M f^ ERKELEY LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. Sontion: C. J. CLAY and SONS, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AVE MARIA LANE. (Slaagofa: 263, ARGYLE STREET. ILeipjig: F. A. BROCKHAUS. J^cto lork: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. Bomfiag: GEORGE BELL AND SONS. AN ESSAY ON THE TO WHOSE DISCOUESE AND FRIENDSHIP IS OWING THE EXISTENCE OF THIS BOOK. TABLE OF CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. OUR PROBLEM DEFINED BY ITS RELATIONS TO LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY AND MATHEMATICS. I'AOE The problem first received a niotlern form through Kant, who connected the ('( pi-iori with the subjective .... 1 A mental state is subjective, for Psychology, when its imme- diate cause does not lie in the outer world ... 2 A piece of knowledge is d priori, for Ei)istemology, when without it knowledge would be impossible .... 2 The subjective and the a priori belong respectively to Psychology and to Epistemology. The latter alone will bo investigated in this essay ...... 3 My test of the a priori will be purely logical : what knowledge is necessary for experience I ...... ."i But since the necessary is hypothetical, we must include, in the d pnori, the groiuid of necessity ..... 4 This may be the essential postulate of our science, or the element, in the subject-matter, which is necessary to experience; 4 Which, however, are both at bottom the same ground . . 5 Forecast of the work ........ 5 CHAPTER I. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 10. Metageometry began by rejecting the axiom of parallels . T 11. Its history may be divided into three periods : the synthetic, the metrical and the projective ...... 7 12. The first period was inaugurated by Gauss, .... 10 Vlll CONTENTS. PAGE 13. Wlio.se .suggc.stit)iis were developed independently by Lobat- chew.sky 10 14. And Bolyai 11 1 5. The purpose of all three was to show that the axiom of parallels eould not be deduced from the others, since its denial did not lead to contradictions 12 16. The second period had a more philosophical aim, and was inspired chiefly by Gauss and Herbart .... 13 17. The first work of this period, that of Eiemanu, invented two new conceptions : 14 18. The first, that of a manifold, is a class-conception, containing space as a species, 14 19. And defined as such that its determinations form a collection of magnitudes 15 20. The second, the measure of curvature of a manifold, grew out of curvature in curves and surfaces 16 21. By means of Gauss's analytical formula for the curvature of surfaces, 19 22. Which enables us to define a constant measure of curvature of a three-dimensional sj^ace without reference to a fourth dimension 20 23. The main result of Riemann's mathematical work was to show that, if magnitudes are independent of place, the measure of curvature of space must be constant . . 21 24. Helmholtz, who was more of a philosopher than a mathe- matician, 22 25. Gave a new but incorrect formulation of the essential axioms, . 23 26. And deduced the quadratic formula for the infinitesimal arc, which Riemann had assumed 24 27. Beltrami gave Lobatchewsky's planimetry a Euclidean inter- pretation, . 25 28. Which is analogous to Cayley's theoiy of distance ; . . 26 29. And dealt with 7i-dimensional spaces of constant negative curvature 27 30. The third period abandons the metrical methods of the second, and extrudes the notion of spatial quantity ... 27 31. Cayley reduced metrical properties to projective properties, relative to a certain conic or quadric, the Absolute ; . 28 32. And Klein showed that the Euclidean or non-Euclidean systems result, according to the nature of the Absolute ; . . 29 33. Hence Euclidean space appeared to give I'ise to all the kinds of Geometry, and the question, which is true, appeared reduced to one of convention ...... 30 34. But this view is due to a confusion as to the nature of the coordinates employed 30 CONTENTS. IX PACK 35. Projective coordinates have beeu regarded as dependent on distance, and thus really metrical 31 36. But this is not the case, since anharmonic ratio can be projectively defined 32 37. Projective ct)ordinates, being purely descriptive, can give no information as to metrical properties, and the reduction of metrical to projective properties is purely technical . . 33 38. The true connection of Cayley's measure of distance with non-Euclidean Geometry is that suggested by Beltrami's Saggio, and worked out by Sir R. Ball, .... 36 39. Which provides a Euclidean equivalent for every non-Euclidean proposition, and so removes the possibihty of contradictions in Metageometry 38 40. Klein's elliptic Geometry has not been proved to have a corre- sponding variety of space 3!) 41. The geometrical use of imaginaries, of which Cayley demanded a philosophical discussion, 41 42. Has a merely technical validity, 42 43. And is capable of giving geometricff, A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 21 to define such two-dimensional manifolds. They must consist, as we saw on the surface, of a singly infinite series of geodesies through the point. Now a geodesic is completely determined by one point and its direction at that point, or by one point and the next consecutive point. Hence a geodesic through the point considered is determined by the ratios of the in- crements of coordinates, dx^ dx.> ... dx^. Suppose we have two such geodesies, in which the t'th increments are respectively dxi and d"xi. Then all the geodesies given by dxi = X'd'xi + \"d"xi form a singly infinite series, since they contain one para- meter, namely X' : \". Such a series of geodesies, therefore, must form a two-dimensional mani- fold, with a measure of curvature in the ordinary Gaussian sense. This measure of curvature can be determined from the above for- \ \ -^A'a'a;f+\"d"xj mula for the elementary arc, by the help of Gauss's general formula alluded to above. We thus obtain an infinite number of measures of curvature at a point, but from '^"~ ^ of these, the rest can be deduced (Riemann, Gesammelte Werke, p. 262). When all the measures of curvature at a point are constant, and equal to all the measures of curvature at any other point, we get what Rieinann calls a manifold of constant curvature. In such a manifold free mobility is possible, and positions du not differ intrinsically from one another. If a be the measure of curvature, the formula for the arc becomes, in this case, ds'=^dx' (l + ^'Sa;'^ In this case only, as I pointed out above, can the term "measure of curvature " be properly applied to space without reference to a higher dimension, since free mobility is logically indis- pensable to the existence of quantitative or metrical Geometry. 23. The mathematical result of Riemann's dissertation 22 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. may be summed up as follows. Assuming it possible to apply magnitude to space, i.e. to determine its elements and figures by means of algebraical quantities, it follows that space can be brought under the conception of a manifold, as a system of quantitatively determinable elements. Owing, however, to the peculiar nature of spatial measurement, the quantitative deter- mination of space demands that magnitudes shall be independent of place — in so far as this is not the case, our measurement will be necessarily inaccurate. If we now assume, as the quantitative relation of distance between two elements, the square root of a quadratic function of the coordinates — a formula subsequently proved by Helmholtz and Lie — then it follows, since magnitudes are to be independent of place, that space must, within the limits of observation, have a constant measure of curvature, or must, in other words, be homogeneous in all its parts. In the infinitesimal, Riemann says (p. 267), observation could not detect a departure from constancy on the part of the measure of curvature ; but he makes no attempt to show how Geometry could remain possible under such circumstances, and the only Geometry he has constructed is based entirely on Free Mobility. I shall endeavour to prove, in Chapter III., that any metrical Geometry, which should endeavour to dispense with this axiom, would be logically impossible. At present I will only point out that Riemann, in spite of his desire to prove that all the axioms can be dispensed with, has nevertheless, in his mathematical work, retained three fundamental axioms, namely. Free Mobility, the finite integral number of dimensions, and the axiom that two points have a unique relation, namely distance. These, as we shall see hereafter, are retained, in actual mathematical work, by all metrical Metageometers, even when they believe, like Riemann and Helmholtz, that no axioms are philosophically indispensable. 24. Helmholtz, the historically nearest follower of Riemann, was guided by a similar empirical philosophy, and arrived independently at a very similar method of formulating the axioms. Although Helmholtz published nothing on the subject until after Riemann's death, he had then only just seen Riemann's dissertation (which was published posthumously), and had worked out his results, so far as they were then A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETKY. 23 completed, in entire independence both of Riemann and of Lobatchewsky. Helmholtz is by far the most widely read of all writers on Metageometry, and his writings, almost alone, represent to philosophers the modern mathematical standpoint on this subject. But his importance is much greater, in this domain, as a philosopher than as a mathematician ; almost his only original mathematical result, as regards Geometry, is his proof of Riemanu's formula for the infinitesimal arc, and even this proof was far from rigid, until Lie reformed' it by his method of continuous groups. In this chapter, therefore, only two of his writings need occupy us, namely the two articles in the Wissenschaftliche Ahhandlungen, Vol. ii., entitled respec- tively " Ueber die thatsachlichen Grundlagen der Geometric," 1866 (p. 610 fif.), and "Ueber die Thatsachen, die der Geometric zum Grunde liegen," 1808 (p. 618 fF.). 25. In the first of these, which is chiefly philosophical, Helmholtz gives hints of his then uncompleted mathematical work, but in the main contents himself with a statement of results. He announces that he will prove Riemaun's quadratic formula for the infinitesimal arc ; but for this purpose, he says, wo have to start with Congruence, since without it spatial measurement is impossible. Nevertheless, he maintains that Congruence is proved by experience. How we could, without the help of measurement, discover lapses from Congruence, is a point which he leaves undiscussed. He then enunciates the four axioms which he considers essential to Geometry, as follows : (1) As regards continuity and dimensions. In a space of n dimensions, a point is unitpiely determined by the measure- ment of n continuous variables (coordinates). (2) As regards the existence of moveable rigid bodies. Between the 2n coordinates of any point-pair of a rigid body, there exists an equation which is the same for all congruent point-pairs. By considering a sufficient number of point-pairs, we get more equations than unknown quantities : this gives us a method of determining the form of these equations,, so as to make it possible for them all to be satisfied. (3) As regards free mobility. Every point can pass freely and continuously from one position to another. From (2) and 24 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. (3) it follows, that if two systems A and B can be brought into congruence in any one position, this is also possible in every other position. (4) As regards independence of rotation in rigid bodies (Monodromy). If {n -\) points of a body remain fixed, so that every other point can only describe a certain curve, then that curve is closed. These axioms, says Helmholtz, suffice to give, with the axiom of three dimensions, the Euclidean and non-Euclidean systems as the only alternatives. That they suffice, mathe- matically, cannot be denied, but they seem, in some respects, to go too far. In the first place, there is no necessity to make the axiom of Congruence apply to actual rigid bodies — on this subject I have enlarged in Chapter 11.^ Again, Free Mobility, as distinct from Congruence, hardly needs to be specially formulated : what barrier could empty space offer to a point's progress? The axiom is involved in the homogeneity of space, which is the same thing as the axiom of Congruence. Monodromy, also, has been severely criticized ; not only is it evident that it might have been included in Congruence, but even from the purely analytical point of view,. Sophus Lie has proved it to be superfluous-. Thus the axiom of Congruence, rightly formulated, includes Helmholtz's third and fourth axioms and part of his second axiom. All the four, or rather, as much of them as is relevant to Geometry, are consequences, as we shall see hereafter, of the one fundamental principle of the relativity of position. 26. The second article, which is mainly mathematical, supplies the promised proof of the arc-formula, which is Helm- holtz's most important contribution to Geometry. Riemann had assumed this formula, as the simplest of a number of alternatives : Helmholtz proved it to be a necessary conse- quence of his axioms. The present paper begins with a short repetition of the first, including the statement of the axioms, to which, at the end of the paper, two more are added, (5) that space has three dimensions, and (6) that space is infinite. It 1 See §§ 69-73. ^ Grundlagen der Geometrie, i. and ii., Leipziger Berichte, 1890; v. end of present chapter, § 45. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 25 is supposed in the text, as also in the first paper, that the measure of curvature cannot be negative, and, consequently, that an infinite space must be Euclidean. This error in both papers is corrected in notes, added after the appearance of Beltrami's paper on negative curvature. It is a sample of the slightly unprofessional nature of Helmholtz's mathematical work on this subject, which elicits from Klein the following remarks* : " Helmholtz is not a mathematician by profession, but a physicist and physiologist.... From this non-mathematical quality of Helmholtz, it follows naturally that he does not treat the mathematical portion of his work with the thorough- ness which one would demand of a mathematician by trade {von Fach)." He tells us himself that it was the physiological study of vision which led him to the question of the axioms, and it is as a ph^'sicist that he makes his axioms refer to actual rigid bodies. Accordingly, we find errors in his mathematics, such as the axiom of Monudromy, and the assumption that the measure of curvature must be positive. Nevertheless, the proof of Riemann's arc-formula is extremely able, and has, on the whole, been substantiated by Lie's more thorough investi- gations. 27. Helmholtz's other writings on Geometry are almost wholly philosophical, and will be discussed at length in Chapter II. For the present, we may pass to the only other important writer of the second period, Beltrami As his work is purely mathematical, and contains few controverted points, it need not, despite its great importance, detain us long. The " Saggio di Interpretazione della Geometria non- EuclideaV' which is principally confined to two dimensions, interprets Lobatchewsky's results by the characteristic method of the second period. It shows, by a development of the work of Gauss and Minding'', that all the propositions in plane Geometry, which Lobatchcwsky had set forth, hold, within ordinary Euclidean space, on surfaces of constant negative 1 Nicht-Euklid, i. pp. 258-9. - Giornale di Matematiche, Vol. vi., 1868. Translated into French by J. Hoiiel in the "Annales Scientifiques de I'Ecole Norniale Superieure," Vol. VI. 1869. 3 Crelle's Journal, Vols. xix. xx., 1839-40. 26 FOUNDATIONS OF GFOMETRY. curvature. It is strange, as Klein points out^ that this inter- pretation, which was known to Riemann and perhaps even to Gauss, should have remained so long without explicit statement. This is the more strange, as Lobatchewsky's " Geometric Imaginaire" had appeared in Crelle, Vol. xvii.^and Minding's article, from which the interpi-etatiou follows at once, had appeared in Crelle, Vol. Xix. Minding had shewn that the Geometry of surfaces of constant negative curvature, in par- ticular as regards geodesic triangles, could be deduced from that of the sphere by giving the radius a purely imaginary value ia^. This result, as we have seen, had also been obtained by Lobatchewsky for his Geometry, and yet it took thirty years for the connection to be brought to general notice. 28. In Beltrami's Saggio, straight lines are, of course, replaced by geodesies ; his coordinates are obtained through a point-by-point correspondence with an auxiliary plane, in which straight lines correspond to geodesies on the surface. Thus geodesies have linear equations, and are always uniquely determined by two points. Distances on the surface, however, are not equal to distances on the plane ; thus while the surface is infinite, the corresponding portion of the plane is contained within a certain finite circle. The distance of two points on the surface is a certain function of the coordinates, not the ordinary function of elementary Geometry. These relations of plane and surface are important in connection with Cayley's theory of distance, which we shall have to consider next. If we were to define distance on the plane as that function of the coordinates which gives the corresponding distance on the surface, we should obtain what Klein calls "a plane with a hyperbolic system of measurement (Massbestimmimg)," in which Cayley's theory of distance would hold. It is evident, however, that the ordinary notion of distance has been presupposed in setting up the coordinate system, so that we do not really 1 Nicht-Euklid, i. p. 190. 2 This article is more trigonometrical and analytical than the German book, and therefore makes the above interpretation peculiarly evident. ■* Such surfaces are by no means particularly remote. One of them, for example, is formed by the revolution of the common Tractrix y^a Hog x = a sm (p, y — a[ log tan ^ + cos 4> A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 27 get alternative Geometries ou one and the same plane. The bearing of these remarks will appear more fully when we come to consider Cayley and Klein. 29. The value of Beltrami's Saggio, in his own eyes, lies in the intelligible Euclidean sense which it gives to Lobatchewsky's planimetry : the corresponding system of Solid Geometry, since it has no meaning for Euclidean space, is barely mentioned in this work. In a second paper', however, almost contemporaneous with the first, he proceeds to consider the general theory of w-dimensional manifolds of constant negative curvature. This paper is greatly influenced by Riemann's dissertation ; it begins with the formula for the linear element, and proves from this first, that Congruence holds for such spaces, and next, that they have, according to Riemann's definition, a constant negative measure of curvature. (It is instructive to observe, that both in this and in the former Essay, great stress is laid on the necessity of the Axiom of Congruence.) This work has less philosophical interest than the former, since it does little more than repeat, in a general form, the results which the Saggio had obtained for two dimensions — results which sink, when extended to n dimensions, to the level of mere mathematical constructions. Nevertheless, the paper is important, both as a restoration of negative curvature, which had been overlooked by Helmholtz, and as an analytical treatment of Lobatchewsky's results — a treatment which, to- gether with the Saggio, at last restored to them the prominence they deserved. Third Period. 30. The third period differs radically, alike in its methods and aims, and in the underlying philosophical ideas, from the period which it replaced. Whereas everything, in the second period, turned on measurement, with its apparatus of Con- gruence, Free Mobility, Rigid Bodies, and the rest, these vanish completely in the third period, which, swinging to the opposite extreme, regards quantity as a perfectly irrelevant 1 " Teoria fondamentale degli spazii di ciirvatura costanta," Annali di Matematica, ii. Vol. 2, 1808-9. Also translated by J. Hoiiel, loc. cit. 28 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. category in Geometry, and dispenses with congruence and the method of superposition. The ideas of this period, unfortu- nately, have found no exponent so philosophical as Riemann or Helmholtz, but have been set forth only by technical mathematicians. Moreover the change of fundamental ideas, which is immense, has not brought about an equally great change in actual procedure ; for though spatial quantity is no longer a part of projective Geometry, quantity is still employed, and we still have equations, algebraic transformations, and so on. This is apt to give rise to confusion, especially in the mind of the student, who fails to realise that the quantities used, so far as the propositions are really projective, are mere names for points, and not, as in metrical Geometry, actual spatial magnitudes. Nevertheless, the fundamental difference between this period and the former must strike any one at once. Whereas Riemann and Helmholtz dealt with metrical ideas, and took, as their foundations, the measure of curvature and the formula for the linear element — both purely metrical — the new method is erected on the formulae for transformation of coordinates re- quired to express a given collineation. It begins by reducing all so-called metrical notions — distance, angle, etc. — to projective forms, and obtains, from this reduction, a methodological unity and simplicity before impossible. This reduction depends, however, except where the space-constant is negative, upon imaginary figures — in Euclid, the circular points at infinity; it is moreover purely symbolic and analytical, and must be regarded as philosophically irrelevant. As the question concerning the import of this reduction is of fundamental importance to our theory of Geometry, and as Cayley, in his Presidential Address to the British Association in 1883, formally challenged philo- sophers to discuss the use of imaginaries, on which it depends, I will treat this question at some length. But first let us see how, as a matter of mathematics, the reduction is effected. 31. We shall find, throughout this period, that almost every important proposition, though misleading in its obvious interpretation, has nevertheless, when rightly interpreted, a wide philosophical bearing. So it is with the work of Gayley, the pioneer of the projective method. A SHORT HISTORY OF .METAGEOMETRY. 29 The projective formula for angles, in Euclidean Geometry, was first obtained by Laguerre, in 1853. This formula had, however, a perfectly Euclidean character, and it Avas left for Cayley to generalize it so as to include both angles and distances in Euclidean and non-Euclidean systems alike^ Cayley was, to the last, a staunch supporter of Euclidean space, though he believed that non-Euclidean Geometries could be applied, within Euclidean space, by a change in the definition of distance'-. He has thus, in spite of his Euclidean orthodoxy, provided the believers in the possibility of non-Euclidean spaces with one of their most powerful weapons. In his " Sixth Memoir upon Quantics" (18-59), he set himself the task of "establishing the notion of distance upon purely descriptive principles." He showed that, with the ordinary notion of distance, it can be rendered projective by reference to the circular points and the line at infinity, and that the same is true of angles'. Not content with this, he suggested a new definition of distance, as the inverse sine or cosine of a certain function of the coordinates ; with this definition, the properties usually known as metrical become projective properties, having reference to a certain conic, called by Cayley the Absolute. (The circular points are, analytically, a degenerate conic, so that ordinary Geometry forms a particular case of the above.) He proves that, when the Absolute is an imagmary conic, the Geometry so obtained for two dimensions is spherical Geometry. The correspondence with Lobatchewsky, in the case where the Absolute is real, is not worked out : indeed there is, throughout, no evidence of acquaintance with non-Euclidean systems. The importance of the memoir, to Cayley, lies entirely in its proof that metrical is only a branch of de- scriptive Geometry. 32. The connection of Cayley's Theory of Distance with Metageometry was first pointed out by Klein 1 Klein showed in detail that, if the Absolute be real, we get Lobatchewsky's ^ See Klein, Nicht-Euklid, i. p. 47 ff., aud the references there given. '^ See quotation below, from his British Association Address. 3 Compare the opening sentence, due to Cayley, of Salmon's Higher Plane Curves. * V. Nicht-Euklid, i. Chaps, i. and ii. 80 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETllY. /hyperbolic) system ; if it be imaginary, we get either spherical Geometry or a new system, analogous to that of Helmholtz, called by Klein elliptic ; if the Absolute be an imaginary point-pair, we get parabolic Geometry, and if, in particular, the point-pair be the circular points, we get ordinary Euclid. In elliptic Geometry, two straight lines in the same plane meet in only one point, not two as in Helmholtz's system. The distinction between the two kinds of Geometry is difficult, and will be discuss(5d later. 33. Since these systems are all obtained from a Euclidean plane, by a mere alteration in the definition of distance, Cayley and Klein tend to regard the whole question as one, not of the nature of space, but of the definition of distance. Since this definition, on their view, is perfectly arbitrary, the phi- losophical problem vanishes — Euclidean space is left in un- disputed possession, and the only problem remaining is one of convention and mathematical convenience \ This view has been forcibly expressed by Poincare : " What ought one to think," he says, " of this question : Is the Euclidean Geometry true ? The question is nonsense." Geometrical axioms, ac- cording to him, are mere conventions : they are " definitions in disguise-." Thus Klein blames Beltrami for regarding his auxiliary plane as merely auxiliary, and remarks that, if he had known Cayley 's Memoir, he would have seen the relation between the plane and the pseudosphere to be far more intimate than he supposed^ A view which removes the problem entirely from the arena of philosophy demands, plainly, a full dis- cussion. To this discussion we will now proceed. 34. The view in question has arisen, it would seem, from a natural confusion as to the nature of the coordinates em- ployed. Those who hold the view have not adequately realised, I believe, that their coordinates are not spatial quantities, as in metrical Geometry, but mere conventional signs, by which different points can be distinctly designated. There is no reason, therefore, until we already have metrical Geometry, 1 See p. 9 of Cayley's address to the Brit. Ass. 1883. Also a quotation from Klein in Erdmann's Axiome der Geometrie, p. 124 note. 2 Nature, Vol. xlv. p. 407. " Nicht-Euklid, i. p. 200. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 31 for regarding one function of the coordinates as a better ex- pression of distance than another, so long as the fundamental addition-equation' is preserved. Hence, if our coordinates are regarded as adequate for all Geometry, an indeterminateness arises in the expression of distance, which can only be avoided by a convention. But projective coordinates — so onr argument will contend — though perfectly adequate for all projective properties, and entirely free from any metrical presupposition, are inadequate to express metrical properties, just because they have no metrical presupposition. Thus where metrical pro- perties are in question, Beltrami remains justified as against Klein ; the reduction of metrical to projective properties is only apparent, though the independence of these last, as against metrical Geometry, is perfectly real. 35. But what are projective coordinates, and how are they introduced ? This question was not touched upon in Cayley's Memoir, and it seemed, therefore, as if a logical error were involved in using coordinates to define distance. For coor- dinates, in all previous systems, had been deduced from dis- tance ; to use any existing coordinate system in defining distance was, accordingly, to incur a vicious circle. Cayley mentions this difficulty in a note, where he only remarks, however, that he had regarded his coordinates as numbers arbitrarily assigned, on some system not further investigated, to different points. The difficulty has been treated at length by Sir R. Ball (Theory of the Content, Trans. R. I. A. 1880), who urges that if the values of our coordinates already involve the usual measure of distance, then to give a new definition, while retain- ing the usual coordinates, is to incur a contradiction. He says (op. cit. p. 1) : " In the study of non-Euclidean Geometry I have often felt a difficulty which has, I know, been shared by others. In that theory it seems as if we try to replace our ordinary notion of distance between two points by the logarithm of a certain anharmonic ratio-. But this ratio itself involves the notion of distance measured in the ordinary way. How, then, 1 I.e. the equation AB + BC — AG, for three points in one straight line. ^ The formula substituted by Klein for Cayley's inverse sine or cosine. The two are equivalent, but Klein's is mathematically much the more convenient. 32 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. can we supersude our old notion of distance by the non- Euclidean notion, inasmuch as the very definition of the latter involves the former ? " 36. This objection is valid, we must admit, so long as anharmonic ratio is defined in the ordinary metrical manner. It would be valid, for example, against any attempt to found a new definition of distance on Cremona's account of an- harmonic ratio', in which it appears as a metrical property unaltered by projective transformation. If a logical error is to be avoided, in fact, all reference to spatial magnitude of any kind must be avoided ; for all spatial magnitude, as will be shown hereafter", is logically dependent on the fundamental magnitude of distance. Anharmonic ratio and coordinates must alike be defined by purely descriptive properties, if the use afterwards made of them is to be free from metrical pre- suppositions, and therefore from the objections of Sir R. Ball. Such a definition has been satisfactorily given by Klein^ who appeals, for the purpose, to v. Staudt's quadrilateral con- struction ^ By this construction, which I have reproduced in outline in Chapter ill. Section A, § 112 ff., we obtain a purely de- scriptive definition of harmonic and anharmonic ratio, and, given a pair of points, we can obtain the harmonic conjugate to any third point on the same straight line. On this construction, the introduction of projective coordinates is based. Starting with any three points on a straight line, we assign to them arbitrarily the numbers 0, 1, oo . We then find the harmonic conjugate to the first with respect to 1, oo , and assign to it the number 2. The object of assigning this number rather than any other, is to obtain the value —1 for the anharmonic ratio of the four numbers corresponding to the four points^ We then find the harmonic conjugate to the point 1, with respect to 2, oo , and assign to it the number 3 ; and so on. Klein has shown that by this construction, we can obtain any number of points, and 1 Elements of Projective Geometry, Second Edition, Oxford, 1893, Chap. IX. 2 Chap. III. Section B. 3 See Nicht-Euklid, i. p. 3.38 ff. ■» See his Geometrie der Lage, § 8, Harmonische Gebilde. •'■' The anharmonic ratio of four numbers, p, q, r, s, is defined as (p-rj).{r-s)l{p-r].(q~^). A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 33 can construct a point corresponding to any given number, fractional or negative. Moreover, when two sets of four points have the same anharmonic ratio, descriptively defined', the corresponding numbers also have the same anharmonic ratio. By introducing such a numerical system on two straight lines, or on three, we obtain the coordinates of any point in a plane, or in space. By this construction, which is of fundamental importance to projective Geometry, the logical error, upon which Sir R. Ball bases his criticism, is satisfactorily avoided. Our coordinates are introduced by a purely descriptive method, and involve no presupposition whatever as to the measurement of distance. 37. With this coordinate system, then, to define distance as a certain function of the coordinates is not to be guilty of a vicious circle. But it by no means follows that the defi- nition of distance is arbitrary. All reference to distance has been hitherto excluded, to avoid metrical ideas; but when distance is introduced, metrical ideas inevitably reappear, and we have to remember that our coordinates give no information, jn-imd facie, as to any of these metrical ideas. It is open to us, of course, if we choose, to continue to exclude distance in the ordinary sense, as the quantity of a finite straight line, and to define the word distance in any way we please. But the conception, for whicli the word has hitherto stood, will then require a new name, and the only result will be a con- fusion between the apparent meaning of our propositions, to those who retain the associations belonging to the old sense of the word, and the real meaning, resulting from the new sense in which the word is used. This confusion, I believe, has actually occurred, in the case of those who regard the question between Euclid and Meta- geometry as one of the definition of distance. Distance is a quantitative relation, and as such presupposes identity of quality. But projective Geometry deals only with quality — for which reason it is called descriptive — and cannot distinguish between two figures which are qualitatively alike. Now the meaning of qualitative likeness, in Geometry, is the possibility * I.e. as transformable into each other bj' a coUineation. See Chap. iii. Sec. A, § 110. 34 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. of mutual transformation by a collineation *. Any two pairs of points on the same straight line, therefore, are qualitatively alike ; their only qualitative relation is the straight line, which both pairs have in common; and it is exactly the qualitative identity of the relations of the two pairs, which enables the difference of their relations to be exhaustively dealt with by quantity, as a difference of distance. But where quantity is excluded, any two pairs of points on the same straight line appear as alike, and even any two sets of three : for any three points on a straight line can be projectively transformed into any other three. It is only with fonr points in a line that we acquire a projective property distinguishing them from other sets of four, and this property is anharmonic ratio, descript- ively defined. The projective Geometer, therefore, sees no reason to give a name to the relation between two points, in so far as this relation is anything over and above the unlimited straight line on which they lie ; and when he introduces the notion of distance, he defines it, in the only way in which projective principles allow him to define it, as a relation between four points. As he nevertheless wishes the word to give him the power of distinguishing between different pairs of points, he agrees to take two out of the four points as fixed. In this way^ the only variables in distance are the two remaining points, and distance appears, therefore, as a function of tiuo variables, namely the coordinates of the two variable points. When we have further defined our function so that distance may be additive, we have a function with many of the proper- ties of distance in the ordinary sense. This function, therefore, the projective Geometer regards as the only proper definition of distance. We can see, in fact, from the manner in which our projective coordinates were introduced, that some function of these coordinates must express distance in the ordinary sense. For they were introduced serially, so that, as we proceeded from the zero-point towards the infinity-point, our coordinates continually grew. To every point, a definite coordinate corresponded : to the distance between two variable points, therefore, as a function dependent on no other variables, must correspond 1 See Chap. iii. Sec. A. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 35 some definite function of the coordinates, since these are themselves functions of their points. The function discussed above, therefore, must certainly include distance in the ordinary sense. But the arbitrary and conventional nature of distance, as maintained by Poincare and Klein, arises from the fact that the two fixed points, required to determine our distance in the projective sense, may be arbitrarily chosen, and although, when our choice is once made, any two points have a definite distance, yet, according as we make that choice, distance will become a different function of the two variable points. The ambiguity thus introduced is unavoidable on projective principles; but are we to conclude, from this, that it is really unavoidable ? Must we not rather conclude that projective Geometry cannot adequately deal with distance ? If ^, B, C, be three different points on a line, there must be some difference between the relation of ^ to B and of A to C, for otherwise, owing to the qualitative identity of all points, B and C could not be dis- tinguished. But such a difference involves a relation, between A and B, which is independent of other points on the line ; for unless we have such a relation, the other points cannot be distinguished as different. Before we can distinguish the two fixed points, therefore, from which the projective definition starts, we must already suppose some relation, between any two points on our line, in whicii they are independent of other points ; and this relation is distance in the ordinary sense '. When we have measured this quantitative relation by the ordinary methods of metrical Geometry, we can proceed to decide what base-points must be chosen, on our line, in order that the projective function discussed above may have the same value as ordinary distance. But the choice of these base- points, when we are discussing distance in the ordinary sense, is not arbitrary, and their introduction is only a technical device. Distance, in the ordinary sense, remains a relation between tiuo points, not bet ween /ou?-; and it is the failure to perceive that the projective sense differs from, and cannot 1 It follows from this, that the reduction of metrical to projective properties, even when, as in hyperbolic Geometr}', the Absolute is real, is only apparent, and has a merely technical validity. 3—2 36 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. supersede, the ordinary sense, which has given rise to the views of Klein and Poinear^. The question is not one of convention, but of the irreducible metrical properties of space. To sum up: Quantities, as used in projective Geometry, do not stand for spatial magnitudes, but are conventional symbols for purely qualitative spatial relations. But distance, qua quantity, presupposes identity of quality, as the condition of quantitative comparison. Distance in the ordinary sense is, in short, that quantitative relation, between two points on a line, by which their difference from other points can be defined. The pro- jective definition, however, being unable to distinguish a collection of less than four points from any other on the same straight line, makes distance depend on two other points besides those whose relation it defines. No name remains, therefore, for distance in the ordinary sense, and many pro- jective Geometers, having abolished the name, believe the thing to be abolished also, and are inclined to deny that tiuo points have a unique relation at all. This confusion, in projective Geometry, shows the importance of a name, and should make us chary of allowing new meanings to obscure one of the fundamental properties of space. 38. It remains to discuss the manner in which non- Euclidean Geometries result from the projective definition of distance, as also the true interpretation to be given to this view of Metageometry. It is to be observed that the projective methods which follow Cayley deal throughout with a Euclidean plane, on which they introduce different measures of distance. Hence arises, in any interpretation of these methods, an apparent subordination of the non-Euclidean spaces, as though these were less self-subsistent than Euclid's. This subordi- nation is not intended in what follows ; on the contrary, the correlation with Euclidean space is regarded as valuable, first, because Euclidean space has been longer studied and is more familiar, but secondly, because this correlation proves, when truly interpreted, that the other spaces are self-subsistent. We may confine ourselves chiefly, in discussing this inter- pretation, to distances measured along a single straight line. But we must be careful to remember that the metrical defi- nition of distance — which, according to the view^ here advocated. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 37 is the only adequate definition — is the same in Euclidean and in non- Euclidean spaces : to argue in its favour is not, there- fore, to argue in favour of Euclid. The projective scheme of coordinates consists of a series of numbers, of which each represents a certain anharmonic ratio and denotes one and only one point, and which increase uniformly with the distance from a fixed origin, until they become infinite on reaching a certain point. Now Cayley showed that, in Euclidean Geometry, distance may be ex- pressed as the limit of the logarithm of the anharmonic ratio of the two points and the (coincident) points at infinity on their straight line ; while, if we assumed that the points at infinity were distinct, we obtained the formula for distance in hyperbolic or spherical Geometry, according as these points were real or imaginary. Hence it follows that, with the projective definition of distance, we shall obtain precisely the formulae of hyperbolic, parabolic or spherical Geometry, accord- ing as we choose the point, to which the value -|- x) is assigned, at a finite, infinite or imaginary distance (in the ordinary sense) from the point to which we assign the value 0. Our straight line remains, all the while, an ordinary Euclidean straight line. But we have seen that the projective definition of distance fits with the true definition only when the two fixed poiuts to which it refers are suitably chosen. Now the ordinary meaning of distance is required in non-Euclidean as in Euclidean Geometries — indeed, it is only in metrical properties that these Geometries differ. Hence our Euclidean straight line, though it may serve to illustrate other Geometries than Euclid's, can only be dealt with correctly by Euclid. Where we give a different definition of distance from Euclid's, we are still in the domain of purely projective properties, and derive no information as to the metrical properties of our straight line. But the importance, to Metageometry, of this new interpretation, lies in the fact that, having independently established the metrical formulae of non-Euclidean spaces, we find, as in Beltrami's Saggio, that these spaces can be related, by a homographic correspondence, with the points of Euclidean space ; and that this can be effected in such a manner as to give, for the distance between two points of our non-Euclidean space, the 38 FOUNDATIONS OF (JKOMETRY. hyperbolic or .spherical ineasure of distance for the corresponding points of Enclidcan space. 39. On the whole, then, a modification of Sir R. Ball's view, which is practically a generalized statement of Beltrami's method, seems the most tenable. He imagines what, with Orassmann, he calls a Content, i.e. a perfectly general three-dimensional mani- fold, and then correlates its elements, one by one, with points in Euclidean space. Thus every element of the Content ac- quires, as its coordinates, the ordinary Euclidean coordinates of the corresponding point in Euclidean space. By means of this correlation, our calculations, though they refer to the Content, are carried on, as in Beltrami's Saggio, in ordinary Euclidean space. Thus the confusion disappears, but with it, the supposed Euclidean interpretation also disappears. Sir R. Ball's Content, if it is to be a space at all, must be a space radically different from Euclid's^ ; to speak, as Klein does, of ordinary planes with hyperbolic or elliptic measures of distance, is either to incur a contradiction, or to forego any metrical meaning of distance. Instead of ordinary planes, we have sur- faces like Beltrami's, of constant measure of curvature ; instead of Euclid's space, we have hyperbolic or spherical space. At the same time, it remains true that we can, by Klein's method, give a Euclidean meaning to every symbolic proposition in non- Euclidean Geometry. For by substituting, for distance, the logarithm above alluded to, we obtain, from the non-Euclidean result, a result which follows from the ordinary Euclidean axioms. This correspondence removes, once for all, the possi- bility of a lurking contradiction in Metageometry, since, to a proposition in the one, corresponds one and only one proposition in the other, and contradictory results in one system, therefore, would correspond to contradictory I'esults in the other. Hence Metageometry cannot lead to contradictions, unless Euclidean Geometry, at the same moment, leads to corresponding contra- dictions. Thus the Euclidean plane with hyperbolic or elliptic measure of distance, though either contradictory or not metrical 1 Sir E. Ball does not regard his non-Euclidean content as a possible space (v. op. cit. p. 1.51). In this important point I disagree with his interpretation, holding such a content to be a space as possible, h priori, as Euclid's, and perhaps actually true within the margin due to errors of observation. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 39 as an independent notion, has, as a help in the interpretation of non-Euclidean results, a very high degree of utility. 40. We have still to discuss Klein's third kind of non- Euclidean Geometry, which he calls elliptic. The difference between this and spherical Geometry is difficult to grasp, but it may be illustrated by a simpler example. A plane, as every one knows, can be wrapped, without stretching, on a cylinder, and straight lines in the plane become, by this operation, geodesies on the cylinder. The Geometries of the plane and the cylinder, therefore, have much in common. But since the generating circle of the cj^linder, which is one of its geodesies, is finite, only a portion of the plane is used up in wrapping it once round the cylinder. Hence, if we endeavour to establish u point-to-point correspondence between the plane and the cylinder, we shall find an infinite series of points on the plane for a single point on the cylinder. Thus it happens that geodesies, though on the plane they have only one point in common, may on the cylinder have an infinite number of inter- sections. Somewhat similar to this is the relation between the spherical and elliptic Geometries. To any one point in elliptic space, two points correspond in spherical space. Thus geodesies, which in spherical space may have two points in common, can never, in elliptic space, have more than one intersection. But Klein's method can only prove that elliptic Geometry holds of the ordinary Euclidean plane with elliptic measure of distance. Klein has made great endeavours to enforce the distinction between the spherical and elliptic Geometries ^ but it is not immediately evident that the latter, as distinct from the former, is valid. In the first place, Klein's elliptic Geometry, which arises as one of the alternative metrical systems on a Euclidean plane or in a Euclidean space, does not by itself suffice, if the above discussion has been correct, to prove the possibility of an elliptic space, i.e. of a space having a point-to-point corre- spondence with the Euclidean space, and having as the ordinary distance between two of its points the elliptic definition of the distance between corresponding points of the Euclidean space. To prove this possibility, Ave must adopt the direct method of 1 See Nicht-Euklid, i. p. 'J? li'. and p. 292 ff. 40 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. Newcomb (Crellc's Journal, Vol. 83). Now in the first place Newconib has not proved that his postulates are self-consistent ; he has only failed to prove that they are contradictory'. This would leave elliptic space in the same position in which Lobat- chewsky and Bolyai left hyperbolic space. But further there seems to be, at first sight, in ^wo-dimensional elliptic space, a positive contradiction. To explain this, however, some account of the peculiarities of the elliptic plane will be necessary. The elliptic plane, regarded as a figure in three-dimensional elliptic space, is what is called a double surface-, i.e. as Newcomb says {loc. cit. p. 298) : " The two sides of a complete plane are not distinct, as in a Euclidean surface.... If. ..a being should travel to distance 2D, he would, on his return, find himself on the opposite surface to that on which he started, and would have to repeat his journey in order to return to his original position without leaving the surface." Now if we imagine a 1 Newcomb says {loc. cit. p. 293): "The system here set forth is fomided on the following three postulates. "1. I assume that space is triply extended, unbounded, without properties dependent either on position or direction, and possessing such planeness in its smallest parts that both the postulates of the Euclidean Geometry, and our common conceptions of the relations of the parts of space are true for every indefinitely small region in space. "2. I assume that this space is affected with such curvature that a right line shall always return into itself at the end of a finite and real distance 2D without losing, in any part of its course, that symmetry with respect to space on all sides of it which constitutes the fundamental property of our con- ception of it. "3. I assume that if two right lines emanate from the same point, making the indefinitely small angle a with each other, their distance apart at the distance r from the point of intersection will be given by the equation 2aD . rir s= — sin -— . TT 2D The right line thus has this property in common with the Euclidean right line that two such lines intersect only in a single point. It may be that the number of points in which two such lines can intersect admit of being determined from the laws of curvature, but not being able so to determine it, I assume as a postulate the fundamental property of the Euclidean right line." It is plain that in the absence of the determination spoken of, the possibihty of elliptic space is not established. It may be possible, for example, to prove that, in a space where there is a maximum to distance, there must be an infinite number of straight lines joining two points of maximum distance. In this event, elliptic space would become impossible. - For an elucidation of this term, see Klein, Nicht-Euklid, i. p. W ti. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 4-1 signed to it. (With many possible coordinate systems, this latter condition is not realized : but for that very reason they are inconvenient, and employed only in special problems.) Thus given a coordinate system, and given any set of quantities, these quantities, if they determine a point at all, determine it uniquely. But, by a natural extension of the method, the above reservation is dropped, and it is assumed that to every set of quantities some point must correspond. For this assumption there seems to me no vestige of evidence. As well might a postman assume that, because every house in a street is uniquely determined by its number, therefore there must be a house for every imaginable number. We must know, in fact, that a given set of quantities can be the co- ordinates of some point in space, before it is legitimate to give any spatial significance to these quantities : and this knowledge, obviously, cannot be derived from operations with coordinates alone, on pain of a vicious circle. We must, to return to the above analogy, know the number of houses in Piccadilly, before we know whether a given number has a corresponding house or not ; and arithmetic alone, however subtly employed, will never give us this information. Thus the distinction which is important is, not the dis- tinction between real and imaginary quantities, but between quantities to which points correspond and quantities to which no points correspond. We can conventionally agree to denote real points by imaginary coordinates, as in the Gaussian method of denoting by the single quantity (a -f V — 1 6) the point whose ordinary coordinates are a, h. But this does not touch Cayley's meaning. Cayley means that it is of great utility in mathe- matics to regard, as points with a real existence in space, the assumed spatial correlates of quantities which, with the coordinate system employed, have no correlates in e very-day space; and that this utility is supposed, by many mathema- ticians, to indicate the validity of so fruitful an assumption. To fix our ideas, let us consider Cartesian axes in three- dimensional Euclidean space. Then it appears, by inspection, that a point may be situated at any distance to right or left of any of the three coordinate planes ; taking this distance as a coordinate, therefore, it appears that real points correspond to A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 45 all quantities from — cc to + cc . The same appears for the other two coordinates ; and since elementary Geometry proves their variations mutually independent, we know that one and only one real point corresponds to any three real quantities. But we also know, from the exhaustive method pursued, that all space is covered by the range of these three variable quantities: a fresh set of quantities, therefore, such as is introduced by the use of imaginaries, possesses no spatial correlate, and can be supposed to possess one only by a convenient fiction. 43. The fact that the fiction is convenient, however, may be thought to indicate that it is more than a fiction. But this presumption, I think, can be easily explained away. For all the fruitful uses of imaginaries, in Geometry, are those which begin and end with real quantities, and use imaginaries only for the intermediate steps. Now in all such cases, we have a real spatial interpretation at the beginning and end of our argument, where alone the spatial interpretation is important : in the intermediate links, we are dealing in a purely algebraical manner with purely algebraical quantities, and may perform any operations which are algebraically permissible. If the quantities with which we end are capable of sjiatial inter- pretation, then, and only then, our result may be regarded as geometrical. To use geometrical language, in any other case, is only a convenient help to the imagination. To speak, for example, of projective properties which refer to the circular points, is a mere memoria technica for purely algebraical properties ; the circular points are not to be found in space, but only in the auxiliary quantities by which geometrical equations are transformed. That no contradictions arise from the geometrical interpretation of imaginaries, is not wonderful : for they are interpreted solely by the rules of Algebra, which we may admit as valid in their application to imaginaries. The perception of space being wholly absent. Algebra rules supreme, and no inconsistency can arise. Wherever, for a moment, we allow our ordinary spatial notions to intrude, the grossest absurdities do arise — every one can see that a circle, being a closed curve, cannot get to infinity. The metaphysician, who should invent anything so preposterous as the circular points. 46 FOUNDATfONS OF OKOMETRY. would be hooted from the field. But the mathematician may steal the horse with impunity. Finally, then, only a knowledge of space, not a knowledge of Algebra, can assure us that any given set of quantities will have a spatial correlate, and in the absence of such a correlate, operations with these quantities have no geometrical import. This is the case with imaginaries in Cayley's sense, and their use in Geometry, great as are its technical advantages, and rigid as is its technical validity, is wholly destitute of philo- sophical importance. 44. We have now, I think, discussed most of the questions concerning the scope and validity of the projective method. We have seen that it is independent of all metrical presuppositions, and that its use of coordinates does not involve the assumption that spatial magnitudes are measured or expressed by them. We have seen that it is able to deal, by its own methods alone, with the question of the qualitative likeness of geometrical figures, which is logically prior to any comparison as to quantity, since quantity presupposes qualitative likeness. We have seen also that, so far as its legitimate use extends, it applies equally to all homogeneous spaces, and that its criterion of an indepen- dently possible space — the determination of a straight line by two points^ — is not subject to the qualifications and limitations which belong, as we have seen in the case of the cylinder, to the metrical criterion of constant curvature. But we have also seen that, when projective Geometry endeavours to grapple with spatial magnitude, and bring distance and the measure- ment of angles beneath its sway, its success, though technically valid and important, is philosophically an apparent success only. Metrical Geometry, therefore, if quantity is to be applied to space at all, remains a separate, though logically subsequent branch of Mathematics. 45. It only remains to say a few words about Sophus Lie. As a mathematician, as the inventor of a new and immensely powerful method of analysis, he cannot be too highly praised. Geometry is only one of the numerous subjects to which his 1 The exceiDtion to this axiom, in spherical space, presupposes metrical Geometry, and does not destroy the validity of the axiom for projective Geometry. See Chap. in. See. B, § 171. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 47 theory of continuous groups applies, but its application to Geometry has made a revolution in method, and has rendered possible, in such problems as Helmholtz's, a treatment infinitely more precise and exhaustive than any which was jaossible before. The general definition of a group is as follows : If we have an}^ number of independent variables x^ .?._,... a;,i, and any series of transformations of these into new variables — the trans- formations being defined by equations of specified forms, with parameters varying from one transformation to another — then the series of transformations form a group, if the successive application of any two is equivalent to a single member of the original series of transformations. The group is continuous, when we can pass, by infinitesimal gradations within the group, from any one of the transformations to any other. Now, in Geometry, the result of two successive motions or collineations of a figure can always be obtained by a single motion or collineation, and any motion or collineation can be built up of a series of infinitesimal motions or collineations. Moreover the analytical expression of either is a certain trans- formation of the coordinates of all the points of the figure'. Hence the transformations determining a motion or a col- lineation are such as to form a continuous group. But the question of the projective equivalence of two figures, to which all projective Geometry is reducible, must always be dealt with by a collineation ; and the question of the equality of two figures, to which all metrical Geometry is reducible, must always be decided by a motion such as to cause superposition ; hence the whole subject of Geometry may be regarded as a theory of the continuous groups which define all possible collineations and motions. Now Sophus Lie has developed, at gi'eat length, the purely analytical theory of gi'oups : he has therefore, by this method of formulating the problem, a very powerful weapon ready for ' Mathematicians of Lie's school have a habit, at first somewhat confusing, of speaking of motions of space instead of motions of bodies, as though space as a whole could move. All that is meant is, of course, the equivalent motion of the coordinate axes, i.e. a change of axes in the usual elementary sense. 48 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. the attack. In two papers "On the foundations of Geometry'," undertaken at Klein's urgent request, he takes premisses which roughly correspond to those of Helmholtz, omitting Mono- dromy, and applies the theory of groups to the deduction of their consequences-, Helmholtz's work, he says, can hardly be looked upon as proving its conclusions, and indeed the more searching analysis of the group-theory reveals several possi- bilities unknown to Helmholtz. Nevertheless, as a pioneer, devoid of Lie's machinery, Helmholtz deserves, I think, more praise than Lie is willing to give him^. Lie's method is perfectly exhaustive ; omitting the premiss of Monodromy, the others show that a body has six degrees of freedom, i.e. that the group giving all possible motions of a body will have six independent members ; if we keep one point fixed, the number of independent members is reduced to three. He then, from his general theory, enumerates all the groups which satisfy this condition. In order that such a group should 1 " Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometiie," Leipziger Berichte, 1890. TLe problem of these two papers is really metrical, since it is concerned, not with coUineations in general, but with motions. The problem, however, is dealt with by the projective method, motions being regarded as coUineations which leave the Absolute unchanged. It seemed impossible, therefore, to discuss Lie's work, until some account had been given of the projective method. '■^ Lie's premisses, to be accurate, are the following : Let •'■i = /(^'. 2/. z, «i. «2---) a'2=0(.T, y, z, Oj, ag...) give an infinite family of real transformations of space, as to which we make the following hypotheses : A. The functions /, (/>, \j/, are analytical functions of X, y, z, aj, «„.... B. Two points x■^y■^z■^, Xny.^z^ possess an invariant, i.e. i](a-i, (/i, z^,x^,y.i, Z2)=fi(.ri', ?//, z^', .r./, y„', z^) where ;r,'..., .r„',.,. are the transformed coordinates of the two points. C. Free Mobility: i.e., any point can be moved into any other position ; when one point is fixed, any other point of general position can take up ao- positions; when two points are fixed, any other of general position can take up X ^ positions; when three, no motion is possible — these limitations being results of the equations given by the invariant Q. " On this point, of. Klein, Hohere Geometric, Gottingen, 1893, ii. pp. 225- 244, especially pp. 230-1. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. 49 give possible motions, it is necessary, by Helmholtz's second axiom, that it should leave invariant some function of the coordinates of any two points. This eliminates several of the groups previously enumerated, each of which he discusses in turn. He is thus led to the following results : I. In tiuo dimensions, if free mobility is to hold vni- versally, there are no groups satisfying Helmholtz's first three axioms, except those which give the ordinary Euclidean and non-Euclidean motions ; but if it is to hold only within a certain region, there is also a possible group in which the curve described by any point in a rotation is not closed, but an equiangular spiral. To exclude this possibility, Helmholtz's axiom of Monodromy is required. II. In three dimensions, the results go still more against Helmholtz. Assuming free mobility only within a cei^tain region, we have to distinguish two cases : Either free mobility holds, within that region, absolutely without exception, i.e. when one point is held fast, everi/ other point within the region can move freely ovoi- a surface : in this case the axiom of Mo- nodromy is unnecessary, and the first three axioms suffice to define our gi-oup as that of Euclidean and non- Euclidean mo- tions. Or free mobility, within the .specified region, holds only of every point of genei'al position, while the points of a certain line, when one point is fixed, are only able to move on that line, not on a surface ; when this is the case, other groups are possible, and can only be excluded by Helmholtz's fourth axiom. Having now stated the purely mathematical results of Lie's investigations, we may return to philosophical considei-ations, by which Helmholtz's work was mainly motived. It becomes obvious, not only that exceptions within a certain region, but also that limitation to a certain region, of the axiom of Free Mobility, are philosophically quite impossible and inconceivable. How can a certain line, or a certain surface, form an impassable ban-ier in space, or have any mobility different in kind from that of all other lines or surfaces ? The notion cannot, in philosophy, be permitted for a moment, since it destroys that most fundamental of all the axioms, the homogeneity of space. We not only may, therefore, but must take Helmholtz's axiom R. G. 4 50 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. of Free Mobility in its very strictest sense ; the axiom of Monodromy thus becomes mathematically, as well as philo- sophically, superfluous. This is, from a philosophical standpoint, the most important of Lie's results. 46. I have now come to the end of my history of Meta- geometry. It has not been my aim to give an exhaustive account of even the important works on the subject — in the third period, especially, the names of Poincar^, Pasch, Cremona, Veronese, and others who might be mentioned, would have cried shame upon me, had I had any such object. But I have tried to set forth, as clearly as I could, the principles at work in the various periods, the motives and results of successive theories. We have seen how the philosophical motive, at first predominant, has been gradually extruded by the purely mathe- matical and technical spirit of most recent Geometers. At first, to discredit the Transcendental Aesthetic seemed, to Meta- geometers, as important as to advance their science ; but from the works of Cayley, Klein or Lie, no reader could gather that Kant had ever lived. We have also seen, however, that as the interest in philosophy waned, the interest for philosophy increased : as the mathematical results shook themselves free from philosophical controversies, they assumed gradually a stable form, from which further development, we may reason- ably hope, will take the form of growth, rather than trans- formation. The same gradual development out of philosophy might, I believe, be traced in the infancy of most branches of mathematics ; when philosophical motives cease to operate, this is, in general, a sign that the stage of uncertainty as to premisses is past, so that the future belongs entirely to mathe- matical technique. When this stable stage has been attained, it is time for Philosophy to borrow of Science, accepting its final premisses as those imposed by a real necessity of fact or logic. 47. Now in discussing the systems of Metageometry, we have found two kinds, radically distinct and subject to different axioms. The historically prior kind, which deals with metrical ideas, discusses, to begin with, the conditions of Free Mobility, which is essential to all measurement of space. It finds the analytical expression of these conditions in the existence of A SHORT HISTORY OF METAOEOMETRY. ol a space-constant, or constant measure of curvature, ^vhich is equivalent to the homogeneity of space. This is its first axiom. Its second axiom states that space has a finite integral number of dimensions, i.e. in metrical terms, that the position of a point, relative to any other figure in space, is uniquely determined by a finite number of spatial magnitudes, called coordinates. The third axiom of metrical Geometry may be called, to distinguish it from the corresponding projective axiom, the axiom of distance. There exists one relation, it says, between any two points, which can be preserved unaltered in a combined motion of both points, and which, in any motion of a system as one rigid body, is always unaltered. This relation we call distance. The above statement of the three essential axioms of metrical Geometry is taken from Helmholtz as amended by Lie. Lie's own statement of the axioms, as quoted above, has been too much influenced by projective methods to give a historically correct rendering of the spirit of the second period; Helmholtz's statement, on the other hand, requires, as Lie has shewn, very considerable modifications. The above compromise may, there- fore, I hope be taken as accepting Lie's corrections while I'etaining Helmholtz's spirit. 48. But metrical Geometry, though it is historically prior, is logically subsequent to projective Geometry. For projective Geometry deals directly with that qualitative likeness, which the judgment of quantitative comparison requires as its basis. Now the above three axioms of metrical Geometry, as we shall see in Chapter iii. Section B, do not presuppose measurement, but are, on the contrary, the conditions presupposed by measurement. Without these axioms, which are common to all three spaces, measurement would be impossible ; with them, .so I shall contend, measurement is able, though only empirically, to decide approximately which of the three spaces is valid of our actual world. But if these three axioms themselves express, not results, but conditions, of measurement, must they not be equivalent to the statement of that qualitative likeness on which quantitative comparison depends ? And if so, must we 4—2 02 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. not expect to tiiul the same axioms, though perhaps under a different form, in projective Geometry ? 49. This expectation will not be disappointed. The above three axioms, as we shall see hereafter, are one and all philosophically equivalent to the homogeneity of space, and this in turn is equivalent to the axioms of projective Geometry. The axioms of projective Geometry, in fact, may be roughly stated thus : I. Space is continuous and infinitely divisible ; the zero of extension, resulting from infinite division, is called a Point. All points are qualitatively similar, and distinguished by the mere fact that they lie outside one another. II. Any two points determine a unique figure, the straight line ; two straight lines, like two points, are qualitatively similar, and distinguished by the mere fact that they are mutually external. III. Three points not in one straight line determine a unique figure, the plane, and four points not in one plane determine a figure of three dimensions. This process may, so far as can be seen a priori, be continued, without in any way interfering with the possibility of projective Geometry, to five or to n points. But projective Geometry requires, as an axiom, that the process should stop with some positive integral number of points, after which, any fresh point is contained in the figure determined by those already given. If the process stops with (n + 1) points, our space is said to have 7i dimensions. These three axioms, it will be seen, are the equivalents of the three axioms of metrical Geometry^, expressed without reference to quantity. We shall find them to be deducible, as before, from the homogeneity of space, or, more generally still, from the possibility of experiencing externality. They will therefore appear as d priori, as essential to the existence of any Geometry and to experience of an external world as such. 50. That some logical necessity is involved in these axioms might, I think, be inferred as probable, from their historical development alone. For the systems of Metageometry have not, in general, been set up as more likely to fit facts than the 1 Axiom II. of the metrical triad corresponds to Axiom iii. of the projective, and vice versa. A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRV. 53 system of Euclid ; with the exception of Zollner, for example, I know of no one who has regarded the fourth dimension as required to explain phenomena. As regards the space-constant again, though a small space-constant is regarded as empirically possible, it is not usually regarded as probable ; and the finite space-constants, with which Metageometry is equally con- versant, are not usually thought even possible, as explanations uf empirical fact '. Thus the motive has been throughout not one of fact, but one of logic. Does not this give a strong presumption, that those axioms which are retained, are retained because they are logically indispensable ? If this be so, the axioms common to Euclid and Metageometry will be a pj-iori, while those peculiar to Euclid will be empirical. After a criticism of some differing theories of Geometry, I shall proceed, in Chapters III. and IV., to the proof and consequences of this thesis, which will form the remainder of the present work. ' Cf. Helmholtz, Wiss. Abh. Vol. ii. p. 640, note: "Die Bearbeiter der Niclit-Euklidiscben Geometric (haben) deren objective Wahrheit nie behauptet." CHAPTER 11. CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF SOME PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF GEOMETRY. 51. We have now traced the mathematical development of the theory of geometrical axioms, from the first revolt against Euclid to the present day. We may hope, therefore, to have at our command the technical knowledge required for the philosophy of the subject. The importance of Geometry, in the theories of knowledge which have arisen in the past, can scarcely be exaggerated. In Descartes, we find the whole theory of method dominated by analytical Geometry, of whose fruitfulness he was justly proud. In Spinoza, the paramount influence of Geometry is too obvious to require comment. Among mathematicians, Newton's belief in absolute space was long supreme, and is still responsible for the current formu- lation of the laws of motion. Against this belief on the one hand, and against Leibnitz's theory of space on the other, and not, as Caird has pointed outS against Hume's empiricism, was directed that keystone of the Critical Philosophy, the Kantian doctrine of space. Thus Geometry has been, thruugh- out, of supreme importance in the theory of knowledge. But in a criticism of representative modern theories of Geometry, which is designed to be, not a history of the subject, but an introduction to, and defence of, the views of the authoi', it will not be necessary to discuss any more ancient theory than that of Kant. Kant's views on this subject, true or false, have so dominated subse(|uent thought, that whether they were 1 The Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. i. p. 287. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF GEOMETRY. 00 accepted or rejected, they seemed equally potent in forming the opinions, and the manner of exposition, of almost all later writers. Kant. 52. It is not my purpose, in this chapter, to add to the voluminous literature of Kantian criticism, but only to discuss the bearing of Metageometry on the argument of the Tran- scendental Aesthetic, and the aspect under which this argument must be viewed in a discussion of Geometr\ ^ On this point several misunderstandings seem to me to have had wide pre- valence, both amijng friends and foes, and these misunder- standings I shall endeavour, if I can, to remove. In the first place, what does Kant's doctrine mean for Geometry ? Obviously not the aspect of the doctrine which has been attacked by psychologists, the " Kantian machine- shop " as James calls it — at any rate, if this can be clearly separated from the logical aspect. The question whether space is given in sensation, or whether, iis Kant maintained, it is given by an intuition to which no external matter corresponds, may for the present be disregarded. If, indeed, we held the view which seems crudely to sum up the standpoint of the Critique, the view that all certain knowledge is self-knowledge, then we should be committed, if we had decided that Geometry was apodeictic, to the view that space is subjective. But even then, the psychological question could only arise when the epistemological question hat! been solved, and could not, there- fore, be taken into account in our first investigation. The question before us is precisely the question whether, or how far. Geometry is apodeictic, and for the moment we have only to investigate this question, without fear of psychological con- sequences. 53. Now on this question, as on almost all questions in the Aesthetic or the Analytic, Kant's argument is twofold. On the one hand, he says, Geometry is known to have apodeictic certainty: therefore space must be a. priori and subjective. On the other hand, it follows, from gTounds independent of ' For a ili^cussiun uf Kaut from a less purely mathematical standpoint, see Chap. IV. 56 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. Geometry, that space is subjective and d priori; therefore Geometry must have apodeictic certainty. These two argu- ments are not clearly distinguished in the Aesthetic, but a little analysis, I think, will disentangle them. Thus in the first edition, the first two arguments deduce, from non-geometrical grounds, the apriority of space ; the third deduces the apodeictic certainty of Geometry, and maintains, conversely, that no other view can account for this certainty^ ; the last two arguments only maintain that space is an intuition, not a concept. In the second edition, the double argument is clearer, the apriority of space being proved independently of Geometry in the meta- physical deduction, and deduced from the certainty of Geometry, as the only possible explanation of this, in the transcendental deduction. In the Prolegomena, the latter ai'gument alone is used, but in the Critique both are employed. 54. Now it must be admitted, I think, that Metageometry has destroyed the legitimacy of the argument from Geometry to space ; we can no longer affirm, on purely geometrical grounds, the apodeictic certainty of Euclid. But unless Meta- geometry has done more than this — unless it has proved, what I believe it alone cannot prove, that Euclid has not apodeictic certainty — then Kant's other line of argument retains what force it may ever have had. The actual space we know, it may say, is admittedly Euclidean, and is proved, without any reference to Geometry, to be d priori ; hence Euclid has apodeictic certainty, and non-Euclid stands condemned. To this it is no answer to urge, with the Metageometers, that non-Euclidean systems are logically self-consistent ; for Kant is careful to argue that geometrical reasoning, by virtue of our intuition of space, is synthetic, and cannot, though d priori, be upheld by the principle of contradiction alone'-. Unless non-Euclideans can prove, what they have certainly failed to prove up to the present, that we can frame an intuition of non-Euclidean spaces, 1 Cf. Vaihinger's Cointnentar, ii. pp. 202, 2(55. Also p. 336 if. - E.g. second edition, p. 39: "So werden auch alle geometriscben Grund- siitze, z. B. dass in einem Tiiaugel zwei Seiten zusammen grosser sind als die dritte, niemals aus allgemeiuen Begviffen von Linie und Triangel, sondern aus der Anschauung, und zwar a priori mit apodiktisulier Gewissheit abgeleitet." PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF GEOMETRY. o7 Kant's position cannot be upset by Metageometry alone, but must also be attacked, if it is to be successfully attacked, on its purely philosophical side. 55. For such an attack, two roads lie open : either we may disprove the first two arguments of the Aesthetic, or we may criticize, from the standpoint of general logic, the Kantian doc- trine of synthetic d priori judgments and their connection with subjectivity. Both these attacks, I believe, could be conducted with some success ; but if we are to disprove the apodeictic cer- tainty of Geometry, one or other is essential, and both, I believe, will be found only partially successful. It will be my aim to prove, in discussing these two lines of attack, (1) that the dis- tinction of synthetic and analytic judgments is untenable, and further, that the principle of contradiction can only give fruitful results on the assumption that experience in general, or, in a particular science, some special branch of experience, is to be formally possible ; (2) that the first two arguments of the Tran- scendental Aesthetic suffice to prove, not Euclidean space, but some form of externality — which may be sensational or intuitional, but not merely conceptual — a necessaiy prereijuisite of experience of an external world. In the third and fourth chapters, I shall contend, as a result of these conclusions, that those axioms, which Euclid and Metageometry have in common, coincide with those properties of any form of externality which are deducible, by the principle of contradiction, from the possi- bility of experience of an external world. These properties, then, may be said, though not (juite in the Kantian sense, to be (I priori properties of space, and as to these, I think, a modified Kantian position may be maintained. But the question of the subjective or objective nature of space may be left wholly out of account during the course of this discussion, which will gain by dealing exclusively with logical, as opposed to psychological points of view. 56. (1) Kant's logical position. The doctrine of synthetic and analytic judgments — at any rate if this is taken as the corner-stone of Epistemology — has been so completely rejected by most modern logicians', that it would demand little attention 1 Cf. Bradley's LorIc, Bk. in. Ft. i. Chap. vi. ; Bosanquet's Logic, Bk. i. Cliap. 1. pp. 97-103. 58 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. hero, but for the tact that an enthusiastic French Kantian, M. Renouvier, has recently appealed to it, with perfect con- fidence, on the very question of Geometry \ And it must be owned, with M. Renouvier, that if such judgments existed, in the Kantian sense, non- Euclidean Geometry, which makes no appeal to intuition, could have nothing to say against them. M. Renouvier's contention, therefore, forces us briefly to review the arguments against Kant's doctrine, and briefly to discuss what logical canon is to replace it. Every judgment — so modern logic contends — is both syn- thetic and analytic ; it combines parts into a whole, and analyses a whole into parts '^ If this be so, the distinction of analysis and synthesis, whatever may be its importance in pure Logic, can have no value in Ejsistemology. But such a doctrine, it must be observed, allows full scope to the principle of contra- diction : this criterion, since all judgments, in one aspect at least, are analytic, is applicable to all judgments alike. On the other hand, the whole which is analysed must be supposed already given, before the parts can be mutually contradictory : for only by connection in a given whole can two parts or adjectives be incompatible. Thvis the principle of contradiction remains barren until we already have some judgments, and even some inference : for the parts may be regarded, to some extent, as an inference from the whole, or vice versa. When once the arch of knowledge is constructed, the parts support one another, and the principle of contradiction is the keystone : but until the arch is built, the keystone remains suspended, unsupported and unsupporting, in the empty air. In other words, knowledge once existent can be analysed, but knowledge which should have to win every inch of the way against a criti- cal scepticism, could never begin, and could never attain that circular condition in which alone it can stand. But Kant's doctrine, if true, is designed to restrain a critical scepticism even where it might be effective. Certain funda- mental propositions, he says, are not deducible from logic, ' Philosophie de la Regie et clu Compas, Anuee Philosophitiue, ii. pp. 1-66. - I have stated this doctrine dogmatically, as a proof would require a whole treatise ou Logic. I accept the proofs offered by Bradley and Bosanquet, to which the reader is referred. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF GEOMETRY. 59 i.e. their contradictories are not self-contradictory; they com- bine a subject and predicate which cannot, in any purely logical way, be shewn to have any connection, and yet these judgments have apodeictic certainty. But concerning such judgments, Kant is generally careful not to rely upon the mere subjective conviction that they are undeniable : he proves, with every precaution, that without them experience would be impossible. Experience consists in the combination of terms which formal logic leaves apart, and presupposes, therefore, certain judgments by which a framework is made for bringing such terms together. Without these judgments — .so Kant contends — all synthesis and all experience would be impossible. If, therefore, the detail of the Kantian reasoning be sound, his results may be obtaioed by the principle of contradiction plus the possibility of experience, as well as by his distinction of synthetic and analytic judgments. Logic, at the present day, arrogates to itself at once a wider and a narrower sphere than Kant allowed to it. Wider, because it believes itself capable ). c?s,, so that their ratio would be unaltered. From this constancy of ratio, as we know through Riemann and Helmholtz, the above proposition follows. Hence all that Geometry requires, it would seem, as a basis for measurement, is an axiom that the alteration of shapes during motion follows a definite known law, such as that assumed above. 147. There is, howevei', in such a view, as I remarked above, a logical error as to the nature of magnitude. This error has been already pointed out in dealing with Erdmami-, and need only be briefly repeated here. A judgment of magnitude is essentially a judgment of comparison : in unmeasured quantity, comparison as to the mere more or less, but in measured mag- 1 The view of Helmholtz and Erdmann, that mechanical experience suffices here, though geometrical exijerience fails us, has been discussed above, Chapter ii. §§ 73, 82. - Chapter ii. § 81. 154 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. nitude, comparison as to the precise how many times. To speak of differences of magnitude, therefore, in a case where comparison cannot reveal them, is logically absurd. Now in the case contemplated above, two magnitudes, which appear equal in one position, appear equal also when compared in another position. There is no sense, therefore, in supposing the two magnitudes unequal when separated, nor in supposing, consequently, that they have changed their magnitudes in motion. This senselessness of our hypothesis is the logical ground of the mathematical indeterminateness as to the law of variation. Since, then, there is no means of comparing two spatial figures, as regards magnitude, except superposition, the only logically possible axiom, if spatial magnitude is to be self- consistent, is the axiom of Free Mobility in the form first given ■ above. 148. Although this axiom is a priori, its application to the measurement of actual bodies, as we found in discussing Helm- holtz's views, always involves an empirical elements Our axiom, then, only supplies the d priori condition for carrying out an operation which, in the concrete, is empirical — just as arithmetic supplies the d priori condition for a census. As this topic has been discussed at length in Chapter il., I shall say no more about it here. 149. There remain, however, a few objections and dif- ficulties to be discussed. First, how do we obtain equality in solids, and in Kant's cases of right and left hands, or of right and left-handed screws, where actual superposition is impos- sible ? Secondly, how can we take congruence as the only possible basis of spatial measurement, when we have before us the case of time, where no such thing as congruence is con- ceivable ? Thirdly, it might be urged that we can immediately estimate spatial equality by the eye, with more or less accuracy, and thus have a measure independent of congruence. Fourthly, how is metrical Geometry possible on non-congruent surfaces, if congruence be the basis of spatial measurement ? I will discuss these objections successively. 150. (1) How do we measure the equality of solids ? These could only be brought into actual congruence if we had ^ Chapter ii. § 72. THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 155 a fourth dimension to operate in\ and from what I have said before of the absolute necessity of this test, it might seem as though we should be left here in utter ignorance. Euclid is silent on the subject, and in all works on Geometry it is assumed as self-evident that two cubes of equal side are equal. This as- sumption suggests that we are not so badly off as we should have been without congruence, as a test of equality in one or two dimensions ; for now we can at least be sure that two cubes have all their sides and all their faces equal. Two such cubes differ, then, in no sensible spatial quality save position, for volume, in this case at any rate, is not a sensible quality. They are, therefore, as far as such qualities are concerned, indiscernible. If their places were interchanged, we might know the change by their colour, or by some other non-geometrical property ; but so far as any property of which Geometry can take cog- nisance is concerned, everything would seem as before. To suppose a difference of volume, then, would be to ascribe an effect to mere position, which we saw to be inadmissible while discussing Free Mobility. Except as regards position, they are geometrically indiscernible, and we may call to our aid the Identity of Indisccrnibles to establish their agreement in the one remaining geometrical property of volume. This may seem rather a strange principle to use in Mathematics, and for Geometry their equality is, perhaps, best regarded as a defini- tion; but if we demand a philosophical ground for this definition, it is, I believe, only to be found in the Identity of Indisccr- nibles. We can, without error, make our definition of three- dimensional equality rest on two-dimensional congruence. For since direct comparison as to volume is impossible, we are at liberty to define two volumes as equal, when all their various lines, surfaces, angles and solid angles are congruent, since there remains, in such a case, no measarahle difference between the figures composing the two volumes. Of course, as soon as we have established this one case of equality of volumes, the rest of the theory follows ; as appears from the ordinary method of integrating volumes, by dividing them into small cubes. Thus congruence helps to establish three-dimensional equality, 1 Contrast Delboeuf, L'ancieune et les nouvelles geometries, ii. liev. Phil. 1894, Vol. xxxvii. p. 354. 156 FOUNDATIONS OF i;b:OMETRY. though it cannot . directly prove such e({uality ; and the same philosophical principle, of the homogeneity of space, by which congruence was proved, conies to our rescue here. But how about right-handed and left-handed screws ? Here we can no longer apply the Identity of Indiscernibles, for the two are very well discernible. But as with solids, so here, Free Mobility can help us much. It can enable us, by ordinary measurement, to show that the internal relations of both screws are the same, and that the difference lies only in their relation to other things in space. Knowing these internal relations, we can calculate, by the Geometry which Free Mobility has rendered possible, all the geometrical properties of these screws — radius, pitch, etc. — and can show them to be severally equal in both. But this is all we require. Mediate comparison is possible, though immediate comparison is not. Both can, for instance, be compared with the cylinder on which both would fit, and thus their equality can be proved. A precisely similar proof holds, of course, for the other cases, right and left hands, spherical triangles, etc. On the whole, these cases confirm my argument; for they show, as Kant intended them to show\ the essential relativity of space. 151. (2) As regards time, no congruence is here con- ceivable, for to effect congruence requires always — as we saw in the case of solids — one more dimension than belongs to the magnitudes compared. No day can be brought into temporal coincidence with any other day, to show that the two exactly cover each other; we are therefore reduced to the arbitrary assumption that some motion or set of motions, given us in ex- perience, is uniform. Fortunately, we have a large set of mo- tions which all roughly agree ; the swing of the pendulum, the rotation and revolution of the earth and the planets, etc. These do not exactly agree, but they lead us to the laws of motion, by which we are able, on our arbitrary hypothesis, to estimate their small departures from uniformity ; just as the assumption of Free Mobility enabled us to measure the departures of actual 1 Prolegomena, § 13. See Vaihinger's Commentar, ii. pp. 518 — 532 esp. pp. 521 — 2. The above was Kant's whole purpose in 1768, but only part of his purpose in the Prolegomena, where the intuitive nature of space was also to be pi'oved. THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 1 57 bodies from rigidity. But here, as there, another possibility is mathematically open to us, and can only be excluded by its philosophic absurdity ; Ave might have assumed that the above set of approximately agreeing motions all had velocities which varied approximately as some arbitrarily assumed function of the time, /(f) say, measured from some arbitrary origin. Such an assumption would still keep them as nearly synchronous as before, and would give an equally possible, though more com- plex, system of Mechanics ; instead of the first law of motion, we should have the following: A particle perseveres in its state of rest, or of rectilinear motion with velocity varying as f{t), except in so far as it is compelled to alter that state by the action of exteraal forces. Such a hvpothesis is mathe- matically possible, but, like the similar one for space, it is excluded logically by the comparative nature of the judgment of quantity, and philosophically by the fact that it involves absolute time, as a determining agent in change, whereas time can never, philosophically, be anything but a passive form, abstracted from change. I have introduced this parallel from time, not as directly bearing on the argument, but as a simpler case which may serve to illustrate my retisoning in the more complex case of space. For since time, in mathematics, is one- dimensional, the mathematical difficulties are simpler than in Geometry; and although nothing accurately corresponds to congruence, there is a very similar mixture of mathematical and philosophical necessity, giving, finally, a thoroughly definite axiom as the basis of time-measurement, corresponding to congruence as the basis of space-measurements 152. (3) The case of time-measurement suggests the third of the above objections to the absolute necessity of the axiom of Free Mobility. Psycho-physics has shown that we have an approximate power, by means of what may be called the sense of duration, of immediately estimating equal short times. This establishes a rough measure independent of any assumed uniform motion, and in space also, it may be said, we have a similar power of immediate comparison. We can see, by im- 1 On the subject of time measurement, cf. Bosanquet's Logic, VoL i. pp. 178—183. Since time, in the above account, is measured by motion, its measurement presupposes that of spatial magnitudes. 158 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. mediate inspection, that the sub-divisions on a foot rule are not grossly inaccurate ; and so, it may be said, we both have a measure independent of congruence, and also could discover, by experience, any gross departure from Free Mobility. Against this view, however, there is at the outset a very fundamental psychological objection. It has been urged that all our com- parison of spatial magnitudes proceeds by ideal superposition. Thus James says (Psychology, Vol. II. p. 152): "Even where we only feel one sub-division to be vaguely larger or less, the mind must pass rapidly between it and the other sub-division, and receive the immediate sensible shock of the more," and " so far as the sub-divisions of a sense-space are to be rneasured exactly against each other, objective forms occupying one subdivison must be directly or indirectly superposed upon the other*." Even if we waive this fundamental objection, however, others remain. To begin with, such judgments of equality are only very rough approximations, and cannot be applied to lines of more than a certain length, if only for the reason that such lines cannot well be seen together. Thus this method can only give us any security in our own immediate neighbourhood, and could in no wise warrant such operations as would be required for the construction of maps &c., much less the mea- surement of astronomical distances. They might just enable us to say that some lines were longer than others, but they would leave Geometry in a position no better than that of the Hedonical Calculus, in which we depend on a purely subjective measure. So inaccurate, in fact, is such a method acknow- ledged to be, that the foot-rule is as much a need of daily life as of science. Besides, no one would trust such immediate judgments, but for the fact that the stricter test of congruence to some extent confirms them ; if we could not apply this test, we should have no ground for trusting them even as much as we do. Thus we should have, here, no real escape from our absolute dependence upon the axiom of Free Mobility. 153. (4) One last elucidatory remark is necessary before our proof of this axiom can be considered complete. We spoke above of the Geometry on an egg, where Free Mobility does not hold. What, I may be asked, is there about a thoroughly non- 1 Cf. Stumpf. Ursprung der Baumvorstellung, p. 68. THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 159 congi'uent Geometry, more impossible than this Geometry on the egg ? The answer is obvious. The Geometry of non- congruent surfaces is only possible by the use of infinitesimals, and in the infinitesimal all surfaces become plane. The funda- mental formula, that for the length of an infinitesimal arc, is only obtained on the assumption that such an arc may be treated as a straight line, and that Euclidean Plane Geometry may be applied in the immediate neighbourhood of any point. If we had not our Euclidean measure, which could be moved without distortion, we should have no method of comparing small arcs in different places, and the Geometry of non-congruent surfaces would break down. Thus the axiom of Free Mobility, as regards three-dimensional space, is necessarily implied and presupposed in the Geometry of non-congruent surfaces ; the possibility of the latter, therefore, is a dependent and derivative possibility, and can form no argument against the a prion necessity of congruence as the test of equality. 154. It is to be observed that the axiom of Free Mobility, as I have enunciated it, includes also the axiom to which Helmholtz gives the name of Monodromy. This asserts that a body does not alter its dimensions in consequence of a complete revolution through four right angles, but occupies at the end the same position as at the beginning. The sup- posed mathematical necessity of making a separate axiom of this property of space has been disproved by Sophus Lie (v. Chap. I. § 45); philosophically, it is plainly a particular case of Free Mobility ^ and indeed a particularly obvious case, for a translation really does make some change in a body, namely, a change in position, but a rotation through four right angles may be supposed to have been performed any number of times without appearing in the result, and the absurdity of ascribing to space the power of making bodies grow in the process is palpable ; everything that was said above on congruence in general applies with even greater evidence to this special case. 155. The axiom of Free Mobility involves, if it is to be true, the homogeneity of space, or the complete relativity of ' As is Helmholtz's othei* axiom, that the possibility of superposition is independent of the course pursued in bringing it about. IGO FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY, position. For if any shape, which is possible in one part of space, be always possible in another, it follows that all parts of space are qualitatively similar, and cannot, therefore, be distinguished by any intrinsic property. Hence positions in space, if our axiom be true, must be wholly defined by external relations, i.e. Position is not an intrinsic, hut a purely relative, proj)erty of things in space. If there could be such a thing as absolute position, in short, metrical Geometry would be impossible. This relativity of position is the fundamental pos- tulate of all Geometry, to which each of the necessary metrical axioms leads, and from which, conversely, each of these axioms can be deduced. 156. This converse deduction, as regards Free Mobility, is not very difficult, and follows from the argument of Section A^ which I will briefly recapitulate. In the first place, externality is an essentially relative conception — nothing can be external to itself. To be external to something is to be an other with some relation to that thing. Hence, when we abstract a form of externality from all material content, and study it in iso- lation, position will appear of necessity as purely relative — it can have no intrinsic quality, for our form consists of pure externality, and externality contains no shadow or trace of an intrinsic quality. Hence we derive our fundamental pos- tulate, the relativity of position. From this follows the homo- geneity of our form, for any quality in one position, which marked out that position from another, would be necessarily more or less intrinsic, and would contradict the pure relativity. Finally Free Mobility follows from homogeneity, for our form would not be homogeneous unless it allowed, in every part, shapes or systems of relations, which it allowed in any other part. Free Mobility, therefore, is a necessary property of every possible form of externality. 157. In summing up the argument we have just con- cluded, we may exhibit it, in consequence of the two preceding paragraphs, in the form of a completed circle. Starting from the conditions of spatial measurement, we found that the com- parison, required for measurement, could only be effected by superposition. But we found, further, that the result of such ' Cf. §§ 129, 130. THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 161 comparison will only be unambiguous, if spatial magnitudes and shapes are unaltered by motion in space, if, in other words, shapes do not depend upon absolute position in space. But this axiom can only be true if space is homogeneous and position merely relative. Conversely, if position is assumed to be merely relative, a change of magnitude in motion — involving as it does, the assertion of absolute position— is impossible, and our test of spatial equality is therefore ade- quate. But position in any form of externality must be purely relative, since externality cannot be an intrinsic property of anything. Our axiom, therefore, is d priori in a double sense. It is presupposed in all spatial measurement, and it is a necessary property of any form of externality. A similar double apriority, we shall see, appears in our other necessary axioms. II. The Axiom of Dimensions^. 158. We have seen, in discussing the axiom of Free Mo- bility, that all position is relative, that is, a position exists only by virtue of relations^ It follows that, if positions can be defined at all, they must bo uniquely and exhaustively defined by some finite number of such relations. If Geometry is to be possible, it must happen that, after enough relations have been given to determine a point uniquely, its relations to any fresh known point are deducible from the relations already given. Hence we obtain, as an d priori condition of Geometry, logically indispensable to its existence, the axiom that Space must have a finite integral number of Dimensions. For every relation required in the definition of a point con- stitutes a dimension, and a fraction of a relation is meaningless. The number of relations required must be finite, since an infinite number of dimensions would be practically impossible to determine. If we remember our axiom of Free Mobility, J This deduction is practically the same as that in Sec. A, but I have stated it here with more special reference to space and to metrical Geometry. 2 The question: "Relations to what?" is a question involving many difficulties. It will be touched on later in this chapter, and answered, as far as possible, in the fourth chapter. For the present, in spite of the glaring circle involved, I shall take the relations as relations to other positions. li 162 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. and remember also that space is a continuum, we may state our axiom, for metrical Geometry, in the form given by Helm- holtz (v. Chap. I. § 25) : "In a space of n dimensions, the position of every point is uniquely determined by the measure- ment of n continuous independent variables (coordinates).'" 159. So much, then, is d priori necessary to metrical Geometry. The restriction of the dimensions to three seems, on the contrary, to be wholly the work of experienced This restriction cannot be logically necessary, for as soon as we have formulated any analytical system, it appears wholly arbitrary. Why, we are driven to ask, cannot we add a fourth coordinate to our cp, y, z, or give a geometrical meaning to of ? In this more special form, we are tempted to regard the axiom of dimensions, like the number of inhabitants of a town, as a purely statistical fact, with no greater necessity than such facts have. Geometry affords intrinsic evidence of the truth of my division of the axiom of dimensions into an a priori and empirical portion. For while the extension of the number of dimensions to four, or to n, alters nothing in plane and solid Geometry, but only adds a new branch which interferes in no way with the old, some definite number of dimensions is assumed in all Geometries, nor is it possible to conceive of a Geometry which should be free from this assumption^. 160. Let us, since the point seems of some interest, repeat our proof of the apriority of this axiom from a slightly different point of view. We will begin, this time, from the most ab- stract conception of space, such as we find in Riemann's disser- tation, or in Erdmann's extents. We have here, an ordered manifold, infinitely divisible and allowing of Free Mobility*. Free Mobility involves, as we saw, the power of passing con- tinuously from any one point to any other, by any course which may seem pleasant to us ; it involves, also, that, in such a 1 Wiss. Abh. Vol. ii. p. 614. 2 Cp. Grassmann, Ausdehnungslehre von 1844, 2nd ed. p. xxiii. 3 Delboeuf, it is true, speaks of Geometries with mjn dimensions, but gives no reference (Rev. Phil. T. xxxvi. p. 450). * In criticizing Erdmann, it will be remembered, we saw that Free Mobility is a necessary property of his extents, though he does not regard it as such. THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 163 course, no changes occur except changes of mere position, i.e., positions do not differ from one another in any qualitative way. (This absence of qualitative difference is the distinguish- ing mark of space as opposed to other manifolds, such as the colour- and tone-systems : in these, every element has a definite qualitative sensational value, whereas in space, the sensational value of a position depends wholly on its spatial relation to our own body, and is thus not intrinsic, but relative.) From the absence of (|ualitative differences among positions, it follows logically that positions exist only by virtue of other positions ; one position differs from another just because they are two, not because of anything intrinsic in either. Position is thus defined simply and solely by relation to other positions. Any position, therefore, is completely defined when, and only when, enough such relations have been given to enable us to de- termine its relation to any new position, this new position being defined by the same number of relations. Now, in order that such definition may be at all possible, a finite number of relations must suffice. But every such relation constitutes a dimension. Therefore, if Geometry is to be possible, it is h j)riori necessary that space should have a finite integral number of dimensions. 161. The limitation of the dimensions to three is, as we have seen, empirical ; nevertheless, it is not liable to the in- accuracy and uncertainty which usually belong to empirical knowledge. For the alternatives which logic leaves to sense are discrete — if the dimensions are not three, they must be two or four or some other number — so that small errors are out of the question \ Hence the final certainty of the axiom of three dimensions, though in part due to experience, is of quite a different order from that of (say) the law of Gravitation. In the latter, a small inaccuracy might exist and remain un- detected ; in the former, an error would have to be so consider- able as to be utterly impossible to overlook. It follows that the certainty of our whole axiom, that the number of dimensions is three, is almost as great as that of the a priori element, 1 Cf. Eiemann, Hypothesen welche der Geometric zu Grunde liegen, Gesammelte Werke, p. 266; also Erdmann, op. cit. p. 154. 11—2 1G4 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. since this element leaves to sense a definite disjnnction of discrete possibilities. III. Tlie Axiom of Distance. 162. We have already seen, in discussing projective Geo- metry, that two points must determine a unique curve, the straight line. In metrical Geometry, the corresponding axiom is, that two points must determine a unique spatial quantity, dis- tance. I propose to prove, in what follows, (1) that if distance, as a quantity completely determined by two points, did not exist, spatial magnitude would not be measurable ; (2) that distance can only be determined by two points, if there is an actual curve in space determined by those two points ; (3) that the existence of such a curve can be deduced from the conception of a form of externality, and (4) that the application of quantity to such a curve necessarily leads to a certain magnitude, namely distance, uniquely determined by any two points which de- termine the curve. The conclusion will be, if these propositions can be successfully maintained, that the axiom of distance is a priori in the same double sense as the axiom of Free Mobility, i.e. it is presupposed in the possibility of measurement, and it is necessarily true of any possible form of externality. 163. (1) The possibility of spatial measurement allows us to infer the existence of a magnitude uniquely determined by any two points. The proof of- this depends on the axiom of Free Mobility, or its equivalent, the homogeneity of space. We have seen that these are involved in the possibility of spatial measurement ; we may employ them, therefore, in any argument as to the conditions of this possibility. Now to begin with, two points must, if Geometry is to be possible, have some relation to each other, for we have seen that such relations alone constitute position or localization. But if two points have a relation to each other, this must be an intrinsic relation. For it follows, from the axiom of Free Mobility, that two points, forming a figure congruent with the given pair, can be constructed in any part of space. If this were not possible, we have seen that metrical Geometry could not exist. But both the figures may be regarded as THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 165 composed of two points and their relation ; if the two figures are congruent, therefore, it follows that the relation is quan- titatively the same for both figures, since congruence is the test of spatial equality. Hence the two points have a quanti- tative relation, which is such that they can traverse all space in a combined motion without in any way altering that re- lation. But in such a general motion, any external relation of the two points, any relation involving other points or figures in space, must be altered \ Hence the relation between the two points, being unaltered, must be an intrinsic relation, a relation involving no other point or figure in space ; and this intrinsic relation we call distance-. 164. It might be objected, to the above argument, that it involves a petitio principii. For it has been assumed that the two points and their relation form a figure, to which other figures can be congruent. Now if two points have no intrinsic relation, it would seem that they cannot form such a figure. The argument, therefore, apparently assumes what it had to prove. Why, it may be asked, should not three points be required, before we obtain any relation, which Free Mobility allows us to construct afresh in other parts of space ? The answer to this, as to the corresponding question in the first section of this chapter, lies, I think, in the passivity of space, or the mutual independence of its parts. For it follows, from this independence, that any figure, or any assemblage of points, may be discussed without reference to other figures or points. This principle is the basis of infinite divisibility, of 1 This is subject, in spherical space, to the modification pointed out below, in dealing with the exception to the axiom of the straight line. See §§ 168—171. 2 In speaking of distance at once as a quantity and as an intrinsic relation, I am anxious to guard against an apparent inconsistency. I have spoken of the judgment of quantity, throughout, as one of comparison ; how, then, can a quantity be intrinsic ? The reply is that, although measurement and the judgment of quantity express the result of comparison, yet the terms compared must exist before the comparison ; in this case, the terms compared in measuring distances, i.e. in comparing them inter se, are intrinsic relations between points. Thus, although the measurement of distance involves a reference to other distances, and its expression as a magnitude requires such a reference, yet its existence does not depend on any external reference, but exclusively on the two points whose distance it is. 166 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. the use of quantity in Geometry, and of all possibility of isolating particular figures for discussion. It follows that two points cannot be dependent, as to their relation, on any other points or figures, for if they were so dependent, we should have to suppose some action of such points or figures on the two points considered, which would contradict the mutual inde- pendence of different positions. To illustrate by an example : the relation of two given points does not depend on the other points of the straight line on which the given points lie. For only through their relation, i.e. through the straight line which they determine, can the other points of the straight line be known to have any peculiar connection with the given pair. 165. But why, it may be asked, should there be only one such relation between two points ? Why not several ? The answer to this lies in the fact that points are wholly constituted by relations, and have no intrinsic nature of their own \ A point is defined by its relations to other points, and when once the relations necessary for definition have been given, no fresh relations to the points used in definition are possible, since the point defined has no qualities from which such relations could flow. Now one relation to any one other point is as good for definition as more would be, since however many we had, they would all remain unaltered in a combined motion of both points. Hence there can only be one relation determined by any two points. 166. (2) We have thus established our first proposition — two points have one and only one relation uniquely determined by those two points. This relation we call their distance apart. It remains to consider the conditions of the measure- ment of distance, i.e., how far a unique value for distance in- volves a curve uniquely determined by the two points. In the first place, some curve joining the two points is involved in the above notion of a combined motion of the two points, or of two other points forming a figure congruent with the first two. For without some such curve, the two point-pairs cannot be known as congruent, nor can we have any test by which to discover when a point-pair is moving as a single ^ See the end of the argument on Free MobiHty, § 155 if. THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 167 figure \ Distance must be measured, therefore, by some line which joins the two points. But need this be a line which the two points completely determine ? 167. We are accustomed to the definition of the straight line as the shortest distance between two points, which implies that distance might equally well be measured by curved lines. This implication I believe to be false, for the following reasons. When we speak of the length of a curve, we can give a meaning to our words only by supposing the curve divided into infinites- imal rectilinear arcs, whose sum gives the length of an equiva- lent straight line ; thus unless we presuppose the straight line, we have no means of comparing the lengths of different curves, and can therefore never discover the applicability of our defini- tion. It might be thought, perhaps, that some other line, say a circle, might be used as the basis of measurement. But in order to estimate in this way the length of any curve other than a circle, we should have to divide the curve into in- finitesimal circular arcs. Now two successive points do not determine a circle, so that an arc of two points would have an indeterminate length. It is true that, if we exclude infinitesi- mal radii for the measuring circles, the lengths of the in- finitesimal arcs would be determinate, even if the circles varied, but that is only because all the small circular arcs through two consecutive points coincide with the straight line through those two points. Thus, even with the help of the arbitrary restriction to a finite radius, all that happens is that we are brought back to the straight line. If, to mend matters, we take three consecutive points of our curve, and reckon distance by the arc of the cii'cle of curvature, the notion of distance loses its fundamental property of being a relation be- tween two points. For two consecutive points of the arc could ' In Frischauf's " Absolute Georaetrie uach Joliann Bolj'ai," Anhang, there is a series of definitions, starting from the sphere, as the locus of congruent point-pairs when one point of the pair is fixed, and hence obtaining the circle and the straight line. From the above it follows, that the sphere so defined already involves a curve between the points of the point-pair, by which various point-pau-s can be known as congruent ; and it will appear, as we proceed, that this curve must be a straight line. Frischauf's definition by means of the sphere involves, therefore, a xacious circle, since the sphere presupposes the straight line, as the test of congruent point-pairs. 168 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. not then be said to have any corresponding distance apart — three points would be necessary before the notion of distance became applicable. Thus the circle is not a possible basis for measurement, and similar objections apply, of course, with increased force, to any other curve. All this argument is designed to show, in detail, the logical impossibility of measur- ing distance by any curve not completely defined by the two points whose distance apart is required. If in the above we had taken distance as measured by circles of given radius, we should have introduced into its definition a relation to other points besides the two whose distance was to be measured, which we saw to be a logical fallacy. Moreover, how are we to know that all the circles have equal radii, until we have an independent measure of distance ? 168. A straight line, then, is not the shortest distance, but is simply the distance between two points — so far, this con- clusion has stood firm. But suppose we had two or more curves through two points, and that all these curves were congruent inter se. We should then say, in accordance with the definition of spatial equality, that the lengths of all these curves were equal. Now it might happen that, although no one of the curves was uniquely determined by the two end- points, yet the common length of all the curves was so deter- mined. In this case, what would hinder us from calling this common length the distance apart, although no unique figure in space corresponded to it ? This is the case contemplated by spherical Geometry, where, as on a sphere, antipodes can be joined by an infinite number of geodesies, all of which are of equal length. The difficulty supposed is, therefore, not a purely imaginary one, but one which modern Geometry forces us to face. I shall consequently discuss it at some length. 169. To begin with, I must point out that my axiom is not quite equivalent to Euclid's. Euclid's axiom states that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, i.e., cannot have more than one common point. Now if every two points, without exception, determine a unique straight line, it follows, of course, that two different straight lines can have only one point in common — so far, the two axioms are equivalent. But it may happen, as in spherical space, that two points in general THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 169 determine a unique straight line, but fail to do so when they have to each other the special relation of being antipodes. In such a system every pair of straight lines in the same plane meet in two points, which are each other's antipodes ; but two points, in general, still determine a unique straight line. We are still able, therefore, to obtain distances from unique straight lines, except in limiting cases ; and in such cases, we can take any point intermediate between the two antipodes, join it by the same straight line to both antipodes, and measure its distance from those antipodes in the usual way. The sum of these distances then gives a unique value for the distance between the antipodes. Thus even in spherical space, we are greatly assisted by the axiom of the straight line ; all linear measurement is effected by it, and exceptional cases can be treated, through its help, by the usual methods for limits. Spherical space, therefore, is not so adverse as it at first appeared to be to the d priori necessity of the axiom. Nevertheless we have, so far, not attacked the kernel of the objection which spherical space suggested. To this attack it is now our duty to proceed. 170. It will be remembered that, in our a priori proof that two points must have one definite relation, we held it impossible for those two points to have, to the rest of space, any relation which would be unaltered by motion. Now in spherical space, in the particular case where the two points are antipodes, they have a relation, unaltered by motion, to the rest of space— the relation, namely, that their distance is half the circumference of the universe. In our former discussion, we assumed that any relation to outside space must be a relation of position — and a relation of position must be altered by motion. But with a finite space, in which we have absolute magnitude, another relation becomes possible, namely, a rela- tion of magnitude. Antipodal points, accordingly, like coinci- dent points, no longer determine a unique straight line. And it is instructive to observe that there is, in consequence, an ambiguity in the expression for distance, like the ordinary ambiguity in angular measurement. If 1/A;^ be the space con- stant, and d be one value for the distance between two points, l-wkn ± d, where n is any integer, is an equally good value. 170 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. Distance is, in short, a periodic function like angle. Thus such a state of things rather confirms than destroys my contention, that distance depends on a curve uniquely determined by two points. For as soon as we drop this unique determination, we see ambiguities creeping into our expression for distance. Distance still has a set of discrete values, corresponding to the fact that, given one point, the straight line is uniquely deter- mined for all other points but one, the antipodal point. It is tempting to go on, and say : If through every pair of points there were an infinite number of the curves used in measuring distance, distance would be able, for the same pair of points, to take, not only a discrete series, but an infinite continuous series of values. 171. This, however, is mere speculation. I come now to the piece de resistance of my argument. The ambiguity in spherical space arose, as we saw, from a relation of magnitude to the rest of space — such a relation being unaltered by a motion of the two points, and therefore falling outside our introductory reasoning. But what is this relation of magni- tude ? Simply a relation of the distance between the two points to a distance given in the nature of the space in question. It follows that such a veXsition presupposes a measure of distance, and need not, therefore, be contemplated in any argument which deals with the a priori requisites for the possibility of definite distances \ 172. I have now shown, I hope conclusively, that spherical space affords no objection to the apriority of my axiom. Any two points have one relation, their distance, which is inde- pendent of the rest of space, and this relation requires, as its measure, a curve uniquely determined by those two points. I might have taken the bull by the horns, and said : Two points can have no relation but what is given by lines which join them, and therefore, if they have a relation independent of the rest of space, there must be one line joining them which they completely determine. Thus James says^: 1 Nor in any argument which, like those of projective Geometry, avoids the notion of magnitude or distance altogether. It follows that the propositions of projective Geometry apply, without reserve, to spherical space, since the exception to the axiom of the straight line arises only on metrical ground. 2 Psychology, Vol. ii. pp. 149—150. THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 171 " Just as, in the field of quantity, the relation between two numbers is another number, so in the field of space the rela- tions are facts of the same order with the facts they relate When we speak of the relation of direction of two points towards each other, we mean simply the sensation of the line that joins the two points together. The line is the relation The relation of position between the top and bottom points of a vertical line is that line, and nothing else." If I had been willing to use this doctrine at the beginning, I might have avoided all discussion. A unique relation between two points must in this case, involve a unique line between them. But it seemed better to avoid a doctrine not universally accepted, the more so as I was approaching the question from the logical, not the psychological, side. After disposing of the objections, however, it is interesting to find this confirmation of the above theoiy from so different a standpoint. Indeed, I believe James's doctrine could be proved to be a logical neces- sity, as well as a psychological fact. For what sort of thing can a spatial relation between two distinct points be ? It must be something spatial, and it must, since points are wholly constituted by their relations, be something at least as real and tangible as the points it relates. There seems nothuig which can satisfy these requirements, except a line joining them. Hence, once more, a unique relation must involve a unique line. That is, linear magnitude is logically impossible, unless space allows of curves uniquely determined by any two of their points. 173. (3) But farther, the existence of curves uniquely determined by two points can be deduced from the nature of any form of externality \ For we saw, in discussing Free Mobility, that this axiom, together \\dth homogeneity and the relativity of position, can be so deduced, and we saw in the beginning of our discussion on distance, that the existence of a unique relation between two points could be deduced from the homogeneity of space. Since position is relative, we may say, any two points must have some relation to each other : since 1 This step in the argument has been put very briefly, since it is a mere repetition of the corresponding argument in Section A, and is inserted here only for the sake of logical completeness. See § 137 ff. 172 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. our form of externality is homogeneous, this relation can be kept unchanged while the two points move in the form, i.e., change their relations to other points ; hence their relation to each other is an intrinsic relation, independent of their rela- tions to other points. But since our form is merely a complex of relations, a relation of externality must appear in the form, with the same evidence as anything else in the form ; thus if the form be intuitive or sensational, the relation must be immediately presented, and not a mere inference. Hence the intrinsic relation between two points must be a unique figure in our form, i.e. in spatial terms, the straight line joining the two points. 174. (4) Finally, we have to prove that the existence of such a curve necessarily leads, when quantity is applied to the relation between two points, to a unique magnitude, which those two points completely determine. With this, we shall be brought back to distance, from which we started, and shall complete the circle of our argument. We saw, in section A § 119, that the figure formed by two points is projectively indistinguishable from that formed by any two other points in the same straight line ; the figure, in both cases, is, from the projective standpoint, simply the straight line on which the two points lie. The difference of relation, in the two cases, is not qualitative, since projective Geometry cannot deal with it ; nevertheless, there is some difference of relation. For instance, if one point be kept fixed, while the other moves, there is obviously some change of relation. This change, since all parts of the straight line are qualitatively alike, must be a change of quantity. If two points, therefore, determine a unique figure, there must exist, for the distinction between the various other points of this figure, a unique quantitative relation between the two determining points, and therefore, since these points are arbitrary, between only two points. This relation is distance, with which our argument began, and to which it at least returns. 175. To sum up : If points are defined simply by relations to other points, i.e., if all position is relative, every point must have to every other point one, and only one, relation independent of the rest of space. This relation is the distance between the THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 173 two points. Now a relation between two points can only be defined by a line joining them — nay further, it may be con- tended that a relation can only he a line joining them. Hence a unique relation involves a unique line, i.e., a line determined by any two of its points. Only in a space which admits of such a line is linear magnitude a logically possible conception. But when once we have established the possibility, in general, of drawing such lines, and therefore of measuring linear mag- nitudes, we may find that a certain magnitude has a peculiar relation to the constitution of space. The straight line may turn out to be of finite length, and in this case its length will give a certain peculiar magnitude, the space-constant. Tavo antipodal points, that is, points which bisect the entire straight line, will then have a relation of magnitude which, though unaltered by motion, is rendered peculiar by a certain constant relation to the rest of space. This peculiarity pre- supposes a measure of linear magnitude in general, and cannot, therefore, upset the apriority of the axiom of the straight line. But it destroys, for points having the peculiar antipodal rela- tion to each other, the argument which proved that the relation between two points could not, since it was unchanged by motion, have reference to the rest of space. Thus it is intel- ligible that, for such special points, the axiom breaks down, and an infinite number of straight lines are possible between them ; but unless we had started with assuming the general validity of the axiom, we could never have reached a position in which antipodal points could have been known to be peculiar, or, indeed, a position which would have enabled us to give any quantitative definition whatever of particular points. Distance and the straight line, as relations uniquely deter- mined by two points, are thus d priori necessary to metrical Geometry. But further, they are properties which must belong to any form of externality. Since their necessity for Geometry was deduced from homogeneity and the relativity of position, and since these are necessary properties of any form of exter- nality, the same argument proves both conclusions. We thus obtain, as in the case of Free Mobility, a double apriority : The axiom of Distance, and its implication, the axiom of the Straight Line, are, on the one hand, presupposed in the 174 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. jibility of spatial magnitude, and cannot, therefore, be con- tradicted by any experience resulting from the measurement of space ; while they are consequences, on the other hand, of the necessary properties of any form of externality which is to render possible experience of an external world. 176. In connection with the straight line, it will be con- venient to discuss the conditions of a metrical coordinate system. The projective coordinate system, as we have seen, aims only at a convenient nomenclature for different points, and can be set up without introducing the notion of spatial quantity. But a metrical coordinate system does much more than this. It defines every point quantitatively, by its quanti- tative spatial relations to a certain coordinate figure. Only when the system of coordinates is thus metrical, i.e., when every coordinate represents some spatial magnitude, which is itself a relation of the point defined to some other point or figure — can operations with coordinates lead to a metrical result. When, as in projective Geometry, the coordinates are not spatial magnitudes, no amount of transformation can give a metrical result. I wish to prove, here, that a metrical coordi- nate system necessarily involves the straight line, and cannot, without a logical fallacy, be set up on any other basis. The projective system of coordinates, as we saw, is entirely based on the straight line ; but the metrical system is more important, since its quantities embody actual information as to spatial magnitudes, which, in projective Geometry, is not the case. In the first place, a point's metrical coordinates constitute a complete quantitative definition of it ; now a point can only be defined, as we have seen, by its relations to other points, and these relations can only be defined by means of the straight line. Consequently, any metrical system of coordinates must involve the straight line, as the basis of its definitions of points. This (I priori argument, however, though I believe it to be quite sound, is not likely to carry conviction to any one per- suaded of the opposite. Let us, therefore, examine metrical coordinate systems in detail, and show, in each case, their dependence on the straight line. We have already seen that the notion of distance is im- possible without the straight line. We cannot, therefore, define THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 175 our coordinates in any of the ordinary ways, as the distances from three planes, lines, points, spheres, or what not. Polar coordinates are impossible, since, — waiving the straightness of the radius vector — the length of the radius vector becomes unmeaning. Triangular coordinates involve not only angles, which must in the limit be rectilinear, but straight lines, or at any rate some well-defined curves. Now curves can only be metrically defined in two ways : Either by relation to the straight line, as, e.g., by the curvature at any point, or by purely analytical equations, which presuppose an intelligible system of metrical coordinates. What methods remain for assigning these arbitrary values to different points ? Nay, how are we to get any estimate of the difference— to avoid the more special notion of distance — between two points ? The very notion of a point has become illusory. When we have a coordinate system, we may define a point by its three coordinates ; in the absence of such a system, we may define the notion of point in general as the intersection of three sur- faces or of two curves. Here we take surfaces and curves as notions which intuition makes plain, but if we wish them to give us a precise numerical definition of particular points, we must specify the kind of surface or curve to be used. Now this, as we have seen, is only possible when we presuppose either the straight line, or a coordinate system. It follows that every coordinate system presupposes the straight line, and is logically impossible without it. 177. The above three axioms, we have seen, are a priori necessary to metrical Geometry. No others can be necessary, since metrical systems, logically as unassailable as Euclid's, and dealing with spaces equally homogeneous and equally re- lational, have been constructed by the metageometers, without the help of any other axioms. The remaining axioms of Eu- clidean Geometry — the axiom of parallels, the axiom that the number of dimensions is three, and Euclid's form of the axiom of the straight line (two straight lines cannot enclose a space) — are not essential to the possibility of metrical Geometry, i.e., are not deducible from the fact that a science of spatial magnitudes is possible. They are rather to be regarded as empirical laws, obtained, like the empirical laws of other 176 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. sciences, by actual investigation of the given subject-matter — in this instance, experienced space. 178. In summing up the distinctive argument of this Section, we may give it a more general form, and discuss the conditions of measurement in any continuous manifold, i.e., the qualities necessary to the manifold, in order that quantities in it may be determinable, not only as to the more or less, but as to the precise hoiu much. Measurement, we may say, is the application of number to continua, or, if we prefer it, the transformation of mere quantity into number of units. Using quantity to denote the vague more or less, and magnitude to denote the precise number of units, the problem of measurement may be defined as the transformation of quantity into magnitude. Now a number, to begin with, is a whole consisting of smaller units, all of these units being qualitatively alike. In order, therefore, that a continuous quantity may be ex- pressible as a number, it must, on the one hand, be itself a whole, and must, on the other hand, be divisible into qualitatively similar parts. In the aspect of a whole, the quantity is intensive; in the aspect of an aggregate of parts, it is extensive. A purely intensive quantity, therefore, is not numerable — a purely extensive quantity, if any such could be imagined, would not be a single quantity at all, since it would have to consist of wholly unsynthesized particulars. A mea- surable quantity, therefore, is a whole divisible into similar parts. But a continuous quantity, if divisible at all, must be infinitely divisible. For otherwise the points at which it could be divided would form natural barriers, and so destroy its continuity. But further, it is not sufficient that there should be a possibility of division into mutually external parts ; while the parts, to be perceptible as parts, must be mutually ex- ternal, they must also, to be knowable as equal parts, be capable of overcoming their mutual externality. For this, as we have seen, we require superposition, which involves Free Mobility and homogeneity — the absence of Free Mobility in time, where all other requisites of measurement are fulfilled, renders direct measurement of time impossible. Hence infinite divisibility, free mobility, and homogeneity are necessary for THE AXIOMS OF METRICAL GEOMETRY. 177 the possibility of measurement in any continuous manifold, and these, as we have seen, are equivalent to our three axioms. These axioms are necessary, therefore, not only for spatial measurement, but for all measurement. The onl)'' manifold given in experience, in which these conditions are satisfied, is space. All other exact measurement — as could be proved, I believe, for every separate case — is effected, as we saw in the case of time, by reduction to a spatial correlative. This ex- plains the paramount importance, to exact science, of the mechanical view of nature, which reduces all phenomena to motions in time and space. For number is, of all conceptions, the easiest to operate with, and science seeks everywhere for an opportunity to apply it, but finds this opportunity only by means of spatial equivalents to phenomenal 179. We have now seen in what the a priori element of Geometry consists. This a priori element may be defined as the axioms common to Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces, as the axioms deducible from the conception of a form of externality, or — in metrical Geometry — as the axioms required for the possibility of measurement. It remains to discuss, in a final chapter, some questions of a more general philos(tphic nature, in which we shall have to desert the firm ground of mathematics and enter on speculations which I put forward very tentatively, and with little faith in their ultimate validity. The chief questions for this final chapter will be two : (1) How is such d priori and purely logical necessity possible, as applied to an actually given subject-matter like space ? (2) How can we remove the contradictions which have haunted us in this chapter, arising out of the relativity, infinite divisibility, and unbounded extension of space ? These two questions are forced upon us by the present chapter, but as they open some of the fundamental problems of philosophy, it would be rash to expect a conclusive or wholly satisfactory answer. A few hints and suggestions may be hoped for, but a complete solution could only be obtained from a complete philosophy, of which the prospects are far too slender to encourage a confident frame of mind. ^ Cf. Hannequin, Essai critique sur I'hypothese des atomes, Paris, 1895, passim. R. G. 12 CHAPTER IV. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 180. In the present chapter, we have to discuss two ques- tions which, though scarcely geometrical, are of fundamental importance to the theory of Geometry propounded above. The first of these questions is this : What relation can a purely logical and deductive proof, like that from the nature of a form of externality, bear to an experienced subject-matter such as space ? You have merely framed a general conception, I may be told, containing space as a particular species, and you have then shown, what should have been obvious from the beginning, that this general conception contained some of the attributes of space. But what ground does this give for regarding these attributes as d priori ? The conception Mammal has some of the attributes of a horse ; but are these attributes therefore d priori adjectives of the horse ? The answer to this obvious objection is so difficult, and involves so much general philo- sophy, that I have kept it for a final chapter, in order not to interrupt the argument on specially geometrical topics. 181. I have already indicated, in general terms, the ground for regarding as d priori the properties of any form of ex- ternality. This ground is transcendental, i.e. it is to be found in the conditions required for the possibility of experience. The form of externality, like Riemann's manifolds, is a general class- conception, including time as well as Euclidean and non- Euclidean spaces. It is not motived, however, like the manifolds, by a quantitative resemblance to space, but by the fact that it fulfils, if it has more than one dimension, all those functions which, in our actual world, are fulfilled by space. But a form PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 179 of externality, in order to accomplish this, must be, not a mere conception, but an actually experienced intuition. Hence the conception of such a form is the general conception, containing under it every logically possible intuition which can fulfil the function actually fulfilled by space. And this function is, to render possible experience of diverse but interrelated things. Some form in sense-perception, then, whose conception is included under our form of externality, is d priori necessaiy to experience of diversity in relation, and without experience of this, we should, as modern logic shows, have no experience at all. This still leaves untouched the relation of the d prion to the subjective : the form of externality is necessary to experience, but is not, on that account, to be declared purely subjective. Of course, necessity for experience can only arise from the nature of the mind which experiences ; but it does not follow that the necessary conditions could be fulfilled, unless the objective world had certain properties. The ground of necessity, we may safely say, arises from the mind ; but it by no means follows that the truth of what is necessary depends only on the con- stitution of the mind. Where this is not the case, our conclu- sion, when a piece of knowledge has been declared d pnori, can only be : Owing to the constitution of the mind, experience will be impossible unless the world accepts certain adjectives. Such, in outline, will be the argument of the first half of this chapter, and such will be the justification for regarding as d priori those axioms of Geometry, which were deduced above from the conception of a form of externality. For these axioms, and these only, are necessarily true of any world in which experience is possible. 182 \ The view suggested has, obviously, much in common with that of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Indeed the whole of it, I believe, can be obtained by a certain limitation and interpretation of Kant's classic arguments. But as it differs, in many important points, from the conclusions aimed at by Kant, and as the agreement may easily seem greater than it is, I will begin by a brief comparison, and endeavour, by reference 1 Compare, with the following paragraphs, the admirable discussion in Mr Hobhouse's Theory of Knowledge (Methueu 1H96), Part i. Chapter ii. 12—2 180 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. to authoritative criticisms, to establish the legitimacy of my divergence from him. 183. In the first place, the psychological element is much larger in Kant's thesis than in mine. I shall contend, it is true, that a form of externality, if it is to do its work, must not be a mere conception or a mere inference, but must be a given element in sense-perception — not, of course, originally given in isolation, but discoverable, through analysis, by attention to the object of sense-perception \ But Kant contended, not only that this element is given, but also that it is subjective. Space, for him, is, on the one hand, not conceptual, but on the other hand, not sensational. It forms, for him, no part of the data of sense, but is added by a subjective intuition, which he regards as not only logically, but psychologically, prior to objects in space ^ This part of Kant's argument is wholly irrelevant for us. Whether a form of externality be given in sense, or in a pure intuition, is for us unimportant, since we neglect the question as to the connection of the a 'priori and the subjective ; while the temporal priority of space to objects in it has been gene- rally recognized as irrelevant to Epistemology, and has often been regarded as forming no part of Kant's thesis ^. If we call intuitional whatever is given in sense-perception, then we may contend that a form of externality must be intuitional; but whether it is a pure intuition, in Kant's sense, or not, is irrelevant to us, as is its priority to the objects in it. That the non-sensational nature of space is no essential part of Kant's logical teaching, appears from an examination of his argument. He has made, in the introduction, the purely logical distinction of matter and form, but has given to this distinction, in the very moment of suggesting it, a psycho- logical implication. This he does by the assertion that the form, in which the matter of sensations is ordered, cannot itself be sensational. From this assumption it follows, of course, that space cannot be sensational. But the assumption is 1 I speak of sense-perception instead of sensation, so as not to prejudge the issue as to the sensational nature of space, ■■' See Vaihinger's Commentar, ii. pp. 86 — 7, 168—171. 3 See Caird, Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. i. p. 287. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 181 totally unsupported by argument, being set forth, apparently, as a self-evident axiom ; it has been severely criticized by Stumpf^ and others ^ and has been described by Vaihinger as a fatal petitio j^rincipii^; it is irrelevant to the logical argument, when this argument is separated, as we have separated it, from all connection with psychological subjectivity ; and finally, it leaves us a prey to psychological theories of space, which have seemed, of late, but httle favourable to the pure Kantian doctrine. 184. We have a right, therefore, in an epistemological inquiry, to neglect Kant's psychological teaching — in so far, at any rate, as it distinguishes spatial intuition from sensation — and attend rather to the logical aspect alone. That part of his psychological teaching, which maintains that space is not a mere conception, is, with certain limitations, sufficiently evident as applied to actual space ; but for us, it must be transformed into a much more difficult thesis, namely, that 7io form of externality, which renders experience of diversity in relation possible, can be merely conceptual. This question, to which we must return later, is no longer psychological, but belongs wholly to Epistemology. 185. What, then, remains the kernel, for our purposes, of Kant's first argument for the apriority of space ? His argu- ment, in the form in which he gave it, is concerned with the eccentric projection of sensations. In order that I may refer sensations, he says, to something outside myself, I must already have the subjective space-form in the mind. In this shape, as Vaihinger points out (Commentar, ii. pp. 69, 165), the argu- ment rests on a petitio principii, for only if sensations are necessarily non-spatial does their projection demand a subjec- tive space-form. But, further, is the logical apriority of space concerned with the externality of things to ourselves ? Space seems to perform two functions : on the one hand, it reveals things, by the eccentric projection of sensations, as external to the self, while, on the other hand, it reveals simultaneously presented things as mutually external. These 1 Ursprung der Kaumvorstellung, pp. 12—30. - See the references in Vaihinger's Commentar, ii. p. 76 ff. 3 Commentar, ii. p. 71 ff. 182 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. two functions, though often treated as coordinate and almost equivalent^ seem to me widely different. Before we discuss the apriority of space, we must carefully distinguish, I think, between these two functions, and decide which of them we are to argue about. Now externality to the Self, it would seem, must necessarily raise the whole question of the nature and limits of the Ego, and what is more, it cannot be derived from spatial presentation, unless we give the Self a definite position in space. But things acquire a position in space only when they can appear in sense- perception; we are forced, therefore, if we adopt this view of the function of space, to regard the Self as a phenomenon presented to sense-perception. But this reduces externality to the Self to externality to the body. The body, however, is a presented object like any other, and externality of objects to it is, therefore, a special case of the mutual exteruality of presented things. Hence we cannot regard space as giving, primarily at any rate, externality to the Self, but only the mutual externality of the things presented to sense-perceJ)tion^ 186. This, then, is the kind of externality we are to expect from space, and our question must be : Would the existence of diverse but interrelated things be unknowable, if there were not, in sense-perception, some form of externality ? This is the crucial question, on which turns the apriority of our form, and hence of the necessary axioms of Geometry. 187. The converse argument to mine, the argument from the spatio-temporal element in perception to a world of inter- related but diverse things, is developed at length in Bradley's Logic. It is put briefly in the following sentence (p. 44, note): " If space and time are continuous, and if all appearance must occupy some time or space — and it is not hard to support both these theses — we can at once proceed to the conclusion, no mere particular exists. Every phenomenon will exist in more times or spaces than one ; and against that diversity will be itself an universal*." The importance of this fact appears, when we 1 E.g. by Caird, op. cit. Vol. i. p. 286. - I have no wish to deny, however, that space is essential in the subsequent distinction of Self and not-Self. ^ See also Book I. Chap ii. passim ; especially p. 51 ff. and pp. 70-1. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 183 consider that, if any mere particular existed, all judgment and inference as to that particular would be impossible, since all judgment and inference necessarily operate by means of uni- versals. But all reality is constructed from the This of immediate presentation, from which judgment and inference necessarily spring. Owing, however, to the continuity and relativity of space and time, no This can be regarded either as simple or as self-subsistent. Every This, on the one hand, can be analyzed into Thises, and on the other hand, is found to be necessarily related to other things, outside the limits of the given object of sense-perception. This function of space and time is pre- supposed in the following statement from Bosanquet's Logic (Vol. L pp. 77 — 78): "Reality is given for me w present sensuous perception, and m the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it. The real world, as a definite organized system, is /or me an extension of this present sensation and self feeling by means of judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension... The subject in every judgment of Perception is some given spot or point in sensuous contact with the percipient self But, as all reality is continuous, the subject is not merehj this given spot or point." 188. This doctrine of Bradley and Bosanquet is the converse of the epistemological doctrine I have to advocate. Owing to the continuity and relativity of space and time, they say, we are able to construct a systematic world, by judgment and inference, out of that fragmentary and yet necessarily complex existence which is given in sense-perception. My contention is, conversely, that since all knowledge is necessarily derived by an extension of the This of sense-perception, and since such extension is only possible if the This has that fragmentary and yet complex character conferred by a form of externality, therefore some form of externality, given with the This, is essential to all knowledge, and is thus logically a priori. Bradley's argument, if sound, already proves this contention ; for while, on the one hand, he uses no properties of space and time but those which belong to every form of externality, he proves, on the other hand, that judgment and inference require the This to be neither single nor self-subsistent. But I will 184 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. endeavour, since the point is of fundamental importance, to reproduce the proof, in a form more suited than Bradley's to the epistemological question. 189. The essence of my contention is that, if experience is to be possible, every sensational This must, when attended to, be found, on the one hand, resolvable into Thises, and on the other hand dependent, for some of its adjectives, on external reference. The second of these theses follows from the first, for if we take one of the Thises contained in the first This, we get a new This necessarily related to the other Thises which make up the original This. I may, therefore, confine myself to the first proposition, which affirms that the object of perception must contain a diversity, not only of conceptual content, but of existence, and that this can only be known if sense-perception contains, as an element, some form of externality. My premiss, in this argument, is that all knowledge involves a recognition of diversity in relation, or, if we prefer it, of identity in difference. This premiss I accept from Logic, as resulting from the analysis of judgment and inference. To prove such a premiss, would require a treatise on Logic ; I must refer the reader, therefore, to the works of Bradley and Bosanquet on the subject. It follows at once, from my premiss, that knowledge would be impossible, unless the object of attention could be complex, i.e. not a mere particular. Now could the mental object — i.e., in this connection, the object of a cognition — be complex, if the object of immediate perception were- always simple ? 190. We might be inclined, at first sight, to answer this question affirmatively. But several difficulties, I think, would prevent such an answer. In the first place, knowledge must start from perception. Hence, either we could have no know- ledge except of our present perception, or else we must be able to contrast and compare it with some other perception. Now in the first case, since the present perception, by hypothesis, is a mere particular, knowledge of it is impossible, according to our premiss. But in the second case, the other perception, with which we compare our first, must have occurred at some other time, and with time, we have at once a form of ex- ternality. But what is more, our present perception is no PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 185 longer a mere particular. For the power of comparing it with another perception involves a point of identity between the two, and thus renders both complex. ]Moreover, time must be continuous, and the present, as Bradley points out, is no mere point of time\ Thus our present perception contains the complexity involved in duration throughout the specious pre- sent : its mere particularity and its simplicity are lost. Its self-subsistence is also lost, for beyond the specious present, lie the past and the future, to which our present perception thus unavoidably refers us. Time at least, therefore, is essential to that identity in difference, which all knowledge postulates. 191. But we have derived, from all this, no ground for affirming a multiplicity of real things, or a form of externality of more than one dimension, which, we saw, was necessary for the truth of two out of our three axioms. This brings us to the question : Have we enough, with time alone as a form of externality, for the possibility of knowledge ? This question we must, I think, answer in the negative. With time alone, we have seen, our presented object must be complex, but its complexity must, if I may use such a phrase, be merely adjectival. Without a second form of externality, only one thing can be given at one moment-, and this one thing, therefore, must constitute the whole of our world. The object of past perception must — since our one thing has nothing external to it, by which it could be created or destroyed — be regarded as the same thing in a different state. The com- plexity, therefore, will lie only in the changing states of our one thing — it will be adjectival, not substantival. Moreover we have the following dilemma: Either the one thing must be ourselves, or else self-consciousness could never arise. But the chief difficulty of such a world would lie in the changes of the thing. What could cause these changes, since we should know of nothing external to our thing ? It would be like a Leibnitzian monad, without any God outside it to prearrange its changes. Causality, in such a world, could not be applied, and change would be wholly inexplicable. 1 Logic, p. 51 ff. 2 For the This, on such a hypothesis, has a purely temporal complexity, and is not resolvable into coexisting Tliises. 186 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. Hence we require also the possibility of a diversity of simultaneously existing things, not merely of successive adjec- tives ; and this, we have seen, cannot be given by time alone, but only by a form of externality for simultaneous parts of one presentation. We could never, in other words, infer the existence of diverse but interrelated things, unless the object of sense-perception could have substantival complexity, and for such complexity we require a form of externality other than time. Such a form, moreover, as was shown in Chapter III., Section A (§ 135), can only fulfil its functions if it has more than one dimension. In our actual world, this form is given by space ; in any world, knowable to beings with our laws of thought, some such form, as we have now seen, must be given in sense-perception. This argument may be briefly summed up, by assuming the doctrine of Bradley, that all knowledge is obtained by inference from the This of sense-perception. For, if this be so, the This — in order that inference, which depends on identity in difference, may be possible at all — must itself be complex, and must, on analysis, reveal adjectives having a reference beyond itself. But this, as was shown above, can only happen by means of a form of externality. This establishes the a priori axioms of Geometry, as necessarily having existential import and validity in any intelligible world. 192. The above argument, I hope, has explained why I hold it possible to deduce, from a mere conception like that of a form of externality, the logical apriority of certain axioms as to experienced space. The Kantian argument — which was correct, if our reasoning has been sound, in asserting that real diversity, in our actual world, could only be known by the help of space — was only mistaken, so far as its purely logical scope extends, in overlooking the possibility of other forms of externality, which could, if they existed, perform the same task with equal efficiency. In so far as space differs, therefore, from these other conceptions of possible intuitional forms, it is a mere experienced fact, while in so far as its properties are those which all such forms must have, it is a priori necessary to the possibility of experience. I cannot hope, however, that no difficulty will remain, fur PHILOSOPHICAL COXSEQUENCES. 187 the reader, in such a deduction, from abstract conceptions, of the properties of an actual datum in sense-perception. Let us consider, for example, such a property as impenetrability. To suppose two things simultaneously in the same position in a form of externality, is a logical contradiction ; but can we say as much of actual space and time ? Is not the impos- sibility, here, a matter of experience rather than of logic ? Not if the above argument has been sound, I reply. For in that case, we infer real diversity, i.e. the existence of different things, only from difference of position in space or time. It follows, that to suppose two things in the same point of space and time, is still a logical contradiction : not because we have constructed the data of sense out of logic, but because logic is dependent, as regards its application, on the nature of these data. This instance illustrates, what I am anxious to make plain, that my argument has not attempted to construct the living wealth of sense-perception out of " bloodless categories," but only to point out that, unless sense-perception contained a certain element, these categories would be powerless to grapple with it. 193. How we are to account for the fortunate realization of these requirements — whether by a pre-established harmony, by Darwinian adaptation to our environment, by the sub- jectivity of the necessary element in sense-percepti.on, or by a fundamental identity and unity between ourselves and the rest of reality — is a further question, belonging rather to metaphj^sics than to our present line of argument. The d priori, we have said throughout, is that which is necessary for the possibility of experience, and in this we have a purely logical criterion, giving results which only Logic and Epi- stemology can prove or disprove. What is subjective in ex- perience, on the contrary, is primarily a question for psychology, and should be decided on psychological grounds alone. When these two questions have been separately answered, but not till then, we may frame theories as to the connection of the d priori and the subjective ; to allow such theories to influence our decision, on either of the two previous questions, is liable, surely, to confuse the issue, and prevent a clear discrimination between fundamentally different points of view. 188 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. 194. I come now to the second question with which this chapter has to deal, the question, namely ; What are we to do with the contradictions which obtruded themselves in Chapter III., whenever we came to a point which seemed fundamental ? I shall treat this question briefly, as I have little to add to answers with which we are all familiar. I have only to prove, first, that the contradictions are inevitable, and therefore form no objection to my argument; secondly, that the first step in removing them is to restore the notion of matter, as that which, in the data of sense-perception, is localized and interrelated in space. 195. The contradictions in space are an ancient theme — as ancient, in fact, as Zeno's refutation of motion. They are, roughly, of two kinds, though the two kinds cannot be sharply divided. There are the contradictions inherent in the notion of the continuum, and the contradictions which spring from the fact that space, while it must, to be knowable, be pure relativity, must also, it would seem, since it is immediately experienced, be something more than mere relations. The first class of contradictions has been encountered more fre- quently in this essay, and is also, I think, the more definite, and the more important for our present purpose. I doubt, however, whether the two classes are really distinct ; for any continuum, I believe, in which the elements are not data, but intellectual constructions resulting from analysis, can be shown to have the same relational and yet not wholly relational cha- racter as belongs to space. The three following contradictions, which I shall discuss successively, seem to me the most prominent in a theory of Geometry. (1) Though the parts of space are intuitively distin- guished, no conception is adequate to differentiate them. Hence arises a vain search for elements, by which the dif- ferentiation could be accomplished, and for a whole, of which the parts of space are to be components. Thus we get the point, or zero extension, as the spatial element, and an infinite regress or a vicious circle in the search for a whole. (2) All positions being relative, positions can only be defined by their relations, i.e. by the straight lines or planes PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 189 through them ; but straight lines and planes, being all quali- tatively similar, can only be defined by the positions they relate. Hence, again, we get a vicious circle. (3) Spatial figures must be regarded as relations. But a relation is necessarily indivisible, while spatial figures are necessarily divisible ad infinitum. 196. (1) Points. The antinomy of the point — which arises wherever a continuum is given, and elements have to be sought in it — is fundamental to Geometry. It has been given, perhaps unintentionally, by Veronese as the first axiom, in the form : " There are different points. All points are identical " {op. cit. p. 226). We saw, in discussing projective Geometry, that straight lines and planes must be regarded, on the one hand as relations between points, and on the other hand as made up of points ^ We saw again, in dealing with measurement, how space must be regarded as infinitely divisible, and yet as mere relativity. But what is divisible and consists of parts, as space does, nmst lead at last, by continued analysis, to a simple and unanalyzable part, as the unit of differentiation. For whatever can be divided, and has parts, possesses some thinghood, and must, therefore, contain two ultimate units, the whole namely, and the smallest element possessing thinghood. But in space this is notoriously not the case. After hypostatizing space, as Geometry is compelled to do, the mind imperatively demands elements, and insists on having them, whether possible or not. Of this demand, all the geometrical applications of the infin- itesimal calculus are evidence^. But what sort of elements do we thus obtain? Analysis, being unable to find any earlier halting-place, finds its elements in points, that is, in zero quanta of space. Such a conception is a palj^able contradiction, only rendered tolerable by its necessity and familiarity. A point must be spatial, otherwise it would not fulfil the function of a spatial element ; but again it must contain no space, for any finite extension is capable of further analysis. Points can never be given in intuition, which has no concern with the infinitesimal : they are a purely conceptual construction, arising 1 Chapter in. Section A, (§ 131). 2 Cf. Hannequin, Essai critique sur I'hypoth^se des atomes, Paris 1895, Chap. I. Section in.; especially p. 43. 190 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. out of the need of terms between which spatial relations can hold. If space be more than relativity, spatial relations must involve spatial relata ; but no relata appear, until we have analyzed our spatial data down to nothing. The contradictory notion of the point, as a thing in space without spatial magnitude, is the only outcome of our search for spatial relata. This reductio ad absurdmn surely suffices, by itself, to prove the essential relativity of space. 197. Thus Geometry is forced, since it wishes to regard space as independent, to h3^ostatize its abstractions, and therefore to invent a self-contradictory notion as the spatial element. A similar absurdity appears, even more obviously, in the notion of a whole of space. The antinomy may, therefore, be stated thus : Space, as we have seen throughout, must, if knowledge of it is to be possible, be mere relativity; but it must also, if independent knowledge of it, such as Geometry seeks, is to be possible, be something more than mere relativity, since it is divisible and has parts. But we saw, in Chap, ill.. Section A (§ 133) that knowledge of a form of externality must be logically independent of the particular matter filling the form. How then are we to extricate ourselves from this dilemma ? The only way, I think, is, not to make Geometry dependent on Physics, which we have seen to be erroneous \ but to give every geometrical proposition a certain reference to matter in general. And at this point an important distinction must be made. We have hitherto spoken of space as relational, and of spatial figures as relations. But space, it would seem, is rather relativity than relations — itself not a relation, it gives the bare possibility of relations between diverse things I As applied to a spatial figure, which can only arise by a differen- tiation of space, and hence by the introduction of some differentiating matter, the word relation is, perhaps, less misleading than any other; as applied to empty undifferen- tiated space, it seems by no means an accurate description. But a bare possibility cannot exist, or be given in sense- perception ! What becomes, then, of the arguments of the 1 See Chapter ii. § 69 ff. - See third antinomy helow, § 201 £f. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 191 first part of this chapter ? I reply, it is not empty space, but spatial figures, which sense-perception reveals, and spatial figures, as we have just seen, involve a differentiation of space, and therefore a reference to the matter which is in space. It is spatial figures, also, and not empty space, with which Geometry has to deal. The antinomy discussed above arises then — so it would seem — from the attempt to deal with empty space, rather than with spatial figures and the matter to which they necessarily refer. 198. Let us see whether, by this change, we can overcome the antinomy of the point. Spatial figures, we shall now say, are relations between the matter which differentiates empty space. Their divisibility, which seemed to contradict their relational character, may be explained in two ways : first, as holding of the figures considered as parts of empty space, which is itself not a relation; second, as denoting the possibility of continuous change in the relation expressed by the spatial figure. These two ways are, at bottom, the same ; for empty space is a possibility of relations, and the figure, when viewed in connection with empty space, thus becomes a, possible relation, with which other possible relations may be contrasted or compared. But the second way of regarding divisibility is the better way, since it introduces a reference to the matter which differentiates empty space, without which, spatial figures, and therefore Geometry, could not exist. It is empty space, then — so we must conclude — which gives rise to the antinomy in question ; for empty space is a bare possibility of relations, undifferentiated and homogeneous, and thus wholly destitute of parts or of thinghood. To speak of parts of a possibility is nonsense ; the parts and differentiations arise only through a reference to the matter which is differentiated in space. 199. But what nature must we ascribe to this matter, which is to be involved in all geometrical propositions ? In criticizing Helmholtz (Chap. ii. § 73), it may be remembered, we decided that Geometry refers to a peculiar and abstract kind of matter, which is not regarded as possessing any causal qualities, as exerting or as subject to the action of forces. And this is the matter, I think, which we require for the needs of the moment. Not that we afiirm, of course, that actual matter 192 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. can be destitute of the properties with Avhich Physics is cogni- zant, but that we abstract from these properties, as being irrelevant to Geometry. All that we require, for our immediate purpose, is a subject of that diversity which space renders possible, or terms for those relations by which empty space, if space is to be studied at all, must be differentiated. But how must a matter, which is to fulfil this function, be regarded ? Empty space, we have said, is a possibility of diversity in relation, but spatial figures, with which Geometry necessarily deals, are the actual relations rendered possible hj empty space. Our matter, therefore, must supply the terms for these relations. It must be differentiated, since such differentiation, as we have seen, is the special work of space. We must find, therefore, in our matter, that unit of differentiation, or atom*, which in space we could not find. This atom must be simple, i.e. it must contain no real diversity; it must be a This not resolvable into Thises. Being simple, it can contain no relations within itself, and consequently, since spatial figures are mere relations, it cannot appear as a spatial figure ; for every spatial figure involves some diversity of matter. But our atom must have spatial relations with other atoms, since to supply terms for these relations is its only function. It is also capable of having these relations, since it is differentiated from other atoms. Hence we obtain an unextended term for spatial relations, precisely of the kind we require. So long as we sought this term without reference to anything more than space, the self- contradictory notion of the point was the only outcome of our search ; but now that we allow a reference to the matter diffe- rentiated by space, we find at once the term which was needed, namely, a non-spatial simple element, with spatial relations to other elements. To Geometry such a term will appear, owing to its spatial relations, as a point ; but the contradiction of the point, as we now see, is a result only of the undue abstraction with which Geometry deals. 200. (2) The circle in the definition of straight lines and planes. This difficulty need not long detain us, since we have already, with the material atom, broken through the relativity which caused our circle. Straight lines, in the purely geometrical 1 This atom, of course, must not be confounded with the atom of Chemistry. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 193 procedure, are defined only by points, and points only by straight lines. But points, now, are replaced by material atoms: the duality of points and lines, therefore, has disap- peared, and the straight line may be defined as the spatial relation between two unextended atoms. These atoms have spatial adjectives, derived from their relations to other atoms ; but they have no intrinsic spatial adjectives, such as could belong to them if they had extension or figure. Thus straight lines and planes are the true spatial units, and points result only from the attempt to find, within space, those terms for spatial relations which exist only in a more than spatial matter. Straight lines, planes and volumes are the spatial relations between two, three or four unextended atoms, and points are a merely convenient geometrical fiction, by which possible atoms are replaced. For, since space, as we saw, is a possibility, Geometry deals not with actually realized spatial relations, but with the whole scheme of possible relations. 201. (3) Space is at once relational and more than re- lational. We have already touched on the question how far space is other than relations, but as this question is quite fundamental, as relation is an ambiguous and dangerous word, as I have made constant use of the relativity of space without attempting to define a relation, it will be necessary to discuss this antinomy at length. 202. Now for this discussion it is essential to distinguisli clearly between empty space and spatial figures. Empty space, as a form of externality, is not actual relations, but the possibility of relations: if we ascribe existential import to it, as the ground, in reality, of all diversity in relation, we at once have space as something not itself relations, though giving the possibility of all relations. In this sense, space is to be distinguished from spatial order. Spatial order, it may be said, presupposes space, as that in which this order is possible. Thus Stumpf says^: "There is no order or relation without a positive absolute content, underlying it, and making it possible to order anything in this manner. Why and how should we otherwise distinguish one order from another ?... To distinguish different orders from one another, we must everywhere recognize a 1 Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, p. 15. R. G. 13 194 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. particular absolute content, in relation to which the order takes place. And so space, too, is not a mere order, but just that by which the spatial order, side-by-sideness {Neheneinander) distinguishes itself from the rest." May we not, then, resolve the antinomy very simply, by a reference to this ambiguity of space ? Bradley contends (Ap- pearance and Reality, pp. 36-7) that, on the one hand, space has parts, and is therefore not mere relations, while on the other hand, when we try to say what these parts are, we find them after all to be mere relations. But cannot the space which has parts be regarded as empty space, Stumpf's absolute underlying content, which is not mere relations, while the parts, in so far as they turn out to be mere relations, are those rela- tions which constitute spatial order, not empty space ? If this can be maintained, the antinomy no longer exists. But such an explanation, though I believe it to be a first step towards a solution, will, I fear, itself demand almost as much explanation as the original difficulty. For the connection of empty space with spatial order is itself a question full of difficulty, to be answered only after much labour. 203. Let us consider what this empty space is. (I speak of " empty " space without necessarily implying the absence of matter, but only to denote a space which is not a mere order of material things.) Stumpf regards it as given in sense ; Kant, in the last two arguments of his metaphysical deduction, argues that it is an intuition, not a concept, and must be known before spatial order becomes possible. I wish to main- tain, on the contrary, that it is wholly conceptual ; that space is given only as spatial order ; that spatial relations, being given, appear as more than mere relations, and so become hyposta- tized ; that when hypostatized, the whole collection of them is regarded as contained in empty space ; but that this empty space itself, if it means more than the logical possibility of space-relations, is an unnecessary and self- contradictory as- sumption. Let us begin by considering Kant's arguments on this point. Leibnitz had affirmed that space was only relations, while Newton had maintained the objective reality of absolute space. Kant adopted a middle course : he asserted absolute space, but PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 195 regarded it as purely subjective. The assertion of absolute space is the object of his second argument ; for if space were mere relations between things, it would necessarily disappear with the disappearance of the things in it ; but this the second argument denies^ Now spatial order obviously does disappear with matter, but absolute or empty space may be supposed to remain. It is this, then, which Kant is arguing about, and it is this which he affirms to be a pure intuition, necessarily pre- supposed by spatial order^. 204. But can we agree in regarding empty space, the " infinite given whole," as really given ? Must we not, in spite of Kant's argument, regard it as wholly conceptual ? It is not required, in the first place, by the argument of the first half of this chapter, which required only that every This of sense- perception should be resolvable into Thises, and thus involved only an order among Thises, not anything given originally without reference to them at all. In the second place, Kant's two arguments' designed to prove that empty space is not conceptual, are inadequate to their purpose. The argument that the parts of space are not contained under it, but in it, proves certainly that space is not a general conception, of which spatial figures are the instances ; but it by no means follows that empty space is not a conception. Euipty space is un- differentiated and homogenous ; parts of space, or spatial figures, arise only by reference to some differentiating matter, and thus belong rather to spatial order than to empty space. If empty space be the pre-condition of spatial order, we cannot expect it to be connected with spatial relations as genus with species. But empty space may nevertheless be a universal conception ; it may be related to spatial order as the state to the citizens. These are not instances of the state, but are contained in it ; they also, in a sense, presuppose it, for a man can only become a citizen by being related to other citizens in a state*. 1 See Vaibinger's Commeutar, ii. pp. 189 — 190. - See ibid. p. 224 if. for Kant's inconsistencies on this point. * The fourth and fifth in the first edition, the third and fourth iu the second. * Of. Vaibinger's Commentar, ii. p. 218. 196 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. The uniqueness of space, again, seems hardly a valid argu- ment for its intuitional nature ; to regard it as an argument implies, indeed, that all conceptions are abstracted from a series of instances — a view which has been criticized in Chapter II. (§ 77), and need not be further discussed here\ There is no ground, therefore, in Kant's two arguments for the intuitional nature of empty space, which can be maintained against criticism. 205. Another ground for condemning empty space is to be found in the mathematical antinomies. For it is no solution, as Lotze points out (Metaphysik, Bk. ii. Chap, i., § 106), to regard empty space as purely subjective : contradictions in a necessary subjective intuition form as great a difficulty as in anything else. But these antinomies arise only in connection with empty space, not with spatial order as an aggregate of relations. For only when space is regarded as possessed of some thinghood, can a whole or a true element be demanded. This we have seen already in connection with the Point. When space is regarded, so far as it is valid, as only spatial order, unbounded extension and infinite divisibility both disappear. What is divided is not spatial relations, but matter; and if matter, as we have seen that Geometry requires, consists of unextended atoms with spatial relations, there is no reason to regard matter either as infinitely divisible, or as consisting of atoms of finite extension. 206. But whence arises, on this view, the paradox that we cannot but regard space as having more or less thinghood, and as divisible ad infinitum ? This must be explained, I think, as a psychological illusion, unavoidably arising from the fact that spatial relations are immediately presented. They thus have a peculiar psychical quality, as immediate experiences, by which quality they can be distinguished from time-relations or any other order in which things may be arranged. To Stumpf, whose problem is psychological, such a psychical quality would constitute an absolute underlying content, and would fully justify his thesis ; to us, however, whose problem is epistemo- logical, it would not do so, but would leave the meaning of the spatial element in sense-perception free from any implication 1 Cf. Vaihinger's Commentar, ii. p. 207. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 197 of an absolute or empty space \ May we not, then, abandon empty space, and say : Spatial order consists of felt relations, and qua felt has, for Psychology, an existence not wholly resolvable into relations, and unavoidably seeming to be more than mere relations. But when we examine the information, as to space, which we derive from sense-perception, we find ourselves plunged in contradictions, as soon as we allow this information to consist of more than relations. This leaves spatial order alone in the field, and reduces empty space to a mere name for the logical possibility of spatial relations. 207. The apparent divisibility of the relations which con- stitute spatial order, then, may be explained in two ways, though these are at bottom equivalent. We may take the relation as considered in connection with empty space, in which case it becomes more than a relation ; but being falsely hypo- statized, it appears as a complex thing, necessarily composed of elements, which elements, however, nowhere emerge until we analyze the pseudo-thing down to nothing, and arrive at the point. In this sense, the divisibility of spatial relations is an unavoidable illusion. Or again, we may take the relation in connection with the material atoms it relates. In this case, other atoms may be imagined, differently localized by different spatial relations. If they are localized on the straight line joining two of the original atoms, this straight line appears as divided by them. But the original relation is not really divided : all that has happened is, that two or more equivalent relations have replaced it, as two compounded relations of father and son may replace the equivalent relation of grand- father and grandson. These two ways of viewing the apparent divisibility are equivalent : for empty space, in so far as it is not illusion, is a name for the aggregate of possible space-relations. To regard a figure in empty space as divided, therefore, means, if it means anything, to regard two or more other possible rela- tions as substituted for it, which gives the second way of view- ing the question. The same reference to matter, then, by which the antinomy of the Point was solved, solves also the antinomy as to the relational nature of space. Space, if it is to be freed from 1 Of. James, Psychology, VoL ii., p. 1-18 ff. 198 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. contradictions, must bo regarded exclusively as spatial order, as relations between unextended material atoms. Empty space, which arises, by an inevitable illusion, out of the spatial element in sense-perception, may be regarded, if we wish to retain it, as the bare principle of relativity, the bare logical possibility of relations between diverse things. In this sense, empty space is wholly conceptual ; spatial order alone is immediately experi- enced. 208. But in what sense does spatial order consist of rela- tions ? We have hitherto spoken of externality as a relation, and in a sense such a manner of speaking is justified. Extern- ality, when predicated of anything, is an adjective of that thing, and implies a reference to some other thing. To this extent, then, externality is analogous to other relations; and only to this extent, in our previous arguments, has it been regarded as a relation. But when we take account of further qualities of relations, externality begins to appear, not so much as a rela- tion, but rather as a necessary aspect or element in every relation. And this is borne out by the necessity, for the existence of relations, of some given form of externality. Every relation, we may say, involves a diversity between the related terms, but also some unity. Mere diversity does not give a ground for that interaction, and that interdependence, which a relation requires. Mere unity leaves the terms identical, and thus destroys the reference of one to another required for a relation. , Mere externality, taken in abstraction, gives only the element of diversity required for a relation, and is thus more abstract than any actual relation. But mere diversity does not give that indivisible whole of which any actual relation must consist, and is thus, when regarded abstractly, not subject to the restrictions of ordinary relations. But with mere diversity, we seem to have returned to empty space, and abandoned spatial order. Mere diversity, surely, is either complete or non-existent ; degrees of diversity, or a quantitative measure of it, are nonsense. We cannot, therefore, reduce spatial order to mere diversity. Two things, if they occupy different positions in space, are necessarily diverse, but are as necessarily something more; otherwise spatial order becomes unmeaning. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 199 Empty space, then, in the above sense of the possibility of spatial relations, contains only one aspect of a relation, namely the aspect of diversity; but spatial order, by its reference to matter, becomes more concrete, and contains also the element of unity, arising out of the connection of the different material atoms. Spatial order, then, consists of relations in the ordinary sense ; its merely spatial element, however — if one may make such a distinction — the element, that is, which can be abstracted from matter and regarded as constituting empty space, is only one aspect of a relation, but an aspect which, in the concrete, must be inseparably bound up with the other aspect. Here, once more, we see the ground of the contradictions in empty space, and the reason why spatial order is free from these contradictions. Conclusion. 209. We have now completed our review of the foundations of Geometry. It will be well, before we take leave of the subject, briefly to review and recapitulate the results we have won. In the first chapter, we watched the development of a branch of Mathematics designed, at first, only to establish the logical independence of Euclid's axiom of parallels, and the possibility of a self-consistent Geometry which dispensed with it. We found the further development of the subject entangled, for a while, in philosophical controversy ; having shown one axiom to be superfluous, the geometers of the second period hoped to prove the same conclusion of all the others, but failed to construct any system free from three fundamental axioms. Being concerned with analytical and metrical Geometry, they tended to regard Algebra as a prion, but held that those properties of spatial magnitudes, which were not deducible from the laws of Algebra, must be empirical. In all this, they aimed as much at discrediting Kant as at advancing Mathe- matics. But with the third period, the interest in Philosophy diminishes, the opposition to Euclid becomes less marked, and most important of all, measurement is no longer regarded as fundamental, and space is dealt with by descriptive rather than 200 FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. quantitative methods. But nevertheless, three axioms, sub- stantially the same as those retained in the second period, are still retained by all geometers. In the second chapter, we endeavoured, by a criticism of some geometrical philosophies, to prepare the ground for a constructive theory of Geometry. We saw that Kant, in applying the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic to space, had gone too far, since its logical scope extended only to some form of externality in general. We saw that Riemann, Helmholtz and Erdmann, misled by the quantitative bias, over- looked the qualitative substratum required by all judgments of quantity, and thus mistook the direction in which the necessary axioms of Geometry are to be found. We rejected, also, Helmholtz's view that Geometry depends on Physics, because we found that Physics must assume a knowledge of Geometry before it can become possible. But we admitted, in Geometry, a reference to matter — not, however, to matter as empirically known in Physics, but to a more abstract matter, whose sole function is to appear in space, and supply the terms for spatial relations. We admitted, however, besides this, that all actual measurement must be effected by means of actual matter, and is only empirically possible, through the empirical knowledge of approximately rigid bodies. In criticizing Lotze, we saw that the most important sense, in which non-Euclidean spaces are possible, is a philosophical sense, namely, that they are not condemned by any a priori argument as to the necessity of space for experience, and that consequently, if they are not affirmed, this must be on empirical grounds alone. Lotze's strictures on the mathematical procedure of Metageometry we found to be wholly due to ignorance of the subject. Proceeding, in the third chapter, to a constructive theory of Geometry, we saw that projective Geometry, which has no reference to quantity, is necessarily true of any form of externality. Its three axioms — homogeneity, dimensions, and the straight line — were all deduced from the conception of a form of externality, and, since some such form is necessary to experience, were all declared a priori. In metrical Geometry, on the contrary, we found an empirical element, arising out of the alternatives of Euclidean and non-Euclidean space. Three PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 201 a priori axioms, common to these spaces, and necessary con- ditions of the possibility of measurement, still remained ; these were the axiom of Free Mobility, the axiom that space has a finite integral number of dimensions, and the axiom of distance. Except for the new idea of motion, these were found equivalent to the projective triad, and thus necessarily true of any form of externality. But the remaining axioms of Euclid — the axiom of three dimensions, the axiom that two straight lines can never enclose a space, and the axiom of parallels — were regarded as empirical laws, derived from the investigation and measurement of our actual space, and true only, as far as the last two are concerned, within the limits set by errors of observation. In the present chapter, we completed our proof of the apriority of the projective and equivalent metrical axioms, by showing the necessity, for experience, of some form of externality, given by sensation or intuition, and not merely inferred from other data. Without this, we said, a knowledge of diverse but interrelated things, the corner-stone of all experience, would be impossible. Finally, we discussed the contradictions arising out of the relativity and continuity of space, and endeavoured to overcome them by a reference to matter. This matter, we found, must consist of unextended atoms, localized by their spatial relations, and appearing, in Geometry, as points. But the non-spatial adjectives of matter, we contended, are irrelevant to Geometry, and its causal properties may be left out of account. To deal with the new contradictions, involved in such a notion of matter, would demand a fresh treatise, leading us, through Kinematics, into the domains of Dynamics and Physics. But to discuss the special difficulties of space is all that is possible in an essay on the Foundations of Geometry. 14 PKINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY, AT THE DNIVEESITY PKESS. 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