Elements of the Science of Religion (C.P. Tiele, 1897) ========================================================== CONTENTS OE THE SECONH VOLUME. THE AIANIEESTATIONB AND CONSTITUENTS OF UE- HGION ...... GENESIS AND VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH . PHILOSOPHY AND KELIOIOUS DOCTllINE THE CONSTANT ELEMENT IN ALL CONCEPTIONS OF GOD ...... THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN WORSHIP, PRAYERS, AND OFFERINGS RELIGION AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON THE CHURCH INQUIRY INTO THE BEING OR ESSENCE OF RELIGION INQUIRV INTO THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN SPIRITUAL LIFE PAGE 1 25 50 76 100 127 155 182 208 237 INDEX 265 ERRATA. VOL. I. I’AOE 62, in 8th line from top, delete the word *‘von.” 122, in 5th line from foot, delete the word “von.” 127, in 10th line from top, delete the word “von.” 276, in 5th line from foot, delete the word “von.” VOL. II. 29, in 9th line from foot, /w “ mean ” read “ meana. ” 76, in 3rcl line from top, /or “conception ” rend “conceptions.” 86, in middle, remove bracket after “ half -human ” and place it after “head” in the next line. 116, in 5th line from top, /or “ mortal ” read “ moral.” 134, in 11th line from top, /or “that” read “than.” 258, in 3rd line from foot, delete the word “in.” 266, col, 2, in last line, /or “195 ” read “ 95.” 268, col. 2, in 7th line from top, /or “166” read “ JI. 166.” 270, col. 2, in last line, before “66” insert “1.” 273, col. 1, in 16th line from top, for “ 103 ” read “ 163.” 276, col, 1, in 14th line from foot, /or “Maraduk” read “Maruduk.” 285, col. 2, in 18th line from foot, for “ anthropical ” read “theri- anthropical.” SCIENCE OF RELIGION. LECTURE I. THE MANIFESTATIONS AND CONSTITUENTS OF BEUGION. In my previous course I endeavoured to explain my views regarding the development of religion. We in- vestigated the stages and the directions of its develop- ment ; we attempted to establish several laws or conditions which that development obeys ; and lastly we tried to determine wherein that development essen- tially consists. We were concerned, in short, with an introduction to the morphological part of the science of religion. A different task now awaits us. We have hitherto been occupied with the ever-chang- ing forms and varying manifestations of religion throughout human history, but we must now inquire as to what is permanent in the forms arising out of each other, and superseding each other, and as to the elements they all possess in common. This alone will VOL. IT. A 2 SCIENCE OF RELIGION enable us, so far as our limited knowledge permits, to determine the essence of religion and ascend to its origin. The subject of this second course will there- fore be an introduction to the ontological part of the science of religion. • I am fully aware that this part of my task is more diflScult than the first. To classify and explain phen- omena, and to trace the development which they in- dicate, is not so easy a task as simply to describe -them or to study them within a particular period of develop- ment, as for example in the history of a single religion or a single important epoch. But it is a still more difficult task to penetrate to the source whence they all spring, and to discover the Unity in their multi- plicity and diversity. I will not, however, dogmati- cally formulate my conclusions. I shall confine my- self to the task of investigation, or merely to that of initiating an investigation, and shall attempt nothing more ambitious. Adhering to the same method as before, we shall start from the solid ground of anthro- pology and history, the well - ascertained results of which can alone enable us to understand the essence of religion and trace it to its source. We therefore again take our stand upon established facts. And the first question we have to answer is — Can we discover, among religious phenomena, any that recur so invariably that we are justified in regarding them as necessary manifestations of religious conscious- THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION 3 ness, whatever stage of development the religion may have attained ? Or, in other words, Does religion contain any constant elements, none of which it can lack with- out injuring it and rendering it imperfect, and which therefore belong to every sound and normal religion ? It seems easy enough to answer this question. Most people who hear it will probably think that we need not be philosophers or scholars in order to answer it. Man* is a thinking, feeling, and willing being, and this must show itself in his religion also. And in point of fact, this is proved by history and the study of re- ligions. “vlii every religion, from the lowest to the highest, we find certain conceptions regarding the supernatural powers upon which men feel their depend- ence, certain sentiments they cherish towards them, and certain observances they perform in their honour. This common and popular view, although inexact as we shall afterwards see, corresponds fairly well with reality. It has been countenanced by scientific au- thors, and adopted in various handbooks. Professor Davids,^ for example, has recently defined the word religioQ as “ a convenient expression for a very complex set of mental conditions, including, firstly, beliefs as to internal and external mysteries (souls and gods) ; secondly, the mental attitude induced by those beliefs; and thirdly, the actions and conduct depen- ’ Buddhism, its History and Literature : New York and London, 1896, p. 4. SCIENCE OF RELIGION dent on both.” He adds, however, that these conditions are by no means fixed and unchangeable, and that they “are never the same in any two individuals” — ^a fact which we are the last to deny, because they difier in accordance with every one’s character and development — yet he calls them “the constituent elements of re- ligion.” Others again mention only two constituents of religion, conceptions and ritual, with the religious community founded upon these ; but they regard both as manifestations of religious faith, and they deem the relation between the worshipper and his god as essen- tial in every religion (Rauwenhofl) ; ^ or, like the philosopher Teichmliller, they resolve every imagin- able form of religion into Dogmatic, Ethic, and Cult;^ or lastly, according to the most recent theory, they explain this threefold basis by saying that religion consists in a direction of the will coincident with a conception of the deity, and that sentiment is the badge of its real existence.^ Seeing then that there is so much agreement in the main among inquirers of entirely different i^hools, in spite of differences in detail and exposition) it would seem impossible to doubt the accuracy of the popular view. Yet the matter is not so simple as it appears. ^ Wijsbegeerte van den Godsdienst ; Leiden, 1887. ^ Keligionsphiloaophie ; Brealau, 1886. * O. Pfleiderer, Religionsgeschichte auf geschichtlicher Grundlage, gte neu bearbeitete Auegabe ; Berlin, 1896. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION. b I cannot here enter upon a criticism of each of the systems named. Nor will I mention those who regard one of these three elements as the sole essential of< religion — ^such as agnostics and mystics, who sum up all religion in a vague feeling of, or mysterious union with, the divine {unio mystica) ; or such as the advo- cates of a school of theology which, though it has strojcig opponents, now finds many adherents in Ger- many, who regard religion merely as a practical system, and the church merely as an insurance scciety for the attainment of temporal and eternal happiness, a sys- tem of which the religious doctrine is but the theory, borrowed from philosophy in content and form, while religious sentiment is simply modelled upon the re- quirements of ethics with the needful modifications.^ This, however, relates to systems which we can only discuss in another connection. But I must not omit to point out that the agreement of these views is not so great as their difference, and that the definition of religion given by. Rhys Davids as a set of three mental conditions, among which, curiously enough, he includes actions and conduct, is a very different thing from Pfleiderer’s view that the essence of religion consists in a direction of the will coinciding with certain con- ceptions of the deity, and that sentiment is merely a badge of its real existence. I must frankly confess, in ^ W. Bender. Das Wesen der Religion und die Grundgesetze der Kirchenbildung, 4© Aufl., 1888. 6 SCIENCE OF RELIGION passing, my inability to understand how anything can be a badge of the real existence of something diflPerent, without necessarily belonging to its essence. But above all it must be clearly kept in view that concep- tions, sentiments, and actions are not, strictly speaking, kindred or really correlative terms. Words and deeds are kindred and correlative ; and we do not requirS to prove that religion manifests itself in both of these, whether the words be merely the stammerings of primitive man, or poetic myths, or doctrines moulded in philosophic form, or whether, among deeds, we in- clude religious observances, or, in a wider sense, the whole of man’s religious life. And so, too, religious emotions, conceptions, and sentiments are kindred and correlative; they arise out of each other, as we shall see, and moreover they all form the source of words and deeds, to which they alone give a religious impress. Words and deeds, creed and cult, understood in their widest sense, can alone literally be manifestations. Although these are not infallible signs of the real existence of religion — because words may be repeated without conviction, and deeds may be aped without meaning — yet it must be admitted that every living religion produces them spontaneously, and that no religion is complete without both of them. But they cannot be called constituents of religion. The true constituents of religion are emotions, conceptions, and sentiments, of which words and deeds are at once the TEE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION 7 offspring and the index. To describe these constitu- ents as manifestations seems to me a misuse of the term. We therefore distinguish the forms in which religion is manifested from the constituents of religion. These forms consist, as I have said, in words and deeds. I mu8t now explain this a little further. The words in whiqh religious sentiment finds utterance — those alone whitih flow spontaneously from the heart, which eman- ate from inward impulse, which conform to the apostolic saying, ** We believe, and therefore we speak,” but hot those which are thoughtlessly mumbled by rote — the words which religious man utters because he feels the necessity of voicing what lives within him, are numer- ous and manifold. Such are prayers, from childhke stammerings to the solemn litanies of the most highly developed ritual — from the wordy and redundant prayers of those who seek to propitiate their god by a wealth of sounding phrases to Our Father,” sub- lime in its simplicity — from the storming of heaven with petitions and supplications, from which not a wish or want, however trivial, is omitted, to the piteous cry of the afflicted sufferer, the exulting song of the highly blessed, the declaration of entire self-dedication, of calm resignation, of perfect conformity of will. Such are hymns and songs of praise, some of them an em- bellished form of prayer, others a form of confession, and others again the utterances of the aspirations of 8 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. the soul — from the monotonous, wearisome, and usually plaintive litanies of primitive peoples to the Vedic songs, the Homeric hymns, the chants in honour of the chief Egyptian and Assyrian gods, the psalms of Babylon and Israel, the profoundly religious poems of Mohammedan mysticism, and those, no less deeply felt, and no less sublime, in which Christians of all times and churches, and in many tongues, have poured forth their religious feelings. Such are the fepic narratives, partly borrowed from folk-lore, and partly original compositions, in which religious thought is embodied — myths from the world of gods, miraculous tales of the golden age when the sons of heaven still associated on almost equal terms with the dwellers upon earth, a mightier and happier race than the present — legends of heroes of light who smote the powers of darkness, stories of saints and martyrs, and lastly the history of the golden era of humanity when the champions of faith wrestled against unbelief and persecution, when religion, after its profound degrada- tion, revived, and when the light of a higher revelation of the divine dispersed the dense and loweriug clouds — not a history scientifically investigated or prag- matically recorded, but actuated and glorified by a spirit of pious adoration, and transformed into an epic, a beautiful idyl, composed by the deity himself. And such, too, are confessions of faith — but not of course those which are merely learned and repeated THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION. 9 by rote — confessions which bear witness to the over- flowings of the heart; confessions in prophecies and sermons ; confessions in the systems of great religious thinkers like a St Augustine, a St Thomas, a Wydifle, a Melanchthon, or a Calvin, systems which borrow their form from philosophy, and seem cold and life- less* in their stern logic, but which are nevertheless the creations of a profound and fervent faith. JTbr is there less diversity in the actions in which religion is manifested. A word may be an action: a confession of the truth boldly uttered in the very face of the powers that are striving to crush it, a summons to resist religious persecution, a vow that binds a man throughout his whole life. But, as a rule, deeds form a more vigorous manifestation of faith than words. Those who confine themselves to mere words, spoken or written, however well meant, however deeply felt, cannot be regarded as thoroughly in earnest unless they seal them with their actions. And these actions are manifold. They do not consist solely in the ob- servances summed up in the term Worship, of which we naturally think in the first place — that is, in communion with the Deity in secret or in public, at set times or whenever the heart yearns for it, a com- munion which, though indispensable to the mainten- ance of religious life, cannot of itself alone be called the religious life. There is something attractive to the religious soul in every religious afjt, provided it be 10 SCIENCE OF RELIGION earnest and sincere. The form may be childlike, naive, and defective, and* we may have outgrown it ; but man seeks in this fashion and in good faith to approach his God ; and those who do not appreciate this fact place the form above the substance. Where all the arts combine to render the ritual impressive, as in the cathedral, which of itself elevates *the thoughts, where, in presence of the devout congrega- tion crowded into every nook, and amid majestic strains of music, the sacrifice of the Mass is offered up, even the Protestant who is enlightened enough to respect worship in every form feels impressed, if not carried away, by the grandeur of the spectacle. I wish I could adequately interpret for you a beautiful description of the Eomish ritual given by Jan van Beers, a poet of the Southern Netherlands ; but it cannot be fully appreciated except in the masterly verse of the original. He detlares that, although he had ceased to be an orthodox Catholic, the foundations of his childhood’s faith “having been sapped by the waters of doubt,” “he felt his soul overwhelmed with a holy trembling,” on entering the imposing temple to which his mother had once taken him as a child, and where “ she had taught him to call the^^temaHy Inscrutable, whose ineffable name the unlvei^e scarce dares to stammer, his Father.” It itemed to him “ as if the old familiar saints with their golden halos nodded to him from their niches, as if the angels once THE MANIFESTATIONS OF EELIGION. 11 more swayed beneath the arches to the music of harps and celestial songs, as if the whole bright-winged hosts of the dear old legends he had once so eagerly listened to by the fireside, long forgotten, suddenly burst into new life within his heart. And when the great organ lifted its melodious voice in the anthem, .and “the radiant and glittering sun ” of the sacrament was . held on hfgh by the priest, and the countless throng of wor^ippers, “from the choir- steps down to the dim twilight of the aisles, bowed as if beneath the wind of invisibly wafting wings,” he felt himself a child again, and hoped and believed as a child, he thought of his mother, and involuntarily folding his hands murmured, “ Our Father ! ” Even grander, and in ite simplicity more sublime, was the worship of the persecuted Huguenots, who, when seeking an asylum in the wilds of the Cevennes, and ever threatened by the dragoons of Louis XIV., met in that temple not made with hands, in order that the inspiring words of their preachers and the artless recitation of their psalms might brace them for the unequal struggle. And yet, beautiful as is such adoration in spirit and in truth, finding utterance in manifold ways, its utterance in the form of ritual is but the symbol and foreshadowing of the sacrifice which consists in so entire dedication of self to the Most High that we shall live in Him and He in us, and that we shall be able to say with Calvin, “ Cot Tneum, velut majctaivmy Domino in 12 SCIENCE OF EELIQION offero.*^ In short, those who desire to learn the nature of a religion from the conduct of its votaries must ^ study not only their forms of worship, but all the other acts prompted by their faith. But I must not omit to answer a question which arises here. How many words have been and are spoken, how many deeds done, in the name of religion, which are objectionable from a moral point of^view, and even arouse out intense indignation ? I do not speak of hypocrisy, which uses religion as a means of attaining sordid and selfish ends, nor of the thought- lessness which prompts people to utter religious words or perform religious acts without considering the con- sequences, for there is no real religion in either case. But I allude to the harsh judgments and the con- demnation pronounced by religious persons against those who differ from them, to the blood of martyrs of all ages and peoples, to the burning of heretics, to the so-called sacred synods and councils which have behaved like gangs of robbers, and to the so-called holy wars which have been waged with greater bitterness and obstinacy than any others. Are such horrors to be regarded as manifestations of religion ? Unquestion- ably. But they also indicate a morbid condition of the religion concerned. They prove that it is cramped by the fetters of particularism and pedantry, that it is identified with an effete tradition, that it is con- taminated by sordid passions, by arrogance, ambition, THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION. 13 'V and Hatred. And to these evils is added the confusion of form with substance, which begets the notion that our own form of religion, that of our fathers, or that of our people or our church, is not only the best (as it doubtless is for us), and not only the purest of all existing religions (which is quite possible, yet without entilling it to take precedence of others which ate less mature, but not necessarily inferior), but the only true religion, and one that ought to be adopted by the whole world. If this conviction gives birth to missionary enterprise as a labour of love and compassion, such enterprise, if rationally and prudently conducted, and not merely from proselytising motives, may be fraught with blessing. But when these motives are tainted with the passion of fanaticism, or clouded by the blind- ness of selfishness, crosses begin to be erected and stakes begin to blaze. But these are pathological phenomena, too often unjustly laid to the charge of religion itself, but which require to be studied and scientifically explained in order that we may learn to distinguish what is sound from what is morbid. And in undertaking this task the philosophic historian must refrain from all partisanship. He must not assume that all the wickedness of hell is on one side, and all the purity of heaven on the other. Even when the ^courage of martyrs who have died for their faith arouses his sympathy, or when he looks up reverently to the great Sufferer on the cross, he will not regard 14 SGIENOE OF RELIGION. their persecutors as utter fiends. For these persecutors were men, not fiends — ^meu weak and ignorant indeed, and blinded by passion and selfishness, yet attached to their religion, although in one of its forms only ; while their deeds of violence, although sadly misapplied, ^wealed that striving after unity which we have ^ready recognised as one of the mightiest factors in religious development. The holiest never ceases to be holy although it is abused ; and it is the duty of the scientific inquirer to discover it even when marred and obscured. Eeligion therefore, which is a mental condition, manifests itself in all kinds of words and deeds. And let me say once for all that, when we speak of religion pure and simple, and search for its essence and origin, we do not mean that kind of religion which is adopted, without inward conviction, as a necessary appendage of enlightened education, and put on like a Sunday gar- ment, but solely that religion which lives in the heart. And we have already pointed out its component parts —emotions, conceptions, and sentiments. The sequence in which I have named these elements of religion is not an arbitrary one. The question as to their order of precedence has been much debated. Some trace the origin of religion to the feelings, others to the thoughts, or at least to the imagination, while * thought and imagination are both traced to the intel- lect; others again trace it to the will. But many, THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION 15 despairing of recondlmg this conflict of opinion, have pronounced the whole inquiry to be futile, and have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to lay down any fixed rule. I do not, however, regard the matter as so unimportant or so hopeless. I am satisfied that a careful analysis of religious phenomena compels us to con^ude that they are all traceable to the emotions — traceable to them, I say, but not originating in them. They origin lies deeper, and we shall try to discover it at a later stage. Religion always begins with an emotion. Strictly speaking, an emotion is simply the result of something that moves us, the effect of some external agency. But I use the word here in the more general sense in which it is commonly understood. And in this sense every emotion embraces three elements : (1) a predisposition, in the form of certain longings or aspirations, as yet partly unconscious, and certain latent and vague con- ceptions, differing according to the temperament and inclination of the individual, which may be described as a mood ; (2) an impression produced upon us from without, or the affection itself ; and (3) the fact of be- coming conscious of such affection, or the perception of such affection. In the case of the great majority of people, religious emotions are awakened by the representations of others, whether heard in the teaching of parents or masters, of preachers and prophets, or contemplated in the works of 16 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. artists, ox learned from the scriptures which we have been taught from childhood to regard as specially sacred, or from other sources. But in the case of persons whose temperaments are religiously predisposed by nature, the emotion is aroused not only mediately, as above, but directly also by the events they witness in the world around them, and particularly in their own history, in their own life, and in the destinies of their own kith and kin, their family, tribe, or people. Their eyes do not require to be opened to the contem- plation of the divine, or at least they cannot rest satisfied with the views of it handed down by tradi- tion ; but they discern the divine where it has as yet been undiscovered by others. Or, to express it other- wise, and perhaps more clearly, things that fail to pro- duce any religious impression upon other people evoke it in them because they are more religiously disposed. For it depends solely on the mood or mental condition whether the things that a man hears, contemplates, or experiences — a word, a conception, an impressive natural phenomenon, or striking incident — awaken in him a religious or some other emotion. Many persons may sit at the feet of the inspired and eloquent preacher, and many may hang upon his lips, but few, very few, of them experience a religious awakening. Most of his cultured hearers will merely take an interest in his preaching as a work of art. The thoughtful will pay special attention to the force and accuracy of his argu- THE MANIFESTATIONS OF BELIGION 17 ment. Moralists, who value religion solely as a means of making men honest, will only appreciate him if his preaching conduces to that end. Not to speak of the great masses, who, though not actually lulled to sleep, hear the sonorous phrases with a kind of dreamy com- placency, without grasping their real meaning — how few there are whose inmost souls are stirred, and who are pjrompted to dedicate themselves and their lives to Ood'anew ! Nor is the case different when the emotion is awakened, not mediately, by the words and repre- sentations of others, but directly by things people see and feel for themselves. This requires no further ex- planation. We all know it by experience. Think for example of the starry vault of heaven. All who use their eyes must be struck with its beauty : those who have learned something of astronomy must marvel at its cosmic system and infinity; and this admiration will often give rise to religious emotion. But it is only the religiously disposed who will discern in it what the poetic eye of Etickert saw when in his famous sonnet he compares it to a letter written by God's hand, and sealed with the sun, but, when night has unsealed it, showing in myriads of lines a single mighty hiero- glyph “ ‘ Our God is love, a love which cannot lie.* No more than this, yet this is so profound, No human mind can fathom or explain.” And, as was the case with the poet, the emotion VOL. II. B 18 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. which has ripened into perception in the religious man is speedily and spontaneously transformed into a con- ception. Let it not be thought that those who are struck by the words they hear or read, or by the image they contemplate, merely adopt the conceptions of others, and that the conception precedes the emotion. This is apparently, but not really the case. No doubt it is a conception which produces an impression upon them, but it is only when the conception affects ihem religiously that they adopt it as their own. But every one does this in his own way ; for the conception which people form for themselves is never exactly like the one which has given rise to it, and of which it is only a reflection. And it never can be thoroughly appro- priated by them unless born of a genuine religious emotion. And next, produced by such a conception and awakened by emotion, there arises a definite sentiment, the direction of the will which impels to action, wbi^ makes the mouth speak out of the abundance of heart, which with gentle hand diffuses the precious fragrance of grateful love and veneration, and which, in short, will not allow the pions to rest until they have sealed it by word and deed. If we now inquire what it is that stamps an emotion, a conception, or a sentiment as religious, and what differentiates it from an aesthetic, intellectual, or ethical impression, we may answer in the familiar old words, THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION. 10 '*the tree is known by its fruits.” Words sincerely uttered and deeds spontaneously performed afford the true test. Religious emotions may indeed be so weak and transient, and conceptions so vague, that they exert no great influence upon the will, and are therefore scarcely perceptible in the life of the persons concerned. Butcf the emotion is vivid, and the conception distinct, they cannot fail to subdue the will and to yield good fruity. And the fruit is different from that yielded by an emotion which is merely admiration for what is out- wardly or morally beautiful, or for the sublime and attractive creations of poetic imagination, or for the in- scrutable depth and infinity of the universe governed by its immutable laws — an admiration which incites the philosophic mind to reflection and impels it to search for the origin of things, in order to found a system of the world. But in the sphere of religion the emotion consists in the consciousness that we are in the power of a Being whom we revere as the highest, and to whom we feel attracted and related; it consi«t» in the adoration which impels us to dedicate ourselves entirely to the adored object, yet also to , possess it and to be in union with it. This reminds me of a well-known and very suggestive myth which is admirably calculated to illustrate my argument. I mean the myth of Py^alion, which was perhaps borrowed by the Greeks from the Phoenicians, but was certainly recast by them in. a more beautiful so SCIENCE OF EELICION and poetic form. You ail knov the story. Pygmalion, the sculptor, has chiselled the image of a goddess so beautiful and so charming that, when it is finished, he falls in love with it. And, behold, the fervency of his love gives life to the cold marble, and the goddess be- comes his! So too the aspiration after the divine awakes in the mind as an indefinite longing ; atid 4hen, just , as the sculptor embodies his idea in his work of art, so the religious mind forms a conception of the deity, corresponding with his ideal ; but the conception does not burst into actual life, the believer is not wholly possessQj^^nd swayed by it, nor does he attain complete union with his God, until he worships Him in adoring love. I have called these three constituents of religion indispensable. And so they undoubtedly are. one only of the three is present, oj when on6 of Ihfe three is absent, there may be a certain religiosity, but there can be no sound and perfect religion. And this point requires to be emphasised, because the contrary has been maintained by various critics from difierent points of view. It was once the fashion, though we hear less of it nowadays, to look down with contempt on every manifestation of faith, and not even to take account of distinct conceptions and definite sentiments, but to attach importance solely to certain vague feelings and longings, as if they contained the whole pith and essence of religion. People felt specially edified by the THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION. 21 verses of a certain poet — who, as a poet, holds a fore- most rank — who in the midst of his wildest flights has sung of the immense espdrance which constrains us in spite of ourselves to raise our eyes to heaven ; and even now certain young poets who scribble their pious con- fessions on the table of some under the inspiring influence of their absinthe^ find enthusiastic admirers. I do not despise their outpourings, for I assume them to be genuine. I rejoice that the need of religion, so long obscured by prosaic materialism, is again beginning to make itself felt. This, however, is but the glimmer- ing of dawn ; the morning has yet to come ; and noon is still far distant. I am Hot sure whether any one maintains that the conception we form of the deity is really everything in religion, and that all else is indifferent. But people certainly often act as if they thought so. Our concep- tion of God and of our relation to Him is very far from being unimportant, and we should do our utmost to purify and ennoble it. But, however poetically beautiful or philosophically profound it may be, it possesses little religious value unless it proceeds from emotion and gives an impulse to the will. Lastly, it has been said, and it is still maintained by many, that everything depends on sentiment. Nor do we dispute that a great deal depends upon it. For is it not the blossom of which the fruit is the offspring ? But was there ever blossom or fruit without tree or BCJENOE OF RELIGION. plant? Surely the object towards which one's senti- ment is directed, whatever be the conception that sways it, is far from being unimportant. Obedience, calm submission, perfect dedication, and sincere adora- tion are all genuine religious sentiments ; and wherever they occur, there religion exists. But it is certainly , not a matter of indifference whether the believer dhter- tains such sentiments towards a benevolent Vishpu or towards a cruel S'iva, or obeys Melek or Ashtarte, or adores the Yahve of Israel, who takes no pleasure in human sacrifices and is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. And there may even be sentiment of a very virtuous and exemplary kind, but unless it is deeply rooted in emotion it cannot be called religious. There are, in short, three essential and inseparable requisites for the genuine and vigorous growth ^ religion : emotion, conception, and sentiment. All fife morbid symptoms in religious life are prob0%!|p.dlic to the narrow-mindedness which attaches value to one of these, or neglects one of the thrisie. if Migion be sought in emotion alone, there is in^mineii^ danger of its degenerating into sentimental or mystical fanati- cism. If the importance of conceptions be overrated, doctrine is very apt to be confounded with faith, creed with religion, and form with substance, an error which inevitably leads to the sad spectacle of religious bate, ostracism, and persecution. Those again who take account of sentiment alone regard every act done in THE MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGION 23 the name of religion, however cruel and inhuman, as justifiable on the ground that they are acts of faith {autos da f4) — of what kind of faith, they do not inquire — while others would care nothing if religion were entirely swallowed up by a dreary moralism. But, important as it is, the indissoluble union of thesa three elements does not of itself ensure the com- pleteness of religion. They must also be in equilibrium. In this respect religion differs from other manifesta- tions of the human mind. In the domain of art the feelings and the imagination predominate, and in that of philosophy abstract thought is paramount. The main object of science is to know accurately, imagina- tion playing but a subordinate part; while ethics are chiefly concerned with the emotions and the fruit they yield. In religion, on the other hand, all these factors operate alike, and if their equilibrium be disturbed, a morbid condition of religion is the result. And why is this ? The answer is to be found in the fact already pointed out, that religion constitutes the deepest foundation, or rather the very centre, of our spiritual life. Or, as it is sometimes expressed, “religion embraces the whole man.” If this means that religion, once awakened and quickened within our souls, sways our whole lives, nothing can be more certain. For the object I adore, and to which I have dedicated myself, occupies my thoughts and governs my actions. But, if understood too literally, the ex- 24 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. jpression would hardly be accurate, and might easily lead to fanaticism. Human life has other and perfectly ' justifiable aspects besides the religious. Yet one thing is certain, religion dwells in the inmost depths of our souls. Of all that we possess it is our veriest own. Our religion is ourselves, in so far as we raise ourselves above the finite and transient. Hence the enorjnous power it confers upon its interpreters and prophets, a power which has been a curse when abused by selfish- ness and ambition, but a blessing when guided by love — a power against which the assaults of the adversaries of religion, with the keenest shafts of their wit, with all their learning and eloquence, their cunning state- craft, and their cruel violence, are in the long-run un- availing and impotent. LECTUEE II. GENESIS AND VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. Every living religion that bears fruit in human life — that is, every religion rooted in faith — begins with emotion, whether produced by teaching and preaching, or by our own contemplation of nature around us, or by our wrestling with it and with our lot in life. Whatever it be that awakens religious life within us, whether something that touches us directly, or the fruit of the experience of others, or even something that has been transmitted to them and assimilated by them in their own particular way, it can only possess rubious eflScacy when our hearts are gen- uinely moved by it. I endeavoured to prove this in my first lecture. And I have already warned you* and it may not be superfluous to reiterate my warn- agfidnst confounding the beginning of religion, which is merely the awakening of religious conscious- ness, with its origin. Its origin lies more deeply rooted in man’s nature. Perceptions can but awaken 26 8GIENGE OF RELIGION. what already slumbers within us, and more highly gifted persons may voice what has hitherto lain inarticulate and even unknown to us in our hearts, but they cannot give us anything beyond what we already, though unconsciously, possess. They may reveal us to ourselves, but they can only do so pro- vided we are religiously predisposed. In others# they arouse alarm, dread, surprise, admiration, or even discontent, aversion, and embitterment. When we speak in religious language of the soul being stirred, or of its being touched by divine grace, we can only do so because, as the same language expresses it, man is created in God's image and has affinity with the divine. We must reserve for subsequent con- sideration the precise nature of the disposition of mind in which faith manifests itself, whether arousel|;- by the impression of one's own experience or tgr?, UiSirt't professions of faith made by others, and the ’ characteristics of that faith. Suflace it for the pre- sent to determine how it is born into the world. We must be careful to avoid the not uncommon error of confounding faith itself with the conception of faith, although indeed, as already pointed out, the emotion which calls it into life immediately trans- forms it into conceptions. We shall to-day consider the nature of these conceptions in general. And the first question that arises is, How are conceptions of faith formed? VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 27 The Well-known answer often given to this ques^ tion, and one that was defended at length by Pro- fessor Bauwenhoflf a few years ago in his ‘Philosophy of Eeligion/ ^ is, that conceptions of faith are the product of imagination. It is equally well known that this answer has been repudiated in various quarters, and often with indignation, as such a doc- trine was supposed to undermine faith itself and banish it to the realms of fancy. Nor was it only the supranaturalists of the old school who took offence at this theory. For it was no less strongly objected to by persons who were of opinion that a rational religion could only be supported by rational reflection, and therefore that the doctrine of belief, to be of any value, must be formed and reformed, maintained and defended by reason. To say that conceptions of faith are a product of imagination seemed to the austere rationalist tantamount to say- ing that they are^^ndemonstrated and undemonstrable nonsense. For my part, it has rather seemed to me a matter of surprise that so obvious and simple a truth should require any defence. It is just as axiomatic as the fact that we see with our eyes and hear with our ears, with this qualification, however, which I must hasten to add, that we could neither see nor hear as we do unless we had brains, and that our imagina- ^ Wijsbegeerte van den Qodsdienst, p. 611 seq. 28 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. tion acts as that of reasonable beings. And this imagination is one of the noblest faculties of the human mind. Like a creative artist within us, it presents us with living pictures of what we ourselves have never beheld, and of things that have happened in the past or at some remote distance; it encircles the heads of those we love and revere with a radiant halo of glory; it builds for us an ideal world which consoles us for all the miseries and infirmities of actual life, and for the realisation of which we can never cease to strive. Nay, even upon our mono- tonous everyday life it sheds a poetic glow. But is it not a very dangerous faculty ? Would it not be better for us, as practical men of sense, to get rid of the torments of this lively imagination, and thus escape many a bitter disappointment? Or would it not be wiser in us, simple mortals, to refrain irom such lofty flights, which almost invariably result a painful fall upon the hard ground of rea3^ity ? No doubt, if left to itself, and unchecked by a clear in- tellect and a well-disposed heart, imagination may be a very dangerous faculty, and may lead to morbid fancies and even to fanaticism and madness. No doubt it is like a fiery steed, which, unless reined in with a firm and practised hand, may carry its rider he knows not whither. Yet without it there would be nothing left for us but to crawl on the earth and eat dust like the serpent in the garden of Eden. VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 2d Let us therefore distinctly understand what imag- ination can» and what it cannot do, and what part it takes in the formation of our religious conceptions. It creates images and ideals, but it borrows the materials for these from reality, from observation and recollection. It is the imagination that unites into a harmbnious whole the images reflected in our minds by perception, and preserved by memory, but which, however rich and manifold, are but imperfect repre- sentations of what really exists in the world of phenomena. By it alone the historian is enabled, with the imperfect data at his command, to sketch a picture of the past in what he believes to have been its true colours, or of the progress of human development. By it alone the man of science is enabled to form an idea of the connection of pheno- mena and the laws which govern them; with its aid alone can the philosopher construct his system. With its aid also the religion^ man gives concrete shape to the faith that is in him by mean of the image of an ideal future and a supernatural and divine world. But imagination can do no more. It can only create images which give utterance to some thought, or give vent to some feeling. If it does not do this, the images are but the vain fancies of a wandering brain, and mere empty dreams. And accordingly when we call conceptions of faith the product of imagination, we must lay special stress on the word SCIENCE OF RELIGION. m conceptions^ as being the forms in which faith reveals ^ itself. And indeed the* emotions and the intellect •contribute just ’ as much to the conceptions as the imagination which forms them. Imagination em- bodies religious thought and religious feeling, but , thought and feeling are the essential and abiding . elements. And therefore as soon as religious thought is deepened, and religious feeling purified — as soon, in short, as the religious man is developed— there arises the need of new conceptions to express more accurately what he thinks and feels in his higher stage of progress. Conceptions of faith have therefore no permanent and absolute value, except, as I shall presently point out, to a limited extent only. And how should they |i What do we see here of the Eternal except an ut^i : certain reflected image ? What image, however > however sublime, can adequately represet^ ^tbe In- finite ? Even St Augustine and ThonjAS Aqujnas recognised the fact that we can only approach God in spirit, but that we cannot comprehend Him. And so, too, all sensible and devout people must be con- vinced that no conception of God, no conception of the infinite and supernatural, can be more than a feeble attempt to picture them to ^urselves. And hence it is that images which long served to express the faith bf many generations are superseded by others which satisfy new needs. We may admire VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 81 the poetry and appreciate the religious thought expressed in the Homeric Zeus, with his council of Olympians, or in the God of Israel, riding upon the Cherubim, or speaking in a still small voice after the terrors of the storm, in the presence of His prophet, who reverentially hides his face; but these conceptions no longer respond to our religious con- sciousness. We hesitate to think of God, who is a spirit; as being visible to mortal eye. It is only in parables, or in the wearers of His image, inspired by His spirit, that we venture to figure Him to our- selves in human form. From our point of view, therefore, the picture of the father and his two sons, the penitent whom he embraces joyfully and enter- tains sumptuously, and the jealous elder son, whom he seeks to appease with gentle forbearance, will ever form the classic expression of God’s all- embracing, all -forgiving, all -enduring love. There is no doubt, however, that conceptions of faith possess relative, though not absolute value. The re- ligious man of every age, and of every stage of develop- ment, longs for something more than vague feelings or abstract philosophical ideas. He desires to behold his God, if not with his bodily eyes, yet with his mental vision. And this is proved by the whole history of religion. The less developed religions invoke the aid of art to represent their gods, whom they desire to behold and to keep near them. Those, again, who 32 SaiENGE OF RELIGION. deem their God too holy to be represented in human ^ form are fain to surround^Him with the images of His elect messengers and saints, and, above all, of the only Mediator. Others who, from dread of abuse and idolatry, have refused to tolerate even this, do not disdain the use of symbols, and delight in pictures and other representations of sacred legends. And sfccord- ingly, if any one desires to awaken religious sentiment by his words, let him refrain from abstractions, con- ceptions, and logical demonstrations ; but let him rather, as a poet, or prophet, or preacher, strive to make his hearers behold the Divine as he himself has beheld it. In the formation of conceptions of faith, therefore, imagination is not the sole agent. All it does or can do is to give shape in our minds to the religious sensa- tions we experience, and to the thoughts awakened itt' us by these sensations. For thought contributes less than feeling and imagination to the genesis of conceptions. It even precedes their operation. With every sensation there at once arises, by virtue of our innate mental norm of causality, the question, Whence? And in religion, as well as in philosophy, this is really an inquiry as to the deepest foundations, the highest Cause ; and the invariable answer of the religious soul is, A power not ourselves, but a power above us, on which we are dependent, and with which we are yet related. This answer is not the result of long and. VALVE OF OOi^CEPTIONS OF FAITH. 3?; deliberate contemplation, or of a calm and logical argUf ment, but of a sudden and spontaneous process of reasoning of which we are ourselves unaware. It is only then that we form an idea of that power, an idea more or less in accord with the nature of our first sensation. Eeligious conceptions therefore originate in no, different way from those of the artist or the poet, but they differ from them in one important respect. While the creations of art completely answer their object when they express aesthetic beauty, though purely ideal, religious conceptions, on the other hand, have no value as such unless supported by the con- viction that they represent something real, however imperfectly, or unless, in a word, they are the expression of faith. We now reach the vexed question, What is the relation between belief and knowledge ? Or, to limit it to the special subject of our investigation, What is the difference between the conception of faith and the propositions of science? The chief answers usually given to this question are well known. “ They are diametrically opposed,” says one of them ; “ the latter are founded on exact observation, and are the result of clear and logical reasoning; the former, scientifically speaking, are mere guesses about things unperceivable and invisible, and are therefore just as uncertain as the others are well founded. Any one may convince a man in his sound and sober senses of a scientific truth VOL. u. c 34 SCIENCE OF RELIGION by means of a clear demonstration, but nobody can prove the truth of conceptions of faith to any man who 4oes not already possess faith. Knowledge is com- municable, faith is not.” “Conceptions of faith,” so runs another answer, “ are the boundary - ideas of , science ; they form the necessary complements of f human knowledge, which, because it is humai\, can- not extend beyond what is perceivable.” And further it may be stated generally, without mentioning various other answers in detail, that there have been for ages past, and that there still are, Christian and non- Christian churches, sects, parties, and schools which recognise the dicta of science only in so far as they do not conflict with their own conceptions of faith, because they believe these conceptions to be founded on divine revelation, or at least to be irrefragable convictions. We shall neither defend nor impugn any of these/ opinions directly. Apologetics and dogmi^if^ ar^; foreign to our subject. We consider tl^ lights of faith to be just as well established as thosew science ; and we are convinced that, when they come into colli- sion, it is because one or other of them has overstepped the boundary between their respective provinces. We need not here vindicate the rights of science, while those of faith will be better vindicated by the results of our investigation than by any long argument* But we must not pass over in silence the question as to the mutual relations between science and faith. VALUE OF CONOEPTIOm OF FAITH. 86 Aud» in the first place, we must ^tinguish between science and knowledge. No one qcN^ed to judge will deny that such a distinction exists. JUt the two things are generally oonfoiinded. Knowledge is the soit.#nd the indispensable^^i^terial with which science wo!*ks, but it is not itself science. Every man of science must be learned, and the more he knows, or rather the more thorough his knowledge is, the better ; but every learned man is not a man of science. The latter must not only possess extensive and accurate knowledge, but he must be capable of thinking clearly. Some fifty years ago it was a favourite saying that “ knowledge is power,** which has doubtless given rise to the modern system of overburdening the brains of our school- children ; but knowledge, like wealth, is a useless and even dangerous power in the hand of those who know not how to wield it aright. All essential knowledge is acquired by observation and research, and it is com- municable to all who possess sound sense and the capacity to follow such research. In other words, it is demonstrable, and every unprejudiced person must admit the validity of the demonstration. But it is obvious that the knowledge thus acquired is of a totally different kind from what, in religious language, if usually termed the “ knowledge of God,** which is really identical with faith. In a certain sense it may be said that faith all^iiiwts on experience, and that it is awakened by what/W0 see, hear, and perceive ; but SCIENCE OF RELIGION. the experience is an emotion of the soul, and the religious man transfers what he beholds and perceives to a sphere which eye hath not seen nor ear heard. All conceptions of faith are inferences. Acquired by- reflection and shaped by imagination, they cannot be demonstrated like the results of research, or imparted in the Same way as knowledge. Between knowledge and faith there thus exists a difference in kind. If the term knowledge be applied solely to facts ascertained by the perception of the senses, and these alone be called truth, faith becomes a very uncertain term, and can lay no claim to the name of truth. But in that case science, too, would have to renounce all claim to certainty. And so, like- wise, would many of the most cherished convictions which influence our actions and sway a great pa3:|i^ our lives — I allude in particular to confidence in ttie love of our relations, and in the honesty ^d sincerity of our friends and fellow-workers, and no less to our own self-reliance, both of which are ultimately and necessarily rooted in faith, but with which we are not now immediately concerned. For science — not in the limited English sense of tlie term, which usually denotes the natural science^ only, but in the wider sense now generally attached to it — science is not a collection or encyclopaedic summary of all we know about a given subject, but is a philosophic conviction founded upon what we know. Science is not attained VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 97 by mere perception — which is indeed as much sub* jective as objective, and never presents reality with absolute precision — but solely by means of reasoning from acquired knowledge, and by means of hypotheses, destined to explmn the mutual connection between ascertained facts, hypotheses which at first rise to the level of mere probability, but which by the discovery of new facts may be established as laws. This applies also to the so-called exact sciences, with the single exception of mathematics, which is concerned with ideal dimensions and proportions, and is therefore purely formal. But all the other sciences, and in particular the historical and anthropological, the so- called mental sciences, start from a hypothesis without which we are unable to advance a step : I mean that intuitive belief in causal relation which is implanted in us by nature, a belief which fevery one therefore takes for granted, though no one can prove it. In . other words, they start from a belief. And thus, where we are concerned, not merely with ascertaining facts, but with criticising, explaining, and combining tholn. so as to build them up into a probable system, the subjective element asserls itself ; mood, taste, opin^|^ and temperament play '^foremost part; and a deal must be left to intuition and aesthetic sentii^^ ^ Between faith, which strives, on the basis of Jt ^ / perceptibn, to form an idea of what lies beyond tion, and science, which, kept within i|s piopei^w SCIENCE OF BELIGION. S6 makes the perceptible the sole object of its research, the opposition is not so absolute as is commonly supposed. If anything like perfect certainty reigns in the province of science, how comes it that fierce conflicts so often arise between its different schools and parties ? Nor is this merely the case when stupid and ignorant people are set to rights by lucid thinkers and sound scholars ; for we often see the most distinguished men and the highest authorities attacking each other with a bitter- ness which pales the fire of the notorious odium theo- logicum. Science and faith are therefore by no means opposed to each other in the same way as certainty and uncertainty. Scientific theories and conceptions of faith are both attempts to explain what we perceive in nature and in mankind. The former do npt go bcr yond the demonstration of the finite caifses and fixed laws which govern physical and mental life. The latter ascend to one or more supernatural causes, in which everything that is finite has its origin. And neither these theories nor these conceptions are immut- able : for, with the advance of science, the development of thought, or the increase of moral insight, both are liable to be modified or even entirely superseded by others. Both are the fruit of imagination as well as of reflection, both start from what we behold and ex- perience, l)ut one aims solely at explaining the world of phenomena from within itself, while the other sup- plements that explanation by bearing witness to the VALVM OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 99 existence of a higher world, whence alone the visible world can be understood. To the man of science the results he attains appear more certain, because the phenomena by which he can test them are more easily controlled f and superficial people, who are blind to all that is not perceptible to the senses, agree with him. «But the religious man, though well aware that the con- ceptions in which his faith are expressed form but a feeble reflex of the reality, is no less assured of the truth of that faith, and his assurance is justified by the instinctive dictates of his soul. Can he then impart this assurance to others ? This is what many doubt. I can expound a scientific theory so clearly, and prove so plainly that it accounts for certain facts better than any other, that every one who is capable of following my exposition without bias or prejudice must feel compelled to assent to it. This applies, however, solely to intellectual conviction. But in order to get others to assent to my conceptions of faith, the most cogent argument will be fruitless unless their hearts are touched."^ However poetically sublime a conception may be, however profound a doctrine, however masterly and logical a system, while we may admire it, we cannot adopt it as the expression of bur faith so long as our faith is different. " There is indeed an old saying which rightly declares that no one can give us faith." Such is the* argument. And it has been so often repeated that it has become a commonplace. .80IEN0E OF RELIGION. 40 I do not deny that there is some truth in it. But it does not follow that it is absolutely convincing, or that we may draw the conclusion from it that a scientific theory may be imparted by means of rational demon- stration, while a conception of faith is incapable of Vbeing thus imparted.' Let us examine the two proposi- tions a little more closely. Are they so very different ? We cannot make others participants of our beliefs if they are entirely destitute of faith, for we cannot give them faith. But neither can we make them partici- pants of our scientific conviction if they lack clear in- telligence and sound judgment, and these we cannot give them. In both cases there is a condition precedent to be fulfilled before our demonstration can take effect. In both cases we are powerless when we encounter stupidity or prejudice or unbelief. Surely, then, it is mistake to maintain that science is communicable, faith is not. The true solution of the difiBcuhgr is, in short, to be found in the fact, which no one will dispute, that science and faith have each a special sphere and a peculiar character, and that they must therefore be proclaimed by different methods. ' How, then, can we impart our belief to others ? Can we do so by the convincing force of our argument, or by the strict logic of our demonstration ? Certainly not. We can only do so when our words find an echo in their souls.^ It is unreasonable to demand that we should only adopt religious opinions after having care- VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 41 fully scrutinised the grounds on which they rest, and after having convinced ourselves that they are not opposed to reason. How few there are who are in a position to do this ! Surely, then, it; is contrary to reason to insist that this is what should generally be done. *Eeligious feelings are usually impressed upon us, at a time of life when we are as yet incapable of such scrutiny, by parents and teachers whose lessons interpret the prevailing opinions of society, of the church, and of the traditions of previous generations. If we fall under other influences at a subsequent period, if we feel that what we learned and repeated in our youth ceases to respond to the religious needs of a more advanced time of life, we can then form concep- tions which satisfy these better, or we can attach our- selves to some school of thought to which we feel specially attracted. But even then we are generally constrained by an impulse of the soul, rather than by a scrupulous balancing of the for and against in a rational method. ‘ Argument, the search for reasons and proofs, is a thing that comes later, when we are called upon to account to others for our religious convictions, or are impelled by contradiction to justify our faith to ourselves. In his chapter entitled "Authority and Eeason,” one of the most remarkable in his work on the ‘ Foundations of Belief,* already cited, Mr A. J. Balfour skilfully and to a great extent triumphantly refutes the view which 42 Sai^KCE OF BMLIGION. has often been accepted as axiomatic, that Beason, and reason only, can be safely permitted to mould the convictions of mankind. By its inward counsels alone should beings who boast that they are rational submit to be controlled.” And he combats the popular preju- dice ‘Hhat authority serves no other purpose in the economy of nature than to supply a refuge for all that is most bigoted and absurd.” He adduces various examples to show that this is largely imagination, and that, in so general a sense at least, it is contradicted by the actual facts. At the close of his comprehensive argument he determines the relative positions of Rea- son and Authority in the formation of belief. He recognises the fact that to Reason is largely due the growth and sifting of our knowledge and the systema- tising of the conclusions of our learning ; that to Rea- son we are in some measure beholden for aid in manag- ing our personal affairs, in so far as they are not already*; controlled by habit ; and lastly, that Reason also 4irectS '‘ or misdirects the public policy of communitiea%itl^ the narrow limits permitted by custom and traditiOh. Whatever other influence it exerts is indirect and unconscious. But all these operations of Reason are trifling compared with the all-pervading influences of Authority, which at every moment of our lives moulds our feelings, aspirations, and beliefs, whether as indivi- duals or as members of society. And this, according to the view of this acute thinker, is very fortunate. VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 48 For reason is a power which divides and disintegrates, and there is mucji more need of “forces whicTi bind and stiffen, without which there would be no society to develop.” And although he admits that Authority has often perpetuated error and retarded progress, Reason has not always been productive of unmixed good. We owe to Authority rather than to Reason our ethics, our politics, and above all our religion. Upon Authority depend the elements of our science and the foundations of our social life, and by Authority the superstructure of society is cemented. “And though it may seem to savour of paradox,” he con- cludes, “it is yet no exaggeration to say, that if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it, not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for influen- cing and being influenced by the action of Authority.” If we were disposed to banter, we might say that such a philosophy was of course to be expected of a statesman clothed with authority and a member of the Government, but that we should probably hear a totally different opinion if the speaker were sitting on the benches of the Opposition. But it is with the philosopher alone, and not with the statesman, that we have to deal. And there is indeed so much truth in his reasoning that we are much more inclined to agree than to disagree with 44 SGIENGE OF BELIOION. him. For it would be of little use to maintain that authority has so much i^iore influence over us, par- ticularly in social life and in religion, only because humanity in general is so backward in rational in- sight, and that it is only the dite who are guided by Ileason, while the mass of mankind is impervious to its persuasion. And it would be a mere trifling with words to say that Eeason also is in its way a kind of authority from which, when it is once brought home to us, we cannot escape. But we cannot accept the proposition of the learned author without reserve, or at least further explanation. What is here meant by Eeason, and what by Authority? Is reason merely the faculty of arguing, criticising, and sifting with full consciousness ? If so, we certainly are not indebted to it for our religion or even for our concepr tions of faith. But reason, which indeed also aoll^ within us unconsciously, embraces far more than the purely intellectual faculty of criticising and com- bining, which to a less extent belonge to the* lower animals also, and enables them to understand our commands. It is the faculty which differentiates the self-conscious human spirit from the intelligence of the lower animals, and enables him to form abstract ideas, to ascend from the particular to the general, and to in- vestigate the cause and effect, the origin and destiny of things. And probably no one will dispute that it is pre- cisely to this category that religious conceptions belong. VALUE OF OONOEPTIONS OF FAITH. 45 And what is Authority? The meaning of the term is certainly not invariable. There is a usurped authority which can only be maintained by force and fear. Some submit to it from ambitious motives, or because they think it to their advantage. But most people obey it unwillingly, and under compul- sion alone, and throw it off as a burdensome yoke as soon as they see a chance of success. And it matters little whether the authority is wielded by the powers above us, by the State or the priesthood, or by some domestic tyrant, or perhaps by our equals or inferiors who try to force their ideas and prejudices upon us by the sheer force of numerical majority. To bow before such authority is degrading to every rational being. It begets hypocrites and infidels. And a faith which has no other foundation is undeserving of the name. And there is also a deceptive authority exercised by plausible sophists and demagogues, whether blind leaders of the blind, or persons who know better, but are actuated solely by mercenary motives or ambition. We must therefore make sure, when we are urged to reverence authority, that it is a legitimate authority. The only legitimate authority is that of our mental or moral superiors, gifted ex- perts in science or art, profound thinkers, men or women of character and weight, sages and saints. Their authority is legitimate, for it is founded upon their actual superiority. It does not require to be 46 80IEN0E OF RELIGION. maintained by force or fear. Those who are modest and not entirely devoid of self-knowledge submit to it willingly, not with the passive obedience of slaves; or with blind reverence, or with thoughtless imitation but because they feel that it opens their eyes to a clearer light and rouses their souls to higher enthusi- asm ; or, to use Mr Balfour's language, because they find themselves brought into a mental state which gives them greater peace, into a spiritual atmosphere where they breathe more freely. Be it noted, then, that personal influence and superiority, even in the province of science, to a greater extent than people think, but chiefly in that of religion, are the most powerful levers. We cannot impart our belief tc others by cold reasoning; we can only win them over and carry them away by the fire and fervency of our conviction. And in adopting that belief they usually accept along with it the conceptions in whiifiA it is conveyed, as being its most appropriate ei^boditp ment. It is therefore undoubted that, like nuilty other elements in our intellectual, moral, and emo- tional life, our religion and faith also largely rest upon authority, or at least emanate from authority, the authority of tradition, instruction, and persona] superiority. But it is no less true that such a faith is valueless, and that such a religion lacks vitality, unless they have found in our souls an echo of which our minds bear witness. For the only true and legiti- VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH, 47 mate authority is not that of arguments, which are often deceptive, nor that of man’s individual reason, but solely that of truth, a heritage handed down to us by our ancestors, a light kindled by the most gifted of our contemporaries, awakening whatever truth 1^ been slumbering within us — a process, whether we call it insight, or feeling, or conscience, which is ultimately nothing but the authority of Reason, or, to use a religious expression, the authority of the divine spirit within us. In conclusion, those who entertain religious con- victions hold them no less firmly than those who have scientific convictions. To impart them to others is not more difficult, and in some respects is even easier, than to induce them to accept scientific propositions. But there is a difference. We cannot possibly define faith by means of dry mathematical formulae, or symmetrical syllogisms, or cold abstractions of meta- physics, without committing moral suicide. Faith can only embody in images, in symbols and allegories, in legends and parables, its bold aspirations, and its speculations soaring above the finite and transient. Not because it stands on a lower platform than science, but because it has a higher aim. It must make shift to express itself in a language which is too poor to express everything. It is, so to speak, a king in exile, a son of God in human form. Those therefore who, in order to prove that it does not con- 4$ SOI E NOB OF EELiaiON fliot with common - sense, seek to bind it down to ^mmonplace, everyday morality, and thus rob it of ill beauty and fragrance, render just as poor a ser- vice to religion as those who maintain that the dog- ipatic, in which they sum it up for their own l^jnvenience or that of their generation, is itself the internal and immutable truth. Schopenhauer, whom we may admire for many excellent and true sayings, without adopting his pessimism, pointed out long ago that it is a common mistake of Supranaturalists and Eationalists to seek for pure, literal, and unveiled truth in religion. This, however, is to be sought for in philosophy alone ; religion — or as I should rather say, religious conception — “ only possesses an indirect, emblematic, allegorical truth.” “ Eationalists are worthy people, but dull fellows ; ” “ Those who try to find the plain and naked truth, either in the domain of history, or in that of dogma, are the euhemer- ists of our time.” The supranaturalists do per- ceive that their doctrine is but the husk of j^fou^ and weighty truth which cannot be rendered intelli- gible to the great majority of people in ar^ other way. “But religion is well adapted to satisfy the indelible metaphysical requirements of mankind, and with most people forms a substitute for pure philo- sophic truth, which is difficult and perhaps impossible of attainment.” I can only accept this last utterance of the philos- VALUE OF CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. 49 ♦ - opher with some reserve. But thii brings us to the important question of the relation between religion and philosophy, or rather between the doctrine of faith and philosophy, a question too extensive and weighty to be disposed of without due deliberation. We shall therefore proceed to consider it in our next lecture. VOL. n. 60 LECTUEE III. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE. We now reach the important question, What is the relation of religion to philosophy ? Or, to put it more precisely, what is the relation between the doctrine of faith, as the summary of all religious conceptions, or the theory of religious life, and that science of sciences which strives to weld the results of all investigation into a harmonious whole, with a view to peno||ii|2lX) the root of all things, to the principia. remm f always been felt that, though often in conflict, ^he doctrine of faith and that science of sciences are closely related. For both seek unity in multiplicity and diversity. Both “are concerned specially and primarily with that monistic side of the cosmos which underlies all the divisions which separate finite indi- viduals from each other." ^ Are they rivals which cannot exist side by side, and which therefore naturally ^ C. B. Upton, Lectures on the Basis of Religious Belief ; Hibbert Lectures, 1898, p. 17. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE. 51 Strive to supplant each other ? Or are they truly one and the same thing, but merely in different shape, in a lower and higher, a less and a more highly developed form, one of which is destined ultimately to resolve itself into the other ? Has the one arisen out of the other, or has each a distinct origin and a special aim t Such are the questions which we must now lacy to answer. There are three possible solutions, each of which has its advocates. We may regard philosophy, or at least its theosophic part, as merely a more precise and scientific form of religious doctrine. Philosophy would then have sprung from religion, and would be destined to satisfy those who are more intellectually developed, and who desire definite declarations instead of the parables and allegories in which the conceptions of faith are usually clothed. It would then have gradually severed itself from faith, it would have lost its distinctively religious character, and would at last have entered upon an independent course of development. Conversely, philosophy may have been the parent, and religious doctrine the offspring. In this case the latter would be regarded as a popular philosophy, rendered accessible to the many, by means of which religion would strive to build its practical system on a theoretical foundation. And in point of fact, there is an influ^tial school of theologians which maintains 52 SCIENCE OF BELIGION. something of the kind. According to them religion is purely practical, and its essential is worship. The sole question that concerns the religious man is, What must I do to be saveij? This is the instruction he desires to obtain. But all speculations as to the being and attributes of God, His relation to the external world, the origin and future of that world and humanity, and everything connected with these themes, belong to philosophy. The pious man, as such, does not puzzle his brains with such questions. And if theologians feel the necessity of rounding off their system of religion with them, they must borrow them from philosophy. A third possible solution is, that religious doctrine and philosophy, though closely related, have originated independently, have developed separately, and hAye entirely diflferent objects in view. And this solut^ also has its champions. We cannot entirely concur in any of these proposed solutions. Each contains an element of truth, and the last is probably nearest the truth. Each suffices to account for certain phenomena, but not one of them can satisfactorily account for all the phenomena. We must, therefore, strike out a new path for ourselves. And with this object in view, we must explain at the outset that we are speaking of philosophy and religious doctrine in the widest sense. We do not memi philo^ sophy solely as it shows itself in the mystio specula- PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE, 53 tions of the Indians, or in the more rational and logical, though still partly fantastic, systems of ancient Greece, where philosophy, as we now understand and employ the term, first saw the light. Nor do we speak of religious doctrine merely as that form which has been reduced to a more or less scientific system by the schools of Christian theology, a dogmatic system which, indeed, in so far as it is in touch with philosophy, is rooted in the philosophy of Greece. But we include all speculations as to the ultimate source of the universe, even in their most primitive forms, figured by means of images, myths, symbols, and the like creations of the imagination, forms of thought necessary to man in his infancy ; and we attach even more importance to these than to the abstract conceptions demanded by a more mature stage of development. Every man in his sound senses, who does not lead the life of a half- dormant animal, philosophises in his way ; and in all ages and among all peoples there have been men who felt the necessity of reflection more than their fellows, and who became the sages and the spiritual leaders of the generation. The Polynesian, surrounded by the ocean, asks himself how his island, his world, sprang out of the bosom of the deep ; the Hottentot and the Kaffir marvel that the moon-god, their great-grand- father, although at times lost to sight, "ever revives, while his children must die ; the Eed Indian seeks for the origin of the world and humanity in the fertilise- 54 SOIENCE OF RELIGION, tion of the waters, which contain the germs of all life, by means of the mighty breath of the great creating Spint, — and they are all philosophers and theologians in their way. There is not a single system of myth- ology, even among the most barbarous peoples, that does not possess its legend of the Creation, and thus endeavours to account for the origin of the universe. However childish the legend, however limited its universe, however destitute of poetry its form, it is by no means far removed from the beginnings of Greek philosophy in the time of Thales of Miletus; and though but a crude outline compared with the systems of Plato or Hegel, it does not differ from them in kind. And when we consult the most ancient literature we possess, we find that the Egyptians and Babylonians, the Chinese, the Indians, and the Persians, not # speak of the Greeks and the Eomans, had their complete cosmogony and anthropogony, and some more or less vague conceptions as to the universe, tlie genesis, the connection, and the destiny of things, and the nature of msm.^ These peoples had advanced beyond the infantile or rudimentary stage. Who does not know the often-quoted hymn in the tenth book of the Egveda (129), which refers to the time when there was as yet neither existence nor non-existence, neither Death nor Immortality, neither air nor heavens, and when the One breathless breathed within itself, until the creative desire awoke in it and manifested the first germs of PHILOSOPHY AND RELIOIOUS DOCTRINE. 56 spirit ? Scarcely less familiar is the Babylonian cosmogony, which has indeed retained more of the mythical form, but which also reaches back to the time when “the Heaven was yet unnamed, and the Earth beneath had no name, but the waters of the two oceans, the heavenly and the earthly, were as yet mingled.” Even the pious Iranian, though more inclined to study the practical • side of life than to immerse himself in profound speculations, entreats Mazda Ahura to tell him,^ “Who is the first author, the father pf Eight (asha) ? Who created the path for the sun and the stars ? Who makes the moon wax and wane ? From thee, 0 Mazda, I long to learn this and much besides ! ” “ Who keeps the earth and the clouds above from falling ? Who created the waters and the trees ? Who has given swiftness to the wind and the thunder-cloud ? Who, 0 Mazda, is the creator of the human race ( Vohu Mario) ? ” ^ “ What artificer has created light and darkness ? What artificer has created sleep and awakening? Who has made morning, noon, and night? What leads the mind of him who cares for that which is right ? ” ^ I quite admit that these are the merest beginnings of philosophy, half-mythical, half-dogmatical concep- ^ Gd.t]m ushtavaiti, Yaan. 44, 3 seq. ® I .^iak Vohu Mano, tho good mind, here signifies the human race. * The last line is obscure, and the translation can only be con- jectured. 56 SaiENOE OF EELIGIOiSL tions, which are not yet reduced to the unity of a symmetrical system of .philosophy or of religious doctnne. This process comes later. The need of satisfying ourselves as to the foundations on which our convictions and^our religious belief rest, and of harmonising our views of the world and of life, pre- supposes a maturity of reflection which requires a long previous course of training. Yet each has his own system, although it be unconscious. For in every stage of development people are dominated by a single root-idea, whence all special conceptions take their rise. It was such a system that we named polyzoism in its religious aspect, and hylozoism on its philo- sophical side — ^namely, the conception that all life is caused by a multiplicity of spirits dwelling in matter. Such a system, too, was Animism or Spiritism, th4 belief that spirits can move independently and choo^^ their dwelling in objects of every kind, and difipBt^^ their power in all sorts of natural pheaoiai^ and human emotions. Systems they are, though unwritten, and neither taught by schools or universities, nor inculcated by churches, but which, no less than the philosophy of Aristotle or Kant, of the doctrines of Trent or Geneva, have dominated long periods of his- tory, and which, to use the felicitous expression of Mr A. J. Balfour, form the spiritual atmosphere we breathe. ^ Philosophy and faith thus existed before they were PHILOBOPUY AND RELiGIOUS DOCTRINE. 57 reduced to systems, or were arranged in scholastic or ecclesiastical dogmas. In recognising this, we by no means return to the theory commonly named after Creuzer, its ablest and most learned advocate, which attracted great attention at the beginning of the present century, the theory that mythology and sym- bolism— that is to say, the beliefs of ancient peoples — were nothing but philosophy in disguise, an exoteric doctrine destined for the multitude, and interpreted literally by them in their simplicity, but whose esoteric significance was perfectly understood by the philo- sophers and divines who had devised it. This theory has long since been condemned by all scholars ; and no one could venture to defend it nowadays without exposing himself to ridicule. Nor can the theory be maintained in the new form which certain philosophers have given it, to the effect that our dogmatic is merely a diluted philosophy, translated from stiff formuhe and abstract ideas into figures and symbols, solely for the convenience of the ignorant many, whose thinking capacity is as yet insufficiently trained to receive the truth except in parables — a sort of picture-book for children, who could understand nothing of the matter without it. For it is inaccurate to say that the Christian religion, for example, in its different vari- ations, consists in figures and similes, except only in so far as human language is inadequate to express the supernatural and infinite otherwise than by analogy. 6B ' SaiENOE OF MELIcftOK For this is not done merely to satisfy the needs of the v;le8s developed, but simply because it is unavoidable. There are things which we cannot speak of in any other way. And does not even philosophy, when it pene- trates to the lowest depths, or soars to the loftiest heights, or when it grapples with the most difiBcull problems, adopt the very same method ? The only persons who neither adopt nor require to adopt this method are those who give up the attempt to seek for unity in the interpretation of the world’s problem, and who deny everything supernatural. And as regards Antiquity — the period of the origin, co-ordination, and organisation of myths, or in a word, the mytho- logical period in its two stages — mythology was not then a mere vehicle for conveying truths which not be otherwise grasped, but was itself the philosophy and religious doctrine of that peri^ Myths and symbols were at first the necessaiy' of both, for they were the only forms of thgiig^t corresponding with the imaginative capacity in that <^arly stage of development. To later and less un- sophisticated times belong the temple - schools and sacerdotal colleges ; the gods are classified in the- ogonies, and in the hierarchy of an organised heavenly kingdom; the genesis of all things is explained in cosmogonies ; sometimes, at least among the Aryan peoples, the whole drama of the world is traced in its successive periods, and crowned with speculations PHILOSOPHY AND EELIGIOlTS DOCTEINE, 59 concerning its most distant future. But here again we deny that theae are images which conceal their thoughts: in w far as they are images, they are the only possible expressions of the daring thoughts of their period. Thus far philosophy and religious doctrine are still closely connected, so closely indeed that it is impossible to distinguish the one from the other. As yet all philosophical speculation is at the same time a con- ception of faith. The stage of thinking, with a view to comprehend and to explain, the stage of science ot philosophy as ends in themselves, has not yet arrived. There is as yet no theory apart from practice. At length, slowly but surely, comes the differentiation. Laymen attempt the solution of questions hitherto regarded as the sole property of priests and theo- logians. Even the Vedic Brahmanas afford evidence of this in more than one passage.^ Kings, who thus belonged to the rank of the Kajanyas, ventured to ask questions of learned and even famous Brahmans, such as Yajnavalkya ; and when these sages were embarrassed and unable to reply, the questioners themselves supplied the answers. Questions and answers alike seem to us absurd. They are character^ istic of that playful fencing of wits in which Orientals delight. Yet they are the first glimmerings of a ' See the pass^g^ quoted b3^Dr John Muir in his * Original Sanskrit Texts/ vol. i. p. 427 seq. 60 SCIENCE OF RELIGION philosophy more or less independent of religion, or v,at least independent of those who had hitherto usurped exclusive sway in all spiritual matters — a philosophy according indeed but little with our methods of thinking, yet one which by its originality, depth, and boldness constitutes an important chapter in the history of the human mind. The independent philo- sophy of the West took its rise in Greece, that cradle of our modern civilisation, and developed its greatest power among the Germanic peoples, and not least in that country where, as I am assured, every thinking being, from the Duke of Argyll and Mr A. J. Balfour to the youngest student in the University of Edin- burgh, is at once a philosopher and a theologian. But it is perhaps in the history of Greek and of German philosophy that the relation between philosophy, noW of full stature, and the prevailing religion can best be studied. It is natural that religion, especially at first, should bitterly oppose philosophy, and that philosophy^ now conscious of its power, should repudiate the^ dictation of the Church, and decline to formulate its results in conformity with the precepts of theology. Each anxiously and jealously guards its own domain. Henceforth they develop side by side. Yet, having been once so closely connected, being still related, and concerning themselves with the same subject-matter, though with different aims, they are bound to come into ever closer contact. It is philosophy in particular PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE. 61 that exerts a constant influence over religious doctrine. You will remember that the Christian dogmatic not only derived the form of its dogmas, but even borrowed many ideas from Greek philosophy, in so far as they could be made to harmonise with the teaching of the Gospel. Think only of the supremacy wielded by Aristotle, or at least by the philosophy regarded as his, over the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, and even over the dogmatic of the Reformers and their suc- cessors. In Calvin were united the philosopher and the theologian, as was afterwards the case with Schleiermacher. The Remonstrant theology of the eighteenth century was much indebted to Locke ; and I need hardly remind you of the immense influence exerted by such philosophers as Kant and Hegel upon the theology of the nineteenth century in Germany and beyond it. After what has been said, it will be comparatively easy to determine wherein philosophy and religious doctrine agree and wherein they differ. The task of philosophy is, with the aid of our whole experience, to explain our faculty of perception and our whole knowledge, and thence to construct a complete and connected cosmogony. With this end in view, it utilises the results of the various sciences, sifts, criticises, and co-ordinates them, and is thus the science of sciences. Its investigation also embraces religious belief, which is a conviction of the con- .62 miSmM OF RELIGION. science, and which it teste in order to see “how far ^ it accords with the laws, of logical thought and with the ascertained results of our scientific knowledge of the world.” ^ Whatever be its influence on human life and conduct, whatever practical lessons may be deduced from the laws it has discovered, yet, ever si|i(!N» it has attained independence, it has been purely >th4cry, purely science. Eeligious doctrine, on the i*|s1;her hand, is not science, but is a theory of prac- tice. It also rests on a metaphysical foundation, and unless convinced of the reality of a supersen sual world it builds upon sand; but since it has attained its independence it has been primarily a doctrine of life. At first it runs a course parallel with that of philosophy, and requires to be careful to keep step with it from the very outset. But even when tlijpjr progress side by side, religious doctrine to some^ eJlB^I^ pursues its own way. In other words, wMi^ it as- similates metaphysical truth from philosophy, because it feels the need of a solid foundation for its edifice, it seeks to substantiate that truth mainly by the evidence of conscience, and then proceeds to ask what bearing the truth has upon human life. It defines the relations between God and man, their foundation and essence, the causes which sever them, and the means by which they may be renewed ; and ^Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage, 3rd ed., p. 459. PHILOBOPEY AND BBLimQm WTBINE. 6S these it sums up, either in the tofm at a law, or a theological system, or in a series of principles to be promulgated by preaching. It is above all a doctrine of salvation, an “Anweisung zum seligen Leben,” a “guide to a blessed life,” as it has been called by a great philosopher. It thus has its own subject- matter, aim, and method, and is therefore a very different thing from a mere translation of the abstract ideas of philosophy into popular images; just as even philosophy itself cannot advance very far with its abstract ideas, for as soon as it enters the domain of metaphysics it is also obliged to have recourse to analogies and images. In short, philosophy has ful- filled its task as soon as it has given a reasonable explanation of the phenomena of nature, and has set up a cosmogony which satisfies the demands of rational thought; but religion goes farther, and teaches that the only way in which we can become reconciled with the world and with life is to establish our proper relation towards God — not a way to selfish happiness, but a way to harmony in our being, thought, and feeling, and to true peace of mind. Wbil might religion adopt as her motto the sacred words, “I will give you rest for your souls!” If this, then, be the relation between philosophy and religious doctrine — first a long period of union, during which they are hardly distinguishable from each other, and then a severance, during which, 64 8GIEN0M OF EELIGION. ’fethough presenting many points of contact, they are in a great measure independent, and pursue totally different aims — why is it that so deadly a conflict often arises between them? For they are constantly at war, or at least on that footing of armed peace which, as is the case with the great powers of Europe during this closing part of the nineteenth century, threatens an outbreak at any moment. Almost every page of history mentions such conflicts. It cannot be said that believers are merely defending themselves, or rather defending what is dearer to them than all else, against philosophers who attack religion itself, and not only subject what it proclaims as divine truth to severe criticism, but even deny it and represent it as mere imagination — it cannot be said, in short, that it is merely a struggle of religion for existence. This may perhaps hold true with to some of the schools and teachers of antiiftlit^, siibh as the later Eleatics, the Atomists, the Epipureans, or the French Encyclopaedists of the eightepath century, or men like Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and many others ; but it does not hold true of a Pythagoras, an Anaxagoras, a 'Socrates, or of such profound religious pantheists as Spinoza and Fichte, and such philoso- phical theologians as Schleiermacher and Biedermann, nearly all of whom, in the name of religion, have been martyred, persecuted, exiled, or condemned as heretics. Self-defence is not the only cause of the PSILOBOPHY AND. RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE. 05 Strife. Nor is it the only cause on the part of philosophy, which often attacks religion, although its right of investigation and criticism is fully re- cognised* When a shallow rationalistic or cynical- materialistic philosophy proposes to weigh everything in its puny scale, and denies the rights of the soul, then indeed religion is in danger, and those who love it, must take up arms in its defence. In that case philosophy is to blame. When it proposes to explain everything, even the origin and essence of things, upon base and material principles, religion is then fully justified in opposing such a distorted view. But they are not always so strongly opposed to each other. Their dissensions often arise from misunder- standing, from the confounding of a specific and tempor- ary form of religion with religion itself. Philosophers oppose religion because they are unable to distinguish it from the conceptions in which it presents itself to them, or to comprehend that these conceptions are merely an ephemeral garb ; and they do not take the trouble to penetrate to the ineradicable needs of the human soul which are revealed in these conceptions. Theologians, labouring under a similar misconception, regard philosophy as an enemy of religion because it subjects to criticism the poetic and philosophic forms, the myths and dogmas in which religion expresses itself, and do not perceive that it thus in reality oondiiees to the purification and the development of VOL. II. B 8GJEN0E OF RELIGION. rel^jion. But the principal cause of these dissensions is a diifeient one. It consists in the difference bf development which often subsists between the two. Philosophy continues its researches without intermis- sion. Eeligious doctrine, on the other hand — ^ahd here I allude not to philosophic theologians and religious thinkers, but solely to organised communities — re- mains stationary for long periods. For a long time elapses before the need of revision is felt. Whatever it has appropriated from philosophy and science, its knowledge of nature and mankind, the physiology and psychology by which its conceptions are con- nected, all belong to a period long since elapsed. In this respect, therefore, it lags behind philosophy. In, so far as its garb is concerned, it stands upon an obsolete platform. And, instead of trying to vin(j|^ cate its position with great persistence, but ,alwp^^: unsuccessfully, and thus injuring rather moting religion, it would do well to bring its conceptions and arguments into harmony with the more accurate knowledge and clearer insight attained in modern times. Nor in doing so would it require to abandon a single jot of the essence of belief. Philosophy and religious doctrine must, therefore, ever continue in mutual intercourse. Philosophy must not be content to criticise religion and faith, or perhaps to condemn them on account of an obsolete doctrine which may happen once to have been oflScially PHILOSOPHY AND EBLI&IOUS DOGTEINE. recognised in one communion or another, and accepted by the multitude without much reflection, but which has long since been modified by earnest seekers of religious truth and brought into harmony with the demands of religious souls and of general spiritual development. Eeligious doctrine, on the other hand, must not come into conflict with what has been ascertained and established in other domains, whether moral, scientific, or philosophical. For this is a corol- lary of the law of the Unity of mind, the necessity of which we have already pointed out. It might almost seem as if, in dwelling so fully upon the subject of creeds or doctrines of faith, we meant to identify them with religion. The reverse is the case. They are not even the foundation of religion. Eeligion existed long before there could be any question of framing its doctrine. The matter stands thus. Ee- ligion begins with conceptions awakened by emotions and experiences, and these conceptions produce definite sentiments, which were already present in germ in the first religious emotions, but which can only be aroused to consciousness by these conceptions ; and these senti- ments manifest themselves in actions. But all this is spontaneous, and originally at least it was not the result of conscious reflection. Eeflection comes on the scene at a later period, on a higher stage of develop- ment, and consciously frames its creed or doctrine of faith. ^ This doctrine has two forms, a practical and a 68 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. scientific, which, though differing in form and aim, are identical in content. Both are indispensable for in- struction, the one for the benefit of the community, the other for the training of those who are destined to be its pioneers. Both of them embrace, sum up, and arrange the results of religious experience and speculation prevailing in different stages of develop- ment in a definite sphere, and in one or other form of religion. The doctrine of faith, as we have said, is the theory of a practice, not an abstract philosophical system, but a doctrine of life. Its essential value consists also in this, that it affords thoughtful believers an opportunity of testing the foundations of their faith, and that it is likewise adapted to justify faith as a connected system in response to the doubts of others. And it possesses the further merit of sum- marising and conserving all that earlier g^ii^rations have attained in the domain of religion, and thus of forming a starting-point for a renewed investigation of truth. I am well aware that it has sometimes been scandal- ously misused. I do not forget that it has been de- graded to the function of fettering men's consciences, of stifling inquiry, and of hampering the loftier flights of the human mind. I admit that, in its name, men have sown hatred and discord, have persecuted, mar- tyred, and murdered. Nay, even in the name of science and philosophy, similar cruelties have been perpetrated. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE. 69 But I maintain that fof^very religion that claims to be something more than a transient outburst of fanat- icism, or a dead ritualism or formalism, for every religion that desires to stand on the solid foundation of Truth, the examination of its creed is an imperative necessity. Without such examination every ethical religion must run wild. It has been seriously main- tained of late that ministers of the Gospel would do better in future to devote themselves to the study of political economy, or of social questions, rather than to that of theology and the science of religion. Were such a view to finiTScceptance, it would be fatal, not only to the Church, but to the whole development and prosperity of religion. It is a consolation, however, to know that it is not the first time that this folly has been proclaimed, and that it will probably die out as quickly as it did on former occasions. Even Melanch- thon had to contend against it. And it aroused the usually so gentle and humane PrsBceptor Germanise to such indignation that he declared that “ those who from the pulpit tried to dissuade men from religious studies ought to have their tongues cut out.” ^ I cannot recom- mend so radical a measure ; but I earnestly hope that neither the Church will be swept away, nor that men who have been trained for their important office by a careful study of theology and a scientific investigation ^ See A. Hausrath, “ Philipp Melanchthon,” in the * Protestantische Monatshefte,’ I., ii. p. 45. SaiENCJS OF RELIGION, 70 of religion will ever be superseded by socialistic quacks or dabblers in political science. But I must ask pardon for this digression. I now return to our proper theme. If the doctrines of belief are highly conducive to the maintenance, propagation, and development of religion, they are no less valuable to the student of the science of religion. The com- parative study of creeds forms one of the chief sources of our knowledge of religions, and best enables us to investigate their essence and origin. It has precisely the same relation to our science as comparative philo- logy has to the science of language. It is no more the business of the science of religion to propound a new creed, in addition to those already existing, than it is the task of the science of language to attempt to a new art of speech. As comparative philolc^ is the source of our knowledge of the laws, essence, jgenesisi, and growth of language, so the comparative study of creeds is the source of our knowledge of religion and belief. Professor Pfleiderer of Berlin, my esteemed predecessor in this lectureship, has recently given new evidence of his unwearied energy in the publication of a new and entirely remodelled edition of his ‘ Philosophy of Eeligion."^ And this edition also aflbrds evidence of his true scientific spirit, as he does not hesitate to renounce his earlier views when continued investigation ^ ReligionsphiloBophie auf Oeschichtlicher Orundlage; dritte neu bearbeitete Auflage ; Berlin, 1896. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIQIOUB DOCTRINE. 71 has led him to form new opinions. No one can study that work without deriving much instruction from it, even when he sometimes feels constrained to differ from the author. My own conception of the task and method of the science of religion coincides in many respects with his. In particular I concur with him in his appreciation of historical research as its foundaticfn, although I regard historical research as a mere pre- paration for philosophical study, while he goes a step farther in regarding it as an integral part of such study. In one main point, however, I differ from him entirely. In his view the aim of the science of religion ^ is to effect a reconciliation (‘‘eine Verstandigung zu vermitteln **) between religion, as historically handed down, and the scientific knowledge of the present day. For this purpose it would require to test every detail of religious tradition, in order to ascertain how far it accords with the laws of logical thought, and with our scientific knowledge of the world — with the established facts of natural and historical science. But such is not, in my opinion, the task of the science of religion, but rather that of philosophic theology, which is, in fact, a new form of dogmatic ; or it is the task of some special dogmatic, treated as a science. Still less do I agree with him in his doctrine that the science of religion must rest partly on metaphysical foundations, — ^that it must inquire into the origin of the relation, ^ P. 459 of the edition cited. SCIENCE OF BELIOION. n : as understood by the devout, between God and man, f^d determine how we are metaphysically to regard God's relation to us, and also to the world in general, since we form part of that world. Such a problem, in my opinion, belongs to the department of general philosophy. If the science of religion attempted its solution it would go beyond its province. For such a task the votaries of our science would require to under- take a preliminary investigation, and to possess a wealth of knowledge in different provinces, which could not reasonably be demanded of them. Our study, in short, forms a department of anthropological, not of meta- physical science. On the other hand, I am entirely at one with him when he imposes on our science the duty of examining the practical motives to which our con- ceptions of faith respond. For these conceptions are the symbolical means of giving expression to practical motives and arousing them to action. And in endea^;*^ ouring to understand the positive psychological tent of historical facts, our science of religion has become at once more thorough and more tolerant than it used to be. On that point, therefore, he is unquestionably sound. The comparative study of creeds, again, is a psychological investigation. Its aim is to discover how the various myths and dogmas, apparently conflicting, and diflering a thousandfold in form, really express those self-same general needs of the human soul, which are ineradicable, and which therefore constantly recur , PHILOSOPHY AND RMLIGIOVS DOCTRINE. 73" in new forms. It has to determine what, in each stage and in each direction of development, are the constant elements of religious belief; it has to discover, by means of patient research and scientific analysis, what the Eoman Catholic Church attempts to establish by infallible authority : quid semper^ quid vhique, quid ah omnihus creditur. Eeligion, the subject-matter of its inquiry, is a metaphysical fact, but its method of inquiry is not metaphysical. Now every creed, be it expressed in philosophical dogmas, or in poetic myths, or in childish animistic conceptions, is the summary of all those elements which together constitute every religion, and whence every religious idea emanates. Its main constituents are a doctrine regarding God (or theology), a doctrine regarding man’s relation to God, ideal and real (or anthropology), and a doctrine regarding the means of establishing and maintaining communion with God (soteriology or the doctrine of salvation). By these means we are presented with a complete picture of religion, and we are therefore best enabled to study it by a comparison of creeds. ^ The starting-point is theology ; for belief in one or more supernatural powers, in a God or a divine world, is the foundation on which all religion rests. There can be no religion without a God. In their zeal for religion without metaphysics, people have sometimes spoken of an atheistic tinge in modern theology, which 74 SCIENOS OF RELIGION. . k nevertheless supposed to be consistent with religion, ^ut it is surely obvious that the combination “ atheistic theology ” sounds somewhat strange, and would indeed be ludicrous if the matter were not too serious. We have already spoken of the atheism of Buddhism ; but when it made its appearance as a religion it had Buddha for its God. What, however, distinguishes religious theology from the philosophic is that the former is not purely speculative like the latter, but is directed to practice. The principal point here is not the question as to the nature of God, but as to His relation to us and to the world of which we form part, and as to the agencies and ordinances in which He reveals Himself to us. The converse of this theology consists in religious anthropology. We are here concerned with religious ideals and aspirations, with man’s origin and destiny, with his life in communion with his God and in obedi- ence to Hisdaws and commandments. But, in contrasl to this ideal, we find man in his unworthihess and weakness, his communion with God obstructed by sensuality and selfishness and broken by sin, while he himself looks longingly for salvation and redemption, for reconciliation with his God, for help in the conflict. To this longing responds, in the third place, the doc- trine of salvation, which indicates the means of restoring that communion, of breaking the power of evil, of be- ginning and continuing a new life, and of realising hope. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE. 75 In order to understand the essence of religion we must study these three root -ideas of all religion in succession. They may fairly, though not quite fully, be summed up in the favourite watchword of religion, ‘‘ faith, charity, and hope,” and they also coincide, though not quite exactly, with the three constituents of religion, conceptions, sentiments, and actions. . Do not, however, suppose that, in making this state- ment, we only have in view religion in its highest development, or that all this may apply to the Christian and several other ethical religions, but not ^ to the nature-religions, or at least not to the lowest of these. It holds good of all. In a thousand varieties, in conceptions, differing according to the degree of development and the character of many races and peoples, we invariably find these three elements : belief in a divine power upon which we are dependent, belief in the high origin and destiny of man, coupled with a consciousness of his shortcomings, and belief in the possibility of salvation, combined with attempts to secure that blessed consummation. All religions are religions of redemption, and all religious doctrine is a doctiine of salvation. This is one of the most striking, and at the same time most certain, results of our science. And to demonstrate this truth, even when it manifests itself in but feeble germs or in unfamiliar forms, is one of our chief tasks. 76 LECTURE IV. THE CONSTANT ELEMENT IN ALL CONCEPTIONS OF GOD. Nowhere perhaps do there exist such diversity and such conflict of views as in the province of the concep- tion of faith. To any one making acquaintance with this province for the first time it seems a perfect chaos ; and even those who have explored it carefully find it very difficult to survey it and map it out on systematic plan. In a sphere in which imagination has free scope and often seems to run riot, is it not in vai^ to seek for any constant element, to try to dise^i^ any- thing like unity amid endless multipliislty, or anything abiding amid ceaseless change ? The task is certainly a difficult one, but it is not hopeless. For the abiding element we seek is not to be found in the conceptions themselves, but rather in what they express. We might perhaps arrange the multiform conceptions in certain groups, and then reduce these to a number of definite types, but we should be unable to demonstrate the ne- OONGEPTIONS OF GOD. 77 cessity of these types. They may often recur in some- what modified form, but there is nothing to prove that they must always recur ; and it may even be doubted whether we should then have laid a foundation for any such assumption. We should find that certain definite conceptions are common to peoples and communities which are either related to each other, or which have reached the same stage of development, but that, as soon as the whole of mankind has outgrown these con- ceptions, they recur no more, and henceforth retain an historical value only. And how can it be otherwise ? Could we, for instance, still conceive the Deity as en- throned on the clouds of heaven or in the realms of light above the firmament, while the powers of darkness and evil hold sway in the depths beneath ? We should in that case still have to regard the earth as the centre of the universe, fixed above a dark abyss, and vaulted over by the heavens, and we should have to repudiate all the ascertained results of scientific research and re- flection. Let us take another example. For many long ages polytheism was the normal form of religious belief, except where the latter still occupied the lower stage of polydsemonism ; and it is not until late in the history of mankind, and only among one or two peoples at first, that it was superseded by monotheism. Slow of growth, the latter only triumphed after a long struggle. For pure polytheism there is now no future left. It still survives, but within ever narrower limits. It has in- 7a SOIENCE OF SELIGION. deed revived in some monotheistic religions, when these have been imposed by force upon a people or a com- munity which was not yet ripe for them, but only on condition that its numerous gods group themselves round the throne of the One as his servants and vas- sals. We may safely say that the foundation of a pure polytheistic religion, except perhaps among a pec^le absolutely shut off from civilisation, has once for all be- come an impossibility. Poets like Schiller and Heine may dwell regretfully on the beauties of the Greek or the German theogony, which seemed beautiful to them because they saw their poetical side only ; but these systems will never return. Zeus and his Olympians, and Wodan with his Asas, belong irrevocably to the past, in this sense that they can never again become objects of belief. A religious conception may be ab- solutely general during a long period, or even through- out a series of successive periods of history, so general that we may almost regard it as an essential eleuxent inherent in all religion ; yet there comes a time whiii it turns out to be no less transitory than the tions it has superseded. We must therefore, as I have already said, search for unity, for the abiding, for the essential, not in any con- ception, however general or enduring it may seem to be, but solely in the religioua thoughts and aspirations to which the conceptions give expression. When we find such thoughts constontly reviving under new aONCEFTIOm OF GOD. 70 forms, we may reasonably assume that they are essen* tials of religion. I do not of course propose to subject the whole of religious doctrine in all its details to such an investiga- tion. We must confine ourselves to a few leading ideas, and try to show that they constitute an integral part of religious belief, although manifesting themselves in very various and sometimes apparently conflicting forms. The first question which requires to be answered is T—What is this permanent and essential element in the manifold conceptions regarding the Deity which suc- ceed each other in the history of mankind, and which still cause so many divisions at the present day ? For all religious doctrine emanates from some theology, however primitive* What then, it may be asked, has the only, eternal, all-wise and powerful, omnipresent and omniscient, holy, just, merciful, and gracious God, whom Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans alike wor- ship, albeit in different ways — the God whom the Gospel proclaims as the Perfect one, the loving, all- attractjng, all-reconciling heavenly Father — what has He in common with even the highest of the nature-gods, the Zeus-Jupiter of Hellas and Rome, not to speak of the bloodthirsty beings in whose honour Canaanites and Moabites, Accadians, Celts, Mexicans, and many others slaughtered their fellow-men and even their own chil- dren ? What has He in common with t&e gods (not to descend to the lowest stage) whose powef^ extends over m SOtENCE OF EELIQION. a limited domain only, ^o have been bom and who die, who are swayed by the Jower passions and are sub- ject to human weaknesses ? I might reply by asking another question : Have we ourselves nothing in com- mon with the people who worshipped these beings ? Is not the difference between their gods and ours essen- tially the same as the difference which separates them from us, though they were men of the same mould as ourselves ? We need not at present inquire into the causes of that difference, as we have investigated them already. It is a difference of capacity and of circum- stances, but still more a difference in development — the difference between the grain of mustard-seed and the tree in whose branches lodge the fowls of the air, the difference between the stammering child and the mighty orator, between the unbridled fancy of the youth and the ripe wisdom of the experienced thinker. But the difference is not so great as it appea^pNm surface. Man climbs up but slowly to such abBtr^»(^. ideas as eternity, omnipresence, and holing in the ethical sense. But their germ is nevertheless distinctly discernible in the less developed conceptions of deity. Let us then try to ascertain the germ from which the loftier conceptions have gradually developed, I mean the one element which essentially and indispensably constitutes the idea of a god. ^The conclusion to which the study of religions has led us is, that a god is a mperhuman power. CONCEPTIONS OP GOV. 8b This is no mere a jpriori notion, but the result of a careful and many-sided comparative-historical investi- gation. How such a conception arose — whether it sprang out of the impression produced by the pheno- mena of nature, and by the action of the powers of nature upon the human mind, or rather out of man's cognition of his own inmost being, which he after- wards applies to all that he perceives around him — we need not at present inquire. We shall seek for its origin at a later stage ; but meanwhile our object is to show that even the richest and loftiest conceptions of deity are but developments of this simple germ, and that they lay enshrined within it from the very outset.' V The root-idea, then, in every conception of godhead is power. In whatever manner this power is con- ceived, as physical or rational, as beneficent or malev- olent, in whatever way it may be described or defined — as wise, just, and holy, as the power of love, drawing all men together and upholding the moral order of the world, or, according to a well-known dogmatic formula, the power of irresistible grace — the idea of Power is the constant and immutable element, so that a power- less god cannot be a god at all. As soon as the man who is swayed by animistic conceptions begins to think that his fetish is powerless to help him, and has, therefore, deceived him, he casts it aside ; for it turns VOL. II. F SCIENCE OF RELIGION. out not to have been a genuine god after all. In the seventeenth century the Arminians were specially con- demned by the Calvinists on the ground that their doctrine of conditional grace seemed to set bounds to Ihe power of the Almighty, which, however, they were by no means disposed to deny. And a couple of centuries later, when the so-called ethical school of theology, with its pessimistic views of the world, tried to save the justice, holiness, and goodness of God by representing the Deity as the power of Good, contend- ing against the natural and moral evil of which it could not be the origin, this, again, was obviously a limitation of God’s omnipotence which vitiated the whole system. Even in a sharply defined dualistic system like Zarathushtrism, in which the supremacy of the great god Ahura Mazda, though undisputed in heaven, does not extend over the realms of the lying spirits (drujcLs), and conflicts with that of the arch^- da^va, Angra-Mainyu, upon earth — even there the power of the god is superior to that of his adversaries, an^ is destined to triumph over them in the end. On a former occasion, in treating of mythology and its interpretation, I had occasion to remark that the religious doctrine of polytheism would never be rightly understood unless the various gods were regarded as personified agencies, as factored, agentes, or, in other words, as powerful beings revealing themselves in the phenomena; and I am pleased to observe that Professor CONCEPTIONS OF COD. Max Mliller has recently expressed his concurrence in that view.^ The controversy among mythologists as to the physical significance of the gods is well known. There was a time when several different theories we#e in marked antagonism. One of these regarded nearly the whole of mythology as a description of the storm — of the strife between the evil powers, who try to with- hold the beneficent rain, and the good powers who steal water or fire from heaven and cause it to descend upon the earth. Another theory viewed it as sym- bolising the conflict between light and darkness, between day and night, between summer and winter. According to some theories the marriage of the god of heaven to the goddess of the earth was the ruling idea ; according to others all the gods were gods of the sun and moon ; and Professor Max Muller has made a very able and learned attempt to show that the myths of the dawn were always the most important, or at least much more so than is commonly supposed. At the present day there is a more general inclination to combine whatever is good and true in each of these antagonistic theories, a movement in which the master of mythological science just mentioned has taken the lead, although we still meet with advocates of a kind ^ Tiele, Le Mythe de Kronos : Bevue de I’Kiatoire des Beligions, 1886, p. 9. P, Max Muller, Physical Beligion : Giflford Lectures, ii. p. 131; and also in * Contributions to the Science of Mythology* ipamm, v. Index ** Gods **). a4 SCIENCE OF EELIGION of pass-key theory, or single explanation, with which they seek to unlock almost* every myth,^ I need hardly say that I have no faith in any such universal myth-opener, and that I am not disposed to join any one of these parties. And all the less so because it seems to me a matter of subordinate importance, though not of indifference, to determine the precise natural phenomenon or object from which this or that myth has derived its origin. Even the most ancient interpreters of the myths disagreed on these points, and perhaps from the very outset there was no agree- ment. For the religious man the chief question is, what his god can effect, what he has to hope or to fear from him. It is quite possible that the Babylonian Maruduk, the Vedic Indra, the Germanic Thor-Donar, and even the Hellenic Zeus, were originally sun-gods ; but in the eyes of their worshippers they were mainly the triumphant conquerors of the powers of darkness, aridity, and winter. The names of most of the gods are so ancient that .they cannot now be interpreted with any certainty by means of the known forms of language, and that they defy all the re-agents of scientific etymology. But those that we can still interpret, and particularly the epithets applied to the gods, usually denote an operation, a power, or a function. In short, no being is recognised and wor- ^ Thus, Ernst Sieoke, Die Liebesgescbichte des Himmels ; Strass- burg, 1892 ; and Die Urreligion der Indogermanen : Berlin, 1897, 00N0EPTI0N8 OF ODD, 85 shipped as divine except by people who believe it to be the operative power in some natural phenomenon; and when religious and philosophical development has culminated in the idea of an only god, God is mainly regarded as the Almighty, who creates, maintains, and governs the universe. Now this power of the gods is always deemed a superhuman power — superhuman, but not supersensual or supernatural. In a more advanced stage of develop- ment a distinction may be drawn between the sensual and the supersensual, but in the animistic stage no such difference is known. The spirits revered by uncivilised peoples are never immaterial. Nor indeed are even the highest gods in the polytheistic religions of antiquity. But they are all superhuman, at least in the eyes of their worshippers, who often estimate the value of human beings by a different standard from ours. When divine beings are worshipped in the form of mountains, trees, or animals (which entirely differ in kind from the objects known as fetishes), it is only because people who have not yet awoke to full self- consciousness attribute to whatever produces a strong impression on them some secret power, a power greater than their own, or because they admire qualities which they themselves either lack or possess to a very inferior extent. When they have reached a higher stage of civilisation, and out of respect for tradition still retain the old animals or monsters as their gods, B6 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. then, as Herodotus relates of the Phoenicians, they allege as their reason the impropriety of making their gods like men — an explanation devised in good faith, though of course an afterthought, in order to account for what seems strange even to themselves. And even where anthropomorphism has attained full sway, where the animals come to be merely temporary metamor- phisms, being usually the companions, servants, or symbols of the deities, and where the deities them- selves are invariably represented in human form, their worshippers will always be careful to express their superhuman character in some way or other. This is sometimes done in a very naive manner. The Hindoo gods (in so far as they are no longer therianthropic^ half-animal, half -human), such as Ganes'a, the god of wisdom,' with his elephant's head, are provided with several heads and pairs of arms. The Babylonian- Assyrian have two pairs of wings. The HomsBric are of gigantic stature, or possess a voice as mi^ity as that of ten thousand men ; instead of human bloody a fluid called iehdry the blood of the gods, circulates through their veins ; and though they require nourishment like human beings, they live solely on ambrosia, the food of the immortals, which is denied to men. And the power these deities wield is not merely greater than that of mortals, but differs in kind. At first it is generally conceived as sorcery, or as a magical power^ from which the idea of miraculous power is developed* CONCEPTIONS OF COD. 87 a power which is not bound by the conditions as human power. The deity simply commands, merely speaks, ‘‘and it is done”; the divine word becomes the great creative power. And the belief of mono- theism, that with God all things are possible, already exists in embryo in all the conceptions of divine power formed by votaries of the lower nature-religions. And so, too, the conception of the divine omniscience must have lain dormant in the hearts of the pious long before it was formulated as a doctrine. Odhiiin's ravens fly forth throughout the whole world, and on their re- turn they alight on his shoulder and whisper in his ear all they have seen. The Vedic Varuna and the Persian Mithra also have their spies (s^oa'as), whom nothing escapes. Satan, whom the author of the Book of Job includes among the Sons of Elohim, scours the whole earth, and then appears before His throne to render his report, although Yahve already knows everything. Each god does not know everything — for that would be inconsistent with polytheism — but the gods collec- tively know everything, while from the great heavenly god of light nothing can remain hidden. With the doctrine of omniscience is closely connected that of omnipresence. The numerous gods of polythe- ism cannot of course be omnipresent. Each of them has his own domain, to which his power is usually restricted. On earth each of them has one or more favourite haunts, while in heaven he possesses his own 86 SCIENCE OE RELIGION. glorious abode. The exuberant oriental imagination surpasses itself when it tries to describe the palaces of the Indian Devas and the Zarathushtrian Yazatas. The poets of the Edda mention ten heavenly abodes of the Asas, of which Odhinn’s Walhalla is the chief, and Baldur’s Breidhablik is the purest. The homes of the Olympians have been built by Hephaestus round the summit of Olympus, on which. Zeus himself is en- throned. But none of them is bound to a fixed abode. They roam wherever they please with marvellous rapidity. With holy awe the pious man sometimes finds his god close to him when he supposed him far distant. Surely,*' exclaims Jacob at Bethel, on awakening from his dream, surely Yahve is in this place ! ” The fact that his own god should appear to him, at a place where a diSerent local god was wor- shipped, filled his heart with joy. That some god dwelt and ruled in this region, as in every region, probably neither he nor any other of the ancients doubted for a moment. What in monotheism becomes the omni- presence of a single god is in polytheism the omni- presence of the divine in many difiereut forms and persons. Wherever one may be, wherever one may go, there a superhuman power works and reigns. This belief is common to all peoples and all ages. As the aesthetic sentiment is developed, the gods are more and more endowed with superhuman beauty. In the plastic representation of the gods the Greeks stood OONOEPfiONB OF GOD. pre-eminent. Their gods have human forms, but they are idealised forms of masculine and feminine beauty. Still loftier is the conception of a divine glory which dazzles poor mortals, a glory which indeed man can- not behold and live. The prophet to whom a glimpse of 'it was vouchsafed had to cover his face, and durst not look up until Yahve had passed by, so that he could only see the skirts of the divine garment. This idea belongs entirely to the Semitic conception of faith, in which God’s loftiness stands out in the foreground ; and when we encounter it in the Greek myth of Zeus and Semele, it seems unquestionably to be one of those features which Hellenic mythology borrowed from the East. But the needs that found expression in these immortal works of art and in the conceptions of the divine glory are precisely the same as those manifested in childish fashion by the savage who bedecks his poor idols with gaudy cloth and all kinds of finery, so as to render them glorious in his eyes, and by the simple- minded votary of Eome, who bedizens his Madonna with gilded crowns and showy drapery. The development of the ethical sentiment is a very different matter. It is not until a late period that the religiously disposed man strives to express the super- human character of his gods by ascribing to them ethical attributes. They become the vindicators of law, the rewarders of virtue, the punishers of vice : they have imposed the moral law on mortals, and m SCIENCE OF RELIGION. require them to observe it; but at first they them- ^Ives are exalted above it A god is never bound by the obligations he has imposed upon men. He acts accbrding to his good pleasure — for the superhuman knows no limits. This is the ideal of the undeve^loped believer. He regards the moral law as heteronomous, being imposed on him from without, and as a collection of commands and prohibitions which he ought to obey, but which he cannot obey without denying himself and sacrificing his own inclinations and desires. It stands to reason, he thinks, that a power which is indepen- dent of all others is under no obligation to obey the laws which it imposes upon men. But when man's ethical consciousness has advanced so far as to substi- tute the autonomous for the heteronomous principle, and when he has learned to measure human worth by an ethical standard, he can no longer regard beings, however powerful they may be, as exalted above him if they are morally his inferiors. The conviction thus ripens within him that the moral element is not a mere arbitrary ordinance, in conflict with human nature, but is a revelation of his own inmost being, and must for that very reason be an attribute of the deity who is the author of his higher nature. He then ceases to seek for the superhuman in external splendour and glory, or merely in a power which tran- scends that of man, but conceives his God as one who possesses in perfection all the moral qualities which he CONCEPTIONS OF OOD. 91 has learned to appreciate in man more than all other endowments. The Unapproachable then becomes the Holy One, and justly so, because “ He is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity.” The highest power then becomes all-embracing love. And so he deems his God to be in blissful possession of that infinite per- fection to which no man can attain, but which is never- the^s the object of his ceaseless endeavour, are now, however, confronted with a question with which many minds are always busied. How can a pure and perfect world be the origin, or (to put the question in a personal form) how can a perfect and at the same time all-powerful God be the author, of a world in which physical and moral evil are so pre- dominant ? Polytheism found no difficulty in answer- ing this question. The world of gods is divided into two different classes — the beneficent or naturally good gods, and the gods who are dreaded, the former being the givers of all blessings, and the latter the authors of all disasters, of death, destruction, and all evil; and both kinds must therefore be worshipped in order to gain their favour or avert their wrath. But in* the ethical religions believers could no longer be satisfied with such a solution. They could not regard evil spirits as worthy of adoration. • In their view the two classes of gods become two hostile camps. On the one side stood the good God with his satellites, on the other the realm of the powers of darkness and destruc- 92 SCIENCE OF RELIGION tida, of sin and wickedness, which had to be resisted ,and slain with the help of the good spirits. Over against Ormazd, the giver of all good {dMa va'hghvdim), is placed Ahriman, who is full of death (jpmru-makrka), and over against the immortal benefactors {arrmha speMa) and the adorable ones {yazata) stand the daSvas and the lying spirits (drujas). This is the doctrine of the Zarathushtrian religion, in which the principle is most strictly adhered to. But even there people were not always satisfied with a God who, though indeed higher and more powerful than his adversary, and destined ultimately to triumph over him, had to submit for a time at least to the withdrawal of a great part of the “ embodied world,’’ his own creation, from his jurisdiction. The theologians came to the rescue. They exalted an abstract idea, Unending Time {zrvan a1caTanam\ to the rank of the highest god, the fattl^^ of both Ahura Mazda and Angra-Mainyu, althouglllr; the text of the sacred writings on which they retied merely imports that Ahura Mazda “created in unend* ing time.” This doctrine, though regarded as heretical by the orthodox Zarathushtrians, was for a time offi- cially accepted under one of the S^eanides, but was soon afterwards condemned. An abstraction could not long remain a popular god. And perhaps it was felt that the difficulty was not thereby removed, but merely 8hifted.J^Another expedient to which they had recourse was the idea that man is free, but that he has abused CONCEPTIONS OF 001). 93 his freedom, and that for this abuse he has been pun- ished by means of sickness and other evils inflicted by Nature herself ; but they overlooked the question whether the omnipotence of God would not be in- fringed by such freedom. Others have denied the absolute na.ture of sin (Pfleiderer), and have repre- sented physical evil as a necessary means of educatiun, as the shadow without which there can be no light It is beyond our province to investigate this problem. It suflftces for us, in this connection, to note the fact that man's religious consciousness has invariably caused the rejection of every system which limited the omnipotence of God in order that His holiness, righteousness, and love might be preserved intact. A perfect solution of the problem would require omniscience, and transcends the human mind. But for the pious of all ages, al- though they are fully aware that they are confronted with an inexplicable riddle, the answer is essentially the same as that given in Israel in ancient times: “ God's ways are higher than our ways, and His thoughts are higher than our thoughts ; God is great, and we cannot comprehend Him." Or, to express this in the terms we have already employed : the divine power is superhuman, and therefore inscrutable. To this definition of gods as superhuman powers it will perhaps be objected that it is imperfect, and that it is not every superhuman power, though recognised as such, that is recognised as a god. Shall we, like SCIENCE OF BELIQION. Baawenhoff, for example, argue as follows ? — “ No one is SL god jure mo; but he has only become a god through the deification he has received from his worshippers. Not only does this hold true of the first time when a man has recognised his god in a supposed supersensual power, but it always continues to be true, and is indeed the general rule in all subsequent and in all future development of religion. To be a power of nature or to be a spirit is not yet to be a god. Such a power only becomes a god when it is worshipped. Even the most primitive religions consist, not in the worship of every kind of natural phenomenon and every kind of spirit, but they invariably select one or more of these, to the exclusion of the others, and promote them to the rank of deities. One only of all the spirits dwelling in animals is elected by the American Totemist to be his god;” and might we not then arrive with him bJh the conclusion that the origin of religion is to be explained “from the coincidence of the moral con- sciousness of man with the naturistic or animist^ view of nature?”^ I cannot concur in this, ^he proposition that no one is a god jure suo rests, if I mistake not, on a confusion of special conceptions of belief with the general conception of a god. The cause of the confusion is, that we generally use the same ^ Kauwenhoff ; ‘Wijsbegeerte van den Qodsdienst,’ pp. 72, 73, 99. I have somewhat condensed the author's argument, but have used his own words as far as possible. CONCEPTIONS OF GOD. 05 word for both. We call Zeus, Wodan, Indra, Varu^a, Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva gods, although they are in reality only the special conceptions formed by different peoples in different ages of their highest god. It stands to reason that they are gods only to those who, I do not say worship them, but who believe in their existence and power, and that, with their last wor- shippers, they have lost, or will lose, their dignity of godhead. The only question that concerns us is, what in all these changing conceptions is abiding, what men in all ages have had in view when speaking of “ God.” Moreover it is not because it is worshipped that a power of nature, or power of any description, or a spirit of whatever kind, becomes a god, but it is worshipped because it has already been recognised as a god. Nor can it even be asserted that, in the animistic or the polytheistic stage of religion, persons or communities regard those superhuman powers which they worship as the only gods in existence. They admit the existence and the dignity of many others also as such. When they enter their domain, or have reason to dread their power, they will even do them homage. When they learn that the gods of their neighbours are very wise, and are thus better able to help them, they will consult their oracles and offer them costly gifts. Thus Ahaziah, King of Israel, sent a mission to Ba‘al-zebub, the god of Ekron, to the great indignation of the prophet of Yahve. So, too, will an 96 SaiENGE OF RELIGION. Asiatic prince beg the Egyptian king, son of the Sun, for the loan of one of his gods in order to cure his daughter of her sickness, the gods of his own land having proved unequal to the task. And when the mighty conqueror Sennacherib (Sin-ahi-irba) is about to organise a naval expedition, he hastens to present rich offerings to Ea, god of the sea, though on his return to Nineveh or Kalach he would certainly have worshipped none but Assur, and the gods who had their temples there. Can we therefore say that Ea was his god solely during the time when he did homage to him, but neither before nor after that time ? Why, it may be asked, does the polytheist not worship all the gods whose power he admits ? Simply because it would be impossible. On the other hand, he will take good care not to offend them. Like the Hindoo, he will not neglect to invoke the VisVe devah, or “ all the gods,” as well as those he specially reveres ; or, like the Eoman, after having named his own gods, he will add: “Sive quo alio nomine te appellari volueris ” ; or, like the Athenian, he will by way of precaution erect an altar to theTJnknown God. And so, too, the Totemist, while choosing a special tutelary spirit, just as you or I might choose a particular physician, does not deny the existence of others. And neither Eedskin, nor Babylonian, nor Assyrian, who speak of their own special gods, nor the Parsee, who believes that every one has his GONGEPTIONS OF GOD. 97 Fravashi, nor tbe Eoman, who sacrifices to his own Lar familiaris, will on that account omit to serve the gods of their tribe or country. How divine service originated is a question to be considered at a later stage. But we may for the present lay it down as a wdl- established proposition, that the religious man in general regards as a god every superhuman power whose existence he owns; that the polytheist recog- nises, besides his own gods, many others whom he has no occasion, or is not bound, to worship ; and that the monotheist acknowledges a single and almighty God, by whatsoever name He may be called. Is it necessary to add to our definition, that, in order to stamp a superhuman power as a deity, it should be worthy of adoration ? I do not think so. I am, how- ever, far from maintaining that every power of nature, as such, is regarded as a god, even by the least cultured of men. Certainly not those which he has learned to control. When he has grown up to full self-conscious- ness he feels that he is superior to all the blind powers of nature, though he is physically weaker than they. The materialist, who sees nothing in the universe but the operation of such powers, takes leave of religion altogether. Men worship that only which they deem above them. Not the beast of prey, whose claws make them tremble, nor the bloodthirsty tyrant who per- secutes them, but those beings alone whom they judge superior to man. As long as they imagine that in VOL. II. G m 80IMN0E OF RELIGION. a tree, or in an animal, or in the firmament of heaven dwells a spirit mightier than their own, and one that can therefore influence the destiny and welfare of themselves and their families, so long will they worship the tree, or animal, or firmament, or rather the spirits residing in them. But as soon as they become conscious of the superiority of the human mind they will cease to worship these objects. As long as they occupy a low stage of ethical develop- ment they will worship even evil spirits, whether injurious to man or not. But as soon as they have awoke to moral consciousness, they will contend against these evil spirits, with the aid of the good divine powers, and they will worship them no longer. They still believe in their power; but it is not a divine power, for it is doomed to destruction — the power of goodness and truth will ultimately triumph over it. The power of the evil spirits is indeed greater than their own, but not superhuman, although perhaps we may call it supersensual. The Zara- thushtrian erects no altars to Ahriraan, nor does the mediaeval Christian build chapels for Satan, however much they may dread these spirits. The Mohammedan casts stones at Iblis, and our Christian forefathers delighted in popular tales in which the devil was tricked or held up to derision. But to a power which he regards as superhuman man looks up with awe, and he speaks of it with reverence. CONCEPTIONS OF OOR 99 We thus reach the conclusion, that men of all ages have conceived the divine as a power operating in every kind of natural phenomenon, as supernatural, not merely in the sense of being greater than human power, but as being bound by none of the conditions, and subject to none of the limitations, attached to human power. Regarded, in the earlier stages of the develop- ment of belief, as a magical power or as a miraculous power (for, as Goethe has said, ‘‘das Wunder ist des Glaubens Hebstes Kind^’), the most advanced believers regard it as the mysterious power in which the ultimate cause of the world of phenomena is to be sought ; a power unlimited and unrestricted in time and space, a power immutable, whatever else may change or perish. It is merely a question of develop- ment, as well as of disposition, whether this power be distributed among many persons or embraced in one alone. But it is always the highest in its own pro- vince, it is always unique of its kind ; and even where it is divided among many, its agency is everywhere: it is the ultimate cause of all that exists, of all that happens. The world of the divine, as men thus con- ceive it, is not merely higher than, but different from, our world of natural phenomena, because it is an ideal world. But it is only in contrast to ours in so far as it is perfect and infinite, while ours is imperfect and finite. Our next lecture will be devoted to an examination of the relation between these two worlds. 100 LECTUEE V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN. At our previous meetings we examined one of the foundations on which religion rests, or perhaps I should rather say one of the indispensable elements in which religion consists — I mean man^s belief in a superhuman ‘ power which works everywhere and in everything^ This is not a mere philosophical theory or an abstraction designed to satisfy man’s crayihg for knowledge, nor is it a purely mental attempt to ' account for the world of phenomena we see around us — whether that world be the whole universe, such as we conceive it to be, or merely that limited portion of it that falls within the ken of uncivilised or primi- tive man, and constitutes his whole world — but it is. a religious conviction, that isjut sav. it exerts a direct and immediate influence on man’s emotional life. For the phenomena which the religious man thus accounts for are precisely those which are bound up with his existence, his welfare, and his whole destiny ; and the RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN. 101 conviction that they reveal to him a superhuman power at once awakens in him a corresponding sentiment of awe and veneration, of gratitude and trust, towards that power, and a sense of his obligation to obey and revere it above all others. Without this belief no. reli- gion can possibly exist. It is the fountainhead of all religions. If it is lost, the old religious institutions may for a time be maintained, and the performance of the old religious observances may for a time be ensured, by the force of habit and tradition, but the life of such a religion is extinct. M^ust as the machine must soon stop when its motive power has ceased to act, although its wheels may continue idly to revolve a little longer, so must such a religion inevitably perish. A God above us— that is the belief without which no religious . life is possible. Does this imply that the moment we feel compelled to reject the popular notion of the Divinity, the moment we begin to hesitate to discern God, with reverential awe, in the highly anthropomorphised image which is regarded by most people as the only true God, we must forthwith renounce religion altogether? Let us dis- tinctly understand each other. It is never a single definite conception, as such, that constitutes the foun- dation of religion. Conceptions change ; the imperfect are superseded by perfect, the impure by the pure, the lower by the higher; but the thing that abides, that underlies them all, is the one idea which they all strive 102 * SCIENCE OF RELIGION. to express in their different ways. All we have done, , and. were bound to do, has been to trace out and estab- lish that idea. If our object had been to construct a philosophical system of religion, we should now have to inquire into everything that is involved in that idea, or that of necessity flows from it, into the primitive myths and the later dogmas, such as those of the creation, of Providence, and of the government of the world, in which the idea has been more or less imper- fectly manifested. We should have to test the dogmas by the idea itself, and show what truth they contain, or how far they are to be regarded as mere imperfect human allegories. We cannot, however, attempt so great a task. Our object is solely to offer you an introduction to the science of religion, and to sketch its elements, while in this ontological part of our course our special aim is to discover what is the perman^t element in the multiplicity of changing forms. Yet there is one side-issue which we must not omit to notice, \jpelief in a superhuman power is a very posi- tive belief, a belief in one or more actual divine beings. Now people sometimes object to attribute personality and self-consciousness to the Godhead, as importing a humanising, and therefore a limitation and degradation, of the Deity. But remember that we cannot even speak of the superhuman except after the analogy of the human, or form any conception of God except with the aid of the highest conceptions known to us, which RELATIONBEIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 103 in the domain of man’s spiritual life are his personality and his self-consciousness. One thing is certain. When devout persons necessarily regard their God as a super- human being, He cannot be less than man, He cannot be unconscious and impersonal, or He would cease to be a god at all, and to be worthy of adoration. It is beyond our province to inquire how far a philosophical system might be built upon the foundation of an un- conscious and impersonal power, but no religion could exist on such a basis. If personality and self-conscious- ness be terms which we may not apply to the Almighty without derogation, let us admit that no human lan- guage can describe His being. But to predicate the contrary of Him would be a far graver derogation, and would be no better than atheism. That “God is a Spirit” is, in brief, the creed of man throughout all ages ; and religious man feels the need of ascribing to his God in perfection all the attributes he has learned to regard as the highest and noblest in his own spirit. And all the more so because no religion is possible unless man feels that he is related to God. And this naturally leads us to consider the other essential of religion, which is to be the subject of our studies to-day. ,,ykot only that “ God is above us,” but also that “ God is . in us,” is a belief common to all religions. It is probably unnecessary to prove, nor can it indeed be 104 SCIENCE OF BELiaiON. disputed, that this idea attained full development in the^ earliest stage of Christianity. The religion which regards God as the Father of all, and all men as His children, thus teaches the closest relationship between God and man ; and this is precisely the doctrine that underlies the whole of the Gospel preaching. IJow this doctrine afterwards developed into the doctrines of the God-Man and the Trinity we may assume to be sufficiently well known to all. Our task is merely to show how this idea has found expression everywhere and in all ages, although in widely differing concep- tions, myths, emblems, and symbolic observances, and to trace its source back to the simplest forms of re- ligious worship. You will remember that we have divided the chief religions of antiquity into two categories, according as the idea of God’s supremacy over the world and man, or man’s relationship with God, has been placed in the foreground and predominantly developed. The category I called the theocratic, in which the deity stands forth chiefly as a ruler and a king, and the second the theanthro'pic, which mainly emphasises the unity of God and man. That the latter should lay the chief stress upon the religious anthropological principle was of course to be expected. But this principle is by no means lacking, and is sometimes very distinctly enunciated, in the theocratic religions also. Does not the Hebrew — whose religion may be taken as one of RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 105 the most pronounced types of this class — ^regard man as created in God’s own image, and did not Yahve Elohim breathe his divine breath into the nostrils of this his latest creation ? Was it not recorded that both the patriarch Abraham and the prophet Moses communed as familiarly with God as men with their friends, and that Israel actually wrestled with Him and overcame Him ? Was it not vouchsafed to Elijah to obtain a glimpse of Yahve’s glory, and was he not taken up to Him in the chariot of fire ? And although the Psalmist asks, “ What is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou visitest him ? ” yet he immediately adds, “ Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels ” (i.e., the '' Elohim,” or gods). In the prophets, in the sacred singers, and even in the cun- ning artificers, the divine Spirit was believed to dwell and to work, for a time at least; and the prophet Jeremiah even looked forward to a time when all mankind should partake of this inspiration. These are surely sufficient proofs that the idea of God’s spirit dwelling in man was by no means foreign to this most theocratic of all the religions of antiquity. In the cognate theocratic religions of Western Asia the world of the gods and that of man are less strongly contrasted than in the Hebrew ; and the older the re- ligions are, or the earlier developed, the less marked is the contrast. In the Babylonian religion, for example, we meet with a legend analogous to the narrative in loe SCIENCE OF BELICION. . the second chapter of Genesis. Bel — that is in this case Maruduk, the creator — is here represented as making men of clay mixed with his own blood, a legend whose symbolical signification is obvious. Here, too,, the legends mention a marriage between a deity and a mortal, and in the narrative of the Deluge men are regarded as the children of Ishtar ; while not only the king, who in the earliest times was even wor- shipped as a divine being, but every pious man, is spoken of as “a son of his god’* {ablu ililu). This idea of regarding the relation between the theocratic god and his people as a nuptial tie is also, as you will remember, not unfamiliar to the prophets of Israel. In the Egyptian religion, which, like the ancient Babylonian before it was modified by Semitic influ- ence, belonged to a very early stage of religious de- velopment, we find the two ideas of the deity as a superhuman power ” and of “ man as related to the deity,” existing side by side, unsophisticated and un- reconciled. Before the time of Menes, who is supposed to be the earliest historical king, the gods themselves ruled on earth in successive dynasties, and every sub- sequent human king was regarded as a son of the Sun, born into the world by the great Mother-goddess. When men were created by the sun-god Ea, the hidden sun-god Turn gave them a soul like his own. Every dead man, provided only he is in possession of the RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN. 107 magic texts, becomes in the lower world Osiris him- self, and after he has in that shape triumphed over the powers of darkness and death, he is permitted to go forth into day in the train of the sun-god Ka and to navigate the heavenly waters in the boat* of the sun. Even the living, by dint of reciting the magical books destined for the purpose, may assume the form of gods, and as such may overcome the hostile powers which threaten them on earth. Eamous kings even have their own temples and priesthood, and their worship continues in vogue for ages in spite of the changes of dynasty. And not only they, but every one who was in a position to found for himself a tomb, or everlasting home, was honoured by liis successors with gifts and sacrifices in the chapel connected with it. It is well known how punctiliously the Chinese observed similar duties, during the period prior to that of Kong-tse, when their religion occupied the same plane of development as that of the Egyptians, and what a prominent place they gave to the wor- ship of deceased ancestors, so that we might describe their religion as anthropocentric, as being one in which the souls of men occupied an intermediate place between the heavenly and the earthly spirits. In the case of the theanthropic religions it is un- necessary to enter into matters of detail. Their general character implies that they lay the chief stress upon man’s relationship with God. In them there exists 108 SCIENCE OF BELIGION no sharp line of demarcation between the human and the divine. The world of the gods and that of man coalesce. Gods become men without losing their dignity, while men are elevated to the rank of gods. In the course of the one-sided development of these religions — as, for example, in the latest Vedic period — the world of the gods sometimes becomes a kind of aristocracy, which holds aloof from such parvenus as those deified sorcerers, the Ebhus, as being still tainted with a human odour, while it cannot deny them their right to receive sacrifices. Were I, however, to pursue this theme further, I should have to repeat much of what I have already said in my description of the theanthropic religions. To that description, therefore, I beg to refer you. But with regard to the lower nature - religions I should like to say a word. In these, of course, every- thing is magical. By this magical power the Shaman in his ecstasy ascends to heaven, or descends to the subterranean spirits. But this magical power is pos- sessed by him in common with the higher spirits, and does not differ from theirs. In some cases there is formed an aristocracy, or superior caste, to which the rank, the honours, and the prerogatives of the gods are conceded, and which forms a transition from man to the higher beings. In the religious observances the magician-priests entirely supersede the gods and assume their forms. The founder of the race is RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 109 usually a son of the chief god, born supernaturally, or is the deity himself. And here, too, the dead are in- variably regarded as having been admitted to the order of spirits, and their souls are worshipped as spirits. There are two widely diffused groups, partly of myths and partly of legends, which owe their origin to the fundamental idea with which we are now dealr ing. They occur among peoples of every rank — at one time as childish tales, at another in the form of beautiful poetry. I allude to the representations of Paradise and the predictions of a glorious future for mankind upon earth. These are complementary to each other, and the latter may even be said to be postulated by the former, although in many cases, as in the Old Testament, the legends of Paradise are alone preserved, while the images of a blissful future are con- verted into higher ethical expectations. Pure and un- blemished, according to the Hebrew tradition, our first parents roamed at large in the garden belonging to Yahve's own dwelling, where the Deity himself walked to enjoy the cool of the evening. As yet they were tor- mented by no cares, they were disquieted by no desires ; as yet they were exempt from the obligation to labour in the sweat of their brows, and from gloomy forebodings of death. Such is the narrative of the Book of Genesis. During the thousand years’ reign of Yima, as the Avesta informs us, men lived on earth in perfect happiness, and — according to some accounts, while death was 110 SCIENCE OF RELIGION unknown — the human race increased continuously, and the earth had repeatedly to* be enlarged. Sick and infirm persons, liars and evil-doers, were as yet un- known; as yet Angra - Mainyu, the Evil One, was powerless. Life was supremely happy. Of each pair, once every forty years, was born another pair. And wlMi^i the overwhelming and devastating winter, which h|j^e Zarathushtrian legends takes the place of the piluge, threatened man with destruction, Yima, warned by Ahura Mazda, and by his command, constructed a mra or enclosure, which protected his first human race against the impending catastrophe, and enabled them to continue their blissful existence undisturbed.^ In the Bundahish, the more recent sacred book of the Zarathushtrians, which, however, contains many ancient elements, there also occurs a tradition concerning the first human pair which is very analogous to the narra- tive of the second and third chapters of Genesis, although differing from it in details. The Greeks, too, used to speak of a golden age, in which men still lived innocently, and therefore happily, but which was soon succeeded by other ages marked by a con- stant decline. For all these beautiful dreams belong ^ Compare the later form of this tradition in “ Dinft-l-Ma!-u6g*l. Khirad," xxvii. 24, ‘Sacred Books of the East,’ vol, xxiv. (West), p. 59, and its adaptation to the ancestral home of the Aryans in Htnokhard, xliv. 24, in Darmesteter’s Zend-Avesta, ii. p. 30, note 64, My version of the tradition deviates slightly from the text, as I hare tried to give it the form I believe it to have had before its Zarathushtrian modification. EELATI0N8HIF BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 111 to a past for ever ended. Paradise has been lost, and may never again be entered by man, Man, the Son of the gods, and once privileged to live in prox- imity to the deity, has fallen from liis high estate, chiefly through his own fault and through disobedience to the divine commands. The divine image has be- come faint, if not entirely effaced. Man must now maintain his life by means of toilsome labour. He must battle against disease and disaster; few are his days and full of woe. The afterthought of Epime- theus has frustrated the wise “ forethought ” of Prometheus. And at the bottom of Pandora’s box — that fateful gift of the gods, from which a host of evils and sufferings escaped to overspread the whole earth — hope alone remains behind. Yet a hope not entirely vain. For hope is too deeply rooted in the human heart to admit of the general ac- ceptance of such a pessimistic view as that indicated by the Greek myth. The beautiful pictures of an irrev- ocable past are transferred to the future. Hope’s anticipations are now of two kinds, earthly and heavenly, People who cherish hopes of the earthly kind dream, like the ancient Germans, of a new earth purified by fire, an earth purged of all evil, a kind of second Paradise, where mankind, likewise regenerated by fire, will live happily in the society of the best of the gods. Such was the hope of the Greek, when the sway of Zeus and the Olympians should once be ended^ Hi SCIENCE OFEELiaiON. Prometheus would be unfettered, and mankind would be delivered from all its miseries. Such more especially was the hope of the devout PS^rsee. During the thou- sand years’ reign of HAsh^darmS-h, which was to precede the advent of the Saviour Soshyans, men were gradually to ffeurn to the sinless state of the first human pair, and during the last ten years they were even to abstain entirely from food and yet live. Then comes the Ee- de^er. All the dead, from Gfiyomard, the protoplast, and from Mashya and MS-shyoi, the first human pair, onwards, are raised, and the righteous and the wicked are separated. The earth is burnt up, and in the ocean of molten metal which overflows its whole surface all are purified, the wicked only after suffering terrible tortures, and the righteous after experiencing merely a pleasant warmth. All then receive from Soshyans a food which renders them immortal. The evil spirits are conquered and slain, or driven unresisting into outer darkness. Even hell itself is purified and added to the earth ; and in this enlarged world, where there will be no more ice and no more mountains, men are to be immortal, and to live for ever united with their families and relations, but without further offspring, in pure and peaceful bliss.^ We only learn these concep- ^ See Bundahish xxx., ‘ Sacred Books of the East * v. (West), pp. 120-130. According to the Sha^yast-lS,-Sh&yast, xvii., 7, ib., p. 384 8eq,j those who have committed heinous sins, or ha^e practised heretical rites, are not to be raised from the dead, for they have already passed over to the Dadvas. This modification of the popular creed was obvi- ously made by the theologians. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN. 113 tions from very late sources, but even in the earliest documents they are alluded to as belanging to an already existing popular creed. The idefil of the earliest Zarathushtiian prophets of salvation was much more sober and ethical, and consisted in the triumphant supremacy of the good God over all men, an ideal more closely approaching the expectations of the prophets of Israel, of which the first preaching of the Gospel formed the fulfilment. But alongside of these representations of a future state of bliss on earth there often occur, in the same religion, others of a different character, which however rather supplement than exclude them, and which relate to the fate of men after death. Thus the Greeks had their Elysian fields, destined for heroes alone; the Scandinavians had their Valholl and Folkvang, where the warriors who fell in battle banqueted with Odhin and Freya ; and the Zarathushtrians their Garodmana, the abode of Ahura Mazda and his satellites, connected with earth by a bridge which for the righteous is broad and commodious, but for the wicked sharp as a razor, so that they inevitably tumble off it into hell. I cite these examples only because they relate to the peoples whose belief in a regeneration of mankind I have already mentioned. But there are thousands of other forms which the belief in immortality assumes, and which it would be impossible even to name at present. Suffice it to say that it occurs everywhere and among all VOL. II. H 114 SCIENCE OF RELIGION peoples, whatever be their stage of progress, and wher- ever it has not been as yet ^undermined by any philo- sophic doubts, or thrust into the background by other causes, and that in every case it is found in connection with religion. It may possibly have sprung up inde- pefidently, and quite apart from religious motives (a matter which we cannot now investigate); it seems certain, however, that it did not spring from the senti- ment of man’s relationship with God, but that both have the same origin, while the belief in immortality, once brought into connection with religion, usually takes the form of a union with the deity, or at least of an entrance into the world of the gods and a participation in their society. This is most apparent in the Egyptian religion, in which this very doctrine is elaborated with special predilection. That this view was practically universal we learn from the worship of the* dead, of which we have already spoken. The Babylonian legend of Ishtar’s descent into hell depicts in sombre colours the “land whence no man returns” {irsit Id tarat), where the dreaded Allat rules over the dead and dis- penses all kinds of torture ; but at the same time it pic- tures in words and images a state of happiness in which the pious man sits down with his God under the tree of life. We meet with both types almost everywhere. And as soon as more advanced moral sentiment asserts itself, and the idea of retribution has been combined with that of a future existence, the lower world, once RELATIONBHIF BETWEEN GOD AND MAN. the destination of almost all the dead, is converted into a place of punishment and torment, while heavenly bliss is awarded to the pious alone. For it is the general belief of all peoples that every man goes to his own proper place; the warriors who have fallen in battle ent^r the abode of the hero-gods ; Herakl^s, the mighty hero, who spent a life of toil and conflict in the service of humanity, is received into Olympus ; Enoch, Moses, and Elijah, God’s chosen friends, instead of de- scending into the sombre lower regions, are taken up directly to Him ; and (when the ethical idea has effectually asserted its influence) the pious go to Him whom they have served faithfully, while the godless, who have forsaken their god and his commandments, are consigned to the powers of darkness to be punished as they have deserved. No one will deny that the idea of relationship with God is but imperfectly expressed in all these images, and that they are but attempts to give it shape ; yet the religious thought that underlies them is that man '4s of God, and through God, and to God,” and is des- tined at last to be reunited with Him. But poetic imagination could not rest satisfied until it had found a more concrete form for this religious con- ception. Its supreme effort accordingly finds expres- sion in the belief in a Mediator — that is, as Pfleiderer has aptly described such a being, “ the combination of the divine with the hhmaii into a personal unity, in 11^ SCIENCE OF RELIGION. external objectivity.” However much mortal man may be conscious of the divine within him, God and man ever present the contrast of Infinite and Finite, of the perfect and the imperfect. Now, as experience, progress in self-knowledge, and the development of mortal con- sciousness gradually beget and confirm in man the con- viction that he answers but poorly to his high lineage and destiny, and as, on the other hand, religious thought gradually creates a loftier conception of the Deity, the gulf between the two ever widens, and it becomes increas- ingly difficult to maintain the former root-idea without prejudicing the latter. And he accordingly fills up the gulf with all kinds of intermediate beings. On earth he fills it with persons of specially religious character, with prophets, priests, teachers, leaders, and reformers, whom his imagination glorifies, and to whom he often ascribes supernatural holiness. In heaven, or at least in the region between heaven and earth, he fills the gulf with the ministers and messengers of God, such as the Babylonian Nusku, the Indian Agni N&ras'ahsa, the Avestic Sraosha, the Greek Hermes, or such as the Angels and Sons of God, — the Hebrew Male'aklm and Bn§ Elohlm, by means of whom the supreme deity com- munes with men ; he fills it too with inferior gods, who are less remote from man, and whose intercession with the most high he invokes. But while the first of these classes consists of men more gifted than their fellows, or raised above them by divine consecration and unction, BELATI0N8EIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 117 or possessed of extraordinary knowledge, yet they are not one with God, nor have they, as a rule, a definite divine origin assigned to them. The second order of beings, on the other hand, is not human, but superhuman. In these orders, the lower divine and the higher human come very nearly into contact, so that the gulf is to some extent filled up, although not entirely closed. This can only be accomplished by the conception of a being who partakes of both natures alike, who is at once God and man, a true son of God and true son of man. By means of such a bold flight of imagination the conflicting natures are reconciled, the heterogeneous elements coalesce in a unity. The belief in Mediators between the divine world and the human, who belong to both alike, is a very general one, and is manifested in many difierent forms. In some cases they are gods who descend to earth and become men, or for a time at least associate as men with men ; as Apollo with Admetus ; or like the numerous AvatS,ras of the god Vishnu, including even the Buddha, and among whom Krshna occupied the foremost rank ; or like the Scandinavian god Heimdall, who by his union with three earthly wives became the father of the three estates of nobles, freemen, and serfs, and whose posterity thus in a very special manner illustrates the kinship between gods and men. In other cases these Mediators are demi-gods, men bom of a union between gods and mortals, such as H^raklSs, 118 SOIENGE OF RELIGION. Belleroph6n, Perseus, ThSseus, and Dionysus, who were believed to have been actually born on earth, though of divine origin, and to have lived and worked on earth — Heroes, that is, Saviours and Eedeemers, as they were called — and some of whom, either as a reward for their achievements, or merely on account of their divine lineage, were raised to the rank of gods and worshipped as such. And often they are actual historical person- ages, glorified and afterwards deified by a grateful pos- terity. Such were a number of kings, like the ancient Sargon of Agade in Babylonia, and sages, like Lao-tse and Kong-tse in China, and, above all, reformers whose work and preaching called a new religion into life, like Mahavlra the Jina, Gautama the Buddha, and Zara- thushtra Spitama, after whom the Jainas, the Buddhists, and the Zarathushtrians are respectively named. The history of most of these personages consists .so largely, if not entirely, of myths, chiefly myths of the sun-gods adapted to them, that it has even been doubted whether they ever existed at all. But such an inference is un- warrantable. Once they were raised to the rank of gods or adorable beings, the actual memorials of their lives, so far as they still existed, would thenceforth be of little use, or would at least seem inadequate, and had therefore to be replaced or supplemented by miraculous tales. That such tales, borrowed mostly from the Mithras legend, were transferred to Christ also, chiefly in the apocryphal Gospels and the Golden Legend, will BELATIONSEIP BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 119 not be denied even by those who are disposed to accept as pure history the whole of the narrative of the can- onical Gospels. It is, however, certain that the dogma of the Son of God, true God and true man, which attained its highest mystic expression in the dogma of the Trinity, has been throughout long ages one of the chief corner-stones of the creed of the great majority of Christians, however different their religious views might be in other respects. Although unable to withstand the searching scrutiny of sober, rational logic, owing to the (from a purely rationalistic standpoint) irreconcilable contradiction qf the two terms which compose the ex- pression God-man, this dogma has ever been cherished by all the Christian churches as a religious truth, and one of the most important of all. And accordingly, with due religious consistency, they condemn as hereti- cal the teaching of those who deny either of these terms, — both that of the Docetes, who rejected the true man- hood of Jesus, declaring it to be apparent only, and that of the Eationalists, who rejected the divinity of Christ. It is not the business of the science of religion to maintain or defend, still less to dispute or destroy, this or any other dogma, or any religious conception as such. Its duty is merely to explain. But here it is confronted with the question — How comes it that this doctrine of the God-man occurs, not only in the theanthropic religions, which with more or less bias place the immanence of God in the foreground, but even in 120 8CIMN0E OF^^ELlklON. the Christiao religions, which &11 sliring from A mon reli^ous communion, having emanated from the strongly theocratic Judaism, Whose Gk>d was transcen- dental, if one ever was ? How has this doctrine come occupy so prominent and so central a place 4ihet its denial is regarded by most Christians as a denial of Christianity itself, and tantamount to unbelief ? ' To this there can be but one answer — Becausd it s&tisilMs the deepest needs of the religious souL^ In the first place, there is' need of commnnioB wii& the Divinity. The result of the development of f^igion' on the theocratic lines was an ever-increasinig ttsalta* tion, by means of spiritualisation, of the concep>tlC^i^ God. Even the great Persiap termer had alrsai^^% Ahura Mazda, held up to his pdOftle as an 'at adoration a god far above all the nature-gods they had hitherto worshipped. In Greece, by the philo- sophers at least, the anthropomorphic concepil||Em. j^ and thus handed down to posterity the memory of the fervour and enthusiasm of that period 5 that ' we owe them to the development of the communi^ into a church, so solidly founded and stoutly built as to defy the storms of the dark ages of barbarism ; and that, when the church was found no longer to satisfy the religious needs of many, and to be a hindrance rather than a help to the sustenance of their spiritual life, we owe the same blessings to the establishment of other communities, differing in views and in organisa- tion, but all agreeiufg in the conviction that the Scrip- BEING OB ESSENCE OF BELIQJOM. m ture is th^ word of God — a conviction which led them not only to guard the purity of its text with anxious care, but^^to bestow the utmost pains on its study and interpretation. All these have been, in their time, necessary means for the preservation of what would otherwise have certainly been lost — but only in their time. Many people nowadays require these means no longer. The Koman Catholic Church still satisfies the religious wants of millions, and possesses many peculiar merits which are not to be found elsewhere, or not at least to the same extent. But for these, she could not continue to exist. Again, the doctrine of the ’ divine inspiration of the Scriptures, in its old mechani- cal acceptation, is still, in the case of many people, the only means of making them appreciate the Bible. But there are millions who have ceased to regard the medi- aeval church as the guide of their religious life, who are nevertheless religious, and to whom we cannot deny the name of Christians. There are many persons also who can .^o longer subscribe to the old-church doctrine of the infallibility of the Scriptures, or who at least regard the divine inspiration of their authors as something totally different from a mere literal or mechanical agency; and yet there is abundant evi- dence to show that such persons by no means under- rate the religious value of the Bible — nay, that, when released from the tyranny of its letter, they are the better enabled to penetrate into its spirit In short, 186 SCIENCE OF RELIGION.: * the husks in which the priceless treasure has been pi^rved throughout the ages have themselves been indispensable, but they have had their day ; and in the fulness of time, just when the spiritual fruit they pro- tect begins to run the risk of being choked by them, they require to be removed and replaced by others. The husk is therefore invaluable, though only for the sake of the kernel. Our concern is now with the kernel. The kerpel alone gives its value to the fruit, and alone affords us sustenance. I therefore agree with Siebeck in holding that the ex- ternal manifestations of religious consciousness are not mere unimportant incidents, and that their study should by no means be neglected. Above all, I consider it wrong to maintain that it does not matter what a man believes and teaches, or how he worships, provided o]ilj-« he believes something and worships in some !b|Shi^n or other. But while I hold that the content of the doctrine and the forms of worship are by nO ^eans matters of indifference in religion, I can no mor^ ndmit that they pertain to the essence of religion than I can regard my body as pertaining to the essence of my human nature, or suppose that the loss of one of my limbs or organs would really impair my personality or true humanity. It is one of the conditions of the life of religion that its internal elements should be re- flected in its external, that the subjective should con- stantly be objectivised. It is indeed of the utmost BEim OR MBBENCE OF BELiaiON. 187 importance tfaajb the outward iorm fshould as faithfully as possible index the inward essence, and that the objective should agree as far as possible with the sub- jective— as far as possible, I say, because there are many cases in which images and symbols can only approximately express the thought that underlies them. Yet, for the very purpose of maintaining this agreement, they must constantly undergo change, be- cause the subjective or inward essence is perpetually developing. What is it, then, that we can characterise as the abiding, the unchanging, the essential element, as distinguished from the ever -varying phenomena in which it is revealed. ‘"The spirit,” every one will of course reply, or, perhaps, “ the idea.” But I cannot accept this answer without some further definition. The terms used in the so-called mental sciences are apt to be so uncertain and arbitrary that, as we are concerned with a. question of fundamental importance, we are bound to determine the precise meaning we assign to -them. The term “spirit,” in particular, is apt to be the least definite of all. When we speak of spiritual kindred in the domain of religion, we denote persons of the same way of thinking, advocates of the same principles; yet we cannot deny that men of totally different views sometimes act more in accord- ance with the spirit of our principles than others who belong to our own party. We distinguish between the 188 SaiENGE OF RELIGION. spirit of Eome and that of Dordrecht or Geneva, between the spirit of the apostolic age and that of th^ middle ages; and we thus denote cardinal diflfer- ences in principle and development within the bosom of one and the same family of religions. As a rule, we here use the word ‘‘spirit” to signify a certain sentiment or frame of mind, but we also include the idea of a direction both of thought and life. The word is, however, also applied in a general way to what may indeed develop, yet remains essentially the same, and retains the self-same individuality throughout all changes. In this sense it might be here employed; but, to prevent mistake, I prefer to use the word “being” — that which is, as distinguished from that which grows or becomes, the ov(ria as distinguished from the ever-changing fiop<^al ; and I have therefore called this part of our course the ontological, though it might perhaps have better been described as the physiological. At all events, our science csitix0^ rest satisfied until it has extended its investigations to thk point. The question as to what is the true being or essence of religion is a very dijScult and cbtuplex one, and I cannot hope to offer an entirely satisfactory or final solution; but I may at least make a humble attempt. And, to begin with, let me emphasise this point, that we are not now speaking of the essence of religion in the metaphysical, but solely in the psycho- logical sense. To treat of religion as something more BEING OR ESSENCE OF RELIGION 189 than a mere psychological problem does not indeed lie beyond the province of philosophy in the widest sense, but it certainly lies beyond that of our science. The difficulty of answering this question is at once apparent from the fact that attempts have already been made to answer it in a great many different ways. Men whose knowledge of religious phenomena, of history, and of psychology merit our admiration, and even the profoundest thinkers, have arrived at widely divergent conclusions on this subject. Some seek for the essence of religion in creeds, and accord- ingly suppose that everything depends on their purity, and therefore on their orthodoxy. And when we observe how passionately men have wrangled, and still wrangle, over doctrines, how they condemn persons who (^er from them as infidels, and how they flatter them- selves that they alone possess a monopoly of religious truth and are God’s elect, we see that such views are very generally prevalent, and that they are perhaps in practical life the commonest of all. Eejecting such views, others maintain that divine worship, the church, and the church’s " ordinances together constitute the essence of religion, and that the only object of dogma is to rally the faithful to a common standard, and to facilitate the religious education of their children. Now we have repeatedly stated that neither doctrines nor worship are matters of indifference, but are rather the necessary manifestations, and in a sense the true SCIENCE OF RELIGION. 190 tests, of religious life. We are convinced that religious men, as thinking beings, feel the need of possessing some conception of God and* the divine, whether de- rived from others or thought out for themselves-r-a conception such as to satisfy their thinking faculty; and we are equally convinced that worship must utter itself in outward observances, because men’s hearts impel them to do so. Zealous for truth, and longing for a sense of assurance and clearness of insight, they naturally translate into outward acts those feelings of which their hearts are full. But how can we discern the essence of religion in what is a mere index or utter- ance of man’s inmost soul ? (And let me remind you that even religious doctrine rests ultimately on emo- tion.) How can we discern the essence of religion in ever- varying conceptions and ideas, which are but an^ imperfect reflection of truths too deep for utterance? How are we to discover it in observances which, be- cause never entirely satisfying the craving of the pious soul, are constantly being superseded by others ? And, above all, how can we hope to discover it in such outward and imperfect institutions as our churches and their ordinances? As well might we attempt to discover in man’s body the true essence of his humanity. In order, therefore, to determine the true essence of religion, we must mount from the visible to the in- visible, from the phenomerfe of external nature to the being : m ESSENCE OF RELIGION. 191 source whence they spring. We need not seek for that essence, that abiding element, in religion as an anthropological phenomenon ; for, as such, religion is subject to continual changes ; but we must seek for it in the religiosity, or religious frame of mind, in which it has originated. Although in reality the two things are inseparable, we must try to distinguish between the ever-changing manifestations of religion and the senti- ment which underlies them. And hence we are concerned neither with doctrine, nor worship, nor church, but with that common root from which they all spring. And what root can this be but faith ? Such was the view I formerly held in common with many others. And, indeed, without faith there can be no true and living religion. Excise faith from doctrine, and doctrine becomes an empty phrase, a lip-service, the parrot -like mumbling of a catechism, without the slightest idea of its meaning, and, in short, nothing but a wretched travesty of re- ligion. Divorce faith from worship, and worship be- comes mere senseless gesticulation, mummery like that of the Chaldsean impostors, a contemptible hypocrisy like that of the Italian priest who, as the story goes, upon the elevation of the host, exclaimed, to Luther’s horror, “ Bread thou art and bread shalt thou remain ! ” Sever faith from the church, and the church becomes an institution in which love of power, ambition, and covetousness reign supreme, and which grievously 192 SCIENCE OF RELIGION abuses the most sacred heritage of mankind. Faith is the life of religion, Eeligion without it is dead. vJAre we then, it will be asked, to seek for the essence of religion in faith ? And there immediately arises the counter -question, Does this apply to religion alone ? Surely, it applies to our whole spiritual life. What is religion without faith ? Yes — but what is our moral life without belief in the reality of goodness, in its power, and in the possibility of its realisation and its final triumph? True charity is said to believe all things. Can a man of science advance a single step in his researches without faith in the unity of nature, with- out belief in the possibility of discovering its laws, without belief in the truth ? Who can be a genuine artist without belief in art and in his own artistic faculty ? And, on the other hand, does theri^ not even, exist a belief in ghosts, in evil spirits, ip witchcraft and exorcism, which, though we may regard it as super- stition and a mere caricature of religion, is nevertheless as deeply rooted in some minds as religious faith in the souls of the pious ? It is thus obvious that we cannot pronounce faith to be the specific characteristic of religion. Some other definition is therefore required. Several different attempts have been made to find such a definition ^The essential element we are in search of has been defined as a belief in the moral order of the wqjrld, involving the postulation of a supreme power which institutes such order, and which 193 BEING an ESSENCE OF RELIGION. causes it ultimately to triumph. (This is the doctrine of Bunsen, Eauwenhoflf, and to some extent that of Kant also.) But this view depends upon the hypo- thesis that religion originates in ethics, and upon an identification of the moral with the religious principle, a view which we shall afterwards impugn. I should be more inclined to agree with those who seek the source of religion in our experience of the fact that in every religion, albeit in countless different ways, a belief in God’s supremacy over the world and man- kind is combined with a belief in man’s kinship with God. Here, therefore, we find a belief in God as the Infinite, the Illimitable, who is the perfect substance of all that is highest in our inward nature, though it be but finite and limited, combined with a belief in ourselves, as created in God’s image, for the purpose of fiftriving ceaselessly to attain to His perfection. Or, briefly, we here find a belief in the essential unity of what is specifically human with what is divine, a union which embraces both the different aspects of faith. Now, this faith is to be met with in religions on the lowest and on the highest plane of development. Yonder in crude animistic conceptions, myths, and symbols, especially in what is known as Totemism ; here in the philosophical form of dogma. This faith has been embodied by the theology of ithe Christians in particular, in their dogmas of the Trinity and of the divinity of Christ, so that both the phases of our con- VOL. II. N SCIENCE OF RELIGION lU ception of faith are united in the Son of God. And is it not precisely this dogma (for it is in truth but one) which throughout the ages has formed the mainspring of religion, and the profession of which has ever been regarded as the cognisance of all true Christians ? And hence we might draw the conclusion that belief in the spiritual unity of God and man, combined with the fullest recognition of God's superiority to man — belief in the Infinite above us and the infinite within us — is the kernel of all religion. This proposition undoubtedly contains much truth. It is a hypothesis ; and it is justifiable as being founded on the preceding genetic-psychological inquiry. Yet this solution, which once satisfied me, does not, after prolonged study and maturer reflection, appear entirely adequate. What it lacks is the great desideratum of unity of principle. And, besides, it is too much of a dogma — nay, it is really a compound of two dogmas, or two distinct conceptions welded into a single doctrine. ■> ,ny ' Nearly the same remark applies to Siebeck's^ ment of this question.^ More Germanico, he»: up his exposition in a single formula, which, fot the benefit of our non-German hearers and readers, we shall an- alyse a little. He regards religion as a conviction that Gcd and a super-terrestrial world exist, and that re- demption is possible — a Qonviction to which heart and mind alike contribute, and which is practically oper- Ibid., p. 442. BEim OB ESSENCE OF BELIQION. 195 ative. And in the determination of religious consGioua^ ness, faithjsj^ essentjaljgj^^^ moment. Faith, in this highest sense, he describes as an act performed by the freewill of the individual. This act consists, in the first place, in an affirmative answer being given by the believer, with regard to the idea of the Good, to the question whether the existence of a highest good- ness and a highest worth should be admitted or denied — a question which, in view of the doubts begotten by experience and reflection, cannot be solved theoretically; but the act is, at the same time, a postulation of the super-terrestrial personality of God as the profoundest guarantee and the all-sufficient foundation of the con- tinuous realisation of goodness. And the formation and elaboration of this conception spring essentially from the fact that the human personality, whatever essential and worthy elements it possesses in its own general natulfe, cannot fail to use them as keys or handles to th#j^ssibility of discerning the transcen- di^ntal origin of the world. It seems to me, with all due^ppreciation of the truths thus enunciated, that the above statement amounts to little more than a dogmatism compressed into a formula, a sort of extractum theologian dogmaticae triplex ! Faith is indeed a free act of each human personality ; and the statement is creditable to the discernment of^tihe German philosopher. Yet I cannot acquiesce in holding that faith in a super- terrestrial deity, as being the foundation and guarantee 196 SGIENOE OF RELIGION. of the realisatioii of goodness, is to be regarded as the abiding diaracteristic of all religion. At all events, this is just another conception (a term which the author himself uses), and a very complex conception too. But a conception, even when a central one, from which all others diverge, and to which all others again converge, can never be the essence or kernel of religion. It may form the root-idea of a philosophical system, or of a philosophical religious doctrine; but doctrine, though a fruit of religion, is not religion itself. I also greatly doubt whether Siebeck’s formula could be applied to religions in their earliest stages of development. We must therefore try to find some other method of solving the problem. It is needless to search for the essence of religion in any outward phenomenon, either in doctrine, or in worship, or in church, or even in faith, which may doubtless be regarded as the source of one of its elements — that of religious thought. It must be sought for in a certain sentiment or dispositicm ^ — in religiosity. Religion is essentially a framf bf mind in which all its various elements have their source. Religion is piety, manifesting itself m word and deed, in conceptions and observances, in doctrine and in life. I once met an aged Roman Catholic priest who complained that his infirmities confined him to the house during the cold winter weather. “ But how,” I asked, “ could he perform the service in his cold and draughty parish church ? ” “ Oh, that is devotion,” was BEING OB ESSENCE OF RELIGION m the reply. I loved and revered the old man for these simple words. For here, I said to myself, is a truly pious man, although our austere Calvinistic fathers would have branded him as an idolatrous votary of the Popish Mass. True to his sacerdotal vows, he felt bound to offer lip the sacrifice which he deemed the holiest rite of his religion. Whether this might hasten his end he did not stop to consider — God knew. Surely this was religion, this was piety and devotion. * Now, I do not claim to have been the first to seek this method of solution. That religion is really piety is no new discovery. Others have already expressed their conviction of its truth. But most people stop here, as if this statement were sufficient to solve the whole problem, whereas in reality it is only the first step towards the solution. For, unless we would rest satisfied with using one term in place of another, we must further determine what piety really means. We need not trouble ourselves much about etymologies ; for we must bear in mind that the German fromm, the Dutch vroom, and the Latin pius are no longer used in their original senses, but now possess a different and deeper significance. Fromm or vroom originally meant what is “ useful, profitable, or salutary,” and pins meant “dutiful or Ipyal.” We have ceased to use the word “pious” in any of these senses. Piety is now practically synonymous with “ devotion, or consecration,” because it involves the idea of self -dedication and personal 198 SCIENCE OF RELIGION. fiacrifice, which is one of the root-ideas of religion* But this is only one of these ideas. Piety involves mote. The fact that the term* is often used in a con- temptuous or ironical sense need no more disturb us than the fact that its Teutonic equivalent originally implied a tinge of selfishness, while the Latin word might denote mere formalism. And therefore, when we say that religion is piety, we need hardly apprehend any iisk of misunderstanding ; we mean, as every one knows, that religion is, in truth, that pure and rev- erential disposition or frame of mind which we call piety. Now, wherever I discover piety, as manifested in different stages of religious progress, and particularly as exhibited in full beauty in the highest stage as yet attained, I maintain that its essence, and therefore the essence of religion itself, is adoration. In adorafbion are united those two phases of religion which are termed by the schools “transcendent” and ^iminan- ent ” respectively, or which, in religious language, re- present the believer as “looking up to God as the Most High,” and as “feeling himself akin to God as his Father.” For adoration necessarily involves the elements of holy awe, humble reverence, grateful ac- knowledgment of every token of love, hopeful con- fidence, lowly self-abasement, a deep sense of one’s own unworthiness and shortcomings, total self-abnegation, and unconditional consecration of one’s whole life and BEING OB ESSENCE OF RELIGION. 199 one’s whole faculties. To adore is to* love “with all one’s heart and soul and mind and strength.” To adore is to give oneself^ with all that one has and holds dearest. But at the same time — and herein consists its other phase — adoration includes a desire to possess the adored object, to call it entirely one’s own, and con- versely a longing on the part of the adorer to feel that he belongs to the adored one for ever, in joy and in sorrow, in life and in death. He gives himself, in order to attain perfect union with the object of his adoration. He cannot feel happy except in the presence of that object. Although it is only in the lower stages of religious evolution that we find the worshipper placing himself wholly at the disposal of his god, in order, con- versely, to gain control over that god ; and although he displays the same selfish desire to secure a monopoly of the divine favour, and the same ignoble emulation, as characterise earthly relations (a selfishness which is speedily dispelled by clearer moral insight and purer moral sentiment) — yet no pious man will ever rest satisfied until he can exclaim out of the fulness of his heart, Lord and my God!” Adoration therefore demands that closest communion, that perfect union, which forms the characteristic aim of all religion, and to which all true believers earnestly aspire. And, further, the spirit of adoration affords a key to all the various manifestations of religion. Who can adore without being so filled with the adored object SaiENOE OF RELIGION. m that it constant^ occupies his thoughts, and that, albeit the object is the Infinite and Invisible, he* cannot re- frain from forming a conception of it, an image to delight his eyes and his heart ? Who does not strive tc^ loiow the adored one better, so far as it is possible poor finite man to know him? Who can adore, without his whole life being dominated by the adored object, without strenuously clinging to it, without being inspired by it, without longing to give vent to his feel- ings in enthusiastic songs and in acts of reverential love ? Thus inspired, he rejoices to find kindred spirits willing to enter into a sacred league with him, and, when he meets with persons whose spiritual life still slumbers, he delights to awaken it, to convince them by word and example, and with his enthusiasm to kindle in their bosoms that sacred fire which burns so brightly within his own. Faith, in all its various manifestations, worship in all its forms, every church and sect ; all the manifold phases of religious life, the longing of believers to seek communion with their God in solitude, their impulse to go forth into the world in order to confess Him in public and show forth His marvellous works ; 'the depths of their self-abasement in presence of the Most High, their trembling approach to His footstool, or their proudest triumph over the earthly and the transitory; the humble prayer, ‘'God, be merciful to me, a sinner”; the sufferer’s piteous lament, “EU, Eli, lama sabachtani”; the cry of anguish, “Out of the BEING OB ESSENCE OF RELIGION. 201 depths I call unto Thee, O God,” as well as the exult- ant, “Nothing shall separate me from God,” — all, all this lies enshrined in adoration. Two further questions that arise here must not re- main unanswered. The first is, “Does all this apply exclusively to religion? Can we call adoration its essence when it is the essence of idolatry also ? We might reply that adoration may take a false course, and be directed towards unworthy objects, just as we may throw away our charity upon persons undeser ving of it, without thereby impugning the truth that love is the fundamental law of our moral life. But we must go a little deeper into the matter. We use the term adoration even in our intercourse with our fellow-men. The passionate love of the youth for the bride of his choice, the unbounded admiration of children for a distinguished father, the wife’s fervent reverence for her husband’s talents, so well expressed by the poet Chamisso in words which I may paraphrase thus : — “ To serve him, live for, and belong to him Be my whole aim. And give myself, and thus exalted be By his proud fame.” All this, though rare in these days of male precocity and female emancipation, and though we may smile at it as sentimental nonsense, is comprised in the word adoration. And although such adoration may be less SCIENCE OF RELIGION. m intense and overmastering than religious adoration, it has a great many features in common with it, and is of the self-same nature. To the same category belongs also the worship of genius, hero-worship, which has been recommended by David Friedrich Strauss as a substitute for religion, and has been so eloquently ex- tolled by Carlyle. Such, too, is the veneration of the saints, although, in theory, the Church carefully distin- guishes between the veneration of saints and the worship of God. The difference, however, is in degree only, and not in kind. But is it not a kind of idolatry to offer to weak and sinful creatures the homage we owe to the Creator alone ? Surely such veneration of saints and heroes, and such fondly cherished memories, can never serve as a subati’* tute for religion. To devote the highest love to what only limited and finite is irreligious. But veneratiap does not necessarily or always imply such a maximum of love. And after all it is not the actual, imperfect, and finite men, as such, that are revered, but rather a creation of the imagination, an ideal objectivised in this or that personage, whether historical or legendary, or of our own acquaintance. Are we^ angry, or do we smile benevolently, when we hear fond relations singing the praises of a father, a son, or a husband, and basking in the sunshine of their fame, in which they fail to see the blemishes detected by your sober and critical eye ? For my part, 1 would rather see a little enthusiasm. BEING OB ESSENCE OF RELIGION. 203 warmth of feeling, and affection, whatever the object of it may be, than an entire want of generous admiration. And what is m9re, those minds which are susceptible of such impressions are likely to be much more alive to religious emotions than those cold natures which scoff at what they consider silly fanaticism. Nay, I venture to go a step further. What is idol- atry? I do not now use the word in its figurative sense, as applied, for example, to such idols as money or honour, art or science : the pursuit of such objects has really nothing in common with religious idolatry, I am only now using the word idolatry in its proper and original sense. And I would define it as religion under the influence of intellectual aberration. To some extent it is an entirely subjective idea. To you and to me an idol appears to be a different conception of the Deity from our own, and I may surely say a lower conception. The Hapi-bull of Memphis is an idol from our point of view, but the Egyptian mysticism regarded it as a symbol and pledge of the ever-reviving Ptah, the God of nature's undying power of reproduction. In the eyes pf the* great Swiss Reformers the adoration of the Virgin was a profane deification of the creature, whilst, in the view of the devout Catholic, Mary pre- sented a marvellous combination of pure maidenhood and of suffering maternal love. St Paul regarded Diana of the Ephesians as an abominable idol, and rightly so, from his religious point of view ; . but, al- SCIENOE OF RELIGION. SS04 though Demetrius and his fellows championed her wor- ship solely from interested motives, there must have been many pious persons Who honestly believed in her divinity, and feared lest disloyalty to the sacred tradi- tions of their fathers would bring ruin upon their city. In the opinion of our Calvinist forefathers, intellectual- ists as they were, the Popish Mass, as already observed, was hateful idolatry, while the Catholics regard it as the daily renewal of the great sacrifice of the Son of God. I venture to say that in all this there is religion, although on a lower plane of development, and that this religion only becomes idolatry when the concep- tion of the deity upon which it rests ceases to satisfy our moral sentiment or our religious needs, and when we have advanced so far in religious evolution as to perceive that the adored object has ceased to be adorable. Here again arises a second question. If a— legend of Ishtar, 114 — traditions as to Orst race of men, 232. Bach’s Passion, II. 153. Balfour, A. J., on progress, not implied by mere movement, I. 278 — on musical development, ib, — on * Authority and Keason,* II. 41 — quoted, 56. Beers, Jan van, depicts Bomish ritual, II. 10, 11. Bel, king of the dead, 1. 90 — one of the triad, Anu, Bel, and Ea, ib, — god of the lower regions, 106— legend of, II. 106. Bellerophdn, as a mediator, II. 118. Bender, religion defined by, II. 5. Bergaigne on the Vedic Religion, I. 23. Bible, inspiration of, II. 185. Bntl Elohlm, angels and sons of God, 11. 116. Bodhi, the highest illumination, 1. 171. Book of the Dead, 1.^ 185. Breidhablik, abode of Baldur, n. «8. Brahm^ becomes chief of the gods, I. 91 — subordinated to Buddha, 171. Brahmanism, Professor Hopkins on, I. 23 — develops into Bud- dhism, 193. Brosses, President de, on fetishes, I. 75. Budde, Karl, on the nomad ideal, * I. 223. Buddha, universalism of the, I. 126-^originally a man, histor- ical or mythical, 170 — deified, 171 — as a mediator, II. 117. Buddhism, I. 124 scg. — univer- salistic, 126 — developed from Brahmanism, 193 — the first uni* versalistic religion, ib. — extreme of theanthropy, 208 — destroys individuality, 210 — divided in- to different sects, 284 — as a church, 11. 169, 170 — progress of, II. 173. Buddhistic scriptures, II. 170. Bundahish, narrative of, as to the first human pair, II. 110, Bunsen bases religion on moral order of the world, II. 192, 193. C Caird, Edward, on types of re- ligion, I. 61 — quoted, II. 121. Caird, John, on history and phil- osophy of religion, I. 16. Calvin, theology of, I. 37 ; II. 9, 61. Calvinists, 11. 82. Cambyses kills the sacred bull of Hapi, I. 101. Carlyle quoted, II. 202. Causality, instinct of, as a source of religion, II. 224. Ceremonies — see Observances, Worship. Chaldaean impostors, I. 188. Chamisso, lines by, II. 201. Chinese burial customs, I. 73 — re- ligion, 99 — religions described, 200. Christ, preaching of, I. 37 — uni- versalism of the teaching of, 126— ‘preaching of, not orig- inal,’ 263 — Master of all, 271 — divinity \)f, II. 193, 194. See also God-man, Mediator, - m INDEX. Christian group of religions the highest known, I. 148 — the- ology, 11. Ifif3, 194. Christianity, divisions of, I.. 56 — nature of, 124 seq. — univer- salistic, 126 — divergent ideals of, 200, 201 — combines theo- cratic and theanthropic prin- ciples, 208, 209 — proclaims God above man and in man, 209 — proclaims brotherhood of men and freedom of individual, ib. — history of, continues earlier history of religion, 211 — in- augurates new epoch, 212 — diversity in churches and sects of, 283, 284. Church arises with the ethical re- ligions, I. 136 — etymology and meaning of, 137 ^eq. — and State, 138 aeq. — at first dominates all intellectual life, 140 — formation of churches, 141 aeq. — attains in- dependence, ih. — State churches, 142: — proper vocation of, 143, 144 — idea of a universal, 287, 288; II. 162 — religion em» bodied in, II. 155 aeq. — as a social phenomenon, 158 — potent factor in development of relig- ion, 159 — Protestant churches, 160 — must religion always be embodied in a? 161 — ‘has had its day,’ 164 — begins with local organisations, 165 — local com- munities unite to form, 167 — at first based on State, 168 — Zarathushtrism, an established, ih. — of the Achsemenides, an established, 169 — Judaism, a, ih. — IslS-m, a, ih. — Buddhism, a, ih. — formed by co-operation, 172 — and State, 175 — requires independence, 176 — exclusive domain of, 178 — beautiful mis- sion of, 179-181 — the Eoman Catholic, I. 21, 56 — ritual of, II. 10, 11— aims and merits of; 73, 159, 185. Churches must be studied, 1. 21 — decline, but religion survives, 38 — the Protestant, 56 — Schil- ler’s saying as to, 166. Civilisation, how far it influences religion, I. 221 — Bechabites op- posed to, 224 — religion cannot be withdrawn from, 225 — in ad- vance of worship, 228 — educa- tive effect of, on religion, 230, 232 — advance of, increases dif- ferences in religions, 283 — how far due to religion, II. 254 — ‘ religion hostile to, ’ 255 — re- ligion promotes and hallows, 257. Cobet, the Hellenist, I. 7. Conceptions, religious, must be studied, I. 21 — cease to satisfy, 35— conception of God changes, 36, 37 — of Deity inadequate basis of religion, II. 21, 22 — distinguished from emotions and sentiments, 6, 14, 16, 18 — of faith, 25 sefy.— of God, 76 aeq. Confucianism, I. 121 — consists mainly in worship of spirits, 200. Conquest, effect of, on religion, I. 82. Conscience^ does religion originate in? II. 217 aeq. Constituents of religion, II. 1, 6 — distinguished from manifesta- tions of religion, 6, 7 — emotions, conceptions, sentiments, 14, 20, 22. Continuity of development appar- ently broken, I. 266-269 — re- stored by great reformers, 269- 270 — law of, in religious dfe- velopment, 271. INDEX. 2W Coquerel, Athanase, on tenacity of religious conviction, I. 230. Creation, doctrine of the, I. 161. Creeds cease to satisfy, I. 35 — differ as men differ, 36 — tend to become simplified, 293, 294 — long stationary, II. 66 — not the foundation of religion, 67 — study of, necessary, 69 seq. — include theology, an^ropology, and soteriology, 73— formation of, 183 — not the essential in religion, 189. Creuzer, theory of, as to philosophy and religion, II. 57. Cult, an element of religion, II. 4. See also Worship, Observ- ances. I) Dadvas, gods of the Iranians, I. 48 — afterwards evil spirits, ib.f 50, 51 — lying spirits and devils, 110 — worship of the, 123 — use of the term, 159 — evil spirits, II. 92 — warded off by spells, 139. Dagon, I. 101. Darius ^i^hases a new Hapi-bull, I. 10|.— ^ved by statecraft, 285. Dead, c^Bms regarding the, I. 73 — kmg of the, 90 — abode of the, ib, — Book of the, 185. Death, primitive notion of, I. 80 — not understood by savages, II. 232. Deluge, the Babylonian, I. 106, 172; II. 106. D^m^ter, the Greek goddess, I. 97. Demons not at first distinct from gods and spirits, I. 89. Dens, meaning of, I. 158. Development in general, and of religion, I. 28 seq. — defined, 28-30 — of religion, meaning of, 31-35 — not mere change, 38 — of religion by the Greeks, 40 — * unconscious growth,’ 42 — chief objection to, 43 — by as- similation, 45 — objections to, 51 — steps or stages in, 54 — of lower nature-religions, 58 seq. — all-embracing law of, 87 — of higher nature -religious, 88 seq. — therianthropic and an- thropieal stages of religions, 100 — of the ethical religions, 120 seq. — promoted by indi- viduality, 145, 146 — place of spiritualism in, 147 — directions of, 150 seq. — directions distinct from stages of, 151 — religious and general, 154— how far af- fected by one-sidedness, 179 — in particular religions, 182 seq. — of religion promoted by the (rreeks, 194-198 — of very com- plex nature, 201 — by reaction, 202 — laws of, 213 seq. — do laws of, exist? 217 — laws of, differ from laws of history, ib. — of religion traced by science of re- ligion, 218, 219— general, influ- ences religion, 220 seq. — pure Yahvism hostile to, 225 — pro- moted by assimilation, 226, 234, 236, 242 — of worship, slow, 228 — religious revelation advances with general, 232 — law of, in unity of mind, ib. — important general law of, 239 — a conflict, 243 — of religion, influence of the individual on, 244 seq. — personality a vital factor in, 246, 248, 249, 253, 254— influ- ence of woman on, 256, 257 — may be retarded by personality, 261, 262 — is growth, not change, 263 — unity and continuity of, INDEX. 2^\) 264 m}. — apparently broken, 266-269 — restored by mighty reformers, 269 - 27 1 — develop- ment continuous, 271 — of* re- ligion, essentials of, 272 aeq. — ‘ from the sensuous to the spiritual,’ 276 — from uniform- ity to diversity, 281 — tendencies to unification and difierentiation in, 289 — tendency of, towards monotheism, 290-292 — simpli- fies worship and creeds, 292- 295 — essence of religious, 299, 300. Diana of the Ephesians, how far an idol, II. 203, 204. Dion^, I. 98. Dionysus, as a mediator, II. 118. Diversity in religion proof of its vitality, I. 284, 287 — unity in, 288, 289 — in general develop- ment, 295. Doctrine, how far nature of re- ligion learned from, I. 22, 24 — infancy of, 78 — begins to be organised, 93 — of the philoso- phers as to the god of gods, 116 — confounded with the writ containing it, 132 — fixed in the ethical religions, 134 — becomes simplified, 293, 294 — growth of, II. 183 — not of essence of re- ligion, 186 — value and objects of, 189 — a fruit of religion, but not religion itself, 196. Dogmatic, an element of religion, II. 4. Drujas, evil spirits, I. 48 — lying spirits, II. 92 — warded off by spells, 139. Dualism of spiritual and non- spiritual unsatisfactory, L 277. Duhm, on Ecstatios and Mystics, 1.270. Dyaus-pitar, the Vedic god, , I. 98. E Ea, the creator, I. 106 — god of the sea, II. 96. East- Aryan religion, divisions of, . I. 66., Ecole d’Etudes religieuses, I. 3. Edda, Christian and classical ele- ments in the, I. 169. Egypt, tombs of, older than temples, II. 261. Egyptian Religion, therianthropic, I. 100, 101 — moral treatises connected with, 102 — develop- ment of the, 109 — character of the, 184-186 — tendency to monotheism in the, 291 — mag- ical papyri of, II. 106, 114, 138. Elijah taken up to heaven, II. 116 — contest of, with the priests of Ba‘al, 131. Elohlm, Satan among the sons of the, IL 87. Elysian Fields, abode of the heroes, II. 113. Emanation, creation by, I. 161. Emotions, distinguished from con- ceptions and sentiments, II. 6, 14, 16, 18 — religion begins with, 15, 16 — how awakened, 16-18, 25 — inadequate as basis of re- ligion, 20, 22 — right of religion a right of the, 236. Enoch taken up to heaven, *11. 115. Epim§theus, * afterthought of,’ II. III. Ethic, an element of religion, II. 4. See also Morality. Ethical and naturalistic principles conflict, 1. 64 — ideas, advance of, 102 — element, progress of the, 105 — reform, personal ele- ment in, 130. Ethical Religions, 66, 67 — ap- INDEX, 371 proached by the nature - re- ligions, 93 — developed, 120 seq, — mainly particularistic, ex- cept Buddhism and Christianity, 124 — sacred Scriptures of the, 133, 135, 136 — intolerance of the, 134 — Church arises from the, 136 — individualism source of, 144, 145. Euripides modifies the myths, I. 115. Evil in the world, how accoiinted for, II. 91 — as means of educa- tion, II. 93. Evolution — see Development. F Fa Hian, the Chinese pilgrim, I. 281. Faith, conceptions of, II. 25 seq, — difference between science and, 33, 34, 38 — how far com- municable, 39, 40 — lofty aim of, 47 — a doctrine of life, 68 — Semitic conception of, 89 — root- ideas in all conceptions of, 125 — vital, but not source of re- ligion, 191, 192 — essential in science and art, 192. Family, basis of polytheism, I. 96 — principle of, in religion, 154. Fate, the will of Zeus, L 91 — in the theanthropic religions, 165. Fatherhood, .ideal of, I. 97 — in the theanthropic religions, 159, 160 — of God in Christianity, 209, ^ Fechner, religious - philosophical theory of, H. 210. Fetish, etymology and meaning of, I. 75 — De Brosses on fe- tishes, t5. — worship of fetishes, 75-80 — object of fetishes, II. 157. Fetishism, origin of, I. 75, 77. Feuerbach, theory of origin of religion adopted by, II. 222- 224, 227. Finite, and Infinite, gulf between, II. 116 — idea of, preceded by that of Infinite, 121. Finns, religion of the, I. 98. Fire, worship of, I. 124. Flint, R., on historical method, I. 17. Folkvang, abode of dead warriors, I. 90; II. 113. Forms of Religion, all, must be studied, I. 9 — many different, 31 — however imperfect, are ne- cessary, 276 — confounded with religion itself, 222. Prance, science of religion in, I. 3. Freethinkers, I. 231. (t Gaia, I. 98. Galilee, new religious life dawned in, II. 184. Garodmana, abode of Ahura Mazda, II. 113. G^th^s, revelation contained in the, I. 47 — worship of the, 133 — miraculous power ascribed to, II. 138. Gautama, the Buddha, as a medi- ator, II. 118. Genesis, Book of, description of Paradise in, II. 109 — similar to narrative of Bundahish, 110 — regards man as by nature im- mortal, 231. - Geniuses, attempt to account for, I. 258 — as founders or reformers of ireligion, hailed as redeemers, 249. Germany, science of religion in,, 1. 3. INDEX. Gifford Bequest, I. 3. God, conception of, changes, 1. 36, 37 — gods originally magi- cians, 79 — gods, demons, ' and spirits not at first quite distinct, a- gods, organisation of, in 3s, &c., 90 — the gods be- e more humanised, 92 — Mexican and Peruvian god of ' gods, 95 — fatherhood of, 97 — therianthropic and anthropical gods, 100 — gods not under moral law, 103 — as con- ceived by the philosophers, 116 — conception of, elevated, 117 — mediators between man and, 130- -conception of, determines nature of religion, 152 — thean- thropic and theocratic concep- tions of, 155-160 — approaches man in theanthropic religions, 160 — theocratic, is absolute, 163 -- theanthropic, power of, limited, 164, 165 — men trans- formed into gods, 168 — man becomes, 171 — familiarity to- wards theanthropic gods, 173--^ sovereignty of, indispensable element in religion, 180 — above man, and in man, proclaimed by Christianity, 209 — concep- tion of, becomes loftier, 227 — original conception of, vague, 290 — oneness of, in the Veda, ib, — supremacy of one, 291, 292— no religion without, II. 73 — conceptions of, 76 seq. — evolu- tion of conceptions of, 79 — superhuman power essential attribute of, 80 seg. — as the Almighty, 86 — superhuman character of gods, 86 — word of, becomes creative power, 87 — omniscience and omnipresence of, ib, — abodes of gods, 88 — plastic representation of the gods, 88, 89 — ethical attributes ascribed to gods, 89 seg. — the Holy One, 90— author of evil? 91 — benevolent and malevolent gods, ib, — omnipotence of, 93 — ‘ a power of nature only becomes a god when worshipped,’ 94 — abiding element in conception of, 95 — strange gods recognised, 95, 96 — every superhuman power regarded as a god, 97 — must a god be worthy of adora- tion ? ^6. — power of, regarded at first as magical, 99 — and man, relationship between, 100 .seg. — religion impossible without belief in, 101 — anthropomor- phised, ih. — personality of, 102 — ‘above us,’ and ‘in us,’ a common belief, 103 — men, chil- dren of, 104, 105 — Hebrew con- ception of, 105— Egyptian con- ception of, 106, 107 — in the- anthropic religions gods become men and men gods, 107, 108 — man as son of the gods, 111 — Zarathushtrian ideal of, 113 — friends of, 114, 115 — and man, gulf between, 116 — conception of true son of, and true son of man, 117-121 — reconciliation with, 124 — and man, approach of, 131, 132 — prayer to, essen- tial of worship, 133 seg. — sacri- fices and offerings to, 143 ^g. — sacrificial meals supposed to be attended by the gods, 150 — — response of, to His worship- pers, 154 — national and local gods, 172 seg. — Scripture, word of, 184, 185— supremacy of, and man’s kinship with, as a source of religion, 193 — super- terrestrial personality of, 195 — adoration of, 198 seg. — wor- shipped in symbols, 203 — primi- INDEX. $ 273 tive customs as to special gods, 205 — belief in, how revealed, 210, 211 — conscience as voice of, 217 aeg. — man’s wish to be, 223 — gods not all nature-gods, 225 — origin of belief in, 227 — dwells in man as the Indnite, the Absolute, 228 seg. — help- lessness of man without, 239 seq. — unity with, object of the religious man, 245. God-man, doctrine of the, I. 167 aeq. ; II. 101, 104 acg., Ill, 117-121. Goethe on the miraculous, IL 99 — on the transitory, 103. Gospel, preservation of the, II. 184. Great Britain, science of religion in, I. 3. Greek -Roman culture, influence of, I. 194. Greeks, development of religion by the, I. 40 — elevate religion, 194-198 — rationalism of the, we’dded to Oriental mysticism, 208 — identify chief foreign gods with Zeus, 291. H HadSs, Zeus, Poseidon, and, the Greek triad, I. 90 — god of the • lower religions, 109. Haoma, god of the cup of immor- tality, I. 50 ; II. 150. Hapi, sacred bull of, I. 101. Hartmann, Ed. von, on types of religion, I. 61, 65 — classiflesthe chief religions, 184 — view of, on origin of religion, II. 223, 224. Hathor, I. 97. Heathen customs and names, sur- vival of, I. 44, 45. TOL. II. Hegel, religions classifled by, I. 58 — characterises the chief re- ligions, 183 — thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of, 204 — influence of, on theology, 11. 61. Heimdall, as a mediator, II. 117. Heine, cynicism of, II. 157. Hephsestus, cult of, I. 108. H^ra, development of conception of, I. 60 — the Argelian, 97 — the jealous queen of heaven, 111. HeraklSs, myth of, 110-113 — as a mediator, 167 — received into Olympus, IL 115<~as a medi- ator, 118. Hermes, messenger of the gods, II. 116. Hesiod narrates myth of Prome- theus, I. 113. Hindu, unfettered imagination of the, I. 191 — bold speculation and gross sensuality of the, ih History of religion distinct from science, I. 13 — supplies mate- rials, ib. — and philosophy of religion, 16, 17 — Prof. Flint on study of, 17 — do laws of, ex- ist? 217 — shows growth, not mere change, 263~^i8regarded by superficial theorists, II. 183 — secular preceded ecclesias- tical, 253 — great epochs in, outcome of religious reform, 225. Hoekstra, S., on individuality, I. 250 — classifies individuals, 254, 255 — on origin of religion, II. 223-224. Holland, first to found chairs of history and philosophy of re- ligion, I. 2, 3. Homer, myths transformed by, 1. 195. Honover, prayer used as a spell, II. 139. See also Ahunavairya. S 27# INDEX. Hope transfers Paradise to future, IL 111 123. Hopkins, Prof., on Brahmanic rites, I. 23. Hylozoism, I. 74 ; II. 56. I Iblis, dreaded as an evil spirit, II. 96. Idolatry not original form of re- ligion, I. 71 — of personality in a sense permissible, 260 — ex> plained, II. 85 — is adoration essence of? 201 — defined, 203 aeq. Imagination insufficient basis of study, 1. 19, 20 — not the origin of conception of faith, II. 27 — creative power and value of, 28, 29 — products of, superseded by others, 30 - 32 — can religion originate in? 214, 215. Immortality, belief in, II. 114, 115 — taken for granted, 231. Incarnation, doctrine of, I. 166. * Indian religions, origin of, I. 56 — and Iranian religions develop in different directions, 188 — asceti- cism, 189 — aspirations and ideals, 192, 193 — spiritualism, extravagant, 201 — brutish nat- uralism, 202. Individual character of religion, I. 154. Individualism, source of ethical religions, I. 144, 145. Individuality, see Personality. Individuals classified by Professor Hoekstra, I. 254 — potent motors of development, 257. Indra, a Vedic god, I. 91 — king of the gods, 98 — the self-ruley, 159 — s^rdinated to Buddha, 171 — ^functions of, IL 84. Infinite, and Finite, gulf between, II. 116 — idea of, precedes that of the Finite, 121 — man’s desire for union with, 149 — within man differentiates him from lower animals, 228 — ‘percep- tion of the,’ 229, 230 — man has, within him, whether consciously or not, 230 — lines of Alfred de Musset on the, ib. — takes pre- cedence of the Finite, 231-233 — ‘within us,’ rejected by the sceptic, 234. Intolerance sets in with fixed doctrine of the ethical religions, I. 134. Iphigeneia, sacrifice of, 1. 176. Iranian religion, development of the, I. 51 — origin of the, 66 — religion reformed, 110 — and Indian religions develop in different directions, 188 — doc- trines of morality, 189 — para- dise, 190 — prayer of the, II. 55. Ishtar of Western Asia, I. 97 — a matriarchal goddess,' 107 — Freya, the Scandinavian, 108 — descent of, into hell, 164; II. 114. Isl^m, a revelation-religion, I. 121 — how far particularistic, 126, 127 — temples and sanctuaries of, 172 — extreme of theocracy, 208 — a church, II. 169. Isolation of hermits, Bechabites, and others on religious grounds, I. 223-225, 231 — hinders de- velopment, 233 — peoples in, stationary, 235 — extolled, 241. J Jacob, dream of, at Bethel, II. 88. Jastrow, Morris, theory of, that science, art, and morality spring INDEX. m $ from reli^on, II. 248 — saying of, 255. JeUl-ed-Blu RfLml, the Persian mystic, II. 132. Jesus, anointing of, I. 25, 26. Job, trials of, I. 162 — includes Satan among sons of the Elohlm, II. 87. Johnson, Samuel, on ‘self-recovery by reaction,' I. 202. Josiah, Mosaic law established by, I. 39. Jbtuns, the Scandinavian, I. 105. Judaism, sects of, I. 55 — founded on the Thora, 121 — a partic- ularistic religion, 126 — individu- ality of, 145 — theocratic, adopts theanthropic ideas, 206 — paves way for Christianity, 207 — pro- claims the national god to be the only true deity, 291 — a church, II. 169. Jupiter, worship of, I. 60 — of the Romans, 91 — called Father, 159 — ti^icked by Numa Pompilius, 174, 175. K Kalevala, epic poeips of the Finns, I. 99. Kant, influence of, on theology, II. 61 — partly bases religion on • moral order of the world, 192, 193. Karman, elaborate sacriflcial ser- vice of the, I. 293. Kings, deification of, I. 168. Kings, or canonical books of Con- fucianism, I. 121--‘veneration of the, 133. Kinship as basis of religion, II. 130. Kong-tse, founder of Confucianism, 1. 121 — as a mediator, II. 118. Kor^, book of revelation, I. 121. Kremer, Alfred von, Arabian anecdote told by, I. 163. Kronos, I. 98. Kfshna as a mediator, I. 167 ; II. 117. L Lamas of Tibet, II. 170. Lang, Andrew, on modern myth- ology, II. 231. Lao-tse, founder of Taoism, I. 122 — as a mediator, II. 118. Last Supper, views regarding, I. 26. Law does not bind gods, I. 103 — of development, historical and religious, 217 ^eq. Le Comte, Professor, on develop- ment, I. 30. Lectisternia of the Romans, II. 150. Lipsius, view of, as to origin of religion, II. 222-224. Literature, can religion be origin of? II. 248— earliest literature is secular, 252. Locke, influence of, on Remon- strant theology, II. 61. Lodensteijn, praises solitude, I. 241. Loki, evfant terrible , I. 108. Love, source of true religious life, I. 294. Luther on the profanum vulgvs, II. 141. M Magic, belief in, I. 79, 80, 85 — effect of, on the Shaman, II. 108 — distinct from religion, 135 — magical power ascribed to prayers, 136-139 — directed against dreaded powers, 140 — 276 f INDEX, disease of religion,’ 141 — dis- tinct from mysticism, 142. Mah^vira the Jina, as a mediator, II. 118. Male'aklm, angels and sons of God, 11. 116. Man, disposition of, determines creed, I. 36 — God and, inter- relation of, 117 — mediators be- tween God and, 130, 132 — con- ceptioh of relation of God to, determines religion, 152 — ap- proaches God in the thean- thropic religions, 160 — men transformed into gods, 168 — becomes God, 171 — gulf be- tween God and man ever wi- dens in theocratic religions, ih. — affinity of, with God indis- pensable element in religion, 180 — God in, doctrine of Chris- tianity, 208 — only knows in part, II. 238 — helpless without support, 239 — in despair seeks protection of beneficent spirits, 240 — hopes and believes in a^ better world, 241 — spiritual life* of, 244 aeq. — though moral, dis- satisfied, 247 — Infinite within, badge of humanity, 248 — re- ligion central authority in spir- itual life of, 254. Maraduk of Babylon, I. 91 — functions of, II, 84 — the crea- tor, 106. Matriarchal goddess Ishtar, I. 107. Matriarchate, principle of, in re- ligions, I. 97. Mazda Ahura — see Ahura Mazda. Mazdayasnans, sacred Scriptures of the, I. 46. Mediator between men and the gods, I. 130, 132 — doctrine of a, 166 seq, — S'raosha as the, 189 — belief in a, IL 115 seq, — demi-gods, heroes, kings, &c., as mediators, 117-121 — doctrine of a, not confined to theanthropic religions, 119. Melanchthon on religious studies, II. 69. Melek — see Moloch. Mesha, king of Moab, sacrifices his son, I. 25, 176. Mexican god of gods, I. 95. Midhgardh serpent, I. 105. Missionaries in higher ethical re- ligions, II. 173, 174. Mithra, chief god of the Modes and Persians, 1. 50 — and Va- runa, satellites of, II. 87. Mithras legend transferred to Christ, II. 118. Moira, or Destiny, I. 165. Moksha, a kind of release or re- demption, I. 65 — how attained, 170 — defined, II, 124. • Moloch, worship of, II. 220. Monotheism of Islam, I. 208 — progress of, 291, 292. Morality religions, I, 62— con- nected with religion, 102 — progress in, not identical with progress of religion, 273 — re- lation of religion to, 297 — is religion identical with ? II. 244 — cannot be severed from re- ligion, 245, 248 — can religion be origin of? 248 — ‘religion hostile to,’ 255-257 — ‘declines as religion progresses,’ 256— ‘ not a substitute for religion, 261. See also Ethic, Ethical. Morphology of religion, I. 27, 54. Moses, taken up to heaven, II. 115. Mother, divine head of spirit- world, I. 97. Muir, Dr John, * Original Sanskrit Texts ’ by, II. 59 — on the Vedic hymns, 138. Miiller, Max, on Science of Re- INDEX. i 277 ligion» I. 1,2, 16 — on classes of religions, 42 — on polytheism, mythology, &c., II. 83 — terms mythology ‘a disease of lan- guage,* 141 — ‘missionary re- ligions’ of, 174 — traces religion to ‘perception of the Infinite,’ 228-230. Musset, Alfred de, lines by, on the Infinite, II. 230. Mysticism exaggerated, I. 202 — Oriental, wedded to Greek rationalism, 208 — distinct from magic, II. 142. Mystics, views of, regarding re- ligion, 11. 5. Mythology, how far nature of re- ligion learned from, I. 22, 24 — root-idea of, 85 — succeeds myth- formation, 88 — of Romans very poor, 198 — the philosophy of antiquity, II. 58 — theories as to, 83 — ‘a disease of language,’ 141 — not originally a religious doctrine, 250. Myths, infancy of, I. 78 — forma- tion of, 83-85 — reduced to a theological system, 83 — suc- ceeded by mythology, 88 — be- come repugnant, 93 — not all originally nature - myths, II. 225. N Naturalism, reaction against, I. 147 — conflicts with ethical prin- ciples, 64. Nature -gods, not all gods were originally, II. 225. Nature-myths ethically modified by poetry and philosophy, I. 110, 114 — not all myths were originally, II. 225. Nature-Religions, the lowest, I. 58 seq. — animistic in character, 64 — on the mythopoeic level, 84 — highest, 89 aeq. — on the confines of the ethical, 93 — at highest, semi -ethical only, 117. Nik6, with wings clipped, to pre- vent her escape, 11. 205. Nirvana, the Buddhistic, I. 170 — a redemption or release, II. 124. Numa Pornpilius, story of, in Ovid, I. 81 — tries to trick Jupiter, 174, 175. Nusku, a messenger of God, II. 116. Nut, the heaven - goddess, I. 97, 98. 0 Objective and subjective religions, I. 61. Observances must be studied, I. 21 — cease to satisfy, 35 — primi- tive, 80 — barbarous, accounted for, 103 — original object of, 169 — slow to progress, 228 — com- plex and abstruse, gradually simplified, 292, 293 — the ob- jects, motives, and forms of, II. 148 seq. — the expression of religious conceptions, 183. Odhin called Father, I. 160. Offerings, original object of, I. 80 ; II. 127 seq. — varieties of, 147. Omnipresence, an attribute of God, II. 87. Omniscience, an attribute of God, II. 87. Ontology of religion, I. 27. Ormazd, giver of all good, II. 92. See also Ahura Mazda. Osiris, king of the dead, I. 90 — myth of, 109 — dead man be- comes, 11. 107. Ouranos, I. 98. 278 ^ INDEX. V Pandora's box, 11. 111. Paradise, legends of, 11. 109-115. Paris ‘becomes more wicked and more pious,' 11. 256. Parseeism, evolution of, 1. 46. P^irseee are Zarathushtrians, 1. 124 — belief and customs of the, 11. 138, 139. Parthenon developed from Ath^n^, I. 118. religions, I. 126. )fiijiinat*chal religions, 1. 98. 'cf^OTeus, as a mediator, II. 118. [ Persian traditions as to oldest race of men, II. 232. Personality, religion inseparable from, I. 230 — great influence of, on religion, 244 seq.^ 246, 248, 249, 252, 253, 254, 257 — power of may be exaggerated, 260 — ‘idolatry of,’ ih. — may retard progress, 26 1 , 262 — restores unity and continuity of develop- ment, 269-271 — promotes devel-^ opment of religion, 244 seq. — mainspring of all progress, 246 — power of, denied by some, 248 — Hegel’s doctrine as to, 249 — Buckle's and Macaulay’s views on, 7 6. — Macaulay on, 252 — vital importance of, ih.j 253 — of God, II. 102, 195. Peruvian chief god, I. 96. Pfleiderer, Otto, founds philosophy of religion on history, I. 16 — on Philosophy of Religion, II. 70 — religion defined by, 3 — quoted, 62 — describes Mediator, 115 — defines worship, 129 — describes twofold character of worship, 131 — on forms of sacri- fice, 144, 147 — on ‘holy men,' 156, 158 — on local church or- ganisations, 164 — Fechner quot- ed by, 210 — on origin of religion, 223. Philology, comparative, value of, I. 153. Philosophy, of religion, I. 15, 16 — relation of religion to, 297 — and religion, II. 48, 50 seq. — distinguished from religion, 51 f^eq. — in disguise, religion defined as, 57 — in myths of antiquity, 58 — gradually differentiated from religion, 59 — opposed to religion, 60, 65 67— and religious doctrine, 61 — is religion a kind of? 242 — cannot be severed from religion, 245, 248 — can religion be origin of? 248, 250 — ‘religion hostile to,’ 255 — no real antag- onism between religion and, 257-259. Piety, rudiments of, 1. 86 — essence of religion, II. 196 seq. — defined, 197 — essence of, is adoration, 198- 200. Pindar modifies myth of Taptalus I. 115 — famous lines of, 161. Poetry modifies the inyths, I. 114 — is religion a kind of ? H. 243 — akin to religion, 248 — ‘re- ligion hostile to,' 256 — no real antagonism between religion and poetry, 257-259. Polydaemonism, I. 81 — becomes polytheism, 89. Polytheism, mythology of, I. 83 — ‘ succeeds polydsemonism, 89 — monarchical, 91 — ^begins to be organised, 94 — dominated by tradition, 95 — transition from polydasmonism to, 96 — family, basis of, ih. — transition to, 98 — stages of, 100 — origin of, 290 — nearly extinct, 292 — once the normal form of belief, 11. 77 — gods of, personified agencies, 82 — accounts for evil by benev- INDEX. olent and malevolent gods, 91. Polyzoism, I. 72 ; 11. 66. Positivists teach that morality must supersede religion, I. 30. Power, of religion, more or less constant throughout history, 280 — constant and essential attribute of a god, II. 80 seq, — divine word a creative, 87. Powers of Nature personified, I. 84. Prayer, worship, offerings, II. 127 seq. — most constant element in worship, 133 — distinct from magic, 135 seq. — not mere sense- less incantation, 138 - 141 — development of, 142 — offerings associated with, 143 — God’s answer to, 154 seq. Priesthood, origin of, I. 85. Prometheus, myth of, I. 113 — tricking Zeus, 174 — ‘fore- thought of,’ II. 111. Prthiv)l-matar, the Vedic goddess, I. 98. Psychological origin of religion, I. 71. Psycholegy affords materials for science of religion, I. 17. Ptah of Memphis, 1. 91. Pfirva-Mlmafiisa, the ritual school, I. 56 — contains elaborate sacri- ficial service, 293. Pygmalion, myth of, II. 19. R Ra, the sun-god, II. 106. Ragnarok, ‘twilight of the gods,’ I. 165. Rama, as a mediator, I. 167. Ramm^, Sin, and Shamash, the lesser Babylonian triad, I. 90. Rationalists, mistake of, II. 48. Rauwenhoff, religion defined by, II, 3— on conceptions of faith, 27 — defines a god, 94 — on two- fold character of worship, 131 — defines worship, 156 — on religious communities, 164 — on moral order of the world, 193 — on origin of religion, 217 — opposes prevalent theory, 223. Rbhus, deified sorcerers, II. 108, Reaction, progress by, I. 202, 203. Reason and Authority, II. 41-47 — can religion originate in ? 216. Rechabites isolated, and opposed to civilisation, I. 224. Redeemers, founders and reformers of religion hailed as, I. 249. See also Mediator, Redemption. Redemption, religions of, I. 65 — or release, aim of all religions, 66 — Brahmanic and Buddhistic conceptions of, 170 — offered to all by Buddhism, 193 — need of, II. 123-125 — idea of, common to all religions, 124. Reform, ethical religions result from a process of, 1. 63 — of religion required, 117, 119 — ethical, 130 — inevitable result of religious evolution, 301. Regnaud, Paul, on mythology and doctrine, 1. 24. Religion, all forms of, must be studied, I. 9— function of the- ology with regard to, 14 — philosophy of, 15 — history of, 16 — nature of, how learned, 22 — morphology and ontology of, 27 — development of, 28 seq. — forms of, develop and decline, 31 -^progresses, though churches decline, 38 — classes of religions, 41 — of the Pdrsees, 46 — study of highest forms of, insufficient, 52 — formation of parties and 280« INDEX. sects in, 55 — classification of religions, 68 seq. — ‘ subjective and objective,’ 61 — defined .as ‘ world-negation,’ 62 — nature- religions and ethical religions, 63 — * religions of redemption,’ 65 — religions of revelation, 66 — Animism not a, 68 — idolatry ■ not the source of, 71 — origin of, psychological, ib. — poly daemon- ism, earliest form of, 79 — de- votion and adoration character- istics of, 87 — polytheism, later form of, 89 — patriarchal re- ligions, 98 — therianthropic and anthropical stages of, 100 — morality associated with, 102 sfq, — reforms in, 110, 117, 119 — the ethical religions, 120 seq. — Buddhism and Christianity universalistic religions, 124-129 — personal religions, 130 — sa- cred books and churches arise in the ethical religions, 133 seq. — individualism of the ethical re- ligions, 144 seq. — is Christian^ highest conceivable ? 1 48 — char- acter of, how determined, 152 — theanthropic and theocratic re- ligions, 155 seq. — ideal and tendency of theanthropic re- ligions, 167 — tendency of theo- cratic religions, 171 — sacrifices connected with, 175 — thean- thropic and theocratic extremes in, 180 — definitions of religions, 183 seq. — Buddhism first uni- versalistic, 193 — developed by Greek culture, 194 — aesthetic element in, 197 — Roman con- ceptions of, 198 — early Judaism a pure, later Judaism a mixed, 206 — Greek - Roman a mixed, 207 — theocracy and theanthrop- ism united in the Christian, 208- 210 — true, revealed in Christ, 211 — does civilisation injure? 221 — forms of, distinguished from, 222 — crimes in name of, 223 — develops along with civil- isation, 226, 230 — law of unity of mind applied to, 232 — isola- tion retards, assimilation pro- motes, 233 seq. — is, impaired by contact with culture ? 240 — development of, by individuals, 244 seq. — saviours, reformers,, redeemers in, 248 - 249 — influ- ence of personality on, 254, 255 — influence of woman in development of, 256 — person- ality, how far hostile to, 261 — unity in, 264 seq. — question as to continuity in, 267 — sur- vives all its successive forms, 268 — power of personality in, 269- 271 — development of, con- tinuous, 271 — essentials of de- velopment of, 272 seq. — is pro- gress in morality progress in? 273 — not identical with ethics, 275 — forms necessary in, 276 — ambitions and usurpations in name of, 277, 278 — power of, constant, 280 — shows vitality in diversity, 284-^ unity in, efforts to promote, 285 seq. — linked at first with art, science, philosophy, &c., gradually be- comes independent, 295 seq. — reform of, inevitable result of religious evolution, 301 — mani- festations and constituents of, II. 1 — what are constant ele- ments in? 3 — defined by Rhys Davids, ib. — defined by Rauwen- hoff, Telchmuller,and Pfleiderer, 4 — views of agnostics and mys- tics regarding, 5-^viewed as a practical system, ib. — constitu- ents of, distinguished from mani- festations, 6, 7 — manifestations INDEX. »281 of, in prayers, hymns, litanies, myths, confessions of faith, 7, S — manifested in actions, 9, 10, 11 — cruelties practised in name of, 12 — true components of, 6, 14, 22 — begins with emotion, 15 — valueless if purely emotional, 20 — morbid conditions of, 12, 23 — essence of, 23, 24 — beginnings of, distinguished from origin, 15, 25 — and philosophy, 43, 50 seg. — distinguished from phil- osophy, 51 seq. — philosophy in disguise, 57 — gradually difier- entiated from philosophy, 59 — opposed to philosophy, 60, 65- 67 — relation of, to philosophy, 61 seq. — ^begins with conceptions awakened by emotions, 67 — cruelties in name of, 68 — creeds summarise elements of, 73 — without a God impossible, ib. — watchword of, 75 — every, a religion of redemption, ih. — ‘G(yl above us,’ and ‘God in us,’ is a belief common to every, 103 — theocratic and thean- thropic, 104 seq. — Hebrew, nature of, ib. — Babylonian, 105 — Egyptian, 106, 107 — belief in immortality connected with, 114, 115 — idea of Infinite in, 121 — worship, prayers, and of- ferings inseparable from, 127 seq. — worship not chief element in, 128 — how far based on kinship, ISO — extinct without prayer, l3^ — Renan and Rob- ertson Smith account for, 135 — does not originate in super- stition or sorcery, 136 seq. — ‘sorcery a disease of,* 141 — sacrifice essential to, 144 seq. importance of ritual in, 152 seq. — as a social phenomenon, 155 seq. — forms necessary in every, 158 — must ethical, be embodied in church? 161 — dis- tinguished from church, 162 — is, aberration? 165, 166 — ten- dency to union in, 167 seq. — of missionary character, 174— ethical, requires to be inde- pendent, 176 — sole mission of church, 178 sf^q. — essence of, 182 seq. — external and internal elements of, ib. — doctrine and worship not essence of, 186, 189— is faith essence of? 191, 192 — God’s supremacy, and mail’s kinship with God, ele- ments in, 193 — Siebeck’s de- finition of, 194 — piety, 197 — adoration essence of piety and of, 198 seq. — and idolatry dis- tinguished, 203, 204 — inquiry as to origin of, 207 seq. — re- ligious and anti-religious theo- ries as to, 210 seq. — is, a crea- tion of fancy? 214 — is, result of reasoning? 215 — how far founded on conscience, 217 seq. — is sentiment basis of ? 221 — conflict of sense of self and sense of necessity as basis of, 223 — world-negation supposed basis of, 227 — ‘ perception of the Infinite ’ as basis of, 228 seq. — the Infinite in man true origin of, 230 wg. — right of, is a right of the emotions, 236 — place of, in spiritual life, 237 seq. — a support in need, doubt, or despair, 239 seq. — relation of. to science, art, philosophy, and ethics, 242 — aesthetic element in, 243 — morality not identical with, 244 — peace of soul object of, 245 — how far source of science, art, &c., 248 seq. — con- duces to, but not source of, all civilisation, 254 — ‘ hostile to 282' INDEX. culture,’ 255 — ‘taints morality with selfishness,* 256 — ‘moral- ity declines with progress of,’ 256 — not truly hostile to sci- ence, philosophy, poetry, &c., 257 8tq. — art or science or ethics can never be substitute for, 260, 261 — reawakening of, 262, 263. See also Develop- ment, Ethical Religions, Na- ture-Religions, Science of Re- ligion, &c. Religiosity, subjective side of re- ligion, II. 183 — source of re- ligion, 191. Religious-philosophical theory of religion, II. 210. Renan, Ernest, accounts for origin of religion, II. 135 — on the aesthetic element in Christian- ity, 243. Revelation proclaimed by Zara- thushtra, I. 47 — religions of, 66, 120 mq. — idea of, common to all religions, 131 — confound- ed with the writ recording it, 132 — interpreters of, II. 156. Rgveda calls the highest gods father or mother, I, 159 — quoted, II. 54 — partly secular, 253. Rhea, I. 98. Rhys Davids, religion defined by, II. 3. Ritual — see Worship, Observances. Roman Catholic Church, charac- teristics, aims, ritual, and merits of, I. 21, 56; II. 10, 11, 73, 159, 185. Roman mythology poor, 198 — merits of Romans described by Mommsen, 199 — ^religion, ten- dency to monotheism in, 291. Rothe, Richard, theory of, that church should be absorbed by State, II. 176. Rshi’s, singers of the Vedic hymns, ' I. 132. Riickert, lines by, II. 17* Rudra, S'iva, and Vishnu, the Hindu triad, I. 91. S Sacrifice of sons, I. 25. Sacrifices, origin of, 1. 103 — human, prevail longer in theocratic than in theanthropic religions, 175 — examples of human, 175 seq. — associated with prayer, II. 143 seq. — nature of, 144-152. SYikyamuni prepares for his ap- pearance as the Buddha, I. 270. Salvation, object of all religious doctrine, II. 75. Sangha, the, germ of a church, 11. 170. Saoshyafits, prophets of salvation, I. 47. Sargon deified, II. 118. Satan, called in the Book of Job one of the sons of the Elohlm, II. 87 — dreaded, though not superhuman, 98. Saviour — see Mediator. Scandinavian mythology, I. 105. Schiller declined to join church, II. 166. Schleiermacher, II. 61, 64. Schopenhauer on philosophy and religion, 11. 48. Schultze, Fritz, on fetish worship, 1. 76. Schwartz, Karl, on the essence of religion, II. 243. Science, ‘alone solves riddles of life,’ I. 222 — relation of religion to, 297 — and faith, difference between, II. 33, 38 — distin- guished from knowledge, 35 — INDEX. defined, 36 — cannot advance without faith, 192 — is religion a kind of? 242 — cannot be severed from religion, 245, 248 — can religion be origin of ? 248 — ‘ religion hostile to,’ 255 — no real antagonism between, and religion, 257-259 — proposed as a substitute for religion, 260. Science of Religion, conception, aim, and method of, I. 1 seq. — defined, 4 — objects of, 8, 11, 12 — is philosophy of religion, 15 — material for, 21 — must study observances, 25 — mor- phological and ontological parts of, 27 — scope of, 52 aeq, — branches of, II. 1, 2 — method and object of, 70, 71— anthro- pological, not metaphysical, 72 - must study every form of cult, 152 — parts of, 188 — seeks only for origin of religion, 234 — distinct from theology and philosophy, 235 — important function of, 262, 263. Scriptures, interpretation of, I. 129 — confounded with the doc- trine they record, 132 — the Brahmanic, Zarathushtrian, and Chinese, 133 — worship of, 132, 133— sacred, of the ethical re- ligions, 133, 135, 136 — inspira- tion of the, II. 185. Seb, the earth-god, I. 97, 98. Sects, formation of, I. 55, 140 seq. Self-consciousness, progress in, im- plies spiritual development, 1. 300. Semites supposed more cruel than Aryans, I. 177 — religion of the, 11. 129, 146. Semitic religions, I. 56 — Baby- lonian religion, 100, 128, 153, 155. i83 Sennacherib recognises Ea, god of the sea, II. 96. Sentiment inadequate as basis of religion, 11. 21, 22 — distin- guished from emotions and con- ceptions, 6, 14, 16, 18— de- velopment of the ethical, 89 — does religion originate in? 221. Set, god of death, 109. Shaman, magical power of the, II. 108. Shamash, Sin, and Rammiin, the lesser Babylonian triad, I. 90. Shu, the classical books of Con- fucianism, 1. 121. Sicbeck, Prof., classifies religions, I. 62, 65 — on Animism, 66 — on Zarathushtrism, 122 — on Ishim, 127 — on signs of religious de- velopment, 276 — on the phil- osophy of religion, II. 182 stq. — defines religion, 194 seg. — describes religion as world- negation, 227. Siecke, Ernst, on mythology, II. 84. Sin, Shamash, and RammUn, the lesser Babylonian triad, I. 90. Siva, Vishnu, and Rudra, the Hindu triad, I. 91. Smith, Robertson, on the religion of the Semites, II. 129 — dis- tinguishes between religion and sorcery, 135 — on sacrificial meals and sacrifices, 130, 144- 146. Sociology affords materials for science of religion, I. 17. Soma, cup of immortality, II. 150 — Haoma becomes almost only sacrifice, 1. 29 — modified, 189. SophoclOs humanises the myths, I. 115. Sorcery — see Magic. Soteriology an element in creeds, II. 73. 28C INDEX. Spenta, a benevolent spirit, I. 48. Spiritism higher than Animism, I. 72, 74 — nature of, i6., 82,. 83, 86. Spirits, not material objects, orig- inally worshipped, I. 71 — super- human magicians, 79, 80 — man’s intercourse with, 81 — not at first distinct from demons and gods, 89 — evil, under command of the supreme gods, 161. Spiritualism, I. 74 — place of, in development, 147. Spiritualistic religions, I. 120. Sraosha, genius of obedience and revelation, I. 47 — the only mediator, 189 — a messenger of God, II. 116. State usurps authority over re- ligion, I. 95 — and Church, 138 — Church tries to rule, 139 — interests of, modify religions, 285 — churches established by, II. 168, 169. Statius, saying of, ‘ timo^' fecit deoSy II. 135. Strauss, J). F., teaches that art must supersede religion, I. 30 — on hero-worship as substitute for religion, II. 202. Subjective and objective religions, I. 61. Sumerian text on sacrifice of son by father, I. 25 — religion, 99. Sun, god of the Peruvians, I. 96. Supranaturalists, mistake of the, II. 48. Sutras, distinction between the, I. 133. T Taboo, I. 75. Taoism, whether an ethical re- ligion, I. 122 — becomes gloomy superstition, 200. Temples of the theanthropic and the theocratic gods, I. 172 — of the Egyptians, 186. Theanthropic religions, I. 155, 156, 158-160 — gods not absol- ute, 164, 165 — doctrines of apo- theosis and incarnation, 166 seq. — mediators, 167 seq. — religions end in making man God, 171 — gods, temples of, 172 — re- ligions, sacrifices in, 175 — principle carried to extreme, 180 — character of Zarathush- trism, 205 — Greek religion mainly, 207 — Buddhism ex- tremely, 208. See also II. 104, 107. Theocratic religions, 1, 155-158 — gods absolute, 157 — religions widen gulf between divinity and humanity, 171-173 — gods, temples of the, 172 — religions, sacrifices in, 175 — principle car- ried to extreme, 180 — tincture in Zarathushtrism, 205 — ideas adopted by Greeks, 206 — Islam extremely, 208. Sec also 11. 104, 105. Theology dreads science of reli- gion, I. 11 — task of, 12-14— Calvin’s, 37 — myths reduced to a system of, 83 — the Baby- lonian, 106 — an element in creeds, II. 73 — ethical school of, 82 — of the Christians, 193. Therianthropic stage of religion, I. 100. Theseus, as a mediator, II. 118. Thor, the Scandinavian god, 1. 105. Thora, the law revealed to Moses, I. 121 — origin of the, 11. 155. Thor-Donar, the Germanic god of thunder, I. Ill — functions of, II. 84. Thursas, the Scandinavian, 1. 105, Tistrya, storm-god, I. 50. INDEX, 285 l^’ornhs, customs regarding, I. 73 — of the Egyptians, 186. Totem, ‘ the original sacrificial vic- tim,'11. 145. Totemism, I. 75, 77. Tradition dominates polytheism, I. 95. Triads of gods, I. 90. Tricolour, ‘ a sacred fetish,’ I. 77. Trinity, dogma of the, II. 193. Turn, the hidden sun - god, II. 106. Tylor, E. B., on Animism, I. 66. U Ukko, the Finnish god, invocation of, I. 99. Union-Jack, ‘a sacred fetish,’ I. 77. United States, science of religion in the, 1. 3. Unity of the mind, law of, applied to religion, I. 232 — of develop- ment apparently broken, 266- 269 — in religion, constant striv- ing after, 285 — not result of mere statecraft or policy, 285, 286 — Grotius longed for, 287 — dear to Roman Church, ib, — by compromise, how far possible, 288 — in multiplicity, 289 — in conception of God, 290-292 — •tendency to, in worship, 292, 293 — in doctrine, 293 — ten- dency to, in general develop- ment, 295. Universalistic religions, I. 126. Unold on state and school, II. 176. Upton on religious belief, II. 50. Ural- Altaian religion, I. 98, 99. Uttara-Mlmtos^, the speculative school, I. 56 — rejects elaborate worship, 293. V Valhalla, I. 90 — abode of Odhin, II. 88, 113. Valhcill — see Valhalla. Vans, the Scandinavian, I. 105. Varuna, chief of the Vedic gods, I. 91 — king of the gods, 98 — the all-ruler, 159 — and Mithita, satellites of, II. 87. Vayu, the region between heaven and hell, I. 164. Veda, a book of revelation, I. 121 — rejected by the Buddhists, II. 170. Vedic aristocracy of gods, I. 91 — triad, ih. — hymns, sung by the Rshi’s, 132 — hymns, origin and nature of, II. 137 — religion, sects of the, I. 55, 56. Virgin, adoration of the, II. 203. Vishnu, S'iva, and Rudra, the Hindu triad, I. 91. W Western Asia, anthropical gods of, I. 100. Whitney, W. Dwight, on science of religion, I. 2 — defines science of language, 5 — on classes of religion, 42 — types of religion described by, 60 — on Buddhism and Christianity, 124. Woman, influence of, on religious development, I. 256, 257. World - Negation as basis of re- ligion, I. 62 — supposed bulwark of religion, 223 — must be re- placed by world - consecration, 277. World-Religions, I. 127. Worship, of fetishes, I. 75-80 — infancy of, 79— of magicians, 80 INDEX, 2%' — forms of, in the lower and higher nature - religions, 83 — origin of, 85 — begins to. be organised, 93 — of animals, 101 — of sacred texts, 132, 133 — official, in the nature-religious, 138 — of deceased ancestors, 200 — slow to follow civilisation, 228 — at first simple, becomes complex, 292— simplified, 293 — not the sole manifestation of religion, II. 9 — of deceased ancestors, 107 — prayers, and ofierings, 1 27 — not chief thing in religion, 128 — may be private, 129 — twofold character of, 131 — prayer most constant element in, 133 — objects, mo- tives, and forms of, 148 — strives after union with God, 152 — requisites of, 153 — ‘faith made visible,’ 156. Y Yahve, bull of, I. 101 — may de- mand human sacrifices, 177 — renounces such right, 179 — lofty conception of, ih. — temple of, 173 — strict ideal of the worship of, 223 — omniscient, 11. 87 — the God of Jacob, 88 — reveals himself to the prophet, 89, 105 — creates man in his own image, 105 — answers Elijah on Mount Carmel, 131 — wars in name of, 173. Yahvism, pure, hostile to all high- er development, I. 225. Yama, king of the dead, 1. 90. Yazatas, the Zarathushtrian, I. 50, 123 — the adorable ones, II. 88, 92. Yima, millennium of, II. 109, 110. Z Zarathushtra, doctrine of, I. 47* 51 — whether historical or myth- ical, 121, 122 — the Iranian reformer, 168 — revelation to, 133— Spitama, as a mediator, II. 118. Zarathushtrism, I. 47-51 — an ethical religion, 122 — character of, 191 — practical piety of, ih, — theanthropic, tinctured with theocratic elements, 205 — re- conciles the practical with the heavenly, 206 — inculcates agri- culture, 224 — doctrines of, II. 88, 92, 98 — legends of, regarding Paradise, 110 — doctrine of sal- vation’ in, 113 — Paradise of, ib. — prayers of, 139 — as a state- church, 168 — creed o4 169 — imposed on conquered enemies, 173. Zarathushtrotema, It. 169. Zeller, on origin of religion, II. 223, 224. Zeus, statue of, by Phidias, I. 41 — development of conception of, 59 — Had6s, and Poseidon, the Greek triad, 90 — of the Hellenes, 91, 92 — father of gods and men, 98 — conception of, elevated, 118 — called Father, 159 — tricked by PromStheus, 174 — of the Hellenes still a nature-god, 196 — name given by the Greeks to chief foreign gods, 291. PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.