Jenkins 8/25/64 MemorandumromDeLoachto Jenkins 8/25/64 56Memorandumfrom DeLoachto Jenkins 8/25/64 Blind memorandumfrom LBJ Library bearing handwritten date 8/26/64 and the typewritten date 8/19/64 Hearings Vol 6 Exhibit 68-2 p 713 In at least two instances the wiretaps continued on targets after they left the Executive Branch and becameadvisers to Senator Edmund Muskie then the leadingDemocraticprospectfor the Presidency SeePart TTp 122 0Memorandumfrom Hooverto Nixon Kissinger and Mitchell 10/9/69 236 Another target said that Senator Fulbright postponed con gressional hearings on Vietnam because he did not believe they would be popular at that time.61 A well-known television news correspondent "was very distressed over having been singled out by the Vice Presi dent. 62 A friend of one of the targets said the Washington Star planned to do an article critical of Henry Kissinger. One of the targets helped former Ambassador Sargent Shriver write a press release criticizing a recent speech by President Nixon in which the President "attacked certain Congressmen.64 One of the targets told a friend it "is clear the Administra tion will win on the ABM by a two-vote margin He said They've got [a Senator] and they've got [another Sen ator].'. 65 A friend of one of the targets wanted to see if a Senator would "buy a new amendment and stated that "they were "going to meet with another Senator.66 A friend of one of the targets described a Senator as "mar ginal on the Cooper-Church Amendment and stated that another Senator might be persuaded to support it.67 One of the targets said Senator Mondale was in a "dilemma over the "trade bill. 66 A friend of one of the targets said he had spoken to former President Johnson and "Johnson would not back Senator Muskie for the Presidency as he intended to stay out of politics. 69 There is at least one clear example of the political use of such information After the FBI Director informed the White House that former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford planned to write a magazine article criticizing President Nixon's Vietnam policy,70 White House aide Jeb Stuart Magruder advised John Ehrlichman and H R Haldeman that "we are in a position to counteract this article in any number of ways. 71 It is also significant that after May 1970 the FBI Director's letters summarizing the results of the wiretaps were no longer sent to Henry Kissinger the President's national security advisor but to the President's political advisor H R Haldeman. e3Memorandumfrom Hooverto Nixonand Kissinger 12/3/69 62MemorandumfromHooverto Nixonand Kissinger 2/26/70 03MemorandumfromHooverto H R Haldeman 6/2/70 B4Memorandumfrom Hooverto Haldeman 9/4/70 85Memorandumfrom Hooverto Nixonand Kissinger 7/18/69 BMemorandumfrom Hooverto Haldeman 5/18/70 87Memorandumfrom Hooverto Haldeman 6/23/70 88MemorandumfromHooverto Haldeman 11/24/70 BMemorandumfrom Hooverto Haldeman 12/22/70 7 Memorandumfrom Hoover to Nixon Kissinger and Mitchell 12/29/69 Memorandumfrom Magruder to Haldeman and Ehrlichman 1/15/70 Ehr lichmanadvisedHaldeman "This is the kind of early warning we need more of your game planners are nowin an excellentposition to map anticipatory action. (Memorandumfrom "E (Ehrlichman) to "H (Haldeman) undated.) Halde man responded "I agree with John's point Let's get going. (Memorandumfrom "H to "M (Magruder) undated) T2Report ofthe HouseJudiciary Committee 8/20/74 p 147 237 These four illustrations from administrations of both political par ties indicate clearly that direct channels of communication between top FBI officials and the White House combined with the failure to screen out extraneous information and coupled with overly broad in vestigations in the first instance have been sources of flagrant political abuse of the intelligence process.73 Subfanding (c) The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their staffs without having been asked for it sometimes apparently to curry favor with the current administration Similarly the FBI has as sembled information on its critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support There have been numerous instances over the past three decades where the FBI volunteered to its superiors purely political or personal information believed by the FBI Director to be "of interest to them.74 The following are examples of the information in Director Hoover's letters under the Truman Eisenhower Kennedy and Johnson administrations.15 To Major General Harry Vaughn Military Aide to Presi dent Truman a report on the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's appointments.76 To Matthew J Connelly Secretary to President Truman a report from a "very confidential source about a meeting of newspaper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories exposing organized crime and corrupt politicians.77 To Dillon Anderson Special Assistant to President Eisen hower the advance text of a speech to be delivered by a promi nent labor leader.18 "It should be noted however that in at least one case the Bureau did dis tinguish between political and non-politicalinformation In 1968 when an aide to VicePresident Humphrey asked that a "special squad be sent to the Demo cratic National Conventionin Chicago Director Hoover not only declined but he also specificallyinstructed the SAC in Chicago not "to get into anything political but to confine his reports to "extreme action or violence. (Memo randum from Hoover to Tolson. et al 8/15/68.) There were no comparable in structions at Atlantic City Former Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled in his autobiography how J Edgar Hoover shared with him some of the "intimate details of what his fellow Cabinet membersdid and said "their likes and dislikes their weaknesses and their associations. Biddle confessedthat he enjoyed hearing these deroga tory and sometimes"embarrassing tidbits and that Hoover"knewhowto flatter his superior. (Francis Biddle In Brief Authority [Garden City Doubleday 1962] pp 258-259) A former FBI officialhas describedone aspect of the Bureau's practice "Mr Hooverwould say what do we have in our fileson this guy Just what do we have Not blind memorandum not publicsourceinformation everythingwe've got And we would maybewrite a 25 page memo When he got it and saw what's in it he'd say we'd better send that to the white Houseand the Attorney General so they can have in one place everything that the FBI has now on this guy (Bishopdeposition 12/2/75 pp 141-142.) "None of these letters indicate that they were in response to requests as is the case with other similar letters examined by the Committee All were volun teered as matters which Director Hoover considered to be "of interest to the recipients 76Memorandumfrom Hooverto Vaughn 2/15/47 Memorandumfrom Hooverto Connelly 1/27/50 79Memorandumfrom Hooverto Anderson 4/21/55 238 To Robert Cutler Special Assistant to President Eisen hower a report of a "confidential source on plans of Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt to hold a reception for the head of a civil rights group.70 To Attorney General Robert Kennedy information from a Bureau "source regarding plans of a group to publish allega tions about the President's personal life.80 To Attorney General Kennedy a summary of material in FBI files on a prominent entertainer which the FBI Director thought "may be of interest".H1 To Marvin Watson Special Assistant to President Johnson a summary of data in Bureau files on the author of a play satirizing the President.82 As these illustrations indicate the FBI Director provided such data to administrations of both political parties without apparent partisan favoritism.83 Additionally during the Nixon Administration the FBI's INLET (Intelligence Letter) Program for sending regular short summaries of FBI intelligence to the White House was used on one occasion to provide information on the purely personal relationship between an entertainer and the subject of an FBI domestic intelligence investi gation.84 SACs were instructed under the INLET program to submit to Bureau headquarters items with an "unusual twist or regarding "prominent persons.85 One reason for the Bureau's volunteering information to the White House was to please the Administration and thus presumably to build high-level political support for the FBI Thus a 1975 Bureau report on the Atlantic City episode states One [agent said] "I would like to state that at no time did I ever consider (it) to be a political operation but it was obvious that DeLoach wanted to impress Jenkins and Moyers with the Bureau's ability to develop information which would be of interest to them. Furthermore in response to a question as to whether the Bureau's services were being utilized for political reasons [another] answered "No I do recall however that on one occasion I was present when DeLoach held a lengthy telephone conversation with Walter Jenkins They appeared to be discussing the President's image. At the end of the conversation DeLoach told us something to the effect that may have sounded a little political to you but this doesn't do the Bureau any harm. 86 In addition to providing information useful to superiors the Bureau assembled information on its own critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or congressional support FBI Director Hoover had massive amounts of information at his 78Memorandumfrom Hooverto Cutler 2/13/58 80MemorandumfromHooverto RobertKennedy 11/20/63 Memorandumfrom Hooverto RobertKennedy 2/10/61 e MemorandumfromHooverto Watson 1/9/67 For additional examples SeeSectionII pp 51-53 ' Staff memorandum Review of INLET letters 11/18/75 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 11/26/69 BMemorandumfromBassett to Callahan 1/29/75 239 fingertips As indicated above he could have the Bureau's files checked on anyone of interest to him He personally received political infor mation and "personal tidbits from the special agents in charge of FBI field offices. This information both from the files and Hoover's personal sources was available to discredit critics The following are examples of how the Bureau disseminated in formation to discredit its opponents In 1949 the FBI provided Attorney General J Howard McGrath and Presidential aide Harry Vaughn inside infor mation on plans of the Lawyers Guild to denounce Bureau surveillance so they would have an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal well in advance of the expected criticism.88 In 1960 when the hnoxville Area Human Relations Coun cil in Tennessee charged that the FBI was practicing racial discrimination the Bureau conducted name checks on mem bers of the Council's board of directors and sent the results to Attorney General William Rogers including derogatory personal allegations and political affiliations from as far back as the late thirties and early forties.89 When a reporter wrote stories critical of the Bureau he was not only refused any further interviews but an FBI official in charge of press relations also spread derogatory personal information about him to other newsmen.'0 The Bureau also maintained a "not to contact list of "those in dividuals known to be hostile to the Bureau. Director Hoover spe cifically ordered that "each name on the list "should be the subject of a memo. 91 97Former FBI officialMark Felt has stated that the SAC's could have sent personal letters to Hoover containing such "personal tidbits "to curry favor with him, and on one occasionhe did so himself with respect to a "scandalous incident (W Mark Felt testimony 2/3/76 p 91.) Thefollowingexcerpt from one SAC'sletter is an exampleof political informa tion fed to the Director "I have heard several comments and items which I wanted to bring to your attention As I imagine is true in all States at this time the political situation in [this state] is getting to be very interesting As you know Senator [deleted] is comingup for re-election as is Representative [de leted] For a long time it appeared that [the Senator] would have no opposition to amount to anything in his campaignfor re-election The speculationand word around the State right now is that probably [the Representative] will file for the U.S Senate seat now held by [the Senator] I have also been informed that [the Senator's] forces have offered [the Representative] $50,000if he will stay out of the Senate race and run for re-electionas Congressman. (Letter from SACto Hoover 5/20/64.) '9Letter from Attorney General McGrath to President Truman 12/7/49 letter from Hooverto Vaughn 1/14/50 89Memorandumfrom Hooverto Rogers 5/25/60 9 Bishop deposition 12/2/75 p 211 Bishop stated that he acted on his own rather than at the direction of higher Bureau executives However Director Hoover did have a memorandumprepared on the reporter summarizing every thing in the Bureau's files about him which he referred to when he met with the reporter's superiors (Bishopdeposition 12/2/75 p 215.) 91Memorandumfrom Executives Conferenceto Hoover 1/4/50 Early exam ples includedhistorian Henry Steele Commager "personnelof CBS, and former Interior Secretary Harold Ickes (Memorandumfrom Mohrto Tolson 12/21/49.) By the time it was abolished in 1972 the list included 332 names including mystery writer Rex Stout whose novel The Doorbell Rang had "presented a highly distorted and most unfavorable picture of the Bureau. (Memorandum fromM A Jones to Bishop 7/11/72.) 240 This request for "a memo on each critic meant that before someone was placed on the list the Director received in effect a "name check report summarizing "what we had in our files on the individual.92 In addition to assembling information on critics name checks were run as a matter of regular Bureau policy on all "newly elected Gover nors and Congressmen. The Crime Records Division instructed the field offices to submit "summary memoranda on such officials cover ing both "public source information and "any other information that they had in their files. 93These "summary memoranda were provided to Director Hoover and maintained in the Crime Records Division for use in "congressional liaison" which the Division head said included "selling hostile Congressmen on "liking the FBI. 9A It has been widely believed among Members of Congress that the Bureau had information on each of them.9 The impact of that belief led Congressman Boggs to state Our apathy in this Congress our silence in this House our very fear of speaking out in other forums has watered the roots and hastened the growth of a vine of tyranny which is ensnaring that Constitution and Bill of Rights which we are each sworn to uphold Our society can survive many challenges and many threats It cannot survive a planned and programmed fear of its own government bureaus and agencies.96 Sub finding (d) The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts to influence social policy and political action The FBI's interference with the democratic process was not the result of any overt decision to reshape society in conformance with Bureau-approved norms Rather the Bureau's actions were the natural consequence of attitudes within the Bureau toward social change com bined with a strong sense of duty to protect society even from its own "wrong choices The FBI saw itself as the guardian of the public order and be lieved that it had a responsibility to counter threats to that order using any means available.9 At the same time the Bureau's assess ment of what constituted a "threat was influenced by its attitude toward the forces of change In effect the Bureau chose sides in the 9 Bishopdeposition 12/2/75 p 207 B3The field officewas also expected to send to headquarters any additional allegations about the Congressmanor Governor which might come to its atten tion in future investigations even if the Congressman or Governor was not himself the "subject of the investigation (Bishop deposition 12/2/75 pp 194 200.) Bishopdeposition 12/2/75 pp 206-7 esThe FBI is not the only agency believedto have files on Congressmen Ac cording to Rep Andrew Young "in the freshman orientation of new House members "one of the things you are told is that there are seven agenices that keep files on private lives of Congressmen. (Rep Andrew Young testimony 2/19/76 p 48 ) "Remarks by Rep Hale Boggs House of Representatives 4/22/71 Congres sionalRecord Vol 117 Part 9 p 11562 'The means used are discussed in the finding on "Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups as well as the Detailed Reports on COIN TELPRO Dr Martin Luther King Jr. and the Black Panther Party 241 major social movements of the last fifteen years and then attacked the other side with the unchecked power at its disposal The clearest proof of the Bureau's attitude toward change is its own rhetoric The language used in internal documents which were not intended to be disseminated outside the Bureau is that of the highly charged polemic revealing clear biases For example in one of its annual internal reports on COINTEL PRO the Bureau took pride in having given "the lie to what it called "the Communist canard that "the Negro is downtrodden and has no opportunities in America. This was accomplished by placing a story in a newspaper in which a "wealthy Negro industrialist stated that "the Negro will have to earn respectability and a responsible posi tion in the community before he is accepted as an equal. It is signifi cant that this view was expressed at about the same time as the civil rights movement's March on Washington which was intended to focus public attention on the denial of opportunities to black Ameri cans and which rejected the view that inalienable rights have to be "earned. 98 The rhetoric used in dealing with the Vietnam War and those in opposition to it is even more revealing The war in Vietnam produced sharply divided opinions in the country again the Bureau knew which side it was on For instance fifty copies of an article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says Withdrawal Not The Answer were anony mously mailed by the FBI to members of the Vietnam Day Committee to "convince the recipients "of the correctness of the U.S foreign policy in Vietnam. 99 The Bureau also ordered copies of a film called "While Brave Men Die which depicted "commtuiists left-wing and pacifist activities as sociated with the so-called peace movement or student agitational demonstrations in opposition to the United States position in Viet nam. The film was to be used for training Bureau personnel in con nection with "increased responsibilities relating to communist inspired student agitational activities. 100 In the same vein a directive to the Chicago field office shortly after the 1968 Democratic Convention instructed it to "obtain all possible evidence that would "disprove charges that the Chicago police used undue force in dealing with antiwar demonstrations at the Convention Once again the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left are taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized law enforcement agen cies We should be mindful of this situation and develop all possible evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false allegations.b01 98Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office et al. 8/13/63 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office 11/11/65 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Officeet al. 3/9/66 101Memorandumfrom FBI headquarters to ChicagoField Office8/28/68 68-7860 17 242 The Bureau also attempted to enforce its view of sexual morality For example two students became COINTF,LPRO targets when they defended the use of a four-letter word even though the demonstration in which they participated "does not appear to be inspired by the New Left, because it "shows obvious disregard for decency and es tablished morality. 10=An anonymous letter purportedly from an irate parent and an article entitled "Free Love Cowes to Austin were mailed to a state senator and the chairman of the -University of Texas Board of Regents to aid in "forcing the hniversity to take action against those administrators who are permitting an atmosphere to build up on campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left. 103 And a field office was outraged at the distribution on campus of a newspaper called SCREW which was described as "containing a type of filth that could only originate in a depraved mind It is repre sentative of the type of mentality that is following the New Left theory of immorality on certain college campuses. 104 As these examples demonstrate the FBI believed it had a duty to maintain the existing social and political order Whether or not one agrees with the Bureau's views it is profoundly disturbing that an agency of the government secretly attempted to impose its views on the American people (i) Use of the Media The FBI attempted to influence public opinion by supplying in formation or articles to "confidential sources in the news media The FBI's Crime Records Division 106was responsible for covert liaison with the media to advance two main domestic intelligence objectives 106 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to MinneapolisField Office11/4/68 103Memorandumfrom San Antonio field officeto FBI Headquarters 8/12/68 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to 'San Antonio Feld Office8/27/68 10The fieldofficealso disapprovedof the "hippy types distributing the news paper with their "unkempt clothes "wild beards and "other examplesof their nonconformity Accordingly an anonymousletter was sent to a state legislator protesting the distribution of such "depravity at a state university noting that "this is becominga way of campus life Poison the minds of the young destroy their moral being and in less than one generation this country will be ripe for its downfall. (Memorandumfrom New York Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/23/69 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office1/69 1WThe Crime Records Divisionalso had responsibilityfor disseminatinginfor mation to cultivate a favorable public imagefor the FBI a practice commonto many governmentagencies This objectivewas pursued in various ways Onesec tion of the CrimeRecords Division was assigned to assemble"material that was needed for a public relations program. This section "developedinformation for televisionshows for writers for authors for newspapermen peoplewho wanted in-depth information concerning the FBI. The section also "handled scripts for publicservice radio programsproducedby FBI Field Offices reviewedscripts for television and radio shows dealing with the FBI and handled the "public relations and publicity aspect of the "ten most wanted fugitives program. The Bureau attempted to assert control over media presentations of information about its activities For example Director Hoover's approval was necessary before the Crime Records Division would cooperate with an author intending to write a bookabout the FBI (Bishop testimony 12/2/75 pp 6-8 18.) 'Memoranda recommendinguse of the media for COINTELPROpurposes sometimesbore the designation "Mass Media Program, which appeared mere ly to signify the function of the Crime Records Division as a "conduit for disseminating information at the request of the DomesticIntelligence Division (Bishop testimony 12/2/75 pp 63-68 88.) The dissemination of derogatory information to the media was usually reviewed through the Bureau's chain of commandand receivedfinal approval from Director Hoover (Bishop testimony 12/2/75 p 89.) 243 (1) providing derogatory information to the media intended to gen erally discredit the activities or ideas of targeted groups or individuals and (2) disseminating unfavorable articles news releases and back ground information in order to disrupt particular activities Typically a local FBI agent would provide information to a "friend ly news source on the condition "that the Bureau's interest in these matters is to be kept in the strictest confidence. 1 7Thomas E Bishop former Director of the Crime Records Division testified that he kept a list of the Bureau's "press friends in his desk.108Bishop and one of his predecessors indicated that the FBI sometimes refused to co operate with reporters critical of the Bureau or its Director) Bishop stated that as a "general rule, the Bureau disseminated only "public record information to its media contacts but this category was viewed by the Bureau to include any information which could conceivably be obtained by close scrutiny of even the most obscure pub lications.11 Within these parameters background information supplied to reporters "in most cases [could] include everything in the Bureau files on a targeted individual the selection of information for publica tion would be left to the reporter's judgment). There are numerous examples of authorization for the preparation and dissemination of unfavorable information to discredit generally the activities and ideas of a target 112 FBI headquarters solicited information from field offices "on a continuing basis for "prompt .. dissemination to the news media . to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents. Headquarters requested among other things that specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters activities habits and living conditions representative of New Left adherents Field Offices were to be exhorted that "Every avenue of possible em barrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored. 113 FBI headquarters authorized a Field Officeto furnish a media con tact with "background information and any arrest record on a man orFor example Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office 10/22/68 108Bishop 12/2/75 p 33 10ACartha DeLoach whohandled media contactsfor several years testifiedthat this technique was not actually used as much as the Director desired If any unfair commentappeared in any segmentof the press concerning Mr Hoover or the FBI . Mr Hoover .. would say do not contact this particular newspaper or do not contact this person or do not co operate with this person If I had complied strictly to the letter of the law to Mr Hoover's instructions I think I would be fair in say ing that we wouldn't be cooperating with hardly a single newspaper in the United States... The men down through the years had to overlook some of those instructions and deal fairly with all segments of the press (DeLoachtestimony 11/25/75 pp 213-214.) 'Bishop stated that the Crime Records Division was "scrupulous in provid ing information which could be cited to a "page and paragraph in a public source (Bishop 12/2/75 pp 24 177-178.) 'Bishop 12/2/7555pp 135-136 " T B Bishopstated that from the FBI documentsavailable to the Committee it was impossibleto determine whether an article was actually printed after a news release or a draft article had been supplied to a media source (Bishop 12/2/75 p 86) "aMemorandumfrom C D Brennan to W C Sullivan 5/22/68 244 affiliated with "a radical New Left element who had been "active in showing films on the Black Panthers and police in action at various universities during student rioting. The media contact had requested material from the Bureau which "would have a detrimental effect on [the target's] activities. 11 Photographs depicting a radical group's apartment as "a sham bles with lewd obscene and revolutionary slogans displayed on the walls were furnished to a free-lance writer The directive from head quarters said "As this publicity will be derogatory in nature and might serve to neutralize the group it is being approved. 11 The Boston Field Office was authorized to furnish "derogatory information about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source [name excised]" Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are good Emphasize to him that the N01 predilection for vio lence preaching of race hatred and hypocrisy should be ex posed Material furnished [name] should be either public source or known to enough people as to protect your sources Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is completely protected by [name] .113 One Bureau-inspired documentary on the NOI reached an audience of 200,000.117Although the public was to be convinced that the NOI was "violent the Bureau knew this was not in fact true of the or ganization as a whole."s The Section which supervised the COINTELPRO against the Communist Party intended to discredit a couple "identified with the Community Party movement by preparing a news release on the drug arrest of their son which was to be furnished to "news media contacts and sources on Capitol Hill. A Bureau official observed that the son's "arrest and the Party connections of himself and his parents presents an excellent opportunity for expoitation. The news release noted that "the Russian-born mother is currently under a deportation order and had a former marriage to the son of a promi nent Communist Party member The release added "the Red Chinese have long used narcotics to help weaken the youth of target countries. 119 'Memorandum to Director from SAC Miami 3/10/70 Bishop testified that he "would hope that in response to the directive to disseminate the target's "arrest record the Division would have disseminated only conviction records Bishop said that under the Attorney General's guidelines then in effect only conviction records or arrests which were a matter of public record in a par ticular jurisdiction were to be disseminated Bishop stated that his policy was not to disseminate an arrest record "especiallyif that arrest record resulted in an acquittal or if the charge was never completed.. because that is not to my mind anything derogatory against a guy until he actually gets convicted. (Bishoptestimony 12/2/75 pp 163-167173.) 11Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office1/13/68 1 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office2/27/68 117Memorandumfrom Tampa Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 2/7/69 'Deposition of Black Nationalist COINTELPROsupervisor 10/17/75 p 21 Depositionof GeorgeC Moore Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section 11/3/75 p 36 'Memorandum from F J Baumgardner to W C Sullivan 6/3/63 245 When the wife of a Communist Party leader purchased a new car the FBI prepared a news item for distribution to "a cooperative news media source mocking the leader's "prosperity "as a disruptive tactic. The item commented sarcastically that "comrades of the self proclaimed leader of the American working class should not allow this example of [the leader's] prosperity to discourage their con tinued contributions to Party coffers. 12 After a public meeting in New York City where "the handling of the [JFK assassination] investigation was criticized, the FBI prepared a news item for placement "with a cooperative news media source to discredit the meeting on the grounds that "a reliable [FBI] source had reported a "convicted perjurer and identified espionage agent as present in the audience. 121 As part of the new Left COINTELPRO the FBI sent a letter under a fictitious name to Life magazine to "call attention to the unsavory character of the editor of an underground magazine who was characterized as "one of the moving forces behind the Youth International Party commonly known as the Yippies. To counteract a recent Life "article favorable to the Yippie editor the FBI's ficti tious letter said that "the cuckoo editor of an unimportant smutty little rag should be "left in the sewers. 122 Much of the Bureau's use of the media to influence public opinion was directed at disrupting specific activities or plans of targeted groups or individuals In March 1968 FBI Headquarters granted authority for furnish ing to a "cooperative national news media source an article "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the poor people's march on Washington I.C by asserting that "an embarrass ment of riches has befallen King and King doesn't need the money. '23 To further this objective Headquarters authorized the Miami Office "to furnish data concerning money wasted by the Poor People's Campaign to a friendly news reporter on the usual condition that "the Bureau must nat be revealed as the source."'24 The Section Chief in charge of the Black Nationalist COINTEL PRO also recommended that "photographs of demonstrators at the march should be furnished he attached six photographs of Poor People's Campaign participants at a Cleveland rally accompanied by the note "These show the militant aggressive appearance of the par ticipants and might be of interest to a cooperative news source.7125 As part of the New Left COINTELPRO authority was granted to the Atlanta Field Office to furnish a newspaper editor who had "written numerous editorials praising the Bureau with "information to supplement that already known to him from public sources concern ing subversive influences in the Atlanta peace movement His use of this material in well-timed articles would be used to thwart the [upcoming] demonstrations. 126 'Memorandum from F T Banmardner to W C Sullivan 8/9/65 "'Memorandum from F .I Baumgardner to W C Sullivan 2/24/64 Memorandumfrom NewYorkField Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/16/68 Memorandumfrom C C Mooreto W C Sullivan 10/26/68 ' Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office7/9/68 "Memorandum from G C Mooreto W C Sullivan 5/17/76 2 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office10/22/68 246 An FBI Special Agent in Chicago contacted a reporter for a major newspaper to arrange for the publication of an article which was expected to "greatly encourage factional antagonisms during the SDS Convention by publicizing the attempt of "an underground communist organization to take over SDS This contact resulted in an article headlined "Red Unit Seeks SDS Rule. 127 FBI Director Hoover approved a Field Office plan "to get cooper ative news media to cover closed meetings of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other New Left groups with the aim of "dis rupting them. 128 Several months after COINTELPRO operations were supposed to have terminated the FBI attempted to discredit attorney Leonard Boudin at the time of his defense of Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers case The FBI "called to the attention of the Washington bureau chief of a major news service information on Boudin's alleged "sympathy and "legal services for "communist causes. The reporter placed a detailed news release on the wires which cited Boudin's "iden tification with Leftist causes and included references to the arrest of Boudin's daughter his legal representation of the Cuban government and "Communist sympathizer Paul Robeson and the statement that "his name also has been connected with a number of other alleged com munist front groups. In a handwritten note J Edgar Hoover di rected that copies of the news release be sent to "Haldeman A G. and Deputy. 129 The Bureau sometimes used its media contacts to prevent or post pone the publication of articles it considered favorable to its targets of unfavorable to the FBI For example to influence articles which related to the FBI the Bureau took advantage of a close relationship with a high official of a major national magazine described in an FBI "'Memorandum from ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/18/69 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office6/17/68 FBI Memorandumfrom Bishopto Mohr 7/6/71 Bishoptestimony 12/2/75 pp 148 151 Two years earlier the Crime Records Divisionprepared a sixteen-pagememo randum containing information on "Leonard B Boudin Attorney for Dr Ben jamin Spock, written at the time of Spock'sindictment for conspiringto violate the SelectiveServiceAct (FBI Memorandumfrom M A Jones to T E Bishop 2/26/68) The memorandum described "alleged associations and activities of Boudin related to organizations or individuals considered "subversive by the FBI (Bishop 12/2/75 pp 134 135) and included names of many of Boudin's clients citations to magazines and journals in which Boudin had published articles referencesto petitions he had signed and notes on rallies and academic conferencesat which he had spoken The memorandumindicated that "the White House and Attorney Generalhave been advised of the information on Boudin's background Notations on the cover sheet of the memorandumby high Bureau officialsindicate that approval was granted for "furnishing the attached infor mation to one of our friendly news contacts but the information was not used until after the "results of appeal in Spock's ease. Bishop did not recall dis tributing the Boudin memorandum (Bishop 12/2/75 pp 125 126) The head of the Crime Records Division speculated that the memorandum was prepared at the request of a reporter becausehe did not remembera request from Hoover or from the DomesticIntelligence Division which was the normal route for assignments to the Crime Records Division Division Chief Bishop testified that he probably instructed the Division "to get up any public source information that we have concerningBoudin that shows his connectionwith the CommunistParty or related groups of that nature. (Bishop 12/2/75 pp 131 133) 247 memorandum as "our good friend. Through this relationship the FBI "squelched an "unfavorable article against the Rureau written by a free-lance writer about an FBI investigation .postponed pub lication of an article on another FBI case "forestalled publication of an article by Dr Martin Luther hing Jr. and received informa tion about proposed editing of King's articles." The Bureau also attempted to influence public opinion by using news media sources to discredit dissident groups by linking them to the Communist Party A confidential source who published a "self-described conserva tive weekly newspaper was anonymously mailed information on a church's sponsorship of efforts to abolish the House Committee on Un-American activities This prompted an article entitled "Locals to Aid Red Line, naming the minister among others as a local sponsor of what it termed a "Communist dominated plot to abolish IIUAC.131 The Bureau targeted a professor who had been the president of a local peace center a "coalition of anti-Vietnam and anti-draft groups. In 1968 he resigned temporarily to become state chairman of Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign organization Information on the professor's wife who had apparently associated with Commu nist Party members in the early 1950's was furnished to a newspaper editor to "expose those people at this time when they are receiving considerable publicity in order to "disrupt the members of the peace organization.132 Other instances included an attempt to link a school boycott with the Communists by alerting newsmen to the boycott leader's plans to attend a literary reception at the Soviet mission 133furnishing infor mation to the media on the participation of the Communist Party presidential candidate in the United Farm Workers picket line 134 "confidentially informing established sources in three northern Cali fornia newspapers that the San Francisco County Conummist Party Committee had stated that civil rights groups were to "begin work ing on the area's large newspapers "in an effort to secure greater employment of Negroes 135and furnishing information to the media on Socialist Workers Party participation in the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to "discredit the antiwar group.136 (ii) Attacks oa Leaders Through covert propaganda the FBI not only attempted to in fluence public opinion on matters of social policy but also directly in 'i0Memorandumfrom W H Stapletonto C D DeLoach 11/5/64 'Memorandum from Cleveland Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 10/28/64 memorandumfrom IBI Headquarters to ClevelandField Office11/6/64 '" Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to PhoenixField Office6/11/68 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to NewYorkField Office2/4/64 "The target was not intended to be the United Farm Workers but a local college professor expected to participate in the picket line The Bureau had unsuccessfully directed "considerable efforts to prevent hiring the professor Apparently the Bureau did not consider the impact of this technique on the United Farm Workers efforts (Memorandumfrom San Francisco Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/12/68 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Fran ciscoField Office9/13%68.) Memorandumfrom San FranciscoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/16/64 Memorandumfrom San FranciscoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 3/10/67 memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office3/14/67 248 tervened in the people's choice of leadership both through the electoral process and in other less formal arenas For instance the Bureau made plans to disrupt a possible "Peace Party ticket in the 1968 elections One field office noted that "effec tively tabbing as communists or as communist-backed the more hysteri cal opponents of the President on the Vietnam question in the midst of the presidential campaign would be a real boon to Mr Johnson. 13 In the FBI's COINTELPRO programs political candidates were targeted for disruption The document which originated the Socialist Workers Party COINTELPRO noted that the SWP "has over the past several years been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through running candidates for public office. The Bureau decided to "alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx Lenin and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky. Several SWP candidates were targeted usually by leaking derogatory in formation about the candidate to the press.138 Other COIN'TELPRO programs also included attempts to disrupt campaigns For example a Midwest lawyer running for City Council was targeted because he and his firm had represented "subversives The Bureau sent an anonymous letter to several community leaders which decried his "communist background and labelled him a 'charla tan."'39 T'nder a fictitious name the Bureau sent a letter to a television station on which the candidate was to appear enclosing a series of questions about his clients and his activities which it believed should be asked.1 The candidate was defeated He later ran (successfully as it happened) for a judgeship The Bureau attempted to disrupt this subsequent successful campaign for a judgeship by using an anti communist group to distribute fliers and write letters opposing his candidacy." In another instance the FBI attempted to have a Democratic Party fundraising affair raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission The fund raiser was targeted because of two of the can didates who would be present One a state assemblyman running for reelection was active in the Vietnam Day Committee the other the Democratic candidate for Congress had been a sponsor of the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on I-n-American Activi ties and had led demonstrations opposing the manufacture of napalm bombs.12 Although the disruption of election campaigns is the clearest exam ple the FBI's interference with the political process was much broader 134Memorandumfrom ChicagoField Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/1/67 MemorandumfromFBI Headquarters to all SAC's 10/12/61 Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/1/65 memo randum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office9/22/65 10Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 9/28/65 memo randum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office10/1/65 11Memorandumfrom Detroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 1/19/67 1 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to San AntonioField Office11/14/66 The attempt was unsuccessful a prior raid on a fire department's fund raiser had angered the local District Attorney and the ABC decided not to raid the Democratsbecauseof "political ramifications. 249 For example all of the COI\ TELPRO programs were aimed at the leadership of dissident groups." In one case the Bureau's plans to discredit a civil rights leader in cluded an attempt to replace him with a candidate chosen by the Bureau During 1964 the FBI began a massive program to discredit I)r Martin Luther hing Jr and to "neutralize his effectiveness as the leader of the civil rights movement. On January 8 1964 Assistant Director William C Sullivan proposed that the FBI select a new "national Negro leader as Dr hing's successor after the Bureau had taken Dr King "off his pedestal When this is done and it can and will be done the Negroes will be left without a national leader of sufficiently compelling personality to steer them in the right direction This is what could happen but need not happen if the right kind of Negro leader could at this time be gradually devel oped so as to overshadow Dr hing and be in the position to assume the role of leadership of the Negro people when King has been completely discredited I want to make it clear at once that I don't propose that the FBI in any way became involved openly as the sponsor of a Negro leader to overshadow Martin Luther King . But I do propose that I be given permission to explore further this entire matter.. If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way becoming directly involved I think it would not only be a great help to the FBI but would be a fine thing for the country at large While I am not specifying at this moment there are various ways in which the FBI could give this entire matter the proper direction and development There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be very helpful to further such a step ...1 The Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr King are discussed more fully elsewhere.'46 It is however important to note here that some of the Bureau's efforts coincided with Dr King's activities and statements concerning major social and political issues (iii) Exaggerating The Threat The Bureau also used its control over the information-gathering process to shape the views of government officials and the public on the "aThe originating documentfor the "Black Nationalist COINTELI'ROordered fieldofficesto "expose disrupt misdirect discredit or otherwise neutralize the "leadership and "spokesmen of the target groups The "New Left originating memocalled for efforts to "neutralize the New Left and the "Key Activitists, definedas "those individuals who are the movingforces behind the New Left the letter to field officesmade it clear that the targets were the "leadership of the "New Left" a term which was never defined (Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 8/25/67.) "'Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan 5/9/68 memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 5/10/68 1 Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont 1/8/64 Although this proposal was approvedby Director Hoover there is no evidencethat any steps were taken to implementthe plan 16See Martin Luther King Jr Report Sec V The FBI's Efforts to Discredit Dr Martin Luther King 1964 Sec VII The FBI Program Against Dr King 1965 1968 250 threats it perceived to the social order For example the FBI ex aggerated the strength of the Communist Party and its influence over the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements Opponents of civil rights legislation in the early 1960s had charged that such legislation was "a part of the world Communist conspiracy to divide and conquer our country from within. The truth or falsity of these charges was a matter of concern to the administration Con gress and the public Since the Bureau was assigned to compile intelli gence on Communist activity its estimate was sought and presumably relied upon Accordingly in 1963 the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted a memorandum to Director Hoover detailing the CPUSA's "efforts to exploit black Americans which it concluded were an "obvious failure. '47 Director Hoover was not pleased with this conclusion He sent a sharp message back to the Division which according to the Assistant Director in charge made it "evident that we had to change our ways or we would all be out on the street. 14 Another memorandum was 'therefore written to give the Director "what Hoover wanted to hear. 149 The memorandum stated "The Director is correct it called Dr Martin Luther King Jr "the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of communism the Negro and na tional security and it concluded that it was "unrealistic to "limit ourselves to "legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive evidence that the Communist Party wields "substantial influence over Negroes which one day could become decisive. 150 Although the Division still had not said the influence was decisive by 1964 the Director testified before the House Appropriations Sub committee that the "Communist influence in the "Negro movement was "vitally important. 1'1Only someone with access to the underlying information would note that the facts could be interpreted quite dif ferently.1ma 'Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan 8/23/63 p 1 18Sullivandeposition 11/1/75 p 20 19Sullivandeposition 11/1/75 p 29 Memorandumfrom Sullivan to Director FBI 8/30/63 Sullivan described this process of "interpretive memowriting to lead a reader to believethe Com munists wereinfluential without actually stating they were in control of a move ment "Youhave to spend years in the Bureau really to get the feel of this Youcamedownhere to 'efforts these 'colossalefforts That was a key word of ourswhenweare getting around the facts Youwill not findanywherein the memorandumwhether the efforts were successful or unsuccessful Here is another one of our words that we used to cover up the facts 'efforts to exploit that word 'exploit Nowherewill you findin someof these memosthe results of the exploitation [Like] 'planning to do all possible you can search in vain for a statement to the effectthat their plans weresuccessfulor unsuccessful partly suc cessful or partly unsuccessful. (Sullivan 11/1/75 pp 15-16.) Hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee 88th Cong. 2d Sess (1964) p 309 Director Hoover's statement was widely publicized (E.g. "Hoover Says Reds Exploit Negroes, New York Times 4/22/64 p 30) It caused serious concern among civil rights leaders who feared that it would hurt the prospectsfor passageof the 1964civilrights bill ' "4Director Hoover had included similar exaggerated statements about Com munist influence in a briefing to the Eisenhower Cabinet in 1956 Hoover had stated regarding an NAACP-sponsoredconference "The CommunistParty plane to use this conferenceto embarrass the Adminis tration by causing a rift between the Administration and Dixiecrats who have 251 A similar exaggeration occurred in some of the Bureau's statements on communist influence on the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations In April IGG;>President Johnson met with Director Hoover to dis cuss Johnson's "concern over the anti-Vietnam situation. According to Hoover Johnson said he had "no doubt that Communists were behind the disturbances. 12 Hoover agreed stating that upcoming demonstrations ill eighty-five cities were being planned by the Students for a Democratic Society and that SI)S was "largely infiltrated by communists and [it] has been woven into the civil rights situation which we know has large communist influence."' Immediately after the meeting however Hoover told his associates that the Bureau might not be able to "technically state that SI)S was "an actual communist organization. The FBI merely knew that there were "communists in it. Hoover instructed however "\Vhat I want to get to the President is the background with emphasis upon the communist influence therein so that lie will know exactly what the pic ture is. The Director added that he wanted "a good strong memo randum pinpointing that the demonstrations had been "largely par ticipated in by communists even though they may not have initiated them the Bureau could "at least say that they had "joined and forced the issue. According to the Director President Johnson was "quite concerned and wanted "prompt and quick action." Once again the Bureau wrote a report which made Communist "ef forts sound like Communist success The eight-page memorandum detailed all of the Communist Party's attempts to "encourage domes tic dissent by "a crescendo of criticism aimed at negating every effort of the United States to prevent Vietnam from being engulfed by com munist aggressors. Twice ill the eight pages for a total of two and a half sentences it was pointed out that most demonstrators were not Party members and their decisions were not initiated or controlled by the communists Each of these brief statements moreover was followed by a qualification (1) "howe e'er the Communist Party I-SA .. has vigorously supported these groups and exerted influence (2) "While the March [on Washington] was not Communist initiated . Com munist Party members from throughout the nation participated. [Emphasis added.] The rest of the memorandum is an illustration of what former Assistant Director Sullivan called "interpretive memo writing in supported it by forcing the administration to take a stand on civil rights leg islation with the present Congress The Party hopes through a rift to affect the 1956elections. [Emphasis added.] (Memorandumfrom Director FBI to the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General 3/9/56 and enclosure.) Director Hoover did not include iii his prepared briefingstatement the infor mation reported to the White House separately earlier that there was "no indi cation the the NAACPhad "allowed the Communist Party to infiltrate the conference. (Hoover to Dillon Anderson Special Assistant to the President 3/5/56.) According to one historical account Hoover's Cabinet briefing "rein forced the President's inclination to passivity on civil rights legislation (J W Anderson Eisenhower Brownell and the Congress The Tangled Origins of the Ciril Rights Bill of 1956 o'7[University of Alabama Press 1964] p 34.) 'Memorandum from Hoover to subordinate FBI officials 4/28/65 Iloover memorandum 4/28/65 Hoovermemorandum 4/28/65 'Letter from Hoover to McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the President (National Security) 4/28/65 enclosing FBI memorandum Subject CommunistActivitiesRelativeto UnitedStates PolicyonVietnam 252 which Communist efforts and desires are emphasized without any evaluation of whether they had been or were likely to be successful The exaggeration of Communist participation both by the FBI and White House staff members relying on FBI reports,'ss could only have had the effect of reinforcing President Johnson's original tend ency to discount dissent against the Vietnam 'War as "Communist inspired" a belief shared by his successor.157It is impossible to meas ure the full effect of this distorted perception at the very highest pol icymaking level 169See e.g. a memorandumfrom Marvin (Watson) to the President 5/16/67 quoting from a Bureau report that "the CommunistParty and other organiza tions are continuing their efforts to force the United States to change its present policytoward Vietnam. '5 The report prepared by the intelligence agencies as the basis for the 1970 "Huston Plan included the followingsimilar emphasis on the potential threat (and downplayingof the actual lack of success) "Leaders of student protest groups who traveled abroad were "considered to have potential for recruitment and participation in foreign-directedintelligence activity. "Antiwar activists who had "frequently traveled abroad were considered "as having potential for engaging in foreign-directedintelligence collection. The CIA was "of the view that the Soviet and bloc intelligence services are committed at the political level :to exploit all domestic dissidents wherever possible. Although there was "no hard evidence of substantial foreign control of "the black extremist movement, there was "a marked potential and the groupswere "highly susceptibleto exploitation by hostile foreign intelligenceservices. "Communistintelligence services are capable of using their personnel facili ties and agentpersonnelto workin the blackextremist field. While there were "no substantial indications that the communistintelligence services have actively fomented domestic unrest, their "capability could not "be minimized. "The dissidence and violence in the United States today present adversary intelligenceserviceswith opportunities unparalleled for forty years. [Emphasis added.] (Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) June 1970 substantial portions of this report appear in Hearings Vol 2 pp 141-188.) F FINDING INADEQUATE CONTROLS ON DISSEMINATION AND RETENTION MAJoR FINDING The Committee finds that the product of intelligence investigations has been disseminated without adequate controls Reports on lawful political activity and law-abiding citizens have been disseminated to agencies having no proper reason to receive them Information that should have been discarded purged or sealed including the product of illegal techniques and overbroad investigations has been retained and is available for future use Sub flodiogs Agencies have volunteered massive amounts of irrelevant information to other officials and agencies and have responded unques tioningly in some ins:ances to requests for data without assuring that the information would be used for a lawful purpose Excessive dissemination has sometimes contributed to the inef ficiency of the intelligence process itself Under the federal employee security program unnecessary information about the political beliefs and associations of prospective government employees has been disseminated ((I) The FI3I which has been the "clearinghouse for all domestic intelligence data maintains in readily accessible files sensitive and derogatory personal information not relevant to any investigation as well as information which was improperly or illegally obtained Eleboietioo of Fiodiirgs The adverse effects on privacy of the ONerbreadth of domestic intelli gence collection and of the use of Intrusive Techniques have been mag nified many times over by the dissemination practices of the collecting agencies Information which should not have been gathered in the first place has gone beyond the initial agency to numerous other agencies and officials thus compounding the original intrusion The amount disseminated within the Executive branch has often been so volumi nous as to make it difficult to separate useful data from worthless detaiI The Committee's finding on Political Abuse describes dissemination of intelligence for the political advantage of high officials or the self-interest of an agency The problems of excessive dissemination however include more than political use Dissemination has not been confined to what is appropriate for law enforcement or other proper government purposes Rather any information which could have been conceived to be useful was passed on and doubts were generally resolved in favor of dissemination Until recently none of the stand ards for the exchange of data among agencies has taken privacy interests into account The same failure to consider privacy interests (253) 254 has characterized the retention of data by the original collecting agency Sub finding (a) Agencies have volunteered massive amounts of irrelevant informa tion to other officials and agencies and have responded unquestioningly in some instances to requests for data without assuring that the information would be used for a lawful purpose The following examples illustrate the extent of dissemination FBI reports on dissident Americans flowed to the CIA at a rate as high as 1,000 a month CIA officials regarded any names in these reports as a standing requirement from the FBI for information about those persons. In 1967 the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department was receiving 150 reports and memoranda a day from the FBI on "organizations and individuals engaged in agit.ational activity of one kind or another. 2 Attorney General Ramsey Clark could not "keep up with the volume of FBI memoranda coming into him and to the Assistant At torneys General on the 700,000 FBI investigations per year. The Justice Department's IDIU sent its computer list of 10,000 to 12,000 American dissidents to the CIA's Operation CHAOS (which apparently found it useless) and to the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service (which did use it as part of its program of tax investigations). In fiscal year 1974 alone the FBI the Civil Service Commission and military intelligence received over 367,000 requests for "national agency checks, or name checks of their files on prospective federal government employees. The information disseminated to other agencies has often been con sidered useless by the recipients FBI officials have said they received "very little in the way of good product from the National Security Agency's interception of the international communications of Amer icans. FBI officials also considered most of the material on "the do mestic scene sent to them from the CIA mail opening project to be irrelevant "junk. 6aThe Secret Service destroyed over ninety percent of the information disseminated to it by the FBI without ever putting it in its own intelligence files. Defense Department directives re quire the destruction of a great deal of information it receives from the FBI about civilians considered "threatening to the military in cluding reports on civilian "subversion. Sometimes dissemination has become almost an end in itself The FBI would often anticipate what it considered to be the needs of other Richard Obertestimony 10/28/75 pp 67 68 'Memorandum from Kevin Maroney et al to Attorney GeneralRamsey Clark 12/6/67 'Clark 12/3/75 Hearings Vol 6 p 249 This statistic refers to criminal in vestigationsas wellas intelligenceinvestigations SeePart II pp 80 95 Statement of Attorney General Edward H Levi before HouseJudiciary Com mittee February 1975 W R Wannall testimony 10/3/75 p 13 0W A Branigan testimony 10/24/75 Hearings Vol 4 p 168 GAOReport p 125 DODDirective5200.273/1/71 255 "appropriate agencies." The Bureau has disseminated data to mili tary intelligence agencies regardless of whether or not there was likely to be serious violence requiring the dispatch of troops the Bureau also disseminated information when there was no connection between the subject of the report and any military personnel or fa cility. Consequently the computerized and non-computerized domes tic intelligence data banks compiled by the Continental Army Com mand cited the FBI as "data source for about 40 percent of the in formation where a source was identified. FBI dissemination to the military has shown how information can get into the hands of agencies which have no proper reason to receive it. The FBI disseminated a large volume of information on domestic political activities to the CIA thus providing a substantial part of the data for the CHAOS program.13 Much of this information was also furnished to the State Department.73 The FBI sometimes dis seminated reports to the CIA and the State Department if the subject matter involved public discussion of national security policy and pos sible "subversive influence. The FBI was also the largest source of political targets for tax investigations by the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service While still in its formative days SSS was placed on the FBI's distribution list in response to a request from an Assistant IRS Com missioner for information regarding various organizations of predominantly dissident or extrem ist nature and/or people prominently identified with those organizations. For example in 1966before the FBI had received any specificinstructions from the Attorney General to gather civil disturbance intelligence Bureau Head quarters advised all Field Officesthat "national state and local government officials"rely on us for information "so they can take appropriate action to avert disastrous outbreaks. Thus FBI officeswere told to "intensify and ex pand their "coverage of demonstrationsopposing"United States foreignpolicy in Vietnam or "protests involving racial issues, in order to insure that "ad vance signs of violence could he "disseminated to appropriate authorities. (SACLetter 66-27 5/2/66) ' These policieswere part of the formal obligation of the FBI under the 1949 Delimitation Agreement with military intelligence The Agreement itself re quired the FBI to keep military intelligence agencies advised of the activities of "civilian groups classed as "subversive. (Delimitation Agreement 2/23/49.) And a SupplementaryAgreementsaid "where there is doubt as to ,whetheror not one of the other agenciesis interested in information collected it should be transmitted to the other agency. (SupplementalAgreementNo 1 to the Delimi tation Agreement 6/2/49.) ""Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, Report of the Senate Subcom mittee on Constitutional Rights (1973) p 72 "The Agreements between the FBI and military intelligence have not been revised to take account of the restrictions on Army surveillanceimposedby the Department of Defense in 1971 See DOD Directive 5200.273/1/71 Richard Ober 10/28/75 pp 67 68 "The FBI Manual stated that information concerning "proposed travel abroad by domestic"subversives was to be furnished to the CIAand the State Department and Bureau Field Officeswere told to recommendthe "extent of foreign investigation required (FBI Manual of Instructions Section 87 p 33a revised4/15/63.) ' For example Reports on the ABMdebate discussedon pp 257-258 10Memorandumfrom D W Baconto Director FBI 8/8/69 256 The FBI perceiving that SSS would "deal a blow to dissident ele ments, decided to supply reports relating to this broad category of individuals and organizations The FBI did not select the reports it forwarded on the basis of the presence of a probable tax violation but on the basis of the political and ideological criteria IRS had supplied yet the furnishing of the report resulted in establishment of an SSS file and subject to resource limitations to a review of possible tax liability.1S Among the other lists of "extremists, "subversives and dissidents SSS received was a list of 2,300 organizations the FBI categorized as "Old Left, "New Left, and "Right Wing. 19 One reason for the Bureau's widespread dissemination of intelli gence throughout the Executive branch was recalled by a former FBI official In the late 1940s a sensitive espionage case involved a high government official At that time the FBI held such information "very tightly, as it had during World War II However one item of in formation that "became rather significant had allegedly "not been disseminated to the White House or the Secretary of State. Mr Hoover was criticized for that and frankly he never forgot it From then on you might say the policy was dis seminate disseminate disseminate.20 This testimony illustrates the dilemma of an agency which was blamed for inadequate dissemination but never criticized for too much dis semination In practice this dilemma was resolved by passing on any information "which in any way even remotely suggested that there was a responsibility for another agency. 21 The following are examples of excessive dissemination drawn from a random sample of materials in FBI headquarters files In 1969 the FBI disseminated to Army and Air Force intelligence Secret Service and the IDIU a report on a Black Student Union the report which discussed "a tea sponsored by the group to develop fac ulty-student "dialogue as a junior college and the plans of the col lege to establish a course on "The History of the American Negro. There was no indication of violence whatsoever Dissemination to the military intelligence agencies and Secret Service took place both at the field level and at headquarters in Washington D.C The informa tion came from college oflicials.22 In 1970 the FBI disseminated to military intelligence and the Secret Service (both locally and at Headquarters) as well as to the Justice Department (IDIU Internal Security Division and Civil Rights Division) a report received from a local police intelligence unit on the picketing of a local Industries of the Blind plant by "blind black workers who were on strike The sixteen-page report included a copy of a handbill distributed at a United Church of Christ announc FBI memorandumfrom D J Brennan Jr. to W C Sullivan 8/15/69 SSS Bi-weeklyReports 6/15/70 from Donald Bacon 9/15/75 pp 91 05 19SSSBi-weeklyReport 8/29/69 20Former FBI liaison with CIA deposition 9/22/75 pp 16 17 n Former FBI liaison with CIA deposition 9/22/75 pp 16 17 memorandum from Attorney GeneralTomClarkto J Edgar Hoover 12/5/47 22Memorandumfrom Tampa Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/29/69 257 ing a meeting at the church to support the strike as well as copies of "leaflets that had been distributed by the blind workers. The only hint of violence in this report was the opinion of a local police intelli gence officer that "young black militants, who supported the strike by urging blacks to boycott white-owned stores in the conimunity might cause "confrontations that might result in violence. _ The FBI disseminated a report on Dr Carl McIntyre's American Christian Action Council to the Secret Service in 1972 The cover memorandum to Secret Service indicated that the group fell within the category of the FBI-Secret Service agreement described as "poten tially dangerous because of background emotional instability or activity in groups engaged in activities inimical to U.S. The report itself reflected no "activities inimical to the country but only plans to hold peaceful demonstrations The report also discussed policies and activities of the group unrelated to demonstrations including plans to enter lawsuits in "school busing cases opposition to "Nixon's China trip and support for a constitutional amendment for "public school prayer. This data came from a Bureau informant.2 In 1966 the FBI disseminated to the Army Navy and Air Force intelligence divisions to the Secret Service (locally and at Headquar ters) to the Justice Department and to the State Department a ten page report on a "Free University. The report described in detail the courses offered including such subjects as "Modern Film, "Workshop on Art and Values, "Contemporary Music, "Poetry Now, and "Autobiography and the Image of Self. Over thirty "associates were listed by name although only one was identified as having "subversive connections (and his course had been "dropped because not enough students had registered.") Others were identified as "involved in Viet nam protest activities or as being known to officials of a nearby es tablished university as "problem people. The information came from several FBI informants and a confidential source. In 1966 the FBI disseminated to "appropriate federal and local authorities, including military intelligence Secret Service the De partment of State and ,Justice and a campus security officers (who was a former FBI agent) a report on a group formed for "discussion on Vietnam. The "controlling influence on the organization was said to be "the local Friends Meeting. Only one person characterized as "subversive was active in the group The report was devoted to de scribing a "speak out demonstration attended by approximately 300 persons on a university campus The gathering was entirely peaceful and included "speakers who supported U.S policies in Viet Nam. The data came from two Bureau informants."s In 1969 the FBI disseminated reports to the White House the CIA the State Department the three military intelligence agencies Secret Service the IDIU the Attorney General the Deputy Attorney General and the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions on a meeting sponsored by a coalition of citizens concerned about the Anti Memorandumfrom Charlotte Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 12/10/70 u Letter from ActingDirector FBI to Director United States Secret Service 5/25/72 "Memorandum fromDetroit Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 4/15/66 Memorandumfrom SpringfieldField Officeto FBI Headquarters 7/5/66 258 Ballistic Missile The only indication of "subversive' influence was that one woman married to a Communist was assisting iii publicity work for the meeting The reports described (front reliable FBI sources) the speakers pro and con including prominent scientists academics and a Defense Department spokesman. In 1974 the FBI disseminated to the State Department the Defense Intelligence Agency the Secret Service the Internal Security Division and the Civil Disturbance Unit (formerly IDII-) exten sive reports on a national conference on amnesty for war resisters One of the participants had "recently organized [a] nonviolent pro test demonstration during a visit by President Ford two others were identified as draft evaders and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War were active at the conference But the report went much further to describe based on information from FBI informants the activities of religious civil liberties and student groups as well as "families of men killed in Vietnam and congressional staff aides. In 1974 the FBI disseminated a report on a peaceful vigil in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy in support of the rights of Soviet Jews not just to the Secret Service and the Justice Department's Civil Disturbance Unit but also to the CIA and the State Depart ment. In 1972 the FBI disseminated a report to the CIA Army and Navy intelligence and an un-named "U.S Government agency which conducts security-type investigations in West Germany (apparently a military intelligence agency) The latter agency had asked the Bureau for information about an antiwar reservist group and a proj ect to furnish "legal advice to GI's and veterans. The report des cribed not only the reservists group but also "a group dedicated to giving free legal aid to servicemen and "an antiwar political group which endorsed "political candidates for office who have a solid peace position and a favorable chance of being elected. The three groups "planned to share offices.' This data came from a Bureau Informant.30 T'he FBI does have an obligation to disseminate to local law en forcement agencies information about crimes within their jurisdic tion Nevertheless there has been improper dissemination to local police under at least two Bureau programs Such dissemination oc curred under COIXTELPRO as part of the FBI's effort to dis credit individuals or disrupt groups.31 Others were in response to local police requests for "public source information relating to "sub versive matters. 3 Experienced police officials confirmed that the term "Memorandum from WashingtonField Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/28/69 memorandumfrom Alexandria Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/3/69 'Memorandum from Louisville Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 11/14/74 11/15/74 11/20/74 "Memorandum from Washington Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 6/28/74 30Memorandumfrom Legal Attache Bonn to FBI Headquarters 1/11/72 memorandumfrom Boston Field Officeto FBI Headquarters 5/4/72 "See COI\TELPRO report Sec IV for examples of FBI dissemination to local police of data on trivial offensesfor the purpose of disruption 'The FBI responds to such requests with "a blind memorandum upon the condition that the Bureau's "identity as source of the information must be kept strictly confidential. Bureau regulations do not link this procedure to any specificcriminal law enforcement function (FBI Manual of Rules and Regula tions Part II Section5 p 7.) 259 "subversive is so broad that it inevitably leads to dissemination about political beliefs. Other executive agencies have also engaged in excessive dissemina tion The Justice Department's Inter-Division Information Unit (IDIU) sent its computerized data to the CIA in order that the CIA could check its records on foreign travel of American dissidents.33 The IDIU sent the same material to the Internal Revenue Service's Special Service Staff which used the information as part of its program for initiating tax audits." The Internal Revenue Service itself dissemi nated tax returns or related tax information to the CIA the FBI and the Justice Department's Internal Security Division (which also made requests on behalf of the FBI) without ascertaining whether there was a proper basis for the request or the purpose for which the information would be used.38 S ubfindin y (b ) Excessive dissemination has sometimes contributed to the inef ficiency of the intelligence process itself The dissemination of large amounts of relatively useless or totally irrelevant information has reduced the efficiency of the intelligence process It has made it difficult for decision-makers to weigh the im portance of reports.37 Agencies such as the FBI have collected intel ligence not because of its own needs or desires or because it had been requested to (10so but because the data was assumed to be of value to someone else Units established to screen and evaluate intelligence have encouraged rather than reduced further dissemination In some instances the FBI has disseminated information to local police in a manner that was counterproductive to effective law enforce ment One former police chief has described how the Bureau under "pressure from the 'White House to prepare for a specific demonstra tion "passed on information in such a way that it was totally useless because it was not "evaluated and thus exaggerated the dangers.38 The need for prior evaluation of the significance of raw intelligence has not been fully recognized in the Bureau's policy for dissemination of data on protest demonstrations.33 "Testimony of James F Ahern (former New Haven police chief) Robert diGrazia (Boston chief of police) and Patrick V Murphy (former New York police commissionerand President of the Police Foundation) 1/20/76 p 44 These experiencedlaw enforcement officialsstated that local policedo not need informationfrom the FBI about "politicalbeliefs. See CHAOS Report Section III SeeIRS Report Section "SSS. 3eSeeIRS Report Section "Dissemination. 'On at least one occasion Justice Department officialsexpressed concernthat they had receiveda report from the FBI on an incident and then a secondreport from Army intelligencewhich appeared to confirmthe Bureau's information but the Army's report turned out to have been based on the FBI's information This led to a Justice Department request that the Army "screen its intelligenceand send "only key items. (Memorandumfor the Record General CounselRobert B Jordan to Under Secretary of the Army DavidMcGifert 1/10/68.) Ahern 1/20/76 p 4 "A'1'heFBI had adhered across-the-hoardto the position that its reports do not contain "eonelusions, and Bureau rules have permitted the dissemination of data from "sourcesknown to be unreliable so long as "goodjudgment is used It has beenup to the recipient agencies"to intelligentlyevaluate the information on the basis of "descriptiveinformation about the Bureau's sources (FBI Man (Continued) 260 The impediments to accurate intelligence collection have been aug mented by the dissemination practice of sonic local law enforcement agencies An example is the report on the Chicago Police Department's Security Section which has been described as having passed "inher ently inaccurate and distortive data to federal intelligence agencies.' The General Accounting Office has confirmed that this is a general problem. While the Committee has not examined local law enforce ment intelligence the dissemination practices of such agencies require as much careful control as federal agencies. The assumption that some other agency might need information has not only produced excessive dissemination but has also served as a specific rationale for collection of intelligence that was not otherwise within an agency's jurisdiction The best example is the FBI's collec tion of intelligence on "general racial matters for the military.43 One of the ironies in the recent history of domestic intelligence was that the Justice Department's IDIU winch was set up to collate and evaluate the massive amounts of data flowing to the Justice Depart ment from the FBI contributed to even more extensive collection and dissemination. The IDILT encouraged numerous federal agencies (Continued) ual of Rules and Regulations Part II Section 5) Thus the FBI has not ade quately distinguished betweensituations where evaluation is or is not necessary More than just "descriptive information about FBI sources is needed to help recipients of data on possibleviolentprotest demonstration understand the likeli hoodofactual disorders ' SeePart II p 78 The GAOhas ranked the types of sources of information relied upon by the FBI in beginning domestic intelligence investigations according to whether the data initially supplied were "hard, "medium, or "soft Accordingto the GAO policeand other state and local agencieswere found to have providedthe lowest proportion of "hard information and the highest proportion of "soft informa tion (GAOReport p 106) "Two major cities have made efforts recently to establish standards for police intelligence activities (Los Angeles Police Department Public Disorder Intel ligenceDivision Standards and Procedures 4/10/75 NewYork City Police De partment Procedures Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Division House Internal Security Committee Hearings DomesticIntelligence Operations for Internal SecurityPurposes 1974.) The TBI Manual cited the needs of the military as a basis for its intelligence gathering on "general racial matters. The Manual stated that the Bureau did not itself have "investigative jurisdiction over such general racial matters, but that its "intelligencefunction includedadvising "appropriate Governmentagen cies of information about "proposedor actual activities of individuals officials committees legislatures organizations etc. in the racial field. TheManualbased "Federal jurisdiction on the military's responsibility "Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial matters is concerned U.S Army regulations place responsibility upon the Army to keel) advised of any developmentsof a civil disturbance nature which may require the rendering of assistance to civil authorities or the intervention of federal troops OSI (Air Force) and ONI (Navy) have a collateral responsibility under Army in such matters and copiesof pertinent documentsdisseminatedto Armyconcerningsuch matters should be furnished to OSI and ONI. (1960FBI Manual Section 122 pp 5 6) "For example in addition to containing the names of known activists the IDI17printouts supplied to IRS's SSS also contained the names of many promi nent citizens whom the Justice I)eparrinent thought could be of assistance in quelling a civil disturbance iii a particular locality should one occur SSS per sonnel were unaware that the IDIF printout contained the names of these per sonsand established filesindiscriminatelyonthem 261 (including many without regular investigative functions) to dissemi nate information to it about "organizations and individuals who might "instigate or "prevent civil disorders. Subfinding (c) ITnder the federal employee security program unnecessary infor mation about the political beliefs and associations of prospective government employees has been disseminated For nearly thirty years the federal employee security program has required a "national agency check of the files of several government agencies including the FBI the Civil Service Commission and mili tary intelligence on prospective employees.4 Although there was often no information to report federal agencies received "name check reports on all candidates for employment This appears to have been the single largest source of regular dissemination of data in intelli gence files These name check reports have provided information from intel ligence files not only about possible criminal activity or personal weaknesses of the individual but also about lawful political activity and association Until recently the Executive Order on employee secu rity required reports on any "association with a person or group supporting "subversive views These reports have been required for every federal employee regardless of whether he or she holds a sensi tive position or has access to classified information. It has been the policy of the FBI and presumably other agencies as well to disseminate via name check reports any information in its files no matter how old or how unreliable which might relate to the standards of the Executive Order.4S The current criteria have been substantially narrowed the basic standards for reporting are group membership and potential criminal conduct..4 However the Justice Department has advised the FBI that "it is not possible to set definite parameters for organizations and that the Bureau should include those with a "potential for meeting the criteria.50 The FBI does not determine whether or not the information it furnishes is decisive under these standards Departmental instructions state It is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular 'sAttorneyGeneralClark to Maroney et a1 11/9/67 "Executive Order 10450 Section3(a) For a discussionof the origins and ap plication of this order pp 42-44 "Executive Order 10450Section8(a) (5) 'Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee 3/3/76 "The current criteria are "Knowingmembershipwith the specificintent of furthering the aims of or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization association movement group or combinationof per sons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commissionof acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Governmentof the United States or any State or subdivisionthereof by unlawful means. (Executive Order 11785 Section 3 June 4 1974.) This order also abolished the "Attorney General's list. Memorandumfrom Assistant Attorney General GlenE Pommereningto FBI Director ClarenceKelley 11/1/74 262 agency in the carrying out of its current activities and respon sibilities and whether or not any action is taken by the de partment or agency is not of course a principal concern of the Bureau.51 The FBI itself has expressed misgivings about the breadth of its responsibilities under the employee security program It has con tinued to seek "clarification from the Justice Department and it has pointed out that there have been no "adverse actions taken against current or prospective Federal employees guider the loyalty and secur ity provisions of the Executive Order "for several years. This has been due to the fact "that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases have proved almost insurmountable. 72 The employee security program has served an essential function in full background investigation and name checks for those having access to classified information But its extension to vaguely-defined "sub versives in nonsensitive positions has gone beyond the Government's proper need for information on the suitability of persons for employ ment.53 Sub finding (d) The FBI which has been the "clearinghouse for all domestic intelligence data maintains in readily accessible files sensitive and derogatory personal information not relevant to any investigation as well as information which was improperly or illegally obtained In recent years the Secret Service military intelligence and other agencies have instituted significant programs for the destruction or purging of useless information. However the FBI has retained its vast general files accumulated over the years under its duty to serve as a "clearinghouse for domestic intelligence data. There are over 6.500,000 files at FBI headquarters and the data is retrievable through a general index consisting of over 58,000,000 index cards Each Bureau Field Officehas substantial additional information in its files Domestic intelligence information included in the general index is described by the FBI as associates and relatives of the subject members of organiza tions under investigation or determined to be possible subver 61Letter from Attorney General TornClark to J Edgar Hoover 12/5/47 The FBI advises that it considers this directive still to be in effect (Memorandum from FBI to SelectCommittee3/3/76.) 52Letter from Kelley to Pommerening 12/11/74 The FBI has advised that federal employees are now evaluated according to "suitability rather than "loyalty and security criteria (Memorandumfrom FBI to Select Committee 3/3/76.) "According to a 1974Bureau memorandumand a confirmingJustice Depart ment memorandum the purpose is to provide "information concerningpossible subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of Government. (Kelley to Pommerening 8/14/74 Pommereningto Kelley 8/26/74.) As indicated in the Committee's finding on overbreadth the concept "subversion is so vague and flexibleas to invite excesses Secret Servicepractices are describedin Reviewof Secret ServiceProtective rasures Hearings before the Senate Committeeon Appropriations 94th Cong. 1st Sees (1975) p 16 Destruction of Army intelligence files is discussed in Report onMilitary Surveillance For a discussionor the originsof this function seep 23 263 save individuals contributing funds to subversive-type ac tivity subversive or seditious publications writers of articles in subversive or seditious publications bookstores specializing in subversive-type publications and related types of informa tion. The Committee has found that there our missive amounts of irrele vant and trivial information in these files. The FBI has kept such data in its filing system on the theory that they might be useful some in the future to solve crimes for employee background checks to evaluate the reliability of the source or to "answer questions or chal lenges about the Bureau's conduct. The FI3I has recently issued instructions to its Field Offices to take greater care in recording domestic intelligence information in its files They are to exercise ""judgment as to whether or not the ac tivity is "pertinent to the Bureau's "legitimate investigative in terest. ' Nevertheless current policies still allow the indexing of the names of persons who are not the subject of investigation but just attend meetings of a group under investigation.80 'Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee 5/22/75 'Current FBI policies modify past practice with respect to the indexing of unsolicited allegations including those of "a personal nature, not requiring "in vestigative action. The Bureau no longer includes in its name index the name of the person about whomthe information is volunteered where the Bureau has "no legitimate investigative interest. In the case of an unsolicited letter for example the name of the sender only is includedin the index The letter itself is also retained so the FBI "can retrieve it via the index reference to the sender "should an occasionarise in the future when we need to refer back to it. (Mem orandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS 11/10/75.) "Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee 7/21/75 This memorandum states that the Bureau has adopted under regulations of the National Archives a program for destroying files which "no longer have contemporaryvalue. The FBI has not included within this program most of the investigative and intelli genceinformation in its files dating back as far as 1939 G9Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACs 1/27/76 The Field Offices weregiventhe followingspecificguidance "For example the statement of a localleader of the Ku Klux Klan in which he advocates regular attendance at church would be merely an exercise of his right to free speechand hence maintenance of such a record would be prohibited On the other hand should this same individual stand up before a gathering and ad vocate the use of violence in furthering the organization's objectives this ob viouslywouldbepertinent to our investigation. Bureau headquarters recognizedthat these were "extreme examplesand that "problems were created in "those instances which are in the middle and which are not so clear. Thus FBI agents were encouragedto consult Headquarters "to resolveany questionconcerninga specificproblem. "One Field Officehas described regular Bureau procedures as follows "[Our] informants after attending meetings of these organizations [under investigation] usually submit reports in which they describe briefly the ac tivities and discussions which took place as well as listing those members and non-membersin attendance at such meetings Copies of these informant re ports are disseminated to various individuals files and the names of those in attendance where no individuals file exists are indexed to the organization's file. (Memorandum from SAC to FBI Headquarters 12/1/75) [Emphasis added.] FBI headquarters did not indicate that this practice was outside the "scope of authorized "law enforcementactivity. It is considered"pertinent to the in vestigation "to maintain records concerningmembership publicutterings and/or other activities of an organization under investigation (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS 1/27/76.) 264 Finally there is information in FI3I files which was collected by illegal or improper means It ranges from the fruits of warrantless electronic surveillance mail openings and surreptitious entries to the results of sweeping intelligence investigations which collected data about the lawful political activities and personal lives of Americans Where such intelligence remain iii the name-indexed files it can be retrieved and disseminated along with other information thus con tinuing indefinitely the potential for compounding the initial intrusion into constitutionally protected areas G DEFICIENCIES I\ CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY MAJOR FINDING The Committee finds that those responsible for overseeing super vising and controlling domestic activities of the intelligence com munity although often unaware of details of the excesses described in this report made those excesses possible by delegating broad au thority without establishing adequate guidelines and procedural checks by failing to monitor and coordinate sufficiently the activities of the agencies under their charge by failing to inquire further after receiving indications that improper activities may have been occur ring by exhibiting a reluctance to know about secret details of pro grams and sometimes by requesting intelligence agencies to engage in questionable practices On numerous occasions intelligence agencies have by concealment misrepresentation or partial disclosure hidden improper activities from those to whom they owed a duty of dis closure But such deceit and the improper practices which it con cealed would not have been possible to such a degree if senior officials of the Executive Branch and Congress had clearly allocated respon sibility and imposed requirements for reporting and obtaining prior approval for activities and had insisted on adherence to those requirements Sub findings Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to col lect information concerning "subversive activities of American citi zens but have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic intelligence to provide safeguards for the rights of American citi zens or to coordinate and control the ever-expanding intelligence efforts by an increasing number of agencies Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the FBI to engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of intrusive investigative techniques such as wiretaps micro phones and informants but have failed until recently to supervise or establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing ade quate safeguards guidelines or procedures for review Presidents White House officials and Attorneys General have requested and received domestic political intelligence thereby con tributing to and profiting from the abuses of domestic intelligence and setting a bad example for their subordinates Presidents Attorneys General and other Cabinet officers have neglected until recently to make inquiries in the face of clear indica tions that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper domestic activities Congress which has the authority to place restraints on do mestic intelligence activities through legislation appropriations and (265) 266 oversight committees has not effectively asserted its responsibilities until recently It has failed to define the scope of domestic intelli gence activities or intelligence collection techniques to uncover ex cesses or to propose legislative solutions Some of its members have failed to object to improper activities of which they were aware and have prodded agencies into questionable activities Intelligence agencies have often undertaken programs without authorization with insufficient authorization or in disregard of ex press orders The weakness of the system of accountability and control can be seen in the fact that many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence operations were terminated only after they had been exposed or threat ened with exposure by Congress or the news media Elaboration of Findings The Committee has found excesses committed by intelligence agen cies lawless and improper behavior intervention in the democratic process overbroad intelligence targeting and collection and the use of covert techniques to discredit and "neutralize persons and groups defined as enemies by the agencies But responsibility for those acts does not fall solely on the intelligence agencies which committed them Systematic excesses would not have occurred if lines of authority had been clearly defined if procedures for reporting and review had been established and if those responsible for supervising the intelli gence community had properly discharged their duties The pressure of events and the widespread confidence in the FBI help to explain the deficiencies in command and authorization dis covered by the Committee Most of the activities examined in this report occurred during periods of foreign or domestic crisis There was substantial support from the public and all branches of govern ment for some of the central objectives of domestic intelligence policy including the search for "Fifth Columnists before World War II the desire to identify communist "influence in the Cold War atmos phere of the 1950s the demand for action against Klan violence in the early 1960s and the reaction to violent racial disturbances and anti-Vietnam war activities in the late 1960s and early 1970s It was in this heated environment that President and Attorneys General or dered the FBI to investigate "subversive activities Further the Bureau's reputation for effectiveness and professionalism and Direc tor Hoover's ability to cultivate political support and to inspire appre hension played a significant role in shaping the relationship between the FBI and the rest of the Government With only a few exceptions the domestic intelligence activities re viewed by the Committee were properly authorized within the intelli gence agencies The FBI epitomizes a smoothly functioning military structure activities of agents are closedly supervised programs are authorized only after they have traveled a well-defined bureaucratic circuit and virtually all activities ranging from high-level policy considerations to the minutia of daily reports from field agencies are reduced to writing These characteristics are commendable An efficient law enforcement and intelligence-gathering machine acting consistently with law can greatly benefit the nation However when used for wrongful purposes this efficiency can pose a grave danger 267 It appears that many specific abuses were not known by the Attor ney General the President or other Cabinet-level officials directly responsible for supervising domestic intelligence activities But whether or not particular activities were authorized by a President or Attorney General those individuals must as the chief executive and the principal law enforcement officer of the -United States Gov ernment bear ultimate responsibility for the activities of executive agencies under their command The President and his Cabinet officers have a duty to determine the nature of activities engaged in by execu tive agencies and to prevent undesired activities from taking place This duty is particularly compelling when responsible officials have reason to believe that undesirable activity is occurring as has often been the case in the context of domestic intelligence The Committee's inquiry has revealed a pattern of reckless disre gard of activities that threatened our Constitutional system Intelli gence agencies were ordered to investigate "subversive activities, and were then usually left to determine for themselves which activities were "subversive. and how those activities should be investigated Intelligence agencies were told they could use investigative tech niques wiretaps microphones informants that permitted them to pry into the most valued areas of privacy and were then given in many cases the unregulated authority to determine when to use those tech niques and how long to continue them Intelligence agencies were en couraged to gather "pure intelligence, which was put to political use by public officials outside of those agencies This was possibly because Congress had failed to pass laws limiting the areas into which intel ligence agencies could legally inquire and the information they could disseminate Improper acts were often intentionally concealed from the Govern ment officials responsible for supervising the intelligence agencies or undertaken without express authority Such behavior is inexcusable But equally inexcusable is the absence of executive and congressional oversight that engendered an atmosphere in which the heads of those agencies believed they could conceal activities from their superiors Attorney General Levi's recent guidelines and the recommendations of this Committee are intended to provide the necessary guidance Whether or not the responsible Government officials knew about improper intelligence activities and even if the agency heads failed in their duty of full disclosure it still follows that Presidents and the appropriate Cabinet officials should have known about those activi ties This is