TREATISE —• , OM TMS LAW OBLIGATIONS, o« CONTRACTS. Bt m. pothier. TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH* WITH AN INTRODUCTION, APPENDIX, AND NOTES, ILLVSTRATIVB OF THE ENGLISH LAW ON THE SOBJECT. Bt WILLIAM DAVID EVANS, Esq. BARRISTER AT LAW. • IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. IL . . * • • *••'••:•. i'» • • • • • LONDOIff PRINTED BT A. STRAHAff, &AV PtllVTlB TO THB XX«G'9 MOST BZCBLLBHT MAJIITTi FO« JOSIYH BUTTBRWOKTH9 LAW-BOOK SELL BR, PLKBT-STRBBT AND J. COOKBy ORM OND*qyAY| OUBLlll. i8o6. L 3701 APR 8 1931 • ••« » • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • ••• • • • % • •• • « CONTENTS or XHE SECOND VOLUME, APPENDIX. X IV. V. VI. VIL VIII. IX. XI. ITo. I. Of Illegality m Contra£is - *. • n. .Of the Confideration of Contrads • I9 III. Of Pcrfons capable or incapable of Contra£k- ing . . . - - - ,as Of the Rule that a Perfon can only ftipulate or "" promife for Himfelf - - • . 3^ Of the Interpretation of Agreements - 35 Of Injuries and Negledls * - ' - 40 Of mutual Agreements . « - 4X Of Apportionment ^ - - - 44 Of the Computation of Time * - 50 Of alterilative Obligations « • . 5a Of joint and feyetal Obligations 5 I. In favour of/everal Perfons - 55 5 2. Againjl fevtral Perfins • - 6% Of penal Obligations - «- - 81 Of Compenfation (or frt-off) - - ill Of Confufion or Eztinguifliment - • 1x6 Of the Statutes of Limitations and of Prcfump- t^s founded on Length of Time - I20 Oithe Law of Evidence Section i. General preliminary Obfervations 141 2. Of the onus proband! « 143 3. Of the Rule requiring the beft Evi- dence the nature of the Cafe will admit - - - - J 47 Sectiok zn. XIIL XIV. XV. XVI. i» CONTENTS. SsCTiON 4. Of Public Efidence • - 151 Ip. Of Deeds • • • 164 6. Of Eridence of Hand Writing , 182 7. Of Writings inferior to Deeds 186 8. Of the Statute of Frauds - 191 8. (B) Of explaining Written Evi- dence by Parol - - 203 9* Of the Examination of Witnefies 223 lo» Of Cafes in which two Witnefles are neceflary « - 27^ II. Of hearfay Eridence - 285 .12. Of the Competence of Witnefles^ and of fome particular Excep- tions to Teftimony - 298 13* Of Confeflioft • •> 319 14. Of Prefumption - - 329 15. Of the Authority <^ Res Indi- cata « • • • 345 |Ia» XVn. Of the Diiliu£lion between Law and VzCt^ and the £ffe£t of Ufage upon the Lsiw • 360 XVHL Of Miftakes of Law Fi&T L Preliminary Obfenrations - 369 11. Diflertation on Miftakes of Law by M. D'Aguefleau - 408 IIL Tranflation of Vinnius on the Quef- tion whether Money paid under ; Miftakes of Law can be re- claimed - - - 437 ZIZ. SeIe£lions from the Pleadings of D'Aguefleau preceded by an analytical Account of their Contenu * - - .. - : 447 APPENDIX A P P E N D I X TO POTHIER ON OB]:.IOATlONS. • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • # K U M B fe R. I. (Referred to, Vol. I. p. a8, 29.) Of Illegality in Contraffs. N adverting more particulillrly ^to contraAs which are void at being illegal in their nature, I (hall not at prefent dwell upon thofe exceptions which are perfonal to the immediate parties to the contrail, as bt;ing founded upon fraud, extortion, or any .undue ad« vanuge taken by one party of the neceilities of the otherj but (dif- mifling fuch with the general remark^ that the EngViJb cburts of hw and equity will, in erery cafe attended with thofe circumftances, dedde according to the great principles of univerfal juftiee,) fhall proceed to fome obfjsnrations refpe&ing contrails, the illegality o£* which is founded upon reafons of public utility and mbralredlitude. Wherever an engagement is entered into with a view to contravene the general policy of the law, n6 form of expreffidn can. remove the fttbftantial defeA inherent in the nature of the tranfa£iion \ the law will inveftigate the realobjed of the contrafting parties, and if that is repugnahtto the principles* €ftabli(hed for the general benefit of ibciety, it will vitiate the mod regular inftrument which ingenuity can contrive. This fubje£l was moft ably difcufied by Lord Ch. J. Wilnut in the cafe of Collins v. BlanUrrty % Wtlf. 347. A bond in the ufual form for payment of money was alleged to be given as an indemnity for a note entered into by the obligee for compounding a profecu* tion for peijtiry. In fupport of the bond it was contended that no averment (hould be admitted of its being given upon an illegal con- fidexaiion not appearing on the face of it. In the courfe of his judgment the Oiief Juftiee ufed the following expreffions : << The manner of the tranfadion was to gild over and conceal the truths and whenever courts of Ijtw fee fuch attempts made to conceal Vol. n. B wicked • • • • • • • * AP1»END1X. pTumb.L iKTicked deeds, they will bnilh away the cobweb vamifh and (hew the tranfa£lions in their true light. This is a contrafl to tempt a man to tranfgrefs the law, to do that whichls injurious to the communis ty— ^it is void by the Common law, and the reafon why the com- 'mon law fays fuch contra£ls are void is for the public good — ^you ' fhall riot Itipolate for iniquity; All writers upon our law agree in this, no/ polluted hand ih^ll touch the pure fountain of juftice." — The whole of the judgment, from which thefe extra£ls are made, may be ftrongly xeQD|iifilleaded to the perufal of all who are engaged in juridical inj^jif^jesl' Many of tlh^'ekceptions which fall within the fcope of thisdivi- £on are.'tpiktr&ry to the immediate juftice which would prevail in a mora>* View between the contrafting parties; but the public tri-< bunajs will not afibrd ji^dicial^afliftance to thofe whofe obje£l is to . ^^Sofiringe the general policy of the law, or to prejudice the rights ••••..'ahd interefts of others {a) ; and perhaps it is one of the greateft *•* fecurities againft tranfa£lion8 of this defcription, that the contrad- kig parties can have no redrefs againft each other, and that where they are equally guilty of an infradiion of the law, the claims of either may be efie£lually refitted. > Upon this fubjefl it can hardly be ncceflary to ftate, that tranfac* tions which have for their object the encouragement of manifeft crimes, fuch as murder, theft, perjury, and perfonal outrage, can never receive the fan£lion of a ;:ourt of judicature ; and any en- gagement of a reward to abftain from fuch crimes is equally dif<- countenanced, as it might efic&ively lead either to criminality or extortion* . («)Iii thecafeof^tfr/ftrt ▼. Thmffin^ i M, S, )ax.y in which it was decided that •■ agrecmeot bj one perfon to pay a coinpeofation to another for ret'iriog froiii a public office^ provided the fonner wai appointed ro fucceed hfiii} was void $ Lord LoBgkkorwgk conclud- ed bii jBdgmeat at fbilowt s « Thia agreementy refting on private-contrad and honourt tnvf perhaps be fit tobe ezecvted by the parties, but can only be enforced by con£derations which 9ppiy to their fceliogt, and is not the fabjeA of an a^ion. The law encourages no man c» be unfaithfurto his promifci but legal obligations are, from their nature, more circamfcribe4 than moral duties.** In another cafe^ where the party to t contraft ofajeOed to it as being a ftand on tixe revenue, I«ord Hm^d (a,H, tfaeolgedion that a contra^ is immoral or illegal, aa between plabtiff . and defendant, founds at all time's very ill in the mouth of the defendant It is not for fiia lake however that the objeAion is ever allowed ; but it is founded on geoerat principles of policy which the defendant has the advantage of,«ootrary to the real jnftiee between him aod the plaintiff, by accident, if I nay fo fay. The principle of public policy is this | Em ^«iW jmU mn oritur mBm* No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his caufe of a^ion upon an immoral or illegd z6t, \ f from the plaintifTs own dating or otherwife, the caufe of •£^ion appears to arife tx tmfi cauja^ or the tranfgreffion of a pofitive law of this couptryy tiiere the Conrt fays he has no right to be affifted. It is upon that ground the Court foes^ not for the lake of diedefbidant, but becaufe they will not lead their aid to fach a plaintiff^ So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change fides, and the defendant was t9 bring his action againft the*plaiotiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it ) for where bottt tre equally in fault, fotwr efi caa^a dtfindtntlt* HsAmii ?. JtknfiHf Gpw/t 344. There Kumb.I.j Of JUegaHty In Cmttraas. 5 There is a tradition that a fuit was inftituted by a highwayman agatnft his companion to account for his fhare of the plunder, and a copy of the proceedings has been publifhed as found amongft the papers of a deceafed attorney. It was a bill in the Exchequer^ which avoided ftating in XxuBi terms the criminality of the engage* menti and i? founded upon a fuppofed dealing as copartners in rings» watchesi &c. but the mode of dealing may be manifeftly inferred* The tradition feceiyes fome degree of authenticity, by the order of the court being fucli as would in all probability enfue from fuch an attempt. The order was, that die bill (hould be di(mifled with cofts for impertinence, and the folicitor fined 50/L The printed account is accompanied by a memorandum which ftates the parti« cular times and places where the plaintiff and defendant were after« wards executed. Europe Mag* 1787, vol. ii. p. 3(So. (u). Contra£ls with a view to future proftitution are illegal ; but an engagement by way of reparation for paft fedu£tion will be fnp« ported, if it is not accompanied with any purpofe of future cohabi- tation. Marchionefs of ^/f/y/7/i/&/f v. /fiiimr, 2 P. Wms. 339. Lad]f . Cw^s cafe, 3 P. Wms. 339. Walker v, Perkins, 3 J?«r. 1568* Prti/ls.Parrotty%Fef. 160. («) J^ Emertt againft Jt^pk mUmmt. The bill (Ntcd that the ptanHff wm Sblled la teKfig io fievctal commddides, foch at pl«te» riogi, watches^ &c that the defendant applied to bin) to become a partner ; that they entered into partn^rfliip, and it was agreed that they fkotM fqaally provide all fort* of ncceiftrieSf fuch as horfes, f to atuch Wkitt and Hereof kcock the fplidtors. 6th Decemher^ The Ibliciton brought into court and fined co/, eaeb } and ordered that JoMthsm Ctiliiu E^. the coimfel who figned the bill, fliould pay the cods* TheplaintiflTwas executed kt T/» kraiD 1750, the defendant at ilf^u^one in 1735. Wremthtoik the fblicltor was coovided of nhbiag Dr. Lsmefv^ in 1 7 3 5* but reprieved and tranfported. Lord Knyw in the cafe ofBid' dly T. Mterip Appendix to Cfifford'i Report of Sontkwark EleAion,has referred to this cafe. Bot^ apoo cxaaitnipg the officcy the account Is not: fupported. Taking tbrxafe ai a fnp- nfiauooi one il faffidc&tlj iUaifaatea the generd prtociplc • Ba Every 4 APPENDIX. CNumb.1. Every tranfafkion the obje£l of which is the violation of a puUic or private duty, is alfo void ; fuch are bribes for appointing to offices of trufti private engagements that an office fliall be held in truft for a perfon by whofe intereft it was procuredj agreements to ftifle a profecution for any crime of a public nature, bonds to re- compenft the procuring a marriage {a). See Parfons v. Thompfon^ 2 H. B. 3*22.; Garforth v. Fearon^ id, 327. j Blachford\* Prejion, 8 r. R. 89.; Collins v. Blantern^ 2 Wilf, 347. \ A perfon who contrafted to keep horfes for government, agreed with another who was under contradl to fupply him with forage, . to commute a part of the forage for money ; this was holden to be void as a fraud upoiithe public. Wallis v. Baldwin^ Doug. 450* For tlie fame reafonthe law will not fupport a promife to in- demnify an officer for a£ting contrary to his duty, or in fhort any other engagement which falls witliin the fcope of the general prin- ciple. Upon the examination of a bankrupt refpefbing particular fums which hew as charged with, having received, a perfon promifed that if tlieaffignees would forbear to proceed in having that examination taken, he would pay a fum of money for the benefit of the e(late< This promife was ruled to be void, as it was 'the intention of the legiiTature that tlie 'creditors fhould have the full examination of the bankrupt, as to the ftate of his efie£t8 and the difpofition of them, and the promife was to induce the affignees and commiffioners to forbear doing their duty. N^ot v. Wallacci 3 T. R. 17. An intention to defraud tlie public revenue is a ffequent caufe . of vitiating contra£ts; but the law of one country does not inter- pofe to prete£t the revenue of another \ and therefore an engage- ment, valid in other refpe&s, is not defeated by any contrivance to evade the revenue laws or fpecial commercial regulations of a fo- reign country (i). And even where goods were purchafed abroad with an intention by the buyer to fmuggle them into England ; it was held that an 2l£lion might be maintained for the price, although the feller was acquainted (if) The cmSu rffpedtng marriage-brokagetre eoHe£led in Mr. FonhloK jut* tnott% to the Treatijt of Efuityy bouk i. ch. iv. f. lo* See alfo the cafea dScrikhlekilt v. Srett, b.the laft edition of Brotun'i PdrJ, Otfuy !▼. 144.$ Boftb v. fySfrrbigttm (E) ib. ir. 163. and Mvri/orer* jiru^thnct (Vifc.) ibid. fill. 247* Appendix II. ^ (^) P0.'Afcr in hit treatife onlafurance' makei Tone obfciratioai in oppofitloo to thia principle, vfhich arc apparently very jndictouf. Having cited a judgment from VaHm^ in which it wat held that« it was not forbidden to t Frttichwun to carry on in a foreign country, • connoltrce prohibited by the laws of fuch coiintry» and that therefore the riik of confifca. Cion might be infured like other perila of the fea 3 he obfervea that thif pHnciple appears fiilfe \ for that thole who. carry on commerce in any coaotry» are obliged by thebw of nattons, and alfo by the law of nature, to cooformy in refpcA to fuch commerce^ to the lawi of the country where they carry it on. lEvery foveiei|a bat emptfc and jvifittdioa over what* •vet Numb.L] Oflllfi^alitymContraeis. S acquainted at the time with the illegal intention of the purchafet. But it was faid that if the feller had any concern in running the goods into England^ he would have been an offender againft the laws of thir country. HUmany.yohnfonjCowp. 341. (jed, whea he oUervet that cofi64er«tioni againft the policjr of the comaooA law, or agaioft the piovtfiona of • ftatute, or againft the policy of juftice, or the mica and claims of deceocy, or the didatca of mofaliiy» are void io laeraad equity. Trtati/t of Efuitjf b. i« c. 4* f. 4, the Numb. 13 OfWtgmymCiti^tai. f die difguife of an illegal tranfa£iion» But thefe contrivances aT« totally inefficacious) when the real intention can be fufficiently^ detected. Indeed w^ers are void if they are of fitcfa a nature that they might have an illegal tendency, although they are not acconu panifd by an illegal intention in the particular inftance i as a vragef between two voters refpe&ing the event of an ele£lion. Allen v« Hettrn% I T» R. $6, and a contrary determination would be in tSoGt a general prote&ion to illicit tranfadiibns. Where money has been paid on account of an Hlegal contraA^ i.g. procuring a place in the cuftoms, the perfonnance of whkk is incomplete^ as for procuring an office, it has been hdd that di* party might refcind the contra^ and recover back the money before the office was procured. Walker v. ChapmaH^ cited Dwg. 471. {a)» And vrhere a wager was laid upon an illegal fubjed, as a boxing match, it was decided that either of the parties might maintain an adion for the money which he had depofked, before the wager wa# decided. CgttoMY.TiurlanJ^ $ T.R. 40 g. And in a recent cafe it is ftated as a determination of tfaeCourf^ of King's Bench, diat a perfon who had loft an illegal wager might fecbvev back his depofit. The Court are r^prefented to have fai^ diat it was more confonant to the principles of found policy an4 yiS&ce, that wherever money had been paid on an illegal confidera* tion, it might be recovered back again by the party who improperly paid it, than by denying the Tcmedy to give cScSt to the illegal con* trad, Lacmujkde v. Wbiu^ 7 Term Reports^ 535. But there is en« dently a miftake in the report of diat cafe ; for the plaintiff wat M fa9 the winner of the wager, which related to a fiibjedl of public notoriety, the eeflation of hoftilities between England and France. And the primary objed of the ajlion was to recover the money which had heen loft by that event not having taken place. The principal ground upon which the wager was held to be invalid]^ inuft (fo long as wagers in general are confidered as obligatory coni trads,) be confidered as pofieffing the charader, rather of fcholaftid fubdety, than of juridical xeafon. It is, that a perfon by laying a wager on the event of peace or war, has a private intereft whicK inay affeA his wiflies in a manner repugnant to his public duty. Where a contrafl: is conne£ied with drcumftances of an illegal or immoral nature, or where there are two contrafls having a con^ or affinity, die one of which is affis&ed by- cireumftances of . (4i)Ib «b clEqr ao ^ Mm ht noosj bi^ mA letcivciS I Iwm vwtMnd t» ^usftioi tte pVBpetci oi tbiided^oB. It keflviti^Uy dilEamt fxom d)»t which foUowy ) for ip thr oos Che parties ^irtft periboally engaged in 9 d^red infradion of the hi«r } tn the other th^* hadintf^y entetedbtoiB eogigement deftitute of %al cCcKJ^ hut aot attended with any fttteil tarpitnde Off crhaiaility* B 4 illegality ; 8 • • APPENDIX. [Numb-I. illegality ; the influence of fuch circumftance^ upon the contrail with which they are incidentally conne^led, is often a queftion of confiderable nicety, and the cafes which have occurred upon this fulv jc(kf do not enable me to ftate with confidence any leading princi- ple which can be reforted to in the expolition-of it. That a partici- pation in carrying the illegal purpofe into effect, vitiates every con^^ trad, whether primary or fecondary, of which it conftitutes the objed, is^a point upon which no difference of opinion can be en- tertained, but what (hall be deemed a participation, is often in itfelf a 'queftion by no means eafy to refolve. And certainly there are many cafes in which a reference to an illegal tahjcGt, without any participation in it, will be fatal to a contra^. Where a perfon is guilty of trading in contravention of the law, the infurance upon fuch trade is fo immediately connected with the illegal obje£las tobe neceffarily involved in the illegality, as is mani- feft from daily experience. It is however aftonifhing to fee how often this exception is taken ^dvaj^^e of by perfons affedliiig faimefs of reputation. There is sio cafe to which the preceding general obfervation, of being << con-* trary to thp irpmediate juftice which would prevail in a moral point of viewbet^^ei) ^e contrading parties/' can more direftly or im-* mediately apply, ^tock-jobbing, though prohibited and difcoun-i tenanced by hvf, i^ extenfively carried on, and a perfon would be held to a£t diflionorably who availed himfelf of the legal exception. A bet of 50/. at car4a i^ paid, or the refufal to pay it is efteemed ^ifgraceful. But an underwriter fays, I have taken a premium to infure againft a contingent lofs, the lofs has happened but fome rule of legal policy enables me to evade my contra£b, though all the circHmftances were knowq tp me at the time of making it ^ I will therefore take advantage of the law, and- refule to e jtecute my de. If the obfervations fuggefted re- fpefling the cafe 4>f Lefoley and Steers are corre£i, and the difcuiEon of the fubjeA is' not precluded by the authority of thefe adjudica* tions ; the laft cafe, as it depends folely upon the preceding, cannot materially vary the courfe of reafoning upon the general propoii« tion. << In a cafe in Chancery before Lord Lougihrougk, his Lordfliip held, that a perfon was not bound by his acceptance of a bill for money laid out on his behalf in efiefling a void infurance upon an £a/l /m/ia voyage ; and referring to the cafes of Faikney v. Renous^ and PetrieY, Hannay^ faid he was aware of thofe cafes, but could not perfefUy accede to them. What was called confent in thofe cafes^ was a confederacy to break a pofitive law, epc parte Mather^ 3 Ve^ 373. Bu$ with every refpedl to the great authorities who have diluted from the principle of thofe cafes, that principle feems jt« be fupported upon the ftrongeft foundations of juftice. Where parties agree to contravene a legal prdubition^ it Is a neceflaxy con- fequence |f umb. 1.3 Of IllegaUty in Cmtrdils. 1 1 feqvence that from fuch agreement no legal obligation can arife; but where the z€t is not in itfelf criminal^ there is an honorary obligation which die party is at lib^y to fulfil, and againft the voluntary performance of which there can be no exception* If the n^ admitting the force of the obligation, he evinces a difpofidon to perform it, but for his own convenience perfuades another to a4« vance the money on his behalf, it is to every fubftandal purpofe, as much a loan of that money to himfelf, as if the money had beea adually counted out to him, and he had paid it over. Having thus in^ duced another to make an advance on his behalf, there is no more juftice in permitting him afterwards to impeach that a&, than if money had been advanced by his requeft to a perfon whom he wiflied to aiBft, but to, whom he was under no obligation, cither ' legal or honorary \ and there is nothing in the policy of the law to relieve him from the undertaking to repay the mop^y (b advanced, when by the advancing it, no illegal objefl: was intended to be {ntp^ moted. The difierent iUuftrations of Lord Mansfield in Faikmj and Remusy all proceed upon the principle of a loan of money^ upon which the lender is not to be affeded by the borrower's ap^ plication. « It has been decided at Nifi Prius, that a perfon, who at tho requeft of a holder of a bill, has put his name upon it, and thereby been obliged to pay the contents to a honafidi holder, may recoyer the money paid, in an a£lion on the bill, from any perfon whofe name is on it, although he knew it was given on an illegal confident'* tion. Ptake 215, Cbitt^ 5 3'*. In the caie of Holman v. Jobnfin^ which has been already twice referred to in the difcuffion of the prefent fubjed, the knowledge by die feller of the goods that an illegal ufe was intended to be made of them by the buyer, did not defeat his adion for the priec, as he had not any participation in the fubfequent illegality ; and it is perfedly familiar, that although die legiflature has vacated fecurities for money lent to play with, the loan of the money is it« felf a valid contra£l. It will be difficult to find a fatisfa£tory prin* ciple for the di(lin£lion, that money lent to a perfon to enable him to accomplifh a future illegal purpofe, (hall create a valid obliga- tion \ but that money lent to him, or what is precifely the fame thing for every rational purpofe, money paid by his defire and upon his authority in order to fadsfy an illegal contradi already executed, fliottld not \ and that, after having prevailed upon another to ad* vance his money in a manner by which no profpedlive illegal pur* pofe could be facilitated, he (hould be encouraged to fet up his «wn pteviotts illegal conduA its a bar to die repayment of it. 12 APPENDIX. tNumb.L ' It has been held, that letting lodgings to a pcrfon who had no other refource for payment than money acquired by proftitution^ was invalid ; and that no a£lion could be maintained for the rent '^ but where it was fet up as a defence to an a&ion for waihing cloathsy that fome of the cloaths were for the purpofe of enabling ^the defendant, who lived in a ftatc of proftitution, to appear at public places, and that the others were night cloaths for the ufe of gentlemen who might vifit her ; it was held that the adlion might be maintained. Mr. Juftice Buller obferved, that the plaintiff was employed to waih the defendant's linen, and the ufe which the de- fendant made of it could not zScGt the contrad. And fpeaking of one of the former cafes refpediing lodgings, hefaid he fuppofcd the lodgings were hired for the exprefs purpofe of enabling the perfons ^ to meet there ; which would certainly be unlawful. See Lhjdy. Johnfon^ I Bof. & Pull. 340. But if the purpofe fo referred to was merely a purpofe perfonal to the defendant, if the plaintiff was to have no concurrence - in promoting it, if his compenfation was ilot made conditional upon the fuccefs of it, (the probability of not being able otherwife to obtain payment, is quite a different thing from fuch a condition,) it will not be eafy to diflinguifh the cafe of the lodgings from that of the cloaths, or from the fale of the tea in the cafe of Holman v. Johnfotu The contraft' of fale, the work anj labour, the occupation, -rare all perfect, independant, and com* plete ; the illegality in the fubfequent ufe is contingent and acci- dental. To induce a confiftency of principle, the knowledge or th^ expe£ia|ion that fuch fubfequent ufe was intended by one party, fhould be univerfally allowed or univerfally difallowed as a bar to the rights^ which the other would be legally entitled to upon the original contract if no fuch intention had exifted. It never has been decided, and probably never will be, that if a pcrfon living witli another in a flate of concubinage hires a houfe for their common re&dence, the landlord, however clearly apprized of their fituation» is without a remedy for his rent ; but fuch a (late of concubinage is notlefs repugnant to the principles of the law than a ftate of pro« ftitution. V The following obfervations, which I have already publilhed in an EfTay on the Law of Infurances, are materially conne^ed witli the prefent fubjeA. << The general right of entering into any legal contra£lis reftrained by a ftatute, which fecures to the two companies of the London AfTurance and the Royal Exchange AfTurance, the exclufive right of snfuring by a common fund ; and alloth/sr ^nfurances in corpattnec- (hip are declared to be void, and all fums underwritten thereon, are to be forfeited, half to the king, and half to the informer; 6 Geo, 3. c. i8. Kumb.!.] Of Illegality in Contrails. 13 c. 18. A fum of money was paid to government for the benefit of this monopoly, the profefled purpofe of which was the ftability of the fecurity. *' All the decifions upon the conilru61ion of this ftatute are of a very modem date. The points which they have eftabliflied are, that where a partnerihip is entered into in contravention of the prohibi- tion that it contains, one of the partners has no claim upon the other for a proportion of the lofles which he has paid. Mitchell v. CocUumf 2 H. B, 379. where three perfons were engaged as part- ners, and the policies were in the name of one ofthem, and another, together with a partner of his own, (to which partnerihip there is no legal objeAion,) were the brokers ; the aiEgnees of the perfon whofe name was ufed were not allowed to recover from the brokers the premiums received. Booth v. Hodgfon^ 6. T, R. 405. It h^d previoufly to thefe cafes been held by Lord Kenyon at Nifi Prsus, that an underwriter who had paid a lofs, could not recover from a broker the money which the broker had received from another perfon, who had agreed to take half the plaintiff's rifk; his Lord- ihip faying, that a party could not appeal to a court of juftice to enforce a contraA founded in a breach of the law. Sullivan v. Greavesy Park 8. But it has been fince ruled by the Court of Com- mon Pleas, that a broker to whom the underwriter had paid the lofs on an illegal policy could not reGft paying it over to the af- fured ; and they even refufed to grant a rule to (hew caufe why there Oiould not be a new trial. Mr. Juftice BulUr faid, ". Is the man who has paid over money to another's ufe, to difpute the le- gality of the original confideration ? Having once waived the ille- gality, the money can never come back to his hands again. Can the defendant then, in confcience, keep the money fo paid ? For what purpofe ihould he retain it? To whom is he to pay it over ? Who is entitled to it but the plaintiff ?" Lord Chief Juftice Eyre ^d, << The queftion is, whether he who has received money to another's ufe on an illegal contrad can be allowed to retain it, and that not even at the defire of thofe who paid it to him ? I think he cannot." Tenant v. Elliot ^ i ^. & P. 3. This decifiot;! certain- ly cannot in principle be reconciled with that before Lord Kenyan ; and it cannot require much argument to fliew that it is more confo- nant to the fubftantial principles of juftice, and fo connedled with them, that nothing but the moft authoritative provifions of the law fliould be fufficient to induce an oppofite conclufion. The perfon who is interefted in contefting the legality of a contra£i, waives the exception, and tranfmits the money which he has engaged to pay, and which he was under an hqporary obligation to pay, by the hands of a tlurd perfoDj as he might have tranfmitted a mere donation ; and H APPtifjyit. tNumb.!. tnd Hit ^ucftion i«, whether a man vtrho is only Ac inftramcnt of . fuch tranfmiffion AkzVL he allowed to intercept the money in its courfc, and appropriate it to himfelf t The ftatement of fuch a qneftion would feem fufficient to decide it. Even the cafe of Boeti and Hodg/oftf in feme degree^ feems to be founded upon difputable rcafonlng. There were in that cafe, in truth, three contra£is, or fets ofcontrads: i ft. The partnerihip for infurance, which was eonfefledly illegal : 2d. The contrafis df infurance, which as be- tween the plaintiff, the infurer, and the aifured, were legal and obligatory, and in refpeft of which there was no difpute ; and, 3d* The contra£t of fenrice or commiflion between the infurer and the broker. When the broker, in purfuance of the laft of thefe .three contra£ls, had received money for the ufe of the infurer upon the fecond, it would have been very iniquitous. to have retained that money upon the allegation, that the infurer had entered into the firft contrad refpe£ling the fubjed matter with his partner, and which could not be enforced as between themfelves $ the infurer Would fingly have been liable to every lofs, and would fingly have bad a right of a£iion againft the infured for the premiums. No contribution could have been claimed on either fide ; then the broker muft either retain the money himfelf, or he muft pay it to the infurer whofe name was ufed, or to die infurer and his partners jointly. Againft the firft there flipfdd be every leaning and pre- fumption, as much as in the cafe laft difcufled ^ and this, whether there was a broker merely engaged as fuch, or two brokers in co* partnerfhip; one of whom was a number of the illegal partnerfliip of infurance. The legal prohibition feems to attach upon the third cafe, leaving the fecond, in which the benefit would accrue to the party who had fubje£ted himfelf to all the legal claims of the feveral persons affured. Thefe fuggeftions, however, are by no means offered with the fame degree of confidence as the obje£tiofi ' to the broker being permitted to retain from one partner what he had a^iually received in execution of the engagement of the other. *urt would not fufier a party to de- mand a fum of money in order to fulfil an illegal contra^, yet there was noreafon why the money in that cafe fliould not be recovered, notwithftanding the original contra£l: was void. Mr* Juftice Btd' Itr was of opinion, that if the knowledge and participation had been made out, it would not have made any difference in that z6i\on^ which was not founded npOn the illegal coatra£^, but on a ground totally diftind from it, and that, the defendant having received the money for the ufe of the plaintifF, it was immaterial whether the money was paid on a legal or on an illegal contraA. He re- ferred to the cafe of Faikney and Remus^ and to a cafe of money lent to pay a bet at a horfe-race. Mr. Juftice Heath exprefled himfelf.of the fame opinion. He (aid, he looked upon the matter in the (ame light as if the money had been paid into the hands of a banker, who could never be allowed to fay that it was paid in on an illegal confideration ; and he confidered the cafe where a^ party was allowe4 to recover money lent to game withal as very ftrong. Mr. Juftice Rooie enlarged very much upon the contrary opinion* Tlie general tStfk of his ob(prvations is included in the propoGtion, << That a man who had been guilty of an indi£i:able oficnce ought not to have the afliftance of the law to recover the profits of his crime, and that whether his agents were innocent or criminal, privy or not privy, his claim againft thofe agents was equally inadmiflible in a court of law.** The cafe was referred to a new trial, principally on account of the uncertainty of the fad, and the defendant afterwards paid the money. Farmer v. Ruffel^ I B. tsT P. 296.'' Retaining the fentiments which I have already fubmitted to the poUic, in the paflage cited from die Eflay on the Law of In- fitrance, die impreffion^ oJF my mind ftrongly coincide with the do£bine of Mr. Juftice Butler and Mr. Juftice Heath. If Gains lends Tititu a fum of money, nobody will contend that Titius has a x^ trwitUiald ^ payment by impeadiing the legality of the mode in •l i6 APPENDIX. [Numb-L in which Gaius acquired it (j), any more than a tenant can impeach the title of his landlord, by faying that the eftate was the revrard of an illegal aflion. And when a third perfoh pays money to Jitius as Ae money of GaiuSf and with the intent of ddiyering it to Gaius y it is immaterial to Jtttus what was the nature of the jno- tive for which the money was fo given, whether an obligatory con- trafb, a void contract, an illegal contra£l, or a gratuitous donation. The money has, to all fubftantial purpofes, as much become the im* mediate property of the perfon for whom the payment was intend- ed, as if it had gone through the circuitous courfe of being paid to himfelf and afterwards lent to another. The Juftice of the cafe as between the parties is too plain to admit of any argument, and the intereft of the public feems to be fufficiently protedied by with^^ holding the remedies of Jthe law in refpefl to the immediate fubjeft which is a contravention of its authority, without purfuing that fub-> je^ in its remote, confequences and incidental e(fe£ts. The legiflature having prohibited giving entertainments to elec- tors after thd telle of a vrrit for the ele£lion of members of parlia- ment, it was ruled in the cafe oiRibbam v. Crickett, i B.l^ P. 264. that an innkeeper could not recover, the price of vifluals furniflied contrary to that prohibition. Suppofing the innkeeper to have been inftrudled generally to fumifli entertainments prohibited by the afl, the cafe f^lls within the common principle of an illegal par;- ticipation. But if an. entertainment was given to particular d^- fignated perfons, the queftion might arife how far the knowledge that fuch perfons were of the prohibited defcripdon would zStd the right to recover. The diftindion between the two cafes woulcl certainly be very minute \ but that muft always be the cafe between the extreme points of legal and illegal contrails, wherever fuch ex- tremes may happen to be. And I cannot but thmk that the prin- - cipks which prevailed (and, if the opinion I have endeavoured tor fupport is correal, wifely and juftly prevailed,) in the cafe of Faikney and Retwusy would fupport the demavd ; that it would be held that the innkeeper furniflied' the entertainment perfbn'alty to the party ordering it, and that he was not concerned to examine the manner in which it was diftributed. Subfequent to the completion of this difcufHon, the cafe of Edgar v. Fowler , has been decided, in which it was held |hat a (tf) In the ctftofBird v. jf^pletm, 8 T. IS. 56ft. the underwrheri ipon. goods from Canton to Hamburgh contended that tbey were not liable for a lofij becaufe the gooda were purchafed at Cannon with the proceeds of a car^o brongbt there cootrary to the Engtifk na-^ ^igatioo laws; bottbe detence wu not allowed. Mr. Juftice La^tntt faid, Wa cannot inquite into the means by which the merchant gains the money that is afterwards Uid out in the porchafe of goods; if the money were obtained by robbery on the highway, and laid •nt in the purchife of a cargo, I do not know why the caigo may not be legaUy infured. 7 broker Numb. L] Of UlegaUty In Contracts. 1/ broker who had efie^ied a reinfurance, (a contrad which the kgiflature for fome reafon, or. for none> has been plea fed to rendef invalid) and credited the infurer and debited the aiTured with the premium, was not fubje£l to an a£lion by the former for the amount, as that would be giving tStOi to the illegal contradl^ 3 Eafi. 222. It does not feem to have been di(lin£tly agreed what would have been the opinion of the court, if the premium had been adualljr paid ; but it does not occur to me, that any difference could properly arife from that circumftance, as the plaintiff was authorized bf the defendant to confider it as paid : and from what fell fromr the court, it feems probable that they would not have thought the aflured, (in confcquence of a notice from whom the broker had re-« fufed to pay) any better intitled to recover. It is obvious that the prin-" ciple adopted in this cafe is oppofite co that which I have endeavoured to fupport. It feems to be no lefs oppofite to that of fome of the cafes which I have cited. Admitting the deference which to a certaia extent is due to authority, tind aware of the liability Xo prejudice in favour of an opinion, not the effe£t of momentary impreflion but of long and repeated confideration \ I muft acknowledge myfelf unable to reconcile the converfe of that opinion in the prefent inftance, to my ideas of the true principles of judi- cial proptiety* I ftill adhere to the opinion, that the authority of the legiflature is fufficiently fupported by denying a legal efficacy to the contrad, without empowering the hand, which is only an inftrument of tranfmiffion, to retain from the party who has made an engagement nowife criminal, inducing an honorary obliga-* tion, though deftitute of legal efficacy, that confideration which the party, ftipulating for the benefit of fuch obligation, has con** fented to pay. It is not probable that my private fentiments will in pradice be oppofed to a judicial opinion of the court of King's Bench, but the obje£i of my enquiries calls not only for a ftate<* ment of the authorities of the law, but, fo far as I am capable of giring it, an expofition of their principles. In attempting that ex- poGtion, I am perfe£lly confcious of my liability to error, but am not willing to make a tacit facrtfice of what I firmly and fairly confider as the truth, and that upon a fubje£k which, to a mind Dot afie£ied by technical habits, would feem incapable of rarfing ai queftion. It may frequently happen that a contract is compoGsd of feveral parts , fome objectionable, others not fo. When that is the cafe, it becomes a queftion whether the illegality of a part infedts and vitiates the whole. A diftindion, as is obferved by Lord Chief Juftice WUmot^ in the before-mentioned cafe of Collins v. Blantem^ has been made upon this fubjefl, between contra£lt void at com- Vot, n. C ' moTi t8 APPENDIX. [Numb. I. mon laW| and fuch as afe void by ftatute \ and it was faid, that in the firft cafe, if it be bad, or void in any part, it is void in toto ; but that at common law it may be void in part, and good in part ; the judges formerly thought an ad of parliament might be eluded, if they did not make the whole void, if part wae void {a) ; it is faid the ftatute is like a tyrant, where he comes he makes all void ; but the common law, like a nurCng father, makes only void that part where the fault is, and prcferves the reft, i Mod. 35, 36. But I conceive that wherever an agreement is fingle and entire, wherever there is one entire complex confiderat^on (^), and an eflen- tial part of it is repugnant to the principles of the law, the whoFe contrad is invalid, whether the objection is founded upon the com- mon law or upon a ftatute ; more efpecially if it is a cafe at all affe£ted by the objeftion of moral tutpitude. But where different engagements contained in the fame a£l are feparate and diftinft, the mere invalidity of the one will not neceffarily induce the de& truftion of the other. A perfon cannot at the fame time fue for the execution of an agreement, and contend that part of that agreement is illegal. It was agreed upon a fale of tobacco to take a particular parcel of bad copper in payment 5 the feller brought aA aftion for the price of the tobacco, and infifted upon being paid in money, for that the contraft .to accept payment in bad money was illegal and void. But it was ruled by the court of King's Bench, that, fuppofing the agreement to be illegal, the plaintiff never could recover. It could not be faid that the fale was good and the payment was bad 5 if it was an illegal contrail, it was equally bad for the whale : it would be great injuftice to permit the plaintiff to recover for the goods fold, for that would be permitting him to take advantage of a cor- rupt agreement, which is never allowed in cafes where a party ap- plies to the Court to fet afide fuch agreements. AlexatuUr y. Owettp I T. J?, 225. ^ (a) I Lev. S09. Hard. 564* {b) Where a perfon made a verbal promife to pay &t d-bt ofanother (which if void hj the ftatute of fiauds), and alfo to do another »&, it was ruled th ic the agreemenc was entire, »nd that rbe pi ainiifi^ could not feparate \t, and reeoveron ont part of the agreement^ the other be'nc; f Jd. Chater v. Beciettf 7 T. R. 201. And in the caiSe oiBlrdv, Jip^ht^n^ 8 T. It. $6*9 which underwent a very fiequent and acteotive difcuirion, a policy effedled upon an Jimtr'i^ $an vclTel at and from Canttn uai admitted to be void, the veflel having biought goods from < f 'i///tfettlement to C«iff/09, contrary to the navigation a^ti, and difpofed of tbecn there, ^ (hat during part of the Cime that the parties intended the policy ibould attach, ivamelyy while ihe (hip was ar Canton, there wai fomcthing illegal in the tran(a£iioo. There is an •Id cafe in which a promifein coafideratioa of at. aftd fuffierijjg an efcape^ was held vo'id a« lo the whole. Cn, Eim% ftoo. NUMBER IL NumK: li 3- Of the Conftderaiion of C out r ads. 1 9 NUMBER ir. (Referred to. Vol. I. p. 29.) Of the Conftderaiion afConiraBs* To the preceding difcuffion upon the invalidity of contrails at founded upon the illegality of their conQderation, I ihall next fubjoin fome obfervations concerning the neceility and fufficiency of a confideration according to the law of England \ a fubjed very di^rt^nt from the preceding, as the objection founded upon the want of fuch confideration is merely negative, whereas the objec- tion laft confidered is founded upon a pofitive wrong. A gratuitous undertaking, ferioufly made, \i certainly fuflicicnt s/\ to fonn the bafis of a moral and honorary obligation, and ought not to be receded from without fomc adequrtte reafon ; but in ge- peral a perfon does not intend to fubje£l himfelf thereby to legal refponfibility : and the objeft of law is rather to give effeft to con- trails founded upon the mutu;il exigencies of fociety, than to com- pel the execution of a voluntary engagement of mere donation- Butinmoft countries there are certain legal folemnities which in- dicate the ferious intention* of contrafting a valid and effeclual ob- ligation, and which difpenfe with the neceflity of any aGual con- jGderation. They import deliberation, and are inconfiflent with the nature of thofe promifcs that are in efFe£t little more tlian the in- timation of a prefent intention, and with regard to which, expref- £ons only defigned to indicate fuch intention may eafily be pervef t- cd into thofe of abfolute engagement. The principal mode of engngement, which in the Roman law difpenfed with an a^iual confideration, was a Jiipulation. The per- fpccurrence. The extent and adequacy of a confideration in relation to the engagement with which it is connedled, is allowed to be immaterial. The cafe of Sbulbrick v. Salmon^ 4 Burr, 1637, is an illuftration of the prin- ciple that it is not requiGte that the confideration fliould be commen- furate with the promife, and that in cafe of mutual promifes the engagement on tlie one fide may be abfolute, whilil that of the other is conditional. The defendant engaged that his (hip (hould fail for Winyaw in South Carolina as foon as ready, the plaintiff en- gaging to load it there and pay a certain freight* There was a condition that if the fhip did not arrive before the firft of Marcij it fliould be in the option of the plaintiff to load the (hip or not. The defendant alledged that by contrary winds, the (hip was pre- fcnted from failing within fuch a time, that it could podibly arrive before the firft of March, And it was contended on his party that as the plaintiff would not be under an obligation to lade it upon an arrival after the iirft of Marchy it was not incumbent on himfelf to go there. It was faid, that the con(ideration failed, and it was a covenant on one (ide only. But it was evidently the opinion of the court, that tike engagement of freighting in cafe 'of an arrival before the firft of March^ was an adequate confideration for the oppofite engagement to go at all events. The decifion more im- mediately turned upon the engagement being by dcedj to which no confideration is neceffary. Lord Chancellor Loughborough^ in a afe which affords one of the iineft modern fpecimens of judicial eloquence, faid, that a bargain without a confideration is a contra- difUon in terms^ and cannot exift. Middleton v. Lord Kenyon^ 2 Vef. 7«A. 188. The cafe which I firft cited as containing two obfervations that could not be fupported, furni(hes the more corre^ principle, that any damage to another, or fufpenfion or forbearance of his right, is a foundation for an undertaking, and will make it binding ; diough no a^iual benefit accrues to the party undertaking. This- ]mndple was illuftrated by the immediate point decided in the cattfe : for a perfon in Rotterdam^ having paid the draft of anothef in England upon an offer of credit on a houfe in London ; a letter from the partners of that houfe, that they would honour a bill which might be drawn, was adjudged to be obligatory, although the money had been advanced before the promife was made } as the merchant C3 in 22 APPENDIX. [Numb. II. in Rotterdam^ by relying on that promife, might have been prevent- ed from reforting for further fecurity to the perfon who originally drew upon him. And in general it may be ftated, that any aft by which the perfon making the promife has benefit, or the perfon to whom it is made has any labour or detriment, is a fufEcicnt confidcra- tion. A confideration, abfolutely pafTed before a promife is made, will not be fufficient ; for inftance, a promife of reward in confideration of having bailed a fervant from prifon. Dyer 272. i RoL Abr. n. Hayes y, Warren^ 2 Str. 933. But if an act is fncomplete, the con- tinuance and completion of it may fupport a promife to make a compenfation for the whole that is done both prior and fubfequent: as, if the aflignees under a commiflion of bankrupt promife the book-keeper of the bankrupt that, if he will continue to fettle and arrange the books, they will pay him the arrears of his wages. See feveral cafes upon this fubjecl, Comyns, Aftion of AflTumpfit, J5. 12. "Where the aft which is the confit?eration of the promife is founded upon a preceding requeft, it is fufficient. See Williams n. O/horne^ V. Rogers y I Saund, 264. , ^ Any preceding moral duty is alfo a fufficient confideration ; as, if one perfon fhould pay the cxpence of nurfing the child of another, or if medical affiflance has been given to the pauper of a parifh, a promife of payment by the father or overfeer would be obligatory. Scott v. Ndfctiy N, P. Efp. Dig, TVatfon v. Turner^ BuILN. P.14T. An engagement to pay a debt contraftcd during infancy, or barred by bankruptcy and certificate, Is in general rather the waiver of an exception than an original cctraft; but under particular: cir- cumftances they may form tlie ground of a fpecific and pofitivc obligation. A promife, made to a perfon who is a flranger to the confidera- tion, cannot be fuflained except under particular circumftances ; as where, upon a fcrvice being performed by a father, he (lipulated for a reward to his daughter; and it was held that the daughter might fuflain an aftion upon this engagement. See Dutton v. PocUy 1 Ventr, 318. Sir T, jcnesy 103. Vi. No. IV. pofl. "N^^here a perfon, who is already under an engagement of a limi- ted nature, promifes to perform that engagement, no new duty- arife^ from the promife, nor is the obligation rendered more exten- fivc unlefs it is founded upon fome frefh confideration, as forbear- ance to fue, a remiffion of part of the obligation, £5*r. Therefore an executor promifing to pay a debt of his teflator, Rann v. Hughes^ 7 Z. 22. 350. n. or a huiband promifing to pay the debt of his wife, JMiicfjinfon Numb. IL3 Of the Confideration of Contrasts. a 3 Ultchinfin v. Hefvfon^ 7 T. R. 348. docs not render himfelf pcr- foaaily liable, and is only chargeable to the amount of his afTets in the firft cafci or jointly with his wife in the other, as if no fueh promife had be^n made : the former oi thefe points was eftabliOi* cd in the cafe before the Houfe of Lords that has been already men- tioned. The Chief Baron dated the pofition in the following terms : The being indebted is of itfelf a fufficient confideration to ground a promife ; but the promife mud be co-ex tcnfive with the conGderation, unlefs fome particular conGderation of HSt can be found to warrant the extcnfjoa of it. If a perfon indebted in one right, in confideration of forbearance for a particular time, promife to p*iy in another right, this convenience will be a fufficient con- fideration to warrant an a£lion againd him in the later right. But in this cafe the executor derives no advantage or convenience from the promife here made 5 for, if I promife generally to pay up'on re- qucft what I was liable to pay upon requed in another right, I derive no advantage or convenience from the promifej and there- fore there is not a fufficient confideration- for it. A doubtful right may be compromifcd, and that compromifc may be the confideration of a valid promife. But if one perfon has a right of a£lion againd another, and a fatisfa£tion is agreed upon, the agreement is of no effeft unlefs it is executed. It' can furni(h no defence to the original demand on the pne fide, and is no foundation for a promife on the other, §ee Lynn v. Bruce^ 2 H, B. 317. and the cafes there cited, — a rule which is rather founded upon precedent and authority, than upon any principles of reafon. But a bond or a negotiable indrument, which furnifli in themfelves a dire£l caufe of adion, are a fufficient execution of an accord and a defence again d the original demand. See Kear-- JIake V. Morgan^ ^ T, R. 513, and the cafes there cited. Though a perfon, who gratuitoufty engages to perform any z£t for another, is not liable in law to any a£tion for not performing his promife> he is anfwerable for any injury occafioned by his neg- ligence in the performance. This is the point decided in the im- j)ortant cafe ofCoggs v. Btrnard^ 2 Lord Rdiym.gog. and is a principal fubjeflt of Sir William Jones*s Eflay on the Law of Bailments. The civil law has adopted a rule refpefting the non-perfornv- tnce of. fuch a gratuitous commiffion, which appears highly rea- fonable, but has not (J conceive) been adopted in the law of Eng^ land: That the commiffion mud be renounced in fuitablc tim^. VinniuSi in his commentary upon a paflage in the inditutes to this efied, faysi a renunciation is either timely, that is, whild the per- fon for whofe ufe the commiffion is undertaken retains a perfe£l; pppoitunity pf tra^la^linjg the fame bufinel^ with equal advantage ; C 4 or «4 APPENDIX. [Numb. IL or untimely, that is, when he can no longer tranfa3 the fame buf^efs either by himfelf or by means of any othei perfon j and that the perfon undertaking the commilTion is anfwerable for any damage which may be incurred by an untimely renunciation, un- lefs there is fome juft caufe for it : for in (lance, if the party whofc buGneis is undertaken becomes infolvent, fo that the other will not be able to recover the expence which he may incur. Sir William Jones argues very forcibly, that the law of England ought to admit an afiion for the nonfeafance of a gratuitous undertaking (or man- date) when fpecial damage is occafioncd thereby. The cafe of Elfe€ V. Gatwardi j^T. R 143. is a determination to the contrary, but the particular point and the reafoning connefled with it were Tery flightly adverted to ; the cafe being wholly referred to mere legal precedents, upon the general proportion that an a£lion can- not be maintained for the non-performance of a gratuitousLpromife. It is remarkable, that, whild the reafoning of Lord Ch. Holtf in Coggs and Bernard^ is generally cited wi^h admiration, and the cafe itfelf is looked up to as of the firfl authority, fo little recourfe has been had in fubfequent cafes to the grand fources from which that reafoning is derived ; that the mode of reafoning and invef- tigation which has been fo much approved fhould have been fo little purfued. Where a contraft is entered into, which is not executed on the one fide at the time, but there is a mutual engagement to be per»- formed at a future period, the promife of the one party is a con- (ideration for the promife of the other, and the engagement mud become obligatory upon both parties at the fame indant y fo that a promife, however ftrongly made, may be rctra£^ed until it has received validity from the aflent of the other party \ and if there is no other confideration than the mutual promifes, a condition leaving one of the parties an unqualified right to diflent, may be taken advan- tage of by the other. This is confirmed by a decifion which took place a few years ago in the King's Bench. Oxley agreed to fell goods to Cookiy if he would purchafe them, and give notice by four in the afternoon \ he. gave the notice, but as the engagement in the mean time was all on one fide, the feller was held to be at liberty to recede. 3 J. 72. 653. But this mutuality only refers tp the complete intention of the parties, and not to thofe exceptions which are introduced by the law for the benefit or proteftipn of one of them ; and of which that party has a right to take advantage in avoidance of the tranfadion. Thus in cafe a mutual coiitpA is entered into between a minor and a perfon of full age, the one may take advantage of his minority, and refift the completion of the agreement ; but that right cannot be urged by the other, to Ihew Numb, n.] Ofibe Confideration ofContraSs. 25 (hew that^ as there was not a mutual legal obligatfonj there was not an adequate confideration for his engagement. Holt v. Wari^ ClarencieuXy 2 S/r. 973. The oafe of a married woman is materially difFerent, for (he is under a legal difability to contra£^^ and not merely entitled to a If one party to a contrail has defrauded the oth::ij it may be fhewn againft him as a bar to the performance ; but it is manifleft that he would never be admitted to alledge his own fraudulent con- duct as an exeufe. But it may not be neceflary in every inilance that the mutual promife ihall be dire£lly proved, provided it may bp fairly prefum* ed ; as> if a woman fues upon a promife of marriage, it has been held that (he might recover though no a£kual promife from herfelf Aould be (hewn, provided (he has teftiiied her aiTent by the gene- ral tenor of her conduct. HtOton v. Manfelli 3 Salk. 16. The cafe referred to is in a book of very inferior authority, but feems founded upon a fair and reafonable principle. The cafe of Bills of Exchange and PromifTory Notes affi>rds, in fome degree, an exception to the general rule which has been under difcul&on. Whei;^ they are indorfed over for a valuable con(ideration|' the want of confideration between the original parties is immaterial ; as between the immediate parties a confideration is prefumed, but if the contrary is (hewn, it is a fufficient defence. It will not benecefiarf at prefent to enlarge upon the do£lrine conne£ied with thefe princi- ples. « N U M B E R in. (Referred to, Vol. I. p. 32.) Of Ptrfons capable or incapable of CoutroBlng. The power of tutors or curators to contrail on behalf of tihe perfons under their charge, is not recognized by the law of England* The committee of a lunatic's eilate has, under the authority of the Lord Chancellor, the management of his property ; but caimot, as I conceive, enter into any contra£l which (hall be regarded as obli- gatory upon the perfon intrufted to his care. Some important obfervations were made refpefling pattial and general derangement of mind, by Lord Thurlow, in the cafe of the Attorney General v. Parnther^ 3 Bro. CL Rep. 441. which it will be defirable to cite. « There is" (he faid) «* an infinite, nay an almo(^ unfur- 26 APPENDIX. [Numb.IlL nnfurmotintable difficulty in laying down abftrafi»propo(itions upon a fubjed which depends upon fuch a variety of circumftancesj as the legal competency of the mind to the a£l in which it is engaged $ if its competency be impeached by pofitive evidence of anterior de- rangement, or affe£ted by circumflancfes of bodily debility fuffi- ciently ftrong to lead to a fufpicion of intelleftual incapacity. Ge- neral rules are eafily framed, but the application of them creates confiderable difficulty in all cafes, in which the rule is not fuHicient- ly comprehenfive to meet each circumftance, which may enter into and materially afFeft the particular cafe. There can be no difficulty in faying, that if a mind be poffefled of itfelf, at the period of time fuch mind afled^ it ought to aft efficiently. But this rule goes a very little way towards that point which is ncccflarj^ to the prefent fubjefl ; for though it be true, that a mind in fuch pofTeffion of itfelf ought, when a£^ing, to a£l efficiently ; yet it is extremely difficult to lay down with tolerable precifion the rules, fcy which fuch (late of mind can be tried. The courfe of proce- dure for the purpofe of trying the (late of any party's mind allows of rules. If derangement be all^dged, it is clearly incumbent on the party alledging it to prove fuch derangement. If fuch derange- ment be proved or admitted to have exifted at any particular period, but a lucid interval be allcdgcd to have prevailed at the period par^ ticularly referred to, then the burthen of proof attaches oq the party alledging fuch lucid interval, M^ho mud (hew fanity and competence at the period when the a£l was done, and to which the lucid inter- val refers ; and it certainly is bf equal importance, that the evidence in fupport of the allegation of a lucid interval, after derangement at any period has been e(labli(hed, (hould be as (Irong, and as de- monftrative of fuch faft, as where the obje£l of the proof is to cftabli(h derangement. The evidence in fuch a cafe, applying to ftated intervals, ought to go to the (late and habit of the perfon, and not to the accidental view of any individual, or to the degree of felf-poiTeffion in any particular aft ; for from an aft with re- ference to certain circumftanccs, and which does not of itfelf mark the redoration of that mind which is deemed necefTary in general to the difpo(ition and management of.afFairs, it were certainly ex- tremely dangerous to draw a conclufion fo general, as that the party who had confeiTedly before laboured under a mental derange- ment was capable of doing afts binding on himfelf and others". The whole of this doftrine was laid down near a century before by M. D* Agueffeauy as advocate^general in the parliament of Parii (the duty of which office in civil caufes is that of afleiTor /o the court), hi the cafe of the Pijince De Conty i a tranflat^ou of whic^ IpKO-* Numb, in.]] Perfons capable or incapable of Contracting, ay I propofe laying before the public, as containing a ricw of fevera^ impoTtailt topics of general jurifprudence difcufled with the moit confummate knowledge, and the moft commanding eloquence. His dcfcription of the nature of a lucid interval is as follows : ** It muft not be a fuperficial tranquillity, a (hadow of repofe, but on the contrary a profound tranquillity, a real repofe ; not s mere ray of reafon which only ferves to render its abfence more manifeft as foon as it is diflipated, not a flafli of lighten** ing which pierces through the darknefs only to render it more thick and difmal, not a glimmering twilight which conneds the day with the night, but a perfe£t light, a livdy and con<* tinued radiance, a full and entire day feparating the two nighta of the madnefs which precedes and that which follows it ; and, . to adopt another image, it is not a deceitful and ^aithlefs ftillnefs^ which follows or forbodes a temped, but a fore and fteady peace for a certain time, a real Qalm and a perfe£^ ferenity ; in {hortf without looking for fo many different images to rcprefent our idea, it muft not be a fimple diminution, a remiilion .of the malady, bul a kind of temporary cure, an intermiilion fo dearly marked that it is entirely fimilar to the reftoration of health. And, as it is impofHble to judge in a moment of the quality of an interval, it is neceflary that it fhould laft fuiliciently long to give an entire aflurance of the temporary re-eilabliihment of reafon ; this period it is not poflible to define in general, and it depends upon the different kinds of madnefs. But it is always certain that there muft be a time, and that time confiderable. Thefe reflections are not only written by the hand of nature on the minds of all men, the law alfo adds its characters in order to engrave them more pro- foundly in the heart of judges." (a) In the fequel of his judgment, the Lord Chancellor referred td the cafe of Greenwood and Greenwood^ in which a queftion turned . upon this, " whether a mind found to general purpofes, being in* fluenced by a falfe imagination, an unreafonable perfuafion, in the doing a particular a£l:, was not fufficient to avoi^ fuch a£t," and obferved, " that a queftion of fo great; extent involved ferious con* fideration." In that particular cafe there, were contradictory ver- dids, and the difpute was probably fettled by compromife. t can- not but think that a mental diforder, operating upon particular fub- jefts, ihoXild) wkh regard to thofe fubjeCls, be attended with the fame effc€ts as a total deprivation of reafon ; and that, on the other hand, fuch a partial diforder, operating only upon particular fub* {(t) R€fc bc'dctd (oBK pafibsetfrom the «ivii taw in fopportof bitobienraticn. jedts. aS APPENDIX. [Numb.m. ' ■ . I jeGt$i (hould not in its legal efFe£ls have an influence more exten« five than the fubjeds to which it applies ; and that every queilion (hould be reduced to the pointy whether the 2l& under confideration proceeded from a mindfully capable, in refpe£fc of that zSt, ofex- ercifing a free, found, and difcriminating judgment: but in cafe the infirmity is eftabliihed to exift, the tendency of it to dire£t or. fetter the operations of die mind (hould be in general regarded as fuflBcient prefumptive evidence, without requiring a dire£t and pofitive proof of its aflual operation. Where the exiftcnce of de- rangement is {hewn in general, the partiality of its operation in the particular inilance (hould be manifeftiy and incontcilably proved, in order to prevent the application of its general effedl. There are fcveral old authorities in the Englijh law, that a perfon Ihall not be allowed to ftultify himfelf ; or, in other words, that he (hall not be permitted to allege that his folemn zOis are void, at having been done whilft in a (late of mental incapacity \ but that advantage could only be taken of the defe£l by his reprefentatives* Modem deciCons feem to have exploded this di{lin£lion, than which pothing could be more abfurd j for it is always a queftion of fa£V, 'whether a given z6l is imputable to a given individual \ and where the nature of the zOt requires a mind capable of rational aflent, the want of fuch capacity is- a negation ^of the a£l imputed. An ample account of the principles which prev^iil in our courts of juftice upon the fubje£l of infanity is given in Mr. Fonblanqu^t valuable notes to the treatife of equity. With refpedl to drunkennefs. Lord Hardnviche refufed to fetafidc an agreement on account, of one of the parties being drunk when it was made, as there did not appear to have been any unfair ad- vantage taken, and the agreement was reafonable in itfelf. i Vef. 19. But in a former cafe Lord Ch. Juftice Holt held that a perfon might (hew in oppofition to the validity of a bond, that he was made to fign it when he was fo drunk that he did not know what he did. Bull. N. P. 192. But though the mere circumftance of being in a ftate of intoxi- cation is not fufficient to vitiate an agreement, it would be evident- ly improper to confider any ^lBL as binding which might be d6ne by a perfon who (to ufc the language of the Treatife of Equity) is fo exceflively drunk that he is utterly deprived of reafon or un-» derftanding; for it can by no means be a ferious and deliberate confent, and without this no contrail can be binding by the law of nature. Mere weaknefs of underftanding, or a haraffed and uneafy ftate of mind, not amounting to a pofitive derangement of intelle£l, doea Numb, in.] Perfons capable or incapable ofContraSling. 29 does not fumiOi a fubftantive obje&ion to the validity of a con* tra£l, but in conjunftion with other circumftances, efpecially with the exerdfe of an improper influence, may be often very material ip tainting a contrad with fraud. Mere infants cannot contraft on account of the want of that underftanding wkich is neceflary to exercife a confent ; but befidea this, there is in almoft every fyftem of law a period, during which perfons are under a legal prote&ion, on account of the judgment not being fuf&ciently matured: and though the mind, individually fpeaking, may be fully capable of exercifing an adequate judgpient^ the law which a&s upon general principles, will not permit a valid engagement to be contra£ied within that period. The particular age of acquiring a legal capacity, muft be in a great meafure arbi- trary. In England the age at which it is acquired is twenty-one, but there are gradations of age under that period at which a perfon acquires a legal capacity for particular purpofes, as marriage, mak- ing a will, until a late ftatute a£ting as an executor. All perf m which it is uot allowed by inteu* tjoa Numb, in J Perfons capable or incapable rfContraSing^ 3 1 ^n of law, and in which confequently it does not in natural juftice cxift/' Married women are by the law of England incapable of making any valid contrj£i> and this is not as in the cafe of infants, merely a prbte£tion, but an abfolu^ difability. Their contrafis are^not Voidable, but void. A hulband is anfwerable for neceifaries fup- plied to his wife fuitable to his rank and fortune, but this is the contrack of the hufband by the intervention of the' wife, and not the perfonal contrafl of the wife. There are fome excepted cafes to the general rule, that a married woman has no capacity to contra£t. The earlieft exception is in the cafe of the hufband having abjured the realm ; the cafes of the hufband being an alien epemy, or being banifhed by a£t of parliament, or even tranfported for feven years, have fince been added ; and it has lately been dc« tcrmined, that the wife of a perfon living in a foreign country^ was from the neceflity of the cafe enabled to oblige herfelf by her contrafts. DeGaillonv. VAigk. i jB^/! 357. Property may be fettled in various ways fo as to be fubjeft to the difpofition of married women, but this is by no means incon- fiftent with a general incapacity to contnGt ^ it is to be regarded merely as a modification of the particular property, and is not attended with thofe circumflances . of perfonal liability which the zGt of contra&ing naturally implies. In fome modem cafes it has been held that where a married woman by agreement lives fcparate from her hufband, and has a feparate maintenance ^-^ttled upon her, her general difability U removed, and that her contracts are equally obligatory with thofe rf other perfons. The court of King's Bench afTuredly afTumed in thofe decifiont tn authority which reached the extreme limits of judicial difcrc- tion. In later cafes the courts evinced a great averfion to extend the doftrine further, and accordingly it was decided that a mar- ried woman by eh)pir>g from her hufband and living in adultery, or by carrying on a fcparate trade, or by having an allowance of alimony during a fuit in the fpiritual court, does not acquire any fpecial power to contraft, which prevents the application of the general' rule of law. And finally, upon folemn argument before «1I the judges, it was determined that a contra£i made by a mar- ried woman is void, notwithftanding a feparate maintenance. By this decifion, the authority of the cafes introducing a contrary doc- trine is exploded, and the law is reflored to its ancient channels Matfiallv. Rutton^ 8 T. R. 545. By particular cuftom, as in London^ a wife may carry on trade feparately 3* APPENDIX. [Numb. IV. I fcparately from her huiband, and with refpefl to fuch fepante tnide» (he is fubje£t to the fame liabilities as if fingle. NUMBER IV. (Referred to Vol. I. p. 34.) Of the Rule, that a perfon can only Jiipulate or promife for him/elf The text of the Inflitutes upon this fubjetS: fays, that if one man promifes that another (hall give or do any thing he is not bounds as if he undertakes that Titius ihall give five pounds, but if he en- gages to procure Titius to give five pounds, he is bound. &i quis olium daturum faBuriimve promiferit, non ohligmhitury veluti f fpondeat Titium quinque aureos daturum ; quod J! effeBurum fe ut Titius daret fpopondtrit^ oUigatur, Vintiius in commenting upon this paflage, ob-' ferves, Noftris et multorum aliorum morihus qui faBum alienum pro* mittitf tacite intelligitur promittere fe curaturum aut effeBurum ut alius det autfaciat, I conceive that the rule itfelf is no M^here formally adopted in the law of England, and can have no other cStOt than as it necefTarily refults from the natural reafon of the thing ; and that if one man engages that an a£^ fhall be done, by another, he is; liable to damages in cafe it is not done, provided there are the other requifites for an obligatory contrad. The diflindion, however, is in a great meafure verbal, as according to all the'fyflems of jurifpru-^ dence, it becomes finally a queftion of intention, whether the party engaged perfonally that the a£b fhould be done, and meant to fub- je& himfelf to the fame refponCbility in cafe of non-performance, as if the engagement related to an zQi of his own. • With refpedl to one perfon receiving a promife for the benefit of another, it has been held that an aflion might be maintained by a daughter for non-performance of a promife made to her father for her benefit upon a conGderation moving from the father. Dutton v» Poole., I Ventris 318. 332. T. Jones 103. the neamcfs of the relation. be- tween the father and the daughter was held fufiictent to entitle her to maintain the adlion upon the promife to her father. Lord Mans^ field has faid, that it was difficult to conceive how a doubt could be entertained upon the point {Cowp. 837, Doug» 146,) but the decifion was certainly very anomalous ; and in other cafes it has been held, • that a perfon, for whofe benefit a promife was m^e to another, could not maintain an a£lion for the non-performance c^ it. 1 Ventris 6. I S/r. 592. But I conceive^ that according to the law of Kinnb. IV.3 OfaPerfmftipid^ab^mrpnmi/af^firm^ 33 of Saglamlt (difiering in diis tefped from the drll law,) tn idion maybe maintained hj the perfon to whom the promile was madey aldioogh the benefit refulting from it was intended for another. In the cafe ef Mmnhinglm ▼. Vtrrnn^ at njff frhut T. 27 Gm. 3. B.R. I B^. fsT P. loi. n. where the holder of a bill recover- ed againft die affignees of die drawcey upon their promife of pay* ment mack to the drawer, it was faid by ByUer, that, independent of die rules which prerail in mercantile tranfadions, if a perfoa makes a promife to another for the benefit of a third, diat third perfon may maintain an a£lion upon it. The reporters laft men« tioned truly obfenre, toI. 3. 149. it. that with rtfpe& to die light of a diiid perfon, to fue upon a parol promife made to an* edier for his benefit, there is great contradi£lion amongft the older cafes, all (tf which are colle&ed, i Fin.0i.fi. 333 to 337. AGim ^ Afm^. See FeUmakeri^ Ctmp.^. Davis, 1 B^. 98. bi Pig/i ▼• Thm»^H^ 3 B^. 147. it was decided,, that upon an agieemeat nude with die crcmimiffioners of a turnpike road, to take the toll at a cer* tain rent to Ar fmd U tbe tnafurtr, no aQion could be maintained by die treafurer, but that decifion was rather founded upon a con« ftradHon of the intendon, than upon the application of any ge« neral rule, as to the right of one perfon to fue upon the promife made for his benefit to another. In Martjn v. Hinde, C^wp. 437. it was contended that a cerd* ficate given by a re£lor to the bifhop, upon the appointment of curate, undertaking to continue him at a certain fahry until otherwife provided for, was merely a contraA with the bifliop» and for his indemnity, upon which no afiion could be maintained by die curate; but it was truly anfwered by the court, that this was not a contrad with the bifiiop, but a certificate and aftrance t» him of a matter of fad, t . e. it was evidence of an aftual contraCk vith, and promife to the curate* Where an engagement is made by deed, or odierwife, to A, for die benefit and on the behalf of B, and the aftion is brought by A, or the engagement is performed to him, the confequent obli« pdons between A and B depend upon principles unootme&ed with, and irrelevant to the prefent difcuflion; which is confined to die obligation, and refponfibiiity of the original debtor. In equity, it is a leading principle, that all the perfons con# cenied in intereft muft be parties in the fuit, and an arrange* meat is made according to the fubftance of die tranfadion^- and die real interefts of tbe perfons entitled, without reference to die mode or circumftances of the contrad, which ar^ only re* pidcd as inftrumental to the intereft \ and it is the peculiar pro- Vol.il ' D vince 34 APPENDIX. CNumbilV. vince and cluraftcriftic diftinaion of thofe courts, to obviate the technical difficulties which might arilc from the mode and form of the tranfa£lion in a court of law. The remaining topic of confideration, is the recognition fonje-r times admitted by courts of law, of the real. and fubftantial intereft in the fuit, and of the charaQer of the perfon aaually inteteacd, as diflinft from the perfon who inftitutea the fuit, as upon an engagementjpaade to himfclf. Where a bond was made to A for the benefit of B, it was hel4 that the latter could neither fuc upon it, nor releafc it. Offiij v. Wardt X Lev- 235- '^le fame rule would apply in the cafe of an affignment of a bond, by the obligee to a third perfon : the ac- tioQ muft be brought in the name of the original obligee. In thefe cafes, if the obligee rekafed the obligor, if might bfc pleaded as a defence by the obUgor» and I apprdiend that in'gcneraj it could be no anfwer to ftate upon tlie recn*ereftedwete ^dieu enemies •. to this it was^Hed, that the pobcies wcreeftaed Kttinb. IV.3 Of a Terfmftipuiating $r pnmi/ingfer another. 35 before tlie war^ and that the parties imciefted were indebted to the plaintiffj who had a lien on die monies to be recoYexed in the ac« tian, to a greater amount than the fum claimedy and judgment was given for the defendant. Brandon ▼. Ne/bett^ 6 7. R. 23. But this cafe proceeding upon principles of public policy^ is no authority in refped to general cafes not afie^ed by the fame confideration^ and does not eftahlifli any general propofition, that a perfonal difability in the party beneficially entitled^ is a bar to an a&ion inftituted on his behalfy by another to whom an engagement i3 nominally mside. An aAion was brought in the name of a confignor of goods as fadorf againft a carrier for damage occafioned by negleA. A letter written by the plaintiff was adduced in exculpation of the defendant : the effeA of this was obje£^ed to^ as it appeared by tbe lame letter that other perfons were the real owners of the goods, and that they had indemnified the plaintiff ^ and it was"^ aigued that the perfons interefted ought not^ to be prejudiced by tbe admtflion of their agent } but it was held that the admiflion of the plaintiff on the record muft be evidence in the caufc. Bamrman f.Radmha^ 7 T. It» 663. Lord Ktnyon in that cafe made feveral raluable obfervations^ as to the impropriety of innovating upon the fettled principles of dielaw> in order to meet the exigencies of particular convenience. I hope that I (ball be ex^fed for having extended this difcuiEon fo far beyond the limits of the fubje& which immediately occafioa* fdit.' N U M B E R V. (Referred to. Vol. I. p. 53.) Of tbe InterpretattM of Agreements* As erery contrad derives its efie6^ from the intentioo of the parties, that intention, as exprefied or inferred, muft be the ground and principle of every decifion refpe£ling its operation and extent^ and the grand objed of confideration in every queftion with regard to its conftruZHon. Mr. Powell defines con/hruBion to be the drawing an inference by diea£t of reafon, as to the intent of an infirtement^ from given Ctrl' ^omftancest upon principles deduced from men's general motivesy eoodufi, and a£Hon* Thb definition may perhaps not be fufficiently complete, inaf* much as the term infirununt generally implies ibmething reduced iato writing, whereas confiruiHon is equally neccffary to afc?rt^in the D 2 meaning 3<5 APPENDIX. [Nuinb.V. meaning of engagements merely verbal. In other refpeQs it ap« pears to be perfeftly accurate^ The Trcatifc of Equity defines interfretatipn to be the coUedion of the meaning out of figns raoft probable. Where an agreement is of known and general natnre, it is nn-^ neceiTary to exprefs the circumfta^ces which are commonly in- cident to it } thefe are neceflFarily prefumed to be in the contempla- tion of the parties, and if any variation is intended^ that mud be particularly mentioned ; long and uninterrupted ufage may afford certainty to expreflions which are vague and inaccurate in them- felvesy and give tStOt to inftruments which would be otherwife unintelligible and void. This is the cafe with regard to policies of infurancci which modem judges have agreed in confidering as very inaccurate, and imperfe^ in their original ftnifture, but as having acquired a definite Hgnificatioit from the long period during which the fame form has fubfifted, and the general adop- tion which it has received. Buty in afcribing the true conftru£lion to contrails of a detached and independent nature, or to thofe variations which are occafional- ]y ..and fpecially introduced in regard to contrails in general ufe, and of definite fignification, confiderable difficulties frequently arife,the folution of which muft chiefly depend upon confidering the prinopal objed of the contra£ling parties, the greater fubfer- viency t^ that objedS in adopting the one or the other conftruc-* tion of ambiguous phrafe \ the mutual relation of the different parts, with the mutual illudration which they may contribute or receive ; and in cafes where a manifed abfurdity or repugnance may refult from a liteml conftruftidn of the terms employed by redraining or extending their general fignification, according to the evident reafon and juftice of the fubje£^, and the intention which may from thence be reafonably inferred. Wherever a fpecial agreement is entered into, it is of importance diftin£bly to exprefs the objed which is in view, not refting too much upon the force and edkacy of a general expreflion applied to an unufual fubjedi \ and alfo to confider and provide for the dif- ferent contingencies which may eventually arife. The want of this caution has often been produ£tive of confider^ able confttfion) and Lord Mansfield has in feveral indances taken notice of the want of accuracy in defcribing the intended import of fpecial agreements, or in fupperaddipg particular claufes in mercantile tranfafiions ; though it is agreed that they ought to ha^e* a liberal interpretation, and are notredridedto any technical txpreflions. Speaking of theefi^efl of the common agreement in a policy to return part of die premium, if the (hip fails with con* Kttmb.Vj huerpretation of Agreements. 37 roji and arrive/^ after mentioning die general inaccuracy which las been already adverted tOj he faid, << It is amazing, that when additional daufes are introduced, the merchants do not take fome advice in framiilg them, or beftow more confideradon upon thenv thenfelves. I do not recollefl an addition being made, which has not created doubts on the conftrudicon of it." Swwnd v. BoydelL Dwg. 255. A full defcription of the intention is very different from an a;i- neceflary multiplication of words, which is in itfelf a fburce of confiderable confufion, bo^ in private tranfa£lions and in adls of public authority. Speaking of the charter-parties of the Eaft India Company, Lord Mansfield faid, the charter-party is an old inftru-» nent, unformal, and by the introdudion of different claufes^ at different times, inaccurate, and fometimes contradi£lory. Like all mercantile contrads, it ought to have a liberal interpretations- Many of the difficulties which have been faifed are occafioned by die multiplicity of unneceflary words, introduced with a view to be more explicit, an efkfk which often arifes from the fame caufe in ads -of parliament. HMatn v. Eaft India Company^ Doug. 27 a. Upon any addition being made to, or any alteration being introdu- ced in accuftomed form, its effe£l and tendency upon the whole llionld be attentively conGdered, fo that the remaining parts of the form may be properly adapted to the new provifions, in order to avoid thofe inconfiftencies and contradiQions, which for want fs if there was no ftranding, and to attribute the lofs conclufively to it if there was. The court decided that the infurers were liable, and lord Kenyon^ in the courfe of his judgment, faid» if a general provifion is made in any deed or inftrument, and it is there faid that certain things ihall be excepted, unlefs another thing happen, which gives effed to the general operation of the deed ; if that o^r thing does happen, it deftroys the exception altogether. With- out inquiring into the reafons for introducing this exception, on the grammatical conftrudiion of the whole I have no doubt. If it had been intended that the underwriters fliall be only anfwerable for the damage that arifes in confequence of ftranding, a fmall variation of expreffion would have removed all difficidty. BarnH v. KenfingUm^ 7 J. R. 222. And in a fubfequent cafe alio arifing upon policy of infurance, he faid, the words here ufed are not equivocal, and we ought not to depart from them ; it would be at- tended with great mifchief and inconvenience, if in conftrumg contraAs of this kind we were not to decide according to tlie words ufed by the contrading parties ; the grammatical conftruc- tion of the words is the fafeft rule to go by. Bochem v. Stirling^ r. R. 423. And in a queftion refpedmg tlie conftruftion of a leafcihe £ud, if Nusdi. V.2 Int}rpr^ation x)f jfgrtdhents. 39 S I were to indulge in conjefture and fpecnlation as to anj fup- pofed intention of die parties not exprefled in the deed, I ihould have as littic doubt (as upon the words) } but I difclaim proceed- ing upon any fuch ground. It i$ fufficient for me to fay, that the lefiee has not entered into the covenant infifted upon, by the kflbr ; the parties have met here upon the conftrudiion of a folemn inftrument, in vhich their refpedive rights and duties are clearly piefcribed ; and we cannot fubftitute any other contraft in lieu of diat into which they have entered. Gerard v. Ciifiont 7 T. R» 6^6. This fubje& has alib been very well confidered in a cafe before the fnpreme court of the United States of America, refpc^ling the tonftni6lion of the treaty of peace with Great Britain. During thfe war the State of Virginia made a law, that all perfons indebted to BrUtfli fubje&s might pay the amount into the loan-office, which ihould be a good difcharge. By the treaty of peace it was provided that '< creditors of either fide fliould meet with no lawful impedi* ments for the recovery of their debts." /fhe defend'ant had paid the money into the loan-office j but it was held that in confe- quence of the treaty of peace he was liable to the plaintiff. Judge Cbacey in giving his opinion to that effeA, faid, *< In the conftruc- tion of contra£^s, words are to be taken in their natural and obvious meaning, unlefs fome good reafon be affigned to (hew that they ihould be underilood in a different fenfe. The univerfaKty of the terms is equal to an exprefs fpecification jon the treaty, and indeed includes it. For it is fair and conclufive reafoning, that if any defcription of debtors or clafs of cafes was intended to be except- ed it would have been Cpecified. The indefinite and fweeping ^ords made ufe of by the parties exclude the idea of any clafs of cafeii having been intended to be excepted, and explode the do&rine of conilTu£live difcriinination. The article appears to come within the firil general maxim of interpretation laid down by Fattel: ** It is not permitted to interpret what has no need of interpretation. When an a£i is conceived in clear and precife terms, wlien the fenfe is manifeft, and leads to nothing abfurd, there can be no. reafon to refufe the fenfe which Ms treaty naturally profents. To go elfewhere in fearch of conjejiures, in ordet to reftrain or ex- tinguifii it, is to endeavour to elude it. If this dangerous method be once admitted, there will be ho z6t which it will not render ufelefs. Let the brighteil light ihine on all the parts of the piece, let it be exprcfl<^d in terms the moft clear and deterniixtate ; all - tins ihall be of no ufci if it be allowed to fearch for foreign rcafons in order to maintain what cannot be found in the fenfe it naturally prdents." Fatt. A 2. c. 17. $263. tFan v. Hfltgn, 3 Da//a^ D 4 Reports^ 40 APPENDIX. [Nuiob.V. Rtpcrtif 199. The vhole of this cafe, and alfo of a cafe of HamjU ion jr. Eaton^ Martin^ 79. in vbich the fame point was decided by the circuit court of North Carolina^ very well defenre attentioni as containing a clear and inftruflive view of the nature and efie£ls of treaties. NU.M B E R VI. (Intended to have been referred to, Vol.1, p. 72. N* 121.) . Of Injuries and NigUBs. The do^lrinei that fathers and others (hall be refponfible for the aAs of children under their care, which it was in their power to prevent, appears highly reafonable ; but I am not aware of any cafe in which it is adopted in the Engfi/b law. Withrefpedl to the refponfibility of maftefs for the a£b of their fervants, a (ingular diftih£lion has been taken, that the matter is only refponfible for the injuries of his fervant, which arife from negligence, and not forthofe which proceed from his wilful wrong. Salk. 441. Day v. Edwards^ 6 T. R. 648. M^Manus v. Criclett^ I Eafii 106. {a). An a£tion cannot be maintained againft a fer- vant, who hires labourers for his mafter on account of a&s done by them \ it muft be either againft the perfons committing the in- jury, or the mafter for Vhom the a£l was done* Stonev* Carhvright^ 6 T.R. 412. It feems extremely clear that with refpe£l to aAs committed by fervants, without reference to the fun£iions in which they are employed, ho refponfibility attaches to the mafters. Mr. Juftice BulUr^ fpeaking in illuftration of the queftion, how far a man was bound by the^a^l of an agent executing his commiffion, faid << There is a clafs of cafes which have been thought to bear ex- tremely hard upon- mafters, who are held liable for the mssfeaf« ance of their fervants, in driving their carriages againft thofe of third perfons ; but thofe cafes muft have been determined on the ground, that it muft be prefumed that the fervants have aAed under the orders of their mafters« But fuppofe a mafter ordered his fervant not to take his horfes and carriage out of the ftable, and the latter went in defiance of his mafter's orders, there is no authority which fays that the mafter (hall be liable for any injury done to another, by fuch z€t of the fervant, though indeed if the mafter had ordered the fervant to go a particular journey, and in [a) Tn rliit c^fcj a very full and iccorate view of the law upoB the fubjcA U takes by Loid Ktnywm the Mmnb.'^]] Of Ityuries tmd NegkSu 41 Ae courfe of it die latter did an injury to fome third perfen, the authorities fay that the mailer is liable \ Fenn v. Hamfony 3 T. R* 717. In Middktou v. Fowler^ SalL aSly it is laid down by Lord Ch. Joftice Halt as a general pofition^ that no matter is chargeable with the a£ls of his ferrant, but when he z&s in the execution of the authority gi^en him : and Lord Kenjon having cited that opinion on the cafe above alluded to^oi ATManusY. Criciett^ fays; << Now when a ferrant quits fight of the obje£l for which he is employed, and without having in view his matters orders, purfues that which his own malice fuggefts, he no longer a£bs in purfuance of the authority given him, and, according to the do&rine of Lord Hob, his matter will not be anfwerable for fuch a£V/' A different principle was adopted in a cafe at the Exchequer Sittings, in which it was held that a fervantof a glafs-houfe no- wife employed in filling the pots, and not having any tiling to do with the management of them, who threw in ibme broken glais for the purpofe of fecreting it from the matter, fubje£led the mat ter to a penalty impofed upon putting materials into a pot with- out notice to the officer. The jury were told generally that the matter was anfwerable for the ads of all the fervants employed in the manufactory, without adverting to the dittin£lion of the aCi's being totally foreign to the fun£lions to which they were en- gaged. Attorney General v. Perrin^ fittings after Michaelmas 1798. As to the liability of a (lieriff for the a£ts of his officerh fee Woodgnte v. KnjadMl, 2 T* R» 148. .NUMBER VIL (Referred to, VoL L p. 1 22.) Of Mutua/ jigreementi. 'Where there are mutual agreements, it often becomes a queftioa of importance whether they are mutual and independent,, in which cafe other party is entitled to claim a performance from the othery or to recover damages for the non-performance, and it is no ex- cufe to allege that he has himfelf been guilty of a breach in the performance of the agreement I ad Whether they are conditions* and dependent, in which cafe the performance of the one, depends upon the prior performance of the other i Or, 3dly Whether they are nmtualy and to be performed at the fame time, and in which, if one party is ready and offinrs to perform his part, he may maintain an a£tion for the default of the other^ although it is not certain that 4ft APPENDIX. CNumb.vn. Azt either is obliged to perfonn the firft ad ? See Brmley t. Smithy cited Doug. 690. In this, as in all other refpeds^ the intention of the parties mat be poGtively expre0edf and then there is no room for conftmfUon, as if a hocfe is fold on the firft of Maj^ to be paid for on the firft of June. But fuppofing there to be no diftind and abfolute agreement upon the fubjed, the dependence or independence of the refpeiflive engagements is to be cdleAed from the evident fenfe and meaning of the partiesi and however the covenants ftiay be tranfpofed» their precedency muft depend upon the order of time in which the intent of llie tranfaAion requires their per* form'ance. Each of thefe divifions may be illuftiated by familiar inftances. A landlord and tenant enter int6 reciprocal engagements; the tenant agrees to pay the rent» to plant a certain number of trees, to repair the fences ; the landlord agrees to repair the houfe, to ered a bam, to pay the taxes. If the tenant brings an aAion againft the landlord for not building the barn, it is no anfwer that Utit tenant has not planted the trees. If the landlord brings an adion for the rent, the tenant cannot infift that the houfe is out of repair. 2d, If a carrier engages to convey a bale of goods for -a certain fum, he cannot demand the money until he has brought the goods to the place appointed \ a weaver cannot demand his wages until he has completed his piece. 3d, If a horfe is fold for 20/. to be paid on delivery, one party cannot demand the horfe, without paying the money, nor the other the money, without delivering the horfe. In fome of the older cafes upon this fubje£):, we meet with deciGons apparently contrary to thefe principles, and which are founded rather upon too minute an attention to words, than upon confidering the nature of things. Modem de» terminations have marked the true diftin£lions refulting from the purpofe and objeA of the contracting parties. Lord Mansfield^ who ftated the threefold divifion already mentioned, has alfo .• fiirniihed us with the proper rule for the application of it. The diftindion is very dear: where mutual covenants go to the whole of the confideration on both fides ; diey are mutual conditional the one precedent to the other ; but where they go only to a part, where a breach 4nay be paid for in damages, there the defendant has a remedy in his covenant, and (hall not plead it as a conditiOfl precedent. The cafe to which that diftinCHon was referred, was' a conveyance of the rcverfion of a plantation with the negroea upon it, in confideration of a fum of money, and an annoity^ And it was held that the purchafcr could not with-hold the pay* ment K«iiib. Vn.3 Of Mutual Afremmu. 43 / mcnt of the aiuutitf, os account of the feller sot tieing legally po£E:fled of the Regroes, otherwiie aof one negroi not being the IMPc^erty 4»f the feller, would be a defence, Bwn ▼. Eyn^ i H. B. BL Rtf* 273. and upon the fiune principles it has been fince de- icided, that if a perlbn having a patent, agrees to let another have the free ufe of fbc invention, and to initru£k him with all poilible ^expedition in the ufe of it, for which the ot^r promifcs to pay {oo/i. upon a^particubr day, it is no excufe for refufing to pay the money, to fay that he has not been completely inftnified* Cann ffbett^ V. Jtmes^ 6 T. if. 57 1. In general, where it is a fingle aft that is to be performed upon icach fide, the rule that one party can only clainv a perfsrmance of the other^s engagement, by ofiering to periform his own, manifeftly applies ; fuch arc all executory contrafts of fale without fpecial provifioB to the contrary^ Goodifin v. Nunm^ 4 7. R. 6ti. Mortm V. LmmbT jT.lL 195. CUzibraok v. Woodrow^ 8 T. R. ^66. The rule has been fo bx relaxed, that it has been held fufficient for the porchalt^ to aver, ihat he was ready and willing to pay for the article foM, aud ready and willing to receive it, but that the feller cefttfed to deliver it. Lord Kenyan obferved, that the plaintiff was bound to prove that he was prepared to pay or tender the money ; if the defendant had been ready to receive it, and to de- liter the goods. Raw/in v. Jobnjin, % Eafl. Rep. 203. confirmed by Waterboufe v* SUnner^ 2 B^f. is^ PuL 447^ This relaxation w^ certainly very judicious, as it prevented the party from bdng ii^ jured of his right, for the want of making a formal tender, the neceffity of which would only occtir to the mind of a perfon ha- bituated to legal iludies \ but in order to fupport the allegation, I conceive it is eflcntially requifite to prove an a£tual and pofitive refufal, and that a mere non-feazance would not be fufficient; in cafe of fuch, aduai refufal being proved, I do not think it would be proper to exaft very rigid proofs, that the perfon who came to demand the exe<;ution of a fale was prepared with money for the payment ; for if the f aft appeared to be no more than a refufal to ddiver without inmiediate payment, the allegation would not be fup- ported ; and if the rcfu(al was abfolute, the perfon who had wholly dtfclaimed an intention of performance on his own part, would not be very favourably heard in requiring a proof of the power of performance in the other party. Hie queftion, whether ah agreement is mutual, fo that neither of the parties can demand a performance of the engagement of the other, without a performance or readinefs to perform his own, is effentiaHy diflferent from that wliich turns upon what (ball be ad- autted as readinefs, and whether the aft, of which the non-perform- ance 44 APPENDIX. [Numb.VH. ance is obj(f£led does or does not conftitute an cflential part of the engagement, the performance of which is admitted to be re* quiGte for enforcing the reciprocal obligation : as to whichi fee die before mentioned cafe of Boon and Eyre^ the obfervadocs there- on in GloTtebrook and Woodrowy and Duke of St. Albans v. Shore^ X /f. BL 270. cited voh i. p. 116. note (a). All the cafes upon this fiibjeft are accurately colledied, and the refult of them judiciouflf ftated bj Mr. Serjeant Williams^ in his notes to Pordage V, Cole. I Saund, 320. Hunlock v. Blacklow^ 2 Sound. 157, Petens T. Opie. 2 Saund* 350. ' Where the a£t of one party is a condition precedent to the ob- ligation of the other, it has been held, that he muft do every thing which can be done without the concurrence of the other, before the obligation can attach, and in fome inftances this rule has been applied with very great ftridinefs, Lancajhire v. KUlingwottb^ 2 Soli. ^523. But it is now fettled, that if the party who is under the con« ditional engagement, difcharges the other from the performance . of the condition, the obligation is complete and abfolute. Jonft T. Barieleyy Doug. 684« cited vo)« |, p. 122. note (c). \. NUMBER VIII.. (Referred to. Vol I. p. 124.) Of Apportionment. The law concerning apportionments may be divided into two principal heads : ift, A9 it refers to cafes of a certain property, being unequally divided between different perfons, fubje£l to a certain charge,^as in the cafe of an efta^e devifed to A. fo^ Yift^ with remainder to B» in fee fubje(El to a mortgage, or where a leafc- hold eftate is divided to A* for a particular intereft and to B. fojr the refidue, and a fine is paid for the renewal for their com- mon benefit. In thefe cafes, the whole mortgage or fine is paid, and the queflion arifes as to the manner of dividing the charge amongfl thofe entitled to the benefit, it being certain that an a|v- portionment mufl in fome inanner be made. For the rules upon this fubjed^, fee Nightingale v. Latvfony \ Bro. Ch, 44Q. Ston^ v* Theedy 2 Bro. Ch. 243, and the cafes there cited. White v. Whit^^ 4 ^^f' 24. The 2d head, which is alone connected with the fubjeft und^r difcufTion m the text, relates to certain claims or duties due in entire fums, and involves the general rule, that where the whole duty does not attach, the whole of it fails, and is lofl, notwith- ftanding Numb. Vin«] Of Apportmmentk 45 • ftanding the occurrence of part of the condition (in which def- cription I include a part^ efflux of time) upon which it is to arife. It is a general rule, that a perfonal contrad cannot be fevered or apportioned ; and upon this principle it was held, that where A. appointed C. to receive his rents at a certain annual falary, and at the end of three quarters of the year A| the mafter died ; nothing was due without a full year's fervice, and it was in the nature of a condition precedent ; Counteft of Plymouth v« Tbrogmortonj i Salk. 65. In 3 Vinet's Abridgementi p. 8. tide Apportionment^ there is a letter from that induftrious compiler, to Sir John Strange (after- wards Mafter of the Rolls), reipefling a caufe of Worth and Vimr at nifi prius^ which Sir John had at the trial (tauntingly, as it feems) recommended to be publifiied in the abridgement ; defir- ing a ftatement of that cafe, and that Sir Jphn (who had fucceed- ed in perfuading the jury to give a proportionate part of wages upon a yearly hiring)^ would point out fofne cafes, or a fingle cafe at leaft^ out of tlie year books, Fizberbert or Brooky or any book of reports fince, wherein it had been adjudged that a contrail for wages is ap- portionable. He adds, that a gentleman having called to inform him that Sir John could not fumifli any fuch report : « Where- upon I told the gentleman of the other part of my letter, and mentioned that I had never yet met with any cafe that would fup- port fuch apportionment : ^or could I find any gentleman at the bar that had, though I aflced feveral ; that I thought every gentle- man ought to do the beft he could for his client, as far as was con- fiftent with juftice, but he ought to ftop there ; that any pro- ceeding further, and fo procuring in juftice to the other fide, was utterly unjuftifiable \ and that if there was no cafe to fupport fuch apportionment, the verdi£t was againft law." He adds, that the dircdion of the court was in that cafe in favour of the defen- dant, and that the jury was guided by the counfel and not by the court. But the law is now underftood to be according to the verdi£t, and certainly that is conformable to the real intention of the parties % neverthelefs it is regarded as a fpecial and excepted cafe, and in the cafe next to be cited, the right of a common hired fervant hav- ing been adduced by way of argument, Mr. Juftice Lawrence faid^ that fuch a fervant, though hired in a general way, is confidered to be hired with reference to the general underftanding upon the fubjcd, that the fervant ihall be entitled to his wages for the time he fervesy though he do not continue in the. fervice during a whole year. The cafe referred to, was an a£tion by the perfonal reprefen-' lattve of a feamanj who had failed from Jamaica upon an under- taking, 46 APPENDIX- [Numb-VHI. takiog) to pay htm 30/. provided he condimed on boaiTdi and did his duty until the atrival of the fhip at Liverpool. He having died upon his pafiage, it^ was held that his refirelentative conk! not re» cover a proportionable part of the wages, on a quantum fmruii for work and labour* It appeared^ that if ther^ had been no fpecial contrafi, the wages due for the voyage upon a quantum meruit, would have only been about 8/. And Lord Kenyan obferved, that he ftipulated to receive the larger fum if the ^ole duty were per-* formed \ and nothing unlefs the iriiole of that duty were per* formed \ it was a kind of infurance. Mr Juftice Lamrenee faid» If we are to determine this cafe according to the terms of the !&«' ftrument alone, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, becaufe it is an entire contra£^. Cutler v. Powell^ 6. 71 R. 320. In Codiv. Jenmngt^ 7 T. R. 381. it was agreed by charter-party to pay frei^t at the rate of feven pounds ^r ftandard hundred, for deals delivered at Liverpool. The flnp before her arrival was wrecked^ and became incapable of proceeding on her voyage, 2nA the deals were put a-fliorc and taken by the freighter. The ownct dasmed a proportionate part of the freight ; but it was ruled that he could not enforce payment of any part of the money under the contra A, not having carried the goodsto Liverpool^zrid the defendant having only agreed to pay on a delivery at Liverpool. In a much older cafe, which was cited im th& preceding, ;r . merchant covenanted with die matter of a veilel, that if he would bring his freight to fuch a port he would pay him fuch a fum i and the matter fliowed that part of the goods were taken away bj pirates, and the refidue brought to the place appcHntcd \ and the court were of opinion that the merchant was not to pay tlie money* Bright r. Cowper^ Brownk^Vy 21* Mr. Abbot obferves, that upon reading this report it is not quite clear what the real quettion before the court was \ but it feems that the plaintiff claimed his whole freight, to which it might be very properly held he was not entitled, as he had not performed the whole contrail ; if he claimed a part only of the freight, and was held by the court not to b^ entitled to any things it may be that» by the particular terms of the contrad, the payment of freight was made to depend upon the delivery of the entire cargo. Concife as the report is, I cannot think it imperfeA, for it ap* pears to be decided merely upon the plaintiff^s allegation, without reference to any quettion dependent upon a further view of the fubje£l ; it is not hinted that any thing turned upon the mode or form of the allegation. According to the common courfe of de- claring, it would be ftated that the defendant had not^ paid the money, or any part of it, and I rather think that upon fuch an allegation, the court would hold the declaration to be fufficient to Numbt VnL] Of A^ortmrnent, 47 td enfide die pbdntiff to a verdid pro rata, provided he was to en* titled by Tirtuc of the contraA itfelf. In the deciCon^ that he, was not entitled to any things though the cafe is attended with hard* ifaip, there appears to be nothbg inconfiftent with the general doc<* Crioc of apportionment. There are however feveral cafes> in which it has been held that if a fliip breaks ground, and is afterwards incapacitated from tlie performance of the voyage, there being no fpecial contradi or uiu dcitaking, freight is due per rata itineris, but there are alfo autho^ riiies which import that in cafe of fuch inability, the mailer has by. the marine law a right to re6t his Ihip, or engage another, which implies an obligation on his part to do fo, if required by the (hip«« per, before he can found any demand upon the agreement. For the cafes upon the fubje£i, fee Mr* Abbdfs Treatife on the Law of Shipping, Part iii. chap. 7. But certainly any rule, that a perfon undertaking to carry goods to a certain port, to be paid an en* tire freight upon die delivery of them, fiiall be entitled to a proportion of die freight, from whatever caufe they are not de« hvcred, except a prevention by the aA of the party who is to pay, b in oppofition to the general principle of the Engl^ law, that an entire contraA cannot be apportioned. As to the apportionment of rent in a leafe, where a tenant is cviAed of part, 'and the di(lin£lion between the a£lions of debt and of covenant, and the cafe of the original Icflee and an alBgnee. Seethe cafe of Stevenfon. v. Lombard^ a Eafiy 575. At common law, if a tenant for life made a leafe, and died before die rent day, the rent was loft, and the tenant had the enjoyment widieut making any compenfation \ but by ftatute 11 & 2. c. 19^ if the tenant for life die before the rent from his fubleflee becomes dvev upon any lands held ffit his life, his executors are entitled to recover a rateable proportion for the time that fuch tenant lived. It is to be obfcTved, that this. zGt flops (hort of its probable obje£l, in not including the cafe of a tenant for the life of another perfon whofe eftate determines by the death of fuch other perfon. If an ccdefiaftical perfon makes a leafe and vacates his preferment l^y the accepunce of another, I conceive that there can be no apportion- ment. The equity of the ilatute, n G. a. is held to extend to tenants in tail. Pagettv. George, Ambler, 198 a Bro. Ci. 659. Where a fettlement is made to a perfon for life, with remainden over, and with power to make leafes, and a leafe is made' con* formable to the power, die rent is hot to be apportioned, but belongs fo die renainder man« Prec. cb. 555. i P* Williams, 177. There arc feveral caies io whkh it has been beldf with, refpe^ to money 1, inveft^d 48 APPENDIX. CNamb.VnL iiiYefted in the funja^ that the dividends are not apportionabk, but goto the party entitled in remainder. ^AtL 260* 582. I'Vif. 672. 3 Bro. CL 99* Wherever an annuity is left payable at certain times, it feems clear that there can be claim to an apportionment y but where a perfon is entitled to intereft of money on a mortgage or other fecurity, the interdt becomes due from day to day, and is tb be apportioned; Edwards v. Countefs of Wamvich^ 2 P. WUliaf^ lyt* In fome cafes, if money is paid upon confideration of a contraA which fails, the right of a total or partial return depends upon the entirety of the contraft. as conneAed with the total or. partial failure. This may fre illuftrated by the common obligation to return the premium of a policy of infurance, if the riik does not attach. Thus, where a (hip was infured for a year againft capture only, and was loft by the perils of the fea in a month, it was held that the aflured had not any right to a proportionate return of premium for the time unexpired} it being an entire contradi for a grofs fum. Tyrie v. Fletcher^ Ccvjp. 666* Laraine ▼• Tbomlif^onf Doug. 585. So when an infurance was made at and from Harfieur to Angola^ at and from Angola to St. Domingo, at and from St, Domin^ gOf to Harfieur ; after a deviation which rendered the policy void, the vefiel was loft between Angola and St. Domingo, this was held to be an entire rift, and nothing was due by way of return upon the proportion between St. Domingo and Harfieur. But where a divifibility in the obje£i of the contrad can be im- plied, the confideration may be apportioned ; as where a veflel was infured from London to Halifax, warranted to depart with convoy from Spithead, and the convoy had failed from S^bead before hev arrival, it was held that there was a right to demand a return of premium, making a dedudion for the rift from London to Spiihead^ but there was a ufage of trade in fayour of this decifion, and the rifts to and from Stitbead were confidered as diftin£l. Steven/on V. Snow, 3 Bur. 1237. The cafes of Meyer y. Greg/on, Pari. 389. Long V. Allen, Pari, 390. RothweU v. Cooie, i B. 8c P. 172. alfo relate to this fubje£l, but a more particular deuil of them would be foreign to the prefent purpofe. The following obfervations have already been laid before the public, in an'EiTay on the a&ion for money had and received. <<'ln a cafe which arofe early in the 18th century, the Court of- Chancery decreedione hundred guineas, as part of an apprentice fee, to be paid back to the father of the apprentice, his mafter hx^ ing died within three wedkt after the fcafing of the articles^ I though Numb* VIIL] Of ApportiGnmenU 49 though it was exprefBly proTidcd by; the arttcles» that if the madcr (bould die within the year, only fixty pounds ihould be returned. Vun. 460. Lord Kenyan^ when Mailer of the Rolls, obferved that this decifion carried the authority of the court as far as could be. 3 Bro* Cb, Rep, 480. And Mr. Fmblanque obferves, that if it be a rule of equity » &S in many cafes it is ftated to be, that equity will not alter or extend the agreement of the parties; the decree feems irre^ concileable with fuch rule. £. i. r. 5. / 8. A fuit in equity maft, in sefpe£^ to this fubje£i, be considered as being merely equivalent to an a£lion for money had and received, and there can be no pretence for referring the decree to any other principle than that of money paid upon a confideration which has happened to fail; and the court, in decreeing the apprentice-fee to be refunded, feems to hare thought the confideration for which it was given, w^s the entire performance of the articles, whereas nt was the {z6t of contrafitng the relation, and the entering into confequent engage- ments. In that view, the confideration was complete and/ entire, and could not partially fail. I much doubt whether the precedent would now be followed, but think it certainly would not be al- lowed by analogy to govern any other cafe. There axe fome cafes in which courts of equity will relieve againfl: d)eftri£l neceffity of performing the whole of an agreement, where a fufficient compenfation can be made. Thus, where an agreement is made^or the fale of ah eftate as free from incumbrances, which appears to be fubje£l to a fmall quit rent, the performance of the agreement may be enforced, making a proportionate dedud^ion from the purchafe money. So where it appears that there is a want of title to a fmall part of the property purchafed, Calcraft v. iSof- hwk^ I VtJ. Jan. 12 1, or where there is a flight and immaterial lapfc of time (a), Ormrodv. HarJman, 5 Fef. 722. 732. But I aimot, from any printed authorities which I have met with, give a diftinA (latement of the extent to which this principle, which is familiar in prafbice, is applied. It may often be extremely diffi- cult to afcertain the materiality of a particular circumftance as conneded with the objed: and views of a contra&ing party; and perhaps it may be found that the lefs deviation is allowed from the &n€t and literal execution of a condition required by the common law, and the lefe latitude is aflumed of introducing an exception referable to no accurate ftandard or criterion, the more exten- fivdy will the general purpofes of dift|ibudve juftice be a6com- pliihed. («) ^nt$ ef e^tthy- ftfintrly cmied thi prfncfpte of giviag ftUef igaiBft lipft of and it was held that the bond was difchargedi and ac-* cording Numb. X.3 Of jllternative Obtigafhm. S3 cording to Lord Coi^s report^ the reafon of the judgment was> that where the condition of an obligation confifts of two parts in tht disjundire, and one of them becomes impoflible by the a£t of Gody the obligor is not bound to perform the other part ; for the condition is for tlie benefit of the obligor, and (hall be conftrued moil beneficiallj for him^ and he had an eledion to perform At one part or the other to ferve the penalty of the obligation, and when one part became impoflible by the aA of God, it (hall be as beneficial to him as if that feparate part had been the fole condition of the obligation, and fo when that part becomes impol&ble by tht z& of God, fo that it could not by any induftry be performed, ihb oblation is faved, although he does not perform the other. Laugh^ Pf^s cafe,' 5. r. ai. Cro. Eliz, 716. 814. Moory 645. But in the cafe of Studholme v. Mandelt^ i Lord Raymond, 1^^% where the defendant covenanted to leave the Hones of a mill in aft good condition as he found them, or pay the plaintiff as much as they &ould be damnified, the damage to be eftimatod by A and B, who view^ed them when the defendant entered them, and gave abend for the performance of the covenants; the plaintiiF brought an a£^ion on the bond (n), and afligned for breach that the de- fendant had left the mill-ftones damnified, and had not made fatis- faftion. To which the defendant pleaded, that A and B had not dlimated the damage, and upon demurrer it was argued for the defendant, that this was a condition disjundive, and therefore the leaving the mill-ftones damnified, would not be a breach, becaufe > at the tin>e of the covenant he had ele^iion to perform the one or the other part ; therefore, according to Laughter^s cafe, without eftimation by A and B of the damage, the defendant was^excufed from the performance, becaufe it was impoflible for him to make- the adjudication, or to compel A and B to do it, and till that was done, the defendant could not be liable, no more than if A enters ' into a bond to perform die award of B and C, and B and C will not make any award. To this it Was anfwered, that thefe co-* venants were part of the condition of the bond, sfhd fince the latter part of the disjunctive covenant was for the fafety of the dcfendalnt^ it belonged to him to procure this eftimation, or otherwife he (hould be liable, and of this opinion was the whole court, and they faid that the rule and reafon of Laugiter^s cafe ought not to be taken fo hrgdy as Cote bad reported it, but according to the nature of the cafe. And Trety, C. J. put this cafe : A, in confideration of I go/, bound himfelf in a bond with condition to make a leafe for («} The report ibtet th|t to be an adion of covenant, but from th^ context of tb« cafe, aB4 the pleadioga which ^n contaiiicd in 3d Lord Raymond , iS^ it appeiri, at abovt ftttfld, Co be an adioo oa the bond. E3 tha 54 APPENDIX. (T^umb.X. the life of the obligee before fuch a day, or to pay him loo/. ; the obligee died before the day ; yet in the time when St.' John was Ch. J. of the Common Fleas, it was adjudged that the obligor fhould pay the hundred pounds, and St. John then declared, that he well knew fome of the judges who gave the refolution in Lat/gh" ter!s cafe, and that they denied that they laid down fuch a rule as Coke had reported : yet the whole court held that the principal cafe of Laughter was good law. The reporter, Lord Raymond^ obferves by way of note, that the laft cafe put by Treky feems to be indiftinguifliable in reafon from Laughter^s cafe. It ha$ been fuggefted, (3 Mod. 233) that the intent in Laughter's cafe was to provide a fecurity for the wife, fo that (he dying before the hufband, the non-performance could hurt nobody, there being no necefTity that any thing fhould be done in order to it after her deceafe^ this reafon would reduce Laughter's cafe (I conceive with juftice) to a point of con(tru£tion upon an implied conditioui that the wiffe fhould furvive the hufband. But it has been held in many cafes, that where there are two aQs in the alternative and in the eleftioh of the obligor^ (or per^- fon who is to perform them) and one is prevented by the a£t or fault of the' obligee, . the law difcharges the obligor from the other, as the benefit of elediion fhall not be taken from tl^e obligor by the a£t of the obligee. The cafes are collefted in Viner's Abridgement, vol. 5, 210, In the mod recent there was a bond, with condition to fettle on the obligee, nmthin Jtx months^ as his counfel Jhould advifsy an annuity of %oL for life, or to pay within fix months, 300/. the obligor pleaded, that the obligee had not tendered any grant of an annuity within the fix -months, and it was adjudged to be k good defence. But though the general principle is founded in juflice, and in (he cafe cited there was a good legal defence, a court of equity^ fo far as regarded the performance of an agreement, (and relieving from all penalties of non-performance) would in this, as in other cafes, difpenfe with an abfolute flridnefs in point of time, and compel the obligor at his own ele^ion to fettle the annuity, or pay, the money. NUM- Numb. XL J yoint and Several Obligations. 55 NUMBER XI. (Referred to, Vol. I. p. 145.) Of Joint and Several OUigatiom* § I. In Favour offeveral Perfons* Obfigadons in folido, between feveral cTeditors^ which P0tbi§r mentions as being very rare in France^ are I conceive wholly mi'* known to the law of England, An obligation may be joint, in which cafe all the perfons, nn whofe favour it is contracted, muft join in an aAion founded upon it ; or it may be feveral, in which ; afe each muft bring a feparate aftion with reference to his own fcparate intereft : or perhaps, where the intereft in a fubje£k is joint, an engagement may be fpecially framed, enabling them to proceed either jointly or feparately at their difcretion. If one contrad was made with feveral perfons, indicating a right in each to make a claim for the whole, it feems that the operation of it would, not* udthftanding thefe exprellions, be that of a joint obligation. I do not fee any legal incompetence in the giving feparate en- gagements to each of two joint creditors, with a condition, that a payment to one ihould operate as a difcharge from the claim of the other; in which cafe, the tStOt of the two engagements would only conftitute one obligation, nearly fimilar in its nature to the obligation in folido *, but I am not aware of any inftance of fuch engag^iBents having been the fubjcdl of judicial attention, and I am not prepared to ftate how far the legal confequences arifing from any fuch, which might occur, would coincide with thofe which are ftated by Potiier, as applicable to obligations in folido. Inftances are not unfrequcnt of difpofitions with a difcretionary power, in refpe£l of the obje£ls in whofe favour they are to be ex- ecuted, but theie are not accofnpanied by the eiFeJis afcribed by Potbier^ to obligations in folido ; it is not competent to any of the objeds, to enforce an exclufive claim in their own favour by priority of demand ; the perfon charged with the obligation can be compelled to execute it in favour of fome of the objeAs, fub- jefi however to the difcretion originally intended ; but the courts will take care to guard againft fuch difcretion being perverted into an abufe, hi cafes of contrads with factors, a right of a£Hon may be main» taioed, either on the behalf of the factor or his principal, and a pay- ment to either will be a fufficient difcharge, except m cafes where £4 the 5^ ^ APPJINDIX. [Numb-XL the faSor has a Hen on the debt, on account of his demands againft the principal. An obligation thus contraftcd, has in many of its effefts a refemblance to an obligation in folido, but is fpecifically diftindl from it, and is not intended at prefent to be the fubjcft of particular examination, although I have thought it proper to allude to it* The general pofition of PothieVi that regularly when a perfon contrafis an obligation of one and tlie fame thing, in favour of fc. vcral others, each of them is only creditor for his own (Iiare,^ is the direft reverfe of that which it feems proper to (late, as appii. cable to the Englijh law, by which a general obligation in favour of feveral perfons, is a joint obligation to them all, unlefs the na- ture of the fubje£l, or tlie particularity of the exprefiions leads to a different conclufion ; and even where the exprefEon^ appear to denote a feparate obligation to each, the legal eiFcd has been held tO' be a joint obligation in favour of all ; in which cafe an aflion can only be maintained by them jointly during ^eir joint lives } aftei[ the death of any, tfe right accrues to the furvivors, and finally to the reprefentatives of the laft furvivor, fo far as refpc£ls the enforcing the claim againft the oppofite party. The confequciit obligations which may refult between the furvivors and the re- prefentatives of the deceafed, is a different fubjed of confideration. In cafe of partners in trade, the right is exercifcd by dic fur- vivors for tlie benefit of themfelves, and the reprefentatives of the deceafed : in other cafes not attended with any fpecial circum- ftances, I apprehend it may be ftated as the general rqlc, that ^he beneficial right, as well as tlie legal power of enforcing redrefs, devolves upon the furvivors. In Slingsby^ cafe, 5 Co. 18. Becknvith covenanted with Ravar four^ Siingsby, and Harvey ^ and with eacky a fid every of them ^ that he had a lawful title to certain prcmifes, and an aAion having been brought by Slingsby alone, it was held that it was not maintain- able, for that the other covenantees ought to have joined, and this notwithftanding the words, nvith each and every of theifi ; iS to which this diverfity was agreed, that where it appears by the de- claration, that each of the covenantees has, or is to have a feveral intereft or eftate, and a covenant is made with them, and with each T of them } the words luith each ofthem^ make the covenant feveral in refpe£l of their feveral intereft, as if a man demifes black acre to Aj and white acre to B, and green acre to C, and covenants with them and each of them, that he is the lawful owner pf all the faid premifes, tlie covenant is feveral. But if he demifes the faid acres to tliem jointly, then the words nuith each. ofthem% are void ; for a man cannot by his covenant^ (except in refpedl qf feveral in- terefts, Nuinb. XLJ Joint and Several ObBgfltions 57 teiefts) make it in the firft place jointi and then by the addition of thek words make it fereral. For howerer perfons may bind them«» fclres, and each of them, fo that the obligation will be joint or fereral at the eledlion of the obligeC) no man can bind himfelf to three and each of them, fo as to make this joint or federal, at the eie&ion of feveral peribns for one caufe : for the court would be uncertain for which of them to give judgment, which the hvt will not allow as was holden, in j H. 6, 44. where a peribn brought a replevin againft two for one bead, and they made fe» vtral avowries, each in his own right ; and by the adrice of all the judges, both the avowries were abated for the inconvenience, that if both the lAies (hould be found fqr the avowants, the court couM not give judgment to them (everally for the fame thing. So, the covenantor in the principal cafe would be twice charged with the fame thing, and therefore the words with each of them, are only an amplification and redundancy, and cannot fever the joint caufe d a&ion. It was ^fb refolved, that an intereft cannot be granted jointly and feverally ; as if a man grant the next tidvowfon, or make a leafe to two jointly and feverally, the words andfeverallj^ arc void, and they are jointly intitled. So, if a man makes a feoflfinent in fee to three, and warrants the land to them, and each of them, this warranty is joint, and not feveral ; but in fucha ^fe» if thor eftates were feveral, their vean:anty would be feveral accordingly. And in a recent cafe, where Mariindale covenanted with An^ derfm^ hb executors, adminiftrators, and affigns, and alfo with Wjatt^ and her aiigns, that he wotdd pay an annuity to Anierfon^ during the life of WjaU\ it was held that the covenant was joints and that, Wyxtt having furvived, the adion ought to be brought by her, and could not be brought by the reprefentatives df Anderfon. Lord Kenyan faid, that it had. been afiumed in the argument, that each of the covenantees had different intcrefts; but that was not fo» (or the covenant was to each of them for the fame thing, and though the benefit were only to one oPthem, yet both had a legal intereft in the performance of it, and therefore the legal intereft being joint during the lives of both, on the death of one it fur* rived to the other. If indeed the covenant had been to^eaeh iy two dtf* ferent deeds^ though for the fame duty (j), there could not have bren a joinder in a£iion : but here the parties claim by the fame ritle, and dierefore the law coincides with the juftice and convenience of the cafe. Anderfon v. Martlndalt. i Eafl. 497. («) Tbiifrauli fOufticiittArcal oblis^Uob (niolldo, u defcribed by PtiJtier, 6 Another I I 58 APPENDIX. [Numb.XL Another ftrong Inftance of perfons having a joint legal intetefl:, although for the benefit of one of them feparately^ occurred in the cafe oiSeott v. Goodwin^ 1 Bof. (5* P. 67.'The defendant, as tenant, covenanted with Grice his landlord, his heirs, and affigns } and the premifes having been conveyed to John Scott the plaintifF, and Robert Scott (but as to the eftate of Robert in truft for John) it was held that ^ip^/i could not alone maintain an aflion on the cove- nant. And Lord Chief Juftice Eyre faid, that as the operation of law upon the deeds, was to conftitutc John and Robert joint affignees, the efie£t of it was that the defendant's covenants became alfo, /by operation of law, contraf^s with John and Robert jointly. •* There is an efTential difference between the cafes, where the objec- tion is that other perfons ought to be made co-defendants, and where it is that there are not the proper parties plaintiffs in the fuit Many plaintiffs can have but one right, having but one iiitereft, and one caufe of a£lion, which ought to be, and is, indivifible, admitting of but one fadsfa£iion. But if in the nature of the thing, if on principles of law or authorities, it could bej that a man (hould derive a feveral intereft, out of a joint obligation to himfelf and othersi and that plaintiffs could fue feparately for their portions of one right, it is moft obvious that it muft vex and harafs defendants extremely. I take i^ to have been folemnly adjudged in feveral cafes, and to be the known received law, that one co-covenantee, one co-obligee, or one joint contrador by parol, cannot fue alone. A breach of a joint contra^ with two or more, cannot be joint and feveral.*' In the preceding cafes, we have feen that the courts confider obligations, which in their expreffions were feveral, to be joint in their effed, on account of tlie joint intereft to which they referred. In Wyndhanfz cafe, 5. Co, 7. it is ihewn that joint words may by conftrudlionof law be taken refpe^lively and feverally .ift. Some- rimes in refpe£i of the feveral interefts of the grantors, as if two tenants in common, or feveral tenant^ join in the grant of a rent charge^ yet in point of law this grant will be feveral, although the words are joint, as Sir Robert Cat/yn, Chief Juftice, held in Brown^ in^s cafe in P/owden. 2d, Sometimes in xefpeGt of the feveral interefts of the grantees, as 16 if. r. 63, 64. a warranty made to two of certain lands, fliall enure as feveral warranties in refpefl that they are feverally feized, the one of one part of the lands, and the other of the refidue in feveralty. 3d, Sometimes in rcfpeSt that the grant can only take eSc€t at feveral times, as in cafe of a remainder being limited to the right heirs of J. N. and J. Si {J. N^ and y. S. being alive) in which cafe the words are joint, and Numb. XL] yoinS and Several Obligations. 59 and jet the heirs (hall take fererally, for they ihall not join in ao- don. 4th, Sometimes in refped of the incapacity and impofEbititj of the grantees to take jointly, as a leafe made to an abbot> and a fecular perfon, or a grant made to two men, or two women, dnd Ac heirs of their two bodies^ the inheritance is feveral, 7 H. 4. 17. 5th, Sometimes in«refpe£l of the caufe of the grant, or rationtfuh^ jtB4t materutf as 15 /f. 7. 14. where one co^parcener granted a rent to two other co-parceners for equality of partition ; although the words are joint, yet the caufe of the grant will be regarded, and the rent will be of the quality of the land, and therefore they will have the rent in the degree and quality of co»parcenery, and not jointly. And Knivrt^ Chief Juftice and Chancellor, faid, in 38 Edv:ari^ 3. 26, that if two co-parceners make a feoiFment in fee, rendering rent to them and their heirs ; the heirs of the one and the othfcr ihali inherit, for that their right in the land was feyeral, n E, 4. 25. & 2. H. 3. 18. a joint fubmiflion to arbitration was taken feverally in refpe£l of the feveral caufes* Thecafeof £rf/^0ifverfus C/ij^am, i. Saund. 153, aflfbrds a» inftance of the fame agreement being confidered as joint in onepan^ and feveral in another. Taylery Cti^am^ h Caftli^ having con- traded with the commiifioners of prize goods, to buy all prize brandies at a certain rate, they entered into an agreement with each other, by which it was declared that all the parties had an equal intereft in the contradi, and therefore each of them for him- felf, and not for the other, covenanted with the other, and others of themrefpedively, that all prize brandies ihould be bought by them in partnerfhip upon their joint account, and that none of them (hould trade in brandy wines by himfelf, or in company with any other, but only on the fame joint account; that no brandies which (hould come to tho hands of any of the parties, ihould be fold by hin^ without the aflent of the others \ that all monies received by any of the partners (hould be paid by the perfon receiving' it, to Kyttm a Gfoldfmith, oir the joint account that there Ihould be n« benefit of furvivorfhip, but that the executors of any of the parties who (hould die, ihould have the fame benefit as the party himfelf might have had if living, and that an account Jbould he given to fuch executors^ of the brandies and debts due for them, within twenty days after the deceafe of the party dying. An a£lion being brought by the executors of Ct^le' againil Cli^bam^ for felling brandies without the aflent of Tajter and Cajlle\ and for trading on his own account, and for not paying to Kynton monies received on the jqii^t account ; and for not giving an accou t to thr plain- ^ffs within twenty days after the death of the tcj. hcm \ ufter judg- )nent by default and entire damages^ given upon a writ of enquiry, Saunders eo APPENDIX. [NaihKXL Smunders excepted as to the breaches for the defendants felting without aflenty and trading on his own account, and fiot paying to Kyntan, that the corenant was joint with the teftatOr, Ind with Tof/er who had furvived him : for though the Covenant be joint mnd fereral by the words, yet the intereft and caufe of a£tiOn In this caier is joint only, for it is an equal damage to Ctr/fle the tef- tator, and to Tayler^ if the defendant has broken thefii covenants as by the declaration is fuppofed, and therefore they ought to hav^ joined in the adion \ and Caflle^ the plaintifPs teftator, being dead, die a&ion has furvived to Tayler ; as in Siyngshy*s Cafe above cited. But die covenant, that the defendant would render an account to the executojs of the party dying, is a good feveral covenant, and well fuable by the plaintifis, only becaufe the plaintitfs have a feveral intereft* and caufe of action in this, but not in the others ; vpon which objefiion^ and another point not connefted with the picfent difcuflion, judgment was flayed. , A bond to A* said payable, the one moiety to A, and the other moiety to B, is a feveral obligation ; and the releafe of one ihatl not prejudice the other, nor can one bar the other of his action. a. Si J. 6i. M9. 64. As the intereft of tenants in common is feveral, though the pof« feflion is joint, it feems clear that a covenant made to them genc-« rally* and much more a covenant made with them* and each of them, may be conftrued as feveral ; fo that each may bring an ac- tion on account of his own feparate damage, and in many cafes they feem to have an elcQion to consider the covenant aa joint or feveraU In Martin v. Crompe, i Lord Raymond^ 340. it was faid by Holty Chief Juftice, that if there are two tenants in common of a reverfion, expe£tant upon a leafe for years upon which a rent is refcrvedj.they may join in debt for the rent, or fever. In Harrif after omitting to plead in abatement in the firft ' a&ion. Sedgewortb v. Overend, 7 r.fi. 279. It is clearly eftablifhed, and is a neceflary confequence of the do&rine involved in feveral of the preceding deciiions, that a te- leafe of one of feveral who are intitled under a joint contraft, it a difcharge from the others, 2 RoL abr. 410, but it feems highly reafonable, that a perfon who has defeated his companions of their right, fhould be anfwerable to them for the lofs arifing therefrom* («) Aplcft JB abategjoit it that which, withaat doijriag that the fUiotiffthai. ft^ t uaie of a&JQQ as it aUcdg^, aflerts that in fofne iacidencal nSptA dieaftioQ iaiinpro|«rl]r Wogfat, and tbeobjcA of it it not to defeat th« claim, but to delay the pr^fecuiioo of it* Thecbafader generjily afcribed to it ii, that it muft gite the plaintiff a better writ« bat gco«ra%y la not oniverfally troc t for fometiineathe riglu of delafing the bra plea ia abataiaeot, ia foysdcd ona tenporary di(abifity of the plaintiff co> fne, at diatlic ia an ootlaw or an alien enemy. There are (tw^al ralet by. which chefe pleu ar« bddto much pcater ftridncft, thto thofe which go to tht meritt of the ad^ioo j but a BORiniticttlar txpofitioa •/ their nitun and cfiefti wooid be fbreign to the pitfent For 6z APPENDIX. I^umb.Xr; For the cafes in which feveral p^rfons, having a joint intereft, may join in the fame a£lion, fee Mr. Serjeant TVilliams^s note to C»rjton V. Utlebyef 2 Saund. 1 16. § !!• Of Joint and Several OhligationSy againfl feveral Perfons, Although the appellation of obligations in folido» is fcarcely known to the Engli/b law, the obligations thcmfelvesj as defcribed by Pothier^ are of not unfrequent occurrence. The mod ufual inftance, is that of a bond or covenant exprefTed to be made jointly and fe- verally, in which cafe it iS| at the option of the creditor^ to proceed againft all in one joint a^ion, or in feparate anions againft each or any of them \ but the obligation mull be treated as wholly joint, or as wholly feparate, for an a£lion cannot be maintained againft two or more of a greater number, provided the exception is pro- perly taken, nor can a conuniffionof bankrupt be maintained againft two upon a joint debt, or confequently upon a joint and fevend debt of three. Vide Allan v. Hartley y Co. B. L. 7. But there are many other cafes which fall within the definition of PothieTy of an obligation in folido, as contra£led by feveral per* fons, each of whom is obliged for the whole, but fo that a payment made by one liberates the others, as againft the creditor. The moft familar inftance of this is the cafe of bills of exchange, with rcfpe£l to which the drawer, acceptor, and indorfers, are aU liable for the whole amount to the holder, and a payment made by any one of them, is as againft him a difcharge of all the others : and it is only the difcharge as againft the creditor which is contem- plated by Pothiery when he fpeaks of a payment by one liberating the others : the confequent obligation between themfelves forming a material part of his difcuflion. Two perfons, each indebted in a hundred pounds, or jointly in- debted in 200/. may. each give their feparate bonds or notes for the whole : two perfons may give their feparate bonds for the -fide- lity of a third : two feparate policies may be made for the infurance of the fame riik : the original landlord or tenant, and their re- ' fpe&ive affignees, are liable to a covenant founded on privity of eftate ; and in all thefe cafes the legal efFeA is that above afcribed to obligations in folido, that each of the parties obliged is liable for the whole claim, but a fatisfaftion made by any one is as againft the creditor a liberation of all the others. But in all thefe cafes the obligation is feparate in refpeft of the right of zSiion ; and one ' joint a£lion cannot be maintained againft the drawer and acceptor of a note, againft the infurers on two feparate policiesi againft iHe perfons Numb. XL3 yoint and Several Obligations. 63 peribns engaging by two feveral bonds or notes^ againft die land* i6rdor tenant, and their refpeAive aflignees. There is certainly no objection to an obligation in folido, being contn£bed by the different parties in different manners, or by one abfolutely, and the other conditionally. If the cafe of bills of ex- diange is admittedy as I think upon principle it muft be, as a legi- timate inftance bf an obligation in folido, it is alfo an exemplifica- tion of this pofition^ the acceptor being bound abfolutely and un- conditionally, the other parties only fubjed to the obligation upon the condition of due diligence having 'been ufed by the holder^ Oae perfon may engage to pay within a month, and another with- in a montli following^ in cafe of the failure of the firft ; it is the unity of the thing which is to be performed, and the right to de- mand the performance of it from any one of feveral debtors, whidi conftitutes the elFcnce of this kind of obligation, and which is wholly independent of the mode or form in which the obligation is contrafked. In refped: to the general conftru£tion of contrads, I concetre that the rule of the Englifh law is in refped of fereral debtors, as well as in refpcd to feveral creditors, the rcverfe of that ftated by fMtr : and that an obligation contrafled generally by feveral per- fons is a joint obligation, imlefs there is fomething in the nature of the fubje£i to induce a different conftrufiion, and render it feveral, in refped of the feparate interefts of the contracting parties, according to the principles in Wyndanfs cafe, which has been already cited, as {hewing where joint words were to be conftrued as feveral in refpeil of feveral creditors. A joint obligation is effentially different from an obligation in (b- Gdo, as the creditor has not a right to proceed againft each or any of the parties individually, but can only profecute his claim againft them jointly. But if a creditor fues one of feveral joint debtors, the objedion, that the others ought to be joined, can only be taken by plea in abatement (^), and this notwithftanding it appears by the («) At to the nature of f«ch plea fee ante p. 6i. ». {a) Where a commiffioa of bank- rapt was taken out agtinft Cwo of three joint traders ; the other being an infant, it was n)ed that it cooM not be fupported. It waa fatd in argument^ that though it wai true that aa aftion might be brought agamft the three paitneri» including the infant who muft plead hisiafancyi yet if the U€t was that the whole demand waa againik the three, and the coo* tnA of partaerftip waa avoided at to one b> hit infancjr, it remained the contrad of the too. The infant having a right to iofift that ht waa not bound by any contrad be had aide, the denund would be againft the two in eficd, and the infant pleading hia infancy » tfaejadgaent would he againft the two in the adion.' Tbe Lord Chancellor fatd that the aAtoB not only migbty but it muft be imagiced, be brought againft the thtce. But Mr. Jaftke Lt Blame, in a cafe before him in Bank at Vwctfv, fummer afliaei 1799* deter- nuMd upon dcmoticr that a replicatiov, ftatbg that the partoci mantioned in the plea iq abatement 64 APPENDIX. prnrnkXi: tbe pluntiFi own (hewing duit more are liable {a). See WVHamit note to Cabell y* Faughan, i Saund. 29 1. If two are fued updh a joint and feveral ol>}igation of three, it feems alfo that the excep- tion can oaljr be taken in the fame manner, though fome cafes have proceeded upon the contrary dodrine, id. ibid* Subjefb to the right of exception by plea in abatement : I conceive it to be clear that feparate ai^iions may be maintained againft each of feveral joint debtors, in like manner as if tliey were debtors in folido {b). One of the i^ftances above cited, from WyndanCs cafe of joint words inducing a feparate obligation, is that of a joint fubmiiTion to arbitration ; but where it is clearly exprefled that the engage- ment is joint as well as fevera],' as (in a cafe already cited upon a former fubjeQ), where Burredge was the preceding, and Rpberfs the fucceeding tenant to Manfell^ and by an 'agree- ment between Burredge of the firft part, Roberts of the fecond part, and Manftll of the third part, the parties agreed to refer all the difputes refpe6iing repairs to Simcoch^ and B, and R Jointly and feveralfyf promifed to perform his award, and the arbitrator having dire&ed each of them to pay a certain fum, they were held to be jointly anfwerable for the whole* Lord Kenyon obferved, that it was radier a hard cafe, and perhaps if it was ftated to them at the time of the agreement, that each was to become anfwerable for the otber^ they would have hefitated before they figned the agreement, but die words were too ftrong to be got over. In a cafe cited in the'p: jce£ng, H and G covenanted for them- lidLvea and £or each of them, to receive the rents due to L, and that ab^aeot wm an infant^ wai » good anfwer to the pica, and I think that this waa nrUent- Ij the right dccifion. Id cafe an adion had been brought againft the infant and the adult, the defence of infancy need not neceflarily hjve been taken by plea, but might have been vied aa a defence at the trial, and then the verdid againl^ the other defendant only woald bive been error on the record. There it cerrajnly 00 authority to warrant a fpecial eotr)'» and the giving any ^ed to the daftnce of in&ocyi woyld be a negation of the joint con- traA declared opon^as would likewtfe a plea of infancy* Thia cafe ia efleniially differcDC horn, thofe of a pleai>f bankruptcy, or the profecation of one defendant to outlawry ; for, an both thefe cafei^ the whole proceeding is founded upon the fuppofition of an original joint coQtraA, although the perfonal exemption of one defendant^ in the firft cafe, exempts him from the liabilty and the outlawry, in the other is an excufe to the plaintiflf for a fe- paittO'pioceedtng, but in both cafes a joint originai liability is aflumedy and. I conceive muft necefiarily l>e proved \ wfaereaa the defence of infancy esdudca the fuppofition of fuch joint liability having ever erifbd ; and it will be aa intolerable hardftip and a palpable in* joftice, if a plaintiflf who fued the debtor who waa adult, ihould by pten-in abatement be oompalled to proceed againft tbe other^.and having done fo ihould be defeated, for want of fttbfiantiating that joint contradk and joint refponfibilityi which ia icquifitt to maintaia hit declaration* {a) The law, as we have ieen above, la oihentife. with refpeft to ao aftioa by one of £»• varal joint credttora. {h) In all cafes of joint adhmt, thedefeadonti ace iofArobli|ed.ia (bttdo, could not be conne£^d with the pre- teding, and were therefore not joint and fereral, but only joints and upon wKieh the furvivor only was chargeable -y but it was held^ that the general words introdu£iory to the covenants of t^ lefleea were fufficient to extend to all the fubfequent covenants{)on their part, unlefs there was fomething in the nature of the fubje& to re^ ftrain theo). Duke of Northumberland v. Erringtorty 5 T. R. 522. Debts conttafled by partners in trade are joint debts, for which an a&ion can only be maintained againft all the partners, or the furviving partners jointly, provided the exception is taken by plea in abatement. And if feveral perfons jointly engage in a particular puichafe, it is attended with all the efic£ls of a partnerfliip ; but where feveral difierent perfons feparately employed a broker to make puicfaafes of tea at the India Houfe ; and the broker, upon payment of the ufual depoGt, took joint wanrants for the whole, which he pledged to a banker for monies advanced $ it was held, that this (tid not conftitttte any partnerihip ^i the refpeftive employers, fo as to render them liable for the whole loan : the defendants in the particular cafe did not owe any thing in refpeA of their own fliares: whether the nSt of the broker would have rendered them liable to die banker for the money borrowed as to then: own proportion, was not therefore taken into conGderation. Hoare v^Dawes^ Doug, jyr* With refpe6i to a contra& made by one psrfon for the purchafe of goods, and a fub^contra£t made by him with others, for taking par* ticolar (hares of them, and which was held not to coaftitute a part« nerfliip : fee Coope v. Eyre, i H. Bh 37. A creditor upon a joint and feveral obligation may, as we have fccn, elcft to confider the debt as joint or as feveral^ and may cither proceed againft all the debtors jointly, or againft each or any of them feparately, but it is held that he cannn proceed \n both ways VcL. II. F at 66 AffJENBli. t*^uirib.Xt at the fante' time; and t^at in tafe he i their concurrence ill the adis of the others renders them perfonally re* fponfible ; but it is not my intention at prefent to enter into a par- ticular examination of that fubjedl. In cafes of injuries, there is certainly, as in the civil law, a right of aSion for the whole damage againft any one of the perfons liable. Sometimes a plalntitf has an ele£lion to confider his de- mand as founded upoti a contract, or upon an injury, in which cafe, if he treats it as a contradi, it is fubjedl to all the confe<« quences of a joint caufe of a£tion, and an exception may be taken by plea in abatement, if he proceeds againft any of the perfons liable feparately. Treating it as an injury, he has the fame right againft each feparately^ as in^the cafe of other injuries. -? In \ > > <» Numb. XI.] Joint and Several Obl'gaflons. In cafes of contrails, if an aflion is brought againft f ^vera* j it cannot be fnpponcd agtiinft all, it wholly fails, becaufe th^ I tndi proTed differs from that declared upon \ but in a<5^ions for / injuries, a verdid may be given for fomc defendants, and againft othfrs. And in a very late cafe, where a declaration dated diat three had the loading of a hogshead of treacle, for a reafon^blc reward, to be paid by the plaintiff, and that they Condu£led them« fdtes fo negligently and unfkilfully, that the treacle was loft j it was held, that the ad ion bting founded on a negle A of duty, and not upon a breach of promifc, the acquital of one defendant did not affefi the plaintiff's right to have his judgment upon the verdi£t againft the others. Govett v. Radmdge. 3 Edfi, 62. Where an obligation entered into by feveral perfons, in one in* finunent, is merely feveral, fo that each of them is only anfwer« * able for his refpe£bive (hare, the obligation has no other effe&s than if it eonfifted of fo many diftin£^ contrads perfe£lly feparate from each other. * . . In the Engiyh as in the civil law, the purfuit of one or more of feveral debtors, who are each refpcdively liable for the whole, does notaffe£i or prejudice the right .'guinrt the others, which continues entire, until the creditor has obtained an a<^ual fatisfa^lion for his demand. Where there is a joint and feveral engagement, an. acknowledge- ment by one of the debtors is fuiTicient to take the cafe out of the ftatute of limitations as againft the others, and is regarded as an acknowledgement by them felves. JVhiicombx. WLiiwgy Doug. 651. and even a payment of a dividend by the aflignees of one of the makers of a joint and feveral promifTory note, who had become bankrupt, was held to take the cafe out of the ftatute as againft the other. Jachfon v. Fairhank^ H. B. 340, which was certainly going a great way indeed. In both thefe cafes the aft Ion w^as brought feparately^ againft the party, who had not made the acknowledge^^ mcnt. But where the engagement of two perfons is made by fepa^. rate inftruments^ and arifes from feparate contrails made "a-Ithv each, I do not conceive that any aft by tlie one can inct^afe or continue the obligation of the other. The argument that one perfon would derive a benefit from the payment of another, and Aat therefore he ought e converfi to be charged by his acknow- iedgements, is often more plaufible than correft ; for the liberation, in the one cafe, is founded upon the general principle of equity^ ^hich does not allow a perfon to receive more than one fatisfaftion for the fame doty, though he may have many ways of enforcing the performance cf that duty ; whereas no man ought to be cliargcd by any coctraft with a greater obligation than he perfonaJly ititendetl F i tt \ 68 APPENDIX. [Numb. XL to fabje£^ himfclf to. I alfo take it to be clear, that the commence- ment of an a£lion againft one debtor, upon a joint and feveral cn^ gagement, is not avaiJable agabift the others, as a proceeding within the time of limitation, I am not aware of any authority, that if one debtor has aSuallt fet off a feparate debt of his own againft a joint and feveral debt of himfelf and others, that this could be taken advantage of by the others, in any aftion inftituted againft them ; although it is certainly reafohable, that fuch a fct-off ihould in all refpe&s be regarded as a payment, and this obfervation applies more forcibly to tlie cafe where the creditor has fet off the joint and feveral debt againft a demand due from himfelf to one of the debtors. It is quite certain that one of the debtors cannot in other' cafes take advantage in a fuit againft himfelf, of a debt owing from the creditor to any of the others. It has long been fettled, that if two perfons are bound jointly and feverally, a releafe to one is a difcharge to all {a) ; and this rule applies («} The foUowing note, by Lord NuttinghdAf upon the fubje^^, is inferted la M. Har^ grea^e^t edicioo of Co. Liu zja. «•— 16 H 6. T. Bs^rcf 37. Ob'i^ce made an acquit- tance to one oblr^r, which waa dared before the obligatioi, but was delivrrrd afeerwardi ; the other obligor pleads thia io bar, and it wjs adjudged a good plea in bar. Note. Each iK'U Wind io the entirety, thctefoie it was joint and Ceveral. 34 H. 6. So in the cafe of the AT/rf , if he releafes to one of the oblij^or?! the other ihall take advantage. 5 Rep. 56. etnirM. And at i releafe in died to one obligor difchargea the other, A> of a releafe in liw, as 8 kep, 136. NtwfittwCt cafe. A woman obligee marfies the obligor ^ that is another fi>rt of difcharge, S164, b *• But 17 C^* B. R. two weie boun^ jointly and feveraily* The pVintiff' fned both, and afterwards entered a rttrsxit againft ooej whether that dif- charged (he other waa the queflion } Strktfy faid it was, for it amoonti to a releafe in lawy as the plaintiflf confeflea thereby, that he had not c«ttfe of a£^ion, aUd therefore be cannot have judgment^ ts In H'ukmot*% cafe, 9 R^, and retraxit U a bar to an adion J tad the plalntiflfy by his own aO, has altered the deed from joint to fereral, and therefore the other (hall have advantage of it. Crok* Jitf, contra ; for a retraxit is only in the nature of an cfloppclly and thereflMv, the other flu' I not have advantage ; neither is it a rcleaibt thoogh it be in the natorc of a releafe j and if the obligee foes both, and then covenants with one not to fae forther, thai is in the nature of a releafe, bat the other ihall not take advantage of it ; and in at H, 6, it is faid, that there nuil be an adual releafe to one obligor, to difcharge the other. Stt March Rep, 165. Paf iS Car, Hatiaau v. RolU The obfigec rcleatct to one obligor $ the other, in coofideration of the forbearance^ undertakes to pay | and in an action upon the cafe, the matter was found fpecially, • In jyamkfird f. fVauifird, I Sa/A.'tpg. it was roledy that if the creditor malces or of two joint debtors his executor, the debt is estiogulihed at law, and there can neter be any legal remedy againfk the other; but in fma^/m and Svantf a Dkkiatf 457, Lard Tbarlew, with a due r^ird to the principlea of ejjalty and juftice, tud, that where the obligee makes one of the obligors executors, and takes no notice of the bood^ but dcrifes the refidoe of the eftate to others, he was ckir it wu not an extbguiihment of Che debt, thoo^ at law it would be fo, and he decreed iccordingly. Where one of two joint debtors manict the creditor^ or one of two Joint creditors fflsrriea the debtor, nothing can be more obvious, than that in juftice and equity relief /hoald be ^Wen againft or' for the other in rffpcct of hrs proportion! Kamb. XL] Jgaa and Several Oblations. 69 ippHes in cqmty as well as at law. Botoer v. Snoadtin* i Atkins^ 294. But the fame rule does not apply in eTery cafe of a perfonal dif- charge. For inftance, if a creditor covenants never to fue a debtor, this covenant may be pleaded by the debtor by way of difcharge ; but if two be bound jointly and fevcrally, and the crcditoi covenants with one of them not to fue hiin, it has been held, that ihat (hall not be a rcleafe, but a covenant only j for the covenant is not a re- kafe in its nature, but only by con(lru£lion> to avoid circuity of a&ion-, for where he covenants not to fue one, he has ftill a remedy, and then it (hall be conftnicd as a covenant, and no more. Fttzgerald v. Trant^ 1 1 Mod. 254, Lacy v. Kinnajlon, \ Lord Raj^- nrnd^ 690. 12 Mod* 551 ; and in a late cafe where the creditor joined in a deed of compofition with the other creditors of one of two obligors, by a joint and fevcral bond, it was accordingly held that the other c^ligor could not avail himfelf of this as a releafe. The lad preceding cafe being cited. Lord Kenjon faid, that to be fait it removed all difficulty on the fubjefl, and was a diredl tutfao- rity in favour of the plaintiflFi he had only been doubting in his own mind on the Uriel law of the cafe, for that the honefty and juftice of it were with the plaintiff could not be doubted, and even if the defendant had fucceeded at law, a court of equity would have given the plaintiff full relief. Dean v. NewaJI, 8 T, R, 168. In another recent cafe, it appeared that Pajbley and Dennis were indebted as partners to PoppUwcIL That Dennis compounded with his creditors for 10/. in the pound, and Poppltwell executed the agreement for the compofition. Afterwards, a conuniffion of bankniptcy ifliied agalnfl. Pajhiej^ under which PoppUn»ell was ad* nutted to prove his debt, and afterwards he received the compo- Cdon, and a petition was prefented, that the debt might be ex- punged, in fupport of which, the counfel cited the cafe of Bower T. Swad/inj I AtL above referred to. On the other fide, it was faid that without doubt a releafe to one of two joint debtors is a releafe to both, according to the cafe cited j but that is upon technical reafons ; and courts of equity have always lamented the neceffity of following the law in that. It was impoffible to fuppofe fpeuiUj, aod Mlt argued, th^t the debt wm not abr^lotely dircbarged, but tmlyyU fit. if the flcber can have the releafe to plead, and bscattfe the fbrbcarance wu a good coofi. kmm» B«t the Co^ft «ai of opinioAa that the debt was abfolotely oifebargeA* ao4 ibcrcfbre the caiifidera'ioi| wai iofuffieicftt. Sec ifodmrt Rep. 7. r. Fiwker v. SltJUm Itmrewa. Ja treTpaft againft three they divided ^ the pleading, Jadgmcot tgaiiift one. Thca he entered n no/i frtftfui again A the t«a odieri i it was held to be no difcharge to tiffl againft whom jadgmcat was had j lot a« la him. the adioa wu determined by the judgment, and the others am divided from him, asd not fobjeft to thi dami^gca ttc^watd •gaioft l^i hot a mTi freftpd, or aoafoit, before jadgsiear agaioft obc^ wqM iikhvgi lU. r3 anjp x^ 70 APPENDIX. Numb-XLJ any intention to difcharge this rhan upon receiving lo/. in the . pound from the other. The Lord Chancellor made the order ac-? CordiniT to the prayer of the petition. Ek parte Slater j 6 Vef, 146. This decifion appei^s to be direftly contrary to that in the pre- ceding cafe of Dean V. Newal/, and ^it may be reafonably fuppofcd, that if the Lord Chancellor had been apprifed of a cafe fo imme-« diatoly applicable, and at the fame time confiftent with the real principles of jufti6e, and with the intention of the parties, he would have been very willing to have acceded to the at^thoiity of it. In the cafe cited of Bower v. SivadUtty the obfcrvation, which is only made ebitery that a releafe to one is a releafe to all in equity, as well as at law, may be fairly under (lood, fub nicdoy viz. that if a perfon by his own aS relinquiflies a right fo as to render himfelf in- capable of profecuting it at law, a court of equity will not intcrpofe in his favour \ but I do not find any decided authority, that a court . of equity will carry^fuch an aft beyond its legal operation. It is certainly reafonable, that it fliould interpofe, to prevent fuch an aft operating to the prejudice of the joint debtor •, but there is no equi«» table reafon for carrying its authority further. Whether the doftrinc that a releafe to one of two perfons, who enter into a joint and fcveral obligation, ♦'nures to the benefit of all, extends to all kinds of contrafts, does not fcpm to be fully fettled 5 mnd in the cafe of Clayton v. Rinnajlon^ 2 Soii- 574> Lord Chief ■Jnfticc jyi>// faid, that the*Court did not determine lliat on a co- venant where the joint remedy failed, there could not be a feveral remeHy. There is a very old cafe, that if two receive for me a fum pf money jointly, and afterwards each of them binds himfelf to ac-^ count for the whole, and afterwards I bring a writ of account againfl them, by divers pr^cipesy and count feverally againft them, as my receivers of the faid fum, my releafe made to one of them of all debts and accounts (hall be a releafe of the other alfo« 2 E, 3, 40 *. 2 RoL Ab. 412. j8 Vinery 353. There arc very numerous authorities, that if feveral perfons commit a joint trefpafs, a releafe to one is a difcharge to all the others. Co. Lit. 232. Hob, ^6. 2 RoL 412. 18 Finer, 352. Where one of two joI*it or joint and feveral obligors only ca- ftge« as furety for another, the giving time to the principal is m equity a difcharge of the furety. Ni/bet v. Smith. % Brown^ Ch. 57^. |?/Af V. Berrington^ 2 Vef.jun. 540. {a) • Aa («) In thh €M^y L«r4 L^itgkbersugi faM, fhiit tlie trfl^hos, liy ttklngnom ndpving fttctber tixQc to the priopipa], dofs 4 malcrial injuiry to ti^e iMcetj, who has a rights thndaf afttf IfiUBb. XL} Joini and Several ObBgatians. 71 As die wcocfbx of a InH of exchange is the pcrfon primarily iiaUc, any oompofi|ion with him difcharges the indorfers ) and if he has efeAs of the drawer, it difcharges the .drawer like wife. But die hoider of a bill, accepted hj a perfon having no effeds, does not reiisquifli his right againft the drawer, by taking fecurity from the acceptor, and giving him time. Ex f arte Smithy 5. Bro. Cia. I. Ex fsrie HoUtny Cookis Bankrupt Law. And it has fincc b«en held, that the holder of a bill who took the acceptor of a bill of exchange in execution, and afterwards difr charged him from cuftody, upon payment of part of the amountf and girmg fccurity for the remainder, with a fmall exceptirei. It is a 'breach of the obligatiooy in confcience and hooeftj* and it is not too much to fay of that obligation* in point of law. 1 he Court csfiOQCtry the caofe by enquiring what mifchicf it might have done, for that would go ioto a ffft variety of fpccnlationy upon which no foqnd principle could be built This pradttccs no inconvenience to any one \ for it only amounts to thit» tJiat iberc fball be on (i^fa^inn with the priiicipaf 4cbtor, wiihout acquainting the perfon who has a great ioieieft in it. The furetjf only engages to make good thr de6cieocy. It is the deareft and moft evident equity not to carry on any tranfa^tion, without the privi(y of him who muft, Bcceffarily hare n concern in every traof^^ion with the principal debtor. You cannot |bBip bin bound and \nnf$.€k. his a^airs (for they are as much his a^ y'>ur own)* without cmfttlting bim. You muft let him judge, whether he will give that iodulgencc contrary ip the nature of bis engagement. Sec alb the cafe of Xdw v. Esfi Udis QmpMtyj 4 Vef, Si4« which w4 In a great «Hlfiuedccided npon iu pniticular circamftaoces, but from which it may lie (voper to «rtra^ the Mowing obfanfations of the Mafter of Uie Rolls : « It cannot be concluded .apgp any prinqp le ibat .prevails with regard to principal and furety, that where tbft priocipal bgs left a fufficient fund in the hands of the creditor, aiid he thinks fit, inftead if retaining it In hit hands, to pay it back to the principal, the furery cifi ever be called ■pan.'*...-4< Tber9 U •odott>t tbat upon a joint ^nd fevcral bond each oUigor is a prio- ^pal.atkw; b«t» Cou^ of quit> m«keaa wide diffidence between principals and fum. tict.*'— «->^< ^here any 9& lias been tii>ne ^y the obligee that may injure the fuiety^ the Cowt is vc^ glad to lay bold of it in favour of the fure y.*' -*«- , — , , ■ ^ P B»tjf«ng wbethgc this OMi be^ooe ydAnWJm laoMdwis aflbr of ibiyipg whgtk Ini? te Qmmm f • Stm, f^. /. 76. F 4 difchargQ 7« APPENDIX. [Numb. XI, difcharge of the others* who are only to be regarded as his fureties ; but that a difcharge to a perfon» who is in cfkSt only liable as a fiirety, does not affe& the claim againft the party, who haying alone received the benefit of the contra£b, is as between the feveral debtors finally chargeable as the principaK In the cafe of Stock v. AlaivfoM, i Bof. 286, it appeared that the plaintiff being indebted to the defendant, gave him ^ hill of ex- change, which was accepted but not paid when due \ the defendant afterwards agreed with the other creditors of the plaintiff, in ac- cepting a compofition of eight {hillings in the pound, and afterwards received the amount of the bill from the acceptor, confidering him- felf as a trudee for the plaintiff for aU that he fo received above twelve (hillings in the pound: and it was held that he was liable to pay to the plaintiff the whole money which he had received frgm the acceptor. The principle upon which the Court feerp^ tq have pro- iseeded, was, that the effeds of the plaintiff, in the hands of tl^e acceptor, were to be confidered as a part pf the plaintiff's property. X have, however, feldom niet with a cafe which I have confidered as more difficult to reconcile with the principles of juilice. After a debtor has accepted a bill, it is a fallacy to fuppofe that the efiefls in his hands are to be confidered as the effe£ls of the drawer, foj. the etigagemcnt which is made by the acceptance is, as between the acceptor and the drawer, tantamount to a payment, and the onyy remaining obligation is to fatisfy the bill, the JFormer obligation no longer fubfifting. The fame eifed^ arife« between the drawer of the bill and the perfon to whom it is given ; fuch btU, until dif- honoured, is a payment pf the debt ; the dired obligation which then fubfifts is that of the acceptor to pay the bill, the drawer bein^ only fubjeA to an acceffory obligation (in the nature of a furety), in cafe the acceptor fails in the performance of the principal obli- gation, and due diligence is exercifed by the holder; but when, from the non-performance of the principal obligation, the liability of the furety attaches, there is furely no injuftice in releafing the furety, upon the acceptance of a partial fatisfa£tion, without relinquifiiing |he pght of claiming a fatisfadiion from the principal, provided the furety is not thereby prejudiced in his claim againft the principal-, if the fiirety (the drawer) paid the whole, he might recover the whole from the principal (the acceptor), and he has in the like manner a proportionate right upon the payment of a part; and in cafe tt^e cre- ditor receives the whole from the principal, he is accountable to the furety for what be has before received from him. If a creditor re- ceives a pledge for hisdebt,thefe is no inconfiftency i^ his difcharging the perfonal refponfibility without relinquiihing the benefit of the pledj^ \ and if fuch dilcluurgc is accompanied vrith a partial iatis£ic« tion« JKomb. XLJ yoint and Several ObUgatlons. jrj tioa»tfae pledge continues aTaiiablc for. the tefidue. It can hardly be fiippofed to be the a&ual intention ofthe creditor, in liberating the furety, to liberate alfo the principal debtor, or in difcharging the per» fcmalrefponiibiUty, to abandon the pledge which is given for the af- foiance of the fame duty s for the .principle of the Roman law, that mmo prsfutnitur donare^ is not a narrow rule of pofitive infti* tutioni but a natural inference of reafon and juftice, any intention in oppofition to that principle ought therefore to be diflinfUy and uneqiuTOcally expreflcd, and the implication of fuch intention can only arife from the fubtilties of technical reafoning [a). The cafe afterwards came before the Court of Chancery, 6 Vef, 300, where thedecifion turned upon principles not immediately applicable to the prefent dtfcuflion ; both courts feemed to have entertained the ' fappofition, that if bills were accepted without efie&s, it would be unieafonable that the drawer, after having compounded with the ' holder, (hbuld be liable to the acceptor, and taking that for granted, they infer that there is no difference, if there are efie&s^ for that then the difcharging the acceptor from the debt to the drawer, would amount to the fame thing, and be a prejudice to-him^ but I conceive that the holder of a bill is at all times, or at leaft I generally, and unlefs 'afFe£led by notice, or otlier fpecial^ circum- ftances, well founded in regarding the acceptor as having that fiharader which appears upon the face of the inftrument, as the principal debtor, and that although in fome cafes the drayirer may be leibrted to as fuch principal, this deviation from the general rule js always for the benefit, and ought never to operate to the prejudice pf the holder. In a fubfequent cafe, {ex ^ parte Gifford^ 6 Fefi 805.)- Mar^ tpQll and Haigh being creditors of Bedford — Bedford^ NiUock gnd Burgefiy and Bajlii^ joined in a promiflbry note as a bilateral fecurity; Baylis entered into a compofition with his creditors of 4/, in the pound, in which Marjball and Haigh con- curred, and gave him a receipt in full ; Bedford and NiUock and Burgefs became bankrupt^ % Bedford paid 4/. in the pound ; Nibhck and Burgefs^ 5/.} and the petition was prefented on the paft of the affignees of Niblock and Burgefs^ praying that the proof upon their rftate inight be expunged \ and. in fupport of the petition, it was contended, that this difcharge of Bajlis was a ^difcharge of the («) Vicwing the cafe as totMlly uoconneQed with all profeffional reafoning, is it poffiUe to imagiMt as a oiatterof faQ, that a perfon agreeing to liberate the drawer of a biU of es- chaog* ogoa paynseot of Si. b the poundy adiaally intends at the fame tiiiie, and as a aecefiary caofe^oeDce of foch agreement, to make him a preient of the itmaiaing i%t, which may be eveotoally recei?ed from the acceptor, the principal debtor ?— And if it it impoflihle to fiapf ol« fuch aa iatention to have adually eaifted, why is it to be prefomed, pcm the mcxe aft of lihemtijig the drawer, that any fuch intcntioa was profefled, and thit fte lalloiiiQg ap a l^al liglkt way a deceit and violation of good faith ? co-fureties f 4 A P P E N D 1 1, [Numb. XI. co-fuftties Mibloch and Burgefs^ in the fame manner as die difcbarg e of the principal is the difcharge of the furety ; for the furcty wh«t had received the difcharge wpuld be thereby freed fron>contri* {>Utiag towards what might be afterwards paid by the co-furcty. The decifion of the Lord Chancellor was, that tKe petition was at leaft premature, for that until Nlhloch^xA Burgeft had paid lox. iu the pound, for which they were liable, as between themfclves and SofliSf they could have no caufe of complaint. His lordfhip en» tcred in fbme degree into the general queftion of the furety being dlifcharged by the difcharge of the principal, as proceeding upon the ground that otherwil^ the principal, who would be liable over to the furety, would not have the benefit of his difcharge, and veferred to the opinion of Lord Thurlow^ that the furety would not be difcharged, if there was an exprefs refervation at the time of the compofition, for that then the fubfequent demand was aflented to, in the terms of the contra^. But this ground does not fully meet ifae law upon the fubjeA \ for it is held, as we have feen^^ tliat the furety is abfodutely liberated, not only when the principal is en* ^rdy dtfcharged, but alfe when time is granted to him. Now the principal would not lofe the benefit of the contra^ with himfelf, «nlefs the furety were proceeded againft within the time allowed to ^e principal \ therefore, the difcharge of ^he furety is referable to « more extenfive principle than that of the mere ttk& of a cir- cuitous iiabiUty, defeatii^ the benefit acquired to the principal. It feems impolfible that the lad cafe can be reconciled with that of ^oek v. Mawfon, when reduced to their fundamental principles. If a difcharge to one of two perfons, who, as between themfelvcs^ are jointly and equally liable, is not an exoneration of the other, except fo far as it a&ually operates to his prejudice i much lefs €^t\ a difcharge to the furety (the drawer) operate as a difcharge to the principal (the acceptor) ; and if the acceptor, in the cafe of Sioci and Ma^v/ofif was liable to the plaintiff (the drawer) for the «fie€ls in his hands, in confcquence of the tranfadion between the plaintiflF and defendant, he could not alfo be liable to the defendant (the holder) ; and if the acceptor was not liable to the holder, the difcharge of the furety induced the difcharge of the principal ; but liow very far was it going beyond that, when it was held, that tbt ^^ceipt of part from the furety was a transfer to him of the whole that was due upon the obligation* of the principal : and that what was only intended to liberate him from an obligation, (honld give him a claim to property, to which he was not other wife in titled. Jt alfo appears to me very difficult to reconcile, in principlcj the i^inion in the cafe etc parte Gifford with that in ex parte ^aterh^* fore cited ; and if they are irr^cottcllables theit can be no queftioQ as to which the real principles of jufticc would award the preference. The ^imiib.XL3 yohHaniSeveruiObUgciiohs^ ^5 The principles which prf^rail in refpefib to the drawer and iiH dorfers, upon a forbearance to the acceptor, are e<}aall]r appUcabk to a forbearance given to a drawer or indorfer, whKh operates as a fall difeharge to the fubfequent tm!orfeTS> in refped to whom An other party is to be regarded as a principal debtor. In Ac cafe expartt Smithy 1 P. W, 137, it appeared that ^ Jent pioney to B and C, on their bond, that B became a hankrupl, and A took C m execution, and C thereupon paid A ^4/. and A ooft^ fcnted to difchnrge C out of execution. Upon whidi it was objected that this being an efcape with the confent of the plaindfl> tivr ob!i;;ee, and the debt being in law entire, it was a diicbarge of the whole debt, and ftould operate as well for the benefit of B the bankrupt, the other obligor, as of C. But it was anfwerod, that die bankruptcy of B^ and the aflignment of his eftate, were pifor to the execution taken out againft Cy and by that aflignment A^ the plaintiff, had an intereft in the eftate of P the bankrupt, wkkh intereft could not be difcharged by A*s taking out an eKeeotkiQ afterwards againd C, the other obligor, any more Amti if two were lx>und in a bond to me, and I fhould recover judgment, and tike out an execution againft the goods of one, and afterwafds on l APPENDIX. tNwnb.Xt It waa admitted that if they had all joined in one bond, for the agpcg*^^ amount of the feparate penalties in each, there muft have been contribution, but that this was faid to be on the foundation of contra£b, implied from their being parties in the fame engage- ment, and here the parties might be ftrangers to "each other, and that it was ftated that no man could be called upon to contribute^ who Was not a furcty on the face of the bond to which he was call- ed to contribute. His Lordfiiip faid, that the point remained to be proved^ that contribution was founded upon contraft. That if a view was taken of the cafes, it would appear that the bottom of contribution was a fixed principle of judice, and was not founded in contra^ i that contra£l indeed might qualify it, as in Swainv. Hall^ I Ci. ii4^.'i49. where three were bound for //. in an obligation^ »nd agreed, if H. failed, to bear their refpc£live parts. Two prov- ed inibWent, the third paid the money, and one of the others be- coming folvenf, he w?.s compelled to pay a third only [a). His lordlhip having cited fcvxral cafes and authorities, in rcfpcci of the obligation of fcveral parties liable to an entire duty, to contri- bute their refpcdlivc proportions, and amongft the reft Sir IVilliant Harhet^s cafe, 3 Co. 1 1,^.' where many cafes are put of contribution at common law, and t^^c reafon is, they are all in qualijure^ and as the law require? equality, they fliall equally bear the burthen. This is conGdercd as founded inequity ; contra£t is n&t mentioned^ He proceeded as follows : •* In the particular cafe of fureties, it is admitted that one furety may compel another to contribute to the debt for which they are jointly bound. On what principle ; Can it be becaufe they are joint-' ly bound ? What if they are jointly and fevcrally bound ? What if feverally bound by the fame or different inilruments ? In every one of thofe cafes, fureties have a common intercft, and a common burthen. They are bound as effedually, quoad contribution, as if bound in one inftrument, with this difference only, that the fums hi each inftrument afc^rtain the proportions, whereas if they were all joined in the fame engagement, they muft all con- tribute equally. •« In this cafe Sir E. Deeritigy Lotd Winchelfea^ and Sir John tinu were all bound, that Thomas Deering (hould account. At law all the bonds are forfeited* The balance due might have been fo larcge as jo take in all the bonds, but here the balance happens to belefs than the penalty of one, which ought to pay ? He on whom the crown calls, muft pay to the crown 5 but as between them«^ felves they are in stqualt jurcy and fhall contribute. This principle (tf) Fu/f Prtff ▼. RiVl, f C*. Ji^tp, 35, cited in ■ note to Petrhg v. Lord lyhMJesf wKrr? two out of three foreiict wrre cmpelleii to pay >n inoi;ttc«, the third htw% xntoU^nt, Numb. XL j| Joint and IS^ertil Obligatlonu 79 is carried a great waji in the clfe of three or more faretiee in a jo]nt obligation ( one being infolvent, the third is obliged to con- triinite a full moiety, lliis cir<:um{l;incei and the poffibility o£ being made Hable to the w]K)le> has probably produced feveral bonds* But tills docs not touch the prhiciple of contributiony where all are bound as fureties for die Um^ pcrfon. *< There is an irfftance in the civil law of average^ where part of a cargo is thrown Overboard to fave the veflcl. Sbo^u ParL Cdt/i 19 Moor, 29'7 The maxim applied is qui fenttt commodum Jmtite debet et crms. In the cafe of average there is no contract exprefs or implied, nor any privity in an ordinary fenfe. This ihews that con- cributioa is founded on equality, and eftablifhcd by the law of all nations. > ** There is no difficulty in afoertaining the proportions in which the parties ought to coxitfibute ; the penalties of the bonds afcer- ^ lain the proportions/* In Ccwell V. Edwards^ 2 Bof. 268, already cited, one of fix fure- ties having paid more thaii his proportion of the debt, brought aa idion againft another for fo much, as, when added to what he had already paid, would make up one third of the whole, three of the other furetics bcin^ infolvent. The Court obferved that it might perhaps now be found too late, to hold that this a£^ion could not be maintained at law, though neither the infolvency of tlie prin- cipals, or of any of the co-furctics were proved $ but that at all events the plaintiff could not be entitled to recover at law, mope than one-fixth of the whole fum paid. If a furety, after the bankruptcy of his principal, pays the debt, or if one of tiie two partners after the bankruptcy of the other pays the whole, he may bring an acllon to recover the amount of pro^ portion, notwithftanding the bankrupt is difcharged by his certi- Ecatc. Wright V. Htmter^ i Eajl^ 20. But if a furety at the time of his J>ecoming fuch, takes an expreis fecurity, it is held that the prcmife implied by operation ^f law does not attach. Touffaini v. Marthinantj 2 T. R, ico. The laft point difcufTed by Pothury viz. whether wheii feverai perfons are condemned in folido, to pay another a fum of money . on account of an a£lion ariHng ex deliilo^ he who pays the wlwlc can have ati a£iion againft the others, recdved a^ detemiinatiofiy thoagh in a very fummary manner, in the cafe of Merrpvtathct r. Ui^ton^ 8 T, R. 1S6, in which a fum of money having been r^ covered againft two defendants, in an adioh for an injury done to a mill, in which a6Xion was included a count in trover for tlie machine Tji oaeof the defendants, againft whom the whole had been levied^ brought 8o APPt^tif, CNiimb. XT* brought an adion againft the other for a contribution of a moiety^ as for fo much money paid to his ufe. Mr. Baron Thotn/bn, before tirhom the caufe was tried, being of opinion that no contribution could by law be claimed as between joint wrong-doers, and con* fequently that this adion upon an implied aflumpfit, could not be maintained on the mere ground that tlie plaintiff had alone paid the money, which hacj been recovered againft him and the other defendant in that adion, and a non-fuit having been entered upon this opinion, Lord Kenyoti upon an application to fet it afide faid, there could be no doubt but th^t the non-fuit was proper ; that he had never before heard of fuch an a£l)on having been- brought^ where the former recovery was for a tort. That the drftmflion was clear between this cafe, and that of a joint judgment againft ieveral defendants, in an a£lion of aflfumpfit, and that this decifion would not affe£): cafes of indemnity, where one man employed another to do afis, not unlawful in themfelves, for the purpofe of afiertiiig a right ; and the Court rcfufed a rule to (hew caufe* The cafe of Philips v. Biggs, Hardr. 164, was mentioned by Law for the defendant, as the only cafe to be found in the books in which the point had been raifed ; but it did not appear what was ultimately done upon it. This cafe, fo peremptorily decided as not to be allowed evenf the honour of a deliberate confi deration, may perhaps be held to have fettled the law upon the fubjeft, but it muft be a matter of regret to fee an adjudication fo pofitively made, which is fo manifeflly contrary to w;hat every man muft feel to be the real principles of juftice, cfpecially when it was not called for by any imperious autho- rity of law. Nothing can be more obvious than the preference due to the Frencl!>hw (adopting ' the principle of equity, which, does not allow one of the co-debtors to enjoy at the expence of another, the liberation from a debt for which they are equally liable), over the fcrupulous principles of the Roman jurifts, which did not give the debtor who had paid the whole to have any re- courfe againft the others. Though the original foundation of the demand is an injury, by which no man can acquire to himfelf a right, the obligation arifing from the judgment into which the caufe of a&ion for the injury is converted, has, in every other xef^eA, the chara&er and properties of a debt, and the obligation of contribution is founded upon the general principles, fo accu- rately ftated by the Lord Chief Baron Eyre, in the cafe of Deering V. Lord Wlncbelfea, by which all who are equally liable to a com- moyi demand, ought equally to fuftain the burthen of difcharg- ing it. NUM- Numb. Xn«3 Of Penal Obligation^, 8 1 N,U M B £ R Xlt* (Referred to, Vol. I. p. 204*) On Pffud OUigatiotts* Hie Chapter of Pothier on penal obligations, appears to» be wholly rderable to cafes in ivhich there is a diftinfl and abfolute agreement, independent of the penalty $ and upon failure of which the penahy as being merely acceflary, becomes ncceflarlly void ; the.exiftcQce of fome other agreement, whether valid or otherwife, being conftantly aflumed. The cafe of a bond in a given fum of money, with a condition to vacate the fame upon a certain event, (which in England Is a common inftniment,) may in fome refpe£ls fall under a diflK?rent confideration ; for a failure in the fubje £1 of the condition does not neceflarily induce an infufficiency in the obligation. We have feen in the Notes to the Qiapter on Conditions, that animpoflibility in the condition does not defeat the obligation ; but m point of law, the engagement is abfolute as if no condition had been added i on the other hand, if there is any thing illegal in the objeft of the contra£l, the obligation and condition are equally void^ What the condition refers to, and is intended to enforce another agreement, I conceive that the confequences ftated by Pothier, will in general apply in this country : where a bond was for the per- fonnance of the covenants in a deed, and thefe related to a term of years which was held to be void in law, it was urged that the condition was fingle j for if the condition refers to a thing which does not exift, it is the fame as if there was no condition ; to which the*coart inclined ; but afterwards it was held, that as the covenant and obligation were both for the corroboration of a grant whicli was void, they were void alfo. i. Lev* 45. In a cafe which occur- red a fliort time before, the condition of a bond was to perform the covenants in an indenture, and the defendant having pleaded tbt there were no covenants in the indehture, the plaintiff had judgment j becaufe if there were no covenants in the indenture the obligation was fingle. i Lev. 3. Thefe cafes of an obligation being held fingle, do not occur in modem praAice \ and a court of equity would probably relieve againft the cffc&s of them, ex* cept fo far as they were intended to inforce a real contrail, and were fully intended to conftitute an aAual debt. A bond Mrith a penalty may in equity be confidered as the evi« dence of an agreement, and the executi<>n of it ^ex^orccd according- Vot. II, G lyj 84 APPEKDII- CNumlKin: ly ; and therefore in cafes where tonds hare been given in con- templation of marriage, by the intended hufband ^ or wife, to tha other, which bonds were confidered as having become void at law by the marriage, they were regarded as agreements for performance of the aSs fpecified in the condition, and chfonrced accordingly. See ABon v. Pierce^ 2. Vent. 280. C^rm^l v. Buckky t, P. Wim. 243. Wathins ▼. WatHnSy 2, Ath. 97. Where two perfons bor- rowed money and gave a joint bond, it was enforced by Lord/f/i/v/- ivicke againft the heir of the obligor, wbo died firft, as if it had been joint and feveral : his loidfiiip faying, in reference to pteccd- Jng cafes, that the reafon the court had gone upon was thai \\\t bond was to be confidered as an agreement in writing ; arid there- fore though the obligation and prnalty were gone by the legal de- mand being gone, yet the condition, takinj^ it altogether, was con- fidered as an agreement in that court to pay the rtioney, and an agreement under hand andfcal. BiJIjop v. Churchy 2 Vtf, 271. And where the condition of a bond was in ceiiudcratioA of a fum of money, to convey and aflure certain lands, the Mader of the Rolls declared, that bonds of tlik nature were always confidered in equity as articles of agreement, and decreed to ht fpccifically performed. Ann Mofelj^ 39, So Lord Parker faid, in Paris v. H^Ufon^ 10. Mod, 5 1 8, that bonds are confidered as evidences of agreements, and the obligors held to a fpecific performance, and not allowed to forfeit the penalty. In Hod/on v. Trevor ^ 2 Peer Wins* 191^ the defen- dant, on the marriage of his daughter, gave a bond in the penalty of 5000/. to the plaintiiF, the intended hufliand, with condition recit- ing an agreement, that he Ihould within three months after the death of his (the ^fendant's) father, fettle one third part of the cftate that Qiould defcend to him, upon the plaintiff for life, with remainder to tlie daughter for life, and remainder to the iflue of the marriage, and declaring that the bond fhould be void on making fuch fettlement. A large eflate hating afterwards dcfccnded, th« plaintiff i\\c^ a bill requiring a fettlement of a third part, to which it was objefted that he fliould have no more than the penalty of 5000/; but the Lord Cliancellor faid, that it could be no argu- ment to fay, that the defendant ought only to pay the penalty of 5000/- becaufc the agreement was recited in the bond, and fuch agreement was not to be tlic weaker, but the ftronger for the pen- alty ; and by the fame reafon, that had the penalty been higher, and beyond the value of the third part of the real eflate, in fuch cafe the defendant would not have been bound to pay it ; fo now the pen- alty .bdng beneath the value of a third part of the eflate, the de- fendant is not bound to accept it; befides it was to be a fettlement for Numb, in.] Of Penal Obligations. 85 ibr die bendit of the iflue of the marriagei and the payment of ^e 50C0/. to the hulband would not anfwer the purpofe* Azid in another ca(c^whcrc, after a parol agreement by the huf«* band's fatfier to fettle lands, he gaVe a bond in the penalty of laoo/. conditioued td pay 600A if he did not do fo ^ liOrd Hanhmche fiidy th^t the general queftion whether the party had an election or option tO fettle the land« agreed in the bonds to be fettled^ o^ to pay the penalty of 600/. would depend on the confidei^tioh what was primarily and originally the intent of the agreement ) whether it was that the lands (hould be fettled, and this 600/. was' only to be confidered as- a penaity» or futther fecurity for it } or whether it was agifced and iltpulated> that either the one or tlie other was to be the pfotifioo for the huiband, and iiTue of the marriage ? His Lordihip faid, he muft confider the agreement to fettle the lands as the primary and original agreement j and that the other was bniy by way of furthet feCurity or penalty, (call it what you pleafe,) and an enforcing the making of the fettlement. Suppofe the agree* ment whidi is xx)ntained in tlie condition ot the bond (which is a common but inaccurate way of making marriage agreements) had been in articles, inftead of the condition of a bond, and an exprefs HkS&oq (a) in (he fame words as here, that the hufband, and his father, covenanted to fettle thefe lands in fuch a rime, or in At* fault thereof, that they (hould pay 6oo/. the conftrudlion the court vould have made, would not be that this gave the hufband or his • father an option to fettle* the lands or pay 600/. but they would &y without hefitation that this Was an agreement to fettle the lands^ and that the 600/. was a penalty if they did not fettle within a certain time, and nothing elfe ; if this would be fo, then there would be no ground to make a different couftruftion, when this is con-* tained in the condition of a bond. But on the part of the defen« dantj^ circumftance is made ufe of, and very properly, from that fom of working it up, that if this was a penalty, what occaiion Was there for making a further penalty of 1200/. ? but on conGder^ tag the whole, he thought that was bately an inaccuracy in the forming of the agreement, and that no fuch intent or conftruc* tioQ would be drawn from it, as was drawn for the defendant. Ihey had made am agreement before marriage to fettle the lands» (as he maft take it, for it was fo recited,) and if no fettlement* tbt penalty; they reduce this tnto^a bond ; what ground is thera to (hew they mtoided this for a ladsf a£lion ? If indeed it could be (hewn that no good title could }ft made, and that the defeA of ictfonaaacff aspfe fimn ]aability> that they might have in view^ but (tf) Qa. declsratita. Q% not . «4 APPENDIX. CNufab.XIi: DOt if the hufband or his father had it in their power to make i fettlement. C^alloner v. Chalhner^ 2 Vef. 528. In Collins V. Collins^ 2 Bur. 820. Lord Mansfield obfcnrcd, that the conftant courfe of courts of equity was to confider the conditions of the bondi as tne agreement of the party ; and ivfAIachvjortb v. Thomas i 5 Vef. 329^ Lord Lotighh and the penalty (Hdy as acceflional, and therefore^ only to fecure the damage really incurred, was too ftrongly eftabliflied in equity to be fhaken. In the particuhr cafe, it was agreed that z- partner£hip ihould be con* dofted entirely by one of the partners ; but that the other ihould have the enjoyment of a particular room, whenever he thought proper 1 and a bond being given to enforce the agreement, his lordfhip feems to have been of opiniouj that the cafe was within the rule, as he continued the injun£iion to the hearing. The following are fame of the cafes which had previoufly been decided upon this fubje A : Salt gave a bond to Ryland in %ol. not to difparage his trade, and afterwards feeing a cuftomer of Ryland*^ cheapening a parcel of flounders, he faid to him, Why would you buy of Ryland P thofe fiih ftink* Ryland put the bond in fuit, and had a verdid. And it was held, that equity would not relieve, becaufe of the fmallnefk of the fum \ but the Lord Keeper faid) it would be otherwlfe, G 3 w«re 86 APPENDIX. llJttmKXn, were the penalty greater^ as loo/. or upwards, i Cham. 183. t Ef^ On the fale of an eftate, it was agreed that the purchafer fliould retain 400/. for two years, without intereft 5 and if thi \irifc of the feller in that time releafed her dower, he was to pay the 400/. oc t\{t retain it abfolutely. The feller having died, his widow did not releafe her dower, but brought a writ of dower, and died before the recovery of it* ' A bill was filed for the 400/. becaufe it was but in the nature of the penalty to fecure againll the dower, which was ^en at an end, and the purchafer was fecu|[ed as ^vell as if (he had releafed within the two years, or after the two years had ex<» pired ; in which cafe, n§ it was faid, the court w:ould certainly have relieved. On the other fide, it was faid, that thi^ was not in the nature of the penalty, but the term of the agreement, and the meafure pf the fatisfafiion for the contingent incumbrance of dower ; and that the court would not haye relieved on her releafe^ much lefs when .(he was fo far from releafing that fhe brought het writ of dower, and if (be had recovered it, and lived Tevetal years, the purchafer could have had only the 400/. apd as he r^n the ha« zard of her living, he ought to have the advantage of her dying ; >nd of^this opinion was the liord Chancellor, and depreed accord^ ingly. Small y. Lord Fitznvilliam. Prec* Chan. 101. In' Aylet v. Dadd^ 2 Atldns^ 32^. and feyeral other pafes, it was laid down by Lord Hardwicke^ that where th^re if a claufe of 94^ ^ine p€sni in a leafe to a tenant, to prevent his breaking up and ploughing old padure ground, the intention is to give the landlord fome compenfation for the damage he has fuftained, and therefore) in that cafe, the whole wmine poena (hall be paid. And in K,olft, v« Peterfon. 6 Brown, P, C460 (ad vol. 435* laft edit.) the tenan^ covenanted) that in cafe any part of the premifea, that had not been in tillage within twenty years, (hould be converted into tillage, he would, for the remainder of the tcrm» pay the further yearly ntnt of 5/. for every acre fo converted ; the tenant having converted into tillage a parcel of land before covered with furze, and an adion being brought againft htm for this, and pther breaches of covenant, and 300/. damages being recovered upon a judgment by. default) Lord Camden dire£led an ilTue quantum, dammjkatus^ ordering that the damages upon each breach of covenant fbould be found fepa« rately. Upon appeal to the Houfe of Lords, in oppofition to the argument, that the damages were increafed to lb high a fum by means of the • covenant to pay tljc increafed rent, which was tp \^ confidercd as a penalty, and that the court of equity could relieve. again ft it, it was faid that this was not a penalty, but a liquidated futisfai^ion, fixed and agreed upon betwcm the parties^ and was referved Kunb. XII.} CfPetud ObUgat'mu. 87 ftferfcd as an additional rent ; wheceas a penalty is a forfeiture for the better enforcing a prohibition> or a fecority for the doing jfom^ cdlateral ad. Op tiic other fide, it was faid that thefie rigorous fiorenantSf diosgh feemingly made for the prefcrvation of eftates^ are ia tScGt a nettr mode of railing rents, more oppreffive tbsin th$ proeeedmg by ejedmenc, and are not in the nature of a contract but of a penalty of vindictive damages ; and ihmiactf ought tp receive no countenance in equity, as^ the penalty thereby referve4 frequently exceeds t{%e value of the inheritance* But the decree was Tcverfcd. Akafe iot lives was made at the y'tarly rent of la^A vith % elaufej that if die tenant aud his heins, with s41 their family, did no^ five on the premifes during the continuance of the lealsf the reut fliottM beraifed to 150/. An aAlon at law having beencommencei «pon t}tt8 daufe, the Court of Exchequer in Ireland ffTOktcA an m^ jundioR % upon appeal to the Houfe of Lorda it was argued in fupr port of the decree, that the covenant being inferted ooly for the iake of improvtment, and to fecure the rent rcftrved, the £une ha4 been fabftantiaHy performed, and the defign thereof anfwered; for It was admitted, that the lands were kept well ftocked widi more than fufficient to anfwer the rent ; but the decree was reverfed. Pon^ firAjy. Adorns^ 6 Br. P. C. 407. (laft edit, a vol, 431.) In Roy V. Duke of Beaufort ^ 2 Atkins ^ 190. the plaintiff and hifi fon, while die fon was in cuftody on the inforrasTtion of ehe duke's gamekeeper, for carrying a gun, gave a bmid, that •die ion (hould pot commit any trefpafs in the duke's royalties, by ihootiugy hunt^ ing, fi&ing, &c. unlefs with the licetice of the gamekeeper, or ia company with a qualified perfon.* The fon havin^g caught two flounders with an angling-rod, in company with two fervants of the duke« one of whom (a brother4n-law of the gamekeeper) invited iiiffl to go anting Wiith them ; the bond was put in fultj and a ver- ialBt obtained on tfie evidence of thefe iiervants, for the penalty, which^ With 40/. for cofts, the plaintifF (his fon being dead) was obliged to pay* Upon a bill filed by him for relief, the following que^ons^rere-made: ift. Whether the bond was obtained by op- preffion and impofitionp -.^d, Wfaeflher it Ihoidd be only confidered ^s a iecuri^ that the fon (hould not poach for the future ? 3d, Whe- ther an ill ufe hsA been made of the bond? }joxA, Hardtuicie, upon At firft qoeftioR| orprefied his opinion in favour cf the bond, and in the courfe of it, obfetved, in anfwer to an argument that the pe- ludty was faKK^flive, ikt ^p be fiuse the penalty was a large one ^ but be did not know that courts of equity, where bonds liave been ei^« tcrcd into vqluntarilyj have ever gone fo far as to take into their con- fideradpi) the greatnefs px the fmallnefs of the penalty ; he ihould be G 4 extremely 8^ APPENDIX. ' [Numb. XII, extremely cautious how he gave an opinionthat would fct afide fuca bonds, whichi if rightly, ufed, might be of great fervtce in the pre, fervation of die game, and an equal benefit to the obligors them- felves, by taking them out of an idle courfe of life, which poaching naturally leads them into. As to the head of fecurity, he faid, that it was moft abfurd, to think that bonds of this kind were intended mertiy^as a fecurit^, and tha^ nothing was to be recovered upon them. He was of opinion, that when thefe kinds of bonds were eiven by way of dated damages between the parties, it was unrea^ lonable to imagine, that they could only be intended as a bate fe*. curity that the obligor {houM not offend for the future, << Was this the cafe (he faid) in what refpeA is a gentleman, who has taken fuch a bond, in a better condition than he was before, if, after he has obtained judgment at law, a court of equity will give him no other fatisfa£^ion than the bare value of the price s>{ the game that is killed. Upon the third point, he obferved, that from the year. 1729, when the bond was given, no evidence was offered of the fon poaching until 1732 (a) $ and after killing thefe flounders, it Tcfts two years, and no aAion is brought (i) i afterwards, the plain* tiff" in equity was a witnefs againft the two fervants for a riot, and they were convifted chiefly on his evidence. It is a very material circumftance, that the fon had a licence (r), or at leaft an encou*' ragement, to |i{h, by being in company vdth two of the duke's fervants (d) (one of whom was brother-in-law to the gamekeeper) (e)^ It frequently happens, that there may be a juft caufe of a&ion, yet the real motives may be very unjuft, which a court of equity will always take into their confideration, though they cannot at law pay any regard to it (f)^ It appears, that. the jramekeeper, who («) VIToiitd not fucb etidence ftaye been irrelevant ? Atkhu does net ftate the proceeds kigt at law, but from tbe oamre of tbe ching , there muft have bcea « plea^ all^iof that the fon had not tiefpafled contrary to the coodicioB of tbe bondi to which the icpticatioQ nuft have aofwered, turith ftating a particular trefpafi i to have ftated more trefpailea than one, woold have becnbad* u being multifariouii except ai to the eAed of tbe ftatute of fyiUism^ whkh bad not at that time been applied to foch bonda at thefi, aad whfcb 11 not at all adverted to i and at one only waa alleged, one only could be finved«> If thefim i!he m nute after giving the bond had (hot a partridge belbre the dufce'a £Me» would not thif have been a breach againft the full intpation of the bond ? But what diftin^tion can r^- fooably be made, ai a fljatter of legal en^uiry^ between one time and another, wh^n there ti no diftinAioB by the cootraA itfelf f {k) If a right of aAioo obcc attached, in how Ihort a fpacc of time vaa It re^«ifltc that tbe adlion AooM be brooght, fo aa it waaoot bgired by any flatute of imitations ? (() This ii quite out of tbe qoeftion. {d) Can a man*t legal right be prejudiced by hia fetTant Maving, wkhoiit hii aothoriiy, concurred in the violation of it ? (<) What difference does this make ? (/) This appears to be a moft dangerons do£lrioe« IVhere a man h^s a legal right, the motivm which induce him to excrclfe that right, or to ioibcar from the es^ifo of *U mod NamhiXn.3 Of PemS Ob^gtti$tu. 89 Tho had die aiuharitr of die doke, wEo has been a mtnefs to the tniiia£lioii of the bond («), gave a licence, or at leaft an encou- sigaDoit {t)i to this fifhing, which, as it was with an angling cod ooij, cannot be called poadung, nor was it ever fo efleemed (r). In fuch a trad of time as two years, it is impoflihlc to fuppofe that ihe gaqackeqcr coold be ignorant of this fiibing> efpecially as his' 9wa biother<-ui4aw was in the company (iQ. ^ Acooiding to the condition of this bond, the plaintiff could not be relieted at law, becaufe his fon could not fiih without exprois kavt bqok the gamekeeper, or in prefence of a qualified perfon, fo that if the Duke of Aoi^ff himiiBif («) had given leave, there muft at law have *bccn • vcrdi£b, becaufe it is not within the exprefii (firms of tbe conditioii of the bpnd. ^Now wbea n man has made this moderate ufe of his liberty (/) ^f fifluift and manifeftly 'appears to have had leave, it would be hard not to relieve againft the penalty recovered upon this bond at jaw." Hie tUid point in the preceding cafe, though not immediately lefqcaUe to the courfe of the prefent difcui&on, is inferted to ihew the xtal ground upon which the cafe was determined } a ground (hot appears tQ mc to be in every refyeft untenable, imd which t I amft reft «id| himfelf. |f be firbcsri the tscrcile of it^ cbt doittaon of fuch ferbearaoce is alio a matter of 4ifcretlon» amH the law bat allowed it to operate at a bar. If a fenu« oKBt of pofiAoal dUafpiobttioA b a foffieieot warraac ht a court of canity to deftat tba dcrcife of « legal rigbt^ tbe difcfftioa affamcd Mdcr tbitpveteace will be fo Ulimitable, aa tocradicace all tbe prindplea of joiidical certaiaty. If «p to and at tbe time of tbe pl^ntiff givifig evidciice agaioft tbe fematt (who by tbe bye probably did not, uotil tbat time^ di- valfe tbe cafcaaftaace)» tbe duke had a rigbt of aAion' wbicb a coort of eqof ty woold not iBBOovt Uflt m tb« eseicilo off tM rigbt couU not be defeated b/ fuch a circiunftiac* Hkiag place. («) Wbtt dien ? [h) Gave ^licep^ey ifaat li> did not give a licence, but gave, an encouragement; tbe ■taaiag of which doet oot appcety eaeept as it nay be ibfencd from wbat fbUowt, that ha ptebafclf woild % |hirefo(% that he aaually did know of tbe circiimibace witbia two jeart vtErwardta (r) Tbe word poacbloj doet not occor an |}ie condition of the bond j bnt If he fliall frij^i i^/^g, the obligation Iball be in lores. The ad agabift fleaUog filh it held to cstend to aoglbg. {d) It there Soy pfefvmpdon /Wi a 4tpn^ tbat a oytn le cognisant of enry aCfc doae is tbe preftnoe of all bit biotbcn*ia.law \ and to what farther dcgreet of rtlationibtp ii the priflciple to be carried F (r) Here another principle woold apply tu pfevcat a pcrfbn takbg adf antage of a penalty iKaiied by bit own aft oT coofient \ bot that ii a pHnclple totally Inapplicable to the pre* ^01 ^ocftion. The cooditioo might havo been OMde genctai, wtcboot Indudfaig an «• cefdoa of tbe confent of the gamekeeper. When a parttcolar taceptioo it iatrodaced, re- fcnble to one cafe, it it not the protiose of ODortt of joAicc to create a more extc^five pcepiiea aot cootemplited by the cootraftbg partiei. (/) What Sbcrty f What leave? He either bad leave fton the gvackecper, or he had aot. If he had, it wat a defence at law, but the whole etfe atfosM tbif be bU not^ ao^ tbit fte bond wat leg4l| feffeitcd* have 9« / APPEN'DIX. [Numb-XIL • have commented upon in the notes vtth a freedom which may perhaps be regarded as arrogances but which I muft always aflert as the privilege of a writer, who wiflies to extend his enquiries beyond the mere colledion of aathorities, and to inveftigate die principles of his fubjed (a). Upon the fecond point, I conceive the opinion of the eminent magiftrate to be founded upon the moft correft principles of juri* ilical reafon ; and I am perfuaded, that if thefe principles had been more cxtcnfively afted upon than they have been, the true objcft of penal obligations would have been «more efi^ually promoted. If At penalties had been allowed to operate really #« ferrorem^ by being a6bually levied, when legally uieurrcd, agrelements would be mow faithfully performed, from a terror of the confequences of their in- ^a£lion ; but tlic fcarecrow- doftrinc of penalties being ftipukted, merely tn terrcrem^ whilft they are known to haV^ no efficient power, is little more thau a trifling with language. No penalty is requifite to render a perfon liable to the damages which may be proved to Iiave arifen from the non-performance of his agreements, but by a real liability to an aftual penalty, fuch non-performance witt com- monly be prevented. In the following cafe, a bond -was given by the plamtiiF to the defendant, who was a'Tiauvmcrchant, as a fecurity for his fervice and behaviour in FhtfJers, as an agent for the defendant in buying iuur tfaeve ; the plaintiff was to (lay abroad till a certain feafoa, and as a fecurity for his performance of the agreement he depofi- ted I do/, in the hands of the defendant. Tlie plaintiff bought but 5/. worth of hair for th^ disfeiidant, and retumed to England before the time agreed bctweep tliem>; and brought a bill for 50/. agreed to be paid for his trouble, and alfo for the depofit. It was infilled for the defendant, that this was a breach of the plaintifiTs duty, and a forfeiture of the bond, and that the defendant had a right to re- tain the 100/. in fatisfaftion of the penalty, and Aat the botpt would («) The general dofirlne of preventing an III ufc hc'ing made of a bond Ii properly ap- pHcabie to a fubjed of a different n^tuie, and is principally ini^anced in tht* caft or genera) ^nds of re/ignatioQ, which, » hen tl,ey were allowtd to t>e Talid in pcnnt of \^w, were pre- vented by courts of e<|uhy from being made tkf cover of fimony ; and, in any other cafe, • court would prevent a legal contra£k from being ufed at the engino of au illegal purpofe* That Lotd Harjfgkki (houldi Irom a rentiment of difap»proba(ioii of the condu^ of the i)uke of Btaufirt, have reforted to fuph reafoniog aa ha^ been ftaied, would feem a cauiioQ againft looking in legal proceedings at any otrer objed than the |rue legal ground! of judicial determination. An objedioo which might have deferred foipe attention in the principal cafe, xfm. that the contraA was repugnant ro a principle of law, inafmach as it wai made by way of compofition fur dropping a crimibal profecuiionj was not made a point b the caie (except as connected wjjh the adveoti'tioas circuraftance of oppre^lion). The decifioni in fubfequent cafes would give coniidfiiable weight to fuch an objection, if the gueft'ioq flv;uld hereafcrr arife. notr fMl tclieve agamft it, for it was the ftitvd dtmages between th^ IKffdes, and d>e counfel cited the above cafe of the Duke of Amh firtf and likewife comf^ared it to the cafe of nomine poen^ in leafes. The I^rd Chancellor faid, he could not decree this penalty, b^f piife it was a bond for fervices only, add difierent from the cafes fi^mmine pamM in leafcs, to prevent a tenatit from ploughing, ber ^ufe that was ftated damages between the parties. Nor wa$ H Kke ^ cafie of bonds given as a fecurity not to^ defra«d the r^ TcnBCi becaufe there, where a perfon is guilty of a breach, it wa^ eonfidered as a crime, and the Court of Ciiancery would not relieife for that reafoil. Here he couM not decree the penalty, but muft decree an ^6tf on at law, upon a ^uanttm danrnificatuSi to try how far ^defendant had been damnified by the plaintiff's non>perfbrmai|oe of his fcTvicc. Benfin ▼• Gibfin^ 3. Jltk. 395. {a) In the cafe of Hardy ▼• Martin^ i.Bro. c. 418. ». one partner, on retiring fippm bufmefs, gave a bond of 600/. to Ac other, not to carry on the fame bufincfs within certain limits ; and after a verdi& at law for the penalty, the Court oPChancery granted an injunc* tbn to ftay execution, and direded an iflue to take an account of the damage a£hia}Iy fuftained. In cafe of a penalty for non-performance of covenants, or agree* fAents, dxe Courts of Equity, in like manner, exercifed a jurifdifiion of reftrammg the recorery, to the amount of damage affefled by at jury. At common law, the rules of pleading, which require iflues ^betaken upon a fingle point in general,* confined the plaintiff to ftate a fingle breach of the agreement, for the performance of irfnch the penalty ^as ftipulated \ but this reftriftion did not ezilt {n cafes wbere the breach of the agreement was ftated in the de^ claration, in which the plaintiff ma^ allege his complaint as ex- teofirely as he finds convenient. («) Tlwfe IccQt to be an inaccuracy in the phmfe th^t the eoort couU net Recite die penalty, becaofe cbac expccflion wo^lJ l^e rather appiicjbie Co a fuit by the obligee to en- force the penalty, than to qne by the obligor to be reliev^ front it ; but thii inaccuracy ia Bore proM^ly imptttable to the teporter than to the Lord Chancellor ; ai to the propriety ofthe^cc'fioaithtfuglitliere it net a fimilaiity of cireoniftaocet to tbeoaiei mentioned^ there does not appear ft> be *ny necrlfary oppofitiao of principle ; and it •• impoflible to fiippofe that the intention of the employer, in R^uiriqg the depofit, wai an> other than that it flioofd be retained in ^afe of the agent*s infraction of his duty. In there cafet the injurj^ friiicb can be manifefted by evidence t» a jury, is almQft neceflarily much left Chaa that which It advally cfperienced by the party. When the conrti adopted (b^ prtnctple above cited, that if a penalty ii inerdy infatei ^ (• fecore the enjoyment of a collateral objeA, the enjoyment of the objeA is confidered Mtbfc principal nffaft of the deed ; if they had gone on to %1k themfeUea, How that eflMI i '^pMdd be moft fully obtained ? they would have probably Ibund the anfwer to be, aa cn« ^ceneat of the pcnalCy frben that en}oy ment was wil/nlly withheld. The dtfttaA eaunciatioo of the-dbovc principle ia the ^afe of Slmuht v. Walter ^ indvcdl fBc to mentioa that cafe before theothen upon tht fiunefitgedi which m aaCeriar to it h point of tiflM* By 9s APPENDIX. CNutti]?. Xit By Stat* i k g.W. c. 1 1. it iscna£led| that in all a^fiions in any court of record, upon any bond, or any penal fum, for non-per- formance of any covenants or agreemcpcs, contained in any Inden« ture, deed, or writing, the plaintiff may afligh as many breaches as he thinks fit, and the jury ihall afTefs damages upon fuch breaches as the plaintiff (hall prove to have been broken } and if judgment ihall be given for the plaintiff on demurrer^ or confeffion, or by nil dicit 9 the plaintiff may fuggeft upon the roll as many breaches as he ihall think fit, upon which a writ (hall iffuc to the (heriff to fum- mon a jury before the juftices of affize* to enquire of the truth of thofe breaches, and to affefs the damages ; and upon payment of iuch damages witli the cofts, execution {hall be ftayed ; but the judgment (hall remain as a fecurity, to anfwer for any damages to be afterwards fuftained by any future breach. The natural conftru£lion of this z{k does not feem to apply to bonds, with a condition to do or not to do any given a£l, without there being any other diftin£i agreement, that fuch z€t (hall be done \ but in CMas v. Collins^ 2 Btir. 824. above cited, where the condition of a bond was that the defendant Ihould pay an an^ nuity to, the plaintiff, and fhould alfo maintain him. Lord Mans^ field faid, " This is an agreement between the parties, and an agree- ment in writing; the condition of the bond is an agreement in writing, and people have frequently gone into courts of equity upon conditions of bonds as being agreements in writing, to have a fpecific performance." I cannot help thinking that there is more ingenuity than folidity in this reafoning ; for though in equity th^ condition of a bond is regarded as evidence of zn agreement, that the aft referred to ihall be done, fuch conditions are not regard- ed as agreements at law, and cannot be declared upon as fuch \ and , wher6 there was another fubjeft to which the words of the ftatute were naturally applicable, it would have been as well to avoid ex-> tending the operation of it to a cafe, that does not naturally pre« fent itfelf to the mind, as being in the view of the legiflature, and to which the words can only be applied by a forced and foreign con(lru£kion. It is however fettled in conformity with the above opinion, that the ftatute extends to all bonds for the performance of any condition. Walcoi v. Gculding^ 8. T. R. 1 24. It is now alfo fettled that the z{k is compulfory (a) , and that the plaintiff is not at liberty to proceed for the penalty as at common law, although there have been decifions, and there feems to have been a tacit pra£lice the other way (*), JDr^igc v. Brand, 2 Wi!f» («) For thf method of proceeding on the ftttute, fee fTiiSem'* N9Us% Cauitfprd» v« Cr^k, I Smtndi 58. JUhirti v. M^rr'uh * SdamL 7S7. t^ 377* KvitobV XII.3 Of Penal Obligatibnh 93 577, Goodwin V. Crowie, Cowp. 357. Hardy v. Berff, 5. T. Ri. 636* in the lali cafe, Lord Kenyon^ and Mr. Juftice Su/Ier, certified theit opinioivin writing to the Lord Chancellori upon a writ of error from a judgment of the Exchequer ; they ftated that it was apparent to tbem, that the law was made in favour of defendants^ and was high«« ]j remedial, calculated to give plaintiffs relief up to the extent of the damage fuftained, and to protedl defendants againfl the pay- ment of furtlier fums then what was in confcience due, and alfo to take 'away the neceflfity of proceedings in equity, to obtain re« Ucf againft an unconfcientious demand of the whole penalty, in cafes where fmall damages only had accrued {a). Sec sdfo RoUs V. RofnveUf J. T. R, 540, ' " But there are cafes where the penalty ftipulated by the parties^ can be the only true and proper meafure of juftice ^ and though there is a technical diftiuAion between a penalty and ftated da«« mages, to which I am about to proceed, I think it would be in geoeral proper to ri^gard the penalty as ftated damages^ unlefs there ii fome particular reafon in the nature of the contraA to the con* trary. Many times engagements are entered into upon confidera* tions, wholly ariGng out of the perfonal feeling-^ of the parties* The perfon making fuch engagement of courfe acts under an ade- quate inducement^ and the perfon who has given that inducement ought not to be deprived of the full fecurity of an obje£t, the per^* fonal importance of which can only be juftly appreciated by him- felf. On the other hand where a bond is evidently a mere bond . of indemnity from pecuniary lofs, the extent of the lofs is the ex-^ tent of the damages. In many cafes, the adual damage which could be brought under the contemplation of a jury muft be as nothing ; and if the nominal fum awarded in fuch cafes, was the onlf confequence that could attach ^pon a perfon violating his en* pgement, the fan£tion provided with a view to its real an4 cfEcient fecurity would be wholly fruftrated. I fliall have ah op^ ponunity prefently of referring more conveniently to a cafe in which this fentimetit was judicially adopted. In all the cafes above mentioned, where it was held that equity could not relieve againit the fum agreed upon by the parties, I (i) The iQ !• penned in a noft carelefi oiMnery bat I think that this ii evidently tha ^nic coDftra^ion of it «|}0B the point in queftion, and chat the aA it coopnlfory upon the fbintlffaito affigoing fome breach « but was difcretionary merely as to the number of Araeba. Jn any other point of view tbtin would be a maqiftft abfardity, in providing diaC lU flabiiff might affign at many breachet at he pleafed, upon judgment on inrntrtf kc iod damages fiiou'd be aflcflcd, Sec. for before that time be might cake hit judgment aodtxeciiuon far the whole penalty, without affigning any breach at all i and giving htm aoaptioa Cp aflign a breach to enable him to recover a part of the panaltyt inftead of talc* ing (he whole without having rrcour that the fum ftipulated to be paid is the only proper nieafure for the decifion of the jary ^ and whether the form of the tranfa£tion is held to 1)e a penalty 01* ftipulated damages^ (the line of difcrimination between which it not very accurately marked,) the fuih fo agreed is the amount which ought to be recovered. In the cafe of Latver. Fecrs^ 4 Burr. 2aif> the defendant pro-* ■ailed the plaintiff, that he would not marry any perfon betides her-« ielf| and that if he did, would pay .)ier (the plaintiflF) loco/, (a) at Che end of t^ee months. Lord Mansfield^ after dating the proceed-* xngs in the caufe, faid, that the jury had given 1000/. damages i and by law, and in juftice, the defendant ought to pay the loooA Money is the meafufe of value. Therefore what elfc could the jury find but this looo/. (unlefs they had alfo given intereft after the three months). This is not an a£lion brought againfl him for not marrying her, or for his marrying any one elfc ; the non-payment of the 1000/. is the ground of the a£^ion. The money was pay* able on a contingency, and the contingency has happened, therc-^ fere it ought to be paid. There is a difference between covenants in general, and covenants fecured by a penalty or forfeiture. lo the latter cafe the obligee' has his elef^ion. He may either bring an adion of debt for the penalty, and recover the penalty, after M-hich recovery of the penalty he cannot tefort to the covenant, bccaufc the penalty is to be a fatisfa£lion for the whole ; or, if he does not dioofe to go for the penalty, he may proceed upon the penalty, and recover more or lefs than the penalty, totus quoties. And upon this AflinAion they proceed in courts of equity. ITiey will relieve againft a penalty upon a compcnfation ; but where the coveiidnf is fo pay a particular liquidated turn, a court of equity cannot make ft new covenant for a man ; nor is there any room for compen«» fiuiion or relief, as in leafes containing a covenant againfl plougli^ lag up a meadow : if the Covenant be not to plough, and there be at penalty, a court of equity will relieve againft the penalty, or wilt i^n go further than that ^ to prcferve the fubftance of tlie agreement f but if it is worded, to pay 5/. an acre, for every one ploughed u|), JhcfC is no alternative, ho relief againft it, no room for compenfa- tion \ it is the fubftance of the agreement. Here the fpecified funr of 1000/. is found in damages {b) % it is the particular liquidated ^) Tilt prottift «m held lobe void, but tbearaoont which o«ight to be mao/ftni, Aip« yofiilf it t»he food, was ptefiottfly difcvflcd^ which perbapc wn aeccfiary io rtgird to tiM fieftionofflDllit {h) Hn UfdAip at dw tiid atreaed the jnry to find Cot the pltiatiff with losof. df« mtitfBi^ifihtfiiM^iktdttdMg*eJMt4 Thii laft, by the byc| was nther an odd pbiot t» lfOftto«iim^ fum ttttmb, M-l Of Penal ObTtgalkm. Jj J fum fixed ancf agreed upon between the partieSi and is therefore the proper quantum of the damag;e9. It it clear that where the (yrecife fum is not the eflence of the agreement, the quantum of the damages may be afleflcd by the jury; but yrhere the precife fum ia fixed and agreed upon between the parties, that very fum is the afcertaincd dama^'e, and th* jury are confined to it.— And the other judges gave their opinions to the fame efie£^. Where psrfons coritraaing for the iron^work of a building*, tigrecd to perform it in* fix weeks, and to pay lo/. a-weck after-^ wards until it was (lone, and gave a bond in a penalty for the pen* forroance, it wr.s held that the lo/. a-wcek was m the nature of ikfttidated damages ; and it was f;;iid by Mr. Juftice AJhhurJi^ that the objed of the pai^ies in naming this fum, was to prevent any altera cation concerning the quantum of damages, which might have beea fttftatned by the non-performance of the contrail. It would have been difficult for a jury to have afcertained what damages bad really been fuffercd by the breach of the agreement; (b that it was a cafe of ftipulattd' damages, and was not to be confidered as a penalty. Mr. Juflice hulUr faid, that when there is a penalty bi the bond, it was (Irange chat the fum mentioned m the condition fhottldbe called a penalty; he did not know that there- could be on equitable and a legal penafty ; but that was as ftrongly a cafe of liquidated damages as could poflible exift, and was like the cafie of demurrage. In either cafe it is impodible to afcertain what the damages are, and the parties agree to pay a ftipubted fum. £k^ ther V. Dyke^ !2- T. R. 32. IxxAJIiey v. WildMi 2 Bof. 346. the defendant engaged to pex^ fonnat the plaintiff's theatre for a certain time, and to attend peD- fonnances and lehearfals, or ful)je£^ hcrfelf to the fines eftabliib' ed at the theatre. There were alfo feveral agreements on the .past of the plaintiff! ^ And it was agreed between the parties, thsK either of them negle£iing to perform the agreement iliould pay td the other aoo/." The plainti^ brought an zQion againft the defen*- dant, for refufing to perform, and for wholly withdrawing from the -theatre; and the declaration- concluded, with dating that by reafon thereof (he became liable to pay the fum of aoo/. in the artides mei>> tioned. It being proved that the agreement was broke by the defei^ dant abfenting herfelf, and evidence having been given that by the regulations of the theatre^ the performers were fubjeA to certaiit IbttU fines for inebriety, bte attendance, &c. a verdid was found for the phiatiff with ao/. damages, with liberty for the plaintiff' to enter t verdid for 200A damages, if the court (houldbe of opinion that the jammcuaomoi in the agreement,, vras to be confidered in the nature 6 cf * . * *» S6 A P PE N D I X. [Numb. Xlf^ of liquidated damages. After argument, it was held that the que& tion of damages was properJjr Jeft to the jury. Lord Eldan hid, that • when the caufe came before him at njfipriuif he felt, as he had often done befote in Confidering the various cafes on this head, much embarrafled in afcertaining the principle Upon which thofe cafes were founded ^ but it appeared to him that the articles in this cafe, furniflied a more fatisfaftory groundg for determining whether the fum of money therein tnentioned ought to be confidered in the nature of a penalty or Of liquidated damages, than moft others which he had met with i what was urged in the courfe of the argument had ever appeared to him to be the cleared principle, vit. that where a doubt is ftated whether the fum inferted be in- tended as a penalty or not, if. a certain damage lefs than that fum i( made payable upon the face of the fame inftrument, in cafe the adi intended to be prohibited be done, that fum fhall be cooftrued ja penalty .y The cafe of Sloman y. Walter^ did not (land in need of this principle; for there, by the very /form of the inftrument, the fum appeared to be a penalty, in which cafe a court of equity could never confider it ad liquidated damages, but mud diredt an afiue of quantum damnificatus. A principle has been faid to have been ftated in feveral cafes, the adoption of which one cannot but iament, namely, that if the fum would be very enormous and ex^ cefSve, confidered as liquidated dafnages, it ihall be tflken to be a penalty, though agreed to be paid in the form of contrad. This has been faid to have been ftated in Rolft v. Feterjon, where the tenant was reftrained from Hubbing up timber. But nothing caa •be mote obvious than that a perfon may fet an extraordinary value upon a particular piece of land or wood, on account of the amufc- ment which it may afford him. In this country a man has a right ' to fecure to himfelf a property in his amiifements, and if he choofe to ftipulate for 5/. or 50/. iddidonal rent upon every acre of furze broken up, or for any given fum of money upon every load of wood cut and ftubbed up, he faw nothing irrdtional in fUch a contra£l ; and it appeared to him extremely difficult to apply with propriety the word " exceffivc," to the terms in which parties choofe to con*- 'tra£t with each othei*. His Lordfhip made fome obfervations upon the preceding cafes on this fubjedi, and faid that with refpe£k to Hardy V. Martin, he did not underftand why one tradefman, who purchafes the good-will of a fhop from another, may not make it a matter of agreement, that if the vendor trade in the fame article Within a certain diftance, he fhajl pay 600/. and why the party -violating fuch agreement ihould not be bound to pay the fum agreed for } though if fuch agreement were^entercd into in the forxti of Naodi.XIL3 €f Paud ObBgatktts. 97 of a boody vidi a penakjTy it might perhaps make a diflference (a). In Us ohfenrations upon the particalar cafe, his lordihip referred to die peanuary payments agreed to be made by the plaintiff, and aifo to the final! fin^ which, according to the regulations of tlie theatre, ivcre to be paid by die defendant ; inferring that in thefe cafes thefumef 100/. was only to be regarded as a fecurity for the'fttpa- hted payments ; and that there was not any ground for diftin* goifluog between thefe and die odier parts of the agreement. Mr. Jafticc He^tbf in die courfe of his opinion faid ) it was very dif* ficnlt ta lay down any general principle in cafes of diis kind, but he thought there was one which might fafely be dated ) that where articles contain covenants for the performance of feveral diiugs, and then one large fum is ftated at the end to be paid upon breach of performance, diat muft be confidered as a penalty ; but where itb agreed that if a party do fuch a particular thing, fuch a fui9 (hall be paid by him, there the fum ftated is treated as liquidated damage^.. Mr. Juftice Cbambre faid, that though in point of form the afltion was for damages, yet if the parties are to be conGdered ashiTing ftipulated for certain damages, the jury ought to be di« xt&tA to find damages, to the amount of the whole fum fo agreed for, and the efkOi of the cafe muft have been the fame, as if the plaintiiFhad declared in debt for a penal fum. After taking notice of fome of the decifions above cited, he faid, there is one cafe ia which the fum agreed for muft always be confidered as a penalty, and that is, where the payment of a fmaller fum is fecured by a larger: in this cafe, it is impoflible to garble the covenants, and to hold that in one Cafe the plaintiff fliall only recover for the damages aduallj fuftained \ and in another, that he fliail recover the pe- naky : the concluding claufe applips equally to all the covenants. With refpe£^ to the cafe of Hardy v. Martin^ in which he was concerned. Lord Mansfiild^ upon the trial at law, inclined to think it a cafe of ftipulated damages : though it appeared by the printed report, that it was confidered otherwife in a court of cqnity (*). In Legh V. Liwisf a bond v(ras given by the defendant to the plaintiff in 400/. to refign the fituatton of mafter of a fchool at («) If lath was adoiftced to be the real Intention of the partiet, there cut be no fortnda* ina faraco«rtof eqputyy whoTe peculiar pvotiact it to prefcrre end maiottmclie fobAinctf of tras&dkmif to fubvert both fonn and fobftaoce, io a mimier vhicb rendcn tiie tranfac- MitfiElf iiAoUy nvg^iorjr* The vlaa^fe vbicb can be a£hiiily proted io foch cafe at tfaii matt m somtbI be aotbinf, becaofe St It very dlffcult to fliew that tbe profit reteifed by tbe one, wwM m particvlar cafea have other wfife fallen Io the other | bat the ral injary faiaioed hj coadoaiAgihc tnde in nobtiM of the ^eemeDt, majr it tbe Ame time la- olcelably exceed the IBpvtjttd penalty. . [h) Tliie cale mmM RsoMy come bitbae Lard Mantfitld a Iccond tf oie, upon the URxt ^Madfaf tba Goort of ChaKery, tad pfrhipf h was upon that accafioo that be eypiefled ibeo|iioaoaaUadedtos fera dircdiaD to the jary fli« they Ind «a ather f aide, than the fctalty IB the bond waoU ccrUinly be OMic pfopcr and jadlcioaa than any other. V01..TL H . Knutsford 98 APPENDIX. [Numb.Xn. Knutsford upon the plaintifPs requeft ; the validity of this bond was eftabliflisd upon demurrer, by the Court of King's Bench, i Eafl^ 39 1 » The cafe afterwards came on at Chefier afiizes for an in- quiry of damages : on the one hand, it was contended that as the plaintiff had not any perfonal intereft,the damages Ihould be merely nominal ; on the other hand, that they ought to be ^iven for the en* tire penalty. Mr. Mansfield ^ and Mr. Burton^ the juftices of Cbtf* ier^ fupported this latter opinion in a very elaborate difcaffion of the fubje£l, and the damages were found accordingly \ the judges confidering that it was the intention of the parties, that an actual liability to the penalty fiiould operate as a fan£lion| (or the per* formance of the primary obligation to refign (tf)« Front the above feries of cafes which I have cited« at much greater length than is confident with my general plan^ it is obvi- oufly no eafy matter to determine, in what cafes the fan&ion, in- tended by the parties to enforce the performance of their engage- ments, fhall or (hall not be permitted to take effe&. But in fram- ing an inftrument foir this purpofe, I think the beft way will be to exprefs the condition or engagement, in terms declaring <* that the party ihall do, or not to do the zQt intended, or in default thereof fliall pay the fum of ■ as and for fipulated damages^ far tht fame ;*■ and alfo to infer{ as a penalty, a larger fum than tliat agreed to be payable as (lipulated damages : and in cafe it is intended that the party making default fhall be liable to pay a certain ftipul^vted fum, but that the other (hall not lofe his right to general damages, to add, *^ and fuciv further damages as the faid > (hall in that behalf fuftain \** br otherwife to add a provi/of " that the damages above (lipulated (hall not prejudice the right of the faid . to fue for any other or greater damages, for and on account of the non-performance of the agreement.'' Bonds given in a larger fum of money, for fecuring the payment of a fmaller, at a vety early period attra&ed the notice of courts of equity, and were reduced to what was deemed their true intention ; a fecurity only for the principal and legal intereft. Lord Mansfield has, upon different occafions, reprehended the courts of law for not adopting the fame principle, and rendering it neceflary t6 refort to a court of equity for the «redu£lion of the penalty. In Wyi/ie V. Wilkes^ Doug. 501. fpeaking of the a£^ 4 & 5 Ann. which will («) I regret that I am not able to farnifli a more full accoant of a judgment fioni the (ood (eofeand learning of which I received pecutiar gradflcatioo, at the tioM of iu being pronot^nced, than th« following very ikort note by Mr. Wtgley^ (who waa couafcl in the caufe) of the opinion of Mr. Man^ld, «< Here the defendant is to refign \ this ii the obje£t of the bond to compel a refignatioo. V^hat elfe but the penalty can poffibly be the mcafuTe ofdamaget? If thii isnoccfae meafiut of damages^ the bond ta nfaice. The plaintiff, to be fure, noight make the deiendant pay C9(ii \ b»t ny opiaioii ia, that if he la iatftM to recover any ;hin|,u la the wholc«*V 7 he Numb. Xn.] Of Penal Obligatidns. ^ be cited prcfently, he fays^ that it was made to. remove the abfur- dity, which Sir Thomas More unfuccefsfulljr attempted to perfuade the judges to remedy, in the reign of Hen. VIIL ; for he fummon- cd them to a conference concerning the granting relief at law, after the forfeiture of bonds upon, payment of principal intereft and cods ; and Mrhen they faid that they could not relieve againft the penalty, he' fwore by the body of God, that he would grant an injunAion. And in Bonafous r. Rybot^ 3 Burr. 1370, he faid, it was furprifing that after the ftatute of ufury, 37 Hen* VIIL which excepts obligations with condition, made upon a juft and true in^ tent, the courts of bw did not confider the ju(t intent of a bond to be principal intercil and cofts, fecured by a penalty, and iuScx the party at any time to fave the forfeiture by performing the in«- ttnt. It was more extraordinary, that after this was fettled in a court of equity, to be the nature of a bond, and therefore every party to a bond underftood it in this fenfe, the courts of law dil not follow equity, but ftill continued to do injuftice, as of courfe ; and put the parties to the expence and delay of fetting it right elfe* where, as of courfe. The praAice of courts of law upon this fubje£l was correfted by Sir. 4 & 5 Ann. r. i6.yi 13, which provides, that if at any time pending an adion upon fuch a bond with a penalty, the defendant (hall bring into the court, where.the a^ion fiiallbe brought, all the principal and intereft due on the bond, and all cofts, the money fo brought in ihall be deemed a full fatisfa£lion, and difcharge of the bond. In the before mentioned cafe of Bonafous and Rjfbott it was made *- a queftion, whether a bond for payment of money by inftalments, was within the provifions of the a£l ? upon which Lord Mansfield faid, that the a£l reforms, in fome inftances, an erroneous courfe of proceeding which ought never to have prevailed, and which the courts themfelves might, and ought to have remedied, but did not. Therefore, it ihould not only have the mod liben^l con(lru6iion« but the courts ought to exercife their own authority, to extend the fpirit and reafon of this parliamentary interpofition for the eafier, fpeedier, and better advancement of juftice, to cafes not mentioned in the a£b. After making the obfervations before cited, he added, that the a£i meant that in cafes of penalties by way of fecurity, the clear final juftice of the cafe ihould be attained in the courts of lav, much to the benefit of both parties : that he could not fee a doubt upon bonds conditioned for payment of money by inftal- ments, {a) and he was glad to bear it had beeil fo determined ; that (j) But the i£l mafimich u it direfls that « the money bnmgfat !a fliall bt. taken to U a full faUfMioo and 4ifciiarse of the bond»'* cannot be applied co thtt cafe without in* H \ juftke. loo APPENDIX. [Nomb.Xn. that the defeazance being dated at a fubfequent time, and written on a diftinfl paper, makes no difTerence. The difcuf- fion upon this fubje£t was however merely incidental ; the ground x}{ deciHon in the caufe will appear in the courfe of the prefent diflertatton. In Wyllie v. Wilkes ^ Lord Mansfield intimated an opinion, that bonds for the payment of an annuity were within the reafon, though not within the letter of the ftatute ; he alfo thought, that payment of the annuity after the day would fave the forfeiture of the bond. The point decided was, that where the bond had once become abfolute by the annuity not being paid at the day, the value of the annuity might be recovered as a debt, under a com- miffion of bankrupt, although no payment was in arrearat the time of the bankruptcy taking place. Upon this fubjcft Lord Manitfield faid, it was a pity that the legiflature (houid be filent, and (hou)d force the courts, in order to attain the ends of juftice, to invent legal fubtletits which do not come up to the common underftand- ing of mankind. That has been done in cafes of annuities. The Court of Chanceny has laid hold of this fubtlety ; it has faid, the penalty is riie debt, if the forfeiture has been once incurred •, and you may have a value fet upon your annuity, and come in as a cre- ditor, under the commiffioii. It was objefted that the forfeiture was waved : the court anfwcrs, no matter for that, it ihall be ftill in force, becaufe it is for the benefit both of the creditor and the bankrupt, that it fhould be fo. This has been fettled, and we all adhere to the determination as far as this cafe goes, as a legal fub- tlety, eftablifhccffor good purpofes,l)ut not to be drawn into prin- ciple or argument in other cafes. Although in point of faft, a creditor may fuflfer the moft ferious mifchicf from the want of punctual payment of his debt, as happens every day, and a fubfequent payment of principal, and intcreft, may be a very inadequate compcnfation for the original difappoint- ment, it may be ftated as a general rule that a promife of paying a penalty, beyond the amount of legal intereft, cannot be enforced. In one cafe, where goods were fold with an agreement to pay a halfpenny an ounce per month, (which rather exceeded the legal rate of intereft) it was held that the agreement might be enforced, being according to the general ufage and pradice of the particular trade, Floyer v. Edwards j Cowp. iia. But in a late cafe, where certain bleachers agreed to allow a difcount of 20 per cent, in cafe of pfompt payment, the commiflioners of bankrupt only allowed juftice, and ceruinly would noc be (6 applied* Before judgment, the proper courfe fecms to be a rule toftay froceedingsj and after judgment, • luk ^ lUy execution, lettiof the iodgment iUod at a fccuiUy for foCuf c paymeats. a proof Numb; Xn.3 Of Penal Obligations. loz a pn)of of the fum, to which the debt would have been thereby re» dttced^ with an addition of five per ant, the Lord ChanaVor faid, that the trade of a gold refiner, upon which Fhjer ^ Edwards arofe, had been turned into a cover for ufury ; the cuftom of the trade could not make the debt more th^.the money radly advan^ ced^ with 5/. per cent. The creditor <;ailnp(.have more than 5/. per £ent. and tlie commifTioners have done rtghtV J^x parte AynsvfQrth^ 4 r^. 678.— When the I-ord Chancellor refc«W*Xp money really advanced, he (eems to have had a flight view tol-Ch^*xeal nature of ufury, which is eiTentially founded upon a loan, eithecre^d or colour- able, and is not referable to other contraAs confeflbdl]F*'Qf ^ ^^^" fcrent nature. If fuch other contrails are reforted to, asrtfie.^olouT and difguife of what is a£fcually intended as a loan, it is certainly proper that the confequences of ufury (hould attach; but mdSl/^y^ cafes afford numerous other inftances, in which the original natiirft ..-/ of uforjr, as regarded both by the authorities of the EngUfi) law, and V\.f/. . by all foreign juri{ls> feems to have been entirely difregarded, and ' • /., the confequences of it extended far beyond its regular limits \ a fobjefi upon which at prefent it would be irrelevant to enlargei bat upon which I hope in a future eflay to enter into a more par« ticular examination (ty for taking lef* thaa tht ftipo- lace j price of g xida or labour upoo the condirianof itnmdiAre paymeDt) and to icduco the price agreed to be paid in default of Tuch condition, to that ;«gieed to be received in u(t of its pctforniaoce. But upon another grwu'd, 1 think the decifion might fairly be fupfotted \ for it ii maoifeft ibac thefe excelTive difcounta are nni lealty intended by the partaesy as compcafatory of promptnefi of pa>fiienty and that in fa£k they are allowed afUr riw cipiratioo of a confiderable U^fe of credit, no ac Connie aver being fetilfd upon the footing of tbeoombat price, ^hen the debtor continues foUent. The objedS of them ia to fccure a difproportionate advantage in cafe of infolvency, and by obta!nlng a dividend of iji. IB the pound upon a nominal fum, tb« whole debt really intended vd be paid after drduftinf the nominal difeoont, would be fecured to the prejudice of tht general ciedicora } fa that in faft the nomioal price ia merely a form 2nd colour to the ttanfa^ion, contrary to the real inccntion of the patties. But every difcount does not fall within the principlci of ihefe obfervacions, merely upon the ground of its exceeding the legal ratft of intcitft } Ibr ia aaof caftty the adual benefit of immediate pa)meDt greatly exceeds the amount of a jvar*i iaienft on the dehc In fa^, there fiecms no reafoo at all to coB6der cbf amount of • yearns iatered as the legal ftandard of aUowaocei unlefs the period ot a year is iUpuUced fbr the dumioB of the credit. H 3 pays loa APPENDIX. [Numb. XII. 0 plys him not, or performs not his agreem^t, and there is no equity that his fecurity (hall be bettered or enlarged for him. i Eq, Ah. 92. But where an a£lion was brought upon a bond, in the penalty of 140/. conditioned for the payment of 72/. and the obligor, after feveral delays at hA^^ j)referrisd a bill fuggefting fraud and want of conrideration,lfc *^Iigor ihould not be relieved againft the pe- nalty of the^boifJhf and that it fliould be referred to the mafter to compute tfii^*principal money, and intereft due thereon, and to tax the co{l«*Qf*tIie obligee both at law and in equity, and that what fiiojil^lje Koimd due for principal, intereft, and cofts, iliould be paid hvtite- obligor. The mafter computed the principal and intereft .'.Jrt^jV' (which as it may be colle£led, though it bnot ftated in the \*;- Import, was ordered to be paid.) Upon an appeal to the Houfe of ;••/• Lords, it was made a queftion, whether the court of equity could juftly award more than the penalty ; and it was objeAed, that the order being to fave againft the penalty, no more ought to be decreed. But it was faid that notwithftanding that, when the fame was referred to a mafter to tax principal and intereft, the order bound the party to pay both, though it was more than the penalty ; and the meaning of the firft part was only to relieve againft the penalty, in cafe the principal and intereft came to left than the penal fum, efpecially the fame coming to be heard upoa crofs bills, and as this cafe was circumftanccd after fuch delay, and upon fuch pleading in the Court of King's Bench. And die decree was affirmed. Duvnl/v, Terrey^ Sho, P. C. 15. In the courfe of proceedings at common law, when judgment is given for a penalty in an a£tion of debt, a further fum is added as damages for the detention of the debt ; this is ufually the nominal fum of I/, and when a larger fum than the penalty can be allowed to be recovered, it is by increafing tliofe damages. In Holdipp v. Otway^ 2 Saund. 102. the earlicft cafe upon this fubje£l, an obli- gation was entered into (by fingle bill as it feems) in 68/. and upon judgment by default in the Court of Common Pleas, the protho- pot !ry, in confequence of the time which had elapfed, taxed 50/. {^ r damages, and intereft, for the detention of the debt. Upon a writ of error, the only objeflion was, that the Court had diemfelves taxed damages for the detention of the debt, without the intervention of a jury. But tlie objeftion was not allowed, for the Court faid, that the whole courfe and pra£iice of both courts vras upon a judgment in debt, by default or confeflion to tax the damages on occafion of the detention of the debt, as well as the cofts of fuit ; and if the Court can tax 2oj. or any otixr fmall fiim for damages, on ' Namb. HL] Cf Penal ObBgaiicns. i ^3 on occafioo of the detendon of the debt, for the fame reafon they may fax ao/. or other greater fum for damages, if they fee anfe. The preceding cafe does not at all turn upon the propriety of aflowxng damages, under particular circuroftances, but folely upon die manner in which thofe damages were adjudged i and it is cer- tainly true that if a judgment fof one fliiUing damages, is not error on the record, neither is a judgment for two {hillings, or ten (hil- lings, or ten pounds, or any larger fum; and I do not fee that any diftia&ion can be made in refpefl to the prefent fubjed, between an obligation by fingle bill, for the money actually intended to be paid, and an obligation conditioned to be void upon the payment of a finaller fum, or upon fome other contingency ; for, in the latter cafe, the fum fpecified in the obligation is tlte legal debt \ the de- tention of which debt is the foundation of the damages, and it eeitainlj would be repugnant to the nature of the proceeding, to allow any larger damages than thofe which are adapted to the mot detention of the debt. In Brmfgevin v. Perrct^ 2 BL Rep. 1 190. a motion was made to pay the whole penalty of a baftardy bond into court, with cods ^ which was oppofed, on the ground that the a£Hon was for a fingle breach of the bond, on which the plaintiff was intitled to recover \ after which the penalty (hould dill remain in full force, to anfwer fiibfequent breaches as they might arife in infinitum ; but it was faid by the Court that this was fo plain a cafe, that ^they did not know what could be faid to make it clearer. The bond afcertains the damage by the confent of the parties ; if, therefore, the defen- dant^ pays the plaintiff the whole ftated damages, what can he re- quire more i In WUte V. Sealey^ Doug. 49. the defendants had entered into a bond of 600/., conditioned for the payment of a rent of 570/., by another perfon upon a leafe of 21 years. After judgment by de- fault in an a^iion on this bond, a fecond a£tion was commenced, and a fecond judgment entered up ; and the defendants obtained a rule to (hew caufe, why, upon payment of the penalty and cofts, the plaintiff (hould not acknowledge fatisfaAion on the record \ it be- mg fwom that they had conceived the fecond a£lion to be the fame as the firft, and the declaration to have been only delivered to cure a miftake in the proceedings. The queftions were, whether ^e bond in this dife was a (landing fecurity for all the payments of rent, during the term, or only to the amount of the penal fum ? ad. Whether, upon the equity of the cafe, and an affidavit on the part of the plaintiff, it did not appear that it was the intention of the parties, that the defendant (hould be bound for the lent during H4 the 104 APPENDIX* [Numb.III. die whole term, fo as to entitle the plaintiff t6 retain the stdvan* tage he had got hj miftake of the defendant (a) i Mr. Juftice BulUr at firft was ftrongly of opinion, on the firft point, (which had not been made at the bar) that by the ilatute of 8 & 9 JiT. 3. c* II. an obligee of fuch a bond as this might from time to time afiign breaches, and recover his damages, and have execution for them, though they amounted to more than the penalty in the bond, and that the judgment would ftill remain as a fecurity for all fubfequent breaches* Mr. Juftice AJhhurJl obferved, that that would be very equitable as againft the lefTee -, but extremely hard on fureties, who only mean to bind themfelves to the extent of the penalty. Lord Mansfield faid, as the bond is conceived, are the defendants liable for more than the whole penalty ? I think not, upon the true conftruflion of the ftatute of William^ the meaning of which only was, that a plaintiff (hould not be obliged upon every breach to go into a court of equity, to have iffues directed of fuatitum damn^atus* ad. Is there any thing collateral that (hpuld make the fureties liable for more ? I fee nothing in the fads of the tranfa&Ton that ought to hiive that effed. The flip of not pleading the firft judgment to the fecond aAion only affeAs the crofts, and not the merits. Mr. Juftice Buller then declared himfelf to. be of the fame opinion, concerning the conftrudtion of the ftatute. In Lord LonfdaU v. Churchy 2 T. R. 388, the defendant had en- tered into three feveral bonds of 2000/. each,, conditioned to account for all monies received by him, as receiver of the harbour dues of Whitehaven ; he admitted having received 5400/., but it was conceived that he had received intereft for feveral parts of that fum ; and three feveral a£tions having been brought, he obtain- ed a rule to ftiew caufe why the proceedings in two of the ac- tions ihould not be ftayed, upon payment of the two peualties in- to court, and why it (hould not be referred to the mafter to fee what was due for principal on the other bond, and why on pay- ment thereof proceedings fhould not be ftayed. After argument, Mr. Juftice Bu/ler faid, he was not fatisiied with tlie determina* tion in the cafe of White and Sea/y \ he was perfuaded that many cafes had been determined upon the point, though they did not occur to the Court then j and that cafe was not moved again, be- caufe it was the cafe of a furety. On fearching, he found feveral calet where the dpdrine had been before eftabliftied. In Ei/ioi V* Daviesy Bunb. 23, intereft upon a bond was decreed to be paid^ («) Tbcre were fotnt circomdancef which Citis6ed the Court, that the Icflbr was miflei by th^ inrctiesi with nfftCi to the fmaUnefs of the peoaltj. tbotgh Komb. XII.3 Of Penal OUgatlm. 105 dio9^ k exceeded the penalty. And in a cafe m the Sing's Bcncht Tr. 6 Geo. 3. Lord MansfiM faid> the penalty is. meitly a feeu* rity ; and where it is not fufficient) the plaint^ may recover d»- mages, as well as the pen^ty. Nothing can prove the principle ftronger than the oonftant pra£bice of giving i/. damages. He dien refened to the cafes above cited, of CMms y. CdUm^ Holdk^ Y. Otwajy and DuvaU v. Price. The Court however £ud, that a* dierc appeared to be fome hardfliip in the defendants cafe, they would let him pay the penalty ki the two a^ons into court, but diey would not ftay i^ proceedings ^ and then, if the phdmiib chofe to proceed further, they would do it attheriik of a jury's not giriDg more than the amount of thofe reipedive penalties. The defendant then confented'to have the rule difchaiged, and moved to pay money into court, as amotion of courfe \ which was pefmis* ted. The fubfequent event of this cafe does not appear. h Wilde y.C/ari/oni 6 7. R. 303, the defendant, in an adio» on a bond, to indemnify a pariih agamft a baftard child, obtained a rule to (hew caufe, why, upon payment of the penalty of die bond with cofts, fatisfadion Ihould not be entered on the reeoid^ which was oppofed on .the authority of the preceding cafe of Lord Lonfdale v. Church \ but Lord Kenyan faid, that he could not accede to the dodirine in the cafe cited, as according to that ait obligor who became bound in a penalty of loocA, conditioned to indemnify the obligee, might be called upon to pay 10,000/. or any other larger fum, however enornious. Suppofe the plaintiff proceeds in the adion, and no defence is made to it, the judg^ ment would be for the penalty of the bond, and i/. nominal da« mages fer the detention of the debt. But here the defendant is willing to pay the whole penalty, and the cofts of the a^on, and- the plaintiff is not entitled to more. In anions on bonds, or on any penal fums for the performance of covenants, 8ce. the a£k of parliament cxprefsly fays, that there fliall be judgment for tixe pe- nalty, aiid that the judgment fliall ftand as a fecurity for further breaches ; but the obligor is not anfweraUe in the whole beyond the amount of the penalty. A bond having been entered into before the American war, hs die penalty of 2400/. proclamation-money of South Carolina, and applicatbn having been made in an a£lion on the bond commenced in the year 1 792, to pay into court that amount in proclamation- money, and that Aereupon all further proceedings ihould be ,ftay- cd, it was faid by Mr. Juftice Buttery that they fliould do great in- juftifcc by acceding to fuch application. The proclamation-money was of a certain vahie when the bond was given, and alfo when it was forfeited s but by change of time and circnmftances, was rendered »o« APPENDIX. [Numb.XlL lendered pf no value whatever^ and therefore it feemed that jaftioe would not be done between the parties, if the Court were to deter- mine that the defendant ihould be at libertyto pay that which was then of no value, but whieh, had he paid his debt when it became due^ would have been of great value. Cuming v. JUunro, 5 7. R, 87. In two cafes in chancery, which occurred fubfequent to the cafe of liOrd Lonfdak v. Churchy it was determined, that intereft on a principal fum could not be carried beyond the penalty of a bond ; and alfo, that no intereft could be allowed on the arrears of an an- nuity, which there was a bond of 10,000/. to fettle. Tew v. the Earl of ITittierton, 3 Bro. Ch. 48. Knighton v. McLean, id, 496. In thefe cafes, feveral authorities were cited, fome of which feem to warrant the determination, but others were alfo cited which would be cer- tainly adequate to maintain the oppofite propofition. Subfequent to all thefe cafes, the following decifion was made by the Supreme Court of the United States oi America ; the authorities of the Engli/h law being, as ufual, fully adduced in the courfe of the argument. The defendant entered into a bond, in the penalty of 5000/. with a condition to be void, in cafe he Ihould, within fix months, obtain a patent for certain lands agreed to be conveyed. Upon an iflue of performance, the jury gave a verdiA for 5000/. debt, and 1922/. damages, being the intereft of the penalty, from the expiration of the three months. After a very able argument at the bar, the judges delivered their opinions as follows : M^Kcan^ Chief Juftice } the only queftion before the court is, whether the jury had a power under the circumftances of this cafe, to give any damages beyond the penalty of the bond i the quantum , (which might be a fubjefl of difpute on a motion for a new trial) is not at all involved in the point fubmitted to our decifion. Of the power of the jury we do not entertain a doubt. Though pofitiTC law and judicial precedents (hould be totally filent on the fubje£l, the prin- ciples of morality, equity, and good confcience, would fumifh an adequate rule to influence and dire^ our judgment. By that rule we muft difcover that the defendant, having contradled to make a conveyance, or to pay a fpecific fum, within a limited time, was guilty of an immoral a£l, in omitting to perform either of the al- ternatives ; and of courfe he ought not to be allowed to be a gainer by the violation of his engagements. It is true, that we cannot compel him fpecifically to comply with the terms of the contradj as a Court of Chancery might do } but we can enforce the payment of a compenfation for the breach ; and as the breach was made in the contrad at the end of fix naonths, when either the lands ihould have been conveyed, or the penalty (hould have been paid, the in* tereft (which is a-reafonaUe and moderate meafure of damages) ought Kamb. XII.] €f Penal OhUgtakm. 107 ooght in jottice to nm from that period. *Ilie Ter£ft for the* amoant i&^ therefore, in our opinion, moral and equitable ; nor is there, I iviil vcntute to (ay, any authority to impeach it, upon the ftrideft principles of law. Sbippettf Juftice ; if the jury had under-^ taken to give more than 5000/. for the injury fuftained, by the in- fnAion of the original contrad, their verdidl wOuld have been affeded by the cafes that have been cited. But the cafea go no farther; and certainly do not deny the right of the jury to make an allowance of intereft for the detention of the money, after the time Kmitcd for its payment. Indeed, the ftrongeft poflible inference to the contrary is to be drawn from the cafes cited by the defend* ants; for Lord Mansfield having aiked what elfe the jury couM ^fe than the penalty, exprefsly adds, *< unlefs they had alfo given intereft after three months,'* ftipulated In the contni£l. 4 jBmt. aaaS, In (hort, the 5000/. paid with intereft at this day is not in fa£i, or lawi more than the 5000/. paid, without interel^, at the day it be* came due. indth^ Juftice ; the plaintiff is clearly entitled to the intereft on every principle of law, morality, and equity. It would hare been (bfficient to me, therefore, if the verdiA had been unfup- ported by any precedent : but I am the more ftrengthened in my opinion, as not a fingle authoritative di£tum is to be found againft it. Ttatts^ Juftice, concurred. By the Courts let judgment be entered for the plaintiff, for damages, intereft and cofts. Peid t« WdVu^X Dallas^ 25a. In forming an opinion upon the preceding cafes, I think it is perfej&Iy clear, that the dofirine which would exclude a party from paying die entire penalty, fo that he might be held afterwards liable, from time to time, toanfwer for the amount of damages accruing to an indefinite extent, cannot be fupported upon any principles of legal rcafoning. At common law, a perfon fued' in an aAion of debt could only be fubje£l to the payment of the debt which was the objeA of the demand (with fuch damages, as under particular cir« cumftances, might be allowed for the detention of it) ; the condition proriding that fuch debt ihould be a penalty for the fecurity of a collateral obje£l, was matter of defence; (hewing, that under the drcumftances of the cafe, the debt,.which was the formal objeA of the obligation, did not attach ; and this ccmdition, which was in its nature mtended to limit the extent of the oUigation, COuld not rea* fonably have the cfied of increafing it. When the condition had not been performed^ fo that the penalty attached as a legal debt, courts of equity, in fome cafes, interpofed, to prevent fuch penalty being carried further than what was confidered to be its fubftantial intent^ the fecurity of the a£lual damages fuftained by the non-performance of a primary agreement, but the interpofition for that purpofe was necefiarily at the inftance of the obligor \ and if the obligor^ inftead of lol APPENDIX. CNumb-Xn- q£ refortmg to fiich interpofittony f^bmitted to the payment of the litnv awarded by the judgment as upon an uneoadttional de))t» no fiirtber remedy could have afterwards been obtained upon the foot-' ii^ of the penal obligation. When the legiilature, by the ftatute of WtUkan^ introduced the fame principle in the proceedings at lawy which had previoufly been the foundation of a pra£i:ice iu TOurta of equity, it certunly was not intended to extend the limits of the former legal obligation ; the purpofe was merely to confine Ac operation of it to what was regarded as its a£lual objed ; aikl yfA^Ok that object had exhaufted the debt which conftituted the formal fubjeft of the obligation, there was nothing further to which liie proTifioms of the legiflature could be applied. Execution was to be only taken out for the damages awarded, but the judgment was to remain as a fecurity for further breaches; a judgment wfaoBy fatisfied could not be a Security for any thing ; and a judg« ment partially fatisfied muft» upon the fame principlesi only be a fecniity to the extent in which it was not fatisfied. The cafes in whidi it is held, that after ferexal payments of an annual or other periodical fum, fecured by a penalty^ execution may be had for the entire penalty, without regard to fuch prerious payments, ftand upon a rery different footing- from thofe which velate to the queftion of a penalty vemaining as a iecurity for further payments, accruing after the i^er ef an entire payment of the penalty (Upulated ; for, in the former cafe, the payments are not made as a pavtiaJ Iatisfa£lion of the debt compofing the penalty, but as a per- formance of the condition, upon the failure of which alone the penal obligation is to attach. The allowing a party to have {atisfa£lion to the extent not only of the debt whkh conftitutes the penalty, but alfo of the intereft on that penalty, which is the proper damages for its detention, appears to be no more than anfwering the claims of ordinary juftice, when the noiwperformance of the condition is attended with circumftances that render the penalty, without fiich intereft, an imperfect fatis* £adion of the primary obje£l of the contra£i; and it certainly ought to be the aim of erery tribunal to render as perfe£l juftice as is eonfiftent with the rules of law. By the rules of law, real damages may be adlowed for the detention of a debt. For diat, the cafe of HMipp and Otway is a decifive authority. By the forms of law, l/« damages is always awarded for the detention of the penalty, or any other debt ; and thefe forms will be beft rendered fub&r- ident to their fubftantial purpoies, by their being extended fe far as may be neceflSiry for (ecuring the original obligation, provided they ^r* not extended further tluin is confiftent with their own par* ticulaf chatafter. And this is particularly the cafe with refpe£t ••* td HhiToh. XII.3 Cf Penal Obligations. 109 to bonds for fecuring money, when the priticipal and intereft amoant to more than the formal penalty ; whilfl: the Courts re- firam the legal operation of die formal inftrument, in order that it nay not be carried beyond the fubftantial purpofe on the one handi it is very unequal juftice not to allow the full extent of that operation, when it is neceflary to enforce fuch purpofe on the other. And it is the more extraordinaryi that courts of equity, which in odier cafes fo far facrificc the form to the fubftance of the tranf- adion, as to enforce the fpecific performance of an agreement, only evidenced by its being the condition of a penal obligation, without alloiring the payment of the penalty to be fubftitutcd for the per- fonnance of the agreement, fhould fo completely deviate from that praftice in Ae very inftanee of all others where the real purpofe of the agreement is moft indifputably evident, and where the meafure of juftice is with moft facility afcertained (/i). But fo are the pre- cedents ; and it is eafier to follow precedents than to inveftigate principies, and there is often a timidity in deviating from even diofe precedents which are moft aft variance with principles, and that, when the effe£^s of the deviation wduld be merely profpedive ; and none of thofe mifchiefs would arife which are the confequcnces of difhiibing precedents that have -been refted upon as rules of pro- perty, and have fo interwoven themfelves with the frame and fub- ftance of the law, that they cannot be feparated without occafioning an injury dafproportionate to the advantage. There is a ftrong cafe, illuftrative of one of the principles laid down by Pathier.j that the penalty ftiall be deemed a full fatisfa£lion, and which perhaps carries th&t principle beyond its fair extent. A fervant entered into a bond for the due performance of his fcrvice, and the mafter having recovered upon the bond, and received the money, it was held that he could not maintain an a£lion agsunft a third pcrfon, by whom the fervant was feduced, though the money was not paid till after the other adion was commenced. It was faid that a penalty, in the very term, includes more than the real damages a£bually fufiered, and that the mafter having received more dian ample fatisfa6lion for the injury done him, he could not after- wards proceed againft any other perfon for a further fatisfa&ion. JJWv. Randallf 3 Burr. 1345. The modem determinations, that the penalty is only to be confidered as a fccurity, may peilxaps in- duce the confequence, that the rule eftabiilhed in that c^fe cannot be applied. («) 2 am here onff caatending for that tficompIc\e JHftlce wMcli !s fitisfied with tfie ftyotattffiim^ inmtdkf but the eredlter c«i oniybeflaccdip the fitttatbfr «4il€h lie wmM iMfft beta ia »f tbt fnmuvf %ceeBie«t bad bees pcd^^fned by tfie^tytmicitf cft»- traad imocft } and probabiy he may il'vp in ^e ipeao tine been .4pcuq»i4aiifV ^ load o£ MQpciuMl btareft upon the' fucns which he iiaa bcCh obliged ta borrow. In lieu of tbo(b wtich be irai iatitUd lo ftceivt. Much iio APPENDIX. CNuinb.Xn. Ifnch ef die reafoning in the cafe itfclf appears very difputable, and fome of the pofitions which it contains are deariy imtenable. It does not, in point of reafon, feem to be, by any means, a ne- cefiary confequence> that one man fliall not be charged with what he has agreed to pay upon the non-performance of his contraSE, and another charged with damages for the injury which he has com- nuttedy in caufing that contra£k to be violated. In the cafe of the Duke of St. Alban^s againft Shore^ i H. Bl. 270. it appeared, that the plaintiff had entered into articles of agrees ment with the defendant for the fale of an eftate, upon which all trees i^re to be valued and paid for by the purchafer, according to the valuation ; and the parties mutually entered into penalties for the performance of their agreement. In an action to recover the pe- nalty, on account of the defendant refufing to complete his pur- chafe> it was pleaded, that the plaintiff had cut down fome trees, and there]>y difabled himfelf from performing his part of the con- traA ; and a principal part of the difcuffion turned upon the nature of the agreement, and upon the queftion, whether this was not fach a reciprocal agreement, that any non-performance on the one fide would excufe a non-performance on the other? But the point de- cided was, that as this was not. an a£lion of covenant where one party had performed his part, but was brought for a penalty, on the other party refufing to execute a contraA, and that, to entitle the party bringing the action to a penalty, he ought pundiually, cxaAly, and literally, to complete his part. It is to be obferved, that this opinion was pronounced without adducing any reafon, or citing any authority, that the point was firft ftarted by the Court, without havmg been agitated at the bar, fa as to enable the plaintiff's coun&l to agitate its juftice or pro- priety. In order to form an opinion upon the reditude of the de- cifion, it muft be affumed, that the plaintiff's breach of the agree- ment was not fuch as to liberate the defendant *, but only fuch as to entitle the defendant to a corapenlation in damages ; for the Court thought themfelves relieved from giving a judicial opinion upon that part of the cafe. At common law, certainly it was no objedion to a perfon fuing for a debt due to him, that a (imilar debt was due from him. The ftatutes of fet-off have introduced a particular fyftem upon that fubje£% \ but this cafe was not at all put upon the footing of a fet-off. Previous to the ftatute of William^ the courts of equity had reftrained a£tions for penalties on thenon-* performance of covenants to a mere fecurity for damages aflually fuftatned ; and by that ftatute, the fame principle is introduced into courts of law ; fo that the tfkOt of the decifion is, that not- withftandmg a party having, to a certain extent^ violated his part of die Namb.XIL] Of Penal ObUgatkm. in the agitement^ and being fobjefb to damages for fuch violation, is intided to an a£lion to the full extent of the damages fuftained by the non-performance of the oppofite party, and notwithftandiijg an a£Hon, which in point of form is for the recovery of the penalty, is in fttbftance only a remedy for the a£hial damages, he (hall be de<^ ' prired of that particular remedy, for the flighteft poffible violation of his own part of the agreement* I forbear entering into a further dif* cuffion, howr far that propofition is founded on correft and accurate principles, but have thought it proper to ftate the propofition accord* mg to what appears to be its neceflarjf import and ttkOt \ by doing fO|tbe fpeculative inquirer will be enabled to form an opinion for bimfelfi as to the foundation upon which it is eftablifhed $ but I am far from thinking,' that any reafoning upon its principle wiU, in pradice, be allowed to diminifh its authority. There is a cafe contrafted to that of a penalty, in which a creditor agrees, upon a certain condition being performed, to remit an a in deftroying each odier, is difUngutfiiod by the term Compenfation \ the extin£lion or re-* dudion of the one debt enfues immediately, and by operation of law upon the other, being contra£led ; as is (hewn in the Chapter to #hich this Appendix refers. By the common law of England^ if the plaintiff was indebted to 'die defendant in as much or more than the defendant was indebted to him, it was no defence. Until the reign of Queen jtnne^ if a perfon who owed me 1000/. became a bankrupt, an j I was indebted to him in 50/. 1 muft have paid the 50 /. and have b'een left to m]f chance of any dividend upon my larger demand \ or rcverfing the ac- count, I muft have paid the 1000/. entire, and have taken my chance of die dividend upon the 50/* If my debtor in the larger fum died, I muft ftill have paid the debt due from myfelf, poilibly for the fattsfadion of his fpecialty creditors, and might entirely lofe the -whole of my crofs demand. «* The natural good fenfe of man- kind was firft fhocked at this in the cafe of bankrupts, and it was providedforby 4 2<««f,f. 17.$ 11. and 5 G. 2, ch. 30. J 2&. Where there was no bankruptcy, the injuftice of not fetting off (efpeciaUy after the death of either party) was fo glaring, that Parliament interpofed, by the a£ls of the a and 8 of Geo, 2. and in any anions where Acre are mutual debts, the defendant may fet off the debt due to himfelf, againft that for which he is fued. Before the fta- tutes which have been mentioned, where the nature of the employ- ment, tranfa£tion or diealings, neceflarlly conftituted an account, conGfting of receipts and paymeuts, debts and credits, the balance only was confidered as the debt, and could only be recovered.** Vid* Grten v* Farmer^ 4 Burr^ 2214. The doArine which was thus introduced into the law of England, partakes very much of the nature of compenfation in civil law ; but there is this material difference, that the debts are not in themfelves and of right balanced and extinguifhed ; that the right oi fet-^ff is merely a defence to an adlion for the debt -, that a defendant is not obliged Numb XHL3 Set-Of. 1x3 obligedi in any inftance, to avail himfelf of this riglity but may at his option pay, or on other grounds conteft, the one debt, and bring a feparate adlion for the other. If the creditor, to whom the laiger debt is due, brings an a&ion in which the other does not fet off his mutual demand, but brings a counter-a£lion, the debt dae to the firft may be fet off in the adion by the lad, and is not cxtinguiflied by his firft obtaining a verdidi for his whole debt ; and he may take advantage of it in the a&ion againft him, remitting fo much of what he has recovered, as will reduce it to the balance* BaJtervUky, Browfif et e contra^ 2 Bur. 1229. The principle that the debt is not extinguifhed by the right o( fet-off, is (Irongly illuftrated by the cafe of PUtj v. Carpenter^ i . Wiyi 19, in which it was held that the plaintiff, to whom a larger debt than 40X. was originally due, but whofe demand was reduced by fet-oflf to lefs than that fum, might bring his a£lion in a fuperior court, an^ was not within the provifions of a local a£i, confining debts for lefs than 40/. to an inferior jurifdi£lion. In the law of England, as in the civil law, the right of compenfa- turn or fet-off, is confined to debts ; one injury cannot be* balanced againil another, nor an injury againft a debt. Freeman v. Hyett, I BL Rep. 394. Neither can unliquidated damages, for not per- fonning -an agreement, be fet off, either againft another den^and of a fimilar nature, or a debt. Hotulett v. Strickland, Coivp. ^6. Weigall V. Waters, 6 T. R, 488. or, vice verfA, a debt againft thefe. BtdL N. Pm 18 i. And this rule applies even when there, is a bond with a penalty, which in point of form conftitutes a debt^ but the payment of which as fuch cannot be effectively enforced* Redrify. Hogan, Bull N. P, 180. It may be added, that upon a bond for the payment of money, the money fecured, and not the penalty of the bond, is for the purpofes of fet-off confidered as the debt. 8 G« 2. ch. 24. And by fettingoff any money due under fuch a bond (as the arrears of an annuity), the bond is not exringuiftied* But certain ftipulated damages which are precifely due according to the terms of a contrafl, or a penalty to which the defendant has become abfolutely entitled, may be fet off, thefe being certain liquidated debts. Fletcher v. Dyke, a 71 i?. 32. It was ruled, in Eland ^ V. Karr, 1 Eafi, 375, that it was no anfwer to a plea of fet^off^ that the defendant promifed to pay the plaintiff in ready money. The mutual debts muft be due in the fame right, and therefore a perfon cannot fet off a demand in his own right againft one^ for which he is fued as executor, or the reverfe, 5/^. 22 G. 2. c. 22. / 13. When a perfon continues tenant, or receiver to executors, after a teftator's death, he cannot fet off againft debts contracted by him in that capacity, debts due from the ^eftator in his life- VoL. II. I time. 114 / APPENDIX. [Numb.XHL time./ Shtpmariy.Thomfiny Bull. Ni P.' 1 80. Tegrtmyer y.Lumlty, Willes^ 261. Montague on Set-Ofy 32. Alfo if a debt is due to, or from fcvcral perfons jointly, there can be no fct-ofF on account of the debt of either of them fingly j and a debt to or from a man in his own right cannot be fct off, againft a debt in right of his wife. To this principle, and alfo to the public nature of the trul^ rcpofed in the affignees of a bankrupt, may be referred the decifioii that fuch an aflignee cannot retain a dividend due to one of the cre^ ditors, by fetting off a debt from the creditor to himfelf. Brown v. Sullen, Doug, 407. But where two perfons are indchtcd Jointly and/everallyy that en- gagement as being feveral may be fet off againft the debt claimed by either of tl em individually. Fletcher v. Dyke^ 2 T, R, 32^ Alfo, a debt from or to a furviving partner, may be fet off againft that for which he fues or is fued, on his own account. Slipper y. Stidjloney 5 T. R, 493. French w. Amlrade, 6 71 R, 58a. It is a proportion confirmed by all the preceding cafes, that a debt cannot in general be fet off, unlefs a counter adlion could be maintained between the fame perfons, and in the fame chara&ers. But there may be fome exceptions to the literal application of this rule. For inftance, Bottomly fued Brook on a bond. It was held to be a good caufe of fet-ofF, that the bond was given to Bottomly ^ as a truftee for Chancellor^ and that Chancellor was indebted to the defendant. Vid. i J. ^. 619. }" A debt may be afligned: and", though no aflion can be maintained for it in the name of the affignee, yet as fuch affignments have for various purpofes been recognized in courts bf law, it may be rcafonably inferred, tliat after a perfon has afligned the debt due to .' Kim, and notified the afTignment to the debtor, he cannot fet off < that demand againft one which may be due from himfelf ^, on the , other hand, it wduld be reafonable to allow it to be fet off, by the . perfon to whom it was afligned ; at leaft, againft any debt contrafled after notice of the aflignment {a) \ and that a debt due ffbm^uch J perfon might be fet ofF, againft the aftion nominally brought by the original creditor ; but I do not ftate thefe diftindions as having any higher authority than mere fuggeftion. A broker under a commifRon del credere, who is anfwerable for debt^ and lofles, may fet off againft a debt from himfelf, thofe debts which are due to his principal, and for the amount of which he is perfonally liable, the tranfa£lions having pafTed wholly with him- felf. Groves. Dubois, i T. R. ill. It has even been decided that {a) At to the general principles rtfpedlng debts, lb ailigQed, Vid* Appendix ta P. J. Cb. I. § I. Alt. 5, (No. IV.) a broker Numb, int.] 8et^, its i broker with fuch commiffion, who has paid his entire debt to die aJlignees of a bankrupt^ was entitled to receive it back. Bize T. Duhafofiy I 7. R. 285. And it has been held that a izStox who receives goods, and is authorized to fell them in his own namci and makes the buyer debtor to himfelf, has a right to bring an aQion to compel payment : and it would be no defence to fayi that as between the buyer and the principal, the buyer ought to have that money, becaufe the principal is indebted to him in more than that fum ; for the principal himfelf can never £iy that, but where the fador has nothing due to him. Drinks water r. Goodwin, Ctnvp. 251. It feems a neceflary dedu£lion from thcfe cafes, that if a fad^or fells goods in his own name, and an adion is brought by the principal, the buyer may fet off any debt due to him from the izOtor ; and fo it has been decided^ George v. C/aggftt, 7 Zl R. 359. Amongft the other efiefls of cohipenfation in the civil law, as amounting in itfelf to a liquidation of the debt, a creditor is obliged to reftore the pledge, upon contra£ting a debt to- an eqtial amount, or upon contrading a debt to a fmaller amount, and an ofier of the balance. I conceive that the difference between compenfation and fet-off", as eftabliihed by our modern ftatutes, would in this refpe£t be material ; that our right of fet-ofF is merely a matter of defence, and is not in any cafe the founda-( tion of a claim. It is eftabliftied by feveral cafes, that there can be no fet-ofF in the cafe of a diftrefs f3r rent. Fid» the cafes cited* Sapsfrrdy* JFUtcber, 4 T, R. 511. Lord Kenyan there faid, << It was much to be lamented that it (hould have been fo decided, bi|t for die fake of certainty in the law, they muil fubmit to thofe deci-« fions,tiIl the legiilature alter the law. The decifion in the prin-> cipal cafe was, that a fubtenant, who, under threats of diftrefs, had paid rent to the original lefTor, might defend himfelf to that extent againft the diftrefs of his own landlord, the original leflee ; for that it amounted not to a fet-off", but a payment, which feems fully to fup-*^ port the diftin£lion fuggefted. Upon the fame principle I am ftrongly inclined to think, that intereft is not ftopped by contrading a debt, which does not carry intereft ; and that only the principal of fuch a debt can be fet ofi^ againft the full claim for principal and intereft. Before the ftatutes of fet-off", the queftion could not hare arifen, and thofe ftatutes do not feem fufficiently compre-* henfive to produce the tScOi of extinguifliing the debts to the extent of their concurrence. If a debt, barred by the ftatute of limitations, be pleaded as a fct-off, the plaintitf may reply the ftatute ; if it be given in evidence on a notice of fet-off, it may be objefted to at th* trial. Bull. N. P. la 180; ti6 A P P £ N D I X- [Numb. Xlll. 180; but perhripsi in moft cafes, the (iibfidence of the mutital accounts would be bdd to take the cafe out of the ftatute. Vid^ infra. No. XV- It is now fettled, contrary to former opinions^ that fet-ofT cat! enly be maintained for fuch debts as were due it the •commence^ Sirent of the a6lion. Evans v. Profflr, 3 T, R. i86. The courts of law cxcrcife a fummary jurifdidion, with regard to money due upon judgments, more extenfire than the right of fet-off under the ftatntes ; the proviflons for fet-off, under tlie bankrupt laW8> are aifo more extenfive than the common right of fet-off abore mentioned \ but a particular examination of thofe fnbje£ls, or a view of the do£lrines of pleadings^ and pradtce re** fpefting fet-offj does not fall within the fcope of the prefent defign* The principles, and cafes relative to the law of fet-off, arc coU k^ed in a publication by Mr. Montague, which has appeared fince the preceding fummary was compofed. NUMBER XIV. Of Conftj/ion or Extingui/hmenim (Referred to, VoL I. p. 429.) Moft of the obfenrations in the chapter oi Pothier, to wfiicti this number refers, are principally applicable to the cafe of an heir, who, according to the rules of the civil law, was a Qom^ plete reprefentative of the deceafed, both in refpefl of his ?ightt and obligations, without reference to the adequacy of the property, whofe fituation was therefore materially different from dxat of the heir, or the executor of the Englijb law. Much of what is dated upon the fubjefl of confirfion, is only an amplification of the felf-evident principle, that no man can be under an obligation to himfelf. With us where a debtor or cre- ditor it made executor, it is plain that an a£tion cannot be fuf< tained, in xtfytBi of that chara6ier, by the ordinary procefi of the law ; bat fo far as the rights, or obligations of third perfons arc involved, the courts cf equity will provide that there fhall not be any defeat of fubftantial juftice, by the union of two chandlers in the fame perfon; but the refpedive charadiers, fo far as is necef* fary for this purpofe, will bcconfidered as no kis diftind^ than if dicy had re&ded in difierent perfons* Onr Nmnb. XIV.] Of Confu/kn ar ExtinguiJhmenU 1 1 ^ One of the moft familiar inftances of confufion taking place, according to the EngliJ/j law, is the marriage of the debtor and creditor, by which, as a general rule, the refpeAive rights and obligations, become abfolutely extin^, and do not re-* ▼ire upon the death of either of the parties. The civil law ad* oiittin^ a feparadon of property between hufband and wife, the fame confequence did not enfue* In the Englt/b law there is an excepted cafe, where a hulbai)d gives a bond to his intended wife for a provifion, to take place after his death. Vid. Cage v. ABon^ I Lord Rajm. 515* Milhourn v. Ewart, 5 T, R* 38J. And m equity, any agreement between the parties, in reference to their intended marriage, will be enforced ; notwithftanding the failu^ of the legal remedy. With refpeft to executors, the efkSt of extinguifliment is veVy fvilj difcufled, in the cafe of Wanhford v. Wankfird^ i Salk, 2291 aod it is deduced as a fettled rule from preceding authorities^ that if leveral perfons are bound jointly and feverally, ;aid the obligee makes one of them his executor, it is a releafe of the debt ; and the executor cannot fue the other obligor. So, if the obligee makes the obligor and another executors, although the obligor never adminUters, yet the a£lion is gone for ever ; and al- though the obligor dies, and makes an executor, the otlier co-execu- tor of the firft teftator who furvives (hall not have an a£Uon againft die executor of the obligor. But if tlie executor of the obligee takes the obligor to huiband, that is no extinguilhment of the debt ; be- caufethehuiband may pay money to his wife as executor, and if ihe lays the money fo paid to her by itfelf, the adminiftrator de bofiis fwn of her teftator (if (he dies inteftate) Ihall have that money as weH as any other goods of die teftator. If adminiftration of the goode of the obligee is committed to the obligor, that is but a fufpenfion of the a£iion, and not an extin« guiAiment of the debt ^ the reafon is, that the commiifion of admi- niftration is not the z(k of the obligee. All the intereft of the •dminiftirator is from the ordinary ; but all an executor's intereft b hoita die teftator. This extinguifliment upon the appointment of an executor, is not wrought by way of a£):ual releafe \ but is in the nature of a legacy, :lnd like all other legacies muft be poftponed to debts from the teftator : and therefore, though no adion can ever be maintained for a debt, which is extinguiflied by the debtor being appointed an executor, he is chargeable with it in account, as part of ibt ztkt» of the teftator,' fo far as the intereft of creditors U concenied } aod I apprehend there can be no doubt| but a fuit in I 3 equity liB APPENDIX. [Numb. XIV. equity may be maintained againft a perfon whofe obligatidn is .dif- cbarged by the appointment of his co-obligor> as an executor (a). That fuch, appointment fhall even operate as a legacy is by no means clear ; and at any rate it only amounts to a mere prefump- tion, liable to be repeUed by inference from other parts of the will ; as where a' teftator leaves a legacy, and direds it to be paid out of a debt due^ to him from the executor, fuch debt fhall be aflets to pay, not merely that fpecific legacy but all other lega<- cies. 3 Bac. Abr. 1 1. Telv, i6o. {b) In like manner, if he leave the executor a legacy, it is held to be a fufficient indication, that he did not mean to releafe the debt, and in fuch cafe the executor {hall be truftee for the refiduary legatee, or next of kin. Coney V. GooJingf, 3 BrQ» Ch. no. So where a teftator bequeathed large legacies, and alfo the refidue of his eftate to his executors, one of whom was indebted to him by bond in 3000/., it was decided that this debt fhould be added to the furplus, and that both executors were equally entitled to it. Brown v. Selwin^ Temp, Ta/b. 240. To/Ier 274. The cafe of C^fi^j^ v. Goodinge may warrant a more extenfiye in« ference than is drawn from it by Mr. Toller : for the Lord Chan* cellor did not, according to the report (which is very fhort), found his decifion principally upon the executor having a legacy ; but declared generally, that he thought it a fettled point in that court, that the appointment of the debtor executor, was no more than partiug with the a£lion. I do not find any exprefs decifion in fa- vour of fuch extinguifliment operating as a legacy, although it is taken for granted in very refpcdable text authorities (r). There i3 ^ material difference between a debtor being appointed executor by his creditor, and a creditor being appointed executor by his debtor. In the firft cafe, the debt is extinguiflied, fo that no aflion can be ever brought. In the fecond, the executor may fue the heir upon any debts for which the heir is legally bound, unlefs fufficient aflets come to him as executor; for although he is the perfop to reqeiye, yet having no aflets he is not the perfon who ought to pay ; bpt if it appears that he has adminiftcred aflets («) Thii 11 the opinion cf Ptweilf J. tho}i$h Holt^ Cb. J. etntra^U^i it does oot •mowit to 1 legacy, but to i payment and releafe \ be, howeTcr, admit! it to be aflcti. {b) T^it cafe doei not, howefer, warrant the propofition. {() %£f. Coiy. $11, Hfrg» n, C§. Lit, %6^ In Ertingtoa y, £v«««, Dkketu, 456. Lord Tkurl9w faid, (hat where an obligee mtket an obligor oat of the eifecutors, and t«kc« no notice of ibe bond, bot devifet the refidue of the cftate to others, he was clear that it |ivai not in equity an extingoiihment of the de^t* though at law it would be fo, becaufe f perfonal demand once fufpended il not (0 bf nf^ms^ { and be dcciec4 the executor to pf|Oi^|; accordingly to Numb.HV-] OfConfu/ion&rExtinguiJbmenU 119 to the amount of the debt or demand^ it has been decided that it vould be a good defence to the heir. We have fecn that the extinguifliment takes place, in regard to a debtor appointed excutor though he never adminifters \ but a CTcditor who was apj)ointed executor, having refufed to ad}^ was allowed to fuftain an adion againfl; the other executor ; 2nd Lord Kenyan faid, that the propolition, that if A. owe B. a fum of money, and chufe to make him his executor, though he will not aft, his legal remedy is extinguilhed, was too monftrous to admit of any argument. Ra^wlinfon v. Shaw^ In the cafe ofGooJngbty. Wells j Doug. 771* a pcrfon being feifed of an eft ate as truftee, by defcent on the part of his mother, became entitled to the beneficial intereft by defcent on the part of his father, and the queftion arofe after his death, whether thtf paternal or the maternal heirs were entitled ? The cafe was de- cided upon a point irrelevant to the prefent fubje^ ; but Lord Mansfield^ and AJbhurfiy and Butter^ J. {WUleSf contra) intimated their opinion in favour of the maternal heirs ^ for that the mo- ment both the leg^l eftate and the truft meet in the fame perfon, dtere is an end of the truft which is merged and gone, for a mani cannot be a truftee for himfelf, and one fet of heirs has no more equity than the other ; there never was a cafe in which it was held, that when an eftate came by defcent, the heir was a truftee though the anceftor was not. Where a perfon poflefled of an eftate becomes in a different right endtled to a charge upon the eftate, the charge is in general merged in the eftate, and does not revive in favour of the pergonal reprefentatives againft the heir \ there are particular exceptions, as where the perfon in whom the interefts unite is a minor, and can therefore difpofe of the perfonalty and not of the eftate ^ but in the cafe of a lunatic, the merger and confufion was ruled to have taken place. Lord Compton v. Oxenden, 2 Vef. Jun. 261. Lord Loughborough faid, that it is a clear principle, both at law and in equity, that where there is a confufion of rights,* where debtor and creditor become the fame perfon, there can be no right put into exertion, but there is an immediate merger \ but it is true in equity, though there may be that which, if all was reduced to a legal right, would of neceffity operate as a merger, the court afting upon tlie tnift will on the intent exprefs or implied preferve them diftinft, sod that confufion of rights will not ts^e place. 1 4 NUM- I JO APPENDIX. [Nomb. XV. N U M B E R. XV. (Referred to, Vol. I. p. 457.) 0^ thiBtaiutes of Limitations ^ an4 of Prefumptionp founded upon Length of Time. In dating the Englijh law refpe^ing limiutions, and prefump* dons founded upon length of time, I (hall ift advert to the pro- vifion refpe£ling ordinary debts; 2d, (deviating from my ufual plan which does not embrace the law of real eftates) to the cafe of eje£lment$ \ and 3d, to thofe cafes in which, without any legif- lative provifion, the Courts of Juftice have adopted rules, analo^ gous to thofe conftituted by ftatute; without dwelling upon anions for injuries, or provifions of a fpecial and particular nature. By ilatute ai J^'J- Ch. 16. $ 3. all aflions of account, and upon the cafe, other than fuch accounts as concern the trade of merchandize, between merchant and merchant, their favors or fcrvants, all ad^ions of debt grounded on any lending, or contrad without fpecialty, and all aflions of debt for arrearages of rent) fiiall be commenced within fix years after the caufe of a£tion. By the fame fefiion, anions of trefpafs, detinue and replevin^ muft be commenced within fix years ; actions of aflault, battery, wounding, and imprifcmment> within four years ; and aditons of flander, within two years. By $ 4. if judgment h given for the plaintiff, and afterwards reverfed by a writ of error, of arrefted; or if the defendant is out* lawed, and the outlawry reverfed, a new a£iion may, from rime to time, be commenced within a year afterwards* And by § 7. if any perfon entitled to any fuch caufe of trefpafs, detinue^ adion for trover, replevin, actions of accounts, actions of debts, a£tions of trefpafs for aflault, menace, battery, wounding, or imprifonment, actions upon the cafe for words, at the time of the caufe of a£iion accruing, (hall be under the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprifoned, or beyond feasy fuch perfons fiiall be at liberty to bring the a£lions within the time before limited, after being of full age, difcovert, of fane me* mory, at large, and returned from beyond feas, as other perfons not having the fam^ impediments (hould have done. And by 4 & j; Ann, c. 16. where any perfons, againft m^hom there is caufe of a£tion, fiiall be beyond fea at the tilme ^f fucb cattfe of ;i£lion accruing, the perfons who fiiall have fuch caufe of aAion, fiiall have liberty to bring an a£iion within fuch times as are limited by the fliatute of jfamesj after their return. I. The principle dated by Pothier, that prefcription cannot begin to run, but from the time when the creditor might infiitute his a demandy Namb.XV.] Statale of Limfatknft ^^ tzt liemand, is inchided in the very terms of the ftatnte» fo that if credit is given, or if si debt is contraded upon condition, it is mam* ieft that no caufe of a&ion can arife until the credit is expfred» or the condition performedi and coniequently that befoxt thofe periods the time of limitation cannot commence. When the de« fiendant received money belonging to an inteftate's eftate, it was hdd that the limitation only commenced from die time of ad- Duniftration being granted $ for until that time there was na porfon entitled to receive the mcmey. Cary v. Stevefrfm^ 2 Salk. ^%U See Witterfl>iem v. The Cbuntcfs of Cariyte^ i H. BL 6oi. lam not aware of any cafe in which the fubjed of a contraft, including feveral . diftin£l times of payment, has fallen under con^ ^deration. To foch a cafe the terms of the ftatute may be titei^ ally applied, fo as to run for each portion from the refpe^ive thnes of payment; and I fee no ground upon which the operation of it can be prevented, though, under thefe circumiVances, the courts Would in all probability be peculiarly difpofed to favour every im» plication of an acknowledgment, extended to the time appointed for the lateft payment. Where there are mutual accounts between the parties, an acknowledgment will be implied at the time of the hft tranfa£lion ; diis will be more particularly mentioned prefently. But the paf^ ticular exception in the ftatute of accounts, between merchant and merchant, feems to have a more extenfive tffe& ; for it has been held that to fuch cafes the ftatute does not at all attach, and there* fore where the caufe of a^on is brought within that exception, no length of time can be alleged as a bar to the demand. C^ttmg V. Sottldingy 6 T.R.igi {a). This exception is clearly confined to the cafe of mutual accounts and reciprocal demands between two perfons in trade, and does not extend to cafes between a tradefmaA and his cuftomers, for thefeare not merchants' accounts, Bui. N. P. 149. Hie continuance of a mutual account of debts and credits it held fufficient evidence of an acknowledgment : for, whext an t&itm was brought for feveral years' rent, and the tenant had fepplied his landlord with (bop-goods during the latter period of the tenancy, it was held that the ftatute did not apply. Lord Kmyon {aid, <' Here are mutual items of account, and I take rt to be cleaxly fettled as long as I have any memory, that every new item and credit in account, given by one party to die other, is an adnriffion of there being fome unfettled account between thens At amount <^ which is afterwards to be afcertained ; and any a£k wUch the jury *may confiddras an acknowledgment of its being («) Vidt b fercfal ofea cited| H^tlRsmtU Aotei to p. %, Snmd. is;. tn ii2 APPENDIX. pjumb.XV. an open account, is fufficient to take the cafe out of the ftatute. Where all the articles are on one fide, it feems* accordmg to a cafe cited by his Lordihip, and decided by Mr. Juftice Dennifm^ that the lad item, which happens to be within £x years, (hall not draw< after it thofe that are of longer (landing. Catling v. Siouiding, Ub. Sup. In the exceptive claufe of perfons under certain protedionsy moft of the caufes of a^iion before enumerated are repeated ; but the claufe does not mention a^^ions on the cafe generally, but only a£lions on the cafe for words. It has however been decide ed to have a general application, and to include the common ac- tion upon promifes, for recovery of debts ; a£lions of debt are in- cluded in the enumeration ; and though there is a cafual omliEon of expreflion in the excepting claufe, it is impoflfible to fuppofe that this exception was intended to apply only partially in refpe£l of the pbje£l8 mentioned in the general purview* Fide Rochtfchili T. Leihnany 2 Str. 836. Upon the ^fft& of the exception as to perfons beyond feas, it has been obferved by the Court of Common Pleas, that if the plain- tiff is a foreigper^ and doth not come to England in fifty years, he has ftill (ix years after his coming to England to bring his adion; and if he never comes to England himfelf, he has always a right of a£lion whilft he lives abroad, and fo have his executors or ad* miniftrators after his death. An infant may fue before he conies of age, if he pleafes \ but if he does not, he has (ix years after he comes of age, to bring his a£^ion. While any of the difabilities mentioned in the ftatute of limitations continue, the party may, but is not obliged, ta bring his a&ion* Stathorftv. Grame, 3 frUf, 145. It has been alfo decided, that if fome of the perfons, having a joint caufe of adion, are in the kingdom, and others beyond feas, the ftatute attaches as if they had all been in the kingdom. Perry V. Jachfon^^ T. R. 516. The term beyond feas is ftriftly conftrued, and the exception is not allowed to extend to a perfon in Scotland^ King V. Walker, I Bl.Rep. 286. In cafe (ix years have not ^lapfcd at the time of the creditor's death, the executor is allowed to commence an a^ion after the expiration of (ix years, provided he does fo within one year after the death of his teftator. This is faid to be by the equity of the claufe which gives a year to conimen^e a new adion, in cafe the firft judgmen thasbeen arretted or reverfed, BuL N, P. 150. Wilcock Y.Huggins, 2 Sir. 907. However reafonable it may be to allow fuch an exception, it is not very obvious how any inference to that effe^ can be drawn from the claufie tQ which it U referred* It Koinb* X V.3 Statute ^f Limiiathnsy &fr. 1 33 It is a rale fully eftablifbed, that when the time required by any ftatute of limitations has begun to run> it fliall continue, notwith- fianding the party entitled afterwards falls under any of the pro- tedionsy or, as they arjc ufually called, difabiltties ; for inftance, if a voman marries die day (he comes of age, or a perfon is thrown into prifon the day after his arrival in the kingdom, the time will ntn, without interruption, from the time of coming of age, or of the aiiiyal. If it has commenced againft the anceftor, it will con- dnae againft his infant heirs. A diftin&ion was lately endeavoured to be taken between a voluntary difability, fuch as marriage, and one which was involuntary, fuch as. imprifonment; but this was not allowed* Doe v. Jonesp 4 7. R. 300. Smitb v. Ht/L X mif 134- According to the modem determinations of Engiyb courts, the admiflion of a debt has a more extenfive tSt& than that which b ftated by Potbier; for it is now an eftabliihed rule, the application of which is of daily experience, that the flighted acknow^dgment of the obligation not having been difcharged, is fufficient not only to interrupt the operation of the ftatute, but to revive from that time the right of a£lion, which was extinfl. Cafes have occurred, in which a perfon, by mentioning in con* ver&tion that he had contracted a debt, but fhould not pay it, as it was ef above fix years (landing, or by declaring at the time of his being ferved with procefs, that he (hould on that account refift the payment, has deprived himfelf of that right, upon which it was liis intention to infift* What z6t% or declarations conftitute an acknowledgment, is a queftion of idJBt ; it was therefore ruled, Aat a judge ought to have fubmitted the ttkCt of a letter, couched in terms of ambi* guity and evafion, to the decifion of a jury, inftead of deciding upon the infufficiency of it, of his own authority. Lhjd v. Maundy 1 r. R. 760, A diftindion prevails between fuch an aft as (hall prevent the operation of the ftatute of limitations, and fuch as (hall repel the defence of an obligation being contrafted during minority. In the firft cafe, a mere admii&on that the debt remains undifcharged is faflictent ; in the fecond, there muft be an a&ual promife. And the iliftin&ion is not without foundation $ for, in the firft cafe, the obligation is founded u|K>n the fa£t, the length of time operates as a defeazance, and the admiflion fumiihes evidence, that the pre- fum^tio)!; lyh^ch was the caufe of providing a bar, is contrary to the fa&. In the other cafe, there is no legal obligation in the firft in- ftance ; there is only a moral obligation, which may be a fufficient ^nfideration ^ fuppo|t ai) aftual promife. The iner^ acknow- ledgment j«4 APPENDIX. CNumb.IV. ledgment of fuch moral obligation can have no legal effe£l ; an .aAual intention to aiTume a perfonal refponGbility is the only foundation of a legal demand| and that intention mud be mani- fe((ed by a£ls or declarations incpnfiftent with the contrary dlf- pofition. The tSdOi of the ftatute is confined to a right of a^iion, it is not to collateral purpofes regarded as an extindion of the debt; therefore, iJF a perfon by will dircfks his debts to be paidj thofe which were barred by the ftatute are held to be included. Neither is a creditor, whofe debt is barred by the ftatute, pre* .eluded from taking out a commiflion of bankrupt, at leaft, unlefis 4he obje£lion is taken by the bankrupt himfelf. ' ^antock v. JEng^ landj 5 Bur. and even in that cafe, I have known the argument, in fupport of the oppofite proportion, difallowed (a). And it is clearly no objection to the proof of a debt, under a commiSion, that it was contra£led above fu years before the commiflion ifiued. A partial payment by one of the drawers of a joint and feveral promliTory note, was held to be a fufticient acknowledgment, to prevent the operation of the ftatute in favour of the others. JViiu comb V. Whitings Doug^ 6^2* And I conceive it may be ftated generally, that an acknowledgment, in whatever manner by one of feveral joint debtors, (hall be obligatory upon all, and that the diftin£iion between fuch acknowledgment being made within^ or after the period of limitation, would not be allowed. It has been decided, that where one joint debtor became a bankrupt, the payment of a dividend by his aflignees ftiould ope- rate as an acknowledgment to aSe£l: the other. Jackfon v. Fair^ hank^ 2 H. BL 340. ^his was certainly carrying the matter to the furtheft poflible extent \ for the right to prove upon the eftate was .not affe£led by the ftatute of limitation^, and could not have been refifted by the ai&gnees. By the feveral deciflons which have taken place, the effe£l of the ftatute of limitations fccms to be almoft reduced to a mere matter of prefumptive evidence.. However conformable fuch a courfe of proceeding may be to the original principles, which render it e;|tp6« disnt tofix a linoitation of time, it knight be juftly queftioned, whe- ther any thing lefs than an acknowledgment, intended to import the fob&ftence of a valid obligation, ftiould be allpwcd to faU^fy the true.conftru£tion of the ftatute (b)^ U {g) upon tpptyifig for the rule to (hew c^^ufe why there (hou)d not be t new trial i& ih% C«f< of Gia^vr n Hpohs, repoited on ouxher point, f TV Jt. 498. {h) U it kwtfsA jfcart fioce thofe obfeffatioof b«ve been eonuDitfled to i^ritio|« By « Tcry recent decifion, it w«t eftablilhedy that faying, I do not amfidtr myfelfat tmwg Air. B^ Mod Numb. XVJ Siattiie of timtaiiuu, tsfc, tig It «n«y not be improper here to hintj that connderable cantioil (hould be applied to the e^ence of perfons brought to prove A mere verbal aclcnowledgment, Thofe perfons are often feleded tcr apply to the party charged as debtor, on account of their cunning, in catching at any ambiguous expreflioni and in reprefenting the ^afe mo(t favourably for thofe by whom they are employed. To tliis it may be added, that fuch evidence is feldom expofed to the temporal rifles which attend the commifEon of perjury {a). It has been argued, that where a party has been induced, by fraud, ta pay money, the ftatute of limitations does not run, or at leaSL (mly runs from the titne when the fraud is difcovered ; but the allegations in the particular cafe were deemed not fufficientto raiCe tbequeilion. Brce v. Holbeach^ Doug. 655. I can, hpwever, faardlf think that the argument U tenable. Courts of equity have» in the exercife of tliat difcretxonary power which they are allowed to poiTefs, adopted an analogy to the flatute of lunitations, with an »■' »! ni th\ rewwmt tUtf was an ackoowledgneot which, took the debt out of the datute. The Coanfaid, that «hi:ever their opinion upon the ftatute might have been, had Che queftion ^n new, fee after the long train of decifiont upoa the fubjeA, it wai neceflary to abide by the cenftra£li90t which had been pat upon itj tii eonformity with which they thodght themfeltes bound to hold that what was faid by the defendant was fuftcient acknowledge mmtof the prc-cxifting debt, to create an aHumpfit, fo ai to take the cafe out of tht ftj:ute. Brymttf^ HtrftmoMf 4 Eaft, 599* Thii decifion wai certainly in conformity with the fcriet of precedents upon the fulgcA ; but ai to the general precedent of adhering to th'« mete authority of former cafesy in oppofition to the poficive termi of an %€k of parliament^ or an eft:ibliihed ivaxim of hw^ of placing a fecoodary above a primary authority, much 4'jubt may fairly, and without difrefpe^, be entertained. Where the return to the ancient fiincijle wo«ld be attended with material detriment, as by difturbing tltlet to real eftatea, held under the fan^ion of rol«i# which, however erroneouvin tiiemfelvea, have been efta« bUdtcd by a feriei of precedenti, the reafon for an adherence (0 the precedent! eviden^if (trepgoderates ; but where there will be no inconvenience beyond the immediate ^afe, when the general confequences will be wholly profpe^ive, I cannot but adhere to the opinloa (which 1 have perhapi exprefltd with ohtrufive repetition), that the courts of joilice hav« u otuch authority now to reftore the law, as they have had before tu fubvert it $ and that a cor red principle of law is an authority entitled to higiier refped, than an erroneous fft of precedents. Confidering the law, however, upon the particular fubje£^, as now beyond tht Mach of argomenty and aware how much my own opinion upoa the cfFefi of precedent it dipeicnt from that which ufaalt^ prevaJli ih praAice, 1 think it not inekrant to fuggeft it fttiiot wbofe claims are barred by the ftstute, and who wift to Obtain an acknowledgment •f the fubfiftence of the debt, the utility of filing a bill of difcovery, obliging the defendant loftace whether tht debt was contra6tedy and whether it has been paid. If the fubfiftenca tf the debt is admitted, ud nithovt pequry, it cannot be denied, it will not, if then is iftjr ceii6ftency of decFfion» be of any avail to add a claim to the protedion of the fUt^tf, (a) Mr. Serjeant iri//uMr\>bferves to the (ame eflfe^, that it might perhaps have baea •8 well if the ktter of the ftatute had been ftridily adhered to ; it is an extremely beneficial H«, 00 «hlch» aa baa been oblervcd, m Saik. 4%i, Green v. RtvUe, the fecurity of all men dcpmdii aad tajKheiefore to be favonred, and although it will now and tfafn pifvent f AMO fiom recovering an honeft dobty yet it is his o>vn fault tbat he poftponed his adion fo fong ; befides which, the permitting of evidence of prgmifv*?, and aikoowlcdgmeAts within iM fa yeecsy Iscma 10 be a d^ng^ious inle: to perjory. CXCcptloH 126 APPENDIX- tNumb.Xr. exception in cafes of fraud ; and it feems from thence to be in- ferred, that the courts of law muft adopt, in the conftruaion of ,the ftatutCi an exception analogous to that of the courts of equity. But the ezpofition of a ftatute is imperative, and not difcretionary ^ and to qualify the exprefs provifions of an ad, by exceptions de- duced from its fuppofed fpirit, however conducive to the jaftice of particular cafes, is a moft alarming precedent. Befides, the ground of introducing a period of limitations is the lapfe of memory^ and the fok of evidence. A tranfafiion, which when explained is perfediy £ir, may be attended with circumftances of a fraudulent afpe&, and it would be unjuft to let thofe circumftances induce a claim, where the evidence, capable of afibrding an explanation, is loft. The qualification deduced from the time of difcovering the fraud, would be attended with continual uncertainty ; for circumftances may appear to give a man the firft difcovery of a faft, with which lie has been long acquainted, but the knowledge of which refts in bis own mind. There is another rule in courts of equity, which may defervc a diilerent confideration, as applied to legal demands, viz. that length of time is no bar in the cafe of a tru/l. Where a man depofits mo- ney in the hands of another, to be kept for his ufe, the poiTeiEon of the cuftodce ought to be deemed the poflcffion of the owner, until an application and refufal, or other denial of the right ; for, until then, there, is nothing adverfe, and I conceive that upon prin- ciple, no a£iion fhould be allowed in 'rfiefe cafes, without a previous demand) confequently, that no limitation (hould be computed fur- ther back than fuch demand. And I think it probable, that under thefe circumftances, the limitation would not be allowed to attach, though the other part of the obfervation would be as probably dif- allowed ; for a fweeping rule has been by fome means introduced into practice, that an a£tion is a demand, whereas every a (lion in its nature fuppofes a preceding default : where money is impro- perly received, or goods arc bought without any fpecific credit, or even where money is borrowed generally, there is held to be an immediate duty, and it is a pcrfcCthf legitimate concluGon, that no demand can be neccflary, in addition to the duty itfelf. Bu^ wherever there is a loan, in the nature of a depofit, or any other confidential duty, is contra£led, the mere creation of that duty unaccompanied with the abfolute breach of it, by denial, or incon- > fiftent condud, ought not to be confidered as a ground of adion. . The commencement of an a£lion within the fix years, of courfe prevents the ftatute of limitations having cSc€t. There are many cafes upon the fubjed, the refult of which is, that the a£iual day of commencing the zCtion is the time to be confidered^ without regard Numb. IV.] Statute of Limitations J t^e. t^j Ttgard to thofe fiftitious relations^ whichj for general putpofes, are dctmed the commencement of the fuiti and that the fuit fo com- menceu muft be that which is effedively proceeded in. II. By the fame (latute of 21 Jac. i.e. 16. no perfon (hall male entry into any lands, but within twenty years after his right (hall firft defcend, or accrue ^ but in cafe the perfons entitled fhall be at the time of fuch right firft defcendedj or accrued, within the age of twenty -one years^ feme covert^ non compos mentis^ or beyond the Teas, fuch perfons, or their heirs, may make an entry as before thca£l, fo as they take the benefit of the a£t within ten years after the diiabtlity removed. — ^The tight of entry is efiential to the main- tenance of an a&ion of ejefiment, which is now the almoft inva- riable courfe of proceeding for the recovery of lands. Writs of right may be fued out within Cxty y^ars, which is the kmgeft period of limitation allowed by law, with the like exceptions as to infants, &c. In cafe of a fine with proclamations, all perfons are barred after fire years, from the levying of the fine, except perfons under difa* bility, and perfons whofe right (hall accrue after proclamation, who mull proceed within five years after the difability is removed, or the right accrues. 4 Hen. 7. r. 24. By 9 Geo. 3. r. 16. the king (who is not botmd by general adls of parliament) is precluded from claiming any lands, &c. except within fijfty years after the title accrued. . The efieA of the ftatute of limitations in refped to ejeflmeiitSy is different from that which is applied to it in cafe of debtSj whereby, as we have feen, it is reduced' to little more than a mere prefumption. For a poifeffion of twenty years gives an a£lual pof- feflbry title, which may be made the fubftantive ground of a claim, without being fubje£k to any defeazance, by evidence of an anterior and adverfe right. Taylor v. Atkins^ I Bur. 119. So, a pofiefiion of fixty years or of fiv^ years, after levying a fine, is not only a bar to any judicial proceeding, but a complete and fubftantive title, fubjefl to the feveral exceptions which are introduced in favour of perfons under age, or having other pro* tedlons or difabilities. In order to fuftain an ejedment, there muft therefore have been an adual poflTeflion, confiftent with the title claimed within twenty years 5 and afts which merely prove a property, but not a pofTeflion, are infufEcient. But the ftatute of limitation3 can only operate in cafe of an ad« verfc poilcllion } therefore, if one perfon has held the eftate oh the joint account of himfelf and another, or by the permiffion of the perfon really entitled, and without claiming any inconfiftent right, the wt APPEND IX. [Numb. XV. the original tide is not zffcStcd* Whether the poflbiEon of one perfon is adverfe to, or confident with the tide of anotheri is, in every cafe, a queftion of fzGt, to be collected by a jury, from all the circumftances. See Doe ▼• Proffer^ Covfp» 217. Page v. Seltyf BuL N. P. 102. The obfcrvation, that if the ftatute has once begun to operate, it continues to run, twith(tanding any fubfequent difability, has already been nsentioned, and this rule has been more frequendy applied to the cafe of dtles than of contra£is. We have ieen that, according to the civil law, a prefcription, which began againft ihe heir, continued againft the fubftitute. In ihe law of England^ I take it to be clear, that the contrary is the cafe, and that no laches of the tenant for life, or in tail, can ope« fate againft thofe who are entitled in remainder, unlefs die adveiCb pofleffion was paramount to that of the perfon from whom dit feveral claims are derived. Such indeed is the literal conftru&ion of the aA, and the application of it, in pra£Hce, is perfedly familiar. But die laches of the tenant in tail falls upon his iflue, claiming under the fame limitation. III. The utility of fixing a period* of time, after which, rights that have not been aflerted, or acknowledged, (hall be confideied as extin£l, has induced the courts of juftice, in many inftances, to follow the example of the legiflature, and to adopt a limitauon of time, which (hall be conclufive> for the bar of a claim, or the prote^iion of a pofieflbry enjoyment. And the period adopted for this purpofe is almoft invariably twenty years. The prefent view of the fubjed does not extend to thofe cafes in which the lapfe of dme is merely confidered as a matteic of cir" cumftantial evidence i and as fuch, is either alone, or in con* ]un£^ion with other circumftances, relied upon as material in re^ fpc£k of an individual cafe. The efTe^l of it, in this point of view, may fairly vary, according to the difierent impreflions of thofe to whom the decifion of queftions of fa£k properly belongs, and is^ perfc^ly diftin6l from 'the applicadon of a general rule of pre- fumption. The ftatute of limitations, as we have feen, only extends to tQions of debt, founded upon any loan or contrad, without fpe- cialty. This, of courfe, excludes bonds and all debts fecured by deedf but it is now an eftabliflied rule, that after a lapfe of twenty years, without payment of intcreft, or other acknowledg- ment, payment (hall be prefumed. And though this is only a cir« cumftance ibr the jury to found a prefumption upon, as it is a prefumpdon univerfally applied, it is in a great meafure attended with the fame effe£l as an abfolute bar. A fmallci' Numb. XV.] Statute of Lmiiathns^^c. 129 A fmaller period of time niayt in CQnjunAion with other circum- Ilance8> fuch as fettling another account in the intennediate tiine, without taking notice of the particular demand, be fufficient to in-» dace a prefutnption in the particular cafe ; but any confideration ot that kind falls within the di(lin£^ion above referred to« Vide Of*^ waid^, Lfighj 1 71 R. 270. It is a general rule, that a perfbn (hall not be allowed to make cfidence for himfelf ; but it has been held, that *an indorfement of the payment of intereft upon a bond, made ten years before the prefumption attached, ought to be left to the jury to decide, whe- dier it was made with the privity 5f the obligor j on the other hand, where the indorfement was made after the expiration of twenty yean, the evidence was rejedied as inadmifiible, and the Chic^ Juftlce took the diftindtion (manifeftly founded in reafon and good fenfe), that in the preceding cafe the indorfement was admitted, becaufe it appeared to have been made at a time when it could not hare been thought neceiTary to encounter the prefumption. Searle • ■ T. Lord Barrington^ a S/r. 826. 2 Lord Raym. 1370. Tamer v. Crifpi a &r. 827. Our courts of equity have, in mod inftances, adopted the pre- famption of a demand having been fatisfied, or a right extingui(hed| after the lapfe of twenty years, provided there are no intennediate ads, by which that prefumption is repelled. The mod common application of this principle is, that after a perfon, to whom an eftate has been conveyed by way of mortgage, has 'been twenty years in pofleflion, without rendering any account, the equity of re« dcmption (hall be held to have been releafed or abandoned ; but if there are any a£ls within the twenty years, admitting the relative charaQers of mortgagor and mortgagee, the prefumption is de- ftroyed, and the time can only be computed from the laft a£t, which is indicative of fuch an admtflion. It is a maxim in equity, that no length of time is a bar in cafes of fraud : where the fraudulent z€L is clear and manifeft, the appli« cation of this rule is perfedly proper and confident with the dif* credonary powers of a court of equity } but where a fiaud is to be inferred from a complication of fafls, and the delay in adducing the charge is not fatisfa&oiily accounted for, it may be right to refleQ upon the principles, on account of which any limitation is intro* duced, and which principally regard the difficulty of accounting for the particulars of tranfadions obliterated from the memory, and of whidi the witneiles may be dead or difperfed. This topic oc* carred in the cafe of Deloraine v. Brown, 3 Bro. Cb, 633. which was dedded upon a collateral point; but the Mafter of the Rolls, in a fubfequent eaft^ fud he referred to the arguments of counfds Vol. II. K to 130 APPENDIX. CNumb.XV, to ihew that > eren in a cafe of grofs fraud, the court does not do j\iftice, by decreeing an account, after a confiderable length of time, againft executors, legatees, and innocent perfons, claiming under the fraudulent party. I^ide 2 Fef. J* 92., Hercy v. Dintimdy. It is alfo held, that ho length of time ihall operate as a bar in cafes of trud ; but this rule can only be applied between the tniftee and the party interefted in the execution of the truft, and cannot he oppofed to the right of a third perfon claiming in oppofition to both i and even as between the immediate parties, where the truft relates to fome a£l of an evanefcent nature, fuch as the payment of ^ fum of money, and not to any permanent intereft, the length of time may be fairly regarded as evidence of performance. The following recent cafes will ihew, in a clear pomt of view, the vegard paid by a court of equity to length of time in general, with the difregard of that circumftance, where the inconvenience which might otherwife arife was fully obviated. A fuit was inftituted for a legacy, which was refifted on the groHud of p^efumed payment, arifing from the length of time (being above forty years) which had elapfed without any demand, and beeaufe all the perfons who could throw light upon the queftion yere dead, and the claim was difallowed^ Lord Commiflioner Eyre Qbferve4> that it is a prefumption of fa£l, in legal proceedings, Vefore juries, that claims, the mod folemnly eftabliihed upon the face of them, will be prefumed to be fatisfied after a certain length of time. 0>urts of equity would do very ill, by not adopting that mle. So eflential is it to general juftice, that though the prc- jumption has often happened to be againft the truth of the fa£b, yet it is better, for the ends of general juftice, that the prefumption ihould be made and favoured, and not be eafily rebutted, than to let in flight evidence of demands of this nature, from which infinite mifchief and injuftice might arife. If he could indulge conjefture, he doubted about the payment of the legacy; he knew that in WaJts there is a pious reverence for the reprefentatives of the family, and that the other relations are unwilling t6 prefs them, and wiU take tihefe demands upon them by a little at a time. But the interefts of general juftice rcquure that demands ihould not be afterwards enforced in this way \ and hotd Conunii&ODer Afihurjk fiiidt that mil flattttes of limitationa and prcfcriptions, analogous to them, arc to be favoured. Jones v. TvbarvilU^ % Vif. Jun» ii. In the cafe of Pickering v. Lord Siatrfordt 2 Vef, Jun. 272*^5811 « fuit was inftituted by perfons daiming as next of kin of Thomas Wabottf who died above thirty yeati before, having dire£ked by his will, that his peribnal eftate ihould be s^^plied to inch charitable piirpofies as his executors ibouU dired. The; csecutora eftabliihed Skfcbool; Kutnb. XV.] Statute of Limitations ^ &fr* 131 a fchool ; and the objefl of the fuit was to recover fo 'much of the perfonaltj, veded in the mortgagees, as had not been applied, (all difpoGtions by will of money fecured by mortgage to charitable ttfes being void, by the ftatute of mortmain). The Mafter of the Rolls, Sir R. P. Arden^ upon the firft hearing of the cafe, direded an inquiry to be made into the particular circumftances, without prejudice as to the refult ; and upon that occafion obfenred, that if a party, having knowledge of his rights, will (it ftill> and, without aflerting them, permit perfons to a£l as if they did not exill, to ac- quire interefts, and confider themfelves as owners of property, to which the other will not afiert his right, there is no reafon why every prefumption fliould not ariije ; as in the cafe of a bond.—- Upon the inquiry which was direded, it appeared that the accounts had been kept fo regularly, that there was no difficulty in afcertaining the perfooal edate at the death of the teftator. The Mafter of thtt Rolls, upon a full and able view of all the circumftances of the cafe, decided In favour of the claim of the next of kin. The fol* lowing are the pafiages of his opinion more immediately applicable to the fubje£2 before us : <* The bill certainly requires very eztraor^ dinary circumftances to fuftain it at fo late a period ; and the firft qneftion is, whether, at this diftance of time, it is too late to make the chim? The queftion in all the cafes is, whether there are mo-* tives of public policy, or private inconvenience, to induce the court to fay, that under all the . circumftances the fuic ought not to be entertained ? It is a very fenfible rule, tliat parties (hall not, by negleding to bring forward their demands, put others to a ftate of inconvenience, fubjeAing them to infuperable difficulties. If, from the plaintiff's lying by, it is impoffible for the defendants to render the accounts he calls for, or it will fubje& them to great inconvc mence, he muft fuficr, or the court will interpofe what is the beft ground, public convenience. The queftion is, whether thefe prin- ciples apply to this cafe ? But firft, I (hall mention another ground \ die prefumption that the demand itfelf has in fome marmer beeii iatisfied or relea(ed \ that is a ground perfedly diflPerent from % bar, and prevails as much in a court of equity, as it has by modern determinadons been wifely held to do at law. Every prefumption diat can be fairiy made, (hall be made againft a ftale demand. It nuy ariie from the afts of the parties \ or the very forbearance to nake the demand affords a prefumption, either that die claimant is coafcioos it was fatisiied, m intended to reUnquifli it.'^ It wilt not be neeeffary to ftate the examination of the particular circumftances inwi which his Honor very accurately concluded, that it was im- poffible, by any fair prefumption, to infer that the parties, being cogniaant of their rights, flept upon them, or ever intended to re- K a linquiib. 13* APPENDIX. [Numb. XV Cnquiih^ what he muft fay upon the whole complexion of the cafe, they never knew they had a right to. ** If the accounts of the perfonal eftate (he proceeded to fay) could not now be obtained, and it was impofiible to know to what the plaintifl% were entitled, that is a fufficient reafon for faymg,they fliould not have it, and rob the charity, becaufe they could not tell .what belonged to them, and what to the charity i but that unfortu- natelv is not the cafe. Therefore, defiring to be underftood by no means to give any countenance to thofe dale Remands, but upon the circumftances that there is nothing inducing great public or private inconvenience, that the accounts are found, and that the truftees are not called upon tq account for what has been diiburfed, I am bound to decide in favour of the plaintiffs/' In Ble^vkt v. Thomas^ 2 Vef. Jun. 669. length of time was pleaded in equity, as matter of defence, and as inducing the pre- fumption, that the demand was fatisficd ; and the plea was allowed. But in Pear/on v. Belchiery 4 Vef. 627. the Matter of the Rolls,^ while he held that a bill could not be entertained, on account of length of time, faid, that it could not be pleaded in bar in the court of Chancery. See alfo as to the following cafes, refpeding the allowance or difallowance of length of time, in oppofirion to an equitable claim. Earl of Dehraine v. Brtnvn^ 3 Bro. Ch, 633. Hmy V. Dinnvoody^ 4 Bro. Ch. 257. 2 Vef. Jutu 87. Ackerly v. Rocy 5 Vff. 565. Harmood v. Oglander, 6 Fef. 199. In the cafo of Sut- ton V Earl of Scarborcugh^ i Vef. N. S. 71. (juft publifhed fincethis (heet was fcnt to the prefs), the Court of Chancery allows a plea of the ftatute of limitations, to a bill in the nature of an a£tion for money, had and received, both as to the difcovery and relief; but the decifion does not affe£% the cafe of a mere bill of difcovery. None of the ftatutes of limitations contain any provlfion in favour of incorporeal rights, (except in cafe of rents) . According to the rules of law, the right to thefe can only be founded upon an adual grant, or an immemorial prefcription which fuppofes a grant. But in order to eftablifh a right, as founded upon a grant, it would be unreafonable to expe£l the produdion of the grant itfelf as a requifite indifpenfable to the fupport of the title, which is de- rived from it. A long continued enjoyment, not otherwife to be accounted for, may, after fuch a period of time as renders it pro- bable that the deed may be loft, or deftroyed, be fairly confidered as evidence of its former exiftence ; and from fuch evidenee, the jury may be fairly induced to infpr the truth of any propoGtion) which is not oppofed by ftronger evidence on the other fide. But the de- cifions of our courts have carried the matter much further than is warranted^ by the mere application of this principle ; and under the Numb. XV.3 Statute rf Limitations^ &fr. 133 the name of a prefumption, have, in effe^ rendeitd die length of enjoyment a dm£!t and fubftantive tifle. It is held, that not only private grants, but records, and even ads of parliament, may be prefumed from length of time^ and fo far as any fuch prcfumption is founded upon a real unafie£led opmion of the truth fo prefumed, I fubfcribe to the juftice and propriety of the proceeding. Beyond that, whilft I admit that the maintenance of a long eftabliihed enjoyment is a very defirable obje£^, I cannot forbear entertaining the opinion, that recent deciGons have exceeded the proper limits of judicial authority, and have introduced a prin* ciple, which, though it is now perhaps only open.to controverfy, as a matter of fpeculation, was not waniinted by the fair rules of legal argument. In the cafe of the Mayor of KingJIon'tipcfi-Hull againft Hcrmr^ Ccwp, 102. a toll had been received by the corporation for upwards of 300 years, but the corporation itfelf having been created within the time of legal memory, it was impofldble that the title could be founded upon prefcription ; but it was left to the jury to infer from the ufage, whether there had not been a grant of the duties fubfe* quent to the charter of incorporation ; and the verdid founded upon the prcfumption of fuch a grant was fupported by the court of King's Bench. But foon afterwards, Lord Mansfield, in referring to die authority of that cafe, advanced a pofition in favour of th^ prindplci which I venture to conteft. He faid, that a grant may be prefumed from great length of pofleflton. It was fo done in the cafe of the corporation of Hu/l againft Horner g << not that in fuch cafes the court really thinks a grant has been made, becaufe it is not pro- bable that a grant (hould have exiftedy without its being upon xe» cord, but they prefume the iviCt for the purpofe, and from a prin- ciple of quieting the pofleflion." Qnvp. 214. That is, in a cafe of advcrfe right, they profefs, by way of form, to believe as true what» In point of fad, they believe to be falfe, in order that length of time may« by fi£kion and circuity, produce an effefl to which directly and primarily it is inadequate. By flatute, any quit-rent, which has not been paid for fifty yearst is ci^tinguifhed ; and there having been no payment of a quit-rent of half-a-crown, for thrrty-feven years, that ctrcumftance was left to the jury, as a ground fpr prefuming an extinguifliment or releafe*; hut the court of King's Bench decided, that fuch a prefunq)tion was not warranted by the evidence. Lord Mansfield, on that occafioQ» adverted to the principle, that the ftatute of limitations is a pofidve bar from length of time, and operates fo condufively, that although the jury and the court are iatisfied that the claim ftill fubfifts, yet they are bound by th^ ftatute to defeat it : that there are many cafes not within the ftatute, where, from a principle of quieting K 3 the 134 APPENDIX. p«umb.XV. the pofledtoni the court ha» thought that a jury (hould prefiime ant thing to fupport a length of pofleffion. He then proceeded to the pofition from which I have exjnrefled my diflenti and afterwardi ftewedf from reafoning adapted to the particular cafe, that there was no ground for inferring an extinguifliment. Mr. Juftice Mon^ in fupport of the fame opinion, obferved, that a prefumption from length of time to fypport a right was rery different from a pre* fumption to defeat aright. Eldridge v. Kwaty Cowp, 214. But the cafe which feems^ to have had the moft influence in mo« dern determinations, is that of Lewis v. Price, tried before Mr. Jttftice Wilmatj at Worcejler affizes, in the year 1 761, in which he faid, that where a houfe had been built forty years, and has had lights at the end of it, if the owner of the adjoining ground buildj againft them, fo as to obilru£l them, an aAion lies, and this Is founded upon the fame reafon as where they have been immemorial) for this is long enough to induce a prefumption, that there was ori- ginally fome agreement between the parties : and he f^tid, that a» twenty years was fufficient to give a title in ejc£i:ment, on which he might recover the houfe itfelf, he faw no reafon why it fhould not be fufficient to entitle him to any eafement belonging to the houfe. -iypinaffis^ Dig* 636. Afterwards, upon a motion for a new trialt > twenty years' quiet and uninterrupted poifeflion of ancient lights {a) was deemed a fufficient ground, from which a jury might prefume a grant. Darwin v. Upton, cited 3 7. i?. 159. So far as length of time Is merely regarded as a circumftance, upon which a jury may excrcife their judgment upon the real fad, I have already admitted the propriety of its influence. But now it has become a matter of dmly and eftabliihed pra£lice to adopt Mr. Juftice Wilmot^ idea to its fvU extent, that twenty years' pofTeffion gives a title to any eafe- vent. It is a£ted upon as a prefumption, jtdris Isf dejure^ a legal fi£lion, upon which any argument or difcuffion is as much excluded as upon an averment of the defendant's being in the cuftody of the Marihal of the Marihalfea, and not as a mere circumftance open to the difcuffion and conGderation of a jury. And it has even been lidd, that the forbearance to exercife a right foi^ twenty years fliall produce an extin£lion of the right itfelf, and that all rights incident to land (hall be referred to the criterion of twenty years* enjoy- flsent. Having been engaged in oppofing the applicarion of that prin- ciple, and having, in conjunction with fome of the moft diftin- guiihed ornaments of the profeffion^ entertained the idea^ that it was («) There feemi to W either a radondancy or inaccortcy la this ezpreffioo. If the nieaninf »as, Aat n enjoyneat of twenty yeiri wai fmlEciest toiflB|«ft dw ebaiader of smi^atty^ the epithet of mmtkHi it implied ia the AaieiDcat of the USim If the word ia •fiid in iti old and k^ftiwMU figoificstioD, the torn of twc&tgi jean la^at of the ^aefiion. a dCYi- APPENDIX, No. XVI. (Referred to Vol. I. p. 474.) On the Law ofE%;iden€€. S E C T I O N I. General Prelirmnarj Objervatiofu* • NO part of jurifprudence is of greater importance than the law of evidence : for the adminiftration of juftice muft neceflarily be preceded by the inveftigation of tnith» and the application of the law muft in every cafe be foimded upon the eftabltfliment of tUe fafis. In adverting to this fubjeft, we perceive one of the ftrongeA: contrails between moral and legal obligation. In the difcharge of moral obUgatioUi every man is a witnefs to himfelf with regard tQ his own conduct and intentions ; but, in enforcing legal obligation, one man is called upon to form an eftimate of the motives and con- dud of another, of which in general he can only have an inTperfe£): knowledge, and muft a£l from reprefentations fubjedl in their na- ture to every gradation of error and deception. The two important objeAs to be provided for in eftabliftiing a fjrftem of evidence, are the manifeftation of truth, and the exclufion of falfehood ; but from the imperfedion of human knowledge and perceptions, the full attainment of thcfc is often impoflible ; the latitude which is requifite for the one is inconfiftent with the caution which is too often neceflary' for fecuring the other; an exceffive ftridnefs, excluding the admiflion of truth, for the parpofe of .guarding againft the dangers of falfehood, is equally attended with a falfe impreflion injurious to the interefts of juftice ; the negative falfehood, in the one cafe, being no iefs repugnant to an adequate reprefentadon of the faA upon which juftice is to decide^ than the pofitive falfehood on the other i and.the withhold- ing an z6tuz\ right being not Iefs an aA o^ injuftice, than the commiflion of an a£lual wrong. Whatever rule is eftabliihed in general, for the purpofe of fecuring thefe refpedhre advslntages, and avoiding 'either of thefe oppofite incoveniences, muft, from the very natufe of the fubjeftj be frequently defedtivCf or erroneous Vol. II. L in i4a APPENDIX. CNumb.XVL in its particular application; and all the perfeAion which judicial wifdom can apply » muft only confift in the adoption of fuch a fyf. tepi as may, with reference to the (late and condition of fociety,be produAire of the greateft fum of advantage in the whole. In examining the general principles of this fubje£l, we difcem two different kinds of fads, very diftinguifliable from each other : the firft, embracing thofe which at their occurrence are neceiTarily fufceptjble of fome indifputable monument of authenticity, fuch as the pronouncing a judicial fen tence ; the other, comprizing ads of which the traces can only be prefervcd in the memory of thofe who were the witneffes of them, fuch as offences and injuries \ but between thefe are various intermediate degrees of fubje£ls, fufcep- tible in their nature of fimilar gradations of authenticity. The intercll of fociety is greatly promoted, by eftabllfhing .authentic criteria of judicial certainty, fo far as this objed can be effectuated without materially .interfering with the claims of gene- ral convenience. Where the ads which may become the fubje£t of examination will admit of deliberate preparation, and the pur- pofes of them evince the propriety of a formal memorial of their occurrence, more efpecially when they are from their nature fubje£l to error and mifrepre&ntation, it is reafonable to expedthat thofe who are intercfted in their prefervation fliould provide for it in a manner ptevioufly regulated and eilablifhed, or that, in cafe of ne*^ gledy their particular intereft (hould be deemed fubordinate to the great purpofes of general certainty. But it is alfo certain that this fyftem of precaution may be carried too far, by the exa£tion of for- inalities, cumberTome and inconvenient to the general intercourfe of civil tranfadions ; the fpecial application of thcfe principles muft be chiefly governed by municipal regulations : but as a gene- ral obfervation, it is evident that the great excellence of any particu- lar fyftem muft confift in requiring as much certainty and regula- rity as is conCftent with general convenience, and in admitting ns much latitude to private convenience as is confiftent with general certainty and regulyity. It may be added, that for thcfe purpofes every regulation ihould be attended with the moft indifputable perfpicuity \ and tliat the eftabliilied forms ihould be cautioufly preferved from any intricacy or ftriclncfs, that may tend to perplex and embarrafs the fubje£l$ which tliey were defigncd to elucidate, and to endanger and deftroy the fubftance which tliey were in- ftituted to defend {a). SEC- {m) The iBimity aft it a ftraog inftance of the applicadda of formal rr^^tcfrtlie ^- Ua of 'which it fubverfivc of the tranf*£tioo in auiBcroot inftances, where there could Hot be poflibly aoy other iaieotien thaa a ftrid aad fiir compbaocc with its 4hec- tiwM Numb. XVI.]] On the Law if Ewdenee* 143 ■ SECTION n. Cy the Onus Probandi. The principky << that he who alleges bimlelf to be the creditor of another, is obliged to prore the hSt or 'agreement upon which his claim is founded, when it is contefted } and that, on the other hand when the obligation is proved, the debtor who alleges that he has difcharged it, is obliged to prove the payment," is clearly one of thofe propofitions in which every fyftem of jurifprudence muft concur in general, whatever particular rules may be adopted, at to the mode and form of the allegation by which the neceffity of fach proof is to be determined. That precifion of allegation, which is required by the EngSjb rules of fpecial pleading, is partibularly well calculated to afcertaun the incumbency of the proof, which is to be made by the refpe£live parties ; and the principles which regulate the obligation of {MKxrf^ where ftridtnefs of pleading is required, may frequently affift in dit expo(iti(jn of the law, where the allegations are of a more general nature. The fame rules which prefcribe the original obligation of proofs win alfo be frequently material in deciding upon the application of ity where the oppofite proofs are fo much in conflict, either in re- fpe& to the credibility of teftimony, or the inferences to be de- duced from admitted fa£is, that the mind, upon a patient and atten- ti?e confideration, is unable fatisfa£lorily to form a conclufion upon their relative force ; fince it is manifeft that whoever is un- der the neccflity of eftabliihing a given allegation, muft adduce, not merely an equality, but a preponderance of proof. It is fometimes too generally contendedi that in cafe of oppofi- tlon of teftimony I the^ plaintiff, on whom it is incumbent to prove the cafe, muft maintain his right to recover by an' abfolute pre- ponderance of teftimony \ but this is only true fo far as it is re^ quifite to eftablifti a prefumptive and prima facie cafe ; and when- ever a fixed and undifputed point is eftabliflied by either party,' it is from that point that the confli£l muft commence, whether in thofe cafes where the allegations are particular, or in thofe where the whole matter in difpute is open upon general pleading. ThuSj ifapUintiff eftabliihes a pofieiBon bf any article taken from himl)y tioBS. Tbe aUfcf to which ihe contraft Wat fobjtfty induced the Icgiilatiire to piclcfibc certain iadkaiioas fbr their notoriecy ) but in the cooftrnAiea «f the pievifions adapted Ibr thii pvrpoCBy a fyftem of chicane has been eftablObed of fo eiieniiYe a satorey at al- aoft to deftfoy any certainty or confidence is the appattat tegilirity of dM coBtnA, and JUiaddcatil accoai|tainentt. t die «44 APPENDIX. p?tiimb.XVL the defendanti and the defendant aflerts a right of propertyi upon which the evidence gWih hf the tctpetHvt parties does not lead to a decifive preponderance \ the decifion (hould be in favour of the plaintiff; his pofleilion being an adequate title, until a fuperior pro' petty is pMved hy a preponderance or refpeding which the law is paf- fite in not cAabUfhing any ptefumption on the one fide or the A confttfion in pra£lice, which I have occafionally been witheft to^ has Mneed me id ftate the preceding obfervations, in them- fidfo fiiffickxilly obtifoilSi with fome particularity atid perhaps |ffolixity« Tbey cMwla|i >y liit^Mtaf gwiphaiytllMt faihafyllaaiwwil*lBi^ fcam imWiii In 3^ APPENDIX. [Numb-Xr. In the cafe of Prefcott and PhilUpSy which was tried at Chefter Spring aflizes, 1 797, it appeared, that the pcrfons, under whom the defendant claimed, had an ancient mill and weir, which were per- mitted^^to fall into decay ; and after a period of twenty years, above nineteen years before the commencement of the aftion, another mill was eredied (upon which it may be aiTumed, for the purpofe of the argument, that there was no alteration in the fcite or fall, as no reference was made to thcfe circumftances), no aA having been done in the mean time by the owners of the adjacent land,advcrfc to the right. The judges at the aflizes, and afterwards in the court of Kng's Bench, were of opinion, that the ceiTcr of twenty years, in the enjoyment, was an extinguiihment of the right to the water- courfe I and, upon that general principle, decided in favour of the plaintiff, treating it as a cafe which would not even warrant ao argument (a). The obfervations which occurred to the prefent writer, in fupport o£ the pofition, that it ought not to be prefumed that the ancient right was loft or abandoned, were, id. That no inconnilent or ad- ▼erfe enjoyment had been acquired ; ad, Becaufe the traces of the ancient right remained at the time of the new ere£bion \ 3d, Be- caufe fo long a period having elapfed fince the prefent eredion, without the right being judicially queftioned, it ought to be pre- fumed, that that was in purfuance of, and conne£^ed with, the ancient right* An analogy has been adopted to the ftatute of li- mitations, in the cafes of corporate offices, eafements and bonds. But the ftatute of limitations, in cafes of ejefiment, only operates upon a£is of adverfe pofleffion, not permitting an undifturbed po{^ feffion and a£lual enjoyment to be defeated. In cafes of corporate offices, the King's Bench proceeded upon the exercife of a difcre- tionary power, and always in protei^ion of a podtive and a£tual enjoyment. None of the cafes embrace the principle, that a right is loft by neglect, there having been no adverfe enjoyment 5 and the prote£lion is merely perfonal and individual. Upon the death of the corporator, the right reverts according to the original con* ftitudon* ^ In refpeft to eafements, all the cafes are in fupport of pofttive ads, as the making windows : there an enjoyment was actually ac* quired, which the court would not fufier to be defeated. There was a cafe in Surry^ before Lord Mansfield^ who laid it down, that an incorporeal right, which, if exifting, muji be in conflant ufe^ ought to be decided by analogy to the ftatute of limiutions* Mufi be in s' («) The ddwdanOt coanfd. In hSit obuioed a heatine, but not witboBt difficulty { Mid the rodgflKot of- the court) )n a great degree, coofifted in complaaaing «f ihe kngUi of time which had been QCcupied nfeo • point loo plain fer aigument. confiarU Numb. X v.] Statute of Limitatkns^ &fr. 137 cwjiant ufu xs emphatic. But nm conftat^ that a right m|^ft be in. eonilant ufc, the excrcife of which is attended with ezpence and ri(k. The party has not fubmitted to any adual inconyenience, which he might have avoided by the aflertion of Jiis right \ he har merely not deemed it neceflary to ezercife a right, which may or may not be beneficial, according to times and circumftances ; he has not acquiefced in any a£l tending to contradid or invalidate it. If A. buys of B. the coals under a piece of land, and of C* a right of road to thefe coals through a barren moor, and declines getting the coals for twenty years (the place continuing a barren moor), is the grant void or lod? Here, at the time when the mill was fuf- fered to fall into decay, the right was as great as if an original right to dam up the water had been granted at that time. If, after fucl^ grant, the plaintiff had made a weir, and enjoyed it for twenty years, the grant or right might be prefumed to have been furiren- dered. That is a^cafe of adverfe enjoyment -, but merely fufiering the river to run in its natural courfe, is reducing it to the cafe of a barren moot % and the cafe of Eidridge and Knott eftabliihes^ the poGiioQ, that^the mere non-enjoyment of an incorporeal right docs not neceiTarily induce the prefumption of its extinguifliment. With refpcQ to bonds, a perfonai demand ihould, from the nature of it^ be recently purfued, and the non-claim of twenty years is a ftrong prefumption of payment \ but this is no wife fimilar in principle to aright connefled with the optional mode of enjoying a real 6ftate« The court of Common Fleas have fince decided, in an a£lion brought by the owner of a market at Southallj for ereding another market at Hayes^ within thr^e miles, that the ere^ion of pens, and the fale of cattle in them, for twenty years, was a clear bar to the right of a£iion. Hdcroft v. Heel^ 1 Bof. 400. . The attempt to found a right upon an enjoyment of twenty yearSf was carried to tlie mod extravagant length, in a cafe which was brought to trial at Lancqfter Summer affizes, i8oo. ' A defendant^ . in juilification of a trefpafs, pleaded that the owners of a meffiiage had, from time immemorial, enjoyed the right of (hooting upon the plaintiff's land ; and it was intended to be proved, that the defendant and his father had bfetn in the habit of fporting there up- wards of twenty years. But the counfel for the defendant did not perfift in an attempt which could only have fubje&ed themfelves tD equal ridicule with their client. The prefent difcuflion has been compofed for feveral years, and I have ingrafted the fubftance of it into the view of the decifions of Lord rjS APPENDIX. [Numb. XV, Lord MatufieU'f a work in which I have had the mortification to esperitnce a total facrifice of a confiderable portion of afliduity and cijepence. Since that time, the fubje£l has been before the court of King's Bench, in the cafe of Campbeli v. Wilfon^ 3 Eafl. 294. The defendant had, for upwards of twenty years, ufed a way over the plaintiff's land, the right to which, if it really exiftcd, muft, fxem the circumftance of the cafe, neceflarily have commenced vridiin thirty years *, but there was evidence to (hew, that the po(» feffion was adverfe : on the other fide, there were circumftanccs to (hew the probability of the claim having originated in miftake. Mr. Jtiftice Chamhn obferved to the jury, that it was probable that the . enjoyment did originate in the miftake fuppofed ; but however that n»gbt be, if they were fatisfied that it was adverfe, and had conti- nued twenty years, it was fufficient ground for prefuming a grant. Upon a motion for a new trial, Lord Ellenborough obferved, that it oime to the common cafe of an ^adverfe pofleffion of a way for twenty years, without any thing to qualify that adverfe enjoyment ; and there was no reaibn why the jury fhould not, as in other cafes, naake the prefumption, that the defendant afted by right. Mr. J. G9%fi thought that in fubftance the queftion was left to the jury, whether the enjoyment originated in a grant; or in any other man- ner ? and therefore, he could n6t fay, but that upon the evidence the jury might not make the prefumption which they had done, though, had he been one of them, he did not know that he (hould have dared to do fo. Mr. Juftice Lawrence faid, no doubt adverfe enjoyment for twenty years, unexplained, is evidence fufficient for the jmry to found a prefumption that it was a legal enjoyment. Mr. Jttftice X# Blanc thought that fuch length of enjoyment was fo ftrong evidence of a .right, that the jury (hould not be dire&ed to cmfider ixasXi circumftanccs as founding a prefumption that it arofe othtrwife than by grant. The fame learned judge explained the cafe refpc£ling Hayes market to have only amounted to an intimation, that it woiild be left to the jury to find for the defendant, upon the gRMUid of prefumption of a grant, after twenty years uninterrupted life. And Mr. J. Grofe faid, he aficnted to that cafe, as fo explained^ but no further. In reviewing the preceding opinions, 'Mr. Juftice Grofe feems to ccinoOT in t^ opinicm which I have endeavoured to maintain \ that the prefumption in thefe cafes is real matter of inference ; upon which the jury are, as in other cafes of circumftantial evidence, to exercife a genuine opinion as to the exiftence or non-exiftence of the fa£l in queftion. But I cannot concur with him in thinking, that fuch was really the fpirit of the diredlions to the jury in the parti- cular cafe. The other judges certainly appear to fupport the fidi- tious Numb. XV.3 Statute of Limitations^ ^c. 139 tioas pTcfumption (a), that although, in point bf fzGtf no legal title exiftedi the adverfe pofleiBon of twenty years was to be deemed fuffident to conftitute fuch title, and that the falfe fuppofition of a grant, deftroyed by time or accident, was the mode and form ia which that right is to be maintained. {a) There are, io trotb, two ktndt of prefumption, a^d vpon in the law, which fcarcelf agree in any thing bat the name : ift,Inirrenccs of fad> really and btumfit made ; at where a pcrfon, haviog the receot poffeffioo of ibleo goods, it prefumed to be the thief; a. Pfe. lomptioat of ibrm; at where a latitfied term is prefumed to be furrendered, tiiough, io U€tp go fnch thing is believed to have taken place. And to the latter chifs, the praftical appli^ otioo of (he prcfumptioo in qaeftlon u certainly Cu be refcned \ becaufe io moft of the cafei, it is impoiCble to fappofe that any perfon in hit fenfes can belieire the lad to be tnie^ which it bid to be picfamcd. Juries are never called upon to balance between the impro* babUity of an enjoyment having fub6fted for twenty yeara, without a legal grant, and the flppotte and infinitely greater improbability, if fo gentle a term can be applied to what it abfalotely incredible, that within twenty years a deed creatbg a right, or even a gnn£ lioa the crown (an a£k which muft be upon record), fliould have afiually been made, wuk- that every trace of its eziftence fliould be loft and obliterated* Id lift, coons have departed from their proper province, whenever they have prefcribcd loajary the inlcceooe which diey are to draw from given £iAs t and twenty years, or anjr ete arbitrary period, can never be the ground of a legitimate inicreoce ; which muft always d^cnd upon tflM general combination of circumftances. Ia the cafe of Cawtfhfil ▼. Wiljm^ tha jory were told, that if the enjoyment had been bf leave or fevoor, ar ^ihtrvift tktn at a r^etai er offtrtiM of a rif^kt^ it would repel tke pre- faapiiBO of a grant : but this principle would deftroy the modern dodrioe, fo far aa iclatee Mthe eejoyment of Hghta, is has alxcady been particularly Aewn. I will not contend that» after the dccifioos which have taken place, if may not be moiv coBfcnieot to the public, that the do^ine which has been ezteniively aded upoo in the enjoyment of real eftates, Ihould be adhered to than deparud from, though of very modem otigio. This didcra from the cafea in which I contend for the departure iirom erraoeoot ficoedent, on account of the confeqoencea being merely prolpedive : but I Aali ever ictgia ihe featiment, that the iotroduAion of fuch a doArine was a pcrverfion of legal principles, ^■d sn unwarrantable afliimption of authority. See the cafes upon thii fubjed^ Cffllfftcd hi Mr. adjcant^^Z/Saai't note to T§rd w. Ffd^ % Smad. 175. AFPEN* _ I Numb. XVI. 3 On the Law of Evidence. 145 In an information againft Lord Halifax^ for refufijig to deliver up the rolls of the auditor of the exchequer, the court of exche- quer put the plaintiff upon proving tlie negativci vi^. that he did not deliver them up ; for a perfon (hall be prefumed duly to exe- cute his office, until the contrary appear. BulL N. P. 298. In a very recent cafe, an a£lion was brought againft tlie Eajl India Company, for putting an inflammable fubftance on board a (hip, without giving fufficient notice thereof to the captain ; and It was refolved, that the proof that fuch notice had not been given lay upon the plaintiff* Lord EUenborough^ in delivering the opinion of the court, faid, that where any a£t is required to be done on the one part, fo that the party negledling it would be guilty of a criminal negle£i of duty in not having done it, the law prefumes the affirmative, and throws the burthen of proving the contrary, that is, in fuch cafe, of proving a negative, on the other fide. WiUlamsv.E. L C. 3 Eaft^ 19a. To a plea of infancy, the plaintiff replied a confirmation after the defendant came of age, and merely proved a promife ; and it was held to be incumbent upon the defendant, to prove his being under age, that being a matter within his own knowledge, which it might be impoflible for the plaintiff to prove. Buller J. faid, he did not agree to a general pofition, to the extent in which it was laid down, that the plaintiff is bound to prove every thing which he alleges. For in a£^ions on the game-laws, although it is necef- farjr to allege tliat the defendant was not qualified, yet tlie plain- tiff need only prove the offence; and then, if the defendant is really qualified, it is incumbent on him to fhew it. Grofe J. faid, it is prefumed that when a man contracts, he is of proper age to con- traft, until the contrary be fliewn. Borthiuick v. Carruthers^ I r. R. 648- A debtor of a bankrupt, fetting off notes of the bankrupt in- dorfcd to himfelf, muft prove that they were indorfed to him be- fore the bankruptcy % and by Afhhurjl J. — It is a general rule of evidence, that in every cafe the onus probandi lies upon the perfon who wiflies to fupport his cafe by a particular faft, and of which he is' fuppofed to be cognizant. Duhfon and others y ajfigneesy v. Evansy 6 r. iJ. 57, In an a£lion for lofs by barratry of the mafter, upon a policy of infurance upon goods, a barratrous a£l being proved, it was ob]e£t:- ed that the plaintiff ought to have {hewn, that the mafter was not alfo the owner or freighter of the (hip, in which cafe no barratry could be committed ; but it was ruled, that it was not incumbent on the plaindff to make fuch proof, for that would be calling upon him to prove a negative, and the proof of the faft, which operates in dif- charge of the other party, lies uppn him. Rofs v. Hunter^ 4 T. i?. 33 . Vol. II. M The 14^ APPENDIX. Numb.XVl.3 The pofition incidentally mentioned in one of the prccedine cafes, that in an anion upon the game-laws> it is not ncccffary for the plaintiff to prove the defendant's wnnt of qualification, is al- ways followed in praftice ; but it is a difputed point whether that doftrine extends to fummary conviftions before juftices of peace • and the judges of 'the King's-bcnch were equally divided upon that queftion, in the cafe of The King v. Stones i Etift^ 639. A cafe of The King v. Jarujs^ in which a convidioh was held bad, the want of the feveral qualifications required by law, not being alleged in the information^ or (hewn by evidence, was much relied upon by Lord Kenyon and Mr. Juftice Grofe^ in fupport of the neceflity of negativing the quaiificatiojis by evidence; but it is evident, that any opinion of the rieccflity of giving fuch evidence was in that cafe fuperiluous, the neceflity of negativing the qualifications in the in- formation being a ground abundantly fufficient for fetting afide the conviftion. It is remarkable, that whilft Lord Kenyon was very tenacious of the authority of one cafe, he obferved, with reference to another, that he had often thought there was found fenfe in what was once faid by Lord Ch. J. Eyre^ that the fooner a bad precedent was gotten rid of the better. The judges gave their rcfpeftive opinions, as to the principle of requirriig fuch evidence. Lord Kenyon argued in fupport of fuch requifition, and of the ne- ceflity of keeping a ftrift hand over the fummary proceedings of niagiftrates/ Mr. Juftice Grofe evidently fubmitted to the ^uppofed weight of authority, in oppofition to his own opinion, refpefting tlie reafon of the cafe. Mr. Juftice Lawrence and Mr. Juftice Le Blanc thought the evidence not requifite ; the latter faid, " 1 do not know that there are different rules of evidence, in cafe of pro- ceedings before magiftrates, from thofe which apply to anions in the courts above* And if the court were to determine, that it was ncccffary for the witnefs to negative the defendant's qualifications, I do not fee why it muft not be equally ncceffaiy to give tlie fam« evidence. before a judge and jury, in an a£^ion for the penalty. Whatever is an authority for the one muft, I think, equally bind the otlicr.'* Whatever may be hereafter determined refpefting the law, I conceive that there can be little doubt refpcfting the reafon of the opinion laft cited. The forms of proceedings before different tri- bunals zr% in their nature matter of arbitrary regulation, but the general principles of natural reafon and juftice, which ought to de- termine the adminiftration of the law refpefting evidence, where no pofitive in fti tut ions intervene, ought to be equally the rule of conduft of the higheft tribunal and the loweft. According to the praftice which formerly prevailed at fome quartcr-fellions, tlie appellants againft ah order of removal were 2 boi'v.^^i Numb. XVI*J On the Law rfEvidenig^ i4f bound, in the firft place, to (hew the fettlement of the patipet out o^ their own parifli. Fid, Rex. v. Woodford, Cald. 236. "iTiis riilcj fecxns utterly repugnant to principle ; becaufe a removal to a pariih is in the nature of an affirmation that the fettlement is there, and Ihould be founded upon fome evidence of the fa£t. The rule thai an order confirmed is good againft all the world, but an Order re-* tcrfcd is only conclufive between the particular pariflies, ftrongly indicates where the original proof (hould be } and (hews chat ail dfdcT ibould only be confirnled upon evidence of an a&ual fettle^ menty and that it may be reverfed for defe£i of proof; and I be# lieve that the praAide alluded to is noW Univeifally exploded. S E C*T I O N m. Pf thi Rule requiring the bejl Evidence the Nature of the Cafe nvill admit* All fyftems of law recognize a leading diftin£lion between writ' ten and verbal evidence \ and written evidence is fubdivided intd feveral clafles of relatite fupenority and inferiority, beginning witli public authentic aAs, and defcending to private memoranda. Writ-* ten evidence is fuperior to verbal, as it is by no means equally lia-< ble to mifconception, or mifreprefentation. And an drigiual xs^ for reafons equally evident, fuperior to a Copy; A grand rule of evidence in the Englifli law is, that the beil evidence mud be given, which the nature of the Cafe will admit | a flight anibiguity in the expteffion of this rule may^ and frequent^ ly does, lead to confiderable mifconceptionj in thofe who are but fuperficially acquaiQted with tlie law, and who fometiities conceive not only that it is incumbent upoii a party to give the beft attain* able evidence of exifting circumftances, but that the eircumftances themfelves mud be fuch as give the moft diftin£t poflible view of iit difputed faA ; and in other cafes, where the circumftances of the cafe afe not fufdeptible of legitimate evidence, that evidence^ !n its nature inadmiffible, may be allowed as a fubftitute; both of which errors I have kndwn to.be the fources of judicial determina* tioiis^ but it was in courts the judges of which have not necefla^ rily a profefEonal connection With the law, although very exten<< fively, engagc;d in the adminiftration of it. But Lord Ch. Baron Gilheti, whofe law of evidence is the moft Ufeflil guide in inve& titrating the general ftibjeCl before us, obviates the firft mifconcep^ tion by obferving, that the true meaning of the rule of law, that requires the greateft evidence that the nature of the thing is capa« ble of, is this. That no iudi evidence fiiall be brought, which ept fii mauri fuppofes ftill a greater evidence behind, in the part/a #wn pofieifion^^for fuch evidence is altogether infuffioient, an<^ M 4 prover 148 APPENDIX- [Numb. XVI proves nothingi for it carries a prefumption with it contrary to die intent for which it was produced ; as if a man offers a copy of a deed, or will, where he ought to produce the original, this canies a prefumption with it, that there is fomething more in the deed, or will, that makes againft the party, or elfe he 'vould have pro- duced it, and therefore the copy is not evidence, and cannot weigh any thing in a court of judice. The fame principle is expounded more fully in a very elaborate judgment of one of the courts of North Carolina^ (upon a queftion which, in an £lnglifh court, would not admit of much debate, tlie neceflity of a deed being attefted by a fubfcribing witnefs,) from which I (hall tranfcribe the fol- lowing extra£l, as affording not an unfavourable fpecimen of the juridical reafoning which prevails in thofe courts. << There is but one decided rule in relation to evidence, and that is, that the law requires the bed evidence. But this rule is always relaxed upon two grounds, either from abfolute neceffity, or a neceffity prefumed from the conunpn occurrences amongft mankind. The rule is not fo ftubbom but that it will bend to the neceffities of mankind, and to circumftances not under their control. The rule is adopted only to obviate the fraud of mankind : one iliall not deceive the jyry by offering a lefs convincing teftimony to eftablifh his point, when it appears there is a proof more elucidative of the point ip controverfy in his own power, which, perhaps, he does not offer, becaufe it would be decifive againft him. It was never meant to exclude the psirty from juftice, merely becaufe he had not, through ignorance, provided himfelf originally with the beft evidence it was poflible for him to provide *, for tlien two witnefles would be better than one, a hundred than two, and fo on progreflively. A writ- ing would be better than a parol contra£t, a deed better than either, and a record better than all. Neither was it intended to deprive any one of juftice, when, without any default in himfelf, he had loft the better evidence, which he had provided originally. It firft deprives him of the power of impofing upon us, and then lays itfelf open to be relaxed as circumftances ftiall, in juftice, require. Thefe circumftances are of two kinds, thofe founded on abfolute neceffity, and thofe founded on a neceffity occafioned by the occur* rences which are common amongft mankind/' The greater part of the particular fyftem which is cftabliihed rc- fpe£iing the law of evidence, may be regarded as an amplification and expofition of this general rule. , It is to be obferved that this, as well as moft other rules of evi- dence, are chiefly referable to the admiffibility of the proof re^ quired, and of courfe are preliminary to any confiderationsrefpeA- ing its weight and efficacy. But the fame principle which di£tates d.e rule, concerning the admiffion of evidence, may be often ad- vun- Numb. XVI.] On tie Law of Evidence. 149 rantageoufl]^ applied in the difcuflion of Its effeO:. The infinite fznttj of tnofa6kions which occur in the intercourfe of focietfy mud in general prevent the adoption of a fyftem for determining what evidence (hail be requifite for the decifion of any contefted hOty not requiring the formality of a written atteftation ; but when weaker and lefs {ztish&oYj teftimony is tendered in fupport of a iz&f the nature of which will admit of illucidatioui from proofs of a more dire& and explicit chara£ler, the fame caution which re- jeds evidence of an inferior degree, when higher evidence might be produced, will awaken fufpicion ; and it will reafonably be fup« pofed, that a more perfed expofition of the fubje£): would have laid open deficiencies • and objcdiions, which a more obfcure and uncertain reprefentation was intended to conceal. But there is dill an important diftin£lion to be attended to : the rules for the admiflion of evidence are abfolute and imperative, and will not admit of any relaxation from confiderations of inconvenience and expence ; wherea^,. in forming a juSgment upon the ade- quacy of teftimony, in particular cafes, circumftances which re* move the caufe of fufpicion may alfo be admitted to obviate the Although the rule of law is for the moft part confined to the known ranks and degrees of evidence, there are inftances of its application to the more or lefs adequate reprefentation of fa&$« Thus in the cafe of Willtarns againil the Ea/i India Company^ 3 Eafii 192. referred to upon another ground in the preceding iedion, it was alleged, that an inflammable fubftance had been put on board a ihip, without igiving a proper intimation. It ap- peared to be the duty of the conduAor of military ftores, to carry the goods on board, and of the chief mate to receive them y the mate w than fuch 2^ it appears by the record to be. Thus, where a perfon not party to a former caufe, (the verdi£l in which was offered as evidence againft him,) endeavoured to (hew diat the finding of the jury in that caufe was entered upon a par^ ticular iffue by the miftake of the officer, it was held, that as thig evidence went to impeach the authenticity of the record, as to the hOi of fuch finding, it was not admilBble. ^ed v. Jac\fon^ » ^h ass- How far a^ perfon, not party to a former proceeding, is affc£led by whatpaflcd thereon, is a fubje£t of diftin£t confideratiouj which will be adverted to in another place. But altliough it cannot be a matter of examination, whether a judicial a& or proceeding was different from what it appears by the record to be, the record is not conclufive evidence, with re- gard to the fa&s expreffed in it, except fo far as the truth of fuch fa&s is neceffarily imported, in an admiffion of the accuracy of record itfelf. For inftance, a record of the convi£lion of an offen- der, is deemed concluGve as to the commiilion of the offence ; but as the time fpecified in the indi£lment is not of the effence of the charge, it may be falfified by evidence. 2 Hawk, P. C. r. 15. (of avoiding judgment), / 2* So a judgment in ejediment is conclufive evidence in an adion for mefhe profits of the plaintiff's title, at tlys time ftated in the demife ; but as to the length of time that the defendant has oc- cupied^ it proves nothing, ji/len v. Parkin^ 2 Bur, 665. Upon the J54 APPENDIX. [Numb^lVI, Ac fame principle, the general relation ^which any aft of a court of record has to the firft day of the term may be corrcut it is properly fettled by modem determinations, that they are nowife evidence to the truth of their contents, being no more than the mere furmifes of counf^. A bill is iiditious, it does not aver {^fX% but fuggefts them, and calls for anfwers to afcertain them ; it may be withdrawn or amended, and decides nothing* Vi. F'ttz, 296* Allan v« Hartley ^ CoMs^ B. Law X* Jioey. Syhurnf ^.T.R. a. £xcept in fomz cafes, which, in vari- ous other refpe£is, admit of a greater htitude in evidence than accords with the general rule of law ; as upon queftions of pedigreest (7 r. R. 2.) they are in general no further evidence, than to (hew that fuch a bill did exift, and that the fa£ls were in difpute in vrder to kt in evidence of the other proceedings. An anfwer in Chancery which is upon oath, and upon which it is prefumed chata man fpeaks upon deliberation, is evidence againft the perfecome a ftranger to the property. I alfo conceive that the , reputation of the country was *an infufiicient ground for admitting the declaration of the perfon, ^fuppofed to be the former proprietor ; it being incumbent upon A., who founds his ^aim againft B., upon the declaration of C, to make out the fa£t, by which fuch declaration could be allowed to have any efleA. I Ihould think it probable in the j>articular cafe, that there was fome evidence of aAual poileflion, which primi facie would be fuffi- * cient. An anfwer in Chancery is evidence againft the party making it, of the trutl^ &f the fa£ls which it contains, and an examined * copy of fuch anfwer is allowed as evidence in all cafes, except upoa an indiftment for perjury, . Witli refpe£l to the party whofe anfwer is adduced, having a right to infift upon the whole being taken together, provided it is relied upon at all, a diftin£lion muft be taken (which, although not declared in the authorities upon the fubje£t, is to be colle£ted from them^ and is founded upon accurate principles) between its being part of the proceedings in the very fuit depending or being merely matter of evidence in a different caufe. In a fuit in Chancery, the defendant by his anfwer, which was put in iffue by the plaintiff's replication, admitted as executor that the tcftator had left iiooA in his hands, and faid, that afterwards he gave a bond for 1000/., and the teftator gave him the other ioo/« ; as there was* no evidence, but the defendant's own admifiion for the recefpt, it was contended that he ought to find credit when he fwears in his own difcharge. But it was anfwered, .and re- 1 folvel Numb XVI.3 On the Law of Evidence. igy folted by the court, that when an anfwer was put in iflue, what was confeiled and admitted need not be proved ; but it behoved the defendant to make out by proof, what was infifted upon by way of avoidance ; but this was held under this diftin^ion, where the defendant admitted zlzGt, and infifted upon a diftindl faft by way of avoidance, there he ought to prove the matter of his defence, becaufe it nhj be probable that he admitted it out of the appre- henfion that it might be proved, and therefore fuch admittance oaght not to profit him, fo far as to pafs for truth whatever he fays itk avoidance ; but if it had been one fa£l, as if the defendant had faid, that the teftator had given him 100/., it ought to have been allowed unlefs difproved, becaufe nothing of the fa£l charged is admitted, and the plaintiff may difprove the whole h€t as fworn, if he can do it. Gi/b* 5 1. Now it muft be remembered that the above decifion is principal- ly referable to the courfe of proceeding in courts of equity. A bill is filed, an anfwer is put in, the plaintiiF either fets down the caufc for hearing upon bill and anfwer, which is an admiffion of the tnab of the whole, and merely brings the /u]ff!deftcy of it into con« teft ; or he replies to the anfwer, putting the whole in iflue general- ly, whereupon the defendant muft fubftantiate by proof, all the faAs upon which he means to infift, whilft the plaintiff may rely ttpon ewery fafl admitted, which he conceives to be material, with- out being bound to the admiilion of any others. Upon this pro- ceeding no queftions of credit, no inferences of fadt, can regularly occurs there are certain general rules refpe£ling what ihall be taken as true, in the admiflions and teftimony, and if a real di& putable queftion occurs refpediing a matter of fanceming other pieces of public evidence, I (hall extrafl the following paiTages from Gilbert^ fubjoining the notes which I for- merly prepared, with the* defign of fubmitting them to the public in an edition of that work. *^ The pope's licence, without the king's, has been held good evi- dence of an impropriation, becaufe anciently the pope was held to be the fupreme head of the church, and therefore, the pope waB held to have a difpofition of all fpiritual benefices, with the con- currence of the patron, without any leave of the prince of the country; and thefe ancient matters muft be admitted, according to the error of the times in which they were tranfaded. A pope's bull is no evidence on a general prefcription to be difcharged of tithes, becaufe that ihews the commencement of fuch a cuftom, and a general prefcription (hews, that there was no time or memory of things to the contrary, fo that the buU doth itfelf contradiA fuch prefcription. But the pope's bull is evidence on a fpiritual prefcription, when you only fay the lands belonged to fuch a mon- aftery as was difcharged of tithe at the time of. the diflblution, for then they continue difcharged by z6t of parliament. If the queftion be, whether a certain manor be ancient demefne^ or not, the trial (hall be by domefday-bookj which (hall be infpe£led by Numb. XVI.3 On the Law rfEvidenci. 16I b^ the court. Ancient demefnes are th^ ibcage temires, ^lat wero in the hands of Edward the Confeflbr, and whith WtUiam the Conqueror^ in honour of him, endowed with certain privileges^ Domcfday-book was a terrier or furvey of the king's lands, which was made in the time of the Conqueror, and which afcettains the particular lands which had this privilege. In eje&ment for the manor of Artam^ the defendant pleaded ancient demefne \ and when Domefday-book was brought int0 court, would have proved that it was anciently called Nittmn^ and that NeUam appears by the book to be ancient demefne $ but he was not permitted to give fuch evidence, for if the name be varied it ought to be averred in the record. Gregory v. tTi/kes, H. 284 CA. 2. B. N. P. I, however, conceive that this evidence was properly referable to the iflue on the record, and that it was not neceflary to put in iflttc the former name of the manor. If an individual, whofe name has been changed by the king's authority, is fued in his pr^* fent name for money lent, it cannot be contended that a promiflbry note figned in his former name would be inadfniflable evidence. An old terrier or furvey of a manor, whether eccleliaftical or temporal, may be given in evidence : for there can be no other wafl of afcettatning old tenures or boundaries. A terrier or glebe is not evidence for the parfon, unlefs figned by the church-wardens, as well as the parfon \ nor then neither, d they be of his nomination, and though it be figned by them, yet it feems to deferve very little credit, unlefs it be likewife figned bj the fubftantial inhabitants \ but in all cafes it is ftrong evidenoe againft the parfon. B. N. P.^ An old map of lands was allowed as evidence (0), where it came along with the writings, and agreed with the boundaries adjufted^ in an ancient purchafe. It was ruled by Lord Ch. J. Holt^ Warvj. Sum. aflizes, i6^$ that if A. be feifed of the manors of B. and C, and during his feifin of both, he caufes a furvey to be taken of the manor of B.^ and afterwards the manor of B. is conveyed to E.f and after a long time there are difputes betw,een the lords of the manors of B, and C, about their boundaries ; tfiis old furvey may be given in evidence^ mi/rd, if the two manors had not becti in the hands of the fame perfon, at the time of the furvey taken. Bridgeman v« Jenmngif I Lord Rajm. 704. Bot it was held at Efceter Sum. afl*. 1719, that furvey books of a manor which were ancient, unlefs figned by the («) This It MC vciy conedlf ansoged it.psbKc ctid«icc» bat I have aot confldsed Kbit tsi nutter of fuffideDt importance to require ita UKifpofidoo, e^ctsllj is the fol^eft. hflt 1 coQflc£Boii with thole whieb accAbpiiif Ic Vol- II. N tcnartt j. I i6f APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. tenants, or they appear to be made at a court of furvey, are noevU ^ence; thty are elfe only private memorials. 12 Fin. Abr. ^o.fil, 12. A furvey taken by one under whom the plaintiff claimed, was alfo rejefted as evidence for the plaintiff. Anon. Sir, 95. Ft, Bull. I N. P. Tii. Ev. An ancient furvey from the firft fruits office, of the pof- fcflkms of a nunnery to which a re£iory was appropriated, taken upon the diffolution of monafteries, by which it appeared what fpecies of tithes belonged to the xtOiQX and what to the Ticar, and a fimilar furvey taken 35 Eliz. were allowed as pro- per evidence, though it did not appear by what authority the laft furvey was taken. Vicar of KeiUngton v. TrincoU^ i Wilf. 1 70. In Dinn on the demife of Godwin again ft Spray , i T, R. 466, a parchment writings tranfmitted from one fteward of a m^nor to another without a date, by which " de conftlio domini regis ex ifffenfu omnium fummoniiorum vtanerii di^i domini regis de B. de modo ienaraftue adfpeciakm rcgatum infcriptis exprejfe ordinaium eft^^ &c. fpeeifying the courfe of defcent within tlie manor, was ruled to be good evidence, though it was not properly a court roll. In Roe ex Jem. Beehee v. Parker^ 5 T. R. 26, the prefentment of the homage "at a court baron of the mode of defcent was held to be full evi- dence of the cuilom, and an objection that it was infufficicnt with- '^out inftances being fliewn, was over-ruled. Where there was an admittance of a perfon, zsyounge/l nephew in 1657, on the one .fide, and on the other a prefentment in 1692, that the cuilom of .defcent extended only to the youngeft fon, and if no fon, to the .youngeft brother, and went no further ; and there was' parol evi- dence of that being the repute, the jury found according to tlie ifdmittance, and the court refufed to grant a new trial. Doe dem. Mafon V. Majon^ 3 Wilf. 63. Corporation books are generally allowed to be given in evidence, when they have been publicly kept as fuch, and the entries made by tlie proper officer, not but that entries made by other perfons may be good, if the town clerk is Gck orrcfufes to attend, but then that muft be made to appear. Whoever .produces a book mud eftablifh it before he delivers it in. Per Cur. Rex v. Mather/ell^ i Sir. 92. In that cafe, a book which appe^ed to have been only mi- nutes of fome corporate a£ls ten years ago, all written by the ptofecutor's clerk, who was no officer of the corporation, was held to have been properly rejefled. Evidence being given of orders in . the corporation books, for disfranchifing certain perfons, it was ruled that orders in the fame books, by which they appeared to have been reftored by virtue of peremptory writs of mandamus^ were ad- miffable, though the writs themfelves were not produced. Symmers, V. Rigem^ Cowp. 489. Rolls I Numb* X VI*3 Oh the Law ff Evidence. 1 6| Rolls or ancient books, in the heralds' office, are evidence to proTea pedigree, but an extra£l of a pedigree taken oat of records (hall not be received ; bccaufe fuch extra£l is not the bed evi« dence in the nature of the thing, as a co{)y of fuch records might be had. 2 Jorus^ 224. Bull. N. P. 248. A vifitation made by thd heralds entered in their books and kept in their office, and the minute book of a former vidtation, figned by the heads of the fe- veral families, and found in the library of Lord Oxford, were ad-^ mltted. Pltton v. Walter , Sir, 161. Camden* s Britannia was held not to be evidence, to prove whether by the cuftom of Droitwich filt pits could be funk in any part of the town, or in a certain place only ; but a general hiftory may be given in evidence, to prove a matter relating to the kingdom in general, as in the cafe of Neaje and Fry \ chronicles were admitted to (hew that king Philip did not take the ftyle mentioned in a deed as king of Spain, at the time it purported to bear date \ Charles V. not having then furren- dercd (/i). DugdaUs Monaflicon was refufed for evidence, whether A, was an inferior abbey or not, becaufe the original records might be had in the augmentation office. The rcgifter of the Navy Office, with proof of the method there tifed, to return all perfons dead, with the letters D — d, is fufficient crldence of a death. £x dem. Whitcomle, E, 6 Ann. c. 13. B. If. P. 249. An inventory taken by a iheriff was admitted as evidence between ftrangers, to prove the quantity and value of the goods ; for the law intruding the fiierifF with the execution mud intrud liim throughout. 2 Keh. 277. A copy of the bifhop's inditution book is not fufficient evidence to prove a prefentation, for the prefentation itfelf Ihould be pro- duced, or it fliould be ilicwn that it had been properly fearched for and could not be found, and the inditution book itfelf might have been produced. Tillard v. Shebbeare, 2 Wilf. 266. ' A certificate from the fecretary at war,_of the nature of a fer- jcant's dation, though oppofed, was allowed to be read in evidenc^e to the court, upon an application for the defendant's difcharge as being a (bldier. Lloyd v. Woodall, i BL Rep, 29. The king's fign manual, declaring his intention to pardon a fen*- tence of tranfportatiqn, and infert the prifoner's. name in the next general pardon, is evidence on an indi£lment for being at large after baring been ordered for tranfportation* Rex v. Miller, 2 BL Rep.^9^. The Gazette is evidence of the king^s proclamation, and of ad- drefles made to him. Rex v. Holt, T. R. 436. The copy printed by the king's printer is evidence of the^ articles of war; Rex ?• Witberi, cittd, ibid. N a SEC- I** APPENDIX. CNumb. XVI. SECTION V. OfDetis, Private writings are divided into deedS) and writings of an in* £erior nature* iThe great diftindion between them isj that deeds, proprio vigorr, conftitute and create an immediate obligation or re- leafe, whereas other writings are only a mode of evidence. An effect of this diftin&ion was formerly adverted to, in examining the natiire of the confideration hrequifite to fupport an obligatory pro- xnife ; and it was ihewn that an engagement by deed is in its own nature valid and obligatory, and dges not require the exigence of fuch a confideration, as is abfolutely requifite to render a verbal engagement, or an engagement by writing inferior to a deed, effica* cious. Upon the fame principle, the difcharge of an obligation by an ordinary writing is of no legal efficacy, merely confidercd in itfelf : a receipt for a fum of money is only evidence of the zOl of payment } it is open to contradi£bion by oppofite evidence, that the payment did not take place, and has no immediate intrinfic opera- tion in producing a difchar^ ; whereas a releafe by deed deftroys and annuls the. obligation, and is perfe&ly independent of every extrinfic circumftance. An obligation contraAed by deed is ana- logous to the Roman (lipul^tion, as was {hewn in a former number of the Appendix already alluded to; and the difcharge of an obli- gation by releafe is, in the fame manner, analagous to an acceptila- tion I the nature of which is explained in a note to No. 5 7 1 • of the preceding treatife. The cBc€t of an engagement by deed is of confiderable im- portance, in the event of the death of the debtor, on account of its being a charge upon real eftate ; which a verbal engagement, or an engagement by any inferior writing, is not, and alfo on account of Its having a priority in the application of the perfonal eftate. In cafe a deed is entered into, engaging, for the performance of a preceding obligation by the fame peribn, the inferior obligation is merged in the higher efficacy of the deed, which becomes the only efie^^ual title. But a deed given by another perfon^ as a col- lateral fecurity, does not zfk& the validity of the previous engage- ment. White y. CujUr^ 6 T. R. 176. In the fame cafe it was held that an inftrument purporting to be a deedy executed by a married woman without her hufband^ and therefore void, did not deprive the other party of the right which ]^e had againft the hufband, as upon a parol contrafi ; and in Lov/e t. Peer/f 4 JBur, 7,22$^ in which a man gave a woman an engagement by deed, to pay her loooA if he married any other perfon, which engagement Numb. XVI.3 On tbi Law of Evidence. 165 engagement was held to be illegar*. Lord Mansfield faid^ that if there was really any mutual contraf): under fair and equitable dr- cumftances, the plaintiff would dill be at liberty to bring her adion, for the void bond could never be in her way. The general definition of a deed is an a& in writing, fealed [a\ and delivered. In the earlier periods of our judicial hiilory^ the art of writing was very far from being generally diffufedi and hence arofe the circumftance that the a£l^ of individuals were rather ratified by appropriate feals, than by written fignatures ; according- ly a feal became the folemn mark of a legal obligation, and contrails or a£ls of liberation, as already obferved, derived no additional legal efEcacyfrom merely being reduced into writing. It does not fcem that any particular manner or form of words are requifite to con- ftitute the fealing and delivery of a deed. I conceive it to be fuf- ficient, that the feal {hould be aflented to as that of the party, and that he (hould in any manner teftify his intention of delivering the inftrument as his deed, having it in his prefence. In one cafe, the lafl: mentioned circumftancq. feems to have been conCdered as unneceflary. In this cafe a wife joined with her hufband, in ex- ecuting a mortgage of her edate which was void. After his death flie did feveral ads confirmatory of the tranfadion, which^ Lord Mansfield i^XAf was a clear acknowledgment that the deed was hers, and that (he was content that the parties fliould enjoy according to the terms of the deed. Goodright dem Carter v. Strabans, Cewp, 201. ^ I have in a former publication intimated my idea, that in that cafe a difpofition to effe£luate the moral juftice of the cafe be- tween the parties is more confpicuouSj than a conformity to the principles upon which it ought to have been decided as a mere queftion of law ; and that at lead it ought to have been left to t;^e decifion of the jury, whether any of the exifting circumflances were mtended as an execution, or whether they were not the confi> quence of an apprehenfion, that a valid deed already exifted. (a) In Adsm w. Kerr^ i Btf. )6o, an inftraineot executed In ytrnmcaf and dccIitcA upoo-as a deed appeared to have no fea]| tbouj^h a mark ol a particular kind bad been ma^B with a pen, in the place where deeds are ufoally felled ; and ic becaoe a queftlon whether eridcace was adniffibley of a cuftom In yamaica to execute bonde in this manner. The opinion of the court appears to have been in faTour of fuch evidence»l||^ the point was not judicially decided. In the cafe in Cardins, cited in a former AAiooj at it bid, the peo« p!e b^gaa at leaf th to forf ct the original ufe of the infticutioo of ieali, and l» fail with aay impcefiion they could get | and the law rather tlian in? alidate the wholt.tranfadlen, left it fo* the jury to decide whether that was the feal of the party or not. 1^ this country the people hifcdeparedftiU further from the ufi; of fcals, by not making any ifflpreflioa at aH, ftiiiching fomwhing likt a feal upon the narpn of cbto mtr, and amking' ilitt pnft iotm Nj la i66 APPENDIX. CNumb.XVI. In the cafe of Sail v. Dutijlerville fe* al\ 4 T. i?. 313, it appeared that one of two partners, in the prcfencc of the other, executed a deed for them both \ there was but one feal, and it did not ap* pear that he had put tlie feal twice upon the wax ; and the court were of opinion that it was a good deed, that no particular mods of delivery wns neceflary, for that it was fuificient if a party ex- ecuting a deed treated it as his own ; and they relied principally on this deed having been executed by the one for himfclfj and the other in the prefcnce of that other. It has been a matter of difpute, whether the appellation of a deed was referable only to contrails, or extended to other fealed inilruments ; for inftance, awards when they happened to be un- der feal ; and confequeqtly whether it was requifite for fuch in- Aruments to have the (lamp impofed upon deeds. Mr. Juftice Lanvrencei in a late cafe^ mentioned, that the queflion had, with rc- fpefb to awards, been agitated feveral times ; but he thought the final determination was, that if the arbitrator delivers an award under feal as a deed, it muft then have a deed (lamp, but although It were by a writing under feal, yet if it were not delivered as a deed, it was fufficient if It had an award ftamp. Brown y. Fawferf 4^/j/?, 384. . At common law the fignaturc of tlic party certainly was not eflential to a deed ; but it i$ the opinion of many great authorities that it has been rendered fo, by the flatute of frauds'. As the prac- tice of figning deeds is univerfal, the difcuilion of that queilion cannot be of much importance ; but it fecms to be extraordinary that it (houUbe fuppofcd, that the ftatute has introduced any altera- tions, with reg^ird to the general queftion, as all the provifions of it arc merely applicable to particular fubjeds, and there are many d^eds with which thofe fubjefts have not any kind of conneftion. With regard to the difpofition of landed property, a writing figncd by the party is exprefsly required. The a£l of an agent, with refpefl to the obje£t of his authority, 18 in general regarded as the a£i of the principal ; but no perfon can be liable to the obligation ariiing from a deed, unlefs it is ci^er executed by himfelf, (in whigh expreflion I include the afls ^bove referrg^ to, as amounting to an execution,) or unlefs the authority is pven by another deed, fo that the aft is ultimately founded upon his own fealing and delivery. Accordingly, it has been ruled that one partner in trade, whofc general authority is more exteniive than that of an agent, cannot bind another by his execution qf a deed. Harrifpn v. Jack/on^ 7 T. R, 207. Where a perfon is emyowered, by a letter of attorney from an- 0ther^ to execute a deedj or (^o any other ^(X for himi it mud be done Numb: XVL] On the Law of Evidence. i6j ioTit as the z(k of the party htmfelfi and pot as the zOt of the at« varatj \ but the particular mode and form of doing the a£l is not miterial. Therefore, when the attorney Wilhs figned for J. Bro^u/if M. IVilki^ it was held to be a good execution of the deed^ as the deed of Brown. See Wilh v. Backy % Eafi^ 2421 and the authorities there referred to. Where a deed is abfolutely void in its execution, fubfequent de« livery may make it good as a deed then firft executed. Such^ for inftmce, is the deed of a married woman, which is void in refpedk of her legal difability to contra£l, but may be render^ed valid by her fealing and delivery after flie becomes a widow. But if the deed is only fuch as may be avoided, by perfons for whofc prote&ion the law has introduced particular exceptions, the whole tStOi is ikrived from the firft execution, and cannot be varied by any fub« fcqucnt delivery. Subfequent a£ts -may amount to a confirma* tion, but cannot operate as an execution of the deed* See PerUnSf 8, 154. Zouch V. ParfortSj 3 Bur, 1 794* Goodright ▼. Strahan^ Cnvp, 201. The books on the law of evidence contain much learning, upoxr , the fubje£l of its being neceflary upon pleading a deed, to produce it to the court, (or, in the language of the law, to make a profert of it,) and upon the diftinQions in that rcfpe£l, refulting from the dif<> ferent nature of the deeds alleged, upon the fituation of the parties making the allegation, and upon their being the foundation of a claim or defence, or merely incidental. I have all along declined entering into difcufiions, which are confined to the rules of'fpecial pleading, not by any means as under-rating the importance or excellence of that branch of our municipal jurifprudence, but as being foreign to my general purpofe. I, therefore, (hall only obferve, that by modern determinations, the profert of deeds may be di£» penfed with, upon an allegation of their being loft by time, or accident, or cancelled, in confcquence of which determination, a perfon is not by fuch an accidental lofs deprived of his ordinary remedies by the common law, and compelled to refort to the affift«- ance of a court of equity. Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 151. Bolton V. Bijb, ofCar/iJlej 2 H^ B. 259. With refpeA to giving bleeds in evidence ; the firft rule is, tha( the deed itfelf muft be produced, unlefs a fatisfaAory excufe caa be given* What iha^U amount to fuch excufe, may vary according to the numerous cafes, between the proof of its being accidentally confumed by fire, and the Cmple allegation that it cannot be found. In the cafe where it was held that the profert might be difpenf- ed with, upon an allegation of the deed being loft by time, or ac* cidcnt, Lord Kvijon^ truly laid, there was no doubt but upon the N4 trial j68 appendix. [Nunab. XVI. trial of a caufc» depending upon the exiftence of fuch a deed, every proper fufpicion would be entertained. A mere excufe hatched for the purpofe would not be confidered as a fufficient apology for not producing the deed^ nor indeed any excufe) but fuch as the juf- ^ce and urgency of the cafe would warrant. Th^re is eyidently in point of reafon a di(lin£lion upon this head, between deeds which regularly fliould be in the cuftody of the per- fon claming the benefit of their contents^ and thofe which belong* ing to or being in the cuftody of one perfon, are material to the inteteft of anodier. In the latter cafe, an application to the per* fon to whom the pofiefiion of the deeds properly belongs, and an inability on his part to find them,, ought to be confidered as fuf- ficient to warrant the admiflion of fecondary evidence ; and fuch is the praAice upon the fubje£l, for it would be unjuft. that one man (hould fufler by the negligence of another, over whom he Las no control. The ftrongeft cafe for difpenfing with the produdion of an cx- ifting writing is, when it is or ought to be in the hands of the ad* verfe party who upon notice refufes to produce it. There is a cafe refpe^ling the non-produd:ion of a deed, which did not pafs without a difference of opinion, and which appears to be very fairly open to difpute. An eje£tment was inftituted upon the feveral titles of Haldane and Urrj. Evidence being given of a title in Haldane^ it appeared by the crofs^examination of one of the plaintiff's witnefTes, ^at Hal-- dane had conveyed to Urry by a deed, which the plaintiff had in court, for the production of which no notice had been given, and which the counfel ref ufed to produce. This was held to defeat the title under Hatdane^hnt not to fet up the title under Urry^ for that the refufal to produce was fufficient to let the defendant into parol evidence of Haldanis eftate being divefted \ but not to excufe the plaintiff from fhewing Urrfs eftate by the bed evidence. The refufal to produce was regarded as aprc- fumptioh of fomething fatal in the contents. Mr. Juftice Tates briefly intimated an oppofite opinion, obferv- ing that the plaintiff's counfel were not obliged to produce tills deed, that no man can be obliged to produce evidence againft hinifelf ; and the only confequence of notice to produce it would have been the admitting inferior evidence. Rh v. Harvey f 4 Bur. 2484. Thedecifion would have been very proper, if it had related to two diftinfi pieces of evidence; if it had been proved by parol, tliat Haldane had conveyed it to a third perfon, that would not have authorized die plaintiff to prove^ that that perfon had conveyed to Urrj^ except by the proper rules of evidence \ but the faA that 8 Haldam Kumb. X VL3 On the Law ofEvidena. x 69 Haldam hid conveyed to Urry^ wa^ one entfte prc^ofition^ nrkieh ought to have been either adopted or rejeAed 1 and not from any difapprobation of a party's conduct, or from any prefumption of an unknown fomethingy garbled and feparated. Lord Mansfieldf in the fame cafe, obferved, that in civil caufies the court will force parties to produce evidence, which may weigh againft themfelves, or leave the refufal to do it after proper notice^ as a ftrong prefumption to the jury. But in a criminal or penal caufe, the defendant is never forced to produce any evideneCf diough he (hould hold it in his hands in court. That a party (hall be af^ually forced to produce the evidence, fo as to be punifhed for refufal, is a prepofition totally unwarranted by authority, and I fuppofe that is not what was meant by the expref* 60ns above quoted, and what is faid refpe£ling leaving the refufal as a prefumption to the jury, fhould it be received with confider* able qualification ; for it cannot be admitted that fuch a prefump- tion fljould Hand inftead of all other evidence, and fupply the to- ,tal deficiency of proof. It is only in wcighing^ the tSkd and fub« ftsnce of evidance, in its nature adequate to the fupport of a izQt in queftion, that the ^ury can take into confideration the opportu« nity allovired to the oppofite fide of contradi£ling the evidence if falfe, or of deftroying the inference from it, if erroneous, and thereby conclude that evidence, otherwife . fufpicious, is true } or that an infcrqice, otherwife flight and feeble,' is corre£l (a). The diftin£lion betwen civil, and criminal, or penal cafes is ex« preisly difallowed, in the cafe of Tlje Attorney Gtn^ral v. Le March* Mif 2 T. Rm 201. /r. where, upon an information in the exchequer, for forfeitures under a revenue a£l, the fubje£l was ehborately and with much perfpicuity examined by the Lord Ch. Baron Smjth. In a very late cafe it was decided, that if a deed is pleaded with a profert, nothing can difpenfe with the produ£tIon of the deed it* felf, as the deed .is fuppofed to be in court at the time, and the party takes upon himfelf to aver the exiftenoe- In the particular cafe the evidence (hewed that the deed had been deftroyed by the oppofite party ; and as that circi;mftance would have been*the moft favourable ground of exception, it is the (Irongeft proof of the uni- verfality of the rule. Stmth Vt Woodward^ 4 Eaft^ 585. In cafe there appear to be fufficient circumftances to ezcufe the production of tlie deed, the rule of evidence,a8 ftatedby Lord Hard^ {ft) In 1 fv/rmer puSIicarion I took occaHon Co obf^rvc, vltb ideitfice to thlf caft, that the having an infliument in court may not alwaya be fufficient to countervail the iacoD* venience artfing from a want of notice to produce it { becaufey upon a notice, the party Bi«y come prepared with evidence^ to repel the infereocei that aifht arUt againft hia, upoB the mere produAion of the inftrnment called for* I7« APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. die defendant's cuftody, he gives the defendant notice to produce it, and the deed, when produced, muft prima facie be taken to be duly executed \ becaufe the plaintiff, not knowing who arc the fubfcribing witnefTes, cannot come prepared at the trial to prove the execution of the deed. Therefore an inftruraent, coming out of the hands of the oppofite party, muft be taken to be proved. If indeed there be any fraud in the cafe, the other party will not be precluded from impeaching it. Vi. Rex v. Inhab. of MiddUfoy^ 2 T, R* 41. Mr. Peahey after quoting this cafe, fays, that the redi- tude of the dccifion, as extending to third perfons, into wfaofe hands an indenture may fall, has been doubted by very high autho- rity. There certainly is confiderable difficulty on which ever fide the point is decided, for the party requiring the produdiion may be ignorant who are the fubfcribing witnefTes. On the other hand, the accidental pofTcfTion of the inflrument may be wholly uniiccoin- panied by any knowledge of its authenticity ; but I conceive that the purpofes of juftice will be more frequently anfwered by the admifBon of this evidence, than by its rejedion. According to tlie opinion of Lord Chief Juftice Holt^ in an ano- nymous cafe, 12 Mod. 607. if it is proved that the witneiles to a deed are dead, beyond the feas, or that a party has made flriffc inquiry after them, and oannot hear of them, he fhall be allowed to prove their hands. Ther? are fcveral cafes conneded with tliis propoiltion, which I think it material to notice. In Henley v. PhtllipSy 2 Atk. 48. it is faid, that if witnefies are dead who have attefted a deed, it is not fufficient that you prove the hand-writing, but you muft likewife (hew that they are dead* Where a perfon has lived abroad for fome years, there muft be ftxiBt proof of his death; otherwife, where the witnefs has lived conftantly in England^ from the time of fubfcribing his nahie to the day of his death, there a flight evidence of his death is fuf- ficient, efpecially where the perfon who proves his hand-writing knew him intimately, and fwears that he believes him dead ; in fuch a cafe, the court will not expe£l fuch nicety as that a certifi- cate of his death fiiould be produced. The diftih£lion juft ftated appears to have no foundation in reafon, and is fo far from being oonfonant to aflual pra£lice, that proof is admitted of the hand- writing of an attefting witnefs who is alive, but Out of the kingdom. Where a fubfcribing witnefs became tlie reprefentative of the cre- ditor, proof of the hand-writing was admitted. Godfrey v. Norris^ S/r. 34* Alfo where the witnefs became the reprefentative of the debtor, jifion. cited, x Wms. aSp. So where the witnefs had become blind. Ft. Wood v. Drury^ x Lord Raym. 734. or was renderrd incompetent Namb. XVI.] On the Law of Evidence. xyj incompetent by being convided of forgery. Jones r. Mafw^ Sir. 833. In Barnes y. Trompowjtyi 7 T. R. 2651 proof was giren of the (ignature of the party to a writing, which appeared from the cir-^ cumftances to have been executed at Riga, There was evidence <^ there having been a perfon at Riga, of the name of the attefting wimefs, but no proof of his hand-writing ; and this was ruled to be infufficient. Lord Kenyon (flopping the counfel) faid, << We ought not So fufix:r this point to be. called in queftion; it is too clear for difcuflion. I do not fay^ that proof of the hand^ >vriting of the contra£ling party is not under any circumftances fofficient, where there is a fubfcribing witnefs, as if no imellii- gence can be obtained refpedling the fubfcribing witnefsj after Tcafonable inquiry has been made; but hete the witnefs is a known perfon reGding at Riga. Generally fpeaking, every inftru- ment, whether under feal or not> the execution of which is wit- neflcd, mull be proved in the fame manner, regularly by the witnefs himfelf if living, if dead, by proving his hand-writing, if abroad by fending out a commiflion to examine him, or at leail by proving his hand-writing, which lad indeed is a relaxation of the old rules and admitted only of late years. I remember a eafe alluded to, in the argument of counfel which was tried at Guildhall, where the fubfcribing witnefs having been domiciled in a foreign country. Lord Mansjield admitted evidence to be given of his hand-writing. The opinion was adopted with approbation at the time, on account of the neceflity and convenience of the cafe, and I myfelf have adopted it in cafes which have been tried before me. The fame medium of pr6of has alfp been admitted, in cafes where the fubfcribing witnefs has been fought for and could not be found, fo as to furnifh a prefumption that he was dead. But the rule has never been relaxed further than thefc inftances, and there is neither neceflity nor convenience in doing fo.** In Adam v. Kerr^ I Bof, iff P. 360, a bond was executed in Jamaica \ one of the attclling witneiTes was dead, and his hand- writing was proved ; the court wete of opinion that this was fuf-* ficient proof of the execution, without proving the hand-writing of the other, who was refident abroad, or of the obligor. In Cunliffe v. Sifion, 2 Eafly 183, a bond appeared to be attefted by one Baie^ and by Houghton^ who had fince become interefted, and was one of the plaintiffs. Diligent inquiry was made for Bate, at the place where the obligor and obligee lived* without having been able to obtoin any intelligence of fuch a perfon, who he was, where he had Ihredj or any other circumftances relating to him 1 this^was ru- led tobe a Ai$cient ground for allowing a proof of the hand-v:ylting of 174 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVL of the witnefs, who had become tntereftedy to be a fufficieht proof of the execution. Nothing was faid in this cafe' refpediing tht hand-writing of the obligoK Upon the point deci^ded, Mr. J. Gr^ faid, << I do not fee what the plaintiiTs could have done more than they have } and if they have ufed due diligence without effeQ, that will let them into fecondary evidence : I fonn this opinion with reference to what is daily pafBng in the world. The frequency of written inftruments, in modem times, has made perfons lefs care- ful than tliey ufed to be, in the fele£lion of witnefTcs to their at- teilation. It has occured to me to know that perfons unknown to the parties, fuch ^s waiters at a tavern, have been called in to at^ ted inftruments of the mod important kinds, even wills, where the parties had no previous knowledge of them, nor even were apprifed that they bore the names by which they attefted the execution {a)" In Prince v. Blackburn^ 2 Eaft^ 250, evidence was admitted of the hand-writing of a witnefs, who, at the time of the trial, was out of the jurifdidiion of the court, fo as not to be amenable to the procefa, though it was obje£lted that there was no proof of his being domiciled abroad, and that the indrument being executed in England made a didIn£lion. Where a witnefs to .a bond was intereded ^t the time of hit attedation» and proof was admitted of his hand-writing, the court, on a motion for a new trial, were of opinion, that he could neither be examiilcd himfelf, nor could proof of his hand-writing be fuf- ficient, and that it was not like the cafe of a fubfcribing witnefs, being afterwards appointed executor of the obligee, in which cafe proof of his hand-writing might be given \ but on being further in- formed that the hand-writing of the obligor had been alfo proved, Lord Kenyon faid, that on confideration of all the circumdances, the matter had bed red where it was. Sevire v- Belli %T. R. '^ii, A fubfcribing witnefs having gone to the £ad Indies, and it not appearing, after due inquiry, that he had ever returned, and tlie defendant having admitted the execution of tlie indrument, it was held fufficient to entitle the plaintifFto a verdift. Coghlan v. Wi!» liamfon^ Doug. 93. But where, in order to edabliOi a bankruptcy («) It would certainly be attended with great adTantase, If a fyftem wtre adopted lor haying' deedi authenticated y by the prefeoce of a perfon Invefled with public cbaraAer, cither actcfttng hit own Icnowledge of the identity of tbeyartica, or baviftg it certified oa ok*k\t by aa aft attache^ to the inftmmeat. It has occurred to sncy in practice upon a criminal profecutiooi to fee an inftance of a forged d^ed attefted by an attorney of the higheft refpeftabiliry ; another perfon being introduced to him by the prifoner ai the party to the deed. The varioos queftiona which have occurred refpefting the inquiry for fub- icribing witneiTc^ ftroogly evince the propriety of felcftiAgf aa attefting witnefleSf perfooa •f fettled ffciideocei and cooiidcrable ftatioo in life* againft Numb. XVI.] On the Law of Evidence. 17$ i agaiiift a third perfon, the bankrupt's acknowledgment of a bond was proved, the fubfcribing wltncfs being in England, the court held it infufficient. Attott ▼. Flt^mbe^ Doug. 2i6. In another aftion by affignccs it was proved, in order to flicw an aft of bank- ruptcy, that the defendant had, upon his examination before the conimiifioners, produced and admitted a bill of fale from the bankrupt-, which washcld to be fufficient proof of the deed as againft him. Bo%vUj v. Longwortby, 5 T. R. 366. ' It has fince been held, without adverdng to the preceding cafe, that the defendant's ad- miffipn, in his anfwcr to a bill of difcovery, was not adtfftffibk evidence of the execution of the deed, without laying fome foundap tion for it, by flicwing that inquiry had been made for the fubfcrib- ing witnefs, and that he could not, with due diligence, be met with. It was fuggeited, on the part of the plaintiff, that no know^ ' ledge of the witnefs could be obtained by him ; but the chief Juf- ncc faid, that no one perfon of that name (of whom feveral were fttggcfted in court within reach of inquiry) had been applied to, for the purpofe of knbwing whether he was the fubfcribing wit- nefs. The counfcl for the plaintiff obferved, that the court had always confidered the evidence of the fubfcribing witnefs material, in order that the defendant might have a difclofurc of the circum- ftanccs i but here the defendant had an opportunity, together with his acknowledgment of dating all the accompanying circumftances, and therefore could not be hurt. But Mr. Juftice Le Blanc faid, that did not follow ; a faft may be known to a fubfcribing witnefs, not within the knowledge of the obligor, and he is enabled to avail himfclf of all the knowledge of the fubfcribing witnefs, relative to the tranfaaion. Call v. Duniing^ 4 Eaft^ 53. It feems very dif- ficult, if not impoffiblc, to diftinguilh this cafe from the preceding one of B and fentenced to tranfporta^ tion. Lewe v. Jol^e, i Bi. Rep. 365. A diftinAion has been already referred to, that if a deed is en-» ^ rolled, which needs inrolmcjnt, a copy (hall be received as evt* dencft ; but if it needs no inrolment there, though it be inrolled^ the copy is no evidence. GUb. 97. 99. The fame diftin£iion, i£ {a) I bate* in a fermer note, sd vet ted to the danger of fubfcribini witnefles being im- pofed apodf bT the periooating of parries erith whom they were unacquainted, and to the koefit wl/ich might reiult from a folemn authentication. This expedient woold have tht feitber benefit of dtfpeofieg with the necedity of exuniniog attefUng witadtM, wbieh w:oU olten very much diminiih the expence of litigation. It would alio be condvctre to the istcrefli of juftiee, to eiUbliih a provifion, that no plea (hould be admitted denying tht etnatjon of a deed, without its being accompaoicd by an affidavit of verificatiott, or at ' kail an affidavit of circumftaoccsy Oewing that there waa a real ^ueAioa vpoD tht h& of executioa intended to be tried. Where the qu'eftion of the excctttioa of aa bftmmeot is aot railed by the plcadbg, it might be very ufcfiil ihr the courts to bt latbortsed, by a rule, to icquire a party to admit Vr deny, upoo oath, beibn a conu milfiaDer, the writiogi porpocting to be fuofcribed with his fignature, and for tht admiflioo fobs deencd fofflddat eridosce *. Thcfc alteraCioas ia the law cou^d only be iMndoced If Icgjflaiive autfaoricy, but part of the baoefit above fuggefted is vfithin the teach of tho coarts tbemfelvciy who fftight very beosficially adopt the praAiceof sot allowing any othas fia to be joined to that of i^ ^ frthm^ withoot fpecial reafoas verified by affidavit. • The above idea piifivCid itW to at ia adwrtisg th« pioof s of aeci^tioa, nsodooad by Pm&mt in tho ten. V9L.ii. O correa. 178 APPENDIX. [Nunib-XVI. CGrreQ:, muft apply to the necefllty of proof by witneiTes i but Mr. Juftice Buller obferveSf that the law that a bargain and fale in- rolled may be given in evidence, without proving the execution; but that where a deed needs no inrolment there, though it be en- rolled, the execution of it muft be proved, may well be doubted \ flotwithftanding that deeds of batgain and fale inrolled, have fre- quently, in trials^it niftprius^ been given in evidence without being proved* In fupport of which pra£lice, the cafe of SmartU and Williams^ in i Salk* 280, is much relied upon ; but that cafe is wrong reported, for it appears by 3 Lev. 387, that the acknow- ledgment wa^ by the bargainor, and fo it is ftated in Salh. MSS:\ beCdes, it appears from both books that it was only a term that pafied> and confequently it was no inrolment within the ftatute. If divers perfons leal a deed, and one of them acknowledge it, it may be inrolled, and may ever after be given in evidence as a deed inrolled } but it would be of very mifchievous confequence to fay, that a deed inrolled, upon the acknowledgment of a bare truftee, might be given in evidence againft the real owner of the land, wadiout proving it executed by him. However, that has been the general opinion, Bxii it fecms fortified in fome degree by the ftatute 10 ^nfUf c. 18, which provides, that where any bargain and fale inrolled is pleaded with a profert, tlie party to anfwer fuch profert may produce a copy of the inrolment. On the other hand, it feems abfurd to fay, that a releaje^ which has been inrolled upon the ac- knowledgment of the releafor, fhould not be admitted in evidence ag^nft him, without being proved to be executed, becaufe fuch releafe does not need inrolment; and indeed fuch deeds have often been admitted, and that was the cafe of Stnarile and Wil/iams-y . the deed did not need inrolment, yet being inrolled, on the ac- knowledgment of the bargainer, it was read in evidence againft him^ without being proved. The indorfement of the proper officer is evidence of the inrol- ment of a bargain and fale, or of the aflignment of a duchy leafe, purfuan^ to a provifo. FL Kinnerjlej y, Orpe^ Doug. 56. In cafe of a deed being accidentally cancelled, there are feverai diftinfbions to be found, arifing from the nature and operation of the deed, and of the necefllty for its being offered to the court in •pleading; likewife, refpediing its being dire£ily the point fn xfliie, or only coming in incidentally. I apprehend it may now be juftlj ftated, that all thefe diftinftions are exploded, and that it is an univerfal rule, that fuch an accidental circumftance will in no cafe prejudice a right which has been duly acquired. Whatever objec- tions would exclude the admiffion of a deed thus cancelled, would apply with equal force to the admiflion of collateral or prefump* tiv« Numb. XVI,] On the Law of Evidence. 179 ■ thre evidence, of a deed abfolutely loft : but recent pradice had eftabliihed the admiffion of that evidence beyond the reach pf controverf J. And the courts have, in modem times, fo completely deriated from the ancient ftridnefs, by which there was a failure of juftice, according to the ordinary courfe of law, in the cafe of a deed being loft or deftroyed, as to allow very extenfive rights to be held under the fiflitious authority of deeds and inftniments which never had, nor in truth could ever have, been believed to have had anexiftence, except in the imagination. Such is the nature ofthje prefumpdons, which were examined with fome particularity in the preceding number. The following diftinflions, fiated by Gilbert^ are founded upon a fair analogy, and feem fully applicable to the cafe of a deed can« ceiled by defign. ^ If there be a joint contraA, or obligation, and one of the obligors' feals be torn off, it deftroys the obligation, becaufe they are both bound as one perfon; and if one be difcharged, the other, cannot ftand obliged, becaufe they both make up but one obligor. But if two perfons be bound feverally, there, if the feal of one of the obligors be broken off, yet th^ obligation continues in the other, becaufe there are feveral contraftors and feveral contrails, and dierefore by deftroying the obligation of one of them, the obliga- tion of the other is not taken away. But if two men are bound jointly and feverally, and the feal of one of them is torn off, this is a difcharge to the other; for the manner of the obligation is difcharged by the %(k of the obligee, and therefore that is, accord<» ing to the rule of law that conftrues every man's %€t moft ftrongly againft himfelf, a difcharge of the obligation itfelf^ befides, fince both are jointly bound as one perfon, the perfon difcharging one of them is a difcharge of the whole ; and a fatisfa£lion is fuppofed^ by the very cancelling it, to be given for the whole debt ; and when one man is difcharged who concurs to make an obligor, and the whole debt is fatisfied, no obligation can reft upon the other.'' "With refpe£l to alteration of deeds, the rule has been, that if an alteration has been made by a ftranger, in a point which is not material, it does not avoid the deed; but it is otherwife, if it is altered by a ftranger in a point material, for the witneffes cannot prove it to be the a£l of the party that fealed and delivered it, when there is any material difference from the fenfe of the contraAi but if the contraA dotli contain the fenfe of the parties, the wit- nefles may well fwear it to be their a£i, for an immaterial al^eratioa doth not change the deed, and c6nfequently the witti^ffes may at- teft that very deed without danger of perjury. B^t if the d^eed be altered by the party himfelf, though in a point not ntaterial^ yet it O a will i8o APPENDIX. [Numb-XVL will avoid the dfeed ^ for when the pirty himfelf makes any altera- tion in his own deed, it difcharges the contrad^ for the contre£i hath the whole force from the words of the obligor; now, whea the obligee undertakes to fupply it with new words, and to alter thofe the party hath fixed upon, this is according to the rules of law which ukea every man's own tlQ. moft ftrongly againil him* felf } a new making, and a new framing of the contract, and for a man to contraA with himfelf, is, entirely void and ineffedual. XI Co. 2J. The rule concerning the alteration by a ftranger, in a material part, has been extended to bills of exchange, in the modem cafe of Majler againft Miller^ in which the determination of the King's Bench was confirmed by the Exchequer Chamber. 4 J. R. 320. 2 ff, ^. 141. It was found by fpecial verdict, that the date of the bill had been altered by fome perfon unknown, and the bill was ruled to be thereby utterly vacated. One judge maintained the oppofite opinion, but that one was Mr. Juftice BuUer. And with all the deference which is due to the authority of a folemn adjudi- cation, it is impoflible to read his moft excellent argument upon the occafion without regretting, that what was indifputably the real juftice of the cafe, fhould be facrificed to the application of a technical rule, extended beyond all former precedent, and thativle itfelf rendered difputable in principle, by decifions upon cafes hay- ing a fair analogy in their nature and circumftances. That the rights and obligations of two perfons (hdl not be af- {e£led by the unauthorized condu£l of a third, whether proceeding from folly or from guilt, is a rule which is founded upon the etei- «al principles of juftice. In refped of deeds, the ancient rules of pleading had rendered it neceOary^ that the deed itfelf ihould be formally tendered to die court. If the deed was accidentally loft, or cancelled, the party daiming under it was without a remedy, by the ordinary courfe of law. Thefe rules were not, in their nature, applicable to inftru^ ments not under feal ; at^d the reafons ftated for rendering a deed inefficacious, which has been altered by a ftranger, feem entirely to proceed from the fuppofition of the deed being brought by pro- tctt before the court. In the progrefs of judicial improvement, when it appeared that tlie feals had been torn from a deed by the play of a child, good fenfe was allowed to prevail, and the effe£l of the inftrument was fuf- tatned. In the cafe oi Read 2igm&, Breokman^ 3 T. R* 15 ii di^ fame judges of the Swing's Bench» who decided that in Mt^ff and Miller the bill was vacated, ruled moft properly, that profert of » deed might be difpenfed with, by {bcwisg that it waijoft by umei Numb. XVL3 On the Law ^Evidhice. iSl ' 6mCf or accident. In the cafe oi Bobon v. 7%f Bijhcp^ Carlijle^ 2 HiH. BL 259^ the three forviving judges o? the Common Pleas» who had before concurred in the affirmance oLMafter and Miller^ gave their opinion, which I admit was not eflential to their deciCon, but which ftUl was given in a tnanner entitling it fo judicial auAt>- litj, that an allegation might be allowed, that a deed was cancelled; by the feal being torn off and deftroyedi or loft) and profert made * of the remainder. Lord Ch. Juftice Eyre faid, << That if the deed be deftroyed, God forbid that a man (hould lofe his eftate by loCng iiis title deeds.** Mr. Juftice Gm#/c/.—-^< As to the cancelling a deeds . 4 man's title to his eftate is not deftroyed by the deftru Alon of his. deeds. The cafe where the feal was torn off by tats> muft be in tlie recollection of every one.** Mr. Juftice Heath,^^^ Surely no one will (ay that if deedi (hould happen to be ftolen, therefore the owner (hould lofe his eftate." Mr. Juftice Rocle* — (who came upon the bench fubfequent to the dccifion of MilUr and Mqfier^) . ^ I agree, that a right once vefted is not divcfted by merely can* celling the deed." According to the principles of corre& reafon- ing> it would certainly appear,- that the circumftance of cancelling, which deftroys the very appearance of a deed, or the actual lofs of the deed itfelf, fliould proiluce as extenfive confequences as an alteration: in the writing. There is no reafon why the officiouf- nefs of a firanger (hould induce a greater prejudice than the play«» ing of a child, or the deftru£lion by rats : and every argument is entided to the moft favourable reception, which maintains the c&ntial interefts of right and juftice, in oppofition to diftinAions which are merely technical In their nature, and which are not fully, fupported by the moft imperious authority. That even an immaterial alteration by the party claiming under a deed, or writing, (hould defeat the iuftrument as againft himftdf, d^s not feem objedlionable \ and the rules of evidence can nevofr be imderftood to mean, that the one party can, by altering an in* ftrument, defeat the interefts of the other : where both parties concur in altering a deed, the proteAion of tlie revenue intervenes to prevent its validity, unlefs there is a new ftamp. Where there |re razurcs or interlineations appearing on the deed, it becomes a qu^ion of fad for the jury, whether they were made before or fubfequent to the execution ; and the decifion of that qtie(Uoa muft of courfe depend upon the particular circtunftances of each individual cafe. 03 sect: i8a APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. SECTION VI. Of Evidence of Hand^writing* *Ae proof of hand-writing is a fubjcft ^hich concerns cvcrjr kind of document, that may be adduced in evidence. Gilbert^ in fpeaktng of an indidiment for perjury upon an anfwer in Chancery, obfenres, that the perjury may be illuftrated by the comparifon of hands, which poffibly may be evidence in concurrence with other proof, that out of the anfwer itfelf evince the identity of the perfon. But that the comparifon of hands only, Ihould be a proof in a eri-^ minal profecution, was never law but on]y in the time of king James\ and the diftin£iion has ever been taken, that the eomparifon of hands 16 evidence in civil, and not in criminal cafes. The reafon why the comparifon of hands is allowed to be evidence in civil matters, is, becaufe men are diftingmfhed by their hand-writing as well as by their, faces, for it is very feldom that the (hape of their letters tgree, any more than tlie (hape of their bodies } therefore the com- parifon of hands ferves for a di(lin£iion in civil commerce, for the Ukenefs does induce a prefumption that they are the fame, aiid the prefumption is evidence till the contrary appears. For every pre- fumption that remains unconteftcd hath the force of an evidence ; for light proof on the one fide will outweigh the defect of the proof on the other, but in criminal profecutions the prefumption is in favour of the defendant ; for thus far is to be hoped of all man- kind, that they are fiot guilty in any fuch inflances, and the penalty inhances the prefumption. Now the comparifon of hands is no more than a prefumption, founded only on the likenefs which may eafily fail, becaufe they are very fubjed to be counterfeited ; there- fore, when the comparifon of hands is the only evidence in a cri- minal profecution, there is no more than one prefumption agaif^ another, which weighs nothing. I am not difpofed to conteft the principle, that, in the application of evidence and in weighing its efFe&, a jury, reding upon the ge- neral prefumption of innocence, may, without violating their duty, be more backward in drawing from the premifes before them a conclufion which (hall amount to the eftablifliment of guilt, than they would be hi drawing a conclufion from premifes not more ftrong in the difcuflion of a civil right. But the general rules of law, concerning the admiffion and fufficiency of evidence, and the parricular conclufion which a jury may draw from the evidence before them, in a particular cafe, are two things, which, as I have already more than once obfcrved, whilft they differ moft eflential- ly in their nature and principle, are very fubjefl to be coafoundtd, and Numb. XVIJ On the Law of Evidence. 183 and which, therefore, in erery difcui&on, Ihould be moft carefully kept diftin£l. There feems to be fomething extremely illogical in the remarks which have been cited, as ferving for the foundation of a general rule 'y " for if men are diftinguiflied by their hand -writings as well as their faces, as it is very feldom that the fiiape of their letters agree any more than the (hape of their bodies ;'' the fame reafon which convinces the mind, that a particular writing has come from the hand of a particular perfon, will equally produce that evidence whether the ulterior refult »is of one kind or another. The ade- quacy of evidence in its nature, to afford convi£lion of a particular fad, can never depend upon the efFed): and confequences of the. izA intended to be proved. I conceive that the diftin&ion is ful- ly contradidted by modern authorities. In the cafe of the Attorney General and ie Merchanty which has been already mentioned, it was laid down as a general propofition, (without any thing to con- fine it to the fubje£): matter immediately under confideration,) that the rule of evidence in civil and in criminal cafes is the fame ; the particular queftion which led Gilbert to the difcufEon of the gene- ral topic, has produced a determination dire£Uy oppoGte to the doSrine which he fuggeits ; for in The King againft Morrisy 2 Bur* 1189, upon an indi£tment for perjury, in an anfwer in Chancery, proof of the hand-writing of the defendant, and the atteftation of the jurat by the proper officer, were ruled to be fufficient evidence of the anfwer being a Aually fwom, fo far at leafl as to put it on him, to (hew or to raife a probable prefumption that he was per- fonated. In the cafe of high treafon, comparifon of hands is not fufficient for the original foundation of an attainder, becaufe there muft be fogie overt ad, and writing is not an overt zGt ; but it may be ufed as in circumftantial and confirmatory evidence, if the fa£l be othcrwife proved. Rex v. Henfeyy 1 Bur. 664. And in any other, criminal profecution, it will be evidence the fame as in a civil fuit, as on an indi£lment for writing a ti; which may be lefcnxd to as oootaimng an ac* curate view of the exifting law upon the fubjeA. EagletM ▼• Kiug-^ pnt 8 K(/l 4^8, and the pra&ice of the law feems to be cleariy iet« tledi that the cafual Icnowkdge or belief of a perfon, who has once feen a witnefs write, and fpeaks from the e0c£b of that incident upon his memory, in refped to the chara£ler of the writing, is ad- miffible^ and a fufficient foundation for reading the difputed paper ; but that a dire£t comparifon with the greateft poflible number of authentic papers, indicating the fimilarity to the moft obvious in« fpedion, and confirmed by the jmoft critical fcrutiny, is wholly in*- admiffiblr. But where, in point of reafon, is the objeQion to a proof by com-* paiifon of hands, as founded upon an infpedion at the trial ? It will furely be admitted that the real objeQ is the inreftigatfbn of truth, and by the indifcriminate reje£lion of a means of eftabUihing the truth, which in many inftauces muft be more convincing dian the evidence actually received, there is a frequent rilk of the failurs of jafilce* Every danger which may vefult from the cafe of forgery^ muft operate at leaft vrttfa equal force, when the deception is aided^ by the comparifon being made, not with the immediate ob|e& of the fenfcs, where the erroneous imprefiions of oneperfon may be cor* reded by the more accurate infpedi<^ of anotlier, but with the traces in the memory, the errors and imperfcdions of which are beyond tlie reach of fcrutiny. What is the common evidence of knowledge but an ad of comparifon ; a comparifbn of the objed: prtfeoted to the fi^t, with the objed imprinted by memory in the mind, with the image and copy of the fuppofed reality ? And when the comparifon is made not with this imperfe& and fallaci* •us copy, but with an indifputed origin^, applied widh Ae fkill and experience of perfons habitually devoted to fimilar inquiries, it is deemed not only a matter of technical caution^ but an eflential point of conftitutional liberty, to rejedt the aiSftance which it may be naturally expe£ted to afford* An expert of the moft ae* curate i86 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. curate talents, comparing the chara£lers of the admitted writing of an individual, through a continued feries of years, with the cha- racter of a difputed piece, cannot be heard to offer his opinion, whilft the knowledge and familiarity that the mind may be fup- pofe to have acquired, from the previous perufal of thofe very writings, or even from the cafual infpe£^ion of a fingle ad, is re- ceived and z€ttd upon without objection. I have known the ad- miilion of this evidence carried fo far, as for an attorney, after the failure of other attempts, to ftand up and fwear to a know- ledge of the writing of the oppofite party, from having once looked over his fhoulder when writing a letter at an alehoufe {a), I have purpofely dated extreme degrees, becaufe by thefe the cha- TtL&cx of ar propofition is moft diftinCily {hewn, and in the admif* fibility of evidence, the law allows no latitude of difciwtion. SECTION VII. (y* Writings inferior to Deeds. it does not occur to me to be neceflary to make any general obfervations refpe£ling writings inferior to deeds, having in a pre- ceding fe£lion pointed out the diftinguifliing charaCler of deeds, as conftituting or difcharging obligations propria vigore, whilfl writ- ings of an inferior nature are only the evidence of a contrad, which, in its nature and quality, is not of higher rank than if it was merely verbal or of a matter of fa£l : the peculiar charadier of bills of exchange, andpromiffory notes, does not fall within the purpofe of the prefent examination. The rules laid down, with refpe£^ to the evidence of deeds, are equally applicable to other inilruments with rttpeSt to the neceffity of producing the original, or, in cafe of its non-produa- tions fupplytng the omiflions by the bed inferior evidence, and the whole of the fyftem eftablifhed refpefling the examination of fub- fcribing witnefles, is equally applicable to other inftrumentSi but it may be proper to take notice as toithe iirft of thefe fubjeds, that duplicates of notices, ferved upon any perfon, are in general regarded as equally original, with the copies adually delivered. In other cafes, a notice to produce the original muft be given to the party intended to be charged with it, or affe&ed by it, in cafe it is or ought to be in his pofleffion. Where the terms of an agreement are reduced into writing at the time^ as evidence of the ft («) Lsncajler Summtfr Affixes, 1799 ; bat it 11 proper to add, chat the fame judge wba allowed the reception of kbia evidence, made (bme obferratioaa upon it which decided the fiite of its credibility. agrccmeat, Numb. XVI.3 On the Law tf Evidence. 1 87 agreement, the "writing mud be produced, and muljk have the proper ftamp, and no parol evidence of the agreement can be admit* ted ; but when there is written evidence of a matter of hSt, as a receipt for a fum of money, proof may be given of the h€t of payroenti or of a diftin^ verbal acknowledgment, as was iliewn in /. 2yfupra, The preceding feflion, refpcAing the proof of writing, is alfo of general application.} and in point of fa<^, the fubje£l to which it re- fers is of much more frequent application in other cafes, than in verifying the fignatures of deeds. Upon the evidence of books of account, there is, in many refpeAsy a conGderable affinity between the dodrine dated in the text of Pothier^ and the praAice of the Englijb law. The do^rine of fcmiproofs, by which a perfoh may obtain a decifion in his favour, by the teftimony of his books, confirmed by his own fuppletory oath, has not with us any kind of application. A perfon can in no cafe require his own books to be received as evidence in his favour ; but if the other party refufes to call for them, and the party himfelf is willing that they (hould be produced, it will fometimes lead to pretty ftrong inferences in the mind of a jury, with rcfpe£l to the veracity and efFed of other evidence. One party has no right to compel the other to produce his books y but if notice is given for thatpurpofe, and they are not produced accordingly, not only may verbal evidence be given of their con- tents, but the mere refuf^ to produce them will always be con- fidered as a very ftrong pfefumption of their contents being un- favourable. A perfon who requires the production of books belonging to an« other, muft make his eledion whether they (hall be received as evidence; he has not aright iirft to infpe^i them, and then ufe them or not according to his difcretion. Being admitted, their whole contents muft. be allowbd as evidence \ but that, as was be- fore obferved concerning other written evidence, does not necei^ farily conclude the veracity of their entire contents. A party can- not make any diftin£tion with refpe^ to what part (hall be received^ but a jury may diftinguifli with refpe£l to matters of credit, and admit one part whilft they difallow the other \ but without fome circumftances to induce a particular fufpicion, it is unreafonable thatfuch diftin£lions flipuld take place. 'Ihc following is a note of feveral cafes, which have occurred refpefling the admiffion of different pieces of written evidence. " Where the draymen came every night to the clerk of a brew- houfe, and gave hin\ an account of the beer delivered, which he fet / *>» N iS9 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVI. fct clown in a book kept for that purpofe, to which the draymen fet their hand5» and the drayman was deads the book m^ith hb hand fct to it was h^ld good evidence of a delivery. Price v. Lird Torringtont i 8a/L 285. So, a fhop book was allowed for evidence : /t being proved that the fervant that writ the book was dead, and that this was his hand, and he accuftomed to make the entries. Pitman v* MadJex^ 2 Sali. 690. But where the plaintiff, to prove a delivery, produced a book which belonged to his cooper, who was dead, but his name fet to feveral articles as delivered to the de- fendant, and a witnefs was ready to prove hb hand. Lord Ch; Jfuftice Raymond would not allow it, fayitig^ it differed from Lord Xorringt^s cafe, becaufe there the witi^fs faw the drayman fign the bpok every night. Clerk v. Bradjhrd, M. 5 Geo. a. Upon irn ifluc out of Chancery, to try whether eight parcels of Hud/on* j )Say Stock, bought in the name of Mr. Lake^ were in truft for Sir Stephen Evans ^ his afiignees (the plainti^s) (hewed firft, that thcfe Vas no entry in the books of Mr. Lahe^ relative to this tranfa^lion. Secondly, fix of die receipts were in the hands of Sir S. E. and there was a reference on the back of them, by his book-keeper, to the book B. B.y of Sir S. E. Thirdly, the book-keeper was proved to be dead, and upon this the queftion was, whether the book of .Sir S, jB. referred to, in which was an entry of the payment of the money, (hould be read ? And the Court of King's Bench, at a trial at bar, admitted it not only as to the fix, but likewife as to the other two, in the hands of Sir B. JL., fon of Mr. Lah, And xn'^marth v. Wilhams^ cited by hord , Hard^chp in Montgomery v. Turner^ ^IS^f ^ fcrivener's book of accountSi the fcrivener being dead, was holden good evidence of payment. Buff. N. P* 282, 283*. In Searlc v. Lord Barrington, 2 Sir. 807. A Lord Raym. 1370. i Mod. 278, 3 Br. P. Cj 535, die court were of opinion, that an indorfement by the obligee, of a bond of payment of intereft, was good evidence to encounter the prefump tion of payment, arifing from length of time, and ought to hive been left to the jury, for they might have rcafon to believe it was {tone with the privity of the obligor ; and the conftant pra£Hce is for the obligee to indorfe the payment of mtereft ; and that, for the' fake of the obiigor, who is fafer by taking fuch an indorfement {han by taking a lopfe receipt ; and the judgment given upon fuch evidence, was, on a bill of exceptions, affirmed in parliament i buf !n Turner V. Crifp^ HiL 13 Geo, 2. the Chief Jbftice refufed to let the indorfement of the receipt of part of the money, {t^ cured by a bond which was made after the prefumpdon had attathed, be given in evidence. 2 Str. 827. .The debt book ol 4n srttorney, long fince deceafed, where he charges 32/. for fufier- ing K«mb. X VL j On the Law $/ EvUenu. ^ i ing a Tccoveryi two articles of which were for drawing and ibgroC* ^ fing the fuirenderof a tenant for life, and which bill appealed- by *. the book tb have been paid, was held admiffible evidence of Attc having been fuch a furrender. Warren v, Grtnvtik, 2 &r. ria^ : A bill of parcels, and receipt of a merchant abroad, was adrnktisd ^ to prove the plaintiff^s intereft in a cargo againft the infurer« Rnf^ '^ ft! V. Scheme, 2 Str^.i 117. A paper in the hand*writing of a te& : tator, containing a lift of bank notes found in his pofleffion at or/ before his death, was held, by. Lord HardRmche^ inadmiiBble tfli : prove his property in thofe notes \ but he fent the cafe to be tried: at law, obferving that Uie rules of evidence in general are the fiiino*' in both courts as to matters of fa&. Glyn v. BatA cf 'Mngkmif 2 Vtf, 38. Entries of a deceafcd fteward in a common day-book^* containing variety of matters, relative to his difierent employers, of; money paid by perfons for trefpafs on a particular p)ii6s, mk account of one of thofe employers, were held admiffible fvidefice,- in an adion relative to the right of fuch employer to the place in qneftion, as they would have been evidence to charge Udifdf wUi. die receipt of the money. Barrj v. BMingtpft^ 4 T, R, 414. Aa cntr^ by the church-wardens of A. in their accounts, ftiting tile- receipt of a fum of money from the chapelry of :5., who that year difputed their ancient cuftom ; but after being fued had paid it, and l/. for cods, and the following writing at the head of the fame page : ** It is an ancient cuftom thus to apportion our poor lay^ B. to pay one fifth, &c." was held good evidence of the cuftom^ die one entry as it charged the officers with the receipt of oMney, and the . other as referring to and explaining that \ and Lord Kenym, faid, that even without that reference, he did not fee any ebjedion to admitting the fecond entry as evidence /r^/ri^ vigvtfg becaufe ufages relating to pariflies muft be got out of the. pariflt books } it is like the inftance of court rolls, which are frequently admitted in evidence, tliough they jfkO: the rights of third peribns« However, it was not necefiary to decide upon that ground, though he had a ftrong opinion of it. Stead v. Heaton^ 4 T» R- 66^ On t queftion refpc£ting the identity of a place, the coals under which^ and alio a rent ifluingout of it, belonged to one of the parties un« der difitrent titles, the entry in the book of a perfon under whom the patty claimed the rent, but not the coals (which were i9ie fub^ jeft in difpute), of receiving the rent for a particular place, was held inadmiffible evidence ^ for, by Loxd XMnyon, what ono man does in his doiet ought not tga^fed tho rights of third perfons^ iliere is only one inftance in which diis is aUowec^ namely^ tho books of m incumbent rei|>e£tinf txthesi whsdi may be evidence for bis fuc<* ceilb?. igo' APPENDIX. [Numb. XVL csflbr, but that has always been confidered an excepted cafe. Out^ ram v. Marnvoody 5 7. /!^. 1 2 1 . In reviewing the preceding cafes, there are fome which appear to be founded upon rather difputable principles. The cafe of the draymen figning the entry, and the ftiil (Iranger cafe of the ihop booki are inftances of perfons being afiefled by eyidencp made behind their back, with intent to prefenre a charge againft them, and which they had no opportunity to crofs-examine. If the drayman and the clerk had told another perfon, that fuch circumftances had pafled, and that perfon had immediately made a minute of it in writing, it will not be fuppofed that a depofition, confiftitig ulti* matcly of fuch hcarfay evidence, would be allowed. If one man writes down that he faw a given zGt done, would the parties to that a£l be allowed to be affefied by fuch* a minute, any more than by a hearfay declaration ? Would his fignature make the evi- 4ence any better ? And is there any fubftantial difference, in this refpcA, between a ftranger who obferves a tranfa^lion, and a per- fon who is an inftrument in it, and who is only from neceflity al- lowed to be a competent witnefs, having himfelf a degree of in- tereft in the fubjed. When a broker is agent for both parties, his minutes, which are part of the res gtji^y would fall under a very difierent confideration. The cafe of Lord Barrington was founded upon very fpjund teaibning ; at the time of making the entry (which, it is an admit- tjcd fad:, was before the prefumptiori had attached) &erle could have no undue motive -, the purpofe was merely to indicate a dif- charge. The bond itfelf would be perfe£t evidence of his claim ; but in the cafe wiiich immediately followed, it was not thought that a perfon whofe right, if adverfely contefted, was at an end, could revive it by any a£^ of his own. Having no legal claim to xoo/. he could not found a right to 90/., by giving credit for 10/. Barry and Bebbtngton certainly went abundantly far, where a fteward, by charging himfelf to his employer with the receipt of a fmall fum of money, was allowed to charge a third perfon with the admiflion of a right. But Stead and Heaton feems to be dire£ily repugnant to the cafe, in which the receipt of part of the money on the bond, after the prefumption had attached, was dif- allowed \ for though, to a /mall extent, the entry made by perfons interefted had a tendency to charge themfelves, it, to a much greater extent, had a tendency to induce a charge in their favour againft the perfons to whom it related. It was preferved and recorded * as evidence of the fubmiffion to a difputed right. The general cffeA and objcA of it were to fubftantiate that right in themfelves. And if one public body (hall not be allowed to charge another public Numb. XVI*]] On tie Law of Evidence. igt public body by their entry of a debt, it would be abfurd to let them obviate the objedion, by fubjoining the entry of a partial pajrment amounting to a recognition. If the perfons who made the entry had appeared as witnefies to prove the hCt, retaining the fame chara£ler of inhabitancy, they would have been i^jeded as interefted. Their death was allowed to give a weight to that as written evidence, which as oral teftimony could not have been allowed ; contrary to one of the mod eflential rules upon the fub- ]t&, they were admitted to make evidence for themfelves. As to tatrics in public books regularly and periodically kept, and per- kCtlj free from all the imputations, which occur to an entry of fuch a nature as has lad been confidered, their charadier is fo mz* tcrially different, that the eftablifhing a propofitlpn refpe£ling the one cannot fairly induce a material argument to ztkSt the other. The particular exceptions from the rules of evidence in general^ which apply to cafes of pedigree, and fome other fubje&s, being equally coniie£ipd with written and with hearfay evidence, the confideration of them is at prefent deferred. SECTION, vni- Of tie Statute of Frauds. The advantages which refult from fully and explicitly ilating in writing, the obje& and terms of any civil tranfa£lion, are fo obvi- ous and confiderable, that almoft every fyilem of jurifprudence manifefts a decided preference to written memorials over verbal reprefentations, in evidencing the occurrences of focial in* tercourfe. The death of witnefles, the imperfections of their memory, their mifconception, and fomctimes their wilful mifreprcfentations of the communications, which they are called upon toteftify, are pro- dudive of inconveniences which are ftrongly contrafted by .the introduAion of authentic monuments, in which the intention of the parties is fuppofed to fpeak for itfelf, and which are not to be afieAed either by the artful glofTes, the inaccurate perceptions, or the natural infirmities, of cafual obfervers. This general obferva- tioii may be applied, with particular force, to the advantage oi^ eftablifhing a criterion for diftinguiihing between a£ts which are confummated by a mutual intention, conclufively fixed and deter- mined, and a£ls of inchoate and preliminary Gommunication ; be- tween the contraAing an obligatory engagement^ and thq making a^ cafual >94 APPENDIX. CNairf).XVI. oafual inttfiution or fuggeftion. The (amc effed is in a conGder* able degree produced, by the ufe of known eftabli&ed tokens, which may eafiiy and generally be underftood, as marking a fettled and certain ctetermination j but whiJft theiie are free from the dangers of nufconception, they leave the fubje£l expofed to the cafualties of time ; and confequently are inferior in their utility to the per- manent evidence of an authentic writing. In all cafes, therefore, where, the nature of the fubje£l indicates a probability, that a know- ledge of the circumftances may be important at a diftant period, it is matter of utility not only to (hew a preference to the tefti-^ mpny of wridng, but to render it an eflential requifite. There b alfo a material diSerence in refpe^ to the danger of msirepreientation, between obligations founded merely upon acorn* munication of intention, without the intervention of any pofitive a£ts, fuch as a contra£^ for the fale of goods, to be delivered at a future period, and tbofe which arife from a matter of fa£b, that has a£laally intervened, as the loan of a horfe* From thefe confiderations, inftitutions of pofitive' regulation hare been eftablifhed in different countries, for afcertaining the eiiSi* ence of agreements, intended to be obligatory upon the parties between whom they intervene ; and although the regulations, thus framed, are often neglected by an injudicious confidence which operates to the detriment of individuals, and the advantage which is taken of tliem is too frequently in oppofition to the principles of integrity, they are, in their general operation, of confidence benefit to the community. In the forming fyftems for the purpofe, while the advantages^ above referred to are properly eftimated, the inconvenience of fad- ing the ordinary occurrences of life with an unnecefiary incum- brance, (hould not be entirely left out of the confideration ; and while it may be proper to require that fo important an objcd, as a (tontraft for tlie future purchafe of a confiderable eftate, (hall be authenticated by writing, there M'ould apparently be but little utility in prefcribing a Gmilar requifite, in order to compel a per* foh to return a watch that he had borrowed, or pay for one which he had purchafed and received. The FrfMb ordonnance, which is the fubjedi of the text in Pe» tbieTf that has occafioned thefe obfervations, feems to have laid rather too great a ftrefs upon the firft of thefe -confiderations, with- out paying fufficient regard to the other ; and it is evident that the txclttfion of all proof refpeding matters of fad, arifing upon con- trz€t% where the bbjefl exceeds fo inconfideraUc an amount as 100 fivres, a little more than 4/. mufl: often occafioa a failure o( jufluce, efpecisAy when it is carried fo hx as in the cafe adduced, ef 8 * preventing I^Tumb. XVI.3 On the Law of Evidence. 1 93 m 0 preventing a man from recovering the goods which he had depofit- ed in the cuftody of a friend. The flatute of frauds, 29 Ch. a. c, 3, which, with feveral other regulations, unconnefted with the prefent inquiry, introduces a fyftem founded upon an analogous principle, and I think was moft probably fuggcftcd by the French ordonnance, is free from this Imputation : for, while it excludes in feveral cafes, a proof by oral teftimony, with refpef^ to matters of mere agreement, in their na^ ture liable to mifreprefentation, it leaves untouched the evidence which is founded upon matters oiizGi \ and in refpc£^ to the moft ordinary contra£l. of fociety, the fale of goods, it admits the full completion of a mutual obligatory intention, to be evidenced by other tokens than a written agreement. This ftatute (many parts of which are by no means penned with technical accuracy,) has been alternately the fubjc£l of panegyric^ ind reprehenfion } Lord Kenyon always fpoke of it in terms of commendation \ with Lord Mansfield \\ appears to have been by no means a favourite. ,It has certainly given rife to more contelled queftions than any ftatute in the book, except that refpe£l{ng the fetdements of the poor \ and the Honourable Dairies Sarrington, many years ago remarked, in his obfervations on the (latutes, that the explanation of it had not been attended with a fmallcr expencc tban 1 00,000/. A great part of tliis expence, however, may per* haps not be fo juftly imputed to the framers of the ftatute, as to the adminiftration of it, upon a principle of relaxed conftru£lion. . Both the ftatute, and the ordonnance have, in their expoiition been regarded, as rendering the compliance with their provifions r4tber a neceftary evidence of the contracts to which they refer, than as aa eflential and conftituent part of the contracts themfelves^ and exceptions have therefore been admitted, where the want of this evidence has been fupplied by the judicial acknowledgment of the parties (a). To proceed, after perhaps an unncceflary length of preface, to the provifions of the ftatute itfelf, fo far as they are conne^ed with the prefent obje£^ ; it is enabled that all interefts in land, created by parol only, and not put in writing, and figned by the parties creating the fame, or their agents lawfully authorifed in writing, fhall only have the force of leafes at will, f, i. except leafes not exceeding the term of three years from the making thereof, whereupon the rent referved fhall amount to at leaft two thirds of the annual value, f. %. And that no a£tion (hall be brought to charge any executor, or adminiftrator with damages («] Sec tfacprcc«4iQg Tre«t»feyNo. 15, uU Koct. Vol. IL P out 194 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. out of his own cftate, or to charge the defendantiupon any fpecial promife, to anfwcr for the debt, default or mifcaniage of another pcrfon ) or to charge any perfon upon any agreement, made in con- Cderation of marriage, or upon any contrafl: or falc of lands, or any intereft in them, or upon any agreement not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, unlefs the agreement upon which fuch aQion is brought, or fome note or memorandum thereof (hali be made in writing, and figned by the party to be charged, or fome other perfon by him lawfully authorifod,/ 3. In the expoGtion of thefe claufes, feveral exceptions have been introduced, where the objeft and efFedl of the ftatute feemed to be otherwifc fufficiently fecured 5 when the agreement was in a fuit in equity admitted to be made, it was held that there could be no danger of fraud or perjury in carrying it into execution *, and therefore the performance of it w^s fpecifically decreed, unlefs the ftatute was fpecially pleaded and relied upon as a bar. In recent cafes, the Court of Chancery has fliewn a difpofition to be lcf$ ftrift, with regard to the mode of taking advantage of the (latnte, and it feems to be the prevalent opinion, that it is fufficient to chim the benefit of the (latute in the anfwer ^ but the point is not ab« folutely fettled. In cafe a defendant does not claim this benefit, in his anfwer to an original bill, he will not be allowed it by mak- ing fuch claim in anfwer to an amended bill. See Cootb v. Jack' /on, 6 Fff, I a, and the cafes there cited. Spurrier v. Fitzgerald^ ib. 548. If the defendant denies that any parol agreement ever took place, a court of equity will not inquire into the truth of that denial, Ccotb v. Jaclfon^ ub^fup. Where the agreement has been in part performed, and. is fuffici- ently eftablifhed, the ftatute is in equity deemed not to apply {a) ; but a£ls alleged to conditute a partial performance, mud appear to . («) In Ftfier v. H«/<, j Ftf, 71 a. Sir A. P. Ardin^ Mafter of the RoUi, intimated it it hit pptnton that the couit had gone jraiher too far in permitting part* performance and other circumftancei, to take cafes out of the ftatute, and then unavoidably perkapii after cftabliflking the agreement, to permit parol evidence of the content! of that agreement. At to part- pet formance, it might be evidence of fome agreement but of what muft be left to parol evidence. He always thought the court went a grtat way. They ought not t» have held it evidence of an unknown agreerociit, but to have had the money laid out re* paid* It ought to have been a coxnpenfation. Thofe cafei are very diHatiifa^lory ; it «« very right to fay the ftjtute (hould not be an engine of fraud, therefot, compenfatioA would have been very proper. They have therefore gone forther* fayingy it wai clear there wM rpme agreement and letting them piote it ; but how doea the circumftance, of a man hnvioglald out a great deal of money, prove that he is to have a leafe for 99 yeari? The common fenfe of the thing would have been to let them bring an afiion for the 2Q0i}ey,.^In a former cafe Lord Latt^hkotouiB faid, iht bent of hit mind waa ibongiy ia favour of the wifdom of the ftatute, and therefore he wm ftrohgly agiuift ill tbe cafei which had iotrcfiched upcn U. Mtrtimtr t. Onktfdp % Vef, Jun^^ 943. have Numb* X VIO On the Law cf Evidence. 195 have been done on account of the agreement. What ads {hall or {hall not be confidered, as amounting to fuch a partial performance, has been the fubje£l of confiderable difcuiSon ; the general refult of which I (hall (late in the language of Mr. Fwhlattque. << The general role is that the z€ls muft be fuch as could be done with no other newordefign than to perform the agreementi and not fuch as are merely introdudory or aticillary to it. The giving of pofTeffion is therefore to be confidered as an zfk of part-performance, but giving, diredions for conveyances, and going to view the^eftate, are not \ payment of money is a2fo faid to be an a£l of part^performance. But it feems that payment of a fum by way of eameft is not (a). Thea£l of marriage is not, in itfelf, fufficient to difpenfe withany promife, in confideration of fuch marriage being in writing \ the oppofite conftru£lion would neceflarily be a repeal of the ilatute, becaufe a marriage niuft ad:ually take place before the ftatute can apply. I am not aware that there are any dired authorities to ihew that diis partial performance can be taken advantage of in a court of law. It may be contended, that the pra£iice adopted upon the fub- jed is founded upon circumftances peculiar to the power of courts of equity, in awarding a fpecific performance, though there are incidental opinions to the contrary (^). The (tf) Siocc wriciog the aboTC it vas held by Lord Lwikhprar^hf that paying iive gulocat In fan of one hundred gutneai to bind the bargain , and in part of tbe purchafs money^ vu not a part*ptrforinance to take a coDtr%dt oat of tbe Aatute. Main v. MUbomrny 4 Vtf. 7S0 1 and m a recent cafr, it wai ruled by the Mafttr of the rolls, |b«t a parcbaier of ID eftiic by n£Uon, did not, by paying part of the aodion duty* pttrfaant tu tbe conditions of i£Lt^ ]olc the {>eaefit of the flatute. Buekmafttr v. H^mf^ 7 VfJ, 34 u He obfervci further* that " even if t|^e payment of the puicbafe money could be confideted aa-part of the piicCy he 4id not fee how that could bind the ptticha^cr. In general, the party feekiog parfteautocei unifl ihew a pcrformaoce on his fidci at • rcafon tat the interterence of tht r4iartia.hia&foar} for the ground upon which the court a£tt ii, frayd, in refufing to pcfform ftfsir pcrfbnnance by tbe other p>rty. In Lewn t. Mirem^^ 3 ^A, tbe pmchafer had pei^Tcoaiiderablc pnrt of the purchafc moncyi acd therefore it was a fraud to refult perfBrmaoce in tbe other fide. In JFIa/ey ▼. Sagennttf 6 Brt. JP. C. 4 5, which being be» £srr the Houfe of Lords, muft fuperfcde the suthoriiy of every other cafe» it was h«Jd that the aat 4aoe by the defeodant* did oot entitle the plaintiff to have the ;|freement fpccifieal- ty perfeffDed.** It anft howtrer be dear that an a£^ done, merely by oat parry, cannot gWe him a title agaiaft the ether s and whercTcr fuch aA does induce a right, the concurrence, encourage- ment, or ar^iHcfcence of the other patty, moft be nccefftrily fuppofed. *(^) la Bf9eit ▼. St, Tma^ 1 V^. Jmm. 333. Mr. Juftiee amlUr^ ftttfng for the Lord ChancaOer ftld, dmt as to pert- performance, courts of law have' lately adapted the lameibrtof rcafontBg that preveils in coortb of equ'ty, that there can be b«t one tnie eenfttnaioo of the ftatote of firaods \ whatever it k, it ought c^nally to hold in courts of laWyMiiora^lty, aoddnltfll id fettled Iceqnity, that part. peribrmanceukei it out ef the ftaiBie, equity wiH not decree upon it, Ayl'ffcv. Tracy^ 2 P. Wmt. 65, neithcrwill equity decree apor- ^on upon a promife in a letter, if the defendant appear in tlie fame ictter to haye endeavoured ;o prevent the marri^e, tliough he was afterwards prefent at it. Douglas v. Vincent , 2 Vcrn, 20%. It is a queftion whether courts of equity will decree an agreement, en^ tered into by letter^ if a deed appear to have been aftemi^ards frani* ed, (but no^ executed) varying tlie terms exprefled in that letter, or if the terms be varied, by a didinA fubfequent parol agreement, partly carried into execution (^). ^ In a very late cafe before the Court of King's I3ench, it was held, that a promife in writing to pay tlie debt of another was not fuffi- inent, as if did no(fts|e the plaintifTs forbearance, which wa^ thecon«p fideration of it ; fince ^e ftatute require; the agreement (not merely ^ promife) y or fome npte or memorandum of it, to b^ in writing \ pA the agreemeiit is that whij:h e;M^h party is to do . or perform^ and by which both parties are to be bound \ for without the pa^ pa evid^ce» the defendant cannot be charged upon the written eontraiA, for vant of a conCderation in la^ ^ fupport it \ and ^ effed of the parol evidence is to make him liable, when the ihtute wa^ |>afled with the very intent of avoiding fuch a charge^ by requiri^ig that the agreement, by which mud be underftood the whole agreement, (hoi^d be ii> writing. Wain v. Walter^ 5 fiaft^ jo- lt has been held to be a fuflicient figning, if a perfon knowing the content^ of a deed, fign it as witnefs only. 3 Atk^ 503. {a) VuU foManfUi^ B. |. c. 3* f. lo. The mere perufing and altering a draft, or putting a deed into a foHcitor's hands, to prepare a conveyance, is not fufficient to di(t penfe with thb (ignature of the party, Hatvkins v. Holmes^ i P. Wms, 770. Redding y. Wilkes, 3 Bro. Ch. 400. In a late cafe it was CQnfended, that a perfon by writing loofe inftruflions for a lormal contra£t, comprizing his own name, as << Mr. St^s, to re- pair, tcc^ anfounted to a fufficient fignature: It was properly held^ that the fignature required by the ftatute, was to have the eflfed of girittg authenticity to the whole inftrument \ and where the name (4) A pxrol vadttaoa to a written asveemfary cannot be enforcfd in eg feity, C^ht v* aUjfcaU^ % Pkrm. 34* In USt fuch a fubfequent as^v^^n' *• <*<>< 'c^* within tht objed^ * Wibcftauite, ifaaa an original agreement ; and the (ame rule wiih n(^6k to part per^- ftiiuoce, or other drcnmftancci preventing the operation of the ibtute, ought eqoalljr co^ be applied iai tho one calb and ta the other. See R»hJo/i r. CtHutif 7 Ft/, 1309 and ths Aaat kBkm of chia Afptndix. {i) This it contiary to the fpirit of the dccifion In Sfktt v. Mot, infra , and I think aUl contrary to the principk of the ftatute, P 3 ^'at 198 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVI. was inferted in fuch a manner as to hare that effefb, it did not much fignify in what part of the inftrument it was to be found. But it could not be imagined that the name inferted in the body of an inftrument, and applicable to particular purpofes, could amount to fuch an authentieation as the ftatute required. Stoiej V. Moorff Co9^s I P. Wms. 770. n. A perfon who has himfclf figned an agreement cannot objefi that it was not figned by the other party, a$ is clearly fettled by a feries of cafes from Hatton v. Grajy 2 Ch. Ca. 164. to Sekn V. Slatky 7 Vif. 265. This is a ftrong iUuftration of the principle, that the writing required by the ftatute is only the evidence, and not the eflence of the contra£l \ for it is an eftablifhed rule that reciprocal contrails are not obligatoryt unlefs both parties are equally bound. . In Sttmn v. Metiviert i BL 599.3 Burr* 192 1» an opimon was intia» mated in general terms, that the ftatute did not extend to iales by au£lion,but the cafe related to a fale of goods, theptovifioa refpe£liiig which will be ftated in a fubfequent paragraph \ and it is now fettled that no fuch exception can be made with refped to land, and that the agent of the feller writing, does not prevent the opera* tion of the ftatute. See Walker v. Con^aiU, i Bof. & Pul. 306. Buckmafter v. Harrop^ 7 Vef. 341. In regard to the provifion, that all leafes of lands for a longer term than three years, fhall only have the efieA of eftates at vfUl\ It has been held that, as eftates at will are now only notional, and the payment of an annual rent conftitutes a tenancy from year to year ; the fame tStd fhall be given to agreements for leafes, which cannot operate to their full extent in confequence of the ftatute. Vid. Clayton v. Blakejy 8 J. iS. 3. It has been alfo held that the other parts of the agreement, fuch as the amount of the rent, the days of entry, the liability to taxes and repairs, (hall be applied to fuch tenancy from year to year. Doe dern. Rigg v* Bell^ j T. R. 471. The provifion refpe£ling agreements not to be performed within a year, does not extend to thofe which depend upon fome uncer- tain event, which may or may not happen within that time, as death, marriage, the arrival of a fhip \ but only to fi|ch Us in their nature and creation, are necefTarily to be poftponed to a more dif- tant period. jfpion. i SalL a8o. Smitb v. WeHaU^ i Ld. Rajtn. 316. Pent on \. EmblerSy 3 Burr. 1278. The dccifions refpe£ling the liability of a perfon toanfwcrfor the debt, default, or mifcariage of another, have drawn the line between undertakings as a principal, and as a furety \ and which are denoted by the terms original and collateral undertakings. Wjbere the whole obligation is confined to the perfon making the I promife, Numb. XVI.3 On the Law tf Evidence. 1 99 promifc, though in rcfpc£t of the benefit to another perfon ; as if I diTc€t a tradefman to furniih goods to my friend^ and place them wholly to my account, the ftatute does not attach. Bourhnnire V. Darnell^ I &i/i. 27 \ but where the undertaking is only for better fecurity 5 as a promife, that if the tradefman will furnifti him with the goods, if he does not^ pay for them I will, it is void \ it being clearly fettled, that if the perfon for wbofe benefit the contra^ is made, is anfwerable at all, the other is wholly exempt ; whether the promife is before or after the delivery of the goods, is perfe£ily immaterial. See Maffon v. Wbaram, 2 T, R» 80. The converfe of this propofition mud neceflarily be true, and if it maoifellly appears tha^ the party undertaking is anfwerable, it is conclufive evidence that the odier perfon is not. In the above mentioned cafe of Bourhtnire v. Darnelly it was ruled that a pro- mife, that a third perfon who hired a horfe (hould return him^ was within the ftatute. The ftatute has been held not to extend to a promife of making a fpecific fatisfadion for an injury } as where an action for an aflault was about to be tried, and a friend of the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a fum of money, to withdraw his pro- ceedings \ the promife, though not in writing, was adjudged to be obligatory. Read v. Nafl>^ I JVilf, 305. But almoft inamediate* Ij afterwards, it was held that a promife, under fimilar circum- ftances, to pay an a£^ual fubfifting debt could not be fupported, as being contrary to the exprefs proviCon of the ftatute.* Fi/b v. Hutcbinfiaj 2 TVilf. 94. Where the perfon who makes the undertaking, is interefted jointly with others, his engagement is binding \ the ftatute only applies to thofe promifes which are made wholly on account of another* Stepbenfon v. Squire^ 5 Mod, 213. Cotnb, 362. A broker in pofTeflion of goods about to be fold, promised the landlord, if he would defift froqi diftraining them for arrears of rent, he would pay the rent, and this cafe M^as held not to be within the ftatute. It was confiderea chat the goods were the fund upon which the landlord had a lien, and that the broker became the bailiif of the landlord. Williams v. Leper^ 3 Burr. 1886. And in a late cafe, where A. who had accepted bills for ^., and held po- lices of afTurance for his indemnity, gave up fuch bills to C. upon liis promife to fatisfy the acceptances, it was held that the promife of C. was not within the ftatute ; and the cafe was confidered as a purchafe by the defendant, of the plaintiff's intereft in the policies. Catling V, Auherti 1 Eajt^ 325. It is clearly eftabliftied, that mutual promifes to marry are not within the proviCon refpc£ting promifes in confideration of marriage. P4 By »^ ^M- ioo A P P E N D 1 X. [Numb. XVI. By f. 7. it is provided that all declarations, or creations of tnifts, or confidences of any lands, fhall be manifeiled and proved by fome writing figned by the party, who is by law enabled to declare fuch tnift, or by his laft will in writing, or clfe they (hall be utterly void ; provided, that where any conveyance fluU be made of any lands or tenements, by which a truft or confidence fiiall arife, or refult by the implication or conftru£iion of law, fuch truft (hall be of the like force and cfFed, as if the ftatute had not been made.y! 8. With rcfpefl: to the principle which has been adopted, upon the firft of thefe claufes \ the fulleft information is to be derived from the cafe of Forfler v. Halty 3 VeJ. Jun* 6^6^ in which it was held that an agreement for one perfon to be truftee for others, might be made out by letters in which he admitted himfelf to be fuch ; and that according to the true meaning of the ftatute, it is fufficient if it appears in writing, under the hand of a perfon having a power to declare himfelf a truftee -, and that is equivalent to a formal de* claration of truft. Thcf Mafter of the Rolls obferved, that it is not required that the truft fhould be created in writings and the words of m^ ftatute in this claufe are very particular. It does not by any m^ans require that all trufts fhould be created only in writing, but that they fhall be manifefted and proved by writing, plainly meaning, that there fhould be evidence in writing, proving that there was fuch a truft. Therefore, unqueftionably it is not necef- farily to be created in writing, but it muft be evidenced by writ- ing, and then the ftatute is complied with \ and indeed die great danger of parol declarations, againft which tlie ftatute was intend- ed to guard, is entirely taken away. In the particular cafe, his , Honor, from feveral letters and papers, inferred an agreement that theleflee of a colliery, took it on account of himfelf and other per- fons, with whom he was engaged in partnerfhip in a bank. The common cafe of trufts by operation of law is, where an cftatc is purchafed by one man, and the money paid for it by another. See the cafes cited, 3 Vef, 765. Where a perfon purchafed an eftate in his own name, and infifted in anfwer to a bill, alleging that the purchafe was made as agent for another perfon, that it was made on his own account \ Lord Northamptm refufed to admit parol evidence of fuch agency, in oppofition to the defendant's anfwer} but faid, that if tlie plaintifFhad paid any money, it would have been a reafon with him to admit the evidence. See BartUtt v. Picierfgiil^ . 5 Ea/ly^'j']. n. The defendant was afterwards convided of perjury, upon his denial of the truft, and a petition was prefented to the Lord Chancellor for a rehearing of the caufe, but was refufed. Where a truftee purchafes lands witli the truft money, and takes • a con* Numb. XVLjI On the Law ^fEviiUnce* not « conveyance in bis own name, a trull w\\\ fef^lt,^ and evid«msK maf be given, aliunde s that the purchafe wa^ nK^de with tnift money, although denied by the defendaift'$ anfwet. Baiguy f 9 Httrmltony Ryalv, Ryal^ cited in Lane v. Dighton^ Amkler^ 409. Fii* Fonitanqii^B notes, Treatife of Equity^ B. 11. c. 5. f. It l%e ftatute alfo provides, that no contrail for the fide agent for the buyer as well as the feller^ and that fe^dng down his name was fufficient to take the cafe out of the ftatute^ that the jcoming the next day and feeing the goods weighed, was very ma* Uerial ; and an opinion was ftrongly intimated, that fales by aa£Moo were not within the ftatute, Simomv. Metivuri 3 Burr* ipai. i BL 598. It may be fairly agreed that the weighing off was an cSkStM deUvery, and that this is a true foundation for the decifion; but- that entering the name by way of memorandum, and without any intention at the time, of confidering that as an authentication by the fignature of the party, or that fales by au Aion (hould be deem- ed an excepted cafe, are points which feem extremely difputable, efpecially fince the ftatute of frauds has been regarded in a more fa* vourable point of view, than it was by the judges who concurred in thatdeterminadon. Sales by au£lion, and the delivery of a fample, or other token in confirmation of the fale, are cafes which it might ,have been very reafonable to except ; but the introducing implied exceptions, unlefs the implication is neceflary to avoid a manifcft abfurdity of conftrudion, is always attended with confequences infinitely more detrimental, than the particular inconveniences which it might occafionaily present. In a cafe which has occurred in the Court of Common FleaSf fince making the . above obfervations, it appeared that goods had been ordered from the defendants, who delivered a bill of parcels, intitlcd Mr* , Bought of Jackfan and Haniin^ which words were printed at the top, and that the defendants wrote a letter wiflung to know when the order fliould be delivered ; the cafe was ruled to be out of the ftatute* The court feemed to think that the printed' name at the top was a fufficient fignature *, but decided, that as the Jury had conned:ed the letter which did not ftate the terms of the contract, with the bill of parcels which did, the cafe was clearly taken out of the ftatute. Sanderfm v. Jaekfau^ a Baf. and Pul. 238. But furely with refpeA to the firft point, (to ufe, with a flight varia- tion, the terms of Lord Ch.Baron Eyre^ in StiJus y. Moerty) a name inferted at the [top], of an inftrumcnt, and applicable to a particular purpofe, could not be [intended to be] fuch an authentication as the ftatute required. As to the fecond point, although the letter certainly referred to the contrad, it feems very doubtful whether it was intended to refer to the particular written evidence of the terms of fuch contra£^ ; and certainly it could not be collefted from the letter itfelf, that there was any other writing to which a reference could be made. The point does not feem to have been diflinaiy Komb.'XVl.^ On theLawqfEindtnce. ^03 diftiiiAly pot to the jury, and as tlas part of the cafe is wholly decided upon the foundation of the jury having found fuch re- ference, the cafe amountSj as an authority, to no more than that the evidence in queftion was fuch, as it was proper to leave to the jury upon the poiijt, whether the reference to the previous writing was intended or not* Where a defendant agreed to buy a ftack of hay, and afterwards contraAed for the fale of it to another perfon, who contrary to his diredion had cat and taken part of {t away, the jury found that there had been an acceptance by the defendant ; which opinion the court confirmed. Lord Kenpn faid, that where goods are ponde« tous, and incapable of being delivered iirom one to another, there need not be an a&uai delivery, but it may be done by that which- is tantamount ; fuch as the delivery of the key of a warehoufe in which the goods are lodged, or by delivery of other indicia of pro* pcrty ; and there the defendant, by felling part of the property to another perfon, dealt with it as if it was in his own ppffeffionf Cba^n V. Rogers^ i Eaft^ 192. It has been ruled that if an entire promife is made by parol, part of which is within the ftatute of frauds, and part not (as a promife in confideration of forbearance, to pay part of the debt of another and certain charges which have been incurred, in calling n^^etings of creditors), the whole is void, Chater v. Beckett t 7 T* R* aoi. I (hall have occafion in the following fe£tion, to pfiake fome farther references to this ftatute, with regard to points conne£ked with the general rule, refpc£ling the diplanation of written agree* jDcnts by parol. SECTION vni. 4 Of explaining Written Evidence hj ParoL It IS an eftabliOied principle of the law of evidence, that rerbal communications (hall not be allowed to explain written agree- ments. The expofition of this principle in the text, (hews a very confiderable conformity between the hw of France and that of England* The rule or principle in queftion, is fometimes confidered as ori« ginating from the ftatute of frauds, a fuppofition for which there is no fair foundation. That ftatute is limited in its operation to parti- cular fubjeds ; it avoids, in refpefl to thofe fubjeds, the common effcfts arifing from a verbal communication \ rendering it neceflary that the tranfaftions fliould be reduced to writing j and having no iktSi relation to an explanation of the writing by parol. The ao4 APPEITDIX^ . [Numb-XVl The rule in queftion, is general, and has no tebtion to die ori- ginal neeeflity of the z& being reduced into writing $ but it exifted ilk die hw prior to fuch neeeflity being in any cafe introduced (a), and the ttkdt of it is to exclude thofe dangers of nuifrepreCentatioii from verbal 'teftimonyi which is the natural inducemeht of re; forting to writing at all. Where there are general heads, or mtiiiutes, not purpordog to tontain the entire fubftance of a tranfadion, I conceive that as a common rule, every verbal communication not inconfiftent widi the written minutes may be allowed i but if the caf^ falls within the fcope of the ftatute of frauds, the fame neceffity which exifts in rerpe£t to a writing in general, requires that that writing fliaU be perfe£l and comprize the entire fubftance, and excludes that explanatory evidence, by verbal communications- of notes odier<> wife imperfe£l or unintelligible, which would be expofed to al( abufes that the ftatute was intended to prevent TTiercforc, as we have fcen in the laft fe£lton, an agreement rc- iierring to fuch parts of another inftrument, as had been read by the t^ne party to the other, was held to be within the prohibition of the ftatute, as it was imperfed without verbal evidence, but an in^ ftrument which is conformable to the ftatute, may by reference include the contents of another writing, which is not fo, as was admitted in the fame cafe, Brodier, St. Patd^ i Fef, Jitn. 316. Where a blank was left in a will for the name of a legatee, p»: rol evidence to (hew who was intended was difallowed^ Btabie v. Attorney General, ^idl. N. P. 298. a jftk, 240. So where a teftatrix made a difpofition in favour of Lady n by a will which contained otlicr provifions for the benefit of Ladj Hort^ Lord Thurlow held, that he could not fupply the blank by parol evidence, and faid that if there was only a title given, it was the fame as if it was a total blank, and that by a blank added te a general legacy, no perfon is referred to (i). The recent cafe of Wetln v. Walters ^ 5 Eafii 10, mentioned in the laft feftion, in which it was held that a promifc in writing to pay the debt of another was V9id, as within the ftatute, for not exprelTing the conGderation of the promife, and that the («) Sfl» f^^thm ▼. Harney Kf, aif • cited ^, (6) In ^hat V. Maffitf 3 Fif. 1489 upon a legacy to Mrs. G, Lord t^u^bkirtttgh, reicrred it to the Mafter to receive evidence, but legal evidence, «ho Mrs G» wat, but faid be did not mean to tcM the V after what evidence he «ras to receive. This caTt can lijrdty be reconciled «t?h the two preoeding, or I conceive vttk the true oonflrvdion of tbe ftatote $ an initiil letter, morally fpcakingi it almoft as indefinite at an abfeUitc blank i and in illpritbtbiiity tbere are more pnfent whofc furnamet begin with the letter £7., than A ho ate diili. gu^«ed by a tU^e. agreement Numb. XVt] Of explaining Written Evidetice^ &c. ao$ agreement of forbearance which was the confideration of the pro- mife» could not be ibewn by parol, is alio referable to this di{^ • tia£Uon» But where a blank was left in the bifliop's regifter, of the name of a patron who prefented to a church, it was allowed to fupply the omiflion by parol teftimony, for the prefentation might have been by parol, and therefore it wiis not in effe£t to make that pafs by parol) which the law requires to be done by writing, Biflfop rf Meaiir •Lord Belfitldf i JVilf, 215. The reafon here given fupportft the diftin^ion for which I contend ; the cafe itfelf is referable to a diftrent principle, for the evidence was, not to explain a writing, but to prove a matter of fa£l, of which there 'was not any written evidence; for the blank rendered every thing which was faid about the perfon prefendng nonfenfe, and the only thing proved by ^ writing was the name of the clerk prefented. la conformity to the fame principles, where verbal declarations vcfe made refpe£ling the intention of adhering to a will, concern* ing which the principal queftion was, whether' it was revoked by -a lii^cqiieiit marriage, and the birth of a pofthumous child; Lord Kmym difclaimed paying any attention to thofe declarations, be<* c^fe letting in that kind of evidence, would be in dired oppofi- tioD to die ftatute of frauds, which was made in order to prevent any thing depending on either the miftake or the perjury of a witneis, Vid. Lancqfinn v. Lancajhire^ 5 T. R, 49. There are ibme cafes refpe£ling the queftion, how far a written agreement may be varied by a fubfequent agreement by parol> Gpeby v. Mufcal^ % Verru ^4. Jordan v. SawiitiSf 1 Vef. Jun* 402* 3 Bro. Ch. 3B8. Rob/on v. Collim^ 7 Vef. 130. The expreifions in ibne of tbefe cafes appear to be general, as referable to all written agreements, whereas it feems clear, that a di(lin£tion ought to be made irith refpe£k to cafes, the fubjeAs of which do or do not fall vkbin the ftatute of frauds : and, in fad in all the cafes mentioned, tb^ fttbjeSs in queiUon were within the fcope of the ftatute, and wboiever that is the cafe it (hould feem, that the fame provifioa which requires a writing originally, would alfo require a writing ia cafe of variation; for an agreement varying the obligations •rifing from a former valid agreement, refpeding a given fubje£t» isasmudi an agreement refpe£ting the fubjefk as that firft made» •nd requires tiie fame formalities. But wbere an agreement is taanifi in writing^s without any legal neceiBty, and the whole might have cxrigi^aUy refted in parol, thext is no reafon why a diftin<^ fiiMbqitent agreement of variation, . ifaould not be as e£Fefiually •wte hypticiJU at die angiial agitcment might have been : ihie variation \ » ao6 APPENDIX. [NotaK XVI. Tariation of a former fubfifting agreementi is itielf an original agreement, though relative to the fubjed of an anterior ftipuld- tion, and whatever is necefTary or fufficient for the validity of the firft agreementi ought equally to be fo for the fecond. There ii nothing in this opinion wliich militates againft the rule at prefent under confideratton. The objeft and principle of the rule is, that an zGt which, upon the face of it, purports to be a memorial of the foil intention of the contradling parties, fhall not, by other evidence of an inferior nature, be fliewn not to be fo ; but the admiffion of cvideuoe of any fubfequcnt agreement is perfedly confiftent with the fuppofition and conclufion of the law, that the written memo* rial IS a full and correal reprefentation of the tranfa£lion which it profeflts to (late. The true extent and nature of the rule feems to be the pieven- tion of any evidence, which would qualify, vary, or (in cafe of apparent ambiguity) explain by the collateraf reprefentations of the parties, the effed and obje£b of an inftrument itfelf ; but not the preciufion of other proof in rcfpe£> to fadb, of which die writing is merely evidence. If a releafe which takes etk£k by its own in- trinfic force and operation, is conceived in general terms, it is not open to proof that it was intended to be conditional or particular i but if there is a receipt for a particular fum, or in full of all de- mands, that is merely evidence of a fa£l, and is open to contradic* don or explanationv Thus it has been decided, that the 6irety for payment of an annuity, having joined in figning a receipt for the purchafe money, might, in an aAionfor the repeddon of that money, die annuity being vacated, (hew that no part of it was paM to him, Sirattan v. R^all, % T. R. 364. It is hardly fiecefiary to multiply inftanees of cafes in which it has been held, upon the general rule, that no extrinfic evidence (hall be allowed to vary the effeft and purport of an inftrument, from that which is to be colleded upon the face of the inftrumen|: itfelf. To (late a few of them : In Lord Imbam v. CbUd^ i Bro.^i. Lord Portmore v. Morris^ a Bro. Cb* 219. HartY. Sbirtvotdp X Fgf. Jun. 2^1. 3 Bro. CL 368 ; a grantor of an annuity was not allowed to (hew by parol evidence, that it was intended to be fub* jed to redemption. So it has been held that no evidence could be . allowed, that an agreement for a leafe was to include more pre* anifes ; or that a greater rent was to be paid than was aduall| expreffed. Meres v. Anfeli^ j WUf. 275. Prejhn v. Mermni a, BL Rep. 1 249, and in WcMatn v. Heam^ 7 Fef. 2 1 ^ cited in note infra^ Sir William Grant faid, by the rule of law, indepen- dent of the ftatute, parol evidence cannot be received to cofntradift tf writtc^i Numb. XVI.] Of explaining Written Evidence j &c. 207 a written agreenaent. To admit it for the pvrpofe of proving, that the written inftrument does not contain the real agreements would be the fame as receiving it for every purpofe, it was for the purpofe of (hutting out that inquirji that the rule was adopt- ed. Though the written inftrument does not contain the terms, it muft, in contemplation of law, be taken to contain thea^reement, as fumifliingbettef evidence than any parol can fupply. In Joyies V. Stathsm, 3 jiit. 388. Lord Hardtvicie, in oppo& tion to a bill, for tlie performance of an agreement written in the hand of the plaintiff, for a lesife to the defendant, admitted parol evidence, that it ought to have been inferted in the agreement, that the rent was to be free from taxes. This decifion proceeded chiefly upon the ground of fraud or miftake j but he intimated that if the defendant had been the plaintiff, he did not fee but he might have been allowed the benefit of difclofing this to the court, becaufe.it was an agreement executory only, and as in leafes there are alvraye covenants relating to taxes, the Mailer will inquire what the agree-^ . roentwas as to taxes } and therefore, the proof offered here is not a variation of the agreement, but is explanatory only what thofe taxes were. This latter obfervation is clearly only an incidental dofhine, and therefore is not cloathed with that high authority which naturally belongs to the judicial determinations of Lord Hardwicke, It is to be obferved that the fubjeft-matter is with* in die ftatute of frauds, and therefore requires an agreement, and that a complete agreement in writing. Where an agreement re- fpe&ing a leafe, contains no provifion refpefting taxes or other iDcidental fubjecls, the law prefctibes the relative obligations of the parties, and to vary the operation of the law ading upon the agree* ^ ment, would be attended with as great mifchiefs and inconveni* ences, as admitting parol evidence in fupport of the claim for an auementation or diminution of rent. And in Rich v. Jack/en^ 4 Bro, Cb. 5141 it was determined by Lord Loughborough^ that pa* rol evidence could not be received, to {hew that a rent mentioned in a written agreement, was intended to be free from taxes \ fo as to fupport a bill for the fpecific performance of an agreement with that variation. His Lordfhip faid, that the hardnefs of the cafe, •under fpecial circumftances, may induce the court to refufe dcr ereeing a fpecific performance, or to leave it to the plaintiff's remedy at law \ but it is quite impoflible to permit the rule of law to be broke in upon ( and that requires that nothing (hould be added to the written agreement, unlefs in* cafes where there is a dear fubfequetit independent agreement varying the former ; but not where it is of matter pafling at the fame time with the written agreement. aoa APPENDIX. ' [Numb. XVL agreement* The Court of Common Pleas had before refufed to admit the fame parol evidence in an a£lion between the lame portieSi whilft Ixird Loughborough was Chief Juftice* The proportion, that a writing is open to contradi£tion or ex* planation, in regard to evidence of matter of hfk^ conneAed with ' and evidenced by the writingi is confirmed by fome decifioni of the Court of King's Bench, upon qucftions of fettlement* The conveyance of an eftate, ezprefled the purchafe money to be kfs. dian 30/. by which no fettlement would be gained, and evidence was held admilTible to (hew that a larger fum had been paid* Rix T. Scammomkfif 3 T. R. 474. Two perfons as church*warcfens and oyeHeers of the poor of the parifh of ji.^ gave 7 certificate that a pauper belonged to the hamlet of B. within that parifh, and evidence was allowed that the hamlet was a diilri£l maintaining its own poor, and that the perfons giving the certificate were officers of the hamlet, not of the parifh at large. Rrx v. Samhm, 3 7. R, 609* An agreement for the payment of a fum of money upon entering into a written contraft^ was allowed to (hew that the contraA in« tended, was an apprenticeihip fo as to defeat a fettlement, though thecontrafl upon the .face of it, might have only been for a fenrice, in which cafe the fettlement would have been gained. Rex vr LainJofiy 8 J. Ji« 379. (a) And in a very- recent cafe, an averment was fuftained that a charter-party, dated the 6th of February^ containing a condition diat the (hip fiiOHld fail on or before the zath of February, was not executed until the i ;th of March ', whereby the performance of the condition was difpenfed with. HaU v, jtzeftove, 4 £3^, 477. And if fuch a fad can be averred in pleading, it is a nece^ry con- fequence that it may be ihewn in evidence, in cafes where no aver- ment is requifite. Mod of the cafes upon the annuity a£fc, are inftances of con- tradicting the ftatement on the face of the deed, by extrihfic evidence^ Tlie do£trine, that ambiguity in an indrument can only be folv- ed by the contents of the indrument itfelf, and not by any ver- bal communications which took place at the time of making it, is confined to fuch ambiguity as appears upon the face of the in«< ftrument itfelf, and not to that which arifing from external evi* dence may by fuch evidence be explained. A cafe upon this fubjed arofe from a tcdator having made a wi^ in which were difpofitions for feveral perfons, but only jtwo wo« («) Thif cafe went fftthcf farther in admittinf evUeace, that the fcrfeo tngigtd wat intended to be oi^y tmplojcd m a panlcular tradt. men Numb. XVI,]] . Of explaining Written Evidence^ &c. 2og men were mentioned, his wife and his niece* And then he de- ▼ifed a particular eftate to her for life. The Lord Chancellor re- fufed to receive parol evidence, as to which of the two was meant. Ca/lkton V. Turner^ cited, ^ Vef. a 1 6, The common illuftration of the fecond part of the pofition, is a devife by a name and defcription equally applicable to two perfons^ or places, in which cafe parol evidence will b^ received, as to which of them was mentioned and intended. Where a teftator dcvifed loc/. to the four children of Mrs. Bamfield^ and after the intervention of feveral other legacies, gave 300/. to the children of Mrs. £., and it appeared that Mrs. B. had four children by her hufband £., and two by another hufband P. ; a declaration by the teftator that he had provided for the four children of Mrs. £., but would give nothing to the P*/., was held by Sir John Strange Mafter of the Rolls, proper evidence as to the loo/. le- gacy, to (hew which four were meant j being only explanatory, but inadmiiBble as to the 300/. given in general terms, becaufe contradidlory ; and it being urged that the evidence read was adapted to defeat the claim of the P*/., as to both legacies, his Honor faid, that it was the duty of the Court to dtftribute and divide, to. regard it fo far as it was apt and legal. Where not fo^ it was not binding. Ham^ire v. Pierce^ 2 Vef. a 16. Where a defcription is partially applicable to two perfons, but totally to neither of them \ (as an error in the redundant part of a defcription will not be allowed to vitiate a defcription otherwife fuffieiently explicit, and only applicable to a fingle individual \) it has been held that this is fuch a latent ambiguity as falls with- in the rule of admitting parol evidence, though in the particular cafe the evidence was not fufficient to remove the ambiguity; and the will upon which it arofe, was therefore held void for uncertainty. In that cafe the teftator devifed an eftate to his grandaughter Mary Thomas of X., in M. parifh ; having no grandaughter Mary Thomas^ but a great grandaughter Mary Thomas, living at a dif- ferent place, and a grandaughter Eiiftor Evans, living at the place defcribed. Thomas v. TBomaSt 6 T, R* 671. Where an objeA is fufEciently and corredily defcribed, but the defcription alfo contains fomething further, which is erroneous ^ the diipoCtion, as I have juft now had occafion iacidentally ta. o^ ferve, will be good notwithftanding fuch error. Thus if a grant is made to William, Biihop of Nortuich, when die name of the Biihop is Richard, the grant is good, becaufe the intention it faficiently apparent; Cf. Lit. So if a devife is made to John, the fon of y. S., and y»'S. has only one fon, whofe name is James, there is a fufficient difpofition in favour of the foi^ of J* 5. Vol. II. Q^ Dowfia ^lo APPENDIX. [Numb^XV!. DowfittYo Stveitf Ambler, JTS* A tedatrix gave a fixth of her effed^s to her niece M. B* for her life, and after her death one moiety to the niece's grandchildreni the children of her daughter Mary^ the other moiety to the niece's daughter ^is^i ; at the time of the willj the niece's daughter Mary Was unmarried^ but Ann was dead leaving ifiue ; and the devife was conftrued to b&ln favour of Mary^ and the children of Ann . Mr. Ambler in reporting the cafe obferveS) that if there is a certain defcription, and a further de* fcription added, it is immaterial whether fudi farther defcription be true or falfe* Bradwin v. Harpers ^ Ambler ^ 374 (a). Alfo when property was given to A, and jB., legitimate children of — — , the perfons menvoned by name were allowed to take, though in fa£l they were not legitimate. Standen v. Standen, 2 Fefty Jim.sBg{b). A defcription which is in itfelf erroneous^ and not corre£led by the context, may confer a fufficient title, provided the objefl in- tended is afcertained by verbal teftimbny, and there is no other to which the defcription is properly applicable. A very ftrong in* ftance of this occurred in a cafe, where a will purported to be made in favour of Catharine Eardley, and evidence was allowed to Ihew that Gertrude Tardley wa3 the perfon meant \ no fuch per- fon as Catharine Eardley appearing to claim the legacy. BeaumotU V. Fell^ 2 P. Wtns, 141. Where a perfon who had had a brother £dwardf then deceafed, leaving children, and alfo a brother iTi/- Jiamf gave property to his brother Edward^ it was held, upon evi- dence, that as he ufually called William Edward or Ned, William fliould be allowed to take. But where tliere is an exifting fubje£l, to which a defcription may be properly applied, parol evidence cannot be allowed, that a different fubjefl was intended. Upon this principle, when Lord Oi/iri/, who had made two wills, one dated.in 1752, and another in 1756, after- wards, by a codicil, confirmed his laft will dated in 17521 evi- . dence that the codicil was intended to refer to tlie laft fubfifting . will> and that the other was brought from the perfon with whom (d) I im iwait thit the cafet mentioned in tbit paragrtph do not depend upoo tlM rule which it the piefcnC fubjeA of examination^ but they are incidentaUy conneded with it| and IB rdmc degree render the ^ftiont refpe^ng the application of the rule in oth«r cilbr, mote perfpicnoua. « (h) in iUiuui r. Ahhtit^ 4 V^, goa. a woman made a will in ATOwr of a peribn h ijcing her huftand, who it afterwards appeared had another wife, and Sir R, Aria^ Mafter of the Rolls, held the difpofition Toid. He admitted the general principle, that ' an erroneoos defcription doca att vidate a legacy ochcrw'ife valid ; but faid, that oodcr the • circomftancof, he waa wananted to make a precedent, and to dturmioe that ^rhereta a legacy is given to a perfon under a particular chancer, which he haa ialfdy afiumed, and which alone can be fuppoled the modvc of the bounty, the law will not penult him to «Ta?lhimfelfo;it, it Numb. X VIO OfeHplalmng Written Evidence^ &c« a\t it wa& depofited^ aiid the codicil added thereto upon a fuppofition that it was the laft, and without its being read to him, was held ta be inadmiiEble. Lord Kenyon^ in delivering his opinion, after fome obfervations concerning the eScGt of the evidence, faid, that the evidence propofed did not introduce any latent ambiguity } and they ought not to let in parol evidence, which, if admitted, inftead of explaining an ambiguity, would only introduce a loofe con« jc£lure ; but he difclaimed forming his opinion on the efieft of the evidence offered } he went upon this ground, that there was no latent ambiguity introduced by parol evidence, to let in the parol evidence which was tendered. Lord WalpoU v. Lord Cbolmondelej^ TT.R. 138. There is another clafs of cafes, M^ore verbal evidence is allow* ed by courts of equity, to aife£t the operation of a writing, though the writing, upon the face of it, is not attended with any ambiguity. According to the technical phrafe applied to this fubje^ parol evi- dence is admitted to rebut an equity; the meaning of which is, that where a certain prefumption wodd, in general, be deduced from the nature of an aft, fuch prefumption may be repelled by the extrinfic evidence, ihewing the intention to be otherwife* For inftance, if a father by will gives a legacy to his child, and after- wards advances a porrion to the fame amount, the portion is pre- fun^ed to be intended as a fatisfa£Vion for the legacy ; but evidence may be given even of verbal converfations, to fhew a contrary intention. Fu Eili/onv, Coot/on, I. Fef, Jun, 100 {a)i So fat the admiilion of parol evidence is only for the qualification of an zGt^ and not the explanation of a writing ; but the fame doArine is applied to the cafe, where a teftator gives his executor a legacyy and makes no difpofition of the refidue of his efiedis. The ge« neral rule is, that an executor takes the refidue when there is no exprefs difpofition \ but as the giving a part is fuperfiuous, when die fame perfon is intended to have the whole, the legacy induces a prefumption, that the general rule was not intended to operate^ and that the refidue is to be applied as in cafe of inteftacy. Still this is only treated as a prefumption, and the cont|^ry iiltention may be (hewn by evidence of verbal declarations. It is too late for any practical purpofes, to examine the reafoning upon which tUs laft diftin£lion (which falls within the expreflion of rebutting an equity) was introduced and eftablifhed \ but it is certain that it is deduced from the civil law, in points where the civil law difiers from the law of England \ and the allowing a written inftnunent to derive a conftru£^ion difierent from that which ifVould natural- ly impoxti in confequencey not of any relative diam£ter of the fub- {a) Set tiXoCliMtw t. B»^9 \ y^* Tm- 173* 2i(j APPENDIX. [Nurab.XVL jtlkf but merely of verbal declarations^ cannot^ on principlesi be seconciled with the general tenor of out jurifpiudence« Evidence which is calculated to explain the fubjed of an inftm- ment, is eflcntial]y different in its chara£ier, from evidence of verbal communications refpe£ling it. It is a leading rule of con* ftrudlion, that all a£ls are to be expounded according to the fub- jedl-matter. Whatever^ therefore, is an indication of the nature of the fubje£^, is a proper medium for confltuing the contents of an inflrumentj and a jaft foundation for giving it a conftru&ion^ confidered relatively, different from that which it would receive, if confidered ab{lra£ledly from the circumftances with which it is connected. Thus, when a leafe was made, amongft other property, of a certain piece of ground, an^ the queftion was, whether- a cellar under that piece of ground was or was not in- cluded, evidence that at the time of the leafe, the cellar in quef- tion was in the occupation of another tenant was held admiflible, to fliew that it could not have been the intention of the parties that it ihould pafs by the leafe. Doe v. Burt^ i T. R. ^ol. With refpefl to wills, (the inftruments which produce more qpeftions of conftruAion than all others united,) Lord Mam" fields in Baldwin v. Karver^ Cowp. 312, faid, all cafes on the €onftru6iion %of wills depend upon the particular penning of the wills themfelves, and* the (late of the -families to which they relate. And in the famous cafe of Jones v. Morgan (a), his lordfliip faid, that to conftrue a will, the intent is to be taken from the whole will together, applied to the fubjed*matter to which the will relates {b) \ and Lord Loughborough^ quoting that opinion, took notice of different cafes in which certain words weve \a) Cited in Lytton r. LyttoHf hfra, {h) WhsK a teftator pro/eirea by hit wiH to dirpofir of property, Qfver which he hi /jft hai oot the power | and by the rame will makes ■ Tatid dirpofition of other property, t9 the perfon intitled to the firft, that perfon caaoot claim the benefit of the will in the on* nfpt€tf witbooc acquiefcing in it in the other } bmt is p»t to hi^ eledfion. It is alio ft genc- fal priDcipleythatif a father who it under an obligation to provide certain pordooa for hi* children, cnakea ■ general difpofiUon in their favoar by wilh the preruroption is that thio ^fpofition is not accumulativey but only raiics a calt of eledioo. The followiag cafe occurred, with refpeft to admitting estrinfic CTidcnce in the applicadon of thefe rules* Dr. Htnthc/iffe, afterwards bilhop of Pettrbcrough^ made a Settlement under which hla younger children were intitled to certain property. He afterwards made a will, with pfw- vifions in favour of thefe children, who claimed the benefit, both of the wiH and the let- tlement. Sir R, Ardent Mafter of the Rolls (who obfcrvcd with great truth, that he wa» as jealous of the rules of evidence as any judge whoever fat in a court of cqwity,) ad- mitted the evidence of an account which the teftator made regularly, at flrfl yearly, and afterwards half yc«rly,0f the (late of his property | ■ tt> (hew that he fuppofed and m- garded the property Included in the fettlemeoff as his owniobfiwving that this was evidence^ oot for the purpofe of explaining the will itfell, for which it was clear that it could oot he aJmitteJ,'butto fbew the circumftances under which he made hit wlU* l^ttlifir* Uinfhcliffet \ yej, ci6, and fee the cafes there cited. ■ . I held Numb, i VI.3 Of explaining Written Evidence j &c. s 1 3 held to apply to a failure of ifiae at a certain period, though taking the words ftridilyi and conftruing them blindly, without confidering the circumftances, would have imported a general failure of ifiue;^ and the limitation attached to them would havb been Toid ; and faid, that the circumftances of the teftator and his family have always been taken into consideration in thefe cafes. fid. Ljttan V. Lytton, 4 Bro. Ch. i. It will be unneceflary to enumerate particular cafes, in which Ae fituation of a family, or the defcription of property {a) have according to this principle been taken into contideration : the principle itfelf being allowed, the application of the inftances is matter of conftruAion, and unconne£bed with the fubjeffc undet dtfcuffion, f But though evidence may be material, as to the nature or defcrip- tion of property, or as to the party having or not having property of a given chara^^er (i), evidence concerning the value or amount^ falls under a different confideration. In one cafe Lord Mant^ fdd went into an inquiry of value, as the foundation for an argu- ment that property of fuch fmall value could not be intended to be the fubje& of fuch limitations, as a conftru£lion one way would in* trodttce. Qatts v. Brjdon^ 3 £»r» 1895. But in a fubfequent eafe, where evidence was offered of the value of an eftate, charged widi fums of money for the (ifters of the devifee, in order to (hew that, according to that value, there would be an equality of £ftribution, from which circumftance the propriety of a particu- lar conftruflion was inferred, his lordihip, in concurrence with the other judges of the King's Bench, held that it was nugatory and inadmifiible, and that it proved nothing at all ; though it laid % circumftance before the court, which might have had its weighs if the Court were called upon to^make a will for the teftatrix. Jkt V. FyldeSf Cowp. 833. And in Goodtitle v. Edmonds^ 7 T. R, 635, Lord Kenyan faid, that in Oates v. Brydort, after the argu^ mcnt, and before the decifion of the cafe. Lord Mansfield (cer^ taiidy from the moft eameft wifh to do juftice between the parties) direded certain inquiries to be made, refpe£):ing the value of the eftate devifed, which at the time gave difTatisfaAion to the profef- fion, who thought that the rules of law ought to prevail in thfe conftru£Uon of the will, whether the eftate devifed by it were of the value of 20/. or of 2000/. per annum % but that he (Lord K,^ believed that, in fubfequent cafes. Lord Mansfield had doubted whether, in the deciCon of that cafe, he had proceeded upon fubk Ibntial grounds* («] See the collc^i^ of ca^i on thii Ail^edj PfWtU m Divifth 477* (^) Ful* Bat*ik T. Rtad^ Vef, Jun. 260. \ Q 3 IjQltA ai4 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL Lord Loughhrough alfoi in a cafe whichi in former ftages had been before Lord Tkurlow and Lord Kenysn^ obferved, that tfaey had very properly refufed an inquiry into the amount of the tef. tator's property^ at the time of bis making his will, for it was too vague Xq calculate^ that a man muft be fuppofed to attach a con- tingent interefty not fairly to be deemed a propertyi merely be- caufe his calculation, as to what he might die pofieffed of, had eren- tuallyiailed* S^nJen v. Standing 2 VeJ. Jun, 593. Another circumftance which may be taken into confiderationi for the expofition of written inftruments, is ufage. Every inftru- ment, is prefumed, in its general terms, to refer to the kAownand dl^bliflied ufage refpeAbg the fubje^l to which it relates, and fliould be conftrued accordingly. Therefore, upon policies of jnfurance, though the literal or general import of terms might lead to one conclufion, the particular courfe of trade may warrant another. A general warranty to depart with convoy, may be ^alified by joining convoy, at the neareft ufual place of ren- deivouSy Litbulief^t cafe, 2 SalL 443. A policy on an Eaft Mia voyage, may admit many things to be done in conformity to the ufage of that trade, which in cafes of an ordinary policy, conceiYed in the fame terms, would be a deviation. Salvador v. Hopkins^ 3 Bur. 1707. The cuftomary mode of conducting the fifhery at Nnu^ fmniUni^ was held to ^arrant fimilar a£is upon the newly efta- ^ bliflied fifhery at Labraiur. NoUe v. Kenno^wyt Doug. 492. {a) A failpr having contraQed for a voyage, upon a note for an en- tire fumi during the courfe of it \ it was fuggefted that it was aiftom^ry, upon fimilar occafions, to make an apportionment \ the refult of an inquiry upon the fubjedi, was not fufficient to raife the i^iDcipal queftion upon the tStCk of fuch ufage ; but Lord Kgnjm^ obferved, that if the Court were aiTured that fuch notes were in univerfal ufe, and that the cornmercial world had received imd zdtA upon them in a difierent fenfe, (from that which he inr ferred upon the particular c^nteft,) he (hould give up his own opi- nion \ aiqd the oUier judges eipreflcd themfelves to the fame efie£l. Cutter y. PpvfeU, 6 T. ^. 320. The ct^Gt of local cuftom was ftrongly recognized in a cafe where a kafe had been Jmdt for a given term, and it was held, (s) See ItUirtfai V. Frembt 4 Esjfff I30» In which Lord Elienhrmgk, ipplying himlelf fft a fvgieftlooy diat there were pecuJitt ndee for the codftroAiiia of policies of iofttrasccy ftid, the Cune rule«f coaftrndloB lohich appUo to ell other iBftnuBentt, appliei efuHj to t policv of afliiraacei that it it lo he cooftmed iccordiDg to its feole and mtaaingf «) col- lefted, in the Srft place, from the terat ofcd ia it, which are to he noderftood in chdr yaifl ordinary and popvUr fenfe, nalelii they have generally, t« refpcA to the foljcA-fl»^ Her, it by the fcoowo ofi^ of trade or the lifce, acfulred a peculiar kttkt diiHod from tU popular (enfe of the f}uiie words. Se« I.oid MUm'i MfmlAm «l|Wi (^^[^^9 ^M*^ V. ^itr, 1 fioj* ^ ful. 1^4, dut Numb. XVI.^ Of explaining Wriiteh Evidence^ &c. 1x5 that the tenant might avail himielf of a ciiftom in thepari{h> to take the wa^'^oing crop after the expiration of his term. It was faidy that the cuftom did not alter or contradict the agreement in the leafe, it only fuperadded a right which was confequential to the taking. Wiggle/worth v. Daliifon, Doug. 20 1. Eyidence of ufagc, however, ought not to be allowed to contra* did the exprefs and unequivocal terms of a writt^inftrument. The common form of % policy of infurance exprefies, that the infurance on the fliip fhall continue until (he is moored twenty-four hourSj and on the goods till fafely landed. Lord Kenyon (contrary to his own opinion) and in deference to what was fuggefted to be the dk€t of former authorities) admitted evidence of a ufage, that the ri(k on the goods, as well as the ihip, expired in twenty-four hours^ but the Court of King's Bench ruled, that the evidence was inadmi{Eblc> and granted a new trial. Vid. Pdrkinfon v« Collier^ Park. Inf. 314* In DonalJfon v. Fcrflety Abbot on Shipping 170. Lord Kenyon^ in an a£Uon upon a charter-party, which ftipulated that the merchant ihould have the exclufive ufe of the fliip and cabin, admitted evidence of its being the conftant ufage, under fuCh charter-parties, to allow the ma&er to take out a few articles for his private trade ; and thinking die ufage proved, direAed a verdi£t accordingly ; but one of the jury diiTenting, the cafe waa who was hired for a year» r^ maining with him after giving a month's notice, or refufe the payment of a proportionate part of his wages \ it being common to engage with fervants, fubje£l to the liberty of parting upon a month's notice. But this appeared to me at the time (and the impreffion has been confirmed by frequent refle£bion fince) to be aninftance of allowing the frequency of particular ftipuladonSf or a habit generally apquiefced in for the fake of mutual conreni* ence and accommodation, improperly to controul the regular operation of the law upon the exprefs terms of a pofitive contra&. In fa£b nothing can be more completely indefinite than die character and quality of that ufage which is allowed to give a defimte chara£ier to other fubjefis. The ufage or local cuftom, known to the common law, is as definite as a circle or triangle \ but for diftinguifliing the ufage which has fuch extenfive influence in modem prafUce, from a&s which are the mere refult of frequent convenience, carelefs acquiefence, impofition or abufe, no adequate criterion has been as yeteftablifhed. See fome obfervations upon this fubjed, which I have eztra&ed from the view of the decifions of Lord Mansfield^ in the following Number of this Appen* dix. Contemporaneous and fubfequently continuing ufage, with re* gard to the carrying of ancient inftruments into execution, is aUa confidered as proper evidence to explain doubtful words in the inftruments themfelves. This kind of ufage is very difierent, in its principle, from that already adverted to ; the one being reiferable to the antecedent nature of the fubje£^, the other being merely evidence of the conftrudion and expofition wloch have in prac^ tife been given to the particular inftrument. Mr. Piake takes notice, that the firft inftance which he finds of this doctrine, of explaining inftruments by the ufage under them, being a£bed upon, is the cafe of the Attorney General v. Parker^ 3 Atk. 576. In that cafe the prefentation to the curacy of Clerhn* Vfelit was given by a deed about ninety years before to the pariih** ioners and inhabitants. Lord Hardnvicke^ after taking notice of the extenfive fignification which may be applied to each of thefe terms, faid, <^ Some fort of limitation is allowed by both fides, Xt> hdve been put by ufage on the liberality of this grant ; and in the conftniAion of ancient grants and deeds, there is no better way ofconftruing them than by ufage> and cententporenea expo/ltw is the beft way to go by»*' • The Kumb. XVI.] Of explaining Written Evidence^ &c. « 1 7 The coqporation of Portfmoutb confifts of a itXtOi. body^ and aa indefinice number of burgeiTes. In Rex v. Varly^ Cawp, 248* the qttcftion was, whether an a£l, committed by charter to the mayor, aldermen and burgefTes, or the greater part of them, was well ex« ecuted by the majority prefent at a regular meeting, although that metting d'd not include a majority of the fubfifting number ; the ofage was in favour of the aA, which alfo appeared to the 0>urt to be the true conftru£lion of the charter. Lord Mansfield faid» foppofing the words of the charter doubtful, the ufage is of great force, not that ufage can overturn the clear words of a charter* but if they are doubtful, the ufage under the charter will tend to explain the meaning of them, efpecially in a cafe like this, where Ac corporation before confided of an indefinite number of burgefles bjr prefcription ; and the charter added no new members but only incorporated the old ones. In Gape v. HandUy^ 3 7. R. 288. n. it appeared that the pre- fentation to the. redory of St. uilban% was given by charter to the mayor and burgefles ; and the queftion being, whether the right was to be exercifed by all the burgefles, or only by the mayor and aUermen, Lord Mansfield faid, *< The ufage is uniform : if the charter was doubtful, fuppofing the queftion to hate arifen recently, the ufage is a ftrong information of the true conftrudion.* In Blankley v. Winftanley^ 3 7. R. 279. the queftion was, whether the juftices of the county of Leicefter^ had a concurrent jurifdic* Cion with thofe of the borough ? The Court, upon the conftnidioa of the charter, were of opinion that they had. — Buller J. (aid, ^ Ufage, confiftent with the charter, has prevailed for ipo yean paft \ and if the words of the charter were more difputable than diey are, I think that ought to govern the cafe. There are cafes in which the Court has held, that fettled ufage would go a great way to controul the words of a charter. And it is for the fake of quietng corporations, that this Court has always upheld long ufage where it was poffible, though recent ufage would perhaps not have fliuch weight.** In H^ithnell v. Gartham^ 6 T. R. the power of appointing a fchool-mafter at Siiptonf was given to the minifter and church* wardens ; the point in difpute was, whether all the church-wardeiis tnuft concur, or whether the a£l of the majority was fuflicient. The jury found the ufage to be in favour of an appointment by a majority ; this accorded with the opinion of the court upon the con« ftrudion. In fpeaking of the ufage, Lord Kenyan faid, it was in« fifted it muft be rejeded, becaufe no ufage could be let in to ex« plain a private deed } but that there was no difierence between a fsmxt deed aad the king's charter. . In both cafes, evidence of ufage 8 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVt ige muft be giTen to ezpouiul them. Mr. Juftice Lawrence i *• It is clear that if there be any ambiguity in this deed, ufage admiffible to ezpiain it. And thr argument of convenience im this or that conllruflion of a deed, creates that fort of ambi- ity that ibould be explained by ufage." He added, " that al- >ugK it was contended that this ufage ought not to be concla- e on Lincoln ColUgt^ to -whom the right devolved in default of : church-wardens, there was no reafon why they fhould t be bound by it ; for if it had at all times prevailed, inflanccG ift.faave occurred iirwhich they had had an opportunity of djf- ting it, if they had thooght proper^ and having always acquiefced, yare now concluded." In Rex V. 0/bourne, 4 E^, 327. it appeared that the power rf ding aldermen of Kingfion upon Hull, was committed to the lyor and commonalty. According to the opinion of the court* d the ufage under the charter, the term ammonahy includes the iermen. Xx>rd Elltnboniigh faid, that even without reforting to y aflt&ancc from cotemporancous, and fuhfcquently continuing Ige, (to which however in fuch cafes, upon the befl authorities the law> refort may allowably be had,) on the face t>f the charter ;lf, by a fair conflrudion of itj commonalty does include the lermcn. It is obfervable that in all the preceding cafes, except that of ; Attorney Generalw. Parlur, (where the exclufive latitude of the ms was fuch, that both parties found it necelTary to reflrain ;mi by reforting to an alleged ufage in their own ravour,) the »urfe to ufage was-only applied to as an auxiliary argument ; and tt the dpinlon founded upon the mere conftru&ion of the in- uments themfelves, was conibimablc to the uCtge under them, the cafe of The King v. Billringer, ^T. R.%10, the charter Bodrmn gave a power to a definite body, which was exercifcd by majority of the fubfifting body, but not by a majority of the Snite number-, the replication impeaching ^is a£l, alleged that ufage no eleflion had been made, or could be made by lefs in a majority of the definite number. The Court declined de- ing upon the validity of the ufage alleged, or upon the manner pleading it, becaufe they held that, by the conftrudion of the irter, exclufive of the ufage, am^orityofthe definite number s requifite. Mr- Juftice Lawrence, upon that cafe being cited The Kii^ t. Ofiounu faid, that the ufage there was not to ez- in a doubtful word in an old charter, but to give a conftruflion the general terms of it. It is ^cdeQXj evident that nothing s decided upon this fubjefl in The King v. Sellringtrt the uf^ 1 the conftni^limi beingi as is the other cafes above cited, in unifon. Numb. XVL] Of explaining Written Evidence^ &c. a 19 nnifon. But in The King ▼• Miller^ 6 71 R. a6Sf where an zCt of {larKament conftituted a body of 48 perfons who» in conjunction with others^ were empowered to do corporate z6ts in the town of Northampton ; and a ufage was pleaded, according to which the attendance of a majority of the number of 48, direAed by the %€t would not be requifitCi and which ufage had fubfifted for 300 yearSf it was held that fuch a majority was requifite under the zQty and that the cafe would not be affcfted by the ufage % former cafes hafing decided in favour of the neceflity of the majority of a de- finite body attending in the performance of a£ts delegated to fuch bodyi as a general queftion. Mr. J. Grofe faid, he admitted that ivhere there is any doubt in a ^atute or charter, it may be ex« jdaided by ufage \ but there was no doubt on the words of tins ftatute, and if the ufage were to be received, it would be for the purpofe of creating, not of explaining a doubt. . Here the ufage was not allowed to prevail, being in oppofition to what was held the true conftrudiion of the charter, as deduced from the general law eftabliihed with reference to the fubje£l in preceding cafes. So that, upon a general view of the fubjeft, the adnal efiedl of ufage under a particular inftrument, in explaining the bftrument itfeif, appears to be very confined indeed % althou^ very frequent opinions have been, by great authorities, exprefled in favour of it. The general principle which is to regulate the ad« ouffion of it, is in itfeif fufficiently vague^ whether the words of an inftrument are clear or doubtful, is a queiUon, the expofitioii of which will often depend vpon the particular chancer and modft of thinking of the individuals to whom it is addreiled ; embracing erery variety, from the decifive impetuofity which doubts hi nothing, to the fluAtt^ting imbeciility which doubts of every thing. It has often been laid, that Uie law has no doubts, and that every doubt which occurs in a judicial inquiry, is only that of the in whereas in filk they had valued it at only 1500/., BmxtM v. L^^ 3 jitk^ 383* So Lord TAmrUwf to execute a purchafe of an eftate, reprefcnced to be of the acat value of 90/. a-ynr, there being an indufttioos concealment of the neceflary repair of a wall, to prote£k the eftatefromihe fca at great eapeoccy Shlr/ty r, Strsttawt 1 Bra. Cl« 440. But Sir fyUIutm Grtm^ Mailer of the R0U19 in 9focUam v. Hetriit 7 fy. xzi. refufed 10 vary» at the ioftance of the plaintiff^ a written agreenent for a leafe of 70/ a-year» and to (obftttute a leafe for6o/« upon the ground of the defendant having rqxefented that 7o/« wai the rent he paid himlelf» when it wu only 6o/. ; and difttngoilhed between the cafeiy whcft a dcftndaat alleget the fraud aa a defence againft perforaing an ^gieementt and thofe where a plaintiff cornea to enlbrct an agreement^ according to the leprcfentncioo. Thii diftin^Hon it evidently foundfed upon the moft corred reafoningy for fraud and mif* repreltntation arc only objeOiona which vitiate a contrad, and do not conftitute and ia« dace one. To intitle the plaintiff to a leafe at the rent paid by the defendaat, it ia ocoef^ lary to fhew a pofitive i^grfemeot f« that purpofe, attended by the legal rc^oiiitea j fhew- ing that a difeent agreement wu Im^perly obtained^ ia a very different thing from diaL With rtfpeft to tbia fnbjett, I think diere can be 00 kgitiffiate difference between the die) fioo of e Court Qf Law, tad a Court of Equity. 2 truth Numb. XVI.] Of explaining Written Evidence^ &c. ^ 223 truth even againft a fair indorfce. Jordaine r. LuflArooh^ As to the hit pofition of Potblerf the principle upon which it is foundedj viz. that two perfons (hall not^ by any colourable pro- ceedingy affedi the confequential rights of a thirds is fo materially conne£led with the eiTential' demands of juftice, that it maybe confidently dated aa an invariable rule of law. SECTION IX. Of the Examination of Witneffis* According to the law of France^ witnelTes could not in general be eiamined in a civil caufe, without a previous judgment for the purpofe> founded upon the allegations of the party requiring fuch proof, and an examination of the written documents which might either conftitute a commencement of proof by writing, tlie nature of which is (hewn in the preceding treatife. Part IV. c. 2. Art. 4. or which being decifive of the caufe might exclude all verbal evi- dence to the contrary. From this judgment admitting proof by wltnefles, an appeal might be, and frequently was, indituted. In the Caufes CeUbres^ there are a great many cafes refpefting the admiffibility of proof by witneffes, in what are called thequeftions i){ ftatc, that is of birth, marriage, and all other perfonal qualities» refpcding which very great credit was given to the public regif- tcrs, fo as frequently to exclude parties .from offering proof in it- felf of a very convincing nature, either in oppofition to fuch regif- ters, or without laying a foundation for it from them. Previous to the admifiion of verbal tedimony, the judge decided upon its relevancy to the matter in difpute, and the admitting fuch evidence to be given, neceffarily indicated an opinion that it might be im* portant in the decilion of the caufe, and that the other admitted hSiz were not fufficient for a full determination, without the aiUdance of the propofed examination, or, nbtwithdanding, any teftimony which it might produce. Thus in the famous cafe of the Prmce de Conti \ the prince clain^ed the property of the late Duke de LonguevilUf or as he is more generally called hi the caufe, iiit Mie d*Or/eanSf under a tedimentary difp would have been bad upon fpecial demurrer, as amounting to the general iflue,] and which would be attended with additional expence to the parties. — ^Now it is cl«ar, tliat in cafe the Court had decided in favour of the plea, much expence would have been favcd, becaufe the allegnttons of the parties in die firft: inflance, would have brought the point before the court in as perfe£^ a ftate as it could have been brought, hj the great additional expence of a trial, and a fpccial cafe. I remember his Lordfliip exprefling his difapprobation of the two pleas, with more feverity of manner than appears by the report. The queflioh which I r8colle£k his having aflced,— Why, if the fpecial plea was pre- ferred, was the general iffue added ? might have received the v?ry cafy anfwcr that, although the defendant might expefl, by the fecial pleaj to obtain a cheap and early dectfion of the caufe, it would not have been judicious to have therefore abandoned every other ground of defence. It muft not be entirely taken for grant- ed, from the doArine in the above cafe, that the fpecial plea wonld have been bad upon fpecial demurrer ; for there are many inftances in the books, of matters being fpecially pleaded in trover, which were, if any defcnccj a defence available upon the general ifTue. The Numb. X VL] Of the Examination of Witnejes. 227 The cafe of Hatton v. Morfe^ i Salh. 394. indicates the true principle upon thefe fubje£l&| an attention to which might frequent'* ly be produftivc of the cfFccl, which I have been defirous to pro- mote in making the preceding obfervations. Per Holt Ch. Juf- ticc: — ^**In debt, the defendant may plead a releafe, becaufeit ad- mits the contra£t which is a colour of aAion, and yet he might give it In evidence on nil dehfU So in ajfumfjit^ the defendant may plead payment, becaufe it admits the affum^tt^ and yet he may give it in evidence on mn ajfum^tt^* , Cafes muft very frequently occur, in which the application of thefe principles would be very important and deCreable, by bringing upon the record, at the fmalleil poflible expence, the real queftion in difpute between the contefting parties*. The preceding obfervations may alfo be applied to the prac- tice of Courts of Equity ; in which the defendant may, if the plaintiflPs bill does not ilate a fuflicicnt cafe to intitle him to re- lief, demur to the fufficiency of it ; but this right is reftrif^ed in a manner that feems very inconfiitent with a due attention to the important principle, that the admin idration of juftice (liould be condu£led with the lead expence and delay, compatible witli the prefervation of its eflential purpofes ; for it is laid down by Lord Loughborough^ that a demurrer muft be founded upon this, tliat it is a fliort, certain, clear propofition, that the bill would be difmiffed with cofts at the hearing* Brooke y* Hewitt^ 3 Vef. 255. The reafon which he afligned, for not deciding upon the demurrer in the particular cafe was, that it was not a dry point of law but was a cafe of circumftances, in which a minute variation of cir- m cumftanccs might either induce the Court to modify the relief, or to give no relief at all. — ^But it certainly cannot, in any mode of ad- miniftering juftice, be unreafonable to exp^£l that a party claim- ing relief, (hall be required to allege a cafe, which admitting it to be true, ihall intitle him to the afliftance which he claims \ and that thofe who are invefted with judicial authority (hould, at the inftance of the oppoGte party, pronounce a decifion upon the luiHcieucy of the charge, without involving the parties in a ferious expence, and fubje£ling tlicm to an anxious delay^ the final re- fult of which may be a judgment upon grounds that would equally have been open to deciiion upon the original ftatement. To inftance a cafe in which this inconvenience occurred^ not upon any judicial determination, but upon the previous opinion of very refpe£lable counfel, founded upon the eftabliihed ^ra£tice. — A perfon born before the marriage of her father and mother, claimed the benefit of a proviflon in his will in favour of his chil* R 2 dren ; ?a8 APPENpIi. [Numb. XVI. dren; there were a great number of circumftancesin the cafe, whicli muft fatisfy every mind of the real intention, that (he (hould be included ; and it was wiflied origin^illyy in an amicable fuit, to ftate ail thefe circumflances ia the bill, fo that a judgment might hare been obtained upon demurrer, whether the natural import of the exprei&ons of the will could receive a modification from the pe- culiar circumftances of the fubje£l to which it was applied. But upon confideration, that a Court of Equity would not decide a quef* tion of this nature upon demurrer, it was thought requifite to go into a tedious and expenfiVe examination of all the circumftances raifing the queRion in difpute ; and the refult of that examination was a judgment, that the I^ord Chancellor had no doubt of die intention, but that it was impoflible iii a court of jufticc, to hold that an illegitimate child could take equally with lawful children, upon a devifc to children ; Cartnvright v. Vawdreji 5 Vef. 530. a decifion which, confiftently with the real purpofcs of jufticc, though not with the ufage of the court, might have been equally made upon tlie original allegations. I have thought it advifable to dwell with fome particularity upon this fubjed : for, although I have not the prefumption to imagine that any fuggeflions tSi mine will alter the courfe of judicial pro* ceeding, the objcft, with which thefe fuggellions are conne£^ed, muft be allowed to be of very material importance, by all who have had an opportunity of obferving the frequency with which the expence of litigation becomes a more ferious confideration than the original matter of difpute; and with the failure which claims fup- ported by the fubftantial principles of juftice muft often experi- ence, from the inability or terror of fuftaining the requifite es- pences of aflerting them \ and if there it a poflibility that the atten- tion of the profeilion may be beneficially dire£led to the fubjefi, thp ftatement of thefe confiderations wUl have received a fuflkient apology. The examination of witnefles may be either taken privately before a judge or officer, as is the cafe in chancery proceedings, or publicly, and in open court, as in trials at common law. In par- ticular cafes, a witnefs is, by fpecial authority, examined before an officer, or commiflioners for the purpofes of a trial at common law; as where the witnefs refides, or is going abroad, or where his evidence is taken, by virtue of a bill in equity, for the perpetuating teftimony; in thefe cafes, the written depofitions cannot be read, if there is an opportunity of examining the witnefs, in the accuf- lomed manner at the trial \ and the death, or abfence of the witneiir muft be fliewn, or circumftanccs^muft be laid before the court,fn>m which they may be inferrcdr The Numb. XVL] Of the Examination ofWitnefes. aig The depoGtions which have been regularly taken. In a former proceedingi between the fame parties, are properly admifiiblejn evidence, where the examination of the witnefles cannot be had^ in the immediate proceeding; and parol evidence may, under finuhr circumftances, be given with refped to what a deceafed witnefs, or I conceive^a witnefs refidlng out of the kingdom, fwore ilpon a former trial between the fame parties : fuch evidence is not admiflible in a criminal profecution* In tbofe cafes the party againil whom the' evidence is adduced, cannot, in general, be deemed to fuffer any n^aterial prejudice } for he bad a full opportunity of fifting the teftimony, by crofs ex- amination, at the time of its beiag originally given, which would, ip many refpeds, and indeed in every refped, except the obfer- vations which may arife upon the demeanour of the witnefs, be attended with the fame advantage, as if fuch teftimony had been firft adduced in the immediate proceeding. But there are cafes where parties are affeAed by teftimony, which they had not any opportunity of fcrutini^ing, and by the admiffion of which they may receive a material prejudice. The ftatute 5 Geo. 3. r. 30. contains a provifion for entering on record the depofitions taken upon commiflions of bankrupt, and diredisy that in cafe of the death of the witneiles proving the bank- niptcyt a true copy of fuch depofitions ihall, upon all occafions, be given in evidence to prove fuch bankruptcy. It has been held in the expofition of this ftatute, that the depofitions are evidence^ npt pnly of the fa& of committing the a£l of bankruptcy, but alfoof the time of its being committed. Jan/on y. Wilfon^ Doug. By the annual mutiny a£i, it is provided that two or more jttftices of peace, where any foldier (hall be quartered, in cafe fuch fqidier has a wife, or children, may fummon him to make oath of his fettlement \ and an attefted copy of fuch a£5davit ihall be at anytime admitted as evidence of fuch fettlement, and fuch foldier ihall not be again obliged to make any other oath refpe^ing his fettlement. By the ((atutes of Philip and Mary^ juftices of peace are dire^ied, in the cafe of perfons being brought before them for felony, to take the examinations of the witneiTes in writing. Thefe ftatutes do not contain any provifion for die examination^ being admitted as evidence, in cafe of the inability of the witnefs to attend at the' fubfequent trial \ and there certainly is a very great ufe in taking fuch examinations, for the purpofeof aflifting the judge at the trial, and in preventing the corruption and prevarication of witnefles, R 3 without 230 A P P E N.D I X. [Numb. XVI. without itj being ncccffarily regarded as the objcd of the ftatutes, that the examinations themfelvcslhould be admitted as evidence upon the trial j but in ^point of pradice, it is now eftablifhed that fuch examinations, if taken in the prefcnce of the party charged, (hall be admitted as evidence, in cafe of the witnefs's death,,in the mean time. I rather think that this praQice originated from its being tajcen for granted, without due examination, that the ftatutes were intended to have this operation ; and that afterwards, the prafticc being cftabliflied, it was not thought proper to difturb it •, for in the cafe of Tie King y. Paim, Salt. 281. upon offering fuch an ex- amination in the cafe of a mifdemeanor, it was faid by the Court of King's Bench, upon advice with the judges of the Common Pleas, that in cafe of felony, fuch depofitions before a juftice,if tlie deponent die, may be ufed in evidence by the ftatutes of Philip and Mary -, but that cannot be extended farther than the particular cafe of felony. But it is evident that in this cafe, it was unncccf- fary to confider whether the depofitions could be admitted as evi- dence in cafes of felony ; the judges correflly adverted to the cir- cumftancc, that the provifion of the ftatutes was inapplicable to the cafe of mifdemeanours ; and the qucftion whether, becaufe an ex- amination is direfted to be taken, it fiiall, undergivencircumftanccs, be received in evidence, was perfeftly irrelevant 5 fo that what was faid upon this fubjefk was merely incidental. Tt appears by a note of Mr. Peah, 2 ed. pa. 93. that it is the practice to receive in evidence the depofitions which were taken before the coroner by a witnefs who is dead, whether the party charged was prefcnt or not. The qucftion^ whether the examination of a pauper refpeQing his fettlemcnt, taken before two juftices who did not remove him, was admiflible upon an appeal from an order, afterwards made, the pauper having become infane, (which was regarded as equivalent to his being dead) received a very elaborate decifion in the famous cafe of Tie King v., Eri/well, 3 T. R. 373. upon which the judges were equally divided. The judges whofe opinions were in favour of admitting the evidence, went upon the ex ten five principle of adniitting even hearfay evidence, upon queftions of this defcription. Mr. Jufticc Gro/e, who took the oppofitc fide, partly founded his opinion upon the examination being extrajudicial, and it migh^be colle£ted, that if it had been taken for the purpofe of an order of removal, he would have thought it admiflible ;.but Lord Kenjon dif« tin£lly exprefled his opinion, that even if the examination had been taken to found an order of removal upon it, it would have been no better than a mere declaration of the party. I conceive that this point Numb. XVI.] Of the Examination ofWiineffes. 23 1 point may now be confidered a6 at reft ; for although it has not been cxprefsly decided, that an examination taken before magi* ftratcsi as the foundation of an order of removal^ cannot be read in evidence after the pauper's death, the point appeur's to be the clear refult of the dectiions which have a^ually taken place. In The Kifig\. Nuncham ComiNfyy i £n/f, 373. the pauper, whofe ex- amination was taken, abfconded b.:tween the removal and the appeal; the Court, without giving any formal judgment, exprefled a decided opinion againft the admifiibility of the evidence ; which was acquiefced in by the counfel. In Tie Kittg v. Ferry FryRone^ 2 Eafi^ 54. the examination was not taken for the purpofe of re- moval, and the pauper was dead, the Court rejected the evidence \ and Lord Kcuyofi (aid, that it was true that in the cafe of Nunehatn Couiifiey, rliere was no evidence that the perfon, whofe examina* wn was taken, was dead j but the opinion of the Court againft the general doArine of the two judges who fupported the reception of die evidence in the former cafe, wasjpretty broadly hinted* The . .cafe of The King v. jihrg^vil/y, 1 Fq/f^ 63. was alfo tliat of a vritten examination never n£led upon. Thrfe cafes certainly ftrongly manifeft the difpofition of the court, and it feems to be pretty clear diat the decifions were not founded upon the minor circumftance, in the two lail, of the examinations having been extrajudicial, or in the iirft, upon the diftindion between the pauper's death or his having abfconded, but upon the more general principle which includes the death of the pauper, after a regular ex- amination. I have known a court of quarter-feiTions admit the e?idence of fuch an examination, and refufe a cafe, upon the rec* titude of doing fo, out of tender regard to the litigant townfliips ; as the difpute regarded only the fettleibent of a fingle individual, and the expence of agitating the queftton, would probably amount to more than that of maintaining the pauper. In The King v. Rave$tJione^ 5 Z". /2. 373. it was ruled that the examination, before birth, of a woman with child, is, in cafe of her death, evidence againft the putative father. In Bretdon v. G///, x Lord Raym. 219. % Sail:. 555. the com* miflioners of appeal proceeded upon the minutes of evidence taken before the commiffioners of excife, which the Court of King's Bench thought wrong, and granted a prohibition as to the admif- fion thereof. But ifo//, Ch. J. faid) that his private opinion was^ that if the witnefles were dead, or could not be found, then the commillioners of appeal might make ufe of the depofitions } but that not being before him judicially, he would not give a judicial opinion,— Whoever has had an opportunity of attending courts of R 4 judicaturca »3» APPENDIX* [NumK X\^ judicature, and alfo of feeing the priTate examinations wUch are taken upon many of the oocaGons above alluded to, muft be con- vinced of the great danger of fuffcring any public or private in- terefts to be affefied by fuch examinations. Wherever the nar- ration of a witnefs may be the fubjeA of obje£Hon, on account of his want of veracity, the failure which juftice muft experience from the want of an opportunity of trying the fa£i by a minute examination of circumftances, open to contradiction, by fixing the witnefs to particulars of time and place, and all other topics not cohiprized in a general fweeping 'account, will be manifeft to the moft curfory obfervers. When an objection to the veracity of the witnefles, who have been believed upon the firft examination, is the very caufe and motive of the appeal, the dead letter narrative, taken by a clerk in the excife, or by a country juftice, exhibits none of thofe prevarications of manner, none of thofe indications of in- fincerity, upon which an adequate judgment, in many cafes, fo eflentially depends. ^ But even when all fufpicion of veracity is fuppofed to be out of I the queftion, how very unfatisfadory is the ex parte account of t witnefs taken under circumftances, in which the adverfe party had not a fair opportunity of crofs examination, or in which fuch an j examination, being unufual, could not reafonably be expelled to ' have taken place. In the examinations taken before magiftrates in cafes of febny, the obje£l of inquiry is not the acquittal or conviction of the prifoner, but the propriety of confining him for the purpofe of trial ; he has not 'thofe affiftances for analyfing the proofs which are adduced againft him, which exift upon a folemn trial, where he can call in aid the exertions of judicious advocates, and is fureof die protection of a learned and impartial judge. The minute invefti- gation of the material fads may have even been deemed irrelevant to the immediate purpofe of the inquiry ; the combating of the evidence by profeiGonal affiftance, or by adverfe teftimony, is fre« quently difallowed ; and it is a very hard meafure, that an authen- tic record may be taken of the evidence which tends to criminate, while there is not an equal opportunity of preferving the materials of defence.' In one point of view, the admii&on of thefe examina- tions may not be very obje&ionable, that is, in refpeft to their producing a maaifeftation of the demeanour of the priibner, upon the oGcafion (^ hearing them, when his filence may be juftly re- garded as a mark -of acquiefcence ; but then the examinations ought to be treated, not as immediate evidence of the fads related, but as evidence of certain izQtz being imputed to the grifoner in his Numb. XVL] Of the Examination afWitneJfes. ^33 his prefenccy and of his condud upon recming the imputation ; and eren in this point of Tiew, the fubjcA cannot be treated with too much caution. The decifion of the event by the materiality of faAs difclofedt on cTofs-examination, is a matter of perpetual occurence % a wit- nefs before a magiftrate» depofes to a prifoner's confeffion % he voold depofe the fame upon the trial ; but upon the interpofition ] of the judge, it appears that the confeffion was improperly ob* tained, and the eridence is reje&ed, but the witnefs is dead, the depofition is produced^ and the prifoner, upon the ftrength of it^ is comri£led* In cafes of fettlement» nothing can be more unfatisfsAory than die examinations, which are ufually produced upon an em parti proceeding, inftituted by a parifli for its own convenience, and depofited privately in its cheft. A. B.fwtars^ that he gained a Settlement in C, hj being hired for a year^ and ferving a year t$ D. B. new deceafed. A very flight perufal of the fettlement hw will (hew how intricate a fyftem is eftablifhed, with reiped to the definition of a hiring and fervice for a year \ and how in* adequate a perfon who has been engaged in any employment muft commonly be to form a judgment upon the complex propofition of law and fad refulting from any given combination of circum* ftances. It would certainly not be unreafonable in future mutiny ads to provide, that an examination, taken under them, ihould be tranfmitted, within a definite time, to the pariih which it purports to charge, and that the officers of fuch parifli fliould be allowed 10 require a fecond examination, at which they might have an opportunity, with profeffional affillance, to make a more particular inquiry. ' The pofltive dire^iions of a permanent ftatute have fixed the law upon this fubjed with refpe£t to cafes of bankruptcy, and there can be but one opinion as to . the propriety of carrying that law into execution, according to the true conilru^iion of its intention ; but with lefpe^i to the expediency of fuch a law, and its connec* tion with the fair expofition of truth, the experience of every lawyer muft furnifli many inftances of a fct of cut-and-dried depofitions being unable to ftand the teft of an open crofs^exami- nation. The only remaining topic arifing from the preceding cafes is^ die examination in cafes of baftardy; which certainly has not any particular reafons of exception, from the general obferva- tions fefpefting the unfatisfaftory character of en parti dcpo- fiiions« It 234 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVL It is a general requiCteto tlie examination of witneflcs, that tlieir tcftimony fliall be given upon oath ; but the manner in which the oath is commonly adminiflered, is not very much calculated to ira- prefs the mind with the folemnity of its obligation. Infidels ^o profefs no religion that can bind their confcjenccs to fpeak trutn cannot be witnefles. But when any pcrfon pro- fefles a religion that will be a tie upon him, he fliall be. admitted as a witnefs, and fwom according to the ceremonies of his OMn religion ; for it would be ridiculous to fwear a witnefs upon tlie holy Evangeliilsi who did not believe thofc writings to be facred. The Jews are always fwom upon the Old Tejiament^ Makome^ tans on the Koran^ thofe of the Gentoo religion, according to tlic ceremonies of that religion, &c. Bull. N. P, 282, See a very full and inftru^ive difcuflion of this fubjefl, iu Oaiichuud v. Bar^ hr, I AtL 21. 2 Eq. Ah. 2^91* The affirmation of ^uaiets is- by BtaU 7 & 8. JiT. & M. ren« dered admifiible, where an oath is required from others, except in criminal cafes ; which exception has been held to extend to the cafe of an appeal for murder, £/r, 854. a motion for an attach- ment for non-performance of an award, 5/r. 441. a motion for an information, for a mifdemeanour, Ztr. 87a. articles of the peace, S/r. 527. a rule to anfwer the matters of an affidavit, &r. 946. and an affidavit in defence of another, l>ut not in defence of themfelves agalnft a criminal information, 2 Bur. 1 1 1 7. It is held not to extend to a cafe refpefiing the appointment of an overfecr, S/r. 1219. or a penal a£tion, Atchefm v. Everett^ dnap. 382. Jjord Mansfieldiin that cafe, took a very comprehenfive view of the fubjedl, and feemed to difTent from fome of the preceding cafes of exclufion. By the fame cafe, it appears that kiffing the book is not cilential to an oatli ; but any other folemnity, which' a witnefs may think more binding, will be admitted. In fome Roman Catholic countries a notion prevails, that an oath impofes no obligation, in point of confcience, unlefs the perfon fwearing has a crucifix before him. I have been informed of an inftance which took place before the perfons relating it to me, of a Portuguefe who, upon tlie cuftomary examination taken before commiffioners, upon bringing in a veflel as prize, gave a full and diftinft account of the neutrality of the veflcl \ but upon a fuggef- tion of the prevalence of the notion above mentioned, a crucifix was exhibited to him, which induced him inftantly to retra£t what he had faid, and admit a cafe of enemy's property. Many learned perfons differ in opinion with refpe£l to the com- parative advantage of a public examination ih open court, and a private Numb. XVI.3 Of the Examination ofWitneffes. 235 priTate examination before a judge or commiflioiicrsi each commooij adopting tlie fide wliich has been familiar to his own habits of prafticc. Sir William Blachftone ftrongly maintains the advantage of the former, as m6re conducive to the clearing up of truth ; and obferveSj that a witnefs may frequently depofe that in private which he will be afhamed to teftify in a public tribunal. He alfo takes notice, that the occafional quedions of the judge, die jury^ and the counfel, propounded to the witnefs on a fudden, will fift out the truth much better than a formal fet of interrogatories' prcvioufly penned and fettled ; and the confronting of adverfe . witnefles is alfo another opportunity of obtaining a clear difcovery^ wliich can never be had upon any other method of trial \ and that by this metliod of examination, and this only, the perfons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of obferving the quality, age, . education, underftanding, behaviour, and inclination of the witnefs ; in which points all perfons muft appear alike, when their depofitions are reduced to writing, and read to the judge, in the abfence of tliofe who made them ; and yet as much may be frequently collefled from tlie maimer in which the evi- dence is delivered, as from the matter of it. Comnuntarus^ III. 373. Dr. Brown takes the oppoGte (ide, and after obferving that the witnefles in the Ecclefiaflical Courts, are to be fecretly and fcpa- rately examined, not in the prefence of the parties or other wit* nefTes, and that their depofitions, after being read over to them ' article by article, and they alked whether there be any thing which they wi(h to alter or amend, are to be (igned by the witnefs, and be afterwards repeated before the judge, i. e. afked again in the open court by the judge, whether there be any thing which he wifhes to alter or correft \ fubjoins the following n^te. ^< How much is this preferablcj in fome refpe£ls, to an examination ztNi/S PrittSf where every incautious or hafty expreflion is inftantly bel- lowed to die jury, and infifted upon, without giving time to the witnefles to corre^ a particle, or if he attempts to do it, perjury or prevarication is immediately charged on him V* Leilures on Civil Law, Vol. I. p. 479. Sir jy. Blmchftofu, in the place above cited, fpeaks of the power of a witnefs to correfl and explain his meaning if mifunderftood, as one of the advantages of open examination, in preference to the evidence appearing in the language of an artful, or carelefs fcribe. So far as the refpeAive examinations may be fuppofed to be taken with proper care and attention, and by perfons of ade- quate abdity I conceive that, with refped to this power of cor- reQionj the advantage is on the fide of the written exambation. If 2^6 APPENDIX- [Numb^XVL If the fttbjecl of the examination requires a conCderable pordon of time to be allotted to it, an inconvenience is alfo like] j to re- fultj in the ufual arrangement of bufmefs, from the limited portion of time employed in trials at Nifi PriuSf the prefiure of other bufinefs, and the want of an oppqrtunitjr of admitting thofe relax- ations and intermiihonS) which an adequate attention to the fab- jeA will naturally require^ a consideration which often renders it neceflfary, for the purpofes of ju{);ice» to fubmit cafes of this de- 'fcription to arbitration, when an amduous attention of many days, or even weeks, is often found requifite for the examination of a cafe, which, upon an open trial, muft be difpofed of in a few hours, or if necefiarily protradied beyond that time, muft be continued, without an adequate allowance for the remilfions of attention^ which nature abfolutely demands. , In this, as in many other cafes already alluded to in the prefent number, the rule which is eftabliihed on either fide, upon a prin« ciple of general preference, muft, in a great many inftances, fail in the particular application. The latent fraud which would efcape detedlion in the formality of a private examination will often be- come confpicuous from the well-timed imprei&on of a judicious queftion before a public auditory} but the truth which is over* whelmed by the petulance and infult, that fometimes accompany die pra£iice of public examination, may exert its full influence where the circumftances that excited confuiion and rimidity are removed. I think the general balance is ftrongly in favour of ^ public examination, but that the abufes and inconveniences to which fdch an examination is liable, require a conftant and zealous atten- tion of the Court, in their corre<^ion or fupprellion. I am apprehenfive that the following obfervations upon the tef- timony of witneflcs which have occurred to me, if not during an extenfive pra£lice, at leaft during an attentive obfervation of the proceedings of courts of juftice, will appear very vague and un- fatisfa£iory as applied to the extent and importance of the fubjefi: of them ; and at the fame time will, from the fpace which they occupy, be condemned for their diffufenefs and prolixity i ^ut al- though I am confcious of my inability to afford fuch a view of thi| fubjeA as would correfpond with my wiflies, I am deCrous of offering fuch a contribution towards it as accords with the irore humble limits of my power. All regard to teftimony fuppofes the general propo&tion, that witnefles, not having any motives for aflerting what ia falfe or fup- prefling what is true, having had an adequate opportunity of obferving the fubje£l to which they depofe, having adiually obferved it with I adequate Numb. XVL] Of the Examination o/Wtinefes. ^37 adequate attention, and having a diftin£l and'petfefl memory with TttpcSt to it, relate what they have feen, or heard with accuracy and fidelity ; and the reracity of teftimony, given by perfons fully anlWering this defcription, is received and a£ted upon as a fufficient teft of moral and judicial certainty. If a perfon, wholly indifiisrent to the event of a caufe, (hould depofe that within the preced- ing hour, he had feen one of the parties with whom he was per- fcQly well acquainted, execute a releafe, the h£t of fuch ezecu* lion would be admitted as a certain truth. But in judicial inquiries, recourfe muft often neceiTarily be had ^ teftimony, not completely anfwering the defcription which has been given, or with refpe^ to which the application of that de» fcription may not be fuUy afcertained i and the fcale of teftimony defcends from that high aflurance, which is for all moral pur* pofes equivalent to certainty, through every gradation of inferior teftimony, to that which leaves the judgment completely in fu& penfe, and from thence, through all the degrees between' the iighteft preponderance on the fide of incredulity, to the extreme o£ fdf-convi£led falfehood. If a perfed and abfolute aflurance that a witnefs completely anfwexcd the above, defcription^ were in every cafe to be regarded as an eflential preliminary to the credence of his evidence, the in- credulity would, in numerous inftances, be in oppoGtion to the a£lual truth of the thing related. Such an incredulity would be the efk€t and fign of imprudence, in the ordinary intercourfe ot life i in the adminiftration of law, it would frequently occafion a fiulure of right, and confequently merit the appellation of in* jttftice. Teftimony therefore will, for either purpofe, be* in general regarded as accurate and true, unlefs there is reafon, from its own inherent qualities, or from extrinfic circumftances, for forming an oppofite conclufion, or at leaft, for fufpending the judgment. If there is an adequate opportunity for arriving at certainty, or obtaining further information refpeding the truth of evidence, upon which the judgment is divided, the mind will require the fatisfaAion of which the fubje A is fufceptible, either in confirma^ tion of the hiEt aflerted, or in contradidion of it, and the fatif- fa&ion expe£ied will be in proportion to the importance of the object, to the degree of doubt attending the teftimony afforded, and the nature of the opportunities for difpelling, or diminiik- ingit. Bot if these i$ no further opportunity of a(f quiring an abfoSi^te knowledge Uo APPENDIX. [Numb- XVL or even wben the witneflei themlielves are together»a4 U commonly the cafe for fome time previous to the trial ; the caafein which they are to be examined becomes the natural and ufual topic of their converfation, and the fuccefs of it, generally fpeaking, cannot be a matter of abfolute indifiercnce. Where the wiflies are anxiouf* ly engaged in favour of an event, the opinions are feldom wholly uninfluenced. A philofopherfees in a ftronger form of view the fa&s which favour his fyftem ; an advocate, though avowedly arguing not upon his own imprelfions, but upon the grounds moft favour* able to his client, becomes really imprefled with the truth of the propofidon which he is engaged to fuftain } and a witnefs, under the circumftances above alluded to, fees the truth through the me* duim of his wiihes. It is the regular habit of the bar to exclude the witneiTes from their confultations } in order to prevent their teilimony being biaflcd by the views which they might receive of the bearings of the caufe ; but the other converfations in which they are engaged prefent that obje£l to their mind. Some prac- ti/ers, to infure the fuccefs of their caufe, interro^te the witneflet again and again, without any finifter motive, and merely with a wifli to aflift the accuracy of their examination. Others noore judicious having once, by careful inveftigation, informed thcm- felves of the truth, truft to the natural and unprepared effufion of it* It is very eafy to lay down a general maxim, that a witnefs ought to diveft himfelf even of involuntary wiflies, that he ought in the manner, as well as the fubftance, of his narrative, to adhere to a fuccinfl, impartial account of the truth; but ftill the infirmities of human natur% will have their operation, and a wit- nefs, in the (hort period allotted to his examination, will, in many cafes, with a mind unaiTe^ied by the flighted intention of a wilful ' deviation from veracity, give an afpe£k to his relations derived from the previous influence of his wiflies upon his opinion ( and if this circumftance will occur, as in numerous inftances it unqueftion- ably will, with refpe£t to perfons who are duly fenfible of the nature of their obligatioq^how much more extcnfive will be the influence of fimiliar confiderations, with refped to thofe who aie indiflFerent to it ? The inference which I wifli to deduce from the preceding obfervations, is the propriety of receiving, with adequate circumfpe£iion, that part of die teftimony which may probably be influenced by fuch confiderations as have been alluded to, without unduly difcredidng the fubftantial parts of the relation, which may be entirely free from any rational objedion. I am perfefUy awaie of the general adoption of the maximi that if the wita^fs wilfully deviates Namb. XVI.]} Of the Examination ofWtneffes. ^41 deviates from truth in any particular, the whole credit of his tef* timony is deftroyedy and ihall have occafion more particularly to allttde to it } but the true application of the maxim is only refer* able to thofe deviations^ which refult from the a&ual depravity of the ffiind) and does not extend to its involuntary infirmities. To illuftrate my general idea by the particular application of it. Two witnefles may give a correal narrative of the fame event, fo far as their moral veracity is concerned, yet leave a very difierent im- prel&on upon the minds of their hearers ^ the mere manner of nanration with refpedl to looks, tones, and geftures, will produce die diflference. The friend of an injured -party will defcribe, with feeling and intereft, the fubjed of his complaint } his previous fentiments give the fubje£l an exaggerated reprefentation to his own mind, wUch he communicates to his hearers ; the friend of his affiulant fees, in a ftriking point of view, the provocation 'which to the other had appeared trivial and infignificant, and the condu£l occafioned by it will appear in very mitigated colours ; and from a mere indifierence in the mode of his relation, will produce a pre- cifely oppofite imprefEon ; while an uiiconncdied bye-ftandcr will give a reprefentation perfectly accordant with the others in Its gene- ral fubftance, butprefenting the corre£l medium between the excefs of die one, and the extenuation of the other. His own narration will receive a degree of vivacity or (luggiihnefs from his conilitutional charader^ but will not be influenced by thofe coufiderations whicfi a£hiate the others. Wherever, therefore, the judgment and opi- nion may be involuntarily, and inconfcioufly affefted by the habits or relations of the witnefs, a fufpicion may be reafonably enter* tained of the juftnefs of his narration, fo far as the operation of thefe caufes may be imputed to him, without invalidating the ge-' neral credit in his veracity. To this obfervation may be added, the readinefs which appears in adducing what is favourable to the party on whofe behalf the witnefs feels an intereft, and a reludtance in difclofing what is adverfe to him. I admit the duty of a perfeft equality and in- dlfierence, but I conceive the deviations from that duty are refer- able, in many cafes, to the fources which I have already alluded to. A witnefs is placed in a fituation to which he is utterly utiaccuf- tmned, he cannot poflefs the prefence of mind, and the compofure of an indifferent fpeQator, or control at pleafure, the tendencies of his difpofition ; the difference of his manner, with refpe£l to the two partji of a fubjed, will properly excrcife the difcrimination of thofe who are to decide upon his teftimony \ they will en- deavour to correA the efkEt of his partiality ; but will not urge the charge of faUebood and prevarication^ beyond the deCgned and Voi.IL S wilfdl 24^ APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. wilfiil dereliction bf mtegrity. I tnift that I have exprefled my- felf with fufficient diftinflnefs, to prevent its being fuppofed that I am becoming the advocate for intentional mifrepitfcntation or delibente fuppreffion ; I wtfli only to inculcate the principle of preventing the natural infmnities of the chamber having a morq extenfive influence upon the credit of teftimony, than they mar rcafbnably be fuppofed ta have upon its^ truth* There are fome particular fubjeds^ in which the fnfpicion of involuntary bias in a witneCi will be ftronger tlian in others. Ic will evidently be lead in plain matters of fad, as whether a car- riage was o>n the right or left fide of the road. It will be ftrongeft when it relates to manner, as whether the driver, who is himfelf the witnefs, was conducing himfelf properly or otherwife. Tbt evidence of converfation asd expreflions ought to be received with very confiderable circumfpe£lion| fo far as any thing de- pends upon its. circumflantial accuracy. It very rarely occurs that two perfons will relate the fame converfation in the fame man- ner. The particular phrafeology of the relator will always blend itfelf wilh the relation ; and notliing is more common than for the irnprcffion of converfation to be influenced by the previous dif- pofition of the parties to it or the hearers of it. The accounts which' are publxflied in the news-papers, of tl^e proceedings in par- liament, or courts of juftice, on the day preceding, vary eonfider- ably from each other, not merely in the taking a more or kfscom- prehenfive view of particular parts> bat alfo in the fubftance of the ftatement relative to the fame particulars, and evert in the order of the fpeakcrs v and tlie general corrc6\ncfs' of the rcprcfentation. is very feldom aflented to by thofe who, from having been prefent, have an opportunity of confirming or contradifting it. Nothing is more natural than to appl)^ what we hear according to what we wifli, to conftrue an expreffion of civility as an cfier of fervice, the recommendation of a cuftomer, as a promife for the payment of his account. Tlie ftatme of frauds has interpofed its authority, to prevent the effeft of this mifconception in fevcral cafes particularly enumerated. The principle of that ftatute, may be judicioufly applied to the efftfk of evidence, in feveral caft$ without the limit of its provifions, bwt fubje£t to the mifchicf againft which it was intended as a remedy ; evidence of promifes, and acknowledgments, is ahnoft always given by perfons who are m a Gtuation which prevents thehr being abfolutely indifevent refped* ing the ctkGt ; and who wiU> in many cafes, unconfcioufly give a turn to the converfations which they relate, by no means accordant with the impreffions which the fpeakers intended to convey. To receive the reprefeutations of thefe peribnS' as> literally ione&j to eonfider Numb. X VI.3 Of the Sxaminathn 0/ Witnejfes. 243 conCder the czpreflions which they relate^ as havlflg the fame authentic certahity as a written documcnty will therefore^ in many cafesi lead to a conclufion repugnant to the truth, and confequently the attention given to fuch etidence will, according to the juft principles o£ ratiocination, be much lefs than that which is due to the plain aiErmative or negative of an unequirocat matter of There is one kind of teftimony to which the preceding obfenra* tion emphatically applies, and which is often fubjedi'to the addi* tionll imputation of an intentional want of fairnefs of condu£b« I mean the acknowledgments which are obtained by perfons con* neded with the law, on behalf of the parties for whom they arc engaged. Such acknowledgments only deferve a full attention, whra it appears that they were made with perfed^ freedom, and with perfedl plainnefs. The difengenuotis artifices which are made ufe of to entrap a perfon into expreilions to be uftd in evi- dence againft him, the eagernefs to make a dired and poGtive plication of an ambiguous expreffion, to drain into a promlfe ^ acknowledgment, what was nevet intended to convey that im*- prefiion to the mind, cannot be too narrowly watched, or too ftrongly difcountenanced* Nothing is more calculated to ex-«ite an unfavourable opinion, than to fee an attorney (land up to fup* fon his fallbg caufe, by fupplying all deficiences of ptoof, from ibme fuppofifd converfation with the adverfe party \ and, according tt> the apt metaphor commonly applied to the fubje^l, pinning the ^Iket. A reputable attorney will be cautious of engaging va, converfation with the adverfe pafty, except in the prefence of his own profeffional advifer, and will be ftiU more cautious in avoiding any unfair reprefentation of it } but however ftrongly the general lefpe&ability of the profeifion may inculcate the propriety of this pra&ice, experience evinces that there are many particular excep- tions^ and the caution which is advifable with refpe£t to crediting Uie teftimony of perfons, whofe fituation is in fome degree a pledge fof the propriety of their condu£l, becomes requifite, in a ftill hi^r degree, with refpe£k %^ the inferior officers of the law ; a fet of peribne among whom thefjre are many inftances of probity of chata£ker, and propriety of cotiduft ^ but who, in general, find theij. greateft tntereft in their adroitnefs to ferve the parties by whom they are engagedJlt-would tend greatly to advance the credit of all evidence given of fuch acknowledgments, if they were imme* lately taken down in writing, and communicated to die party mak* ing diem ; and in cafe any diffent was exprefled, or explanation offered, Aat iliottld be added to the minute \ in (hort, it i$ defirable dot anaccttxateiDfimoDal (houU he made of the tranfiiAipn^ and of Sa the 244 APPENDIX* [Numb. XVI. the demeanour of the party, before the iin|>refiicmof themelnofytotiM be perverted 5 and what 19 ftill more important, before the teRJmont could be influenced, by a view of its materiality, derived from the fubfequcnt* afpeft of the cadfe. The preceding obfettafions may be extended, in atemarkable degree, to the inferior retainers of police^ wlio generally feel a ftrofig intereft in the convidron of p^rfow charged with criminal offences, and are apt to fuppofe their ovm reputation for afiiduity and a£lif ity Connefted ii^ith that event, h would conduce to the piirify of juftice in thisrefpefl, if no accounts of the declarations of prifoncrs to thefe pcrfons were received upon a trial, which were not ftated and reduced into writing upon the examination of tlie prifoncr before the magiftrate, and the prifoner*s declaration refpeding which, at that time, vi^as alfo care-* fully recorded. The magiilrntes fhould likewife be very particu- lar in ftating, on the examination, the circumilances and majnicf in which the declaration was obtained, and not be fatisfied witli the common-place quellions, of whether there were any threats or promifes; fince the legal objedlion iS, in. terms, often carefully avoided, while the fpirit and principle of it have their full operation and cffeft. Courts of juflice, generally, with great propriety dircft a jury to lay out of their mind any reprefentation of officers of polipc, refpefting the alarm or agitation manifefted by a perfon, on being charged \vith any offence, a fubjeck which is often very eagerly prefented to them j correftly obferving, that innocence may not be lefs agitated by an unexpedlcd charge, than criminality alarmed by detection. The evidence of pcrfons who dcpoTc to their fcientific knowledge of any matters in difputc is, in may cafes, fubjeft to be influenced by their wifhes, in favour of the party adducing them. It has been the obfervation of a great advocate, now advanced to a high judicial fituation, refpeflmg tlie confli£fing. tcftimony of furvcyors produced by the oppofite parties, that thefe pcrfons were only advocates upon oath. The courfe of prafticc certainly fumilhes many inflances of the truth and propriety of the obfervation 5 the proper correSion of this inconvenience is to apply the attention, rather to tlic conviflion, which thefe advocates produce upon the mind, by the juftice and confiftency of their arguments, than to give to their tcftimony the authority which is due to an indifferent relation of an obvious matter of fa£l. The above obfcrvations will fufficiently indicate the principle v.hich I have endeavoured to eftablifh, in fa\'our of a diftinflion, between the caution which (hould be applied in the reception of evidence, frcm perfons who may naturally be fuppofed to be not indifferent in the event of an inquiry, and the abfolute difcredrt of tlieir tcftimony, - • - • • The Naoib. KVIJ Of the Examimtion ofWiineJfes. 245 • The opportunity of obfervation, the accuracy with which that obfenration has been concluded, and the fidelity of memory with which it is related, are alfo circumftances which (hould naturally fonn a material ingredient in the credit which it (houid receive. k is very certaAi, that the mind is often deceived by its impref-f- tons upon thefe fubje^s : and that upon examination and iaquiry, its mod firm ^pinion^ are found erroneous \ for the truth of which pofition the moft fati$fa£lpry teft will be afforded, by referring each individual to the evidence of his own experience. Tl^e well knows anecdote of Sir Walter Raleigh^ who fupprefled the fecond volume of his Htftory of the Worlds upon finding himfelf deceived tn the mature of ad occurrence, of which he had fuppofed that he had an a.ccurate kzK>wledge from his own observation, is a conftant leflbn as to the propriety of a minute examination into the accu- racy which the mind of a perfon poflefles refpe£bing the fubje£t of his relation ; but it is a more important caution upon the neceffity of (tiftinguiihing between mifconception, and mifreprefentation ^ andagunft rejefking the general teftihiony, as unworthy of reception £rom its want of veracity, virhen the only imputation to which it is jufUy fubjeA, is a miftaken conception refpediing fome inciden- tal particular. The difcordancy of witnefles upon the fame fa£i^ is therefore very frequently afcribed to a mere difierence of ob- fervation or mehuMy. The immediate attention of one perfon being dire£bed to one part of a fubje£l, and another to another, a difiexent Impreflion is l^t upon their minds^ each, by the frame and courfe of his attention, will have a lefs lively idea, and a lefs retentive memory, and confequently will be, in a greater degree, fttbjeA to the influence of tniftakei with reipe£^ to that partof tlie fabje£l which has had the fmaller portion of his regard, than with itTpefi to the other upon which his mind has been more immedi- afecly occupied* A greater or a lefs degree of attention will alfo be pointed to the fubjefl itfelf, without reference to the diftin£lion bdwcen the difierent parts of it, according to the mind being in other refpeSs free or engaged, according to habit, inclination, or an infinite variety of other caufes being calculated, or otherwife to create an intereft in the occurrence. Hence will refi^It a dif- ference of narrative, which fo far as it is reiblvable into this caufe, will rather be an indication of veracity, than induce a fufpicion of wifehood. The diftindion between the inconfiftency tl^at refults fromiepvefentarions having no folid foundation in truth, and which dierefore accompanies every part of a narrative, not included in die previous alrangement, and the variation which may be afcrib- edto a (tiffeience in the impreffions of the mind refpe£ling a real occurrencci often calb for the mod judicious difcriminatiou. But S 3 , though 246 A P P E N D I X* [Numb, XVI. though a dtfcordancy referable to the caufes which have been main tionedf is certainly no indication of falfehood, it is fometimcs too ftrongly relied upon as a raanifeftation of truths and at dcmon-r itrating that there has been no preriou^ concert ; whereas^ it is aU mod impofiible for a previous concert to embrace every incident tal circumftance, which may be introduced into the examination as a teft of veracity, I conceive that this difcrepancy is, in general, only a negative quality, leaving the teftimony of which it forms a part, to ftand or fall by its merits in other particulars. I have heard of a mode fometimes adopted, (and the mention of which is Hot fo much calculated to promote the pra ought equally to prevail in other cafes referable to the fame principle. Itfometimes occurs, that a witnefs, having a given 'fa£l propofed U> him, will not fwear pofitively to the non-«xiftence of it ; when the hCt is of fuch a nature, that if true, it catmot be fuppofed but that he mufl: have known and recoUedied it. Thus if a witnefs was aiked, whether fince the commencement of the trial, he had told a perfon prefent that he was come to perjure himfelf ; there can be DO doubt but that he can with fincerity only an(Wer yes, or no 1 but there are man^ cafes in which it is equally evident, to thofe capable of forming an adequate judgment, that the recoliedlion of the exiftence, or non-exiftence of a given fa£l, mud be perfe&lj diftin£li but in which the witnefs, from a fuperabundance ci caution, esprefles himfelf widi doubt and hefitation ; and in fa£k I obferve this kind of hefitation to be very general, in perfons of confined habits of thinking when examined upon fuch topics* They are then plied with a fet of queftions about, j^it had beenfi^ mufl you not have recolUBed^ &c. &c« afked in a manner which en- crafes their embarraiTment ; but the anfwer to which is not (o much an a£l of teftimony as of reafoning. Where proof is adually given of a fa£b, that the witnefs could not but know and lecolleA, his exprefling himfelf in terms of doubt and uncertainty, is to be- regarded as an z6t of wilful mifreprefentation ; on the odierhand, if no fuch proof is given, and the teftimony is, in other xefpe£ts, unfufpicious, and the witnefs is not a perfon who, from his fituation and underftanding, cannot but be aware of the power of giving a dtred affirmative, or negative ; it (hould be taken as the refult of his teftimony, that the fa£l did not exift ; or at all events, it {hould not be taken for granted that it did, from a witnefs de- claring that he could not fwe^ diat it vhu mtfo. Evidence of reafoninr^ is alfo referable to the fame general topic. A witness's teftimony of a fa£l may be pofitive, though the reafion he exprefies for it is falfe or abfurd. I have heard a mtnefs, when crofs-examined, as to his reafoi) for knowing cloaths which had been ftolen from him, refer to a matter of general defcription, which of courfe was. followed up with. Had no other perfon ever cloaths of that defcription f The judge, in his obiervations to the jury obferved, that a witnefs, in affigning reafons for fa£ts of which he muft have a pofitive ki^owledge, as * iv the .^5* APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. the identity of his own cloaths, often gave the worft reafon that could be imagined ; but the abfurdity of the reafon afcribed, did not diminifli the weight of the teftimony of a£iual knowledge^ But where the evidence necefiarily refolves itfelf into matter of reafoning^ the cafe is materially difierent, for there the failure of the leafoh prevents the fubfiftence of the conclufion which is founded upon it. To inftance a cafe which occurred in the fame Court with the preceding. A witnefs fwore that a perfon examined on the other Cde^ was not fit to be believed upon his oath ; and being alked his reafon faid, that he had never made a good fence Gnce he came to his farm. Where a witnefs is ejcamined as to his reafon^ intendoni or opinion upon fome pad occafion^ it will often happen that he ftatei fudi leafony as appears to him mod plaufible at the time of his ex- amination. If the reafon inquired for relates to fome pofitive faft out of the ordinary courfe of occurrences^ the reafon and motive can be* in moil cafes, remembered, with as much diftin£tnefs and accuracy as the hGL ; but I have known perfons interrogated with fome feverity, as to their reafon for not doing (bm«thing, to which the nature of the thing fupplies the anfwer, that no adequate mo* tive occuried to induce them a(f^ually to do it ; but the wimefs, per- plexed, and confufed by the queftion, will, in an indiftind and hefitating maimer, give fome anfwer which induces an. unfavour- able impreifion with refpe£); to his veracity. This obferyation occurred to me in hearing a trial, where a witnefs who had made a (haft, for the purpofe of getting brine under the land of die defendant, made certain obfervations and experiments, to afcertain that he did not carry it under the land of the plaintiff, and thefe obfervations being fuch, as if true, were, from the nature of die fubjedl, conclufive with refpe£l to the inference deduced from them, he was interrogated as to his reafons for not doing various other things fuggefted to him at the trial. Sometimes an intendoq is inquired into, refpefting mn occurrence at a diftant period, upon which, in all probability, there did not exift any intention at all} as where a perfon, who had 40 yeara before engaged her fon to ferve another for a given time to learn a ^rade, was aflsied, whether ihe did not intend that he fhouldbe an apprentice i To this,being| fts ufual, defirous of getting to an end of her examination, flic an* fwered,j^//V whereas it was highly improbable that ihe ihould have any intention, with refpeA to thofe diftinfiions between fenrice . and apprenticefhip, Which have been introduced into the fetde- ment law; inftead of iperely defigning that there fhould be a fer- vice and inftru^ion upon the terms agreed upon, according to which tcrm3 ;hp fon would haye acquired a fettlement by fenrice ; yet Numb* XVI.3 Ofih& Examination of Witnefes. ^5 f yet from this znU^ctyyeiy a bench of juflicesvas induced to decide the contrad to be a defe£live apprenticcifaip. And here it may be proper to advert to a diftinflion^ which hag often occurred to me» and was referabk to the preceding cafe^ . between the words ufed by, and proceeding from the witnefs at his own, and his giving an anfwer of ^/, or m^ to the queftion pro- poled to him ; the former being the indication of his own impre^ £ons and recolle£bion upon the fubjed of inquiry, the latter being the refult, the adoption, or rejediion of an extripfic^ fuggeftion. It , is therefore not an accurate reprefentation of the teftimony of a witnefs, to ftate that he had given a narrative in language appa* fentiy his own, when he had merely given an afErmative or negative anfwer to the language of another. Such a converfion of ex* preflions can only be an adequate delineadon of the teftimony^ upon the fuppofition of the witnefs having diftin£Uy and fully comprehended the language prefented to him, and of his aflent pz diflent to it, being a perfe£l reprefentation of the ideas previ- onily exifting in his mind. There is a peculiar danger of this kind of perverfion, when a fununary,andrx^0f/rreprefentatbn, taken at one time, is introduced in evidence at another. The preceding obfervations have been chiefly referable to telti« mony upon mere matters of fa£t, but thefe are often blended with matters of judgment } and the latter are themfelves, in many cafes, the fole objeA of examination. The adequacy of the judgment muft therefore be afliented to before any confidence can be placed in the refult of it ; and this confidence will depend upon the apparent or acknowledged talent of the witnefs, and his opportuni- ty of forming an adequate opinion, which latter circumftance will be materially influenced, by the nature of the fubje£l to which it is applied. In general, every perfon exerciCng an occupation is fuppofed to be converfant with the fubje£l of it, and hb opinion |S abided by, unlefs contradiAed by others intitled to an equal poofidencej or unlefs there are intrinfic circumftances for difput- ing it ; cmfiiit in artejua credendum eft. But upon the confliA of teftimony, a judgment is often to be pronounced according to the q^parent relative competence of the refpe£tive witnefles \ this judgment ought not to be haftily ie» ferred to the fluency of Aeir expreffions, or the plaufibility of their inanner; fince a patient attention will often perceive, that the flooft accurate knowledge is not always accompanied by the greiteft facility of communicating it The opportunity which re- ittlts from die a&ual obfervation of a particular fubje£l, is evident- ly more to be relied upon, fuppofing the judgment to be equal, itoii that wbifh if founds upon rclationi and much more than that asz A P P E N D I X.- [Numb, XVI. that which 1$ referable to mere hypothefis. A conGftency with undifputed izds i^ one of the moft advantageous tefts, of the con* fidence which ought to be repofed in the decifions of the jndgmenti but it is often dangerous for tbofe who are to decide^ ading upon their own inadequate conceptionsi haftily to' deduce a .chuge of inconfiftencyi in oppofition to the opinions of technical experience, Wherever fuch an inconfiftency is fuppofed to exift, it Ihould be fully pointed out, for the purpofe of receiving fuch elucidation as the witnefs may be enabled to afford, without referring it for mat"* ter of fubfequent obfervatioui which may probably be erroneous. The teftimony of a witnefs, with refpedl to fubjeAs upon which he has a peculiar knowledge, is fpmetimes received with diflatisfaci tion on account of his depofing to the exiftence of diftin&ions, or criteria t whiph are not perceptible to thofe by whom he is e^uunined ( and which| becaufe they cannot difcem, they will not fuppofcto cxift } but this is an improper ftandard of judgment, for everjr perfon can, with inftantancous facility, difcover the cafual variations sn fubjefls with which he is habitually familiar, and thefe in cir* cumftances fo minute that they would not be fufceptible of com^ munication to a common obferver. The Arab or Indian will trace, through the foreft or defert, the footfteps of which the members of cultivated fociety cannot difcem the flighted impreflion. The mariner will defcribe the particulars of a vefTel, which to the paf- fenger appears a fpeck in the horizon j the lawyer, and the phy- fician in the obje£ls of their refpe£live profeiGons, the botanift in his plants, the chemift in the contents of his laboratory, will per« ceive a materiality in diftin£lions, of which, to thofe who are un- accuftpmcd to their different purfuits, they cannot convey an in- telligible defcription. The mind in weighing the capacity of an expert, with relation to the fubje£k of his art, fiiould not decide upon the apparent uncertainty of the new and adventitious objeft of its attention, but upon comparifon with its own facility of ob- fervation, upon fubjefts with which it is moft familiarly conver« font. There are few fubje£ls in • which, independently of experi- ence, or .the conclufions of precife and accurate reafoning, there would be a greater apprehenfion of uncertainty, or a ftronger fufpicion of guefs and conjedure, than the art of decyphenng, jret it is an art which, (at leaft in its Idweft application) of a fubltitur tion of letters,) depends- upon principles as certain, and afanoft as eafy of communication, as the loweft rule of arithmetic. The weaknefs of thofe who circumfcribe the bounds of poi&bility and veracity by the limits of their own perception, is often ilhiftrated by applying the fable of the horfe, who was torn to pieces, for .ifl;nt*n^ in the torrid zone, that in other climates the men wefc whit , NombiXVIO OftbeExamiHatlonofWitTuffes. 253 \ iHrhtt^i add that paflengers codd traTcl over the fttrfiicc of firers* i Thex€ are alfo waiif cafes in which witnefles fpeak from judg« meilt and opinidni withoat reference to any technical knowledge \ fuchy for inftance, id evidence of chara&et, and all other teftimony amounting to a general conclufion upon particular iz€t9 ; when diis conclufion is accompanied by a narrative of h&z from the (ame witnefs, the fufficiency of the conclufion is a matter per' hOAj diftin£b from the reality of the fads ; an advocate who would impeach the veracity of the fa£ls» makes but little progrefsf by (hewing the weaknefs of the conclufion^ and on the other hand^ Ae advocate who relies upon the f ads, is not precluded from dif- puting the conclufion. This may be illuftrated by the following cafe, winch I have known to occur in praAice % a perfon depofed to having entered into a fervice under circumftances which^ in ^oint of law, would amount to a general hiring, which in equivalent (o a hiring for a year;. but (he. alfo declared that (he was not hired at all; the lattef part of her teftimony was evidently no more than the judgment of an ignorant witnefs, as to the legal import of the term hiring^ to which (he attached the idea of an engagement made in a certain manner, or for a certain time ex* prefsly mentioned \ but it was contended and fuccefsfuUy, in a Court of Quarter Seflions^ that it was impoflibie to pronounce m favour of the acquifition of a fettlement upon this evidence, as the witnefs upon whofe teftimony the whole depended, declared * that there was not any hiring, and thofe who produced her, and relied upon her evidence, were bound to take the whole together* In deciding upon the truth of evidence, much ftref^is laid upon the inherent* probability of it, a criterion which, within its proper Kmits, is attended with great utility, but which, like all other ge- neral criteria^ may be carried too far ; for where a teftimony is dire£l and pofitive, where the circumftances to which it relates are pal* pable and not calculated to excite delufion, where the witnefs had a petfe^^ opportunity of knowledge, where he has no motive to mifreprcfent, and ftill further, where the reprefentation militates againft the ufual motives of conduft; where feveral witne0es, of unimpeached integrity, free from all fufpicion of collufion, fpeak<> ing from detached and uncommunicated knowledge, concur in thtfs atteftation ; where the hGt attefted concurs with other undifputed phenomena, not reconcileable with the fuppofition of its falfehood ; the previous and infuhted probability of the fa£k ^SkntA is a tefs powerful motive for the dectfion, than the pofitive conviQion rc« fulting from the force of the teftimony \ the rejeAion of iriiich would be founded ^upona much higher degree of improbaUlityi than 954 APPENDIX* pramb.XVL than that which it profdTes to contGt^ Such I oynceire to be ibe fummary of the argument, which is ufually applied to a fubjeA of » much fuperior naturi! to that of my preient inveftigation, but the principles of which may be properly adapted to inferior ohytCts of ordinary difputation. It is feldom that a cafe will occur, in which the improbability of falfehood will advance to that high degree of certainty, which is involved in the preceding enumeration, btxt each of the circumftances alluded to will have their influence in forming a decifion between the abftrafi improbability of the fad fluted, and the particular improbability of the immediate relation under all its circumftances being falfe. I have witnefled icTcral caies which called for the pradical application of this diftin&icm t the one which at prefent occurs to me, is axi a^ion againft a man for fowing the field of another with dock feeds; a hSt which was pofitively fwom to by a cafual ob-' Server, and confirmed, amongft other circumftances, by the giowth of die docks, in the courfe which he had taken; it 'was contended to be highly impiobable, that any man fliould be guilty of fttch malignant condu£l ; but it was answered, that it was much more improbable that the witnefs, who had no conne&ion with the one party, or animofity againft the other, fliould gratuitoufly invcrfve himfelf in perjury, in attefting the hGt which was fo corroborated. A topic connected with the preceding obfervations, which ve-^ hte to the fubjcft of die teftimony, as exifting in the mind of the witnefs, and intended to be the obje& of his reprefexitation. Is the cone&nefs of the language ufed by the witnefs in conveying his fentiments, aiid of bis conception of the queftions propofed to him* The degree of accuracy with which the language reprefents the fentiments, is a proper fubje£k of inquiry, before the terms made ttfe of are conftrued widi too literal preciCon ; and the incorre£bnefsr of language, or conception, fliould be carefully diftingui&ed from mifreprefentation or evafion ; an obfervation which might feem to be unneceflary from its obvious propriety, and the little danger which may be fuppofed to exift of a contrary praAice* But the faft is otherwife, and a mutoal mifconception, either real or afle£t- ed, is frequently the ground of cavil on the one fide, or the fcreen for equivocation on the other. When die latter is the fad» it is very feldom fuccefsful, the equivocaticui is kept up for a fecond or two, asid die expofure of it> very properly, throws a general difctedit or the whole teftimony of the witnefs ; but the want of a patient and tethporate attention, may often permit this imputadon to fall vi^eie it is not juftly merited, and wheie a careful ezanuaadon of die meaning intended to be exprefied would completely reitove it» ^What has heen before obfervcd ^"ith refpefi to language as being tbr Numb. XVI.] Of the Exa/riinatim of Witneffes. 1155 the fubjed> mavi in fome degree, be applied to it as the medium of evidence \ but the error refulting from its inaccuracy or mifcon^ ception is, from the difference of the occafion, much more eafily . fufceptible of correflioiu Peculiar modes of fpeech, either per- (bnal or provincial, metaphorical language, a greater or fmaller latitude in the acceptation of terms, the mutual fubftitution of definite and indefinte expreflions, are fome of the caufes which cootribute to the uncertainty at prefent under confideration. In fome parts of the country, it is, with perfons in the inferior ftation of life, an ordinary mode of fpeech to fay, that they believe a fad, of which they have tlie mod pofitire aflurance. When this expre^ lion flips out on a judicial examination, we commonly bear the queftion. Believe ! are jm not.fure rf it f and an anfwer in the jiffirmative is followed up with, then why d$ you fay you ieiieve ^ A queftion very proper, when there Is a fufpicion that the terms of die anfwer were intentionally evafive ; but the corredlive is fire* quently applied, when in hGt the caufe' of complaint does not exift. Sometimes, the mode of phrafeology which gives an eib* aggerated or extenuated reprefentation of a fubje£l, witbotit any confcioulhefs <^an intention to deceive, originates from thoie views of a fubjedl which are conne£led with a difpoGtion refpe£tii^ the event, and which have already been the fubje£l c^obfervation. The fame general obfervation, which has already been fo oftCcn traced in its diiiercnt applications, of a diftinAion between inac* curacy and mifreprefentation, applies to the convi£iton fubCfting ia the mind from the reprefentation of others, where the tzCt is regarded as certain, and is reprefented as exifting, although the iburce of die witnefs's knowledge prevents its being a matter of legitimate evidence* I conceive tliat this inaccuracy often efcapes ttndete£ked i the witnefs fpeaking in general terms'of the exifteiure of the fa£t, and there being no fufpicion of his dcnng fo otherwife than from his own obfervation. Some fads we fpeak of as afliiredly true without objedion, of which our knowledge is al« mod neceflarily derived from reputation, as, for inftance, the death of a perfon ) the fuppofed notoriety of fome other fade, induces us to think and fpeak of them with the (ame degree of aflurance as of this, which, though an infradion of the legal rules of evi* dence, is no tranfgreflion of the moral obligation of veracity, al« though it is fometimes reprefented as fuch, in the courfe of a cap- tious crofs-examination* The manner and deportment of witnei&s is very commonly a ptincipal ground of aflent to, or dtilent from their teftimony ; and is doubtleis a very natural indication of the exiftenceor the want of fin* cerity. That the difpofition of the witnefs will have an influence on 6 his 9s6 APPENDIX. [Namb. XVI. his manner is undifputed ; the adequate obfenration of it UKowever » matter requiring the moft ikilful and judicious difcemment ; the dc- teiEliop ofa{{e£ted plaufibility, and the afiiftance of conftitutional tU midity, are objedis which refpe£lively import^ in an eminent degreCf the proper adminiftration of juftice. A perfe£l judgment of the , caufes of a perfen's demeanour upon a particular occafion^ can only be formed by thofe who have a previous knowledge of his general habits and charaderyand in this refped an intelligent jury is of great aidvantage ; fince being aflembled from difierent parts of the coimtryt fome of them will, in moft cafes, have at leaft a general knowledge of the witne0es who appear before them. It would be greatly beyond the limits of my power^to trace even a flight outline of this ext^nfive fi]ibjed>butafew detached t)bfervattonSj founded uponmyimpreifiona lefpeAing it, may not be wholly irrelevant. In deciding upon the demeanour of a witnefs, conCderable allowance is to be made for the vnaccuftomed (ituation in which he is placed, and the impreflions which it may be calculated to make upon his mind. To fome peiibna diis public appearance is a matter of indifierence, but by many it is regarded with an appreheitfion, ptodu£tive of emban^flment and ^itatidn, which, to unlkilful obfervers, may appear therefultof infincerity. This embarrafTment will fometimes attach itfelf in a pe* culiar degree, to thofe who are accuftomed to appear before the public in a diflTerent (ituation, and who are therefore habitually aj^xious rt{^€ting the impreffion which tliey may induce. It is an anecdote of Garrich^ that when examined as a witnefs re(pe£l* tng the nature of a free benefit, he was incapable of giidng an intelligible teftimony* In deciding upon the demeanour of -wit- neiles, much attention is due to the mode of interrogation^ and the popular ^opinion refpe£ting the perfon who is engaged in it* An afperity in the particular condufl of the cohnfel or the judge^ or even the reputation of it with refpeft to the former, will necel^ farily p)roduce an tStOi upon the fenfations and deportment of the witnefs ; and an apprehenfion of the ridicule which frequently affixes itfelf permanently to the charaAer, is often a predominant fen* fation of the witnefs upon his examination. Good fenfe, when fully exercifed, will corre^ theCe apprehenfions, and fatisfy the witnefs that violence and ridicule will be ineffectual, when oppofed to the plain and unaffe£led language of truth ; but the didates of good fenfe are often an infufficieht prefervative againft conftita« tional timidity. A refolutlon to appear undaunted, and repel the expelled aggreC- fion of counfel by infolenee, a foolifh inclination to make A theatrical exhibition of wit and humour, exciting the horfe-laugh of the bye-ftanders, a morofenefs and fuUennefs of temperi will give Kumb. X VL] Of the Examination of Witnefes. 257 an an&TOurable afpe£i to the manner of a witnefs^ when there is no intentional want of veracity in the matter. The real abfurdity of a witnefs's demeanour or • mode of reprefentation, will often diminiih the proper impreflion of the fa£ts for which it is neceflary torefort to his teftimony^ and particularly in cafes where there is a latitude of difcretion, as in queftions of damages ; the judgment is often pradlically biafied^ by the fentiment of ridicule being a teft of truth. A due regard to the principles of juftice will however prevent the fair demands of a party from being afie^ied by the follennefs or abfurdity of the witnefleSi whom he is necefTitated to adduce in fupport of it ; and will lead the mind to a iludious dis- crimination) between the fz€t which is the fubje£t of inquiry, and the accidental circumftances which may accompany tlie relation of it. The judgment upon a witnefs's manner is not unfrequently framed by a contraft between a cool and fteady narration, and a fluttering hefitation; this judgment may, however, often be failaci- ous, for a witnefs who has prepa|[ed his ftory, may have fuffici- ently arranged the particulars of it in his mind, while another who has an opportunity of contradicting it, if falfe, is furprized and con*^ founded by the unexpe&cd ftatement. In a cafe where I had an opportunity of knowing the real fads, I have feen a witnefs give a fteady and cc^e&ed reprefentation of a fuppofed converfation in a perfedily fimple and unafFe£led manner ; the oppofite witnefs^ when fuddenly interrogated as to the exigence of fuch a con- verfation, began with, Not that I recolUR^ I do not believe it vpon my honour ^ and a great^ many other exclamations in fuch a Gttnfufed, fufpicious manner, that even thofe who, from their private knowledge, had the mod indifputable confidence of the veracity with which he told them upon coming out of court, that there was not a fyllable of truth in the conVerfation related^ perfe£tly acquiefced in the propriety of a decifion founded upon the opinion of hit falfehood. The following pafiage from Lavater is not inapplicable to the purpofe of the prefent inquiry. After remarking that guilt is pro* bably more daring than innocence, but the voice of innocence has greater energy and more convincing povjers^ the look of innocence is more fcrene and bright than that of the guilty liar \ he ftatcs an inftance of two young perfons^ who more than once came before him, and moil folenmly affirmed^ the one^ < are circumftances ?ery proper to be taken into coo&deration* It Numb. XVI.] Of the Examination ofWitneJfes. a6i It is a mltf of lawt diat witnefles cannot be aiked any queftiond wbich tend to fubjeA themfelves to puni(hment» or as it is ufually cxpiefled to criminate theoifelvcs; but whether they may be •aiked if they have already received a punifiimentf which does not disqnafify their teftimony, or whether they may be interrogated as to any circoihftances of improper conduft^ not immediately con« Rcded with the fubjed of their examinationi and aifo, whether their tefixlal to anfwer inquiries upon thefe fubjedls can be obferv- ed upon as affe&ing the credit of their teftimony, are queftions of great importance upon which there is a very confiderable diffctencev of opinion. Some judges are very ftrongly of opi- niony that thefe inquhies ought not be allowed ; but it has been uaderftood to be the more prevalent opinion of the bench, as itcertamly is very generally the opinion of the profeiSon, 'that they sre admiffible and proper ; and this latter opinion is dearly fup- j^rted by the coutfe of pra&ice which has adually prevailed. Mr. Piohj in the fecoad edition of his Lanv of Evidence^ dates the argaments in fupport of thefe oppofite opinions^ in a very fair and perfpicuous manner \ and the right and propriety of the examina* tioni alluded to are maintained with confiderable ability in a l^hamphlet inutledi An Argument in favour of the Rights of Crofs* Examimtion, I have at all times felt a very confiderable difficulty in the confideration of this fubje^l ; but as a knowledge of a wit- ncfs's habits and purfuits> his condud and difpofition, will naturally influence the regard which is paid to his aflertions ; I think th^t the preponderance of argument is in favour of the opinionj that an examination, by which thefe may be afcertained cannot, upon any general principles, be fuppreffed' as irrelevant or improper ; and that thofe arguments refpedling a witnefs*s condud ought not to berejeded, which may tend to determine the regard that the mind, without reference to technical rules, or legal confidcrations, would pay to his tcftimony. At the fame time, I think that this is a liberty wbkh, like all others, will be beft fecurcd by a cautious rigilance in repreffing its abufe, by a refufal of advocates to adopt the pailions, and prejudices of their clients, and to injure a witnefs by reproaches and infinuations, that cannot reafonably be expeded to influence the fair decifion of the caufe *, and by the Court (hewing a marked difcontinuance to the adoption of a different line of condufi, calculated only to occafion an unnecefihry pain and injury to the witnefs, without promoting the rights or intcrcftsof the party. The fituation of a witnefs iti life is alfo a circumftance which frequently influence tht regard that is paid to his teftimonyi tfpecially with refpeft to matters of judgment and obfervation j T 3 and a62 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVL • and even with refpe£l to mere veracity it is not wholly indiflSerent ; for although, in the abftrad, the teftimony of every perfon i$ to be regarded as true, and the fenfe of obligation may be equally ftrong in every condition of fociety ; the temporal difadvantages arifing from the detection of falfehood or prevarication, independent of the terrors of legal puniihment, will frequently depend upon, or be connected with a perfon's rank and ftation ; and therefore all couf Cderations of credit, connedied with the evidence itfelf, will be, and conftantly are, materially influenced by this circumftance« The cSc£k of a bias in favour of the event of a caufe, refulting from the fituation of a witnefs, will be more or lefs ftrong in proportion to his being more or lefs fubjeft to temptation ; the comparifon be« tween the relation itfelf and its probability, will be made with greater itlinutenefs, in proportion to the ftake in fociety which is engaged in fupport of its veracity. The influence of fituation is moft ftrong in caie of conflicting teftimony i for fuppofing other circumftances to be equal in every rtfycSt^ there is no doubt but that a conCderable diverfity of fituation would have confiderable influence in dire&ing the balance of credit ; and to illuftrate the pofition by an extreme inftance, few perfons would hefitate in regarding the narrative of a clegyman on the one fide, with fuperior credit, to that of a bailiff's follower on the other* The number of witneffes, and their concurrence in fupport of a given ^ficrtion, is alfo a fubjed); of material importance in deciding upon the credit of their teftimony ; for the improbability of two witneflTes concerned in the fame falfehood, or being influenced by the fame miftake, is much lefs than that of the falfehood or miftake of either of them individually ; and the improbability in« creafes in proportion with the number. But in the contrafting of contradi£lory teftimony, the mere confideration of number is held fubordinate to that of the indications of individual veracity, and the maxim that ponderantur^ tion numerantur teftes^ is of very fre- quent practical application. Other eircumftances being equal, the preponderance of numbers is certainly intitled to the advan- tage, and fometimes this preponderance will be fufficiently great to counterballance an apparent fuperiority in other circumftances on the oppofite fide ; and although nothing can be more remote from the fubjefl in difcuflion than the application of the ftri£t rules of mathematical equality or proportion, a fair attention to the principles of thofe rules is often of ccmfiderable importance. The degree of influence or indifference of the refpe£live witneffes, theif apparent veracity, their demeanour, their chara£ler, their fituation,^ tlie probability of their relation, are circumftances, all of which Numb. XVI.] Of the Examination ofWitneffes. ^6^ vMch are to be carefully and attentively brought into the account. The opportunity of confederacy^ or the want of fuch opportunity» is a moft important confidention in determining the efie^ of num- bers. The concurrence in'fpeaking of one obfervationof one detach- ed htiBt^ is of much inferior value to the concurrence of perfons fpeaking from detached and feparate obfervationst of different faAs leading to the fame concluGon. I have already had occafion to advert to the accordance or variation of witneflea fpeaking of the tune occurrence, to the difierence between that inconfiftency which eflentially faftens itfelf upon the fubftance of the relation, anddiat which may be fairly referable to different degrees of accuracy orminuteneis, in the obfervation or memory of fa£ls which have a£hially occurred ; and to the unity and accordance, which being too ftri£l and circumftantial, are inconfiftent with 'that diverfity of obfervation and expreffion, that naturally occurs in the unprepared account of a real tranfa£lion, affords an indication of concert and defign [a). It is not an unfrequent obfervation, that if one of the witneffes in fupport of a caufe is not intitled to be credited, the difcredit attaches to the caufe, aiid extends to other vitnefles apparently unexceptionable. This kind of obje£lion is, I think, fometimes applied too generally,and withoutufingthatcaution and difcrimination which the principle of it eflentially requires. In cafe the impeachment of the veracity of a particular witnefs refttlts from circumftances that indicate management and fabri- cation in the caufe itfelf; in cafe the perjury of the witnefs im- plies the fubomation of the party \ the whole fyftem may be re- garded as tainted and corrupt, unlefs there are any, in oth'br re- fpe£ts, fuperior reafons for believing the contrary ; and the mere abfence of circumftances of fufpicion, diredly afiediing the other witnefles, will not deftroy the prefumption of falfity that has attached itfelf to the caufe. But if the imputation upon the par- ticular witnefs is merely perfonal ; if it refults from confiderations («)The followiflg paiTage of the famoai law, 3 ff*. dcteAibus, 11 matciialljr applicable to diU fobjed. Teflium fides dil'genter examinanda ell. Ideoqae in ^erfona eorum ex- plonoda ernnt inptimis con«litio cujofque % utrum quia decurin, gn plebeius (it, ft an Ibonete le inculpate ritae, aatero ooutui quis»& reprehcQ/ibilif ; aa locuplcf vel cgeni fit, at lucri caufa quid facUe adoiitta( : vel an ioimicui ei fic» adverfus qoem teftimonium Icrt, vel amicus ei fit pro quo tcftimonittm dat. Nam ft careat fufpicione teftimooium^ fe) pfDpter perfonaoiy a qu2 fertur, quodhonefta fit* vet propter caufam, quod oeque lucrty aeque giaiisy acqoe ioimicitaae cauCa fit, admittendam eft. ^ t. Idaoqae. D. Hadriamu VnrieVaro l«gata proftnci« Ciciliie refcripfi^ cum qui }odicat, nagis pofle fcire quanta Mes hibcnda fit teftibul. Verba epiftolae hacc funt. <* Tu magii fcire potes, quanta fideq babeadafit teftsbut : qui 8c cujus dignitatit & cujus eftimationia Tint : tt 'qui fimpliciter viii fnit dicere, ntruoi unum eundemque meditatumfcnnooMD attulaintj anadeaqusi iatcrrogaferai c|ttiiipof« v:riQmilia rcfpondcrint.'' T 4 foreign a64 APPENDIX- CNumb.XVL foreign to the immediate caufe ; if it is founded upon tome coUaccfral motive of his owiii and no fufpicion of fubornadon can be fairly entertained ^ the caufe, in other refpe&s^ fliouki be at liberty to iland or fall upon ijts general merits^ without being affefled by the peculiar objection ; in the fame manner as a feries of reafoning, in itfelf perfe£i and complete, is not afie£led by the collateral addition of an untenable argument. The confli£i of oppofite witnefles is the grand fource of foTenfic altercation* In adverting to the circumftances which influence the credit of witnefles individually or coUedlively, I have neceflSirily had occafion to mention their oppofition. Without going through the particulars again, it will be fuflicient generally to obfenre» dut whatever principles of reafoning are correct and proper^ when examining the veracity or accuracy of an individual witncfs or a number of witnefles uncontradicted, become more pecultarily important in determining the balance of credit, with ictpcSt to veracity, or the fuperior degree of accuracy, vpon matters of judgment and obfervation, in cafes of confiid and oppofition. The general ground of credit, founded upon the prefumption jthat a witnefs fpeaks with truth and accuracy is deftroyed, when the re- fpe£tive aflertimis are in oppofition to each other, and therefore cannot both be true. Whatever therefore may eftablifli or diminHh the confidence in a witnefs, whofe teftimony is uncontradi£led, will determine the preference in cafes of oppofition ; but the re- {peOtive grounds of afilent or difcredit are foqietimes fo equally balanced, that the mind cannot, with fatisfadion, pronounce a judgment between them ; and all that can be recommended is a calm, patient, and anxious tnveftigation. Where the poffibility of midake on the one fide is contrafted with the imputation of per- jury on the other, and there are no collateral circumftances to fix the determination, there can be no doubt but that a cafual error is to be deemed more probable than a wilful mifreprefentation. When the judgment, after every exertion, is reduced to the necef- fity of deciding, that on the one fide or the other, there has been an intentional falfehood, and no fatisfa£lory reafons occur for fixing the fuperiority of credit i the lafl: refource is to obliterate wholly the confli£ting teftimony, and to determine upon the want of a preponderance in proof, according to the rules which muft have prevailed in the total abfence of it. The refult of an invefti- gation of evidence wilf, after the mod enlightened and painful refearch, be in many cafes, unfortunately at variance with the adual truth, but in proportion to the dangers of error inherent in the very frame and nature of the fubjeCl, (hould be the care and anxiety Kamb. X VI.3 Of the Examination cf Wiinejfcs. fl€s anxietf ezetciibd in the avoidance of fach error as may proceed firom an excefs of confidence on the one hand or of caution on the 4)dierf and although that care and anxiety wiU often fail in their particahr application, the perfedlion of human precaution wiU be attaiaedy if they are fo condu&ed that, according to the pria* eqries of reafon and experience, they may be expe&ed in general to fucceed. To the above ob&rvations, in which I hare endeavoured to ftetdi fome of the principles that may not be undeferving attention^ in forming a judgment upon the accuracy and veracity of evi* dence, and which are deduced from the nature of the fubjed idetfi it remains to fubjoin a few others, originally founded upom the fame principles^ but more immediately conneAed with pofidve rules of prafiical authority. In the examination of wxtnefles, a diftinAion is made with refpe& to the party by whom they art called, it being, iif general, inadmiflible for a party to put what are termed leading queftions to the witnefles adduced by himlelf, al** diough fuch queftions are perfedly allowable upon & crols-ex« amination. It is fometimes laid down that leading queftions aire thofe which are to be anfwertd by a mere affirmative or negative^ and in which confequently the anfwer is fully fuggefted by the queftion. I think however that this defcription, and the obje£tion founded upon it, are fometimes applied more extenfively than the principle upon which they are founded requires ; the good fenfe of the rule is perfe£Uy manifeft, with refpedt to all cafes where the queftion propounded involves an anfwer immediatdy bearing upon the merits of the caufe, and indicating to the witnefs a re« prefentation which will beft accord with the interefts of the party ^ but where the queftions are merely introdudory, where the mere anfwer of yes, or no, will leave the point of the cafe precifely a» it found it, and can only be material as laying the foundation for a further inquiry ; the reafon of the obje£tion does not occur, and the objeftion itfelf appears to be ill-founded ; and the making k cmi only proceed from a captious and petulant difpoAtion to intsrtvpt the courfe of examination. If a witnefs is afked generaOy with re-* ference to a particular occafion, whether a perfon faid arty thing, the anfwer jr/ or fWy cannot very materially advance the iiltereft of die party i and can only ferve as the foundation for the mote general queftion, of what it was that was faid. But I have very frequentty known this preliminary queftion excite a clamorous intefpoihiM fot coffcfllng At (tippofed impropriety, by teHing the advocate diat his queftion (houM be, What did the perfon fay ? A queftion which Hecefiaril^^fuppofes the exiftence of the general hSt of fomeihing haviitg i66 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL luTing been faid, which poflibly may not be the h€t. I think that, according to the principles cf good fenfe and fair reafoning) the reftri£bion ought not to be extended to cafes, to which the occafion of it cannot be deemed to apply \ and that if the objedicHi does not prompt an anfwer bearing upon the fubje£l in difpute, if the negative or affirmative anfwer will be perfe&ly indifierent, except as ferving for a foundation of further inquiry ; the G>urt would beft confult the ends of juftice, by difcouraging a condu£t that can have no other efieft than a frivolous altercationi diilra&ing the attention of the advocate on the one fidci and giving the other an opportunity of (hewing off liis talents for interruption i and exhi- biting a pertnefs which may imprefs the byeftanders with an idea of fpirit and ingenuity. It is faidi that if a witnefs depofes falfely in any part of his leftimony, the whole of it is to be reje£led i and this is certainly corredl fo l^ar as the falfehood fuppofes the guik of perjury ; the ground of credit being there deftroyed ; but if nothing can be im- puted to the witnefs but error, inaccuracy, or embarraffment ; if there does not appear to be a real intention to deceive or mifre- prefent $ neither the obje^iion nor the reafon for it applies* The argument is fometimes urged with conflderable vehemence, that a party who relies upon the teftimony of a witnefs, muft take it al-« together, and cannot rely upon the one part and rejedl the other \ whereas there is no inconfiftency in aflerting the general veracity of a narrative, and contending for the inaccuracy of fome of its incidental particulars ; much lefs is a party to be driven from hit reliance upon the matters of f'dGt rcleated by a witnefs, becaufe he contends that the witnefs is ill founded in his reafonings and inferences deduced from them, as I have endeavoured to illuftratc in a preceding part of the prefent fedion. It is a general rule that a party cannot call witneffes to the ^if^ credit of others, whom he has before examined; but if a witnefs proves fa£lsin a caufe which make againft the party who calls hinij^ that party, as well as the other, may call other witnelles to con- tradiA him as to thofe fa£is v for fuch fa£ls are evidence in the caufe, and the other witneiles are not called dire£Uy to difcredit the firft^ but the impeachment of his credit is incidental and con- fequential only. Bull. 297. Peake, ia6. I think it probable that an exception would be allowed to the rule of exclufion above mention- ed, in the cafe of inftrumented witnefles denying their atteftatipn'; for as thefe are witnefles whom it is neceffarily incumbent on the ps(rty to produce, and the nature of their teftimony is attended with fufpicion, the difcredit of their characters is a ftrong cor^ roboratioo KumKXVI.] OfibeEMminatmofWitneJfes. %6j roboration of the eridence, which it is competent to give from other fources, of the authenticity of the inftrument. Ad exception to the reftriflion above mentioned, agalnft putting leading queftions, is allowed in the cafe of the witnefs's appearing to be unwilling to depofe the truth in favour of the party by whom they are adduced. This unwillingnefs is commonly to be decided by the judge, according to his.imprciEon of the demeanour of the witnefs, upon the trial. The fituation of the witnefs, and the inducements which he may have for withholding a fair account^ are alfo very proper circumftances to be taken into confideration in forming this decifion. A fon will not be very forward in dating the mifcondu£^ of his father, of which he has been the only wit- nefs ; a fervant will not^ in an a£iion againfl: his mafter, be very leady to acknowledge the negligence committed by himfelf. I conceive that the principle which requires a party to abide by the whole of what his own witnefs has fwom, or wholly to abandon it} is alfo, in this cafe, fubjefl to an exception \ for there certainly is no teftimony the veracity of which is lefs fnfpicious, than the admiffion extorted from an unwilling witnefs \ and it would ma- terially prejudice the interefts of juftice, if a witnefs of this de- fcripdon could place the party producing hini in the dilemma of cither abandoning the benefit of the truth which has been with difficulty obtained, or of adopting all the falfehood which the wit- nefs may have the iniquity to mix up with it. The proper courfe ieems to be to regard the evidence of an unwilling witnefs in the ^ame light as that of a witnefs adduced by the adverfe party ^ re^ fpeding which it is a fettled principle, that you may believe what makes againft his point who fwears, without believing what makes for it. Bermon v. Woodbridge^ Doug. 781. The crofs-examination of witnefles adduced by the oppofite party is a fubjefl of the utmoft nicety, with refpe£l both to the condu£i of the advocate, and the difcrimiqation of thofe who are to form a judgment \ and it is in this part of the caufe that moft of the obfervations already fuggefted principally arife. The on- ginal examination of the witnefs, (except in the cafe of his giving an unwilling teftimony,) feldom gives much room for obfervation \ the ftatement is for the moft part fufficiently explicit and dired* Sometimes that intereft which he may feel in the event will be apparent, and thus aflift the effe^i of the crofs-examination ; fome* times a real careleflhefs and indifference upon the fubjed will pro* duce an indolence of deportment } and a want of exertion for the re- coIle£Hon of material occurences injurious^ to the party adducing himj ia the fame manner as it has the effe^ of preventing a fuU and adc* quat# s68 APPENDIX. [Nuiab* XVI i|ttate reprefetitation of his cafe ; but wherever this occurs diere is very little ground to exped that his crofs-examination will lead to any (onclufions unfavourable to the veracity of his ftatement. This in- dlfierence is not unfrtquently afTumed ; whenever that is die cafe. It feldom fails to be detected and expofed in the courfe of a judi- cious crofs>«xamtnation. If there is no apprehenfion that a wit. nefs has any other difpofition than to give a plain and fucciaft declaration of the truth, nor any wi(h in the advocate to convey a different imprtflton ; but his crofs-examination is merely for the purpofe of explanation, or for afccrtainiag further fa£ts of whidi he may be fuppofed to have a knowledge, it is not to be materially diftinguiflied from his examination in chief. The peculiar charac- ter of crofs-examination only attaches when it is fufpeded that the witnefs is guilty of a perjury, or at leaft mifreprefentation or fuppreflion of fa&s, or when it is wiihed to convey that iinpref- fion to the jury $ and it is a matter of daily experience dut diii purpofe is efie£led by an able and judicious crofs-examination, in many cafes where the purpofes of juftice would be eluded upon tny different mode of inquiry. The abufes to which this pro- cedure is liable are the fubjeO of very frequent complaint, but it ironld be abfolutely impof&ble, by any general rules, to apply a pre- ventative to thefe abufes, without deftroying the liberty upon whidi ^ benefits above adverted to eflentially depend 2 and all that can be efie£ted by the interpofition of the Court, is a difcour^gement of any virulence tow'ards the witnefles which is not juflified by the nature of the caufe, and a fedulous attention to remove from the minds of the jury the impreflions which are rather to be im- puted to the vehemence of the advocate, than to the prevarication of the witnefs. Whatever can elicit the a£lual difpofitions of the wit* liefs with refptCt to the event, whatever can dete£t the operation of a concerted plan of teftimony , or bring into light the incidental H&B and circumftances that the witnefs may be fuppofed to have reprefied ; in Ihort, whatever may be expeded fairly to promote the real manifeftation of the merits of the caufe, is not only juftifiaUe but meritorious ; but I conceive that ^ client has no right to ex- ft€t from his counfelan endeavour to afFifl his caufe, or what is a tnore frequent obje£l, to gratify his paflions by unmerited abufes by embarraffing or intimidating witnefles, of whofe veracity he has m> real fufpicion, or by conveying an impreiRon of difcredit which he does not a^ually fed ; and that where fuch expectations are intimated, there is an imperious duty upon the advocate, who, while die proteAor of private right, is alfo the^minifler of public juftice, which itquires tliem to be repelled. Confidering the fubjcd merely I as Numb, X VI.3 Of the Examinatim ef Witneffes. a6^ as a matter of difcretioiiy the adoption of an unfair condufl ia ciofs-examination has often an etkd repugnant to the interefta- which it profefles to promote. In the cafe of Hunter y. Keioe^ before the Court of King's Bench in Ireland^ Mlc. 1794. Ridgewayp ^c. 350, Lord Clonmell obferved that crofs-examination had gone to an unreafonable length, but he had in general permitted gentle* men to go as far as they pleafed, becaufe if there was an honed cafe on the other fide it would do them no good. But however un- favourable an injudicious afperity of crofs-examination may be to the adyancenient of the caufe, it, for the moft part, is congenial to the vriihcs <^ the party, the negle£l of it is regarded as an indifference to hid intereft and a dereliction of duty ; and the pradice of it is one of the fureft harbingers of profef&onal fuccefs. The benefits of crofs-examination are fometimes defeated by the interpoGtion of the Court, to require an explanation of the motive and o\>yt(k of the queftions propofed, or to pronounce a judgment apon them immediately : whereas experience frequently (hews that it is only by an indireCl, and apparently irrelevant inquiry, that a witnefs can be brought to divulge the truth which he had prepar- ed himfelf to conceal \ the explanation of the motives and ten- dency of the queftion fumifhes the witnefs with a caution that may wholly defeat the object of it, which might have been fuccefs* fully attained, if the gradual progrefs, from immateriality to ma- teriality, was withheld from his obfervation. The importance of ati inquiry may fometimes be ftrongly felt by an advocate, and upon very reafonable grounds, from his own inftruftions with refpedtto the bearing and circumftances of the caufe, which the judge, a&ing only upon th^ imprcfiions of what has already been difclofed, can- not by any poflibility anticipate. The full expofition of the motives can only be attained by a premature expofition of the cafe that is to be brought forward, and even when that can be done without prejudice to the party, the endeavour to fatisfy the Court would have the common effeClof an interruption of the regular courfe of inquiry, and inftead of aflifting the accurate difculGon of the queftion, would, in all probability, terminate in confufedand deful* tory altercation. SEC. ^ » 270 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL SECTIONX. OfCafts in which two Witmjfes are necejfary. The neceflity of proving a cafe by two witneffcs muft, like many of the other cautions which have been introduced into the law of evidence, very frequently occafion a failure of juftice ; and as a ge- neral principle, independent of all coiifiderations of a judicialnaturt, there can be no doubt but that the mind will give afuU ailent to the declaration of a fingle individual of an unimpeached chara£ler> hav- ing no influence which can come in confli£): with his difpofition to veracity, fpeaking of fa£ts which he had an adequate opportunity to obferve, and which contain In themfelves no internal violation of probability. Where any of thefe qualities are wanting to the teftimony, it will of courfe be examined with greater circumfpec* tion \ and the caution applied in its reception will increafe in pro- portion to its departure from the combination of circumftances which produce an implicit reliance upon its truth, and to the nature of the confequences which may refultfrom the error of too implicit an aflent, giving due conGderation to the efFcfts of the oppoGte error of too fuf- picious a diftruft. Where the teftimony is in fupportof the imputa- tion of guilt, it will be weighed with greater fcruple, than when it tends to tlie manifeftation of innocence. The affent to the teftimony will alfo be regulated by the opportunity which the nature of the fub- ie£k affords, of further elucidation, for where any circumftances^con- ne£led witli the nature and objeft of the evidence, are calculated to induce fufpicion, and the fa£l afferted muft, if true, be fufceptible of confirmation, the mere omiflion to give it the fupport that may be reafonably expe£ted is an additional reafon for its difcredit. But the reafons which operate to produce a diflatisfaftion with tefti- mony, as being inadequate and inconclufivc upon an examination of its nature and tendency, are very infufEcient to warrant its re- je£tion upon the ground of a general preliminary objefiion ; which is as unreafonable, as to refufe the affiftancc of the ftrongcft light which can be artifically procured, under circumftances that render it impoffible to procure the affiftance of the light of day. It is an obfervation of Lofft in a note to Gilbert ^ after citing the opinions of Beccaria in favour of requiring two witneffes, and of Black/lone againft it, that thofe laws, which condemn to death on the depofidon of a fingle witnefs, are fatal to liberty. In right reifon there fhould be two, becaufe a witnefs who affirms, asd the accufed who denies, make an equal balance, and a third muft in- cline the fcale. It might *jperbaps be faid with greater juftice^ that the Numb. XVI.3 Where two Witnejfes are necejfary.. 471 the abfolute and indifcruninate exclufion of a fingle witnefs in every capital cafe, would if not .fatal) at Icaft be dangerous to fecu* Tity ; as the opportunity of a folitary fituation would enable a mif- crcant to perpetrate a robbery, or a rape with impunity, however refpe£lable the charafier of the perfon who fufiered the violence, and however aflured by previous knowledge of the identity of the ofiender. The fuppofed equality between the denial of the accufed and the teftimony of the witnefs is merely fanciful, unlefs it can be aflerted, that there is an equal inducement to make a falfe accufa* don, for the purpofe of deftroying an individual, with whom there was no previous animofity, and to deny the commiflion of a crime, for which a party is juftly liable to undergo punifhment, between (as I have feen it obferved in a publication of Mr. Chriflian) a perfon who by his falfehood has every thing to lofe and nothing to gain, and one who has every thing to gain and nothing to bfe. The general rule of the Roman law which rejedis the proof by t fingle witnefs as infufficient, is followed in the Engltjb courts which adopt that law, as the bafis of their proceedings; but it is faid, by Sir William Blackftoney that to extricate itfelf out of the abfurdity of univerfaUy requiring two witneiles, the modem pra£iice of the civil law courts has plunged itfelf into another, for as they do not ' allow a lefs number than two witnefTes to ht plena probation they call the teftimony of one, though never fo clear and po&tivCf frmiplena frotatio only, on which no fentence can be founded. To make up therefore the neceiTary complement of witneflcs, when they have only one to any fingle fzGt, they admit the party himfelf (plaintiff or defendant) to be exaniined in his own behalf ; and adminifter to him what is called the fuppletory oath ; and if his evidence happens to be in his own favour, this immediately converts the half proof into a whole one. By this ingenious device, fatisfyuig at once the forms of the Roman law, and acknowledging the fu- perior reafonablenefs of the law of England ; which permits one witnefs to be fufiicient where no more can ho had, and to avoid all temptation of perjury, lays it down as an invariable rule that, nemo tejlis debet ejfe in propria caufd, I am not at prefent enabled to afcertain the accuracy of the learned commentator's ftatement refpe&ing the pradice of the Englijb courts of civil law, but if the party can infift, dejure^ upon his own oath being received as a fuf- ficient confirmation of the teftimony of a fingle witnefs, the appli- cation of the fuppletory oath is confiderably varied from its origi- nal inftittttion, according to which it could only be iidminiftered at the difcretion of the judge, The 27« APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL The (iemiproofs mentioned by Pathur, and which will admit of eonfirraation by the oath of the party, are written documeBts^fuch as the books of tradefmen* I conceive that there are no pafiagcs in the text of the civil law, which warrant the jndge in decidkg upon the teftimony of a fingle witnefs confirmed by the foppleiory oath. Poihier, No. 833. obferves, that the do£lors mention the depoGtion of a fingle witnefs who is a perfon of credit* as a proof which may be completed by the oath of the plaintiff; but refeis to the paiTage to which this Se£lion is an Appendix, as ihe\^^i^ that by the law of France this is only allowed in matters of very l%ht importance ; fuch as trefpafles where the damage does not exceed so fols by day, or 40 fols by night. Mafcardus in fuj^ort of the poGtion, that the oath of one witnefs is a femiproof, whidi, with the addition of the fuppletory oath, willbe fufficient, refers to X. Tbeo- fompusy 14* di dote pralegaU L. Jusjurand. 9 Cod* de TefL and law 1 • adfin.ff, Teftamenio quemadmodum aperiantur. The firft of thcfc laws relates to the cafe where a teftator dire^led that Pdianiu^ who knew hu intention, (hould provide for the portion to be given to his daughter; and Polianusy upon being called upon by the daughter's huiband, depofed that it was the father's intention, that ihe (hould have an equal portion with her elder fifter, which was decreed accordingly ; but the law has no reference whatever to the fuppletory oath, and in this cafe Polianus was not an acciden- tal witnefs, but a perfon whofe knowledge of a fa£): formed an effcntial ingredient in the caufc. The law 9. Cod. dire£ls that witneifes, previous to their depofition, fliall be bound by the fano tion of an oath, and that credit ihould be given in preference to the witncfics of greater refpeflability. It adds, that the emperor {ConJtafitifUf) had formerly ordained no judge (hould, in any caufe, eafily fuffer the teftimony of a Angle witnefs to be admitted, and that he now forbids the anfwer of a Gngle witnefs being at all re- ceived, even wiiere he is a perfon of the higheft credit. Juru- jurandi rellgione teJleSi priufquam perhiheant teftimonium jamdudum ar3ari pracepmus ; et ut hotujiioribus potius ieflihus fides adhtbeatwr^ $ I. Simili in^do fanximuSf ut unitu tejlimonium nemojudicum in qw^ cunque caufa facile patiatur ddmitti. Et nunc mantfefie Janctmus ut unius omnifto tejlis refpottfio non audiatur^ etlawfi prmclare curi^ bonorc praftJgeat. The operation of this law is evidently a dixeft ex* cluGon of the teftimony of a fingle witnefs ; and very littie can be inferred from tlie recital of the former prohibition, againft eafily receiving fuch teftimony in favour of the pofition, that it was . in general previoufly allowed, accompanied by the fandion of the fuppletory oath. I am at a lofs to conjecture upoa what founda- tion Numb. XVI*] Where two Wltnejes are necefarf. 373 tion the reference is made to the title ^emadmodum Ufiamtnta aperianiur^ for there is not either in the digeft or code, any pafTage under that title whidi has the flighted relation to the fubje£t, and it is not probable that any direct authority would have efcaped the laborious induftry of Mafcardus. But whatever the true con- clufion upon this point may be, it muft always be reniembered that it was a didinguiihing chara£^er of the fuppletory oath, that it was in the difcretion of the judge not only whether it fliould be adminiftered at all, but alfo to which of the parties it {hould be adminiftered ; and that, fuppofing the teftinvony of a fingle witnefs to be a fufHcient femiproof, the judge, inftead of admitting the party producing the witnefs to depofe that his teftimony was true, might put it to the^ oppofite party to fwear that it was falfe. I have felt a difappointment in not receiving information, npoD the modem pra&ice upon this fubjed, from the leflures of Dr. Brotufim The common law courts in the e:cercife of their prohibitory jurifdi^iion, (which in fome cafes appears formerly to have been carried beyond its legitimate limits,) have interfered to controul the civil law courts, in the exercife of their regular pra£^ice of re- <|uiring a proof by two witnefTes. A more correct principle feems to have prevailed in Roberts* s cafe, Cro. Jac. 26g. 12 Co, 65. where upon a fuit for fubtraAion of tithes a prohibition was applied for, becaufe there was only one witnefs to prove the leafe, but was not allowed, becaufe it is a rule, that where the cognizance of the prin- cipal is, the cognizance of the acceflary neceflarily follows, and that when the original caufe belongs to the fpiritual court, though matter triable at the common ^w arifeth, depending on the origi- nal caufe, yet it (hall be determined by that court, and the furmife tbt a party has but one witnefs is not a fufficient caufe for a pro- hibition, where the ccclefiaftical court hath jurifdi&ion of the principal. But in the fubfequent cafe of Richardfofn v. Dejboroughy I Venfr. 291. the fpiritual court having refufed the proof of pUne admini' pavit by one witnefs, a prohibition was granted, for that where the matter to be proved (which falls in incidentally in a caufe before them in the fpiritual court) is temporal, they ought not to refufc fuch proof as the common law allows. In Sh^tr v. Friend^ a Salk. 547.. a prohibition was granted to the fpiritual court, be- caufe they would not allow the proof of a payment of a legacy by one witnefs, and the, court faid, they m?y follow their own rules^in Xiuflgs which, are originaUy in their CQgt^^ance, but if any. collateral natter doUi arife| as contiqintogjdie pa|mcat of a le^acy^ if proof bo Vol., II. U by 27+ APPENDIX. [Numb.IVL by one witnefs, they ought to allow it. Tlic fame princii^s were laid down incidentally in the cafe of Breedon v. Gi7/, i Lord lUvfm. 32 1, in which it Was faid, that if the fpiritual court require more than one witnefs to prove the revocation of a nuncupative will, the King's Bench will not intermeddle, but if in a fuit for a legacy payment or a releafe be pleaded, if they do not admit of proof by one wk- nefs, the King's Bench grants a prohibition. It is fo much the faihion in all matters of controyerfy, between the courts of common law and thofe following the pradtice of the civil law, to imagine that the former who have certainly the power have alfo the right on their fide, that the expreflion of a doubt refpefting the propriety with which the controuling power has been cxercifed, if it has the honour of being noticed at all, will moft probably be noticed with difapprobation ; but it (hould al- ways be recoil jfted that the power and courfc of procedure of f!ie fpiritual court, with refpc£k to the objeds of its jurifdic- tion, are as much a part of the law of England as the authority and prafticc of any other tribunal whatfoever, and every part erf die law of tl^e land is equally facred. Whatever may be the wifdom of tlie pratlice which requires in general a proof by two witneiTes; it is, with refpcft to thefe courts, an eftablifhed part of their con- ftitution, and therefore an edabliilied part of the conftitution of Ae kingdom, and when there is a confli£l between the praflice of the refpeftivc courts, with regard to the proof of fafts upon which they have, whether originally or incidentally, a concurrent jurifdic- tion, it is not to be tnken for granted that the courfe of the one is improper and illegal, becaufe it happens to differ from that of the other. Similarity of proceeding is, generally fpeaking, a defirable, but is often a fubordinate obje£t ; and when fuch fimilarity is re- qiiired, it ought to be confidered whether it can be carried through in all its leading features, before it is required to be applied to any one of them ; for otherwife the partial fimilitude may only increafe the effeft of the general want of refemblance. It is an effcntial part of the common law of evidence, not merely that the teftimony of one witnefs fhall be received, but that the witnefs fliall be ex- amined viva voce in open court, with all thofe opportunities of fifting the truth and accuracy of his narrative, which arc incident to a public crofs-cxanunation ; whereas the examination in the fpiritual court is in private, and upon prepared interrogations where the advocate is wholly incapable of trying the credit of witneffcs, by qucllions fuggeftcd from his demeanour and courfe of narratiw upon his original examination ; the evidence can only be encounter- ed- by queftions prepared by anticipa(Ion, upon a view of the allrgations refpeding Which the' wUnclis te CO depoie, but the neccf- . • ' ' • fitj Numb. XVIJ Where two Wttnejfes are necejfary. %y$ 9 Cty for a concurrence of two witnefles, may in fome degree cpun« teraft the difadvantage of not having an adequate opportunity to fcrutinizcy in the 'mod effedlual manner, the tetlimony of each witnefs individually. In the common law courts the decifion is by a jury, who were originally required to come from tlje neigh- bourhood ; and who were fuppofcd to have a knowledge of the parties and the witnelTes, and of the credit due to them, and in fome degree alfo (however juftly the principle of the fuppofition may be difcountcnanced in modern pradice) a knowledge of the fadks of the caufe, whereas the judge of the fpiritual court has nothing to guide his decifion, but the dead letter written examinations, which are adduced before * him : the conformity required from thefe courts, then, in the admiflion of a fingle witnefs, is very defeflivc and imperfed, unlefs it can be alfo extended to the introduction of the jury and the viva voce examination. In the fubjeds, with refped to which the conformity Is required, there appears to be an afiumption of authority which the principle applied to them is infufficient to fupp^ rt ; for although p^ene admint/lravit is a queftion which, according to the nature of the demand, may be cognizable by either court indifFerently, legacies are the peculiar province of the fpiritual court, in total exclufion of the courts of common law, and therefore the controul of the courts of comnion law, with re- fped to fubjeds wholly foreign to their own authority, upon the pretence that the cognizance of the courts to which they peculi- arly belong, is only incidental, cannot upon any corre£l principles of reafoning be reconciled ta the dodrine which is profefledly en- tertained; and here it may be recolleded, that the concurrent power exercifed upon this fubjed even by the court of chan- cery, is of no great antiquity, and that the controuling power in fome degree afTumedby it is comparatively recent. The courts of equity are not in general clafled amongft the courts of civil law, but with the fame mode of examination they have adopted the fame principle of requiring a difputed hGt to be proved by the oath of two witncfles, fubjed to the power .of rjC- ferring the cafe to the courts of common law, to be tried in the ordinary form by viva voce examination before a jury ; and in fome late cafes, the adoption of the do£lrines and principles of equity, in courts of common law, has been cenfured as founded upon an im- perfedl and therefore erroneous analogy j inafmuch as the anfwer of a defendant can in equity only be contrad:£lcd by two witneiTeSf whereas the demand at common law may be fufficiently eftabliOied by the evidence of one. I am by no means difpofed to contend in favour of the incroachment by courts of common law, upon the province of courts of equity, and am fully aware of all the incon- U a vcnienccs a7« ^ APPENDIX. [Numb-XVI. vcnienccs of adopting the partial imitation of a proceeding, where the whole fyftem with which it is connefted cannot, fo far as relates to the particular fubjcft, be equally embraced, but with refpcfi to this particular objeftion, of a difference in the proof to be required, I do not feel the weight of the argument. If it can be afcertaiued that the faS inquired after is properly and without incroachment the objeft of any given jurifdi^ion, the mode of afcertaming that faa may be properly left to the eftabiifhed conftitution of the jurifdi^ion itfelf, and the defe^ks and difadvantagcs on the one fide may be counterbalanced by the fuperiority in another : thus, to revert to the diftinftion mentioned with refpeft to the preceding fubje£(, the difadvantage (fuppofing it to be one) of admitting a proof by one witncfs, may be counterbalanced by the advantage of a viva voce examination and the afliftance of a jury. The general rule that a decree (hall not be made againft the an- fwer of the defendant upon the oath of one witnefs, is fully eftablilbed by a feries of cafes, from 3 Cb. Ca. 1 23. ^Ham v. Jourdw^ I Vern. 161. to Mortimer v. Orchard^ 2 Vef. jfun, 243. But this rule is only applied where the anfwer contains a full and pofitive denial ; for where a defendant only denied notice to her> ielf, and it was proved by a fingle witnefs that notice had been given to a petfon, who in the opinion of the court was fully prov- ed to be her agent, this was held fufiicient. Lord Harimcb faid, that the rule which had been ftated was generally true, but 'that it admits of this di(lin£tion, where the defet>dant*s anfwer is a clear denial of a fa£b, which is proved only by one witnefs, the court will net decree againit the anfwer. But where it is not a pofitive denial of the fame fa6^, but admits of a difference that it is 'only a denial with refpe£t to herfelf, whereas in other refpeds it wlU equally ztkfk her, there are feveral cafes where the court on one undoubted witnefs will decree againft that anfwer : then here fhe denies only peribnal notice which is a negative pregnant, that (till * there may bo notice to her agent, and is a fa£l equally material. Le Neve v. Le Neve, i Fef, 64. 3 -^/i. 646. In jirnot v. Bi/coe, I Fef, 95. the fame illuftrious perfon faid, if the fingle evidence is denied by the anfwer, there is not fuf- ficient to decree upon, and the bill muft be difmifled$ but the anfwer is not ad diem, the charge being pofitive, and the anfwer only to belief, which is not fufiicient to contradi£t what is pofitire- Jy fworn, nor could the defendant be convi^d of perjury thereon, but there being fome doubt on the evidettce> his Lordfhip dire&ed an ifTue. In Retch v. Kennegal, i Vef. 123. Lord Hurdwicle fisud, the an- fwer muft be a pofitive denial and reft fingly thereon. In thefe two Numb. XVI.] Where two Witnejffes are necejfary. ajy \ * t two laft cafes, as in many other inftances in Vefefs Reports ^ there is no diilind ftatement of the circumftances upon which the opinions were founded. In a prior cafe of Hine r. DodJ, 2 Atk. 275. his Lordlhip feems to have rather deviated from the principle juft refer- red to, for a witnefs fwore pofitively to the defendant having acknow« ledged notice of a prior deed not regidered, andLord HardwickeiziA^ » Undoubtedly this is material evidence, bift then it is only oqe witnefs againft the anfwer of the defendant ; it is true his anfwer is very loofe, by referring from one anfwer to another \ but in the laft he fwears to his beliefs that he did not know of the fa£l." But a principal ground of deciGon was, that the regifter a£l of deeds in Mtddlefrxy gives priority to the inftrument firft regiftered^ and al- though courts of equity give relief in cafes of notice, his Lord- (bip feemed to think that fomethlng more than this evidence of the defendant's confeffion againft his anfwer as to his belief, was necef* ftrfto'take the cafe'of the a£^. This cafe, therefore, cannot be properly conCdered as laying down any rule in oppofition to the do£farine before adverted to. . In Walton v. HMsj 3 Ath* 19. Janfon v. Rany^ id. 140. Lor4 Hardwiche held that the rule did not apply, as the evidence pro- duced by the plaintiff was fupported and corroborated by a great many concurring circumftances, but no explanation is given in either of the cafes with refpe£t to what thofe circumftances were^ or how they appeared to the court, whether from the internal probability of the cafe itfelf, the admiffions in the anfwer, or thc( teftimony of witnefles* It does not feem, in any of the equity cafeS| to have been the fubjed of difcuflion whether the proof by dif- ferent witnefles of different fa£ts, leading to one conduCon^ 18 to be regarded as a fufficient compliance with the rule, which requires two witneffes in oppofition to the defendant's anfwer. la PenAer v. Mathers y i Bro, Ch. 52.' the bill was filed by the original lefiees of a term, againft their aflignee for the fpecific per- formance of an agreement, to execute a bond of indemnity againft the covenants of the original leafe ; this agreement was denied by the anfwer and proved by oiie witnefs^ and Lord Thurlow at firft expreffed his opinion that the plaintiff ought to have a decree^ upon the principle that the rule was fubje£t to the modification^ that if there are circumftances fufficient to turn the fcale, it ought to be turned, the oath of [the bye-ftander with circumftances cor- roborating it, being better than that of an interefted perfon \ but upon a fuggeftion from the defendant's counfel, that a particular perfon was prefent at the tranfadiion befides the witnefs who ha4 been examined, he direfied an iffue. The only confirmatory cir- cumftance 10 that C9k was^ that arifing from the nature of the U 3 cobtraa a78 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL contraft itfclf, according to which the vendor would cxpcft to have no more connexion with the original leffor. The Lord Chancellor ftated the general rule to be, that where the defendant in exprefs terms negatives the allegations of the bill, the court will neither make a decree, nor fend it to a trial at law. • , In Ihhotfon v. Rhodes ^ 2 Vern, 554. i Eq. Ah. 229, the Lord Keeper in direfting an iflue, where the anfwer denied a notice which was proved by one witnefs, direfked that the plaintiff fliould admit the defendant's anfwer to be read at the trial, not as evidence, for that could not be, neither fliould they admit it to be true, but to be fwom fo that the defendant might have the benefit of his oath at law as in equity, if it would weigh any thing with die jury. • In the cafe of Lord Milton v. Edgewortb^ vi. B. P. C. Old Edit. V. 313. Nl Edit, the Court of Exchequer in Ireland haring dire£bed an iflue generally on a queftion, whether there had been an agreement for reducing the intereft on a mortgage from^ to 6 per etnt, which was proved by one witnefs on behalf of the defen- dant, with confirmatory circumftances, the Houfe of Lords con- firmed the diredion, with the addidon, that the appellant (the ori- ginal defendant) fliould be at liberty on the trial to read an anfwer in a former caufe, by the perfon under whom the plaintiff claimed, in confirmation of the fa£l alleged. This cafe, according to the report of Pember v. Mathers^ was referred to by Lord Thurhw^ as confirmatory of a general pra£licc, that where the court fends a fad proved by one witnefs to a trial at law, it orders the anfwer to be read in evidence.' But it is clear that the decifion by no means warrants that inference ; the witnefs was for the defendant in fupport of his anfwer, and not for the plaintifl^ in oppofition to it ; the anfwer dire6%ed to be read, was that in a former caufe, and made by a perfon under whom the plaintiff claimed, and would therefore manifeftly be evidence dejure^ and without any dire£Hon at all. As Lord Thurlonu was counfel in the caufe, and the early part of Mr. Brown^s Chancery Reports is by no means difllhguifti- ed for corre£lncfs, it is much more probable that the error is im- putable to the reporter than to the Lord Chancellor. In Only v. Walker^ 3 Aik, 407. an agreement for a compofition was proved by one witnefs, but as ftated by the reporter, there was the cir- cumftance of the defendant's confefling the agreement proved in the caufe, and fome other circumftances . (not mentioned) to cor- roborate the proof of the fingle witnefs. If the confeflion alluded to was proved by another witnefs, and went to the extent of the agreement alleged, this was a full proof by two witneffes ; but the cafe Was not fo confidered, and an agreement of a difierent kind was admitted in the anfwer. The Mafl;cr of the Rolls offer- ed Numb. XVL] Whem tvfo Witneffes are neceffaty. 279 cd ifac defendant an iflUe, who declined it» utilefs he was allowed to read the anfweri as was done in Ihhetjon v. RhodeSy and another cafe of Cant v. Beauclerck ; but his Honour faid| that It-did not reft . gngly upon the oath of the witnefs, for feveral circumftances cor* roborated what he fwore» and therefore was not within the rule of thofe cafes, and confequently he could not give any dire£lions that the anfwer of the defendant (hould be read at law. In a book called ClerKs InfiruBory 9. it is faid, that a man and hi» wife are confidered but as one witnefs ; but books of this kind are no authority ; and it is very improbable that fuch an abfurdity would be admitted in modem prafiice. la the fame book, p. 6. it is laid down, that if a defendant in an anfwer affirm any thing, which he feconds by the teftimony of a fingle witnefs, and nothing is proved againft it } this is fufficient to decree for the defendant or to difmifs the bill* I apprehend that the rule is here corre£lly ftated, for the ground of requiring two wimcfles againft the anfwer, is the credit given to the defen- dant's oath, whereas there is nothing to oppofe to the teftimony of die witnefs for the defendant ; if there is any obje£lioa, or fufpi« cion with refpedl to the a&ual teftimony given, it is competent to the court in this as in all other cafes to dire£t an iflue. By ftatutes i EJw.6* c» luf. 12. 7 Wm. 3. c. 3./ 24. it is provided that no perfon (hall be indidled or convidied of high treafon, except by the evidenee of two wttnefles ; the latter z(k im- ports, that one witnefs to one overt ad, and another witnefs to another overt a£l of the fame tieafon, fliall be fufficient. And the iame rule was previously adopted in the conftrudlion of the former z£k, but it is exprefsly provided by the laft a£i, that if two tieafpns of different kinds are alleged in the fame indidment, one witnefs for each (hall not be fufficient. The proof by feparate witnefles, of repeated attempts to kill the king, is the proof of diffisr- ent overt z&s of the fame treafon, and not of diffisrent treafons} and one witnefs of each attempt is therefore fufficient : Fid, Staffhrft caie, Raym. 408. It is alfo held, that if one witnefs proves an overt aA of treafon in the county where tlie indictment is laid, the proof by another witnefs of another overt a6l, in a different county^ will .maintain the charge. See i Eafi, P. C. r. a. /. 65. One witnels alfo is fufficient to prove a collateral fa£i, as where a prifoncr called witnefles to prove he was bom in France^ (which, under the circumftances, would have been a fufficient defence,) it was ruled that his being born in Ireland might be proved by a fingle witnefs : Foftety 240. I think Mr. Eaft has cleariy (hewn, P. C. r. 2. $ 66* that the ads of parliament are fufficiently fatisfied by two wit- U 4 ncfles n flSo APPENDIX. [Numb.IVI. nefles proving the confeiEon of the party charged. .ITic ftat. i and 2 P. and M. r. lo. provides, that treafons rcfpefting the coin may be proved as before the ftat. of Ed^v. 6. and thefe treafons arc not included in the ftatute of William. The ftat. 40. G. 3. f. 93. contains alfo an exception with refpefl to the aflaiCna* tion of the king, or any direft attempt againft his perfon, where- by his life may be endangered, or his perfon fufFer bodily harm. In cafe of perjury, it is required that the falfehood of what has been fworn ftiall be proved by two witneflcs, as the oath of the party accufed on th^ one fide in the original fwearing is conHder- cd as equivalejit to the oath of one witncfs againft him. Perhaps upon the principles of corrcA reafoning, this confideration may be rather calculated to (hew that fuch evidence ought to be received with confiderable caution, than that it ought to be abfolutely re- jedied ; and the motives for falfehood in the original teftimony or depofitiori, may be much ftronger with reference to the event on the one fide, than the motives for a falfe accufation of perjury on the other. It is held that the rule docs not apply where the tefti- mony of the fingle witnefs is fupported by other circumftances. I do not find any authority with refpeft to the nature of the cir- cumftances, which fliall be deemed fufficient for this purpofe \ the only fa£l that I recollefi having feen a£led upon as fuch in prac- tice, is the writmg of the defendant. Whatever principles are applicable to the fufficiency of the proof given by two witneflcs in one cafe, are equally applicable in others, where there is the fame ncccflity, except where the par- ticular nature of the fubjeft induces a difference. A cafe occurred (which I quote from memory) before Sir William Scatty in the Confiftory Court of London in Eajlcr Term^ 1 79a, upon a pro* ceeding for difturbing a clergyman in the exercife of his fundions ; and it was held that the proof ' of one aft of interruption by one witnefs, and of another by another, was not fufficient. iTie learned judge faid {a)j the cafe had been compared to high treafon at common law, and to proceedings for adultery and defamation in that court; but in cafe of high treafon the guilt conGfted in the intention of the mind, of which the fafts proved were only in- dications, and the proof by different witneffes of different afts, was all levidence of one criminal intent ; and that in cafes of adultery and defamation, there was always a general article charge ing the fa£J; of adultery or defamation, befides the articles alleging (tf) I do not tflfe^ to ftats any of hli exprefHons, but oierel/ ttteospt to delineate ae« cording to mj RcoUe^ion tbp fttbft»ace of Uic ar^asQcnc* particular I Numb. XVI.3 Wh&etwo WHneffes are necejfarj. aSi ■ panipular inftances («)» and the iievera) particuhr fads con- ftituted parts of the fame adulterous or defamatory condu£i> where* as in the particular cafe, not only the proofs, but the charges td which they were applied, were feparate and diftind. The following paflage from UAguifftau^ in the cafe of the priilce ie Cmtjy in fupport of the pofition that an allegation of infanity may be fapported by the teftimony of difierent witneiles, to dif- ferent indications of it, may perhaps be deemed fuperfluous wi^ itfpe£l to the immediate propofition, but my partiality for this illuftrious magiftrate, and this particular exercife of his judicial talent, prefents a temptation for adducing his authority, whenever an opportunity occurs, which I have not the inclination to reSft. The queftion either relates to a certain (ingle determinate idJBij in which cafe it falls within the common maxim unus Ujlti nuUus ufiisy becaufe that fa& being eflential, it is abfolutely re« quifite that the depoCtions of two witnefles ihould concur to eftabliih the truth of it. Or, on the contrary, the queftion is refpe£Hng a general fa£(j a habit, a multiplicity of adlions leading to a fingle conlequenoe | and then it would be both xmpoffible to require two witnefles for each particular a£fc; and unjuft to reje£l the fingle depofitions of feparate a£^s. We fay, in the firft place, that it would be often impoflible to Inquire from a party, that each zQi Ihould be proved by two wit- nefle^. For infanity, or faulty, appear in all places, and at all times, and yet the fame perfons cannot always be prefent at this multitude of aAions. One obferves one adion, another another* But if it were abfolutely requifite that they ihould all fee the fame a£bion, it muft be fuppofed that the perfon whofe ftate is to be contefted, is to be always furrounded by a crowd of witnefles, the exa£i and afiiduous obfervers of his condud, who may at a future period relate the fame circumftances of fanity or derangement. But this fuppofition is not only abfurd and impoffible, we add, that it would be unjuft to reje^ the fingle depofitions of fe« parate a&s. The general fa£b is the only one, of which the proof 13 ordained \ and you know that in this caufe, although it was contended to be tieceflary to allege particular fads of infanityy you paid no regard to this argument, but confirmed purely and fimply the fentence^ which admitted a proof to be .made of the genenj fad. Particular («] In the Ecclefiaftical Court, the allegation !i contaioed in a fct ofatticlet particularis* log the tranfaffcions intended to be proTed, and the exannoation of the witneflea confiftt in teadiog tbeartkiet, and taking their depofitlqni with refpeA to the fa£ka alleged. The firft fitkle iaalwaya g^oetaly ftatiog the charge of adultery, ice without aoj circumftaacea or f artkolari \ upon which general anisic no witoeflet can be esamiacd.^ faas sSi A P P EN D I X. [Numb. XVL hJQt^ are infinite. How could they all be included in the articles of the allegation ? The witnefies are left at liberty to feled and ftate thfm as proofs of the general fad \ but this general fad is always the fubjedl of the proof, and the principal obje6l of juftice. It is fufficient if all the witnefies fay, that the perfon whofe ftate is contefted, appeared to them to be fane, or the contrary. It is not neceflary that they (hould all agree in the reafons of their judg- ment, provided they concur and are unanimous with refped to the principal fa£l, and only differ in particular circumftances. They come to the fame point by different ways, and thofe who were feparated ia the means, afe united in the end. It is the fame, as if two ex- perts concur in declaring a writing to.be forged, but found their opinion upon different oblcrvations. If they were feparately ex- amined, and concurred in their judgment, although their motives might be different, would not the proof be as ftrong as any which the fcience of experts can fupply ? In the fame manner^ witnefies are examined with refpe£l to a perfon's fituation* One adduces one fa£k, another dwells upon another, all equally pronounce a con- current judgment upon the ftrength or wealuiefs of his mind; can it be contended that die proof is not perfe£i, becaufe each cir* cumftance is not attefted by two witneffes i Do not we know that it' occurs every day in queftions of ftate, efpecially in thofe ^riiich relate to filiation and legitimacy, that it is very rare to fee two witneffes who mention the fame fad \ One eftabliflies one prefumption, another furiiiflies another conjeAure, and it is the afiemblage of all thefe prefumptions and conjcAures which forms die proof. An infinity of atoms compofe a body, and although each in particular feems to have no extenfion, they together form an extended fubftance. Many rays, which when feparate have no perceptible luftre, by .their union produce a glowing body of light, many particular fa&s^form one general fa&« So likewife let us add, that in thefe affairs the witneffes in fome degree par- ticipate in the fun&ions of the jXidges, whofe decifion they fome- times anticipate. Now as it is not neceffary that the fame fa&s fliould determine all the judges, and fome may be influenced by one fa£%, and others by another,. yet they are all faid to be of the fame opinion, when they all decide in favour of fanity or of the want of it ; in the fame manner witneffes are to be confidered ;is unanimous, when from different fads they all draw the fame conclufion, upon the fame general fa& which is the fubjed in difpute. The writers on jurifprudence, and efpecially Majcarius^ after having dated a part of thefe reafons, draw from tISem this general I confequence : Numb. XVI.] Where two Wiineffes are necejfary. 283 confequence : Non tamen de neceJfitaU requiniur quodjint eonttfiui fed fatis erii ut fahan fingulares fint^ fuia ei tarn reBe prAabunt SECTION XI. Ofhearfay Evidence* Mr. Fanhlanque^ in his notes to the Treatife of- Equity. B, 6. c. i« f, Im fjpeaking of this fubjeA, obferves, that in confidering the authority of general rules, it is material to diftinguifh thofe which are drawn from ^e depths of reafon, and the AxiQ: obfervance of which is eflential to the attainment of truth, from thofe which ztc founded upon notions purely of conyeniencei and which may be confidered as merely modal and afTiftant, rather than eflential to fuch objeA ; fuch are thofe general rules which refpe& the order of proceeding, &c. After taking notice that his author has dated feme general rules^ with reference to the qualifications of wit- Defies, he adds, that it may be material to ftate, in addition to thofe which refpe£l the qualification of witnefies, thofe which re* tfc£k the nature of their evidence, for though they are generallj thrown together, he apprehends them to be in their nature extreme* ]y diftin£l. Thus when evidence is reje&ed as hearfay, it is re* jeAed not on the ground of any want of qualification in the wimefs, but that die nature of his tefl;imony, though it be true, does not aflbrd the degree of proof yhich the fadl may allow. It is certain that privately fpeaking a hearfay^ of certain fz&$ may in many cafes convey to the mind as full a convidion, as the ocular obfervation of the fads themfelves. If a perfon of indif- putable veracity relates a palpable fad, as received from another of equal veracity, the hearer ads oipon the fuppofition of the exiftence of the fad, with the fame aflurance^as if it had fallen under his own infpedion, but the degree and extent to which this convidion can be carried, is comparatively very fmall^ and the ad- mitting it in the adminiftration of juftice, would be produdive of very confiderable error and inconvenience. It would import a full reliance upon the veracity, the accuracy, and the fuUnefs of the in* formation that had been communicated by every perfon through whom the information had been tranfmitted, and would want the . fandion of an oath which could not be applied to the occurrence itfelf, but only to the fad of the communication* It would alfo be fubjed to die perhaps ftronger objedion, of not admitting thofe inquiries 384 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVL inquiries which conduce to a full and {s^i&h&oxj explanation of what is related. Evidence of this defcription is therefore in general excluded| and Hioft of the cafes in which it is apparently admitted, when properly examined, will perhaps be found in principle not to amount to ex- ceptions from the general rule i for it is to be recollected that all confiderations of evidence muft be purfued with reference to the fubjedi matter to which it is applied, and that to weigh the com- petence or fufficiency of evidence in any given cafe, it is re^uifite to difcem with accuracy the nature of thb propofition which it is ofiered to eftablifli. What is called hearfay, may be properly divided under two principal heads: i ft. Thole in which, it is a mere narrative of an event : ad, Thofe in which it is the aftual occurrence of a fadi, which hSt may be materially connefled with the general conclufion intended to be drawn upon the fubje£l of the enquiry. Speech is a mode of a£tion ; but as it is an aAionof much more frequent occurrence than any other, and as there arc Ibme refpefis in which it may be diftinguifhabic from other actions, it is often referred to as a feparate fubjedl, and the fre- quency of the feparation occafions the affinity to be fometimes overlooked; but I conceive that the di(lin£tion between the cafes, in which the immediate a£lion of fpeech fumiflies a material indication with refpe£t to the ohjeQ. of inquiry, and thofe in which it is a mere z€t of narration, will in moil cafes fumifh the proper principle for afcertaining whether the evidence of its occur- rence is or is not properly admiflible. Many a£ls are in them- ielves of an equivocal nature, and the eiFe£t of them depends upon the intention or difpofition from which they proceed, which is in general beft denoted by the expreilionij accompanying them. Where- cver, therefore, the demeanour of a perfon at a given time be- comes the obje£t of enquiry, his expreflions, as conftituting a part of that demeanour, and as indicating his prefent intention and dif- pofition, cannot properly be rejedled in evidence as irrelevant. In qoeftions of fraud or bona Jides^ an adequate judgment can in ge- neral only be formed by having a perfeft view of the whole tran- fa£kion, which of courfe includes the converfation which fonns a part of it ; and, according to the phrafe ufually applied to this fub- jefi, the language which is ufed on any occafion forms a part of the res gejla. In qucftions refpeding afts of bankruptcy, the in- tention is almoft always the very point in iffue, and this is com- monly to be colledled from the converfations importing the exi& tence of thofe apprehenfions which give a chara&er and quality to the concomiunt anions. In Batemany. Bailey^ % T. R. 51a. 4 a pofon Numb. XVL] Of bear/ay Evidence. 9Z$ t perfon who had been carried from his own honfe to ManchifitTf under an arreft> upon being liberated went to a retired public houfei where be took pains to withdraw himfelf from obfervation. Eridenoe was oflered of what he faid, upon his return home, as' Slewing that he had kept out of the highway for fear of another arreftt which being rejedied, the Court of King's Bench upon an application for a new trial, ruled it to be admiffible ; and it was faid by the court, that although the bankrupt cannot be called as a wicnefs to prove his own bankruptcy, yet it was nerer doubted but that what was faid by him at the time in explanation of hia own ad, may be received in evidence. An admiflion by him be- fore his bankruptcy of a debt due to another, is fufficient to charge hiseftate. If he has been abfent from his home, an admiflion by him that he has been abroad to avoid his creditors is good evidence. Whatever he fays, in (hort, before his bankruptcy, is evidence ex- planatory of the a£t done by him. In this inftance, he abfented himfelf from home under fufpicious circumftances, for which his leafims were alked, and without doubt it was competent to in- quire of the witnels to whom he communicated them, what thole reaions were. — So> far as the obfervations in the preceding cafe are referable to the immediate point before the court, I think that Acy are perfedly correft, and in truth they are directly illuftrative of the principle which I am endeavouring to eftablifh ; but fome of the cxpreflions that have been cited, if conftrued literally, may be applied with greater latitude than the principle feems fairly to warrant. The converfation of a perfon, upon his return home^ naturally connects itfelf with the occafion of his abfence, and is an indication of the exifting ftate of his mind *, ' and wherever the expreffions can be fo conne^ed with the actions, as to be regarded as the mere refult and confequence of the co-exifling motives, they form a proper criterion for dire£ling the judgment which is to be formed upon the whole condud. But while it is an eftabliihed rule that the teftimony of a bankrupt upon oath fliall riot be re- ceived to eftablilh the exiftence of his own bankruptcy, it feema inconfrftent to admit, as an indifcriminate propoCtion, that any thing which he may have previoufly faid (hall be an admiflible medium of evidence \ and I think the proper confideration will be beft re- ferred to the principles already adverted to, according to whicbj whatever expreffions may fairly be regarded as refulting from the cotemporary motives ading upon his mind, and influencing his condu£fc,^will be properiy received \ but that a mere narrative s^t any time before the iflTuing of the commiflionof a coiidu£l, and the motives of thatcondttft at any indefinite antecedent period, ought not 286 A P P E-N D I X. [Numb. XVI. not to have an authoritjf which is denied to his folemn examiiia- tion* . In cafe a queftion fiiould arife refpe&ing the ftate of health of a perfon at a given period, the application of that perfon to a me- dical pra&itioner, and the reprefentation of hi« complaint, would be properly evidence of a fa£t, the reprefentation being the natural effe£l and confequence of the exifting indxfpofition. According to the reprefentation in the publig prints, of a cafe of Avifin ▼. Lord Kinnaird (which will nioft probably not be included in a regular re- port before this difcuflion has pafled theprefs),refpe£ltnganinforance by the plaintiff on the life of his wife, evidence has been allowed by the Court of King's Bench, of the wife having reprefented at a fubfe* quent period the ftate of her health, at the time of efief^ing the infu- rance.This uponprinciplelfliould have conceived to be inadmiflible, as amounting only to narration; the mere circumftance that it could not be fuppofed that the party was a£iuated by any undue motive, would ^o a great way in favour of the general admiflibiiity of hearfay evidence \ the circumftance that this was the confefEon of the wife of the party afi:e£ked by the evidence, does not feem to form. a fufficient exception, unlefs it can be contended, which it certainly cannot, that the wife's declarations are in general to be admitted againft the hu(band. In cafes of eonfpiracy, whether amounting to treafon or not, the a{is of any of the parties engaged in the confederacy, with reference to the common objed, are admiflible evidence againft the others, whether immediately privy to them or not. Se? Rex v. £/0/f/, 6 7. R* 527* and the cafes there cited ; and I conceive that verbal a£ks, if I may be admitted to ufe that term, as indicating a prefent purpofe and intention, cannot be diftinguifhed from others ; but in this cafe as in others, where the expreiTions are merely narrative of a paft occurrence, I do not think that they are properly admifiible to prove fuch occurrence] having exift- ence. In this view of the fubjed, there does not appear any fubftantial difierence between the expreflions of a third perfon, and thofe of a party adducing them in his own favour \ fuppofmg the previous fa£l, that his conduA in other inftances could properly be the fubjedl of inquiry. If an action was brought againft a perfon, for knowingly giving another a falfe charadler of affluence, his fainiefs in doing fo might be rendered apparent by his giving credit himfelf ; his ofiering to become refponfible to a different perfon, or his recommendation to . his owu neareft couaeftions, would alfo be a natural indication of his Numb. XVI.3 Of bear/ay Evidence. 287 bis fincerity^ndthereforey I conceive, would be aUb proper eridtace of it ; as in any other cafes, thofe expreffions which indicate an ixifting temper and difpofition would be a proper medium of proof, whenever the exiftence of that temper and difpofition woiild be a proper objef^ of inquiry. It is fomctimes faid, that the objeftion to hearfay evidence, does not apply with refped to a declaration accompanied by an a£k i in the preceding obfervations 1 have endeavoured to trace the nature and import, and, therewith, the limits of this propofition, which I think is only corre£l where the expreilions are demon- ftrative of the nature of the z€t itfelf, and that the mere circum- ftasce of being cotemporaneous by no means removes the prin* cipfe of the obje6iion. Thus where a man delivers-^a ftolen watch to a conftable, arid fays, that he has received it from the prifoner % what is related is a detached and feparate fad, and not a mere expofition of the accompanying h£k itfelf; and therefore is, I con* ceive, not properly admiffible, although I have known an argUF^ ment addrefled to a court of Quarter Seflions with confidence and fuccefs, in fupport of the oppofite decifion. In the fame court, I have feen a decifion (which, after the numerous citations that I have made of judgments which have appeared to me in oppofition to the correct principles of legal reafoning, with a view to illuftratt my general obfervatidns, I am glad of tlie opportunity of adducing as an inftance of concordance with my opinion), I have known evi- dence offered on behalf of the prifoner of the declaration which he made at the time (^ being apprehended, which was obje£led to, but received : thefe declarations correfponding with the evidence adduced by him, were a manifeft indication that the defence had not been pre- pared at leifure and by way of afterthought i they conftituted a part of his demeanour, at a time when the demeanour is neceflarily affect- ed by the confcioufnefs or guilt or innocence ; and denoted a con- Cftency in his defence, whicl^ was a ftrong corroboration of its veracity; the mere declaration ftandiil); alone as an infulated fad, would have been no proof of the truth of the aflertion, but the evidence of it could not have been properly rejeded, as the im- materiality of it could not be afTumed, if by the addition of other evidence it could naturally be rendered material. If a perfon is employed as agent to another, the ads of the agent within the apparest limits of hia employment are, in point of legal tSk&f the ads of the principal, and therefore, whatever is repie- icnted by the agent in the courfe of fuch tranfadion, is properly evidence agttnft his principal, not properly as a proof of the adual truth of die fad xeprefented, but as conftituting in itfelf • tqprefemation by which the principal is bound, as if it had been made 488 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. nude by himfelf» and which is equally obligatory upon him, whether the relation is true or falfe. In the cafe of Biggs y. L(nth nnce^ 3 7. jR. 454. the defendant dire£ied goods to be delivered to Woody the captain of a (muggltng veiTel, and Mr. ^(lice h^i^ decided at nift prius^ that as it was eftabliihed that Wood was the defendant's agent for this purpofe, any acknowledgment under his hand was evidence againft his principali as much as if it had been the acknowledgment of the defendant himfelf : the cafe was decide ed before the court upon the merits in favour of the defendant, and no difcufiion took place refpe£Hng the admiffibility of this evidence. In Banerman v. RakeniuSf 6 T. R, 665. it was faxd in ai^ument, that Lord Kenyon had frequently ruled againft fuch evidence at the fittings, without its having ever been queftioned, and his Lord- ihip's own opinion, as exprefled in that cafe, feems to be againft the admiffibility of fuch evidence, which, according to the courfe of the caufe, did not become a material queftion ; but the prerious decifion of Sefiai v. Porter ^ in the fame volume, 158, alfo feems to be a decidve authority in oppofltion to it. There the protcft of a captain was ruled not to be evidence againft his owners in favour of an infurer, even although it had been communicated to them by the broker, which was contended to amount to a recognition of the fads which it reprefented. If this a£b, which refults from the ordinary or more' corre£tly fpeaking, the conftant courfe of nautical traufaAions, could not be allowed to afied the parties, bjr whofe agent it was made, much lefs (hould any diftin£l coUatenl reprefentation. When it is alleged that the zQi of the agent is the a£l of the principal, the propofition is always to be qualified by ^ •the nature and apparent limits of the agency \ but an authority to negotiate a contra6)r, to receive goods or money, or do any other tranfa£Hon in the courfe of bufinefs, by no means 'tidicates an authority to bind the principal, by any naked collateral reprefenta* rion of a fa£l, which has antecedently taken place ; therefore the proper inquiry refpef^ing the expreiTions as well as the other a£ls of an agent, is how far they fall within the a^ual or oftenfible purpofe of his delegation. ' On the trial at Nift Prius^ of the cafe of Fowler v. Padget, the principal point of which is reported f T. R, 509. I remember that part of the evidence offered to prove, that the plaintiff had left •his dweiling-houfe with intent to defraud or ^delay his crediton, <»wa8, that .when creditors called at his houfe in Mandf^ir^ they ywere told that he had gone upon fome bufinefs. toT'Tori^n:, when in truth he had gone to London. Upon, the .dificulfipn of the ad-« itnilfibility of this evidence, of. which my 4nemory does, not fumiih •me with thetcfult^ and whiph is. sot noticed , in -the- mport, dt occurred tfumbi XVI.] Of hear/ay Evidence. 289 occurred to me as a bye ftander, that the evidence was not of the charafter of hcarfay ; that the point intended to be afcertained, was not that the faft related was true ; but that the anfwer given was purpofely falfe ; and that the intentional falfehood of an anfwer given to a perfbn calling at his houfe, may lead to a conclufion of concealment, and conifequcntly of fraudulent intention. A pre- fumption of agency may be eafily formed, with refpeft to the an- fwers given to perfons calling at a man's habitation ; the nature of Tuch anfwers, and the authority of giving them, being as much conne£le3 with the domeftic economy of a houfe, is the tranfac- tions with cuftomers ate connefted with the arrangements of a fiiop. It muft be remembered that Ae adequacy of the conclufion, deduced from the faft of fuch a mifreprefentation being given, is a queftion perfeftly diftinft from that which applies to the com- petency of the proof, as founded upon hearfay. One of the cafes, which are mentioned as exceptions to the rule for the exclufion of hearfay evidence, is where it is adduced to fliew that the teftimony given by a witnefs upon the trial, is con- Gftent with his declarations on former occafions; but it has been faid that this is not evidence in chief, and it is doubtful whether it be fo in reply, i Mod, 283. According to the principles of Correft reafoning, the propriety of the evidence in this cafe as in the others already referred to, muft depend upon the nature of the objedl which it is intended to attain. In an ordinary cafe the evidence would be at leaft fuperfluous, for the aflertions of a wit- nefs are to be regarded in general as true, until there is fome par* ticular reafon for impeaching them as faife ; which reafon may be repelled by circumftances, (hewing that the motive upon which it IS fuppofed to have been founded, could not have had exiftence at the time when the previous relation was made, and which there- fore repel the fupgofitioti of the fa£l related being an after- thought or fabrication. The fufpicion of an oppofite conduft may refult, either from the inherent nature and complexion of the evidence itfelf, or it may be indicated by the imputations a£lually thrown out in crofs-examination, or otherwife by the oppofite party. If a witnefs fpeaks to fafts, negativing the exiftepce of a Contra£l, and infinuations are thrown out, that he has a near con- ne£lion with the party on whofe behalf he appears, that a change of market or any other alteration of circumftances has excited an inducement to recede from a deliberate engagement ; the proof by unfufpicious teftimony that a fimilar account was given, when the contraft alleged had every profpeS of advantage, removes the imputation refulting from the ojpoCte circumftance, and the tefti- mony is placed upon the fame level which it would have had, if the Vol* II< X motives 290 A P P E N D I r. [Numb- tVI. motives for receding from a previous intention had never had ex- iftence* Upon accufations for rape, where the forbearing to men- tion the circumftance for a confiderable time, is in itfelF a reafon for imputing fabrication unlefs repelled by other confiderations, the difclofure made of the hGt upon the firft proper opportunity after its commiflion, and the apparent ftate of mind of the party who has fufFered the injury, are always regarded as very material, and the evidence of them is couftantly admitted without objcfiion. See Eqfii P, C. cL lo, § 5.. Cafes, where reputation is admitted as evidence, alfo appear in fome degree, although more remotely than the other inftances which have been adduced, to fall within the principle of the pre- ceding obfervations, for in thofe cafes the exiftence of the fafl of reputation is in general fo clofely and intimately cbnneAed with the faA reported, that from the proof of the one, it is a legitimate courf: of reafoning to infer the exigence of the other; In the fame manner as in other cafes, it is competent to argue from the vidble effeft to the ncceflary or probable caufe; and this principle accords with the diftih£kion which is made between reputation of the general propofition, which is the natural effc€t of the exiftence of the fa A propofed, and evidence of what has been faid refpefiing particular circumllances from which that faft may be inferred, for'fuch evidence is mere hearfay ; the narration of the particular event is in this cafe, as in all others to which the obje£lion applies, merely rjferrible to that particular event, which in itfelf is only a tranfitory incidental circumftance. A general reputation that a road was a public highway, could only arife from the aAual occur- rence of the faAs of which it waa a natural confequence ; the cir- cumftance that ^. Bi had done an individual ad, amounting to an indication of its being a highway, is as much infulated and the re- lation of it as much remote from being an afhial confequence that the fa£l had occurred, as the relation that A. B. had murdered C. />., Is remote from being an actual confequence of that event having neccflarily taken place. The firft cafe in which reputation is admitted, is pedigree. It is almoft impoflible in moft cafes to prove by direft evidence, the adual birth of the perfon whofe filiation is a fubjefl of inquiry, the few perfons having an immediate knowledge of the fubjefl, are often dead long before the motive of inquiry arifes ; but the concurrent and confequent fa£ls are attended with a notoriety, which is fo generally and almoft fo univerfally the tffeGt of an afiual occurrence of the principal hO. to which it has relation, that it is afled upon with as much confidence as could be given to tlie moft dire£t and pofitive aflurances. In the cafe of the King v. 1 Erifuelly Numb. XVI.] Of bear/ay Evidence., 291 En/wetlf which will be mentioned prefendy, Lord Kenyon faid» that *< the declarations of the members of a family, and perhaps of others liring in intimacy with them, may be received in evi* dcnce as to pedigrees, but evidence of what a mere ftranger faysy has ever been rejeded in thefe cafes." The terms intimacy ToAJhangtr^ as applied to this fubje£t are evidently extremely ngue, the circumftances attending conianguinity are, in their own nature, calculated to induce an opinion, and convidion of die exifting relation, and do not by any means necef- farily depend upon the fubfiftence of a perfonal acquaintance. If for aferies of years, from infancy to manhood, I have feen a per* fon treated, and heard him called the fon of another living in my neighbourhood, it is not requifite that I fliould have ever fpoken cidier to the one or the other, or to any of their family, in order to be convinced of the reality of the relation fubfifting between them. But independently of the reputation of the general fad of relation, there are fome particular fads, the declarations refpe^ting which are received in cafee of pedigree ; and in thefe cafes there is a material difierence between the ads of members of the fame family, who are interefted in the minutiae of its occurrences, and perfons who have only a knowledge indicating the general fubfif- tence of the relation ; and upon thefe fubjeAs there does not feem to be any material difierence between written entries and verbal declarations. For inftance, the time of birth is a matter refpe£ting which the members of the family alone have in general an intereft to take notice. In Goodright v. Mofs^ Cowp. 591. it was decided that a mother^s anfwer in Chancery, was evidence to (hew that her fon was bom before marriage ; and Lord Mansfeld in allufion to odier cafes, that had been previoufly decided, faid tradition is fttfficient in point of pedigree : circumftances may be proved. An entry in a father's family Bthlty an infcription on a tomb^ftone, ^ pedigree hung up in the family manGon, (as the Duke of Buciing^ ham's W2$y) are all good evidence. In the preceding cafe of Goed-^ rigbt V. Mofey Mr. Bar. (afterwards Lord Chief Juftice) Eyre^ a| Njfi Prius, refufed to admit evidence of reputation, that the party was bom before marriage. I think however the propriety of thia determination is rather doubtful, for if reputation is evidience that jt. was the fon of ^., an oppofite reputation at le;tft diminiihes the weight of one argument in favour of that propofition, and.is i^. general as naturally (and perhaps more frequently) a confeqvence of the adual fad on the one fide, as the reputation of tegkioiacy on die other. There is a difinclination to baftardize iflue, which is fomeliiiles perhaps carried too far. When paitics are adkuallf ttanied, and 292 APPENDIX. [Numb-XVii there is no impoffibility of the hufband being the father of the iffue C)f the wife, every confideration of decency and propriety repels the admiffion of evidence to the contrary. But when the queftion is, whether a perfon was or was not bom during wedlock, it fhould be recoUedled that the interefts of juftice arc concerned in prevent- ing one, who is really a baftard, from ufurping the rights of the legitimate members of the family; and there is no particular ' reafon of public policy, which requires that thofc who have, the real rights in. their favour, ihould meet with peculiar obftacles in fubilantiating the proof of ufurpation. In all queftions of prefcription, reputation is univeffally admit- ted to be evidence j but I have already adverted to the rule, and the reafons upon which it is founded, which confines fuch evi- dence to the genetal right, and excludes it with refpedl to particu- lar a£ls, by which that right may have been exercifed, or otherwife manifeded to exift. In Tates y» Harris^ Gilb. Ev, 77, an old map of lands was allowed as evidence, where it came along with the writings, and agreed with the boundaries adjufted in an ancient purchafe. I ihould conceive that the defcription of lands in old deeds would fall within the fame principle, where the obje£l was merely to fliew the defcription, that had been applied to the property at a given time, although the perfons againft whom fuch deeds were afterwatds adduced were no parties to them ; for there can be no other motive in fuch defcription, tlian to mark the objed of the inftrument ; the contents of tlie deed can give no right againft third perfons, and therefore there can be very little motive for in- fertingatiftitious defcription, of a co-exilling fubjedi which at the time will fpeak for itfelf . 1 have known however fuch evidence to be treated with great contempt, in the cafe of Prefcott v. Philips^ Trin. 1798 J adverted to anie^ No. IJ, IjOtd Kenyon applied to it, the epithets of (tuff and nonfenfe. Mr. Judice Afbhurjl^ thought the evidence abfolutely inadmiflible, becaufe it was poITible that a man might chufe to be a very great rogue for the fake of pofterity. Mr. Juftice Grofe. — ^It is the cleareft cafe that ever was. Mr. Juf- tice Lawrence was filent. — ^This difcuffion may at firft fight appear ratherapplicable to a different part of our inquiry ; but I think thefe dcfcriptions are very much to be aflimilated to hearfay evidence of matters of reputation. In Davies v. Pierce^ 2 T. R. 53. and HoUoway v. Baker^ cited, ibiJ. it was held that the declarations of former tenants, rcfpefting the perfons under whom they held their farms, were properly admifEble. This evidence feems to fall with- in the principle already adverted to, and referable to the written evidence laft mentioned \ being a matter of cotempoi^ry defcrip-* tion> Numb, XVI.] Of hear/ay Evidence* - 293 tion, conncd'ed with and ariHng out of the a£tual exiflence of the faft which it purports to indicate. The admiffibility of hcarfay evidence in cafes of parochial fettlement, formed % one of the leading points upon which the judges of the King's Bench were equally divided, in the famous cafe of the King v. Erifwell^ 3. Tl i?, 707. The queftion there agitated, has fince been placed at reft, as we have feen in a pre- ceding fe£lion> ($ 9.) but the difcuilion refpeding it will con<* tinue to preferve its utility, in the expofition of this branch of the law of evidence. Declarations of a perfon under the apprehenCon of impending death, are alfo fometimes admitted as evidence, chiefly in cafes of murder, where the declarations of the dying perfon are admitted to aifeA the party accufed, upon the principle, that the mind is un- der thefe circumftances as much imprefled with the obligations of adherence to truth, as when fpeaking under the fan£lion of an oath ; and the reafoning fo far as it goes is certainly well founded ; but while the veracity of thefe declarations is admitted, it is highly important to ufe an anxious caution in deciding upon the efiefi of them. The fandion of an oath is only one part of the benefit of a judicial examination, and only one of the reafons for the exclufion of hearfay evidence ; the opportunity of inveftigating the accuracy of the evidence, of applying queftions, by the anfwers to which it may be explained or qualified, is an important circumftance, and this is wholly loft. Much confideration alfo fliould be given to the ftate of mind of the party whofe declarations are received. Strongly as his fituation is calculated to induce the fenfe of obligation, it muft alfo be recoHeded, that it has often a tendency to obliterate the diftin£tnefs of his memory and perceptions ; and therefore, whenever the accounts received from him are introduced, the degrees of his obfervation and recolleflion is a circum- ftance which it is of the higheft importance to afcertain. Some- times the declaration is of a matter of judgment of inference and conclufion, which however fincere may be fatally erroneous ; the circumftances of confufion and furprize, conncAed with the obje£l of the declaration, are to be confidered with the moft minute and fcrupulous attention ; the accordance and confiftency of the fa£l related, with the other fafts eftabliflied by evidence, is to be ex- amined with peculiar circumfpefbion, and the awful confequences of miftake muft add their weight to all the other motives, for de- dining to allow an implicit credit to the narrative, on the folc confideration of its being free from tjie fufpicion of wilful mifre- prefentation. The exiftence of an apprehenfion of deaths at the time of mak- X3 ing 294 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. ing the declarations) is to be inferred, either from the cotemponi|| or previous declarations of the party, or from the nature of m fituation being fuch, as neceflarily to induce that impreffion. It was agreed upon a conference of all the judges in Eajler Tmn^ 1790, that it ought not to be left to the jury to fay, whether the dcceafed thought he was dying or not, for that muft be decided by the judge before he receives the evidence, i Eafi, P. C. c. j. $ 124. I am aware how much I fubjed myfelf to the imputation of prefumption, in hazarding a doubt upon the correfknefs of a poiition which has been fo eftablifhed ; but feeling the doubt, the mode of inquiry which upon deliberation I have adopted as having the moil utility, obliges me to exprefs it ; and if in doing fo I unintentionally incur the charge of difrefpe£l to the particu- lar opinion of the particular judges, I fliall have fome ezcufe when it is confidered that my motive is a fuperior refpe& to the fundamental principle of law, that queftions of fad are cxclufively the province of the jury. The relevancy of the evi- dence to the charge, the eiFe£l of the conclufions to be deduced from it, (fuppofing thofe conclufions to be afcertained,) the propriety of fubmitting it to the jury, with refpe£l to the conclufion which {hall be inferred, are properly within the conCderation of the judge. The judge upon the anterior evidence of apprehexifion, muft decide as to the reception of the fubfequent evidence of de- claration I thus far is mutually agreed — ^but the evidence from which the appreheniion is inferred may be true, or falfe ; the inference deduced from it may be correal, or erroneous y the fum of the in* quiry is the queftion of fa£l, whether the deceafed did or did not a£) under the apprehenfion imputed ; queftions of veracity, queftions of inference, and the refulting queftions of hGt are in all other icafes allowed to belong to the decifton of the jury ; and the pro- priety of the decifion of the judge in favour of receiving the de- claration, by reafon of evidence indicating the apprehenfion of approaching difTolution, is no more conclufive upon the jury, in admitting the relation of the circumftances, by which the appre- heiifion is fuppofed to be manifeft, to be true, or the inference deduced from the relation, to be corredl, than the declaration itfelf is conclufive upon them, as to the veracity of the party deceafed, or the accuracy of his reprefentation. According to a fair analogy to other proceedings, the dire£^ion fhould be previous to conCdering the cSe€t of the declaration ; to determine, ift, whether the deceafed was really in fuch circumftances, or ufed fuch expreflions, from which the apprehenfion in queftion was inferred : ad. Whether the inference deduced from fuch circumftances or expreffions is cor- tcGl : 3d, Whether the deceafed did make the declarations alleged againft Numb. XVI.3 Of hearfay Evidence. 295 againft the accufed .: 4th, Whether thofe declarations are to be admitted as (incere and accurate. In Wright T. Ciymer^ 3 Bur. 1 244. it came out by the defen- dant's re-examination (or as it is called crofs-examination), of a witnefs produced by himfelf for a different purpofe, that one Medlycoitf who had written and atteited die inftrument under which the defendant claimed, acknowledged in his laft illnefs that he had forged it ; to which evidence no obje£iion was made by the coun- fcl for the defendant at the trial ; but upon an application for z new trial they obje£ied againft it as hearfay evidence. Lord Mans-' jield with reference to this obje£tion, faid, << It came out upon their own crof^^'^xamination \ they made no obje£lion to it at the trial. The competence of evidence depends upon the circum- {lances under which it is given. Even though it had been upon an examination by the plaintiff*, efpecially as it was all written and witnefled hy MedJycott, and gave the premifes in queftion to his wife^ as the account was a confeffion of great iniquity, and as he could be under no temptation to fay it, but to do juftice, and eafe his confcience, I am of opinion, that the evidence was proper to be left to the jury." The admilEon of hearfay evidence was one of the points in dif- cuflion in the famous Doug/as caufe, and is the principal fubje^i of one of the letters of Mr. Andrew Stuart to Lord Mansfield. The queftion in that cafe was whether Lady Jane Douglas had been delivered of twins at Part's^ on the 10th oi July^ 1748. The truth of this poHtion was impeached on feveral grounds, which it will not be here neceflary to advert to, as the prefent difcuflion is only relative to the admifiibilxty of the evidence \ neither will it be neceflary to examine how far the inference intended to be deduced from the particular evidence, was combated by any other fads in the caufe. It was alleged by Lady Jane and her hufband, that (he had been delivered by the afliftance of a furgeon of the name Pier la Mar; this was treated on the oppoHte fide as a fi&ion and invention^ and it was faid that no fuch perfon could be found to have had an exiftence. In fupport of the filiation, evidence was given that a furgeon of th^ name of Delamarre^ at a time coincid- ing with that in queftxon, fpoke of delivering a foreign lady of advanced age, of great family in her owrf country, and who had come laft from RheimSf (which defcription accorded with Lady Jane,) of twins i the obje^iions againft the probability of diis account, and the want of coincidence between this Delamarre, and the defcription given of the furgeon who attended Lady Jane are here omittedj as tbey apply rather X4 to 2g6 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI, to the cffefl: and confequence of the evidence than to the pro- priety of attending to it, if free from any fuch obfervatipns,— The following preliminary obfervatiphs, fey Mr. Stuarty upon the general nature of the fubjeft, place in a very perfpicuous point of view the general nature of the objeflions againft hearfay evidence. ** Hearfay evidence is, in general, of very little confequence, and ought never to be regarded, except where, for want of direft and pofitive proof, the judge is neceflitated to give a determination even upon fuch flight probabilities as are laid before him. For, befide^ that a teflimpny of this kind is weakened by its removal fron) the firft fource, it is liable, from its very nature, to important objeftions, which greatly diminifti its authority. Very few per- fons impofe on themfelves fuch drift laws of veracity, that every word which drops from them in converfation can* be regarded a$ a judicial teftimony. — ^Vanity, felf-intereft, love of talkativcnefs, a variety of motives, even the mod frivolous, make people indulge themfelves in fifligns of this nature ; and they think themfelyes the more fecure, both as^ a deteftion is not attended with any impor- tant confequence, and as their companions never dream of lifting their ftory, or examining circumftances, fo as to render the de- teaioii poffible.'' '* If fuch narratives have fmall authority at firft harid, what weight is due to them when rep.eated, after an interval of many years, by perfons who were noways interefted in the original event ? The memory of men is never fo tenacious as to retain, with any tolera- ble exaftnefs, circumftances which entered merely by the ear, which could at firft make but a flight impreflion upon them, and which they never, during a very long interval, had any occafion to recoUeci. Every one's experience may convince him, that no conveffation was ever repeated by four or five perfons, even next day, without fomc material variations, and fometimes contradic- tions in the circumftances. But if innocent error be fo natural, and even unavoidable in fuch teftimony, what muft be the cafe where the leaft fufpicion of fraud, or corruption, or even partia- lity, is allowed to enter ? A perfon who relates a hearfay is not obliged to enter into any particulars, to anfwer any queftions, to folve apy difliculties, to reconcile any contradidlions, to explain any pbfcurities, to remove any ambiguities : he intrenches himfclf in the fimple aflertion that he was told fo, and leaves the burden entirely on his dead or abfent author." With refpeft to the admiflibility of the evidence in the cafe referred to, I conceive that the general principle of the objeftion will not be found to apply, when the real propofition intended to be eftabliflied is attentively confidered.— :If the enquiry had refted merely Numb. XVI.] Of hearfay Evidence. 297 merely upon the abftrad queftioa — ^whether Lady Jane^ at the time referred to, had or had not been delivered — ^and the parties alleging fuch birth had^ in order to prove it, offered the kind of declaration now under difcuflion, it would have been a mere naked cafe of hearfay ; but that is not a corre£i view of the nature of the difpute ; the filiation was fupported by the ufual evidence of nurture, education, and repute, by all thofe circumftances whick are prima facte fufficient ; the truth of it was impeached by coUa* teral circumftances, and amongft the reft by the imputation that the furgeon, whofe name was adduced, was a mere fi£kion, and the improbability that Delamarre^ the furgeon, proved to have had an exiftence, could be the perfon intended, or could have been fo connefted with Lady Jane and her hufband. — But if at the fame time Delamarre had held converfations importing fuch a connect* tion, agreeing in the leading particulars with the fa£is related to have pafled, fuch a concurrence of circumftances, as that Sir John Stewart and Lady Jane fhould, at mere random, have taken up the name of La Marrey a fi6):ion and non-entity ; and that Delo' tnarrey at the very time to which that relation was applied, (hould have, of his own head, invented a fiditious ftory, coinciding in its leading particulars with the fi£^ion adopted by other perfons, with whom he had no conne£lion or intercourfe, is marked with' the higheft degree of impijobability ; the convcrfation in queftion would therefore almoft neceflarily indicate the exiftence of a con- • ne if thecompetenceof witnefleshad been examined preyiott3 to the infertion of the preceding fe&ionsj refpe£ling their number and the nature of their teftimony^ but the preference is not of fufficient importance to induce me to deviate from the coarfe of my au^n In the treatife of Potiierwe have feen, that the law of IVance required feveral qualifications with refpeQ to the atteftation of ibrmal inftrumentSj which were not necefiary in witnefles adduced to prove a matter of h€t \ women^ foreignersi monks profeffed, who were ail excluded from the former^ were fu£Bcient witnefles for the latter. For the parties can choofe what witnefles they perfon^l infamy, eaufes which lead to a fufpicion of partiality^ ta which was added the fufpicion of fubomation* It is obferved by Gilbert that idiots and infane perfons are obr ^iottfly incapable of being witnefles^ upon which Mr. L^t x^m2x\&, that this mud be underftood of fuch as manifeftly are within the ^iefcription of this deplorable calamity ; otherwife defedl, or xn- conftancy of underftandi^g, not clearly to this extent^ will zfkQ, Aeir credit but not their competency to be examined. Yet of an infane perfon it might, for'defe£l of other evidence, merit to be confidered, whether in civil cafes at leaft, the teftimony of fuck might not be admiflible, upon points where his underftanding did not appear to be fubje£l to difturbance ; it being well known that in many of their melancholy inftances, efpecially where the refult of {ome violent paflion, the party afieded is entirely cool, clear, and recoUedied in his ideas, and as free as other perfons from the deluGons of a perverted imagination, in every thing not conne£led with the caufe of his infanity : with regard to perfons who have only temporary fits of madnefs, (then ufually termed lunacy,} and at other times are in all refpe^is found of reafon, thefe are then confequently as capable of teftimony as of any other legal aa, ' According to the law of England, there is no fixed time at which children are excluded from giving evidence, but the reafon and fenfe of their evidence is to appear from the queftions propounded, and Numb. XVI.] Of the Competence rfWiineffes^kc 299 and their anfwer$ to tliem.— Gi/^. 144. And Mr. Loffi obferrest that as children ot very tender years are capable of being legally confidered as capital ofienders^ much more are they capable of facing witnefles. There are cafes in which infants of the age of fix years were held inadmiflibic as witnefles to prove a rape, or an aflault with an intent to commit a rape ; but in the cafe of the King v. Brajtie^ 12 April, I779> Bull. N. P. it was determined by all the judges that an infant of the age of five years might be fwom and give her eridence upon oath, provided Ihe have difcretion, and be acquaint* ed with the nature of an oath. Sir Matbew Hale exprefles an opinion, that where the informa* tion from the party injured is peculiarly efientialj it may be expe- dient to hear an infant, though the court ihould think it unfit to fwear her \ but this fentiment is now univerfally exploded. It is cuftomary when children are adduced as witnefles, to mJkm a preliminary examination, in order to decide upon the extent of Aeir underftanding, and their fenfe of moral and religious obliga* don ; but it may deferve confideration, whether fuch a deciGon could not be as accurately formed by attending to their examination upon the fubje£l in difpute, as by their anfwers to the queftions which are now commonly ufed as a touchftone. The next objeQion is perfonal infamy. This obje£lion was of much greater extent in the civil law than it is in the law of £ng« land, and in France included perfons in a (late of mendicity, and thofe againft whom a decret (or warrant of apprehenfion) had iflued for any criminal offence, until they were legally acquitted of the charge. According to the law of England, a convi£lion and judgment for a capital felony, is a difqualification from being a witnefs \ but where the convi£iion is for a felony within benefit of clergy, the allowance of clergy, and the confequenc punilhment, is a reftora- tion of competency. The ancient punifliment upon this occafion was a burning in the hand, which was treated as having an' in- fluence to purge the ofllence. But the oflRsnce of petty larceny being a cafe of felony in which inferior puni(hment( were inflided originally, and not by way of commutation, the rules concerning the benefit of cleigy did not apply to it, and as there was no purifying proceiis, tfae.ftaini once contracted, continued after the punifhment was complete* This abfurdity continued until the 31ft year of his prefent Ma<- jefty, when it was enaQed, that no perfon ihall be an incompetent witneis by reafon of having been convi£ted of petty larceny, c. 35. Although nothing can be nu>re general and explicit than the Ian* gtiage 30O APPENDIX. [Numb. XVL guagc of the aft, I have known it decided in an inferior court that a perfon under fentence of imprifonment for petty larceny was incompetent, until after the imprifonment had expired. This was adopting, by way of analogy, the rijle in cafes of grand larceny; but nothing can be more repugnant to reafon than reforting to analogy for the purpofe of altering the plain interpretation of Ian- guagc, perfeftly unambiguous in itfelf> and leading to no abfur- dity in its confequences. Of offences inferior to felony, thofe which may be ftated as cer- tainly dlfqualifying a witnefs, are, perjury, forgery at common law, ;md barratry. It was formerly held, that the infamy of the pupiflimcnt pf ftanding in the pillory was a difqualification, but I Conceive that modern opinions are uniform, that the difqualification muft pro- ved from the infamy, not of the punifhment, but the crime. In order to fupport the objeftion to a perfon's evidence on the ground of infamy, the record of • conviftion and judgment, or a copy of it properly authenticated, muft be produced j no other evidence of the commiflion of thie crime is admiflible ; and a vcr- dift upon an indiftment for perjury, without a judgment, has been ruled to be infufficient. It has been a matter of debate, whether the King*s pardon rc- ftores the competency which is loft by the conviftion of an in- famous crime ; Gilbert adopts the opinion that it does ; but in jcafe of a conviftion for perjury on the ftatute^ the King^s preroga- tive of pardon is exprefsly excluded. Under this kind of exclufion may alfo be ranked perfons excom- ' mnnicated. Mr. Lofft enumerates the caufes of excommunication, and expreiTes his furprlze that they remain as unrepealed exceptions to the competence of witnefles. A general infamy of charaSer may defeat the credit of a wiN nefs, but does not afied his competency. And it is only allowed in refpcft of the queftion of credit to give general evidence, and not tor enter into a detail of particular fafts, as has been already mentioned in a former fe£lion, upon the examination of wit- nefles. The caufes which lead to a fufpicion of partiality, and which exclude the tcftimony of witnefles in the civil law are, as may be feen by the Treatife in the preceding volume, very numerous, and feem to extend to alraoft every circumftance which can tend to in- fluence the wifties of a perfon in refpeft to the event. They ex- clude relations, fervants, profeiEonal agents, and (fubjeft to cer- tain diftinftions) thofe who are engaged in any fuit with either of the parties. The flightcft rcflciiion muft evince the impolicy of fuch Numb. XVI.] Of the Competence of Witnejfes^ &c. 30 1 fuch a rule. The grand foundation of judicial re£litude is^ as I have frequently had occafion to take notice in the courfc of the prefcnt number, an accurate and complete information of the faQs to which it is applied ; and the flowing a mere fufpicion of partiality in thofe, to whom fuch fafis are often mo (I familiarly known, indifcriminately to preclude the admiffion of that teftimony, which may be eflentially requiGte to the intereils of juftice, is a Very difproportionate facrifice of a certain advantage to the avoid- ance of contingent evil. Any circumftances calculated to induce cither partiality or en- , mity, may be very properly, and, as I conceive, very fuffici- ently eftimated in deciding upon the credit which ought to be given in each particular inllance ; additional caution will be ex-' cited, and the confiftency of the evidence, taking one part of it with the other, its coherence with undifputed or well eftablifhed circumftances, its internal marks of probability, the demeanour of the witnefs, will all be more accurately examined, and this will, upon the general average, induce a more accurate knowledge of the fa£is in queftion, than a courfe of proceeding which, whilit it Is occafionally ufe^ul in the prevention of falfehood, is conti- nually injurious in the fuppreflion of truth. Even the benefit arifing from the exclufion of thofe perfons as witneffes, who have a direct and immediate iuterefl. Is, as a gene- ral queftion, very problematical. ^ Mr. Fonblanque^ in one of his excellent notes to the Treatife of Equity obferves, that no rule can be more reafonable in a general view, than that which requires the teftimony by which any fa£l is eftablifhed, to be free from that bias which an intereft in the event might, even imperceptibly, give to the mind of a witnefs : but this rule, though fo admirable in Its principle, is, perhaps, of all the rules of evidence, the moft flexible in its application ; the variety of influences to which the human mind is fubjeft, may be confidcrcd as intcrefts which it more or Icfs anxioufly confults. The voice of nature may be fuppofed to give a bias to the tefti- mony of thofe who ftand in the relation of blood j and, according to even the worldly conftruftion of intereft, the child is in- terefted in preferving the charafter and defending the property of its parent ; but i& is a fpecies of intereft which the law does not , apprehend to be likely to fupcrfede the rights of truth and juftice, , and therefore a child, by our law, may be a witnefs for or againft . his father. The habits of frlendfliip may have fo blended the claims of charafter, that the teftimony of a friend may, in fomc inftances, be confidered as the teftimony of a man in his own be- half, but the law does not reje£l fuch teftimony j It may indeed in fuch 3e« APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL fuch inftances be influenced by a more powerful motive than the profpe£l of acquiring or preferving wealth, but it is a confideration which does not difqualify the witnefs, however it may weigh in eftimating his credit. What then, it may be afked, is intended by the intereft which excludes the teftimony of a man, whofe tefti^ mony is in other refpefls unimpeachable ? It is a melancholy re<- fle£lion| that though the law of England conceives the claims of truth to be fufficiently ftrong to reprefs the feelings of nature, and the not lefs powerful di£kates of friendfhip, it dares not truft the interefts of juftice to that fpecies of influence which the fmalleft, prefent, a£iual or fuppofed pecuniary benefit may excite : << I mean not (he adds) to arraign the wifdom or policy of the law.— > I have already dated it to be of all the rules of evidence the moft flexible in its application, that liberal fpirit which ever accom- panies the truly enlightened mind, haying modified its rigour bj diftinguifiiing that aflual intereft which goes to the competency of teftimony, and that influence which merely afieAs the credit of it.**— Whatever juftice there is in the general tendency of the pit- ceding obfervations, the law of England, fo far as it differs from that of other countries, is rather an exception from, than a pecu- liar obje£l of, the cenfure which they import. In difcufling the nature of that intereft which induces the dis- qualification of a witnefs, Gilbert obferves^— that it is where there is a certain benefit, or difadvantage to the witnefs, attending the confequence of the caufe one way. Few fubjeds have produced a greater multiplicity of decifiom than the extent and application of this rule, and amongft thofe de- cifions there is a confiderable degree of contrariety. That which is an intereft, and that which is merely a caufe of influence, have been confufed and blended together \ but the neceflity of comparing and examining a difi^ife clafs of cafes, and the difiiculty of recon- ciling and diftinguiihing them, is in a great degree prevented by the judicious and accurate inveftigatlon which took place in the modern determination of Bent v. Baker, 3 T. R. 27, which is now regarded as furnifliing the proper criterion in all difputed cafes. That was an afiion on a policy of infurance, and the broker who had efie£led the policy, and who had himfelf fubfcrihed it, ttfter {everal other perfons, was adduced as a jvitnefs to ftiew that the policy was void. His teftimony having been rejefted at Nj/lPrtus by Lord Lough* horoughy the cafe was brought, by bill of exceptions, before the court of King's Bench, who ruled the evidence to be admiflible.. There was a writ of error in the Houfe of Lords^ and the matter wat Numb. XVI. J Of the Competence ofWitneffes^ &c. 303 was finally fettled by compromifei but the opinion of the court o£ King's Bench has been fince conGdered as fixing the general ftand* ard upon queilions of competence. It- bad been formerly decided, that one underwriter could not be a witnefs for another upon the fame policyi and that decifion had been generally followed, the ground of it being, that although the witnefs had not an intereft in the particular caufe, he was interefted in the queftion which it involved upon the validity of the policy. There were fcveral fpecial circumftances upon which, in Bmt v. Bakery it was held that the evidence ought to have been received, particularly the necelTity arifing out of the witnefs's chara£ler as broker. But the grand point which the cafe eftablifhed Was, that a witnefs (hall not be reje£led as incompetent, unlcfs he has an intereft in the event of the caufe.. Upon that point Lord Kenjoh exprefied himfelf as.foUows : << I muft acknowledge that there have been various opinions upon this fubjedi, and that it is impoilible to reconcile all the cafes. Then we have only to confider what are the principles and good fenfe to be extrafied from them all \ I think the principle is this, if the proceedings in the caufe cannot be ufed for him he is a competent witnefs, although he may enter* tain wiihes on the fubje£i \ for that only goes to his credit, and not to his competency ; as where he ftands in the fame fituation with the party for whom he is called to give evidence, there is no doubt but that it may influence his teftimony; or where a father is giring evidence for the fon ; but this docs not render him incom- petent, and fuch circumftances are always open to obfervation* So here the witnefs might have had his wiihes; his fituation might luive created an influence upon his mind, but the queftion ftill is^ whether. he was a competent witnefs : on the grounds already ftated, I think that he was." And after obferving upon fome of the parti* cular circumftances, he faid, <^ However, thefe are only the fmali points of the caufe, and I again recur to that which is the princi* pal ground of my opinion, namely, that the witnefs was not inte^ refted in the caufe then depending." Mr. Juftice JBu/ler^s opinion feems to have b^en prii^cipally founded upon the particular circumftances, but he faid that on the general ground he inclined to think that there was no objec* tion to the competency. The true line he took to be this, if tie noitnefs to gain or lofe by the event of the caufe f Now the witnefi could not gain or lofe by the event of this caufe, becaufe the verdi^ could not be evidence either for or againft him in any other. Mr. Juftice Orofe^ with refpefl to the general queftion^ whether the witnefs's being interefted in the general queftion put t9 him ihall render him incompetent, ^s well as l^is being interefted in 304 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVt in the event of the fuit, faid — " I think it is better to narrow the objeflions to thofe cafes where the w^tnefs is interefted in the event of the caufe." And after a confiderable interval Lord Keri- yon faid — "» The cafe of Bent v. Baher^ laid down a clear and cer- tain rule, by. which I have ever fince endeavoured to regulate my opinion in caufes coming before me at Njfi Priusy though probably I may not have decided properly in every inftance, when called upon to form an opinion on the fudden. The rule there laid down was, that no obje£lion could be made to the competency of a wit- nefs upon the ground of intcreft, unlefs he were direftly interefted in the event of the fuit, or could avail himfclf of (he verdift in the caufe, fo as to give it in evidence, on any future occafion, in fup- port of his own intereft." Smith v. Pragu, *] T, R, 60. It will not be neceflary to enter into a detail of the numerous cafes which have occurred upon this fubjcfl:, or an examination how far they have been individually conformable to, or variant from the ftandard which is now eftabliflied, and according to which a witnefs is not incompetent, unlefs he has an intercft in the event of the caufe. The dlftinclion between an intereft in the qufeftion pro- pofed and in tlie event of the' caufe, cannot be more ftiikingly illuftrated than by the immediate fubjefk to which the cafe of Bent V. Baier relates — the admiOion of one underwriter in behalf of another upon the fame policy. In. the application of the rule which is now eftabliflied, and of the adjudications rcfpefting it, it will be an important caution to avoid drawing too general concludons from particular prcmifes, and to attend to the obfervation of Mr. Juftice Buller^ in the cafe of The King v. Proffer y 4 T. /?. 19, " That the queftion whether evidence be admiffible or not, depends upon the fubje£l matter to which it IS applied." For inilance, it is decided generally, that a tenant cannot be a witnefs to fupport his landlord's title, as he is liable to an a£tion for tncfne profits, if his landlord is defeated : provided the declaration in ejetlment is ferved upon the teftant, it may be affumed for this purpofe, that a judgment agaiafl the landlord, who is fubftituted under a rule of court, may be good evidence agamft fuch tenant in an aftlon for mefne profits, as the tenant had an opportunity of maintaining his owii perfonal intereftj but a former tenant, or one who came in pending the proceedings, and quitted the premifes before the trial, could not, in any aftiori againii hirafelf, be afFefted by proceedings which he had not an opportunity to contefl, and would therefore have no interefl, on the ground fuggefted, in the event of the caufe. Where the,intereflof a community, as a parifh or cofporatlon, is in queftion, the members of that community are not in general admif- Mtimb. IVI;] OfH^ Cifffetme tfWHneffes^ &c. %o$ admiffible witnefles. Thusy where a corjj^oration were loAla of a manor, and having approved part of a boouAon, demifed it» reierv^ ing rent to the mayor and bailifiti ) it wad contended that freext^en might be witnefles, to prove that there was a fufficiency lefc^ ba> caufe they had no intereft at all« the rent being referved to the mayor and bailifis, and the freemen not having the direAion of the corporate funds : and fecondly, that the intereft Was too minute to operate as an obje&ion to their teftimony ; but it was anfwered by the Court, that the rent muft be referved for the ufe of the corpoi* raliouy and therefore die objeAion muft prevail, however imaU the intereft may be in reality. Barton v.^Hindlef 5 71 R» 174* The efie£l of this obje£lion appears to be often prejudicial in {hutting out the due inveftigation of truth, but while the general principle of the obje£bion is allowed, it would be highly improper to fub* jeA it to the flu£iuation of opinions upon the degree of intereft in particular cafes ; and any corre&ive of the exceptions upon general grounds, can only be applied by legiflative authority* But ftill the objedions muft be underftood as fubfervient to the grand criterion of Sent v. Saier^^^n intereft m the event of the c^ufe. On this account It has often been held, and is now a fami* liar matter of pra£lioe» that a liability to be rated to the poor does not difqualify a perfon not aAually rated, from being a witnefs on a penal ftatute, giving part of the penalty to the pariffa* In the tafe above referred to, of He King v. Proffer^ 4 T.R. 17, it was ruledy that on an appeal, by fcveral perfons, for not being rated to the poor, (which was an tle£tion qualification,) a perfon pdflefled of rateable property hi a pariih, was a competent witnefs to prove that they ought to be rated ; upon which occafion Mr. Juftice BnlUr made the obfervation already cited, that the queftion whe» ther the evidence be admiffible depends on the fubje£l matter to which it is applied.^ It is alfo decided, that the owners and occ)i» piers of rateable property within a pariih, are gjood witneffes for a pariih, and compellable to give evidence on the other fide, unleia afiusdly rated* Rtn v. ^nOh Ljnn^ 5 T. R. 664. Ritx. v. Lklk Ltmlif^ 6T.R. 157. TUs dectfion, at leaft fo fat as afieds the owners, is a departure firom the common ftandard* for although, in cafe of a penalty, the- application (tf whidi is a matter of tranfient nature, the intereft may defend upon the circumftance ctf being afiually rated \ , the deci» fioo of a fettkment cafe prodnees a permanent efied, by either liberatiiig or diargiiig the parifli to an indefixute period \ apropos^ don of that pennanent chaifge diexefore falls npon the property, ia wUch dietOTMrlM only. parted widi a temponay iateieft, and VoL-n. T . which. 3o5 APPENDIX. tNumb.XVi: which, beyond the extent, of that intereft, mnft be incieafed or diminiih^ in value to himfelfi according to the decifion of the afc. * Since making thefe obfervations it has been decided, in the afc 4>f Tie King r, the Inbabttanis of Kirdford^ a ^oftt SS9^ ^^< ^ oc- cupicTi whofe name was purpofely omitted in the rate, was a com- petent witnefs, although it was contended, that he was crentoall? interefted in the confeqnences, as he might be put on the next nte^ while the fame burthen fubfills — but the Court held that it wu perfedly contingent whether the witnefs wouM be interefted or not, he might die, or part with his property before the ms^ngthe next rate, and he could not be rejeded on the mere gTOund ojf an expediant intereft. — From the conftant tenor of my obferratioDSi it :is evident that I am no friend to extending the exceptions againft 4he competence of witnefles, but upon frequent confidenition of the fubjedl, I cannot think tliat the mere cireumftancrof a witneft not being included in the exiiling rate, is, upon the principles of accurate reafoning, an'anfwer to the obje£lion, unlefs by contnfli or otberwife, his fecurity from a legal liability te the rate is as ei- tenfive as bis intereft in the rateable property, or the liability of that propertyto the charge which is the fubjed in difpute. Thchft rate is immaterial to the queftion of intereft — ^that rate is fixed, snd muft be paid. The decifion of the (ettlement induces die neceffity of an earlier or a greater rate being afterwards made \ or it r* lieves from that neceihty, and the perfons interefted in the queftioa are thofe upon whom the liability to fuch new, or additionsJntCi may fall. And if that rate may, in confcquence of the permanent nature of the charge, impofe a permanent liability on the propertyi thofe who have a permanent intereft in the property have an afiuai intereft in the decifion. It cannot^ I conceive, be correAly laid, that the intereft is contingent^ merely becaufe the ground of it nay •poflibly ceafe before the operation of it attaches^ The conttnuance of matters in their exifting ftate cannot leafonably beconfidercdasa contingency, otherwile a fliort anfwer might be given to all objce* tions of incompetence. Corporators, tenants' adually rated, or any other perfons may die, or ceafe to bear the chara£ler which is the caufe of the obje£kion. The pauper nny die, or» beii^a (emale, may marry. The anfwer of an intereft betag contingenlt only ap» plies if fome future event, which may or may not happen, muft necdC* iarily take place before the intereft can arife} but where the cfaara&r already exifts, the polTibility of its removal does not deftsy ttciflgpfr <}uencesof it. It is the removal only of the intaneft that i^eoatijigen^ and when the contingency takes place^ the oonfequencea of its en(b ^Qce will detepaine. To try the queftion of iHMtft Yifd| ipd we teefoif b ft&cial net ic«ofi»eteot* Ya fron jo8 • APPENDIX. CNumb.XVt from the goneral (late and order of focietyi and not that which !$ merely founded on the accidental want or failure of evidence in |he particular cafe. Thus fervants and agents are allowed to prove the delivery of goodsi or the payment of money, although by doing fo they remove the refponfibility originally incumbent on thein* ielves. But where the aflion is s^inft the mailer, on account of the negligence or mifcondu£l of the fervant, the latter cannot be a .witnefs for the former, to whom he is anfwerable over, without a oreleafe. Green v. New River Comp. 4 T. R. 58JK , A perfon robbed iS| by mere conftruAion of law, without any ftatutable provifion, allowed to give evidence, in an a&ion againft the hundred, except in certain cafes provided for by fpecial a£ls of parliament. ' One of the grounds of the decifion in the cafe of Bent v. BatfTf yrzs the neceffity that a broker who had efie£led a policy, and who from the nature of his fituation muft be the beft witnefs to many purpofiss, and was the only witnefs who, from the nature of the thing, could fpeak as to any reprefentation made by him to the under* ivriterSf fliould not be precluded from difclofing wliat viras material in favour of the underwriters, and it was upon this point that Mn Juftice ji/bburfif who declined giving an opinion on the great quef* tion in the caufe, principally relied. Another general exception is, that a peffon (hall not, by his own a£l| render himfelf an incompetent witnefs, when a party has acquired an mtereft in his teflimony, as by laying a wager on the event of the caufe* Suit, N. P. 290. This alfo was a point in ^e cafe of Sent v. Balery in which Mr. Juftice Grofe obferved, that the broker who had efie&ed the policy, and in whofe evidence another gained an intereft, (hould not, by his own a6%, (of after- wards fubfcribing the policy) deprive ^at other of the benefit of liis teftimony. A third exception is, that where a perfon who is tendered as a witnefs, does every thing in his power to get rid of any objedion to his teftimony, it (hall not be competent to the other party, by . an obftinate refufal, to prevent his being examined. . In GoedtitU •V. Weljhrd^ Doug. 139. the devifce of a reverfionary intereft fur- rendered to the heir at law, who contefted the will, but the heir refttfed to accept the furrender, and it was held that, as the wit- nefs had parted with his intereft, fo far as depended upon him, liurdperfons had a right to his teftimony, and the furrenderee ihould not deprive them of it, by refufing to accept the furrender.— So in Bent V. Baher^ the broker had joined with the other underwriters in a bill in equity, for Ae purpofe of avoiding tlie policy 5 but the defendant a&d Mritselft ofiisrcd to pay the aiTured the coftt of the fnit KiimK XVI.] Of the Competence cfWineJes^ &c. 309 ftttt in cquitji and to procure the bill in equity to be difmifled, as to them^ at their own expence> which ofFer the plaintiffs would not accept} this was held fufficient to remove atiy obje£lion to his eridence, founded on the fuit in equity. Mr. Juftice Bullery ftat« ifig the piopofition with which I have introduced this paragraph-^ In order to warrant the application of this principle, the nature of the refufal muft be attended to. If the witnefs has an intereft which he agrees to relinquifh in favour of the party, the party can- not, by his own refufal, defeat the teftimony ; but, on the other hand, he can never be required to concur in relinquifliing any claim, or intereft of his own, againft the witnefs. Where a witnefs has an equal intereft in the decifion either way> he may be examined. In Bucklandr. Tankard, 5 T.R. 578, the acceptor of a bill called one Gregfon to prove that the plaintiff had no property in the bill, but that it belonged to the witnefs, and had been merely delivered to the plaintiff to obtain payment for him | which evidence was difallowed, on the ground that if the plaintiff (hould fucceed, the witnefs would be put to greater difficulties to get back the money, than if the plauitiff fliould be foiled by means of his teftimony. But in Bderton v. Atkinfin, 7 7. R. 480, when tfa^ queftion arofe whether Barker, who received money from the de^ fendant, was or was not intitled to do fo as agent for the plaintiff; it was held that Barber was a competent witnefs, being anfwerabte either to the plaintiff or the defendant, although it was objeded that if the defendant recovered, the witnefs would be liable in ad^ dition to the cofts of that aflion. And in the fubfequent cafe of Birt V. Kerjbaijo, 2 Ea/ly 458, it was held that an indorfer of a bifl was a competent witnefs, for the drawer to prove that he had rQ« ceived the money from him, and paid it to the indorfee, although it was admitted that if the plaintiff recovered, the witnefs would be anfwerable to the defendant for the cofts of the caufe; and the au* thority of Buckland v. Tankard, was difallowed. — There can cer- tainly be no difpute with refpe£l 16 the principle, where the event is to the witnefs a matter of abfolute indlfierence \ and it feems t6 be going too far to confider the probability of a greater difficulty in making out the cafe on the one fide than on the other, as a ci^* Cttmftance which 9St€ts the intereft ; but I do not fee how it is poffible to regard a witnefs as indifferent who has a preponderance of mtereft on either fide» or to ;conceive that the ffighteft poffible Ihteteft on the one fide, can either, in point of legal reafoning, or in refped to the probable motives of condu£l, be fufiered to coi\ri- teibabnce the greateft poffible intereft on the other ; and if not> tfaei the flighteft ezeefs is as much a teal tntexeft as if diat excefi». y J had 3IO APPENDIX. 'CNu»nb.XVL 4 had been die oidy fabjc£k in difpute* It is fometimes faid that an interefted witnefs is admiffible in criminal profecutions } but many cafes fuppofed to be founded upon this principle^ in h€t proceed upon a different ground. The admiffibility of evidence in crimi* nal cafes is a fubje£t to which I (hall prefently refer with more particularity. Though an intereft in the event of the caufe is in general necef* iary to the difquaiification of a witnefs^ and an intereft in the queftion propofed is not fufficientj it does not follow that a witne& is neceflarily incompetent who has an intereft in the event of the fuit> unlefs he has an intereft in eftabliihing the truth of hb an- fwer to the queftion propofed. There are not many cafes to which this obfervation can apply^ but the ttkSt of it may be illuftrated by an inftance which I have heard ftated, withdut oppofitioDi in the court of King's Bench. Upon an indiAment againft a town- Ihip, or an individual^ for not repairing a highway, an inhabitant of the pariih at large is interefted in eftabliihing the indiSmenti as he thereby exonerates himfelf ; therefore he cannot prove the fpe« cial obligation to repair, but he may prove the place in queftion to be a common highway, for to that extent bis teftlmony only in^ duces a charge upon himfelf. . In Ftfthertngbam v. Greenwood^ Str. 1 29, it was held, that if a witnefs thinks himfelf interefted in the queftion, though in (trid* nefs of law he is not, yet he ought not to be fwom, and a cafe was cited where a perfon who owned himfelf to be under an honorary, but not a binding engagement, to pay the cofts, was held incompetent ; which do£lrine was admitted In Trdawnj t. Jionuu^ I H. BL 303. I cannot, however, avoid entertaining a doubt on the reflitude of this opinion. It is agreed that a party fii a caule has a right to tlie teftimony of a witnefs to whom there is no legal exception. Whether there is an exception, founded •upon an a£^ual intereft recognized by law, i^ a plain and palpable obje& of inquiry, but it is injurious that one man ftiouid be prejudiced by the mere imagination of another \ chat his claim ihould be repelled by the idea of an obligation in his favour, which .obligation he will afterwards be unable to enforce. A rdeaie which deftroys all legal intereft is, as is perfedly hr miliar, fufficient to induce the admiilion of teftimony, though the relcafe is executed even after the witnefs is called. Thefe re- leafes are often given by perfons under an expefiation that thofe who have profited by their teftimony will not withhold their ihare of the advantage. An expectation of this kind is always open to obfervation, as it may influence the wifhcs or affcA tlie credit* though dumgli k does not exdude ^ tefttmony of the perfon by whom it is oBtettained (a). The interefts of the huiband and wife are fo identified in coni^ templation of the Englifb law, that whatever exceptions, founded upon intereft, can be taken to the evidence of the huiband. Will be equally applicable to that of the wife^ And it is alfo a general rule, that the hufband and wife cannot^ in eitfadr civil or criminal cafes, be allowed as witnefles either for or againft each other, a rule which is founded not merely upon the confideratbn of intereft, but upon a principle of public poliey* Upon this principle it was ruled in an a£tion brought by truftecs for goods which had been conveyed to them for the feparati^ nfe of ihe wife, and were taken in execution for the debt of the hufl>and» that the huAand could not be admitted as awitnefs to prove the identity of the goods. Davis v. Dinwoodyy 4 T. R. 678. Tins rule is fubje£l to fome exceptions in criminal caies. In cafe of high treafon, the allegiance to the fovereign is confidered aa paramount to the obligations of marriage, and the rule does not attach. Where a woman is forcibly married ihe is a witnefs to prove the h€t, in an indi^raent againft her huiband^ founded upon Jf^ 3 Mmiy 7« Cm a. Lady Audlej was allowed as a witnefs to prove that her huiband aflifted in committing a rape upon her; but the authority of this cafe has been irequently difputed. Mr. Juftice Bulkr obferves, that the wife is always permitted to fwear the peace againft her huiband, and her aifidavit has been admitted to be rcsd, on an application to the court of King's Bench, for an information againft the huiband for an attempt to take her away after articles of reparations and it would be ftrange to permit her to be a witnefs to ground a profecution upon, and not afterwards to be a witneiii at the trial. 3ut an application for articles of the peace is founded upon tha neceffity of immediate protection, it is a meafure merely cautioU'* ary, aiid no legitimate inference can be drawn from the pra&ice in fttch a proceeding, fo a common law queftion of evidence. Tht eircnmftiince of admitting the oath of the wife as a ground for an information, does not induce a much ftronger argument. Upon fummary and interlocutory proceedings the reprefentation of par« ties is contiouaUy admitted, whofe teftimony would.be unqueition- ably fcjeAed upon a trial before a jury. A plaintiff is not only allowed to make an affidavit of a debt, in order to hold the defend* •ant to bail, but the affidavit Is in general (with what pioprfety it k not material for the prefent purpofe to difcufs) eondufive^ and (a) The ofts which have beeo decided refpefting the tompeteoce of vltDeflcf, ert venr «ell«€dbdhjMr.P«dw. Y4 not 3it APPENDIX. [KoiDb.X¥L Sftt AibjeA to eoBtndidUon \ yet the. evidence of the planntiff not be admitted to fubftantiate that debt upon the trial. The de- feadanti a|[aii|ft whom an tnfennation it moved, may> by his own affidavit, coatradid the charge imputed to him. It might be thought ftrange that he ihould be allowed to repel, by his own affidsvi^ the granting the information, and yet be precluded from giving his own evidence afterwards to contradid it ; but it would produce Ttry confiderable furprife if any fuch evidence waf oflieied. Mr. Xj^ mentions the cafe of a criminal charge againft a hu(band, for ^ perfonal injury to his wife, at Burf AffizeS) 1784, upon whidi thejudgc recommeaded, in his charge, that the bill ihould not bo £ound, if unfupported by any other evidence than that of the wiie, fince a caufe unfuiuble for the public ear would come to trial, with a legal neceflity of the prifoner being difcharged for want of evi- dence competent to go to the jury. But it muft be admitted, that if thcv point were otlierwife difputable, the opinion exprefied by a judge in his charge to a grand jsiry, would not have a Tery con* fiderable uifluence in fettling it. I believe, however, that thejevi* dence of a wife againft her hulband, upon a charge for perfonal ilk treatment^) is in pradHce now admitted. .^cafe in which a wife was admitted to prove that a debt was due, not from the defendant in her caufe, but from her hufband^ IS often cited, accompanied with the propofition, that between other p^es the wi^ may be admitted as a witnefs to charge her hn£* band. &r, 504, Certainly if the huftand had no intereft in th^ event of the caufe, there could not be any obje^lion to the evir dence of the wifet There are feveral cafes in whidi perfons wore not allowed t# prove the faft of their being, or not being married. In one of them {Half V. Jahnfin^ Sfr. ^6^^) the rqKnrter not inaptly makes a ^uery — ^fqr it is b^ggiog the queftion which is to be tried. Thpre ceruinly does appear an incongruity in holding that a pcrfon fliall not be allowed to prove a h£kf upon the exiftenee, or mm-^silleaes of which, the eompetenoe, or incompetence to be examined de» •ends^} and the cafe is involved in the dilemma, that if the ptftico ore married the ulterior ccoifequences attach without {mther qttC& lion } if they are not maipried there is no obje Aioa to the compelenoo. Wheve a man is indi£^ed lor polygamy, the firft wife is not a lawful witncis to fupport the faft oS her marriage, and fopft^ i|uently the profecution againft her hulband | but ii^ fe^ond wifc is a fufficient witnefs to prove the feeond marriage» wUcb k ^naerely a criming aA, and induce^ no lelation between Ae pii4M> The do^^rine of czclufion has been extended furtheft in the ^af& ei the Ki94 ^. 04 M0Ht0tlis rf (Xvifif% zT^Ji^7fi|^ i^^bif^^ ^oniMl Nbnib.XVL]' Of the Competence tfWihufef, &c jtj >pcwian kairteg b<«n amoved as the wife of y. JT. die hufband, upon his examination, denied having been prerioufljr married to any other perfen ; and it was held that another woman fliould not he allowed to give evidence of her having been previonfly married to him. Mr. Juftice Afibuvfi iaid, that the ground of die wife^t incompetency arifes from a principle of public policy, which does not permit huiband and wife to give evidence that may even tend to criminate each other. The obje£Hon is not confined merely to cafes where the hufband or wife are diredly accufed of any crime» but even in cdlateral caufes, if their evidence tends that way, it QuU not be admitted* Now here the wife was fwom to contradift vribat her huiband had before fwom, and to prove him guilty of perjury as well as bigamy, fo that the tendency of her evidence was to charge him with two crimes. Howeveri though what fhe thea fwore could, not be given in evidence on a fubfequent trial for bigamy, yet her evidence might lead to a charge for that crime^ and caufe the hufband to be apprehended.— --And Mr. Juftice Grtfk^ the only other judge in court, concurring in that opinion^ obferved, that the true and beft ground of objedion was not Aat of intereft, but was founded on the political inconvenience of eating diIenti titled to the whole» or any part of a penalty, cannot be examined as a witncfs to fupport the information j and manj^ccmviaions be* fore juftices of the peace* have been fet afide on account of this obje£lion. The connexion of a private intereft with a public profecuties has been formerly allowed as an objeAbn in many cafes, wluch have fincc been over-ruled. For inftance, a perfon from whom a note had been fraudulently obtained, was held by Lord Chief Juf- tice Holtp to be an incompetent witnefs to fupport an indidnient for the fraud, for though the verdiA upon the information cooU not be given in evidence in an aftion on the note, the Court were fure to hear of it to influence the jury. Xex. v. Whitings Soli. 183. There are alfo fevers|l cafes in which it has been held, that per^ jury could npt be proved upon an indidment, by the evidence of the perfon againft whom it .was committed. AlfO| that in an information upon the ftatute of ufory, die pa^ty tq the ufurious contrail could not be a witnefe^ becaufe that vvould be to avoid his own fecurities. But the authority of all thofe cafes is now deftroyed, and dte Cubje£k was, after fome other decifions, contradictory to thofe already ftated, very fully inveftigated by Lord Mansfield^ in A& cafe of Abrahams v, Bum^ 4 Bur. 2251, in which a perfon wha bad borrowed and repaid money upon an ufurious contrad, was held a competent witnefs in a penal adion to prove the ufury % and it was laid down as an eftabliflied rule, that the queftion in a cii^ mipal profecution, being the fame with a civil caufe in which the witnefs was interefted, went gtnerMj to the credit, unlefs the judgtnent in the profecution where he was a witnefs, could be given in evidence in the caufe where he ws(s interefted. It was alio ftated as eftabliflied, that where the matter was doubtful, the obje^ tion (hould go to the credit, and not to the compe^nce* In that cafe the borrower had repaid the whole money, and there was no fecttrity or pledge outftanding againft him, which was partly relied upon in the decifion ; and fome expreffions fell from the Court) from which it might be inferred, that it would be a iuf« ^cient objedion if the caufe turned upon points and trsM^fa^ipn^i which, if proved in another caufe, would avoid the d^bt. A cafe which happened fome time afteriirards feems to admit the /sun^ principle — ao uncertificated bankrupt was not alkivedi 9^ a vitne6| Nttrab^XVL] OftbeCcn^enceifWHneJesytic. 315 to fupport z penal action for receiving ufurions intereft from himfelf» not havbg repaid the money borrowed. Mafters v. Dragon, 2 T.R. 496. But this was prior to the full inTeftigation which the do£irine of competence receive in the cafe of Bent v. Bakers and I have already had ocCifion to allude to 1 fubfequent decifion^ in which the contrary was ezprefsly decided^ upon the broad and intelligible yrinctple» that the witnefs had not any intereft in the event of the caufe. Smtl v. Praftr^ 7 T. R.60 {a). It may (till be queftionable whether the party grieved can be z witaefii to prove perpiryf upon the ftatute 5 £/iz» c. 99 as by that ftatute the party injured is intitled to loA and as the ftatute gives the aQion to the party upon the offender being convidedy fuch conviAioa tends dire^y to his inscreft> and muft be given i^ cndeace in the aftion^ therefore the teftimony feems inachniJfibk* In Howofd v« Sii/lej, 4 JEa/lf JS09 it was held^ that a perfioa was a competent witneft to provebribery at an deflionj although a fimilar aAion had been brought againft himfelf^ and he avowed die intention of availing himfelf of the indemnity given to a difcoverer. A perfon whofe name is forged is ftill confidered incompetent to prove the forgery, ualefs he has a releafe from thofe who are in* ierefted in the validity of the inftrument, as is evident from daily pra^^ice. An exception is ftated in Bull. N. P. 289, where he is SK>t dircAly interefted in the queftiony as in tFe/ls^ cafe, who was indi&ed for forging a receipt from ^.^^A. having recovered the money in an a£lion a^^inft W^Us^ was admitted to prove the ibrgery« In a cafe at the Old Bdley, Stpi. 1792*. the obligor in a bond being indited for altering a receipt for intereft, fo as to make it appear a receipt for principal and intereft, Mr. 'fiztonJIoiiam held the obligee to be an incompetent witneis, although he had obtained a verdiA invalidating the receipt, as judgment had not been en- tered up. If a fimilar point were again to arife, it might not be unimportant to confider, how the witneis, in fuch a cafe, can de- rive any benefit from the convi£lbn of the ofiender, as the goods of fuch oflfender bemg forfeited to the crown, the witnefs is thereby deprived of the fruit of his verdid, and lofes all chance 4>{ £itisfa£lion for his demand j and it may perhaps be found, that the inadmiflibility of fuch evidence has been taken for granted too generally, without advertmg to the difierencc of confequences which refuk from its being received between one cafe and another. (a) In the ICiMg w. BoJIm, 4 E^/i, 571, the defeodanty In a fuic in equity » put in an anl«crt npra which an IflVse wat diicdHy which came on to be tried at the fame affiaes, «ick an Indifhnmt Ibr pojory In the anfwer. The imiidmcnt cane on Srft tot ttul, and St VMistod, that ths plaiatiff is Cfttity wat a com^tcteat whocfa m f roic ihc perjury. a I have ji« APPENDIX. CNumb.XTL I have heard a learned judge aflign a reafon for not admitting a p^onj whofe name is forged to an inftrument} purporting to fub- jeO; him to an obligation, viz. that though the crown acquires a right, by forfeiture, to the goods of the offender, it may not be allowed to fet up fuch a right in refpeA of the particular obliga- tion, which, by the fame record that is neceflary to the title, is found to be a forgery* There are fome other points refpeAing the teftimony of vit*> nefles, which it may be at prefent proper to advert to. A counfel or attorney cannot be allowed to give cTtdenee re** fpefting matters which have been difclofed to them confidentially in thofe capacities, by their clients : but with refpe£i to matters of h,€t which are in their own knowledge, they are equally admiffible, and are equally compellable to give their evidence, as other pcrfons. In the cafe of The King v. Waitirt/onf Str, xiia, it was ruled, that an attorney prefent at the putting in an anfwer by his client, was not compellable to prove that fad on an indiAment for per- jury againft the client ; but the reporter makes a quxre, for diii was a fa£fc in his own knowledge, and no matter of fecrecy com- mitted to him by his client. An attorney is not compdlable, upon a fuhpitna duces tecum^ to produce papers with which he is intruft- ed by his client, as evidence againt his client, but ought upon re- ceiving the fubpcena, to deliver them up to him. Ren v. Dixotii 3 Bur. 1 686. But an attorney having attefled a deed^ and refufing to give evidence thereof, was puniflied by attachment. Doe ex Jem. yufp V. Andrews^ Cowp. 845. An interpreter between a partj and his attorney, was held, by Lord Kenyan^ to ftand in the fitua- tion of the attorney himfelf, in Madam du Barr/s cafe, cited 4 T. R» 756. A perfon by profeflion an attorney, and confulted confidentially, but not employed as an attorney in any fuit, is not within the exemption. W'il/on v. Ra/lalU 4 T. R. 753. Mr. Juf- tice Butler faid, <* This dodrine of privilege was fully difcufled in a cafe before Lord Hardvneke. The privilege is confided to the cafes of counfel, folicitor, and attorney ; but in order to raife the privilege, it muft be proved that the information which the adverfe party wifhes to have, was communicated to the witnefs in one of thofe chambers ; for if he he empbyed merely as a fteward, be may be examined. It is indeed hard, in many cafes, to compd a friend to difclofe a confidential converfation, and I Ihould be glad if by any law fuch evidence could be excluded. It is a fubjedl.of jttft indignation when perfons are anxious to reveal what has been communicated to them in a confidcntxal manner i and in a cafe mentioned Numb.XVt3 OftbcCcmpemceofWitnifes, &c. 317 mentioned in the affgument where Rejndds^ who had formerly been the attorney of Mr* Paries but who was dilmifled before th^ trial of the caufe» wiihed to give evidence of what he Icnew rela^ dve to the fubjedl^ while he was concerned as the attorney } I ftrongly animadverted on his condu£^» and would not fufier him to be examined^ he had acquired his information during the time he aAed as attorney, and I thought that the privilege of not being examined to fuch points was the privilege of the party, and not of the attomej, and diat the privilege never ceafed at any period of time. In fuch a cafe it is not fufficient to fay that the caule is at an end, the mouth of fuch a perfon is ihut for ever. I take die diftinfiion to be now well fettled, that the privilege extendatQ thofe three enumerated cafes at all times, but that it is confined to thofe three cafes only. There are cafes to which it is much to be lamented that the law of privilege is not extended; thofe in which medical perfons: are obliged to difclofe the information which thej acquire in attending in their profeffional chandlers. This point Mras very much confidered in the Duchefs of Kingstof^s cafe, wheve Sir C^tfar Hawkins^ who had attended the Duchefs as a medical perfon, made the objedion himfclf, but was over^ruled, and com* pelled to give evidence againft the prifoner." After an interlocu* tory judgment was figned, and a writ of inquiry executed, in an a£lion at the ftiit of an indorfee of a promiflbry note, and the caufit compromiied, the plaintiff told his attorney he was glad it was fettled^ as he had only given ten pounds for the note, and knew it yms a lottery tranfadlion ; the Court held that this cafe was not wtfain the rule, that the diffisrence was, whether the communidiie» tion was>nude by the client to his attorney in confidence, aa in- ftru^ons for conducing his caufe, or a mere grMtis diBum. Coim dm v^Ktmlrick, 4 T. iZ, 431. The cafe mentioned in SuUm N. P. 784, where a defendant pleaded to debt upon bond, the g njad 6 Edw^ 6% againft buying and felling ofices, and upon the trial- A. uros produced as a witnefs to give an account upon what occafion die bond was given, and Lord Chief Juftice Holt refnfed to admit him, becaufe he wa» privately intrufted to make the ban* pin by both parties, and to keep it fecret — feoms not to be law^ sicoording to the opinion in Wilfon v. RafialL It alfo feema to he a. neceflary confequence of the dedfion in Wilfon V. Rn/lall^ that the privilege of fecrecy does not extend ti> sny communications made-in the bufinefdof ccmveyancing, although tt»perlbnemployed therein may be an attorneys for i^isnotacafir m whiah^an attorney has^any fpecial privilege, or zeepgnixed dm^ ttOiv, • bttthe i9r vmAf vetoed tci u% pvfpn^of flnU i» &e b»fi^ ncfi irnnirad. 'In 3iB APPENDIX. pJumb. XVL In WaAut T. SBe/fyy t 7. R. 2^, it was decided diat a perfoq %4k> had ghren credit to a negotiable inftrument» by puttmg hit name upon it» could not afterwards be admitted as a witnefs of any fads to invalidate it ; but that decifion was over-nilcd in J^rdam V. LaJUroJie^ j T. R. 60 1 » in which it was decided that the in- dorfee of a bill dated at Hamburgh^* for the purpofe of evading the ftamp duty, might be admitted as a witnefs to prove that it was drawn in England, r Lord Mansfieldf m Walton v» Sbdlj^ and Mr. Juftice Afihurf^ who differed from the reft of the court in Jordaint v. Lafobrwkt^ leKed in a great degree upon the maxim of the civil iaW) ntm idlegans Juam turpitudinem e/l audiendui. I conceive, however, the teal principle of the maxim is no more than that a perfon (hall ttot found any claim, or defence, upon his own iniquity, and that it has no relation to the cafe of a witnefs, and, in fad, it mud in general be very difficult to conceive that a pcrfbn would be inclined^ as a witnefs, to ftate his own mifcondud, in oppoGtion to thr truth, unlefs he appeared to have fome motive for doing fo, con- neded with the event of the caufe. ' Mr. Juftice Lanvrenee^ in Jordaim v. Lafhhmole^ faid, that as nd earlier determination than Wabon v. Shelly was to be found in fttp* port of the point which was there decided, it muft depend upon its being fupported by the general principles and rules of law, applica- ble tct'the admiffibility of witneffcs. " Now'* (he faid) " I find no tule lefs comprehenfive tlian this, that all perfons are admiflible witneiies who have the ufe of their reafbn, and fuch religious belief as to feel the obligation of an oath, who have not been conviAed of any infanious crime, and are not influenced by intereft. What credit will be due to them muft depend on a great variety of cir- cumftances^ and muft be decided on by the jury ; and I am not ftware of any cafe folemnly decided, excepting that of Waltwt v. Shelljy in which a witnefs has been reje£^ed as incompetent, but upon the ground of fome objedion which may be clafled under one or other of thefe heads. Under none of thefe ^laflcs does the wit- nefs in this cafe fall, and the conftant praAice of examining accom* plices (hews, that the mere circumftance of a man's reprefcnting himfelf as having done things inconfiftent with common honefty, ii not fufficient to reje£l his teftimony, however it may weaken and impeach it." : It is faid that parents ihall not be received as witneflcs to baf* tardize their own iflue: the proper application and extent of this vule, are (hewn by Lord Mansfield in &e cafe of Goodright v» Mrfff Cotap* ^^i. cited in the preceding (eftioui * that it is in the power of courta to correQ die inconvenience alluded to, without, overturning the precedent i by granting ndes for defendants to pay money into court ^itioit i aiid I think it would certainly be defirable to allpwa party, Numb* XVI.] Of Confefion. ja r party, as much as poflibki to reftrain and limit the ground of di& putCy without fubje£ling him to demands for which he is really not anfwerable by doing fo. A judgment by default, or upon demurrer, is alfo confidered as amounting to an admiflion of the fa£ts ftated in the declaration \ and the effeflk of fuch admiflion fcems to be ibmetimes carried fur- ther than the rules of legitimate reafoning will fairly warrant. Upon fuch a judgment the plaintiff is, without giving any evidence^ intitled to damages ; but the damages are in general only nominal, unlefs a£^ual evidence is given of the particular right upon which the claim is founded: but when evidence is given, it fhould appear to be open to every inquiry, with refpeft to the fa£ks which it purports to eftablifh, fince the acknowledgment is only of a right of a£tion in general, and not of a right in refpe£l to thoXe particular fzGts fo adduced in evidence. The cafe of De Gaiiion v* VAigUj I Bof. isf PuL 368, has always appeared to me, upon this principle, rather incorrefl. In that cafe the defendant pleaded coverture, to which there was a replication alleging circumftances to render her perfonally liable; which replication, upon demurrer^ was allowed to be good, and judgment was given for the plaintiff. Upon the execution of the writ of inquiry, the defendant gave evi- dence, that in the particular tranfaAion brought forward, (he had only a£led as agent for her hufband } and the jury being of that opimon, gave a verdi£t for only nominal damages : but a new in- quiry was awarded, as the court were of opinion that the evidence ought not to have been admitted, and that the only*queftion to be decided by the jury was the amount of the debt, and that the quef- tion whether tie debt were contracted by the defendant as agent for her hufband, or in her feparate capacity, muft be taken to be de- termined by the record. — ^Now I apprehend that a judgment by demurrer cannot fairly be carried further, in efFe£l, than a judg- ment by default, except as to the eftablifhment of the point of law. By the judgment on the demurrer the court had decided, that fuch fa£ts as were dated in the replication, were a fufficient anfwer to the defence alleged by the plea \ but whether any fuch hSts did, or did not exift, was no further decided, than as a demurrer is technically a confeflion of the exiilence of fome caufe of aCtion^ upon which, as upon a judgment by default, the plaintiff, without any evidence, recovers nominal damages ; but when adlual evidence is introduced to raife thofe damages to a greater amount, there would be a terrible perverGon of judgment, if the particular fa£ts fo adduced, were not open to examination : a perfon who demurred, or fufiered judgment by default, having only in contemplation a debt of 40/. might be chsM'gcd with a claim for 4O1OOQA which Vol. II. Z he 3M APPENDIX. tNumb.XVI. he had never heard of; or with which he had only been incident- ally conn^aed. Wherever particular evidence is introduced to fupport a claim on the one hand, that evidence ought, accorc&ig to the principles of juftice, to be open to examination and contra- diction on the other (a). ^ <• I do (a) At diethne of writing feme of the preceding obfcmti»», 1 had In cwtemplitiot a cafe of CJbmbtrt t. MarfiatJ, ihen depending upon a motion for a new trial in the Cooit of Common Fleas of Lancafter, and fince determined in a manner contrary to mj w'lQut MdexpeftadoRi* j i ^ j* Eight defendaott were (Vied npon a demind for fcreral hundred pounds, and pleaded m abatement, that the promifes were made jointly with a great man, other pofan,. The fia war, that they were a committee appointed by the affociation of feveril friendly focletles, for the purchafe of proVifiont. From the moUipLcty ofnsmei inferted in the plea, it was impoffible to ftibflantiaw it by erideoec j hut the real fad wsi, that the defendants were themfelves not liable, the co.) tr aft haring been m«ie before they weruconneaed with the inftitution. H wa. however held, that they were precluded bjr their plea,ftom contefting the particular demand fctup in evidence by tht! ptonfffs, «b an, othermamierthanbyihewiog the joint liability -of the other p«ribn. n«ned. Suppofiag that they could have (hewn the exLftence of fome other contraA, made in conjund^a with thofe peifon. with the plaintiff, 1 fuppofe that U would not »^-« J««»J»^^^^^ eould be ii«^' with any o*er debt, which in faa they -,«!»?^7; ^Ij^^^^^ • •u.P i-f«r« anv evidence was given for the plsmtift, he would be intitied to a ITt^^l Wiethe rther perfoM «m«l i .he ,«ri»ion i., whether «., .a«.l «.d«ue p.« r.he,Wnriff. W intiUe himfelf to ««« rh.n oomin.1 t. A ' f A^r. reallv is anv fuch, is confined to a general cauCe of adion, and has no m- Ziit i« "^.-hich wimeff..™, b..ad«c.a to r- \^^"'r JrS«i^ttrp.«e.t,hech«nbe,.-.nto«». of the Judge, .ppoinua for.h.aori». ^^IIL «« -.opport-DUr or ..tending the .rgument. but the Mlow.ng unfucufi- M^LIZT.^ »r« f-bmitting the a.otion for . new tri.. .o *. j-dp. «h. -n- ZZX .(fa- t. birin wHtin, with fc(^ «-.erir,. «.d with « »ach «»«a». rfd,dr.«t,^T,-t»- nt~Uo««d pt^udice. or.«.d«c««.n e»et .Uo« to te «>• l^L 'Mo «.fe it (held b. held th.t the pl.io.iff «« ind.W to . •erf.a, mAm l^icebdniV- «««*""«• ""^-''""''^ th.tan.n,oir,in«, the ^.i-tH 71 ^.»1°b.. -tempted to be proved on the part of the pUintiff. ^ r^|- ZldAmitb reCpea .o the .mount of d.m.ge,. For otherwfe the d.a..g«. »»««'^'j "^ jTt^ «uft be for the .mount rt.trd 5o the ded.r.tio« j or they muft bee«t«d T^^. Z d««ee. then muft be either nomin.l. or they muft be the fubjeft .f .► t^ ^ ' .i ilrfl Ae fubjea of in«tpm.eao„;rp.rtoftb.pUW«.-.f«-th«p««of.Bc«^ r«J be deeL »h.«ttto tto itut . lihtrt^ ta of^Jias », ow. f.|«eft»»» Numb. XVI.] OfConfeJpon. 323 I do not by any means impeach the cafes where the judgment is upon a promifTory note^ and it is held unnecefTary to prove the Cgnature of it, for in thofe cafes the legal confeiRon may be fairly held to extend tp the exiftence of the contra£fc declared upon. My obfervations apply not to cafes in which the nature of the pro- cedure renders evidence unneceflary ; but to thofe in which the queftion under conCderation relates to the tSt€t of evidence a£lu- ally produced ; to cafes which cannot be fupported without tend<* ing to the conclufion, that although fome evidence is neceffary to fupport the particular demand contended for, yet if any evidence is given, it muft be abfolutely decifive whether the fa£ts imported by it are corred or erroneous, unanfwerable or capable of explana- tion, true or falfe. With refpe£i to extra-judicial acknowledgments, great caution is requifite in prevejiting their being carried further than their a£iual intent. The impreflion, which the party fuppofed to have made the acknowledgment intended to convey, ought to be ftri£ily attended to; a critical catching commentary upon accidental expreflions ought to be carefully avoided) the evidence by which the ac« knowledgment is fupported is often very fufpictous, as I have had occafion more particularly to obferve in a former fedion, and fliould be very fcrupuloufly examined : the mere circumftance of not denying a charge may make certain circumftances very reafon- ably give the fame impreflion as the a£lual admiflion of it \ but this is by no means univerfal, and the nature and weight of the circum- ftances, and the motives for filence or denial, ought to be fully at-, tended to. Much care ought efpecially to be taken in preventing any expreflions being regarded as an acknowledgment, v^hich were only ufed as a propofal for accommodation. * When it appears that parties have met for the purpofe of compropife, the evidence of any offer of accommodation is very properly excluded \ the danger confifts in withdrawing from obfervation the real nature of the converfation, or tranfadiion, in which the fuppofed acknowledg- ment is alleged to have taken place. An a£(ual payment is certainly the moft unequivocal mark of thedidarec of judicial antbonty, where my only poflible motWe was aa nnblafled opinioa apoD the troth and jaftice of the fubjeft, I Ihould be more juftly open to a fimilar accufa* (no wheo my Tctaiotng fientimtatt advanced in the behalf of a client mi|hc lead to the im- poucioD of pertuiacicy. I was not concerned in ndviSni the mode of defence j bnt, apart ftott all iamcdinte connexion with the caufey I cannot but regret that, by the laws of tMgUndy eight men have the profpeft of fpeoding thetr Kvea in gaol, on account of • dibtwbieh they never had any thing to do withy' merely becaufe they had alleged^ that if (luj owed any thing at aU, they owed it in coojttaAion with other perfont. Z % acknowledging %24 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVL acknowledging the juftice of a demand ; but fuch a payment is fubjc£l to repetition, when it appears to have been made by xnif- take ; and the recovery of money fo paid 15 one of the moft ordinary grounds of the common adion, for money had and received. In Ma'colm V. Fullarton^ 2 T, if. 645, it was ruled, that arbitrators were warranted in awarding a part of a fum of money, which had been paid by the defendant to the plaintifFs, (the aflig- nees of a bankrupt,) to be repaid. Mr. J. Buller faid, he was con- vinced that the defendant was not bound by the payment, it having been made by miftake \ the only payment (he proceeded) by which a party is, bound, is that which is made into court, under a rule of court ; that is a payment on record, and tlie party can never recover it back again, {a) though it afterwards appear that he paid it wrongfully ; but that does not extend to payments between party and party. — If the a&ual payment, which is the ftrongcft mode of acknowledgment, can be defeated, by fliewing that it originated in miflake, it muft follow a fortiori that any weaker kind of acknowledgment cannot properly have a more concluGve opera- tion. But it is obferved by Pothicr^ that a confeffion can onl^ be avoid- ed by (hewing that it was made under a midake of fad, and that it is not fufficient to allege a miftake of law. In a former publication I have had occafion to advert to the queftions, whether a perfon who had paid money merely under a miilaken notion of legal obligation, was eiUitled to repetition ; and alfo whether a perfon who promifed to fatisfy a claim, knowing the faAs by which he was legally exonerated from it, but not knowing* their legal confequcnccs, incurred an obligation by doing fo. My conclufions upon thofe two points having been contradided bf fubfeqiient decifions, I was induced very particularly to refume the confideration of them, and having met with the difcuffion of the general fubje£l of Miilakes of Law, by UAgueJfeau^ I had pro- pofed to offer the tranflation of that piece, together with my own obfervations upon die particular fubje£l, accompanied with fome general refle£lions refpe£ling the grounds of legal reafoning an4 determination, as a detached publication, to which intention I made fome alluCon in a Qote to page 306 of the preceding volunie. It has fince occurred to me, tliat I might, without impropriety, in- clude thefe articles in the prefent Appendix, and they are accord- ingly fubjoined in a following number. With refpedl to the prefent fubje£^> of a confei&on made (tf ) This cbfervation does not at lU iffeft the qoeftion before idvetted toy wfdi rcfptft to the payment of moac/ iato court operadng u a conCli&OB, bcyoad tbe tamsX aftoiBf paid. Wider Numb, XVI.] OfCoiifeJftm. 325 under the miftaken idea of legal obligation^ I certainly adhere ^ the fentiments which I have expreOed in the eflay alluded to ; and I think that the principle which militates againft inducing any J)rc- judice, from a mere miftake of law, applies more forcibly to a bare, confedion, than to any other fubjeCi. A fum total cannot, according to any fair principles of reafon- ing, be regarded as more than the particular items of which it is compofcd 5 and, therefore, when a perfon acknowledges generally the exigence of an obligation, and it manifcAly appears that his only intention was to acknowledge the exiftence of certain particu- lar fa£ls, and a certain legal concludon as refulting from thofe i^(X%y the cafe fliould be confidcred precifely in the fame manner as if he had made the acknowledgment diilributively ; ftating feparately the fa£ls, and the legal opinion with refpe£l to them. If the fadls alone would not be fufEcient to induce an obligation, and the ob- ligation refulted from the mere expreflion of an erroneous opinion with refpe£l to the law ; it would alfo be fufficient to prove, by other teftimony, the exiilence of the fafts, and to confine the evi- dence of confeiHon folely to the opinion exprcfTed upon the point of law ; and thereby to conclude a perfon by every erroneous legal opinion which he had ever entertained. I fuppofe it will not be ferioufly contended, that in either of thefe two latter cafes the ob- ligation would attach J and the queilion in difcuflion aiTumes and fuppofes the fa£l to be fufficiently afcertained, that what was ex- preffed generally and conjunctively in the firft cafe, proceeded from precifely the intention, as what is exprefTed diftributively and par- ticularly in the fecond. It will not be fufRcient to obje£t to this courfe of reafoning, as bearing the appearance of fubtlety, unlefs it can be alfo (hewn that the analyfis is not fairly conducted; and if what is to be regarded as fubtlety of reafoning is to be excluded^ the right courfe will not be to do the thing by halves, but to aflky what is the plain decifion of common juftice and common honefty, leaving all artificial reafonings out of the queilion ; and to confider whether one man's ignorance of the law is a fufficient ground fqr fubje£iing him to a prejudice, and entitling another, at his expence^ to an adventitious benefit ? It certainly is very difficult to recon- cile the mind to the idea, that a millaken notipn of the law is alone, and independently of all confi^eration of particular circum- fiances, (and it mud be remembered that the argument is at pre« fent wholly upon the general propofition,) an adequate caufe of legal obligation. There are feveral cafes in which the Englifh law aAs upon the principle, that an error of law cannot induce any legal confe- Quences. Ia the cafe of ^rd Griffin^ cited in Wiltus^t cafe, 4 Z 3 Jwir. 326 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL fiurr, 2551, the Attorney General came into court to confcfstbe errors affigned in a judgment of outlawry, and to confent to the reverfal. The Court told him his confeffing an error in law would not do ; they muft judge it to be an error, and their judgment would be a precedent. In {he caufe of Cox v. Parry^ i 71 R. 464. an infurance was made intended to cover certain goods of A,^ and other goods of J7. ; the infurance as to the goods of A. was Toid, his name not being inferted in the policy, as was required by an a£t then exifting; the defendant paid into court fufficient to cover the lofs upon the goods of B. \ and it was confidered how far that could amount to an admiflion with refpe£l to the goods of A* The ihort anfwer might have been given, that the payment into court Emitted the general validity of the contra£b, but merely confined the application of it to that fubjed, with refpefi to* which it was really obligatory ; but the decifion was upon the point, that paying money into court was an admidion with rcfped to the fum paid, but no more. But in Yate v. Willan^ above alluded to, Mr. Juftice Lawrence^ referring to the cafe of Cox ▼. Parry^ faid that it amounted to no more than this : that if the con- tra£^ declared upon be illegal, the defendant ihall not give it eflefi by his admiflion, becaufe no admiflion of the parties can conclude the court, to make them give efFe£l to an illegal contradl.— — Now the illegality, m the cafe referred to, was nothing of a criminal nature, with refped to which the court, from a difapprobation of the objed, refufes its afliftance to either party ; all that could be poffibly meant to be referred to by the imputation of illegality, was the mere want of circumftances fuflicient to induce a valid legal ^ obligation, and if the general fentiment of the learned judge is, as I conceive, corre£l, it follows that an admiflfion of obligation which does not previoufly exid, has not the ef!c£l of inducing any. Upon judgment by default, a defendant is intltled to the fame ex- ceptions as upon general demurrer^ the defendant being bound by his fuppofed confeflion with refpe£l to the fa£l, but not with re- fpeft to the law! The confideration of the general queftion, how far a perfon . is bound by his confeflion arifing from a miftake of law, is wholly unafFefled by any queilions refpefting the proof by which any miftake may be eftabliihed ) and which fa£t, like every other, muft be fuppofed to be afcertained or agreed before the queftion of law can arife. The confeflion itfelf, properly fpeaking, ought only to be regarded as primd facte evidence of the exiftence of fafts, fuflicient to induce the obligation which it imports, and as forming a prefumption open to explanation and contradi&ion. I do not by any means offer to impeach the dodlrinej that a per- fon Numb. X VLJ Of Confeffim. 327 fon (hall not difavow axontra£t which he has entered intO|Onthe pretence of having been ignorant of the legal confequences attach- ed to it. There his intention of entering into the definite contraA is complete^ and that intention includes the legal confequences^ whether known or otherwife \ in the cafe of a confeilion there is no intention of contra£ting any new obligation, but merely the expreffion of an erroneous opinion, with refpe£t to ah obligation fuppofed already to exi(} \ and which, if it docs not exift, there is no adequate reafon to create. In the firft cafe, the party Mrith whom the contra£i is made, might be fubje£led to prejudice if the obligation was not fupported ; for he had a right to rely upon the confent of the other party, to aiTume all the legal obligations refult* ing from the** nature of the contract, and his own confent was purchafed upon the faith of that reliance. In the f(fcond, cafe, the party claiming the benefit of the acknowledgment, is merely con- tending for a contingent advantage, for wliich he has not given any confideration whatever. ' In the fcflion upon hearfay evidence, I adverted to the quef- tion, of the confeflion of an agent being admitted as evidence againft his principal, and dated my reafons for conceiving that it could not be allowed. There is one cafe in which the declara- tion of a wife, that (he had agreed to pay 5 s. a-week for nurfing a child, was received againft the hufband. Lord Chief Juftice Pratt obferving, that matters of tliis kind were generally under the dire£lion of the wife, Anon^ Str. 527.4 but this feems to be a mere anomalous decifion at Nifi Prius, which ought not to have any eSe€t in oppofition to the general principle, which is clearly eftabliflied, that a wife's declarations cannot be ad- mitted againft her hufband ^ which has been carried fo far, as even to exclude the declarations of the wife fuing as execu- trix. Alton V. Prichetti 6T. R. 680 {a). It has been held that the {I) The cafe of jtvifin v. Lord fCmnairdf refened Co in the fe£lion on Hi^r/ay EmJinee^ nno*t reported, 6 Bttftt l88. The ptrtlcul^tr evidence obje^ed to was, ibat the pliiotiff*i ^ wifC} being til in bed, mentioned tkat fi>i had been at Marthtfitr tbt VMik hefin to infiirt kfr Rft 3 tbatjbt was ^eryftofly wktufn wentf ami not Jit le go : and the court feem to haveconlideredic u a cotemporary dedarAtion. The argument partly proceeded upoa the sroond of breach of confidence between hufband and wife, for which there wai certain* ' ly no foandation. Another point which the court aded upon was, that the plaintiflFes« amined a furgeon aa to her appearance in point of bftalth, on the day when the infurancc WIS cffe&ed j and be ezprcflcd a favourable opinion, principally from the anfwers ihe gave tobUmquiriei; and it was held by the court that this evidence being given on the part •f the plaintiff, Jet in the other evidcnee (fuppofing it originally inadmifiible) on the part of the defendant* This point may require a great deal of confideration, before the principle which it involves »& adopted as a rule of law. i ft, If a witnefs on the one fid« iUm toy thiag ia hii aofwer which ii not properly evidence \ theie bebg nothing objec- Z 4 tionablt 318 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. the. admiiBons made by an under-flicrifF are evidence againft his principal in an a6Uon for an efcape, becaufe he is anfwerablc for the a£ks of his under-flierifF, and the latter gives bond to him for the due performance of his office. Tabjley v. DobU^ i Lord Raym. 190. Thcfc reafons are not' very fatisfaQory ; for although a flieriffis anfwerablc for the afts of his under-ftieriff, it does not follow that the declara^ tion of the under-flierifF (except where it conftitutes a part of the res gefta) is the proper evidence of thofc afls, and the liability over is only an indireft and incidental confequence, the primary objeft of the aflion being to charge the (heriiF perfonally, and his fecurity for reimburfement may probably be defedive. The argument would go to fliew that all principals are bound by the admiffions of the agents, againft whom they have a remedy over. tionabie or objefied to in the queftion, I cannot conceive that that if fafficient to warrant cvidenccy which in its natare it iUega), being df lib«rately given on the other* 2d, The con- yerf^tion fpoken to b^ the furgeon was a cotemporarjr %Qty and the point which (eems to be decided ii, that the giving evidence of a cotcDnporary^ explaoiitory declaration, conflitut- ing a part of the rti gtfiM on the one fide, would let in explanatory or hearfay cvi- deoce^ given of the fame tranfiQion at a fubfequent period by the other fide, wbicb cer- tainly is very fu from being a necefTary conclufion.vMr. Juflice Laivrtnce fatd, that if the evidence of what ihe faid was ftruck out of the qoeftioo, there would flill be abandant * evidence to (hew that the verdi^ was right. But I apprehend that if any inadmiHible evidence it received, it is not fufficient, to fupport the verdiA, to (hew that there was other evidence fufficient to warrant the jury on drawing the fame coodufion. It certainly would be no anfwer if the objedion was taken by the good, but almoft obfolete, courfe of a bill of exception!, a proceeding which is comnaonly declined partly from an apprehenfion of ap- parent difirefped, and partly from confiderations of expence. Tbeidra of difrefped it always difavowed» and I believe upon a calculation of expence a fecund trial at LamafUt would at leaft be eqval to the molt chargeable mode of making ap the record. This cafealfo inclines me to cxprefsa wiih, which I have very often entertaiocdi that where a point of evidence it argued at Kifi Pnus, the queftion (hall be previoufly put down in writing ; and that a diftindnote in writing (hall alfo be made, at the time of the points which are fubooitted to the jury. The flight lofs of time which would a^ ife frojQ writing the points, and reading them to the juij from the note, would in many cafes be very amply compenfated. The new trial io Avtjan V. Lord Kiimalrdf was applied for, not only on the queftion of evidence, but upon a fuppofed mifdiredlion of the judge, that if the jury thought that at the time of eflfirAiog the iofurancp, the immoral habit of excefllve drinking was fo rooted as to endanger the life of the plaintiflTs wife, by its probable continuance, and this was known to the plaintitF at the time, it would avoid the infurance. But this ground was afterwarda difavowed and removed by the report.— X am fure I (hall not be fufpeded of meaning to convey the (lighteft imputation of any other intention, than that of communicating the moft full and faithful account of the trial j but having been prefent, and ftruck with the circumftance at the time, I can declare that if X have full and diftinA recollcdion of any incident which has occurred in thecourfe of my life, it is of a direction to the eife^l mentioned in the objec* tion. To defire a judge to take a particular note of a particular direftion, has often a teasing and irritating eftc^, and may excite a reply of unintentional har(hnefs, but a ge- neral habit which (hould eftvAually fecure a perfed reprefentationy appearing before the ^urt in bank of the incidents at the trial, would have a more beneficial influence 00 the adminiftration of the la w^ than that rapidity of execution which is often legardtd as the fureft teftof excelieope* 6 SEC, Numb. XVI J Of Prefumptim, 329 SECTION XIV. « Of Prefumption. The examination included in a former fediion, of the principles which regulate the burthen of proof, neceflarily produced a rcr ference to different cafes of prefumption ; the proper eflFedl of prc- fumption being to confider the truth of a propofition, whether poiitive or negative^ as fufficiently eftablifhed until the contrary ia Ihewn. In fome cafes the mere want of a prefumption on the one (ide is a fufficient prefumption in favour of the other ; for wherever the nature of a fubje£l leaves it perfedly indifferent, whether a given hGt does or does not exift, the party who founds his claim or his defence upon the exigence of it, muft remove that indifference, and the oppofite party may rely upon the (ingle argument, that nothing appears in oppofition to him, and that de non apparentibus &* nw ^tflentibus eadem eft ratio* Where the exiflence of one h€t fo neceflarily and abfolutely in* duces the fuppofition of another, that if the one is true, the other cannot be falfe, as where connexion is inferred from pregnancy^ the term prefumption cannot be legitimately applied : for the nature of prefumption is, that it does not require to be fubftantiated« but that it may be defeated by pofitive contradidion, according to the maxim that Jlalitur prafutnptioni donee probetur in contrarium^ The diftin^iion between prefumption and proof is, that the one may be falfe, but until fhewn to be fb, muft be regarded as true ; that the other (the fads upon which it is founded being admit-' ted) cannot be otherwife than true. In fome cafes, the inference of one izQ, which is deduced from another, is fo flrong, or fo completely eftablifhed by legal authorU ty, that although it may really not be true, no argument or evidence is admitted to the contrary. This is the fubjeA which in the civil law is diftinguifhed by the appellation of prafumptio juris Isf dejure^ the nature of which is fully explained in the preceding treatife, and the principal fubjeA to which it is applied is the force of a judicial determination, the fa£ls imported by which are not open to contradiction, although they may be, and frequently are, in oppofition to truth. The prefumption that, when two mar« ried people cohabit together, and there b no perfonal incapacity^ the iflue of the wife are the iffue of the hufband, — the maxina« ^when properly applied,) that the king can do no wrong—are alfo 330 APPENDIX. [NumKlVL alfo of this defcrlptlon. Some presumptions are allowed and a£led upon, which are not really believed to have any foundation in truth, but are merely convenient fi£lionS| introduced for ad- Tancing what are fuppofed to be the purpofes of juftice; fuch are the prefumptions in favour of a right to lights, which have been enjoyed for twenty years, and otlier prefumptions, the offspring of modem pradkice, which were particularly adverted to -in the preceding number : fuch is the prefumption chat a Cutis- iied term has been furrendered, which is admitted to prevent an afiion of ejedment from being defeated by a formal objeAion. The mode and form in which tbefelaft prefumptions are introduced, are> by regarding them as an a£lual conclufion by the jury from the fa£is ; but it is well known tliat fuch fa£is are not fuppofed to have any real exiftence. How far the fpirit of invention in this refpe£l will be carried, it is impoilible to guefs'. In Wiliififon V. Pajn^i 4 r. R. 468. the plaintiff brought an aAion on a pro- mifibry note given him, in confideration of a fuppofed marriage with the defendant's daughter. The note was objected to, on the ground that the marriage was not legal, having been contra&ed by licenfe when the plaintiff was under age, and there being no perfon competent to confent ; it was alfo (hewn that the marriage could not have been folemnized after he came of age, the wife being confined to her bed from that time until her deatb« The judge left it to the jury to prefume a- fubfequent legal marriage by banns } which they accordingly did. A new trial was applied for, but refufed. Whether the court, in their refufal, proceeded upon recognizing the propriety of the direction, upon the dif* cretionary nature of their authority in the granting of new trials, or upon the fufficiency of the a£lual marriage, (fetting the pre- fumption out of the queftion,) cannot be exadlly afcertyined, each of thefe grounds having been adverted to ; the firft of them how- ever was not dire£Uy and explicitly avowed. Nothing can be more clear, than that a jury, profefling to believe the truth* of a fubfe- quent regular marriage, profeffed to believie that which it was im- poffible, according to the ordinary ftruf^ure of the underfUnding, that they could believe in point of iz£k. If fuch marriage had taken place, the plaintiff mufl have known it, being himfelf a party \ and it is beyond all imagination that, knowing it^ he fhould not have beefi in a condition to prove it. Lord Kenyon in that cafe alluded to another cafe before him, of Standen v. Standen^ in which tlie jury prefumed a legal marriage, though there was (trong fuf- picion that there was not rime enough for the banns to have beai publifhed three times 9 but the real deciiioQ in Standefi v. Standen 4 proceeded Nninb. XVI*] €f Prefumption. 33 1 proceeded on the gmund of difcrediting the witnefs who fwore to impeach his own marriages The principle adopted in Wilklnfon ▼• Pajne is certainly very dangerous in its tendency, as it goes to fubvert the main foundations of the diftindiion between truth and falfehood. Many cafes mud occur in the adminiftration of juf- ticcj where the wiflies of thofe who are to decide muft, from the nature of the circumftances^ be in oppofition to the legal right ; but if we once begin to ihake the rule tliat the law is to command, and the judge to obey ^ if we once admit the propriety of profei&ng to believe, as true, what we are adiually convinced is not fo ; no- body can fay where the deviation will ftop, and legal certainty will be facrificed at the (hrine of judicial difcretion. The Englijb law has feveral inftances, eftablifhed by z6i of par- liament, of the prefumptions of law {juris) mentioned by Pothier^ (that is* prefumptions which the law pofitively requires to be made, but which are fubjedl to contradiAion by pofitive evidence,) prin- cipally in cafes of revenue and penal ftatutes. If a queftion arifes, whether a duty has or has not been paid ? whether a per- fon has or has not a given qualification ? it is generally required that the proof of payment or qualification ihall be incumbent upon the party, who is fubje£l to any penalty or forfeiture on the oppofite fUppofition. By an edi£l of Henry II. diFrancty made in the year 1556, cited Domain b. iii. 77/. 6. it is ena£ied that, " If a woman has con* cealed her being with child, and is brought to bed privately, and without any witnefs, and it be found that the «hild never was chriftened, nor had any public burying, (he (kould be reputed to have murdered her child, and be puniflied with death." Our ftatute, a I James L c* 27. anno 1623, which provides that, « If any woman fliould be delivered of any iflue, which, being bom ^ive, (hould by the laws of this realm be a baftard, and (he en- deavour privately either by drowning, or fecret burying thereof, or any ether way, fo to conceal the death thereof, that it may not come to light whether it were bom alive or not, but be concealed ; the mother (hall fuSer death as in cafe of murder, except fhe can prove that the child Was bora dead," is fo very fimilar to the pte- ceding edidi, that it may reafonably be fuppofed to have been fuggefted by it. This ftatute, after refting a long time, almoft as a dead letter in the book, has been lately repealed, and a more hu- mane difpofition has been fubftituted for it* The prefumption certainly is in iu own nature too violent, as the fenfe of (hame, in cafe of a child being born dead| may be attended to without facri« ficing the duties of humamty. - The 33^ APPENDIX. LNumb.XVI, The prcfumptions of moft frequent occurrence are thofc it whichi from certain edablifhed fafis^ an inference is deduced that may or may not be true, but, the truth of which being much more comformable to probability than its falfehood, is regarded as fuf- ficlently proved, until the contrary is (hewn. To induce this prc- fumption, the facls from which it is deduced iliould be either direftly cftabliflicd, or themfclves deduced from other fafts upon the fame principle of inference, fo that the ultimate prefumptioH may be conne£led, either mediately or immediately, with fads cftablifhed by proof; it being always a primary prefumption that poGtive teftimony is to be regarded as true ; unlefs there are fpe^i^ cial reafons for difcredit, or at lead for doubt. The general principles upon thi§ fubjeft arc very diftindly cx- prefied by Domat as follows : « Tlic certainty or uncertainty of prefumptions, and the effe£l which they may have to fcrve as proofiy depends on the certainty or uncertainty of the fafts from whidi the prefumptions are gathered ; and on the juftnefs of the con- fequences which are drawn from thofe fa£is, to prove the fach which are in difpute. And this depends upon the conne£lton that there may be between the known iz€t% and thofe whidi axe to be proved: thus one draws confequences from caufes to their efie£ls» or from efFe£ls to their caufes ; thus we conclude the truth of a thing by its connediion with another to which it is joined \ thus when one thing is fignified by another, we prefume the truth of that which is fignified, by the certainty of that which fignifics it ; and it is out of thcfe different principles that figns, conjeAure?, and prefumptions arc formed, concerning which there can be no certain rule laid down ; but in every cafe it will depend on the prudence of the judge, to difcem whether the prefumption be well or ill grounded, and what tScGt it may have as a proof."* He further obfcrvcs that, *« every thing which happens naturaUy and commonly, is taken as true ; and, on the contrary, what is neither natural or common will not pafs as truth, unlefs it be proved ; and that from thefe principles it follows, that there afe fads which pafs for true, although there be no proof of them,, and that there are others which pafs for falfe, unlefs they are proved,'^ Among the more general cafes of prefumption are thofe, that in- nocence and fanity are to be prefumed, but that guilt, fraud, or infanity, are to be proved } but as it very feldom occurs that thefe will admit of dire£t and pofitive proof, they are ufually eftabliihed by the proof of circumftances, which, being inconfiftent in their nature with the general and ordinary prefumption, induce the fpecial and particular prefumption to t}ie contrary^ ^ AlthougH Numb. X VL] Of Prefumpiion. 333 Although guilt IS in general to be proved, and innocence Co be prefumed ; a matter which, abftradledly taken, h unlawful, xaix&9 upon the general llateoient, be taken to be criminal, and any par* ticulars which didinguifli and excufe it ought to be fpecially ihewn. See Rex v. Bear, 2 Salt. 418. ** In every charge of mur- der,/^ir^a^ of kilihig being firjl proved, all the circum fiances of accident, neceiEty, or infirmity, are to be fatisfa£^ori]y proved bf the priibner, unlefs they arife out of the evidence produced againft him; for the law prefumeth the fa& to have been founded in malice, until the contrary appear ; and very right it is that the lawr (hould fo prefumc. The defendant, in this inflance^ flandeth upon juft the fame footing that every other defendant doth, the matters tending to juflify, excufe, or alleviate, mufl appear in evidence be- fore he can avail himfelf of then:." Fo/ler*s Difcourfe on Hotnuide» So, where infanity is once proved to exifl, but a lucid interval if alleged to have prevailed at a particular period, then the burthen of proof attaches on the party alleging fuch lucid interval, who mufl fliew faniry and competence at the period in queflion. Attomew General v. Panther, 3 Bro, Ch. 25. cited ante. Sometimes* a prefumption from certain fafts is allowed for ge- meral purpofes, but is fubje£l to particular exceptions. Thus, in Tefpe£^ to marriage, cohabition and general reputation are ufually regarded as fufficient evidence, without any neceflity for an a^u* il marriage being proved ; but an exception prevails in the cafes of a£Hons for adultery, and indi£lments for polygamy. Amongfl other general grounds of prefumption, things are held to be legally and properly in their exiiling flate, until the contrary is fhewn. If a perfon is in pofTefTion of property, the prefumption is that he is the rightful owner. It is alfo a prefumption that things continue in their exiiling flate, unlefs ihere is evidence of an alteration having taken place. Thus where the ifTue is upon the life or death of a perfon once (hewn • to have been living, the proof of the fa£l lies upon tlie party v/ho afTerts the death ; for the preCumption is, that the party continues alive until the contrary be (hewn. Throgmorton, v. Walton^ 2 RoL Rep. 416. Wilfon v. Jiodges, 2 Eafly 3 1 2. But what evidence fhall be deemed fufficient to encounter that prefumption, is a different queflion. It cer- tainly need not be diredl evidence, and it is fufficient to (hew circumflances that rebut the general probability. In the cafe of a life infurance, the death of the perfon infured is fufficiently proved, by (hewing that he failed in a (hip which has not been heard of for an unufual time. Patter/on v. Black, Park Inf. 433. The lame priociple is applied in the cafe of infurance of a (hip. Green . . , V. Srown^ * 1 334 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVI. r. Brown J 2 Str. 1 199. Newbj v. Read^ Pari 63. Sometimes the weight of the evidence may be afieded by the nature of the queftion in difpute. In Rowe r. Hajland, i Black. Rep. 404. Lord Mansfield faid^ that in eftablifliing a title upon a pedigreci where it may be neceffary to lay a branch of the family out of die cafe, it is fufficient to ihew that the perfon has not been heard of for many years, to put the oppofite party upoiithe proof that he ftill exifts. Many pcrfons go to the Eafi or Weft Indies^ and are never heard of again. What is done in fuch a trial is no injury to the man or his iflue, if he fhould afterwards appear and claim die eftate. In Harvwod y.^Goodrighi^ Cowp. 86. it^was found by fpe- cial verdi£i,that a teftator made his will, and gave the premifes in queftion to the plaintiff in error, and that he afterwards . made an« other will different from the former, but in what particubrs did not appear to the jury. The court decided that the devifee under the firil will was entitled againft the heir at law. Lord Mansfield in delivering their opinion faid, « The duty of the court is to draw a conclufion of law, from the fads found by the jury ; for the court cannot prefume any hGt from the evidence ftated ; prefnmp- lion indeed is one ground of evidence, but the court cannot pre- fume any fad. The ground the defendant refts upon is fliis, that it is uncertain whether the will be revoked or not, and where the heir at law claims, his title fhall never be taken away by an un- certainty. But this is all a fallacy, for here the devifee does not fet up an uncertainty, but a clear title under the firft will ; and oa the contrary, it is the heir at law who fets up an^ uncertainty againft her.** Sometimes an ordinary prefumption becomes an abf(rfute one, by excluding all the circumftances which are ihconfiftent with the poflibility of its truth. In cafe of filiation, the iffue of the wife is prefumed to be the iffue of the huft>and ; this prefumption may be repelled by pofitive evidence of incapacity, or non accefs; but where neither of thofe fads appear, and, h fortiori^ where they are excluded by proof, the prefumption of parentage becomes, as before ohtcrvcAfZ pra/umpiio juris (ff ., de jure, znd no evidence in oppofition to it can be received. See the pleading of jyAguiffeuu^ upon this fubjcd, pffi. No. 19. In cafes of contrad where no particular evidence appears to the contrary, the parties are prefumed to have contraded accord- ing to the general nature of the fubjed, and the local ufage, if there is any &ich, refpeding it. In cafe a perfon agrees to become tenant to another at an annual rent, without fpecifying any par- ticular term, the con\rad is, by operation o{ laW| for a tenancy from Numb. XVI.] Of PrefumptioTu ' '335 bom year to year : therefore if there is evidence of the fubfiftence of a tenancy^' but no evidence of the terms of it^ fuch a tenancy firom year t6 year is prefumed» until the contrary be fliewn \ it is alfo prefumed that the parties contra£led, fubjed to the general oUigarions refulting from their refpedive charadiers. In cafe tlic commencement of the tenancy does not appear^ and it is ufual in the country where it fubfifts for fimilar tenancies to commence on a particular day, it will be prefumed that the tenancy in queftion commenced agreeably to the cuftom. If a per(bn engages as a fenrant in huibandry, without any particular time being fpecified^ the tSkSt of fuch general hiring is a hiring for a year \ and in qaeftions of fettlement where the particular hiring cannot be Ihewn, but a fervice for a longer term than a year appears to have exiftedy it is a fufficient ground for prefuming that it was under a yearly hiringj or at leaft a general hiring, which has the fame eScCi. See Rne^.Lpb^ 5 T. R. 327. Rex v. Long WlMtton^ id. 447. There is a rule that omnia prafumuntur rite ejpt oBa. A land- lord inftitttted an eje&ment againft his tenant for non-payment of renty and recovered judgment by default. After he had been fe- veral years in pofleflion, a new ejefbment was brought on behalf of die tenant, on the footing of the original leafe. It clearly appeared that there was a forfeiture for non-payment of rent$ but it was infilled that an affidavit of the rent being in arrear, and of there being no fufficient dillrefs (which was a neceflary proceed- ing in the firft eje£lment| in order to determine the leafe,) ought to be produced in the fecond, in order to repel the title founded on the leafe. And it was faid, that a court will not prefume any thing in fupport of a judgment obtained by confeffion, or default^ or in any other way than upon a trial of the merits. Lord Mans-^ field in die courfe of the argument obferved, that it was only ftated that there was no affidavit produced, not that there was no affidavit at all \ that* aU prefumptions are dependent upon certain circwnftances, and fuch circumftances are proper for the confidera* tion of a jury. Befides the general prefumptton, diat the proceed- ings were regular and omnia folemniter a3a^ here is a decifive iz6t ftated, diat the defendant entered under and by virtuo of the a£k of parliament. And the cafe does not ftate affirmatively that the judgment was irregular, or exprefsly and explicitly that there was no affidavk at all, or indeed any thing whatever to take off tfaft general prefumption, which was inunenfely ftrong the other way. Doe r. LiwiSf i Bur. 614* No veihal evidence is allowed of what has been faid by a prifonery when brought before a juftice of peace upon an accufation of felony. 336 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL feIony> unlef ^ k appears that his examination was not taken in writing ^ for as it is the duty of the juflice to take fuch exandna- tion^ it is prefumed that he has done fo, until the contrary is (hewn v and if the examination is in writing, a parol account is not the bed evidence. Where a perfon proved an original leafe made in the time of queen £iizabeti, and poiTeilion in himfelf and thofe under whom he claimed, from 6 Ann. to 19 G. 3. the court held that it ought to be left to the jury, with a recommendation to prefume all mefne aflignments. Earl \. Baxter y % BL Rep. 1228. Wl^ere truilees were required to convey upon A. coming of age, the jury may prefume a conveyance to him, as it was what they were bound to do, and what a court of equity would have compelled them ^to have done if they had refufed \ but it is xather to be prefumed that they did their duty. England v. Sladcj 4 7*. R, 682« This laft cafe however feems rather to have the complexion of a fi£lion, than of a real prefumption. With refped to the general principle of prefuming a regularity of procedure, it may perhaps appear to be the true conclufion, that wherever a£is are apparent^* ly regular and proper, they ought not to be defeated by the mere fuggeilion of a poflTible irregularity. This principle however ought not to be carried too far, and it is not defirable to reft upon « mere prefumption that things were properly done, when the nature of the cafe will admit of pofitive evidence of the fa£l, pro* vided it really exifts. It is a rule that omniaprafumuntur contra fpoHatorem. In Harweodv, Goodrightf dbavtreknedtOfhordMansfieldtzid, that the jury might have had evidence to prove an inconfift6ntdifpofition,orcircumftances to lay a fair foundation for prefuming it to be fo, as fpoliation, or the like } and agadn — In cafe the defendant had been proved to have deftroyed the laft will, it would have been good ground for the jury to find that it was a revocation. , In Cowper v. Earl Cowper, 2 P. Wms. 720. the plaintiff, as heir of his father, Spencer Cowper, claim- ed an equitable eftate which had been fettled upon the firft mar- riage of Lord Cowper, brother of S. Cowper, upon the iflue of that marriage, Spencer Cowper being heir at law of fuch iflue. On be* half of the iflue of a fecond marriage, it was contended that there might have been a releafe from Spencer Cowper to Lord Covjper ; and as Spencer Cowper was the executor of Lord Cowper, and had, after his death, burned and deftroyed feveral papers, it was further contended that the exiftence and diftru£lion of fuch a releafe ought to be prefumed. The Matter of the Rolls (Sir J. Jekyll^) with re- £pc& to the nature of the claim, obferved, that were he to con- iider the matter^ not as fitting in judicature, but taking in all maxmer of conCderations, fuch as honour, gratitudcj private con« fciencey i^iimb. XVf.J Of Pre/ufnpthn. 337 fcience, &c. he muft thihk the claim ifaould never have been made. With refped to the deftrudion of papers, he faid the fads proved^ tertainly did give ati unfavourable afpe£l to the plaintifTs claim^ imt did not go fo lisr as to bar it. After a very full examination of thefa£ks which wete proved, in order to eftablifli the charge of fpolis^on, he faid, << That had there been the leafk pofitive proof of a releafe from Mr. Conaper^ he fhould have difmifled the bill, but when fuch a releafe or conveyance is only fuppofed or inferred from appearances, dut of which the fuppofition does not necefiarily or even naturally arife, he could not but think the title, though in his Xf^m opinion it fhould not have been fet up, was a clear and fubfifting one.*' The mere non«-proda£lion of written evidence which is in the power of a party, generally operates as a ftrong prefumptioo againft him. I have adverted to this fubjefb in the fe£lion on Deeds : I conceive that it has been fometimes carried too far, by being allowed to fuperfede the neceflity of other evidence j inftead of being regarded as merely matter of inference, in weighing the tSkOt o£ evidence in its own nature applicable to the ftibje£i in difpute. If the deftruflion,^ or Withholding of evidence leads to 9} prefumption againft the party, to whom it is imputable,' much more is the fabrication (a), or alteration of it, calculated to induce the fame tSe£k. It muft however be remembered, that' whatever impropriety there may be in any fuch fuppteffion or fa- brication, the efieA of it ought only to be applied to the decifion of f«) One of the greateft and moft difficolc points in the Dt^Ut caafe, arofis from ^xxjohn Stew»rt having fabricated four lettera, a« recrivcd from La Mkrn the furgecm ; acondaft certainly very fufpiciova, aiid calculated to induce a ftioag prtfuibptioo againft the gtneffl veiacity of hta account. I believe the true condulioo, from all the circumftinco In thic aaofey to be that which was drawn by liie Houfe of Lords in fapport of the fifiation ^ but it If impofllble for gieat doubt not to haoK upon a cafe aflvAcd by fuch a circumftance. Thia part of the cafe is the fobj? dl of the iirft of Mr. jf, Stuart't letters to Lord Mans* fidJ, la which he charges him with fofcaoiog the inference refulting from this fabrica* tim, and contrafts his conduct upon that occaiion with that which he hadpurfued in the ifff^i!rptf cafe, where lie had laid it down, that if the certificate of a marriage purporting to be a coremporary a^ was a fabricarioo^ the other evidence in fapport of the marriage ought not to be believed. The following paflage containa Mr* Shtmt^% general obiervi* tions upon this fubje^. ** 1 had been accu(^omed to think, that in judging upon evidence, a matter of fuch ^« llaite importance, in the conftitutioo and jurifprudence of every well regulated Hate, llierc were certain rules clia)>liihed, which in every conrt| and in every couotryy wrper founda'tion> and not reft upon mere, fuggeftion or furmife. This was clearly illuftrated in the cafe of Goodtitli dim. Brydges v. Duke of ChandoSf 2 Bur, 1065* Under a iettlement G. B. was tenant in tail in poiTeiBon of certain lands, and tenant in tail in remainder of others, which had been limitted to his mother for her jointure. He fuffered a re- covery; and the jointrefs having lived feveral years, jt was con- tended that a furrender from her for the purpofe of making a ten-^ aat to the prxcipe ought to be prefumed, but the court decided ta the contrary. Lord Mansfield faid — ^There are two forts of pre- -■ ■ ing to the fame condufion with the forged cviience; parol tBftlm«>ny in f^iport of it vill beJittleregtrded ; tHe forgery of the written evidonoe cnrsminatfs the tcftim-iny of the witneflcs, in favoorof'the party who Kai made uf: of th^c forgrc), and notbir§ will %»in •redit on that fidey but either clear and conclufive Mrriiten evidence, free from fufpicioD, or the teftlmony of fttch a number of refpe^^ble di&nrerefted and cooGAeot witneflet, fpeJting todrci(Jvcandcircuro((antiate h€tt, aileavei no room to doubt of tHe ccruioty of their kaowledgCi and the truth of their aflertiont. ** On the other band, the proof of a forgety fuch as hai br en defcribed, nnft alfo have cheefTe^l to gain a more ready admi^Tion to the evie conCftcnt, if it be eflabliflicd by the concurring tofiimcny of a crowd of witnti^ and fupported by varfous articles of written and unfufpe^ed evidence, the hiu of a fair mind will be totally In favoHi; of the party producing fuch authorkiei, Md againft that which bad been obliged to have recourle tothefoiged evidence.** (a) Loid Coke after mentioning the hA fays, ** which cafe we have reported iot ■ double •aveat, ift, to judges, that they in cafe of life judge not too haftly upon prefumptiooi; and, ady to the true and innocent man, that be never feck to excufe him(elf by falfe or uo- ine meant, leil thcjeby he, ofiicodbg God(thc avthor of uutb]^.o?er(hiow himfelf ai it€ M«k did«*» ftunption^ Numb. XV1.;3 0/ Pre/umptiotk 339 fumptk)ns, one a prefumption of law not to be cbntradi£ied ; the other a fpecies of evidence ; which latter mud have a ground to ftand upon, fomcthing from whence it is to arife. Where a perfon has power to fuffct a recoVery,and thereby bar the eftate tail, omnia pt^umuntu^ rite ft folemniter aEla^ until the contrary appears, and it is reafon-> able that it (hould be fo, but if the contrary (hall appear, there is an end of the prefurtiption. So where the freeholder is a truftee for the tenant in tail himfelf, and under^is power and direflion^ it is a reafonable and juft caufe for ptefuniing, that every thjng was regularly tranfa£led. So when thepetfons intereftcdto objeA . agalnft the validity of a recovery, have had 6pportunity to make objedions to it, but inftead of doing fo, have acqUiefced under if, and not at all difputed its validity, this is a prefumption that all was right and regular. But there can be no prefumption of the nature of evidence in any cafe, without fomethlng ftpm whence to make it, fome ground to found the prefumption upon. Whereas, here is abfolutely nothing from whence to prefume. No fort of ground to build any prefumption upon. Mr. Juftice Wilmot faid, that he had no notion of a prefumption without fome fa£ls or circum* (lances to found it upon. This would be inferring fomcthing feen, from fomcthing not feen. Length of time alone is nothing ; the prefumption muft arife from fome fa£ls,-or circumftantes ari/ing within the time. The fa£ts from which a prefumption is deduced, muft be fuch as are not merely confiftent with the propofition, which they ate intended to eftablifli : for evidence, which leaves it indifferent whether a given fuppofition is or is not founded upon truth, is in e({e£l no evidence at all \ neither is a mere preponderance of pro- bability fufiicient to conflitute a prefumption ; although the con« fiilency of the faA confirms the alTent, to any a£tual uncon- tradifted teftimony in fupport of it, in the firft cafe, and the pro- ponderance indicates the preference which, caieris paribus^ ought to be given, in the fecond. A prefumption can only be applied, when the circumftances are fuch as to render the oppofite fuppofi- tion improbable. The degrees of probability are very extenfive, and a confiderable latitude muft be allowed to the judgment applied to the circumftances of each particular queftion ; which, as it cannot be previoufly defined, is from its very nature fubje£l to be afte&ed by the variety of individual fentiments. • Con- fiderable attention ought to be paid to the confequences of the decifion, and to the efiefl of error as it may be committed oiv the one fide or the other, but this caution fhould not be fuflfered to degenerate into exceflive timidity. And where the judgment is fully and . fatisfa&orily convinced, the condu£l (hould not be in* A t 9 iluenccd 34^ APPENDIX. [Numb.XVL fluencied by the fncfc at>t)fehcnfioh of a remote improbable con. tingcncy, or the fuggcflion of fanciful hjpothefis. The cftft and weigbt of prefumption cannot be influenced by any confidcnr- tion more cxtcnfivcJy, than by the opportomty which the nature of the cafe affords, to fupport or contradi£l it by dircQ tef* timony . A perfon \r'lio reds hi» cafe on the argtiment, that certain circumftanccs which he adduces, afford a prefumption of the exiftence of a dtfputed fafl, is not entitled to any attention what- ever, if he cannot but be in a condition to give dircGt and pofidre evidence of the fa£i itfclf, fuppofing it to be true ; afid on the other hand, preffimption may be regarded as (Equivalent to abfolute proofj when the party againft whom it militates, cannot but be in a cou^ dition to defeat it by pofitivc teftimony, if falfe. Where the in- Confiftency of the admitted fa<9s with an oppofite fuppoGtion to that which is inferred, Is abfolute and complete, fo as to amount to a moral or [^yfical impoflibility, the term prefumption, as I have already obferved, isinnpplicable, and it is a cafe of pcrfed proof. In other cafes the exiftence of a mere pofGbility to the contrary may be fo flight that the grounds of prefumption will affed the mind, with the fame con vi(^^ ion a»abfolute demonftration. Thus, toinftance the cafe of the controvcrfy between Marjb and Travis^ if RAtrt StevenSy in collating a given number ofmaniifcripts of the NetvTefiih fnenty found out which he denoted by an arbitrary character, whercifl there were twenty-four fingular readings in the Catboltc EpjftUsf and Mr. Miirjb afterwards found a manufcript having a fet of fingular readings, exa(^lIy coinciding with thofe indicated by ^tevensy it might be (hewn (as it has been) that the fa£t of identity is only lefs than certainty by a degree, whicfh it is almoft out of the power of Ian* guage to exprefs, and to' all pra£lical purpofcs, the convidion rcfulting from this propofition becomes equivalent to certainty it- fclf. But let the ticgree of Improbability be ever fo great, if in ^ny the flighteft cirr umftancc a clear abfolute unanfwerable in- confiftency is (hewn, the fuppoHtion that was aiTumed is entirely dcftroyed {a\ Suppofirtg, for inftance, with reference to the fame controvcrfy, that it was abfolutely and completely proved, that in the manufcript of Stevens where K is wanting, U was not Includ- ed in its room, and that in the manufcript of Marjb^ U was in- cludedj the incompatibility would deftroy the ftrongeft poflible inference from the conformity. But then in proportion to the (0) Several ciKiimftaiicei wera tH^uced hi the Dotgtui tumft to Aew caoft dbatthe chM ^oducfid at chcfoa of Isdy yMc«wa9 in Mt the cbiM of «m ACgwrn^ whioh wai takes from iu f «cntt hy (bme ftrangert t^ut the time of the aficrted delivery, bat tlie ckiM of Mig^n had l^ue eyes, and thofe of the pierfeA whofe birth mn to difpota were bUck. TkH dUleren^e fully e(bblt(hed would wholi/ deftmy all poffiMe evideoce of coincidcocff i«' laA the colom of the eyes ia fobjcd to change, which I conceive is«oC th^calb ■ - 4 pofitlTC Namb. X VL] Of Prefumption. 34 1 poGtive inference of identity on the one hand| the oppoGte evidence of incompatibility ought to be manifeft and unimpeach- able on the otheri and if inilead of its being fully afcertained, that ^e U was not included in the manufcript of &t€vens\ the cafe amounts to no more thun that there was no adual notice tliat it was included, the argument of coincidence is not defeated^ unlefs it can be (hewn that it was impoflible that the LTihould be includ* edy without having been noticed in making the collation, a fup- poGtion which is not only deftroyed by its intrinCc wcaknefs, but oontradi£led by feveral pofitive inftances* Wherever, therefore, the. poGtlve known argument leads to a clear and fatisfa£lory con^ cluGon on the one (ide, it ought not to be deftroyed by the mere exiftence of a circumftance not abfolutely accounted for on the other. The following paSage from Burlamaqut on natural bw, and the note which he fubjoins from the Biblioth^qut Raifonee^ afford fome important conGderations upon this fubjed.— When a truth is fuf«» £ciently evinced by folid reafons, whatever can be objeded againil it ought not to ftagger or weaken our convi£lion, as long as they are fuch difficulties only as embarrafs or puzzle the mind, without invalidating the proofs tliemfelves. Btsrl. lliere is-^a wide difftr- ence between feeing that a thing is abfurd, and not knowing all that regards it \ between an unanfwerable.que(tion hi relation to a truth, and an unanfwerable objeAion againft it, though a great many confound thefe two forts of- difficulties \ thofe only of the laft order, are able to prove that what was taken for a known truth cannot be true, becaufe otherwife fome abfurdity muft enfue. But tlie other^ prove nothing but the ignorance we are under, in relation to fe- veral things that regard a known truth. Bib. Rais, Therefore when a feries of fads diftindlly and unequivocally proved manifeftty tends to one concluGon, and another id^k is pro* pofed in contradiAibn to that concluGon, the mere inability to account for fuch oppofite fa£l, is not fufficient to deftroy the in- ference deduced from the others, but the poGtive inconfiftency ihould be fully (hewn. If the fa£ls in fupport of the conclufiou are fully eftablifhed, and thofe in contradi£tion to it reft upon mere inference and probability, wluch unoppofqd might be fuf- ficient to eftublifh their exiitence, tins inference may not be fufficient to deftroy the conclufion, unlefs it accounts for the fa£ts from which that conclufion is drawn ; as a conclufion riefulting from certain fa£ts on the one fide, cannot be fufficicntly encountered by a conclufion deduced from uncertain fads on the other. If the evidence in fupport of the concluGon is free from the fufpicion of error and ioaccuracy in its leading principles, but the relation of any inciden- A a 3 Ul 34* APPENIXIX. [Numb.XVL tal circumftance of inconGftency which is alleged againft it, may be fujefl to thofe imputations, it is more reafonable to adhere to the firft, than to be influenced by the laft, unlefs, as in the preceding cafe, the oppofite relation is calculated not only to oppofe the con- clufion, but to account for the undifputed fa£ls (a). Sometimes a eoncIuGon from circumftances may be fo forcible as to difcredi^ even the pofitive teftimony of a faft in abfolutc contradidion of it, as for inftance, where a crime is fully proved to have been commit- ted, and the circumftances upon which it is imputed to the prifoncr^ eannot upon any reafonable fuppofition be reconciled with his inno- cence, the evidence of an alibi is naturally attended with fufpicion and diftruft, and requires a ftronger ground of reliance, than tht ott dinary prefumption of the veracity of evidence. I fuppofc all argu- ments of inaccuracy, from an indiftin£lnefs in the obfervation of a particular time to be out of the queftion ; for when the cafe may be reducible to that, it admits a lefs violent folution* The circumftances from which a prefumption is deduced, may be dependent or diftinf^. In the firft cafe, all tlie h&s conftitutc one entire chain, and a removal of any one of the links deftroys the conne£^ion of the 'whole ; in the fecond, the removal of any one circumftance leaves the effe& of the others fubfifting ; but the concurrence of feveral diftin£l and independent circumftances, leading to the fame conclufion, greatly increafes the ftrength of the whole, and each afiTords a mutual fupport and corroboration to the other. It is judicioufly obferved in Butler's Analogy^ that pro- ' bable proofs, by being added together, not only increafe the evi-* dence but multiply it ; and that unlef^ the whole feries of things, which are alleged in the argument he had before adduced, and every particular thing in it can reafonably be fuppofed to have happen- ed by accident, then is the truth of it proved in like manner, as if in any common cafe numerous events acknowledged were to be ' alleged in proof of any other event difputed ; the truth of the event difputed would be proved not only if any one of the acknowledged Opes did of itfelf clearly imply it, but though no one of them fingly did fo, if the whole of the acknowledged events, taken to- gether, could not in reafon be fuppofed to have happened unlefs (he difputed one were true. («) The following ctfe which has fallen under my obfcr? ation, is partly connected yt\l\i this reifoQing : A. being in company with B.^ had hia pocket picked of three guineas ; B» told C« rather triumphantly, that he had piclced ^'spoclietof 4 guineas. This was ftated by ■ court of quarter- feflions to the jury as an inconfiflencyi «hich dcftrof ed the pcefuinptioo of guilt } but foppofiog there to be a fiUiehood, or inKcuracy wttb rcfpe^l to the numbcaincntioaed by B,f or an imccura^y with refpeA to Cs lelation, the vartation in that refpedt did not deftroy the pteromptioii, or nUier coicJtfiOB ariibg Iroai & Cijlng, that he had picked the pocket of ^. III Nomb. XVIO X)fTrefumption. 343 In the preceding obfervations, the faSs from whicli the con- tluGon is drawn are aflumed to be clear and undifputed ; M. fome faQs naturally tending to one concluHon are clearly afcertained and others which are in thennfelves ambiguous would conform to Tuch conclufion, fo that a given fuppofition would render the whole conneftcd and conGftent^ there may be in general fufficient ground to infer, not only the exiftence of the conclufion in queftion, but the true expofition of fuch ambiguous fafis^ as are confident with that conclufion ; and fometimes, even, if all the £a£ls tajcen feparately may be equivocali but their union leads in one poiot pf Tiew to a clear and diftinft conclufion, and {hews ^ relation and oonncftion, but no reafonable ground can be fuggefted for a fimi- lar coi)Currence to that which aflually exills upon a diiFerent fup- pofition, fuch fadis may mutually and reciprocally receive a pro- per expofition, by the general concHrrencc of the whole, cfpecial- ly where the conclufion is unoppofed by other fafts, which are indicative of a different conclufion. The prefumption of a fa£t which is deduced from fcveral undifputed circumftances, is fome* limes more fatisfaSory than the pofitive evidence of the faft itfelf, which may be open to miftake, or mlfreprefentation, and it is clear, that a well connected chain of circumilances is of all evidence the lead fufpicious iw point of veracity, for it is che evidence which \% leaft capable of being fabiicated wrth efFeft, But it often requires great judgment and difcretion ^o trace with propriety the conneSion between the exifting circumflaoces, anui|ger per- fon had more ftrength than an elder. But this rule was fubjeQ to fome exceptions for the benefit of mothers, and in fupport of the rights of patronage and fiduciary bequefts. This point arofe upon the death of General Stannuix and his daughter, mentioned in the cafe of the King v. Dr. Kay. 1 BL R. 6^0, the property being claimed by the brother of the daughter's mother, upon the prefumption that (he had furvived her father \ the deci«« fion in the cafe reported was upon a collateral point, and the que£* tion was never judicially determined. In Mr. Fiami^ pofthumout works, there is a very elaborate difcuffion of the fubjeft, in which his couclufion feems to be, that the prefumption of the daughter's fuTvivorihIp could not be fupported. This fubje£l came befoi« Sir William TVynne^ as judge of the Prerogative Court, in the cafe of Wright V. Nethtmmody 6 Maj^ I793f upon a queftion refpeding^ the implied revocation of a will by marriage, and the birth of a child, pf which I have inferted a note io the cafe of Lugg v. Lugg^ 2 Salk. ^93. The father and*child having periihed together by ihipwrecli|« the learned judge faid, that with refpe£b to the priority c^ death, it had always appeared to him more fair and reafonable in thefe ' iinbappy cafesj to confider all the parties as dying at die fame in- ftant 34» APPENDIX. [Numb, XVI Not only i» an a£(ual adjudication binding upon the parties, hit even where a perfon who had paid a debt, but upon being fucd for iti'could not find the receipt; and paid it over again, it was ruled that 1)C could not afterwardi^having recovered the receipt) maintain an a£lion to recover it back, Marriott v. Hampton, 7 T. R, 269. A Cmilar cafe was cited, in which there was an oppofitc deter* mination, and Mr. Juftice Z^wr^nr^ obferved, that if that cafe was law, it went the length of eftablifliing this, that every fpecics of evidence which was omitted by accident to be brought forward at a trial, may dill be of avail in a new adion, to ovcrhale the "fonncr judgment j which was too prepoflerous to be dated, ^.ord KeBy» has ruled at AJff Pr/w/, tliat even where a party, upon being fucd, paid the mone^ demanded, a( the fame time protcfting that it was rtpt due, he could not fuftain an aftion for the repetition of it. Brown V. M^Kinally, i E/p. Cyi 279. In a former cafe, an aflion lad been brought by the indorfee, againft the maker of a promlf^ fory note, who, after interlocutory judgment figned, pid part of the money, and gav^ a warrant of attorney for the refiduc, and afterwards brought an a£iion to recover back the money which he had paid, giving evidence that the plaiptiff in the former •{lion had notice of the note being given ver« ruled it, on the ground that the money had been paid under a compromife, and not under the judgment of a court. The cafe came before the court, upon a queftion refpeding die ^dmii&bility of evidence, entirely collateral to the nature of the demand } and a rule for a new trial was refufed, no notice being taken of the objec- tion to the caufe of a^lion. Cebden v. Kefidricki 4 7» J?. 43 1. It is very difficult to reconcile this determination with that which afterwards topk. place in Harriett v. Hampton t and indeed it feems a perverfion of terms, to call an indulgence in point of time, with refpe£l to the payment of part of the money demanded, a com- promife, fo as to annul the payment of a part, when the payment of the whole would have been conclufive. Hie decifion of Marriott r. Hampton was certainly contrary to the moral juftice of the cafe, as between the parties \ but the decifion feems fairly to refult from the corre£^ principles of law, fo far as regards the money paid in confequence of the a£lion. Perhaps the point, that the money paid before the a£lion brought, might have been reclaimed, on the ground, that the party by bringing his zfkion had difavowed it as a pay- ment of the debt, would, if it had been made, have fairly juftified a verdi& againft the defendant retaining the 'UzfconfcientiOtts ad- vantage wluch he had acquired. la Mttmb. XVL] Of the Authority^ cfRez Judicata. 349 In WaUer v. Witter^ Doug. I. an a£Hon was brought on a' judgment in Jamaica^ in which it was incidentally obfenred, that courts not of record, or foreign courts, or the courts of WaUs^ have not the pririlege of their judgments not being controverted. . Ttie cafe of Sinclair v. Frazef^ before the Houfe of Lords, was cited, in which it was part of the refolution, that the judgment of a court in Jamaica ought to be received as /riWyo^ir evidence of the debt, and that it lay upon the defendant to impeach the juftice thereof ; but thsiff refolutioti as weU as the obfervadon in Walker v. Wittir^ was extra-- judicial and collateral to the decifion. But in Hirbert v. Coot, Dum* forJPt note to Wille/s Rep^Sy 36* a plea to a declaration in debt on the judgment of an inferior court not of record, that the caufe of a^ion arofe without the juf ifdi£lion of the inferior court, was upon demurrer adjudged to be good. Lord Mansfield faid, that the argument how far the party was precluded after judgment, from alleging that die caufe ofaAion arofe out of the jurifdi^ion, was not applicable \ for the demurrer admitted the fad, fo diat it appeared on the record, that there was no caufe of a&ion within the jurifdic* tion. But with deference, I (hould conceive that if the defendant was precluded from alleging, that the caufe of adion did not arife within the jurifdidion, his a£lually making fuch an allegation could not reafonably be fupported, and therefore that the fiditious admiiEon of the truth of a plea, which arifes from denying its fufficiency, did not warrant getting rid, by a fide wind, of the principal queftion^ whether a new perfe£l and indefeafable caufe of a£lion, independent of all queftion refpefting the re£litude of the original judgment, did not arife by virtue of the judgment itfelf. In Galbraitb v. Nevilk^ mentioned in a note to the third edition of Douglas ^ Lord Kenyon exprefled (trong doubts refpe£ling the do£lrine advanced in Walker v. Witter^ which was maintained on the other hand by Mr. Juftice Buller. I conceive that there is no other inftance in which it has been judicially decided, that the judgment of a court not of record i or of a foreign court, was not cdhclufive, with refpe£l to the point decided, fo far as the fuit contained proper parties and incidents to have given it a conclufi ve efTeA, if the court had been of record ; and many cafes which have been decided refpc&ing prize caufesy arc dircQly in fupport of the oppofite propofition. The cafe oi Mofes V. MacfarlanCf 2 Bur, X 005 ..which I'am next to mention, did not turn upon the circumftance of the inferior court, not l>eifig of record* In that cafe the plaintiff bad indorfed to the defendant four promiflbry notes under forty (Iilllings each for a particular purpofe, the defendant fued the plaintiflPupon them, in the court of con« fcience and obtained judgment, under which he received the amount i and an aAIon of money had and received^ was fuftained for 35^ AI^PENDIX. [Numb. Ivf. for recovering it back again. The cafe is a valuable one, fo far M it -expounds the important principles upon wWch that right oC a&ion depends i but, as a precedent upon the immediate point, that a fum of money paid under the dire£l authority, of the judg- ment of a court of competent authority, may be reclaimed as un- duly paid, it dircflly* militates againft every principle that can be applied to the fubjeft. The decifion gave great diflatisfaftion when it was pronounced, and I conceive it would clearly now not be regarded as an authority. I have obferved in an cflay in the a£lion for money had and received, upon the arguments adduced in fupport of the decifion, and have had the fatisfafllon of finding jny view of the fubjcft confirmed, by that of Lord Chief J. Ejrej (of which I was not aware at the time of my own examination), in Philips y. Hunter^ 2 i/. jB. 402. I have often thought, what I perhaps may be cenfured for fuggefting, that Lord MansfUId was, in the cafe of Mofes v. Macfarlane^ in rather too great hafte to promulgate the principles which he had imbibed from the condi^h ittdebiti of the Roman law, and that he. applied them in a cafe where that law had clearly interpofed the exception, ttat propter suSloritaUtn ret Judicata repetitio cejfat. Ff. Mandate 59. The rule that a judgment can only be conclufive between tht parties, or thofe deriving title under them, is very fully efVablifhed, and in general it can be admitted even as evidence only between fuch parties j but to that there are fome e^fceptions, which are referred to below (a). In our law, as in the civil law, the fame perfon is only barred when fuing in the fame right, therefore a 5)erfon who has fued as adminiftrator, and is barred, may have an ^6lion after- wards upon the fame obligation as executor, for although the plaintifi^was in truth executor at the time of the prior aftion, his (tf) A jadgment U evidence agiioft other parutSy^whenever the master in difpute u a •ncftion of public right, and all perfons Handing In the fame iicuacionj are affefled by it, nd it Is evidence to fupport or defeat th« right claimed : thus a vnrdid finding a prefcrip. live right of the cuftoai, or tJghr, though neither of the litigating partiea a.e named in, or claim under thofe whoaie vartkt Vb the record* Peake't Evidence^ 2J, Ed, 40. As to the righ tof the rcverBoner or mnaindeNman, to give in eviderice a verdict in favour of the tennor or tenant for lide* Vi, p;Aev. Crouch^ i Lord Raym, 7}0. RufiivortA v. Counttd tf Pemhrth, Hard, 47a. cut. Ev. 35. Ptakf 39. A verdi£t againft one fcrvantof J, &, as to the maHcr's right 0/ AAery is evidenc?, but not conclufive evidence againft aaotber fervint, maiotainiog the fiune right. Ktmurjlfy v. Orpt, Doug, 5 1 7. • GUb, Ev. 36. \ Oty ofL^^m ^.Carke, CsTtk* i8i« } Sjrry Y. Bmer^ Ptaket, N, P. 156* ^ Rut T. St, PMocras^ iM» a 19. miitakiflg Numb. X VI.3 Of the Authority if Rc8 Judicata, 351 miftaking hi$ remedy does not prevent his^ maintaining his true adion. Robiftfon^s cafe^ 5 Co. 33. a. In bicledonv. Burgefs^ I W. and Af. i SA. 27. Cjm*. 166. cited in the before-mentioned cafe of Ouiram v. Morrivood^ the queftion arofe, whether after an aflion by one plaintifF, and plea of pre<«. fcription with judgment thereupon for the defendant, the judg- ment was an eiloppel againft traverfing the fame prefcription, in an adion brought by the fame plaintiff jointly with another perfon ? ' but the point was not decided, judgment ha^ng been given on a( collateral obje&ion. One of the points eftablifted in Outram v, Mormwod^ was that the former vtrdiGt againft the wife was atr cftoppel againft the hu(band claiming in her right. In Ingram r. Brofy 2 Lev. 2io. the defendant as bailiff of J. 5. made cog- nizance for taking a herriott, to which it was pleaded that ^. and B. as bailiffs of J, S., had formerly made cognizance for the fame Iterriott ; and it w^s ruled that the plea was not good, without ^cging that the cognizance was made by the affent of J. S.p as it might hare been by a ftranger without his privity. It is eftabliihed by feveral cafes, that a judgment in one z€tioa is a bar in another a£lion of a different nature ; fo that the fame caufe of adion {hall not be brought twice to a final determination r and the fame caufe of a£lion is where the fame evidence will fup- port different anions, although the afbions may be grounded onr different writs. See Kitchen v. Camphell^ 3 If^ilf. J04. S. C. 2 Black. Sz7. by the name of Kitchen v. CampMf, in which it was decided that a verdid for the defendant in trover was a bar in aa aAion for money had and received, for the money arifing from the fale of tbe'fame goods. See a)fo the feveral cafes there cited. But the propoiition, as dated in the preceding cafe, is properly qualified fo as to be confiftent with the dodrine contained in* feveral authorities, that where the point has not been brought to a final determination in the firft adion, but the plaintiff failed from the mode of a£iion not being adapted to the nature of the daia, a judgment for the defendant in the firft a£lion was no bar to the plaintiff in the fecond. "Where an a£iion of debt was brought upon an obligation, in the condition of which there were two points to be performed bj the obligor, at the requeft of the obligee, and the defendant pleaded in bar that the plaintiff h^d made no requeft, upon which the iflue was found for the defendant, and afterwards the plaintiff brought another a&ion upon the fame obligation, and the defendant pleaded the former ad^ion in bar and not by way of eftoppel ; the opinion of the court was, that it was a perpetual bar to tlie obligs^ tioQ* n 354 APPENDtX. CNumb.XVt tion» tbe verdid being in forcei although the obligation was for& fieited for the other point. Dyeff 3yi» i» I conceive howerer that that determination would not apply to excluding an a£^ion upon a fubfequent breach $ but only to bar any zStion for d. caufe esifting when the former was brought* The principle, that if the fub}e& matter has been once properly in judgment, the cafe (hall not be again open to difcufli<»i, on account of the ftating a ground of decifion not before adduced, is illuftrated by the cafes of Gfedt^ head ▼. Bromley, 7. T. R. 455. Sctumman V. Weatbfrbeart, 1 Eafi^ 537. in which it was held that after an application to fet afide an annuity, for non compliance with the ptovifions of the annuity ad, had been difmifled, the application could not be renevired, by making obje^lions not before entered into. In the firft of tbefe cafes, Lord Kenyan obferred, that the z6i of parliament gites a fummary jurifdi£lion to the court, to be exercifed according to a known legal difcretion, and that they could not gotem their dif^* cretion better than by analogy to the proceedings at common law \ where if an a£iion be brought, and the merits of the quef^ tion difcufled between the parties, and a final judgmetit obtained by either, the parties are concluded, and cannot canra^ the fame queftion again in another a£lion, although perhaps fome obje£lioa or argument might have been omitted to be {a) urged upon the firft trial, which would have warranted a diiierent judgment. But relief was afterwards given in with refpcA to the fame annuity, in the Court of Chancery. See Bromley v. Holland, 7 F^ 3. The queftion, how far a court of equity is authorised to refcind an inftrument, after an ineffeAual application for tlie purpofe in a court law, where there are no equitable circumftances, and the court of law has full concurrent authority, was not difcufled with that particularity which the importance of it would feem to re< quire. In cafe of eje£lment, a verdi£l in one caufe is not cOncluliire In another; but this arifes from the fictitious quality of the a£tion, and from the real parties not being recognized fo far as td let in this obje£iion. The judgment, however, is condufive in an a£lion for mefne profits between the real fubftantial parties to the firft caufe, fo far as regards the pofieflbry right neceflary to maintain the a£tion. But (according to the paflage already quoted in thefeftion on Records), the judgment, like all others, onlyconcludei the parties as to the fubje£l matter of it. Therefore beyond the tiioe laid in the demife it proves nothing at all $ becanfe beyond that doc («) Thefe words arc not In the report, bat the fulgeQ dwtlier rc^ifct tbemtvbery^ f tted, ia^idtr to ftpport tlie faife of the coatest. die Numb. XVI. J Of the Authority o/Rts Judicata. 353 the plaintiff has alleged no title, and need not prove any:. As to the length of time the defendant has occupied, the judgment proves nothing, nor as to the value, jiplin v. Parkin , 2 Bur, 665. With refpeS to deciilons which, operate m rem, the judgment is binding againft all perfons, upon the ground that all the world are parties to tlie proceeding. This do£irine has been principally applied in the cafe of condem* nations in the Exchequer, and in cafes of prize. It is perfe£bly familiar, that a judgment of condemnation in the Exchequer is conclufive as to the property againft all the world. There has been a confiderable difcufEon upon the queftion, whether the fame efkEtwzs applicable to condemnations by commiflioners of excife. In Hefs/baw v. Pleafance, 2 Bi, Rep, 1 174. the Court of Common Fleas, upon the ground of a diftin£lion between courts of record and other jurifdi£lions, were of opinion that it was not; but there were feveral preceding cafes cited in Gaban v. Maingay^ infra, to the contrary ; and in the fame cafe is cited a fubfequent decifion by Lord Mansfield at Nifi Prius, in a cafe of Dixon v. Ccok^ ^rfiich was removed upon bill of exceptions into the Exchequer Chamber^ but never brought to judgnient, in fupport of the concluGve effeft of the condemnation. In the cafe of Gahan v. Maingay^ Ridge-^ way, &c. The fubje£t received a very elaborate difcuflion in the courts of Ireland, It was decided in the Court of Exchequer^ that the condemnation of fub-commiflioners was not conclufive^ which decifion was received in the Exchequer Chamber, by the Lord Chancellor afliiled by the two Chief Juftices ; and all the cafes bearing upon the fubje£t, were very fully and diftindily taken into confideration. The diftin£tion with refpe£l to a jurif* di£lion of competent authority, not being of record was (hewn to be without foundation. The Lord Chancellor obferved, that the Ecclefiaftical Court is not a court of record ; the Admirality Court is not a court of record ; the Prize Court is not a coujrt.of record ; yet was it ever heard that the juftice of a fentence pro- nounced by the Ecclefiaftical Court, or the Admiralty Court, or the Prize Court, upon a matter confefiedly within their feveral jurifdid^ions, was ever queftioned upon the trial of a collateral afiion for damages in any of the fuperior courts. It never yet was confidered, (except in Henjhaw v. Pleafattce) that the judg- ment of a court of competent jiirifdiAion, could be queftioned in a collateral a£iion, in which it was pleaded or given in evidence^ merely becaufethe court, in which the judgment was prcmouncedj was not a court of record (a). In {m) la the cooife of bii jo^gment, hts Lordihip fold, **U hat ben ur§^d at the bar, Voc II. B b that 3S4 APPENDIX. [Numb.IVI. In Seottv. SkiormMnf t St. Rip, pjj^ It was contended that tf though a judgment of condemnation in the Exchequer was coiw cluGve with refped to the forfeiture of the goods, it did not pro- ttf£k the officer from his mifbehaviour in an an adlion of trefpafs ; that thongh conclufive in rem, fo that the right of the crown to the goods fliould never b^ contefted again> it was not coockfiTe infir/inam, in cafe the owner could prove that they were in faft Mi feisable^ and fiionld bring an afiion for damages; but die ODntrary was decided, as the only poffible ground that the plainuff CDuld rely upon, in the cafe before the court, which was unaccom- panied by mifl)ehaviour, or ahy unwarrantable violence, was, that the goods were not in truth Ibble to be feized. The application of the fame doArihe to a condemnation by commiffioners, was the principal point in Oahafif v. Maingay, Lord Carletan taking notice that the fole ground of the a£tion was the illegal feizing and CMrying away the plaintiff's goods, and Aat the verdiQ did not find any circumftances of ill condu£i accompanying the feizure, which, independent of the fuppofed illegality of the feizure, could IHaintain an a^on of trefpafs. In Codiv. SMi, sT. R. 255. it was a matter of difcuflioB, whether a judgment of acquittal in the Exchequer is cdnclufive on ihc one fidci as a verdi& of conviAion is on the other, but the cafe was decided upon a collateral ground. In Fimr^Sf Mr* TtU £vldsiU0f Price Baron, is faid to have admitted fach evidence asconclttfive. Upon principle, I (hould conceive that the oppofite datenninatioa would be more corred, as fuch an acquittal would be wcmnted upon the mere negative ground, that the ctewn had not adduced ftAcient evidence to fuppoirt the feizure \ aad an in* dfirfdiial| having a collateral intereft in fupfwrting the legality ef the feizure, is not a ^ncurrent patty ivith die crovm in fupporting iht cooodemnatiqini atnd afierting die claim of property on die one fide, hi the fame mamicfras eirery perfon having an intereft in op _ ,' ■ •• — ■»- ^-- -^i^-i^ dttt tht commilboaert, and fiib-Mminillioiieri of excife ate iUiteratey and tEat dicj m partial and intereftcd men. But if tbe Icgiflatan hat thongbt fit Co eoAmUt ju£cifl pdtmfi to OKB of chat dafaipciofiy mt iboiild vtry moeh ei^cetd o«r jttrifllidk«i,aSd graff- ]y nSStlBU thi aatboriTf cottducced to 111, if, is ^itSng jodgmeot vpoa thit fccordr«t «MS to tnttr ifllo s coiifidtradoo of tbe policy of tliat eftabli ftfoeoC. Sitting ia a court of Um^ ] an not at liherty to aotar into an exanioatJofl of tbe joflicei or Injbflico of iii^ jodg. HicAt of a coart of compeCtot jutifdj^on, oiilefi k eomes before ma Sy wnk df anW. All pArticfl to focb a jvdgmCnt ai^ bound by it, ontlf if is retedW bj a tilbssal baviog tnaa- ptfaoc mtbtnity to icview ir» 1 |piow of So fscb daa^iroua and extravaiant exoefi^ into which any court of ji^ftice can be betrayed^ aa entering into a difcuffioo of Icgiflalife policy in etching particular uibonala. If tbe parlliiDdat Kai thSugbt At to toUuhir judicial poweri to eicile officers of a particular difcrtptiofi, wo can only fee tint tbey do votaxcaed the jufifdiaioB intnsSed to them. If they do sot exceed tbcif inrifdiaaeof ^ Isnro as ssthoritjto proaoimcc that thep m iacooipeiNit sr conspt judges.*' pofing Numb-XVL] O/ibeAut&oriiyo/ResJndicztz. 355 poling fuch condemnation^ is in contemplation of law a fufficient party in the other. The/e is no inftance, in whieh the fupport given by the Englsfii courts of juftice to the judgment of a competent authorityf is more confpicuous than in the cfft€t allowed to foreign condemna- tions in matters of prize, even where fuch condemnation has ap« peared on the face of the proceedings to be an outrageous violatioa of every principle of right and juftice. If the condemnation is pro- nounced on the ground of a want of neutrality, or a violation o£ treaties, which are juft caufes of capture, it is however iniquitiouSf abfolute, and concluiive. Gejerv, Agridtdr^ 7. T. R. 681. Gunetti V. Kenfington^ B T. R. 230. Bufing v. Royal Excbangt AJJurancif $EaJl^ 99. But if the fa£l concluded is not a legal ground of con« demnation, the condemination has not any legal tfkdt \ in other \iords, a izGt eftablilhed by a foreign fentence of condemnation hai no other efiedl than the fame fa£i eftabliflied in any other manner. Calvert v. Bovil/j 7 T. iS. 523. Majne v. Trpttert Pari. hf. 363. Pol/and v. Be/l, 8. 7. R. 434. Bird v. Appleion^ 8 T. R. 562. No formality of expreffion is requifite, provided it evidently appears that the condemnation was on a legal ground. Bandllay v. Lewif, Park, 359. and if no fpecial ground of ccm* demnation appears, it is equivalent to a pofitive fentence of con- demnation as enemy's property. Saloucci v. Woodmafs^ Pari, 362* If there is any ambiguity in the fentence, fo that it does not appear whether the condemnation was on the ground of being enemy's pro* perty, or upon a pofitive regulation as an arrSt, for declaring veflels prize if any papers have been thrown .into the fea, the truth may be fiiewn. Btrnardi y.AIo/ieaux,Doug, 57;. The fentence is only bind- ing as to the conclufion, and not as to the truth of the premifes from which thatconclufionis formed. Chrifiiey. SecrOan^ 8 T.JR. 192. But it is eflentially requifite tothe validity of a fentence, dial it fbould be pronounced by a courtof competent jurifdi£^ion : and, asit is contrary to the law of nations, for a belligerent to etcGt a tribunal in a neutral country, the fentences of fuch fuppofed tribunal are of no effeBt; Cafe of the FJadoyeff, i RMn/on, 135. Havelock v. Roctwood, 8 T* R. 268. but a condemnation in the country of the ally of the complain- ing power is fupported. Cafe of the Chri/iopherf 2 Robtn/bn^ 209* Oddyy, Bavilf 2 Eafi, 473. In the cafe of the Himuk and Maria^ 4 RabinfoHj 43, Sir JFUIiant Scott ftrongly intimated his opini]e£i in rcfpcft to which the proceeding is in remy is the jurifdi61\on of the fpiritual court with refpeft to wills, and in* tcftacy with reference to perfonal eftatc ; the probate of a will being neceffary and conclufive evidence in all civil proceedings. Sec Barnf/ley y.Povvel/y I Fef, 120. 284. and the cnfes there cited. Biit where a teftator made a codicil to his will, to take efFc£k in a given cafe, it was properly ruled by the Mailer of the Rolls, that granting probate of the codicil was no conclufion with refpeft to the event having taken place, upon which the operation of it was to attach. Sinclair v. Hone^ 6 Vef, 607. The efFeft of the aft of the ecclc- fiaftical court is confined to the direfk operation cf it ; for where the defendant claimed goods as adminidratrix to a woman, and the plaintiff (hewed that he was married to her ; which the defen- dant contended that he was eftopped by the adminiftrztion from doing, as that would not have been granted if fuch marriage had taken place. Holt^ Ch. Juftice, decided the contrary, obferving, that a matter which has been direftly determined J>y the fentencc of the ccclefiaftical court, cannot be gainfaid. Their fentence is conclufive in fuch cafes, and no evidence fhall be admitted to prove the contrary } but that is to be underftood only in the point direft- ly tried, otherwife it is of a collateral matter, to be collefiked or in- ferred from their fentence 5 as in this cafe, becaufc the adminif- tration is granted to the defendant, therefore they infer that the plaintiff* was not the inteflate's hufband, as he could not have been taken to be, if the point there tried had been married or unmar- ried, and their fentence had been not married. Blackham^s c^k^ I Salh. 290. And the fame opinion is expreffed by Lord Hard' mjickCi in Baker v. Pritchard, 2 Aih» 387. In the KingY. Vincent ^ 5/r. 481. it was ruled that the probate of a will, while unrepealed, was conclufive evidence in fupport of it, uponanindiftment for forgery j but this doftrinc was difputed by De Grey, Ch. Juftice, in the Duchefs of Kingllon^s cafe, and was exprefsly over-ruled by Lord ElUnboroughf in the cafe of the King v. Gib/on^ Lancajler fummer aflizes 1802, where the prifoncr was convicted and executed. A direS fentence in tlie ccclefiaftical court, in affirmance or avoidance of a marriage, is allowed to be conclufive evidence in all civil cafes, where the marriage comes incidentally in queftion (ex- cept in cafe of collufion). Sec Bunting* sc:iCCf 4 Co. 29. Kenn's cafe, 7 Co. 41. JonerY. Bow, Carth, 225. Da Coflay. Vilin Real, 2 Sir, 691. Clowes V. Bathur/l, 2 Sir. 960. Meadows v. Duchejs of King* Jlan, Ambler, 756. But in the Duchefs of Kingjlon^s cafe, 1 1 State Trials, 201. it was decided, that a fentence againft a marriage, in a caufe of juftification was not conclufive evidence on an indiftment for polygamy. The opinion of Lord Ch, Juftice De Grey, upon that occafionj »-»-' Numb. XVIJ Of the Authority ^Res Judicata. 357 occafion, affords the moft inftruftlve view that can be given of the tfk& of judicial fentences {a)., 'fhe following propofitions were deduced by him, from the feveral cafes which had been previoufly decided. Firft, that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurif- di^ion, dire£^ly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclufive between the fam^ parties, upon the fame matter dire&ly in queftion in another court. Secondly, that the judgment of a court of exclufive jurifdidlion dire£^ly upon the point, is in the like manner concluGve upon the fame matter, between the fame parties coming incidentally in queflion in another court. . But neither the judgment of a concurrent or exclufive jurifdiftion is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in queftion, though within their jurifdiclion, nor of any matter inpidentalty cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument by the judgment. It . was alfo the opinion of the judges, that, fuppofing the fenteuce to be conclufive upon fuch indidment, the counfel for the crown may be admitted to avoid the tStGt of fuch fentence, by proving the fame to have been obtained by fraud or collufion. In Prudham v. P/&//- lips^ cited Amblefy 763. Harg^ L. Tracls^ 456, upon the queftion, whether fraud in obtaining fentence in a matrimonial caufe could be (hewn in avoidance of the fentence, in a collateral a £lion, Lord Ch. Juftice Wilksy after much debate, took a diftindion between the cafe of a ftranger, who cannot come in and reverfe the judgment, and therefore muft of neceflity be permitted to aver that it is frau- dulent, and the cafe of one who is party to the proceedings ; that fraud M'as a matter of fa£t, and if ufed in obtaining judgments was a deceit on the court and hurtful to ftrangers, who, as they could not come in to reverfe or fet afide the judgment, muft of neceflity be admitted to aver that it was fraudulent, but that a party cannot give evidence that the judgment was fraudulent, but muft apply to the court, which pronounced the judgment to vacate it \ and if both parties colluded, he faid, it was never known that either of them could vacate it. In the cafe of a foreign attachment, according to the euftom of the city of London^ if the regular proceedings have been had againft the defendant, tlie garnifhee in whofe hands the property has been attached, is proteAed by the judgment in cafe of an adlion brought againft him by the original defendant, and is not required to prove the reality of the debt due to the original plaintiff, nor, as I con- ceive, can any evidence be allowed as to the non-exiftence of fuch debt. Sec M^Daniil v. Hughes^ 3 Eajl^ 367. In the cafe of Phelps v. Holkar^ before tlie fupreme court of Pennfjlvania^ I Dallas^ 26 1, an attachment had iffued to which (#} See alfo Mr. Hargrtmi^t obferratloni upon thit Tubjea. Lmw TraUt^ 451. B b 3 the 3S8 APPENDIX- [Numb. XVL the (heriff returned, that he had attached one blanket, (hewn to him as the reputed property of the defendant, upon which judgment was given by default, and an a^lion of debt being brought on that judgment in Pennfyhania^ the queftion was referved, whether the judgment was conclufive evidence of the debt, which it was re* foived that it was not: as the attachment was a proceeding in rem, and ought not to be carried farther than the property attached. I have above had occafion to refer to the opinion of Lord Mam* fields in Walker r. Witter, that the judgment of foreign courts (which are coupled with Englijb courts not of record) are only prima facie evidence, and not conclufive evidence in an a^ion here } and in mentioning the points that have bee9 determined, in regard to matters of prize, have cited feveral cafes, which (hew it to be the eftabliflied law, that with refpe£b to that fubjeA at leaft they are entirely conclufive. In 12 Vin. %T,pl. 5 Anon, the Lord Chancel- lor took the following diftindion ; that where a fuit is for a debt or other thing, a fentence in another country is not binding, but the court here mud examine into the matter in order to form a a judgment ; contra, where the fuit here is in order to carry that fentence into execution, for then the proceedings here are founded It upon the fentence, and not upon the debt. In Burrows v. Jemitto, or Temineau, 2 Str. 733, 12 Fin. 87. die acceptor of a bill refident at Leghorn^ who had by a fuit there, according to the law of the place, been difcharged from his liability, on account of the failure of the drawer, applied for and obtained an injun£lion in Cliancery againft a fuit here. Lord Chancellor King obferving, that the court at Leghorn had jurifdi^iion of the thing and of the perfon, and that he thought he was bound by the fentence; he thought the judgment would be a difcharge at law, but as the other judges might be of a different opinion^ he would not put the party upon the difficulty and hazard of a trial {a)» In Si7/ V. Worfwick, I H. B. 665- Hunter v. Puts, 4 71 /?. 182. 5. C. in error by the name of Philips v. Hunter, 2 if. B* 402. it was ruled that if a creditor in England, after a trader here has be- come bankrupt, attaches his property in a foreign country, he is liable for die amount to the affigriees. Lord Ch. Juitice Eyre, differed in the laft cafe from all the other judges, and thought die («) The difcharge hy btnkniplc^y or foncnder of property la a foveiga cooatry, Km Cune anilogy to a foreign fenteoce. With refped to that fubjed, it h«t been held that foch a difcharge fliall be valid here, with refpeQ to a debt conlraaed in the country where the dif^arge to(^ place. Baihmine ▼. Q^ldifii^ Gb. B. Zi. 347* 1/ ^d. But not with fefpilfc ^toadebtwbichaccniedio£itf/«iA Sii/fAT«Birrl«Mii, lEs/f,^. If • biU of eachaaga ia drawn in Jhurks payable in EngUmi^ and di(hoDOiircd» the debt accmca -in AmarkM, aad the dnwer it difcharged by a btokroptcy and ccrdficaie thciCi P«r/«r ▼. Bnmm, 5 £A decifioo Numb. XVl.Ji Of tie Autbmty ^Res JucOcatau 35a decifion wa$ an improper interference with the decifipn of a count of competent authority . He faid — " If we had the means pf knpwr iog the law of another country, we could not examine a judgmpot of a court in a foreign ftate brought before us in this manner. It if io one way only that the fentence or judgment of a court, of % foreign ftate is examinable in our courts, and that is when this party who claims the benefit, applies to our courts to inforce it ; in whi^ cafe be confideted it as examinable/' I do not think that the dc cifionofthe above cafes could be juftly regarded as a fubverfion of the authority due to the courts in which the attachment had taken phcei for there is no inconfiftency in a perfon who recovers % judgment which is valid' and efie£live as affecting the immediate parties ; being, under given circumftanccs, anfwerable as a truftee for the amount received (3). I have fometimes heard of a contrivance to fubje£l perfons re« fident in England^ to the procefs of the courts in Ireland, by ferving them with a writ here, fwearing generally to the fervice and en- tering an appearance, and thereupon proceeding to judgment, and bringing an action on the judgment in an Englijb court. I cannot however think that the courts of this country would fupport fuch a praAice upon the mere fi£lion, that the defendant could not aver againft the record : if the Union has had the effedi of giving^ to the records in the courts of Ireland^ the charader of recorda in England, (as to which Vide Collins \. Matthew , $ Eafl, 473.) ib that the fpecial fad cannot be (hewn on a general iflue of nil dekei^ I fliould fuppofe that a plea fetting forth the fpecial circumftanoe6> with proper averments would be fuffictent } or that the courts would even oppofe a fummary remedy, to fo violent an invafion oC their own prerogatives. Mr. Peake, in his Lanv of Evidence^ difcufles with fome particu^ larity, the queftion, !iow far a verdid in a criminal profecution fliould be allowed as evidence of the fame fafis in a civil proce- dure. I think it may be fairly ftated as the refult of the law upon this fubjedi, that there is no authority whatever, upon which any reliance can be placed, in favour of the admiflibility of fuch evidence* The cafe of Boyle v. Boyle, 3 Mod, 164. which is upon the face of it completely inconfiftent with itfelf, and which is contained in « book of no reputation, can hardly claim the rank of an audiority. It is faid, that a woman obtained a prohibition againft a caufe of {h) A fentenceof expalfion in a collegey is condufive evidence in a queftion u to the ligbt of die party to be within the garden y &c. Rex t. Gmndn, C«nf. %t$» A coovtOioo More tmMp&net it« antil qoalhcd or leverfed/conclvfive evidence for him in en wGtiomoi' tiefpafi, StrieUsMd t. fFsrdp Mr, Tttet J. 7 T. Jt. 633. «. Where a furcharge was cooSra* cdby coQiiniiSonertofhottfe«» tec. 9 on appeal it wai ralcd la bt coodafife in trofpafa. Msri tf itgilmf. Muvt/ 1 B^. Of ?»/. 391. B b 4 ja&itatiooy 360 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVII. jactitation, the man having been convi£ted of haying married her, having a former wife living ; — thus a judgment which implies the invalidity of a marriage, is made an affirmance of it. All the cafes in which a party having an interefl. in the fubjeft of a criminal profecution has been admitted as a witnefs, are in dired oppofition to the principle, that the verdidl: on fuch a profecution can be admitted as evidence, in refped of the civil right. NUMBER XVII, X)fthe Dtftifinions between Law and Fa8y and the EJfeEl of Ufage upon the Law. (Referred to, Vol. II. p. 15a.) In the preceding number, on the Law of Evidence, I have re- ferred to the following note, which I had previoufly inferted in the view of the decifions of Lord Mamfieldy Vol. II. 338. withrefpeO to the diftinCiions between law and fa£l, and tlie efFedl of ufage. << There are few objeAs of more importanccj confidering the diflribution of judicial authority in the Engiijb courts of common law, than the eflabiifliing an accurate criterion for diflinguifhing the boundary between queftions of law, and what are called quef- tions of fa£^. When the diftin&ion is eftablifbed in a particular inftance, the confequence enfues, that if the queftion falls under the former part of the divifion, the grounds of determination muft be j&dicially recognized by the coiirt, that they ^re not the objed oif evidence, and cannot be conditutionally referred to the deciiion of jury : the reverie of this takes place if it belongs to the latter. Jn many cafes the boundary is defined with fufficient accuracy, but in fome ther^ appears to be an almoft .inextricable confuCon and difficulty; and' this applies mofl particularly, to difcqflions upon the cuftom of merchants, a term the efFefl and import of which does not appear to have been accurately defined, when it Is confidered as a queftion of fad, but which is as precife as any other when confidered as a queftion. of law, according to the doc- trine of Lord Chief Juftice Holt^ in the cafe of Hawkins v. CW)*, X Lord iSajrm. 130, in which the declaration ftated it to be the cuftom of merchants, that if a bill of exchange Mras indorfed over for the whole or any part, the drawer was obliged to pay the fum fo indorfed ; and upon demurrer, it was urged, that as the plain? tiff had alleged this to be part of the cuftom^ it was well enough ; but the Chief Juftice anfwered, that this is not a particular local cuftom, but the common cuftom of merchants, of which the law takes notice; and therefore the court cannot take the cuftom to be as ■Numb. XVII.3 Difference between Law and TaEl^ &c. 361 as ftated : and which do£krine is more diftindly announced by Mr. Juftice Fofler^ in Eiie v. The Eafl India Company^ 2 Bur. 1216. ^ where he fays, the cuftom of merchants is the general law of the kingdom, part of th^ common law. This principle has, however, been often departed from, and the cuftom of merchants fubmitted a« a fa£l to the jury, and made the obje£t of examination by witneiies. A local cuflom, tlie exiftence of which is confefTedly a matter of inquiry for the jury, is a term accurately diftinguifhed ; the extentj nature, and requifites of it are clearly defined, and amongft thefe are the palpable circumftances of its being imme- morial and compulfory. But the term cujlotny in the fenfe at prefent under confideration, feems to be in many cafes, not car- ried beyond its popular fignification, importing frequent habit^ although fuch habit may have been merely the refult of perfonal convenience, or of miilaken notions of legal obligation, and al- though it may have been of novel introduction. '< In the common diftribution of law and fa£l:, the law is under- ftood to be a general and univerfal rule, and the fa£b to be of a limited and particular nature. Whatever therefore is decided refpc£ling the former, becomes properly an authority for fucceed- ing determinations ; and a want of uniformity in a general rule of property, or conduA is of material detriment 5 but the decifion on matters of fa£l in one caufe, is not, in its nature, material in the invefttgation of another, except between the fame parties, or thofe fucceeding to their rights. An exception has been fa. far allowed, that in matters of local cuilom, a verdi£l between other parties is admiflible in evidence, but then it is only regarded as one amongft other circumftances ; upon the general aggregate of which, a jury may form thenr determination, the influence of*it \^ not prpvioufly defined ; and it is very far from being confidered as imperative on the judgment of another jury, or a^ precluding other fources of examination ; and to be introduced at all, it muft be verified as any other record. But an opinion of a jury has been exalted to a' much higher rank than tliis, in the cafe of the cuftom of mer- chants, and almoft placed on a level with legiflative authority*. For in the cafe of Lichharvow v. Mcfony which underwent as much . inveftigation as almoft any mercantile caufe that ever occurred, the judges of the King's Bench having given a decifion, that the indorfement of a bill of lading defeated the right of ftopping in tranfitu^ which decifion was reverfed in the Exchequer Chamber ; and afterwards the judges having very much differed in their opi- nions before the Houfe of Lords, it being treated all along as queftion of law, the knot, inftead of being unravelled, was cut in two, by referring the cafe to a jury as a queftion of fzQi ; the jury found a verdi^y that by the cuftom of merchants the indorfement bjrre»i 3«a APPENDIX. £Numb.XVn. barred the right of die (hipper : and in a fubfequent cafe of Htm* tfr V. Barings cited i Bof. &f PuL 567. evidence was refufid re- fpe£i:ing the negotiability of a bill of lading, it having been ad- mitted on record in the former cafe, and contrary to the rule and pradice refpe&ing local cuftoms, no evidence was given of the former verdid, but it was judicially recognized by the «ourt, and the rule of law has been fince confidered as eftabliflied. *« That twelve farmers in Anglefea or Merwnetbjlnre^ (hould con- clufively fettle a general rule of property, is a dodrine which would not be thought to refie£t much credit on the Englifh law : but although thefe mercantile queftionis are moft frequently decided by a fpecial jury at Guildhall^ the law and conftitution do not recognize any difference founded upon that diftinAion. Without entertaining an idea in the flighted degree- derogatory to tlie im- portance and Value of juries, I f annot but think it a manifeft inconvenience to refer to that tribunal the decifion upon general rules ; their opinion is neceflarily inftantaneous, and the reafons on which it is founded are not fubjefl to public inveftigation, and being a fleeting accidental body, the decifions thus formed by them are muf h more likely to be erroneous, confidered as the founda- tion of general rules, than opinions formed upon accurate and mature deliberation, by perfons profeffionally and habitually con- verfant with the fubjefls of their enquiry, and fuhmitting to public notoriety the reafons, and principles, and authorities, upon which thofe opinions are founded. " With refpcft to queftions conne£ted with the con(lru£tion of written inftruments, it muft be admitted, that a tru^ con{lru<£^ion tnuft'be founded upon the words confldered with relation to the fubje£l matter. Whatever, therefore, explains and illuftrates a fubjed to which an inftrument refers, is properly admiflible, to direfl the judgment as to the efl?e£l and object of the inflrument itfelf. Therefore, where words are ufcd which are appropriate to a particular branch of trade, or which in fome trade have a known conftant familiar import, though perhaps in fome degree diflTering from their ordinary application, it feems reafonable that the import fo eftabliflied fliould be fliewn, fo that a judgment may be ezercifed fj^om the nature of the fubje^ and context of the in- ftrument whether the words were, or were not, intended to be ufed, according to fuch appropriate fignification : but where words are, in themfelves, free from ambiguity, and no eftabliflied techni- cal import has been attached to them, nothing is more contrary to the general fpirit of the bw, than to fettle their conftru Aion by thQ pinions of witneflTes- << In every cafe where a queftion turns upon the degree of dili- gence Numb. IVII.3 Difference between Law and FaSl^ &c. 363 gence or neglc&y attached to a particular tranrafkiont the ufual mode and habits of bufinefs are properly admiilible, in order to lead the judgment to an accurate conclufion upon the particular cafe, and the jury are the proper judges of the efFedV. But all diefe cafes are very diiFerent from ezaipining witnefles to prove, or referring to juries to eftablifh, a general rule of property. << In regard to many points upon the fettlement laws, the decifions upon oppofite fides approach fo near, or are fo contradiAory, that it is impofEble to reconcile them with any common principle. This difficulty has, in fome cafes, induced the court to transfer the de- cifion of the point from themfelves as a qucftion of law, and to leave it for the feflions as a qucftion of fadl, ^a courfe of proceeding which is very conducive to the increafe of litigation.- If a qucftion is, in its nature, a qucftion of law, the difficulties attached to it cannot be legitimate reafon for converting it into a qucftion of fiid. A regular feries of adjudications, embracing a common and conGftent principle, may ibmetimes be properly adhered to, al- though'the introduction of the principle may appear to have been founded upon erroneous reafoning, becaufe, by fuch courfe, that certainty which is a primary obje£l of the law, is materially fecu- red. But where clafliing and contradictory determinations, leave the fubje^ more indefinite than if there had been no determination at all, die moft beneficial courfe would feem to be a difregard of the tStSk. of fuch determinations ', an examination of the fubjedl in its original principles, commencing with known eftablifhed data, and an enuxltiation of the refult, that would leave to the inferior court little more than the application of particular evidence, to a definite and unambiguous propofition." The cafe of The King v. Stiventon^ 2 Ea/f, 362. may call for feme obfervations connejied with the preceding difcuflion. The qucftion arofe as to the legality of a fummons, ifTuing from the office of the Solicitor of Exclfe, iuftead of being figned by the commiffioners, and it may be taken for granted, fo far as relates t0 the prefent purpofe, that, independent of the autliority of ufage^ hch a fummons was infufficient, but the ufage in hGt having been to iflue fuch fummonfes. Lord Kenyon faid, '< that the court ought not to fuffer the qucftion to be agitated. Whether a fummons which has iflued from thefe commiffioners in the ufual courfe of pradice^ and in conformity with the pradiice of the fuperior courts is regular ? Subpoenas «re conftantly iffiied in this manner ; they are feat down blank into the oountry, and there filled up: and in ike fiMBe maaner are jurors fummoned by the (heriflF to attend she affile^ withom bU fignamre to the proceft. I am afraid of (liaking n 364 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVIL ihaking tlie pra£hlce of all the courts and judicial officers in the kingdom." Upon this cafe it may be obferved, that the fupport of one abufc by merely (hewing the exidence of another, is not a very ligitiniatc courfe of reafoning ; in the cafe of fubpoenas, the principle of convenience will perhaps induce the courts to fuftain their own long continued irregularity ; but I think Lord Kettyon would have rather hefitated at admitting the general propofition, that whatever was allowed in the fuperior courts, was therefore allowable in every inferior jurifdiftion. The flieriff's warrants for fummoning jurors iffue under the feal of the ofEcCi and under the immediate authority of the under (herifF, whom the law recognizes as the legal efficient officer j the immediate fummonfes are under the fignature of the fummoning officer; alfo a known authorized charaAcr, and perhaps in thefe two in Ranees, the pradice may have the antiquity which amounts to common law, but in the cafe of commiffioners of excife, his lordfliip's judgment is certauily not confident with the principles which he laid down with fuch dit tinguiihed ability in the cafe of The King v. Erifwell. He there faid, tlie propofition dated was, that the feffions having in general received fuch evidence as that in quedion, their ufage creates a rule by wTiich the courts are to proceed. I confcfs (faid he) there is (bmething of povelty in that argument, which refers thofc whom the conditution of the jurifprudence of this country hath inverted with the power of correfting the errors of judiccs of peace, to the very praftice of thofe perfons to learn the rules of evidence by which they are to proceed. I ' remember the cafe of Baldwin (Sf Ux. V. Blackmore jTCYortcd in i Bur, 593. and of which I have a MS. note, and a fujl memory, where juftices of the peace had committed a man and his wife, for returning to a parifh from which they had been removed by an order. The a£lion was brought by the huftand and wife, on the ground that the wife had been improperly committed ; the cafe was twice argued : and the ufage of committing femes covert was infided upon ; and it rather appeared at fird, that fome part of the bench were inclined to gi?e countenance to fuch an ufage ; but I well remember that Mr. Judice Fo/ler treated the argument with more indignation, than is expreffed by Sir James Burrow in his account of the cafe. I perfeAly well recoiled that learned judge's faying, *< that he had heard communis error facit jus y but he hoped he fliould never hear that rule infided upon, to fet up a mifconception of the law, in dedru£lion of the law. I diould have difdained to fay any thing Qix this pofitioni unlefs it had received . the appearance of fome countenance Numb. XVII.3 Difference letween Law and Fa^^ &c. ^6^ countenance in the cafes I hare mentioned, and in the dlfcuflion of this cafe. It is the whole ground of the opinions hinted at in the other cafes. The pradlice I know varies according to the ufage of each county where the fcflions are held ; and I fhould as foon refort to the ufage of every pariih in the kingdom,' on a qucftion concerning the rateability of perfonal eftate. But I will not enter more into this point, as I am clear it would be mod dangerous to adopt it. The miftakes of judges, provided they be- came univerfal, would, according to that do<3rine, become rules of law. An ufage commencing at fooneft, fince 13 fef 14 Chds. IL («). contrary to law, and working injuftice every day it was perfifted in, would fuperfede the law." 'JThcfe were manly fentiments, and pronounced in the true fpirit of judicial wifdom, but how can they be reconciled with the fentiment in the King v. Steventeny that the court ought not to fufFer the queftion refpe£ling the legality of a ufage, which muft have commenced at the earlieft, fince the 1 2th of Ckas. II. to be agitated ? Although fome ftrefs is laid in the King v. Erifwellj upon the nature of the fubjeft to which the obfervation is referred, it is manifeft that the main tendency of the obfervations was general. In the great quedion of general warrants, it was contended that the ufage eftabliihed a right. Lord Mansfield^ who in fome cafes^ and particularly in the queftion rcfpefting the rating of perfonal property, gave very undue influence to particular ufage, faid, How do the ordinary magiftratcs ufually a£l in fuch cafes ? It is not contended that they can iflue fuch a warrant : if the fecretaries aft in that capacity, the law muft be the fame, unlefs a different reafon can be alFigned. It is faid, that ufage will juftify it ; and it appears that the fame form fubfifted at the revolution, and has continued ever fince. Ufage has great weight : but will not hold againft the clear and folid principles of the law \ unlefs the over- turning it wouH be very ill confequence indeed. But where no great inconvenience can arife in refpeft of what is paft, and the confequence with regard to futurity may be very great ; there is no reliance to be had upon fuch an ufage. Befides, ufage muft be general and allowed, ujttata et approbata. But this has been an • ufage of only one oflSce and officer, againft the praftice of all other confervators of the peace. — Wi/moty J. I have not the leaft doubt, nor ever had, that thefe warrants are illegal and void.— JTaUSf J.' So totally bad that an ufage, even from the foundation of Rome itfdf would not make them good. Money v. Lead i J!/, -R^. 555. In the cafe of Magdalen College^ 11 Rep. 68. the (tf } The jtar afttf the exctfe tiBu firguments i66 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVn. arguments adduced in favour of ecclefiaftical leafet» that fercnl fimilar Icafes had been granted fince the difabling ftatute, by the advice of men learned in the law, was anfwered by the Juftices Cde^ Croh;DoddiriJge, and Haugbton; that thenumber of leafes was more §x amfuehidine cleritorum, who imitated precedents of leafes made before die ftatute, than of any fage advice of men learned in the Iaw;and fecondly, thatifw////i#db errantiumnonparitgrrorifairocinium. I do not ftop to inquire whether fuch fummonfes as were iffued la the cafe of Steventon, were independent of ufage good or bad i the court laid that queftion afide, and decided wholly upon the ufage. Neither is it material to inquire, whether any inconveni- ence could refuit from giving to fuch a pradice a pofitive fane* toon on the one hand, or from conforming to the general prin- ciples of law on the other. The pra£lice, if requifite, might be fully provided for by the legiflature. In the particular cafe, it is probable that the parties who zSted certainly with improper inten- tions, but as certainly were entitled to the benefit of all exceptions founded upon bw, were mifled by their reliance that a blunder and irregularity, proceeding from the negligence of ofEcial prac- tice, and never brought under judicial notice, would not be raifed into a kgal principle merely from the length of time, for whicli it had been improperly continued. The obje&ion which I Mrilh to urge, goes to the foundation of the argument itfelf, that what is wrong to day becomes in its repetition right to morrow, and if one day will not do, how many will ? For there is no ftatute of limitations. It' is not uncommon to adduce an argument in fa- vour of the ancient and eftabliihed law and conftitution of the country, by comparing it to a grand and venerable fabric, but furely the tBc€t of the comparifon will not be improved, by ex- tending the veneration to the duft and cobwebs. In the cafe ex parte Leice/Ier^ 6 Vef. 429, the preient Lord Chancellor advanced a pofition which is in dire£i oppofition to the principles that I am endeavouring to maintain. He faid, that where a pra£lice has prevailed for a feries of years, contrary to the terms of an order of the court, and fometimes contrary to an a£l of parliament, it is more confident to fuppofe fome ground ap» peared to former judges, upon which it might be rendered con<* fiftent with the pradtics* I can never advert to expreflions of this defcription without protefting my diflent ; and I thiidc ^t even the immenfe diflference of fituatipn, between the higheft depofitary of public juftice, and the moil obfcure individual can never give a legitimate fandion to the doArine, that an habitual difobcdience or violation of the law, (hall be allowed as fuperior authority, to the pofitive and unequivocal mandate of the law itfelf) this ai^ 8 gumcat Numb. XVII.] Difference beiwen Law and Fa6ly &c. 367 gument is perfedily collateral to that» which confiders ufage as the bed expofitor of a rule attended with ambiguity, for the pro- poiition which is obje£tcd to, aflumes the fad of the exifting prac- tice, being contrary to the legal authority upon the fubje£l, it takes it for granted that the law is one way, and that fome good reafon has been found for fetting up a different authorityj as fur perior to the law on the other. s NUMBER ( 3,69 ) NUMBER XVm. {a) OF MISTAKES OF LAW. Part I. Preliminary Obfervations. Part II. A Tranf.ation of B'Aguefeau*s Diffirtation on Mjfiahs of Law • Part III. Tranjlation of Vinnius on the ^flion^ Whether Money paid under Miflake of Law can be re^ claimed? Of Miflakes of Law. (Referred to VoK L p. 306. and ante^ p. 324. of this Volume.) ^ PART I. Preliminary OhfervatiQns* IN the Effays^ which I lately fubmittcd to the public, on the aflion for money had and received, and on bills of exchange, 1 had occafion to advert to the queftions, Whether money paidmerely under a miftaken idea of legal obligation was fubjeft to repetition ? and Whether a>i indorfcr of a bill of exchange, knowings the fa£ks by which his obligation was difcharged in point of law, but igno- rant of the legal confcquencc of them, was bound by a fubfequent promife of payment ? Upon the firft of thefe queftions, I extrafted a very learned and judicious argument of Vinnius^ in fupport of the a(Rrmative proportion, and fubjoined fome cafes that had occurred in the Englifi courts of juftice, which appeared to be a confirma* tion and adoption of the fame doflrine. Upon* the fecond quef* tion, it appeared (contrary to fome decidons which had occurred) to be a neceflary corollary of the folution propofed of the firft> tliat the promife was not obligatory. Since that period, a determination has taken place in the Court of King's Bench, upon the firft queftion, oppofrte to the con- clufion, which had appeared to me to be bed fupported by law and reafon ; and, very lately, the learned Chief Juftice of the fame court has, at Wtfi Prius^ given a judicial opinion oppofite to tliat which I had adopted on the fecond. («) The prefent number, which was written In t^O^^ was intende<1 to have formed a feparace publication* and is mentioned with that view in a Oote to p. )'w6. ot the prec«d* in% volume; but at the difcuflaoni in Part IV. c. 3. f. 1. and in the Appendii Co til At fcAioQ, ««re. No. 16. f. 14. have foree relation to the fubjedl^ I hate fioce decided wpoia iDferting it at a part of the Appendix. Vol. IL C c Perhaps Sfo APPElSrprX. [NumbrXtnt Perhaps it mdy be thought, that I fliould z& ti^ft conGQientlf with the propriety of my own fituaticm» by bowing with (kference to the authority of thefe determinattons, than by renewing a dif* culGon which has received its conclufion from jthofe whofe epl- nions are not only to be refpefled for their wifdom and talents^ but alfo to be afted upon and acceded to, as terminating, by their authority, the controTerfy of a difputable fubjc(^. I hate however always thought that a candid and difpaflionatc examination of judicial opinioi^s was perfe£)ly confident with a proper deference to the rank and charafter of iliofe, by whom thcj were entertained^ and that fuch examination is often attended with public and profefltonal utility : and Z truft my unaffeded perfonal refpe£l towards tbs noble and learned magiftratc^ whofe fentimenis I have taken the liberty of bringing into difcufTion, wiU be a fecurity' againft my juffly incurring, the im- pvtation of prefumption^ or of improper tenactt]f,of opinion, b Renewing the confidcration of thefe queftions. It muft cert^nly be admitted, ^at the 'fixft of the autho* yity of an obfervation which I conceive wiH appear in .the fcquel to have certainly not been neceiTary to the judgment which it accompanied, and probably not to have; been corre£lly and con- £derately applied y and that fo far was the queftion from leading to an expofition of tlie great and general principles whi«h are coi> neded with it, that it was difpo&d of in a fummary manner, with* out any argument or deliberation. My acquaintance with the writings of IfAgHiJftau has only commenced fince the ^pearance of the before mentioned ESays, although I had for many years been ax»ious for the acquifition o£ them. His admixable pieces of judicial eloquence have (ince that (ime occupied a confiderable portion of my time and attention,, and the tranflation of feveral of them has greatly contributed to my gratification* His pleadings appear to comprife a mod ftrik- Bng union of profound learning, logical accuracy, arul felietty of diflion. They are not, as may be fuppofed from the title, the arguments of a pouafel for his party, but the advice of an afTefibr to the court. The decifions of the parliament ot Paris were givsn i]^ writings without any public decla* atiom of tlieir grounds and leafoas^ Numb. X VIII j • Of Mifiakes (f Law. 371 teafons) but were preceded by % very full cxpoGtion, publicly hiadc by the Advocate General, of the fifts, the arguments of the parties, and the legal principles of decifion s and it is the execution of this important duty, which Conftiiutes the fubje£l of the plead* ings abore referred to. It would afford me great fatisfaSion to communicate' to ttcf countrymen, fomuch of the excellence of thefe pleadings, as I am enabled toprefcrvein the tranflation : and my intentions and wifiies upon that fubje£^ are ottly fufpended by the uitimation of tliofe bcft qualified to form an accurate judgment upon the fubjeft, that the ufual reception of publications, tending to illuftrate the general principles of jutifprudence, or to exhibit the particular application of thofe principles in the pra£lice of foreign countries, is not fuf- ficlently favourable to afford an adequate expe8ation offecurity frtm lofs, or to reconcile incurring the neceflary expence, with the dic- tates of common prudence {a) . The father of At. UAgueJfiau^ (of whofe charafter a delineation of particular intereil is preferved from the mafterly hand of the fon,) having filled with diftinguifhed virtue and reputation, fcveral of the mo/l important public (ituations in France ; upon the in- ilitution of the office of a third Advocate General, in the parlia- ment of Paru^ recommended his fon, then only of the age of ai, to the appointment, z\m\ Louis XIV., in acceding to the requeft, de- clared, that he was fo well acquainted with the father, as to be fare that he would not deceive him even in the teftimony which he gave in favour of his fon. How far this confidence was merited, and juftified, is evident to all who have the flighteft acquaintance with the writings and hiftory of UAgueJJcau. It is obferved in the fummary of his life prefixed to his works, that he appeared at firft with fo much eclat, that the celebrated Dents Talen^ then prefix dent k mortiery declared he fliould wifh to finifli as that young man had begun. It is added, that ** he was equal to a multi- tude of affairs, that he treated them all fundamentally, and fre- quently difcovered laws, pieces, aM decifive reafonings, which had efcaped the advocates of the parties. He united to erudition, order, and cleamefs of ideas, the force of reafon and the moft brilliant cloqucince." The truth of this teftimony doe^ not reft upon the partiality of a kindred biographer, but upon the exift- ence of the productions to which it is applied. He continued in this fituation until the age of thirty-two, when upon the recom- mendation of the prendent Harlay^ himfelf one of the moftemineat («) In thelequd of the prefeot Tokme» I fliall embnce the opportunity of infertmf ibme fpecimeaiof (kefcj^lcadiflgt} but I do not tbiukic aacerial to alor tfie precedtog IboTiiiee* C c% juriftf J7« APPENDIX.- [Numb. XVHI. jurifts of the country, he was promoted to the office of ProcuTcui General, to which that of Advocate General is in fome degree a deputation, but an office the fun^iiohs of which were of a moit reclufe nature than thofe of Advocate General ^ more intimately cohne£led with the details of adminillration, requiring the ezercifc of learning, and talent, in the compofition of written arguments, but not calling forth the application of oral eloquence, except upon the opening of the feilions of judice ^ upon which occafion the Procureur General, in rotation with the fenior Advocate General, delivered an addsefs to the judges of the parliament> refpeding the duties mofl entitled to their attention,,and the failings againft which it was moft important to awaken their caution* From* this office hepaflfed to that of Chancellor, the grand depoGtary of juiUceand kgiflation, in the year 17 17, upon the appointment of the regent Duke of Orliansy being then of the ^gc of jp. In the earlier year> of his fillings this fituation, he was twice baniflied to his eftate *, the firft time, in confequence of his fteady oppofition to the financial proje£ls of Law ; the fecond, for refiding an undue precedence being allowed to cardinal Duhoisy contrary to the ufage of the kingdom \ but being redored to his dignity, he continued^ in pof- feflion of it until the day on which he completed his 80th year, when he prevailed on the king to accept his refignation, which la lefs than a year was followed by his death. His varied excellencies, not onFy in the fcience of jurifpnidence, but in every department of polite literature, and more efpecially in his public and private conduft, will beft 'appear from the col* Ie£iIon confiding of 13 large volumes, 4to. which has been made fince his death, of his produ£lions in the courtb of his official duty, and his domeftic and familiar intercourfe* The diflertation which thefe remarks are intended to introduce, is perhaps Icfs calculated than any other article in the colle£lion, to afford a fpecimen of his general (lyle and manner. It appears to have been compofed for his own fatisfa£lion, in forming a conclufiott upon the important fubjc6l which it involves, and the circum- ftance of its not being dedgned for publication manifeilly appears from its being in two different languages. It begins in French^ afterwards French and Latin are intermixed, and laftly, above half the diflertation rs in Latin. The writer appears to have ftudioufly confined himfelf to a ftri£t and logical dificuflion, a quality which is ecjually confpicuous in his other numerous pro- du£liohs, but is in general accompanied by the finer beauties of compofition, which, id the prcfent inilance, fcem to have been Itudioufly avoided. Aithougli it is evident, that the diflenatioa i» not clothed in a language Numb. XVIil.] 9f Mi/iakes of Law. 373 language intended to meet the public eye, it is no lefs manifeft that the courfe of argument is perfeft and complete, and that the con- dttfions are the refult of a full and comprehenfive examination of dicfubjeS*. The grand principle upon which the dlflertation depends, is the ' diftinflion between the effeft of ignorance of the law, as it regards the violation of a public duty, and as it only concerns the miftake of aprivate right ; and the confequence deduced from that principle IS, that although fuch ignorance can afford no excufe in the firft • -cafe, it docs not in the laft operate as a fufficient caufe for diveft- iig thcjaxjperty of one man, and conferring it on another* It mud be acknowledged tha^ fome of the reafonings by which this diftinftion i« illuftrated, have very much the air of metaphyfi- irit to our ufages, their reafon to pur cudoms \ and, by the pr'mciples which they give us, they ferve as our guides even when we walk in a road , which was unknown to themfelves." If therefore it is manifefl^ that a particular conclufion upon a ge- neral and mod extenfive quedion, ia plainly deduced from the inaxims which fuch men as thefe have laid down, as the firil principles of j,udice ; if thofe maxims are, in themfelvesj the re<» fult of that common reafon which is given to all men, and, to be aflented to, requite only to be propofed; if the immediate quef-* tion^s One which every man, fpeaking from the ordinary dictates pi natural judice, (independently of the influence of teclmical fcience,) mud anfwer in the affirmative ; if fuch is the neceflary confequence front the opinions of Papinian^ judly diled in the treatife before ua, Romans jurifprudenttA viva vox ff pr^icu/yoti it will be of fmall importance to thofe who confult the decifions of that jurifprudence, with a view to be affided by their wifdom, and fipt 16 offer 4 blind obedience to their authority, ^ethe^ a con- trary Numb. XVni.] OfMiJlakes of Lata. 375 trary'do^hine may have had the preferenccj as itfulting frdm tha legiflative authority of individuals, who, without regard to their power to convince, were entitled to command* If it is (aid, that the difcuffion, however interefting to a foreigner* to the inhabitant' of a country, acknowledgmg the Roman law a< the bafis of its own particular jutifprudence, however fatisfa£Vory in its i-efult, as applicable to the particular do£triAes> or even the general principles of that law, is immaterial to the EngUJh lawy^r.^ that the queftion for his difcuflion, is only Whet|ier there is s?ny precedent in fupport of the aflerted right of adion ? I might au«- IWer in the language of Lord Mansfield^ in the pafl&ge which I havob feie&ed as my firll citation in a former publication, wherein t endeavoured to introduce the ftudent to a knowledge of his ju» dicial character : " The law of England would be a ftrangd icience, indeed, if it were decided by precedent only. Precedentsf only ferve to iiluftrate principles, and to give them a ftxed authori«J ty. Bat the law of England, which is excluiive of pofitive law, caa^ed by ftatute* depends upon principles^" and to a fimilar obfervation, in anothet cafe, that ** the law does not confift in parw ticular cafes, but in general principles which run through the cafes and govern die decision of them.'' I might refer to the great difcuffion upon the fubje£^ oi literary property i to the decifions upon the legality of wages, and of contrada not exprefsly pro- hibited, to the dodrlne eftablifiied in the iectnt cafe of Pa/ley v, Truman, and its qualification in Hajeraji v. Cregfy, both difcufled with much elaborate reafoning, as founded upon the principles of natural juftice, but both inclmled in the (iiort fentence of the Raman \zw: Conftln mm frdudulentt nulla ohligat't9 efi, ctiie cobwrent and united parts of a general whole. While the ad:^ntage which has refultcd to the community, from this mode of conduf^iug judicial in- quiries, is generally acknowledged, there can be no reafon why a purfuit of the fame courfe of inveftigation (hould be difcouraged ; while the particular precedents refulting from thefe inquiries are followed with admiration and refpeci, the general precedent which fandlions the fame line of proceeding, which evinces the propriety of feeking for ufeful affii^ance wherever it may be met with, is too important to be treated with negleft or difregard- The original fources of informa,tion are not exhaufted, the power of reforting to thefe fources is not annihilated \ and if a court (hould admit its willingnefs to afient to a given propofition, provided the lame, or another court had given it their fanfiion, the day, the - year, or the century before, why (hould they deprive themfelves of the liberty which they allow to their prcdeceflbrs, of deducing iheir opinions from the principles of juridical reafon, and aflifting themfelves in that dedu£lion by the previous inquiries of others^ yrholc ability and induftry entitle them to refpeft, without requir- ing an implicit deference to their conclufions ? Evety thing wJiich now is precedent originally wasrcafoning : although the benefits o£ legal certainty, frequently warrant and require an acquiefcencc 10 the authority of the precedent, whilft the mind withliolds its affent to the reafoning upon which it is founded. I (hall hazard afewob^ fervations in- the fequel, upon the extent to which this principle maybe juftly and ufefully applied; my prefent objeft is chiefly to obviate the reje£iion of any do£trine which may, upon an in* veftigation of principles, be found to be ufeful and correft, upon ,the mere ground of there being no fuflicient precedent to warrant it. The precedents of e(labli(hing fuch doftrincs are fo numerous^ that I may appear te have been undertaking a work of fuper* crogation in defending its propriety -, but though a mere aflent to the reditude of this principle is fufficiently general to fuper* fede the neceflTity of proving it, the pra£kical adoption of it is ' fufficiently rare to juftify the propriety of enforcing it. What^ jettt courfe of reafoning may form a legitimate ground for die determinations of the bench, muft alfo be a legitimate foundation for the arguments of the bar, as the nature and efTence of thefe confift in fubmitting to the attention of the bench, the topics which appear to warrant a determination in favour of the client : and truth, juftice, and reafon, muft necefTarily retain their inherent charafterifticsj by whomfoever ihey may be accidentally pro* pounded 1 378 APPENDIX- [Numb- tVUL pounded and enforced ; but though this propofition, like the for- mer, fcarcely requires the afliftance of argument to eftablxih its propriety, it, like the former, is rather fupported by theoretical aflent than by praAical reception. Numerous as the exceptions to this obfervation unqueftionably are, it cannot be denied thit It is too fafliionable to fneer at a deviation from the beaten track of practical authority, as the refult of pedantry and oftentation ; but although, limiting the range of profeffional argumeiits to Impefj Pra^ice, and the Ind^x to the TVrw Reports^ might po'flibly be found to diminifb the trouble, without detrading fr(»m die pro- fits of individuals, the majority of the profeflion would afluredly be unwilling to confine themfelves within fuch narrow trammels. But if there is any fubjecl to which the doflrine of an univer- fality of principle peculiarly applies, it is that of reclaiming money unduly paid} not only upon the ground that there is no fubje£l in its nature, more wholly referrible to the* general rules of natural juftice, as diftinft from the laws founded « upon local habit or municipal inftitution, but alfo upon the more favourite ground of precedent itfelf. It will be generally agreed that the fyftem of law upon this iubje£l, ks adminiftered in England^ is chiefly to be deduced from the determinations, of Lord Mansjiddj and that the few cafes re- fpe6ling it of an earlier date are not of fufficient importance to form any regular fyftem* But Lord Mansfield's own views upon the fubjeft are peculiarly referrible to the principles of uni* Terfal jurifprudence, as illuftrated and embodied in the Roman law, ^d the whole feries of his condud refpeding it is a continued precedent of his recurrence to thofe principles. In the leading cafe of Mofes v. McLcfarlam^ in which he embraced the earlieft opportunity that occurred to him, of giving an cxpofition of the grounds and nature of the adlion for money had and received, he enters diflFufely into the general doArine refpe£ling it, and ftates ieveral principles which have ever fince been looked up to as the Aandard of authority (even by thofs: who think that in the par- ticular application of thefe principles, he did not allow fufficient confequence to others by which they ought properly to have been reftrided and controuled). But it will fcarcely be contended Uiat he found the materials of his expofition in any preceding volume of Reports f whereas a very flight comparifon will evince the fourcc of it to have been the juridical wiiHom of ancient Thi^ Numb. XVni.3 Of Mlfiakes of Law. 379 This kind of equitable a6iion to recover money* which ought not ia jufticc to be kept, is very beneticial, and therefore much encouraged. It is only for money which, eic equo et bono, the defendant ought to refund. It does not lie for money paid by the plaintiiFy which is demanded of him as payable iu point of honour a^id honefty, though it could not have been recovered from him by giyy coudGe of Uw* H«c coD^i^o ex bono et seqao introdudta,^ quod alterius apud al» terium fine caufa deprehenditufy revocari confuevit. 1. 66. fT. jLib* 12. Tit. 6. de Cond. Indeb* As in payment of a debt, b^n'cd by the ftatutc of UiniutionSf Or contraApd 4v4q^ bis io {(li^ fpr mone^ foA^J vilt^^t^ Naturales obligationes non eo folo xftimantur, ii a£lio aliqua earuin nomine cpmpetit : vcrumetiam eo fi foluta pecunia repeti non pofiit. ff. Lib. 44. Tit. 7. dc Oblig. ct Adio. 1. 10. Lib. 46. Tit. !• de fide juflbribus, I. i6. § 3. Naturaliter etiam fervus oblige* mr, et ideo fi quis ejus nomine folvat^ vcl ipfe manumiffus ex peculio, re- peti non poterit. 1. 15. de Coa* didione Indebiti. fif. I2. Tit. 6. Naturale autem 'debit um in hac caufa pro vero debito habetur, eoque ctfi exigi non poteft ; fobi- tum tamen non repetitur. Vinnius. Ad. lalt. Lib. 3. Tit. 2i 4. 6. Julianus yerum debitorem poft litem conteftatam^ maaente adhuc judicioy negaba^ folventem repetere pofle : quia nee abfolutus, ncc con* demnatus repetere pofiTet, licet enim abfolutus fit, natura tamen de* bitor perman^t. !• 6o'm de Cond* {ndeb. Hue item plerique referunt cz* ceptidnem Senatus Confulti Mace- doniani; nam et filius familias fi mutuam pecvniam acceperit, et pater familias perperam folverit, non repetit. Vinnius, Qqoniam, natu- ralis obligatio manet^ fil Lib. i^ Tit. 6, de ^et. Maced. I, 9. lo^ Quod indebitum per errorem foI« vitur, aut ipfum aut tantumdeni repetitur, 1, 7. 4e Cond. Indeb* Is cui quia per crropem non de^ bitum folvity quafi ex contrafka dcbcrc vidctur. J deceit, &c. If fuch laws ne mibi injuriam fachu*, 1. 4. ibid. are violated/and the defendant takes advantage of the plaintifPs condi- tion or fituation, then the plaintiff ^ fliall recover. * . But It may be faid, that however appoGte all the reafonings deduced from UAgueJftau and Vinmus might be to have fhewxij a ' fmriy what the decifion ought to have been, whatever influence the difcufllon now fubmltted to the public might have had, if it had been prefented as an argument to the court| the fubjefi: is now at reft and concluded by authority, and that any reafoning of a private individual refpefting the grounds of that conclufion^ muft be not only unavailing but impertinent. But however little encouragement the difcuffions of a private individual, refpefllng legal fubje£ts, have received, or are likely to reeeive, the reafons which militate againft the ofitrring fuch dif- cuffions to the public, fecm to be much more numerous oh the fcore of prudence than on the principles of propriety. The law, like every other fubjeft, may be regarded as a matter either of pra£tical information, or of fcientific inquiry ; if a do£irine which is merely the fpeculative opinion of an individual, ihould be con- veyed to the public in fuch a manner as to be fufceptible of pro- ducing an erroneous impreflion, that it was admitted mjudi-. clal pra£lice, much inconvenience might arife, and much cen- fure would be reafonably incurred. Or if an individual (hould pronounce a peremptory decifion, in oppofition to principles efta- blifhed by judicial authority, he would be fairly liable to the im- putation of prefumption. But in fuggefting grounds, and reafons, in fupport of a difFerence of opinion fairly dated, every reader I« left to the exercife of his own judgment, upon the corrednefs of the premifes and their accordance with the conclufion. To fupport a general and indifcriminate obje&ion to this courfe of proceeding, it muft be affumed that the reafoning which is offered is fatisfac- tory and corrc£l \ for if either the premifes arc cnoneous in thcm- ^^ fclvcs^ 1\ S«i APPENDIX. tNumb-XVlIL felres, or inadequate to the condufion which is deduced from them, an objcaioh arifcs of a very different nature from that dfi prefumptuous arraignment of eftabliflicd authority. Perhaps, ia fome tifcs, an examination, of any fubje^i may efcape reprehen- fion even whiift the rcfult of it is not affented to, as, by exciting aa attention to the arguments fuggeftcd, the error of thofe arguments may be candidly pointed out, and an opportunity may be afforded of giving a corre£l elucidation of the principles by which they arc oppofed : to promote inquiry is often a matter of not lefs utility, than to bring fuch inquiry to its proper termination ; and if the pofilbility of error was regarded as an invincible objedion to the cxpodtion of what, upon an attentive examination, is conceived to be truth, there would be an impediment to inquiry, which would only prevent the di&ufion of error^ at the expence of facrificing truth. If then a fair and liberal inveftigation may, notwithftandihg the poffibility or even probability of an error, be attended with ad« ^rantage, as it excites inquiry, it cannot be reafonable to objed to an inquiry as prefumptuous, when the refult of it, for anything that the objeAion neceffarily fuppofes to be contrary, may be judicious andcorre£i, however oppoGte to the conclufions of authority. If the reafonings of the mod humble mechanic fliould, upon examina* tion, be admitted to be accurate, they would not be reje£led by the philofopher, though placed in oppofitioii to the opinions of a Newton* The oppofition would be a ftrong prefumptive evidence ^f their error, but when that prefumption yielded to the force of fuperiof evidence, no veneration of an illuftrious nathe would juftify rejecting the conclufions eilablifhed upon the admitted bafis of reafon and truth. According to the fentiment of Bcyle^ while authority is a long bow, the effed of which depends upon the (Irength of the arm which draws it, reafon like the crofs-bow, has equal efficacy in the hands of the dwarf, and of the giant. With refpe£l to the cSkOt which prior adjudications ought to be allowed in praAice, the bed ftaiidard to appeal to is the rule of public utility, which is the fource and ought to be the mcafure of ailent to their authority. If the precedent upon any given fubjcft, coincides with what is admitted as the principle, there is no room for difputation, becaufe the tonclufion, to which ever ground it is referred, is manifcftly the fame* If the oppoiite analogies, in fup- port of conflifting opinions, are, as it often happens, fo nearly equal, that the judgment, upon an adequate view of the grounds upon which the decifion is to be framed, may fairly heGtate be- tween the two^ and the decifion is^ in its general confequences, 5 mfrmi. Kiimb.XVin.3 OfMijIaketofLaw. jjj: M priorii immaterial» the advantage of certainty m adhering to a ludicial deteiminationy once pronounced and a£ted upon, is much too obvious to require proof or illuftration* Even when the fubjcfti upon anretrofpeftive view, appears to have been fuch as would not only have admitted of a reafonable difference of opinion^ but have called for a different conclufion upon a full examination of its principles, fo that what is prefented as authority is admitted to have been founded upon error ; it may be frequently beneficial to adhere to fuch conclufion, and nothing is of more ordinary occurrence : but how far the propriety of fuch adherence extends^ if the main queftion under confideration ; the propofition aflumes the decifion to be erroneous ^ the ground of adhering to it is the beneficial confequence of doing (o ; the queftion then how far the adherence is proper and requifite, becomes identified with diat of its being beneficial or otherwife^ confidered with relation to all its confequences and effedls. This diftin£kion is adverted to by Lord Mansfield^ in a paffiige in the cafe of Roblnfon and Bland, which I have upon other occafions appealed to, and which I confiderasl marked with peculiar excellence and utility. His obfervation, is, that, «« Where an error has been eftabliihed and taken root, upon which any rule of property depends, it ought to be adhered to by the judges till the legiflature think proper , to alter it, left the new determination fiiould have a rctrofpe£t, and (hake many queftions already fettled : but the reforming erroneous points of praftice can have no fach bad confequences, and therefore they may be altered at pleafure, when found to be abfurd or inconvenient." May not the latter part of this obfervation, which is in 4ts ex* prefBons confined to the particular cafe of erroneous praflice, with propriety be generalized and applied to every other fubje£t whicb falls within the fcope of the fame reafoning, viz. that to reftify the error will not be attended with any bad confequences ? The abftradl preference of truth is a pobit which does not require to be eftabliflied by argument; the particular confli£t is between error fupported by precedent, and truth in oppofition to it ; and furcly it appears to be carrying the fandion to error fufficiently far, when it is allowed to be co-extenfive with the utility refulting from it. Perhaps in fome cafes k may be difficult to fix the criterion to which I am propofing to refer ; and when it become^ doubtful whether the adherence to, or the deviation from, an erroneous authority will, in its general confequences, be attended Vith greater benefit and utility, the grand queftion may arife on which fide the preference ought to be given. I do not con- •ehrc that the occafions for applying the rule which may be adopted^ 1 384 APPENDIX. tNumB-XVH!. adopted, in anfwer to that qucftion, would be very numerous j and, without enlarging my obfcrvation, which probably will be already regarded as too difFufc, I am willing, for the purpofe of the difcuflion, to admit, that where an erroneous- ^ropofition ii cftabllflicd by authority, and it Is doubtful whether die pfej»dicc, from fubverting the authority, may not exceed the advantage of correfting the error, the precedent fhould be allowed to have the turn of the fcalc in its favour. But, limiting my admiffion to die terms in which it is exprcffcd, I conceive that the poflibility or prol^ability, that in fomc cafes, not particularly adverted to^ or de- fined, it may be difficult to form an adequate opinion as to the fuperior advantage of retaining the error or of correSing it, is not, according to any principles of fair reafoning, to influence the decifion of other cafes, in which no fuch circumilance exifts, and in which the beneficial confequeuces of deciding according to the original reafon of tlie fubjedl, would confefiedly preponde- rate. And if there are gny cafes to which the propriety of a return from precedent to principle mod diftin£lly and emphatically ap- plies, it is thofe in which the point in conteft has reference to the grand and fundamental principles of juftice and integrity, and which are not included in any eftablifhed and connefted. fyftem of poGtive law ; in which no extenfive range of property, or order of judicial or commercial proceedings is aiFeAed or involved, in which the only mifchievous confequence of corre£ling an errone- ous precedent will be the fubje£ling \o the cofts of an a£lion, a perfon who may have the inclination to acquire to himfelf an adventitious benefit arifing from the detriment of another, where the one was without merit to entitle him to the advantage, the other without offence to fubjeft him to the injury. I here uic the term erroneous precedent^ not as afiuming to decide that the particular precedent under examination is of that quality, but as fupporting the argument that, if, upon confideration, it appears to be fo, there is no predominant re^ifon of public utility to militate agaiuft the corrcflion of it. It was long a prevailing opinion, (than which certainly none could be more abfurd,} that the a£t dire£ling (heriiFs to take bail bonds was a private ftatute, and many cafes proceeded upon that opinion j but the cafe of Ali/Is v. BoficI, i Sir, 399. was decided upon the correft and oppofite principle. The queilion after wardi coming before the Court of King's Bench, in Samuel v. Evans, 2 r. R. 569. Mr. Juftice Aphurji fiiid, that " If all the cafes on this fubjedi were on one fide, however apparently contrary to reafon they might be^ the Court would be bound by them \ but if there arc Uumb. XVIII.] Of Mi/lakes o/Lmv. 385 are jnreral cafes which are not reconcileable to reafon on one fide» and one fenGblc cafe to the contrary, we ought to decide accord- ing to the latter* Now, there can be no doubt on the reafon of . the thing, but that this Is 'a general law \ and, the cafe in Strange corroborating the opinion that it is fo, we might determine it to be fuch, independent of the authority of another ad, which unquef* tionably makes it a general law.'' — I have always regarded this fentimeiit as flopping fliort of the true principle, by which the eieition of judicial authority ought to be regulated : and if a court pofiefles the authority of corret^ing an eftabliihed do£lrine, fup* ported by feveral cafes which are not reconcileable to reafon, be* caufe there is one fenfible precedent to the contrary, I cannot fee any material obftacle to their fetting the example of that fenfible precedent themfelves. The authority of the court is the fame to- day as yefterday ; in the 44th of Geo^ 3. as in the 6th of Geo. x. % and it is very difficult to underftand the logic, by which it would be wrong for a court to correA an erroneous opinion to-day $ but if themfclves, or any other court of concurrent authority, had been guilty of that wrong to^ay, it would become right to follow the example to-morrow. Would it not place the adminiftration of juftice upon a more refpefkable bafis, if it were to be held that reafon and juftice (hould be regarded as its firft, and precedent as only its fecondary, principle, than to reverfe the difpofition and to facrifice the former at the (brine of the latter ? Admitting moft willingly the beneficial efiedis of precedents, in fixing and afcer* taining principles, aflenting to the impropriety of lightly renewing difcuf&ons upon topics, with refpedi to which reafon may fairly hcfitate in its decifion and certainty of determination is more beneficial than a particular conclufion on either fide \ objefling to the fubverfion of confefledly erroneous opinions, when they have fo incorporated themfelves with the juridical fyftem, as not to ad* mit of feparation without inducing injurious confequences ; the only propoGtion which I endeavour to eftablifli, or rather to en-* force is, that the acknowledged conclufions of reafon and juftice (hall be admitted to prevail over the accidental fan^lion of error by precedent, when no important reafon of public utility requires an oppofite determination. I am fully aware that in this, as in o^er inftances already ad- verted to, I may appear to have been unneceflarily occupied, in fiipporting by a length of argument a felf-evident propofition, which nobody would offer to difpute. I muft again advert to my former apology, that the obje£Uon, however fpeculatively true, is often pra^Ucally faUei and that the commodious attribute of Pirecedents in iaving the trouble of an analytical inveft^ttdon of ' Vol. H. D 4 principles 386 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVUl principles has given them pre-eminence far beyond any title, to which they can afpire upon reafons of general utility. I may perhaps have alfo incurred the imputation of extending this general diflcrtation far beyond the limits which the fubje^ that has given rife to it could have required ^ without entering into the difcuflion of that charge, I am willing to admit, that the diflertation, although immediately occafioned by a particular topic, was intended to embrace a general fubje&, a fubjedi which I con^ fider in itfelf as of high importance; the proper fource of legal argument) the freedom of difcuflion allowable to advocates and profeflional writers, the utility of recurring to the great principles of natural judice, and the influence which ought to be allowed to the cxiflence» or to the want of particular precedents yrith regard to queftions in their nature referrible to and dependent on thofe principles. I have alfo defigned to avail myfelf of the opportunity of defending, with fome patticularity, the courfe of examination which I have adopted in different inquiries already before the public, and in others which a prefent want of encouragement and attention, however mortifying, may perhaps not intimidate me from fubmitting to their judgment, provided I may indulge the idea, that my endeavours hitherto have not been juftly marked by a fentimcnt of difapprobation. Craving indulgence for this egotifm, I proceed to a fliort de- fence of the obfervations firil alluded to, as included in a former publication, and fmce that period contradicted by judicial autho- rity, t In refpe£i to the queftion, whether money paid merely from a miftaken idea of legal obligation, unconnefted with the cxiftcncc of any moral duty, is fubjedt to repetition, I in the firfl place in- ferted the obfervations of Vinnius in fupport of the aflirmative pro- pofition, (which will be fubjoined in the prefent number,) concluding with the principle deduced from the pureft fources of natural juftice, that tyielius eft favcre repetitiotn quam advent itio lucro^ and coinciding in their general effeft with the argument of D* Aguefjeau^ of which in the follounng (hcets I have attempted a tranflation. Having then mentioned the opinion of Pothier^ wlilch is exprefled in very few and general terms to the contrary, and is wholly founded upon the authority of two laws, the tStOi of which is fully examined by Viunius and d^AgueJfeau {a) : I proceeded to obferve, that it was lingular that a queftion open to io much («) to Cod. de Jur. et Fa^. Tgnor. Cam quit, jui ignorioi, indebluio pecantaai IbWerit, cefTitrepetitiu ; per ignorantiam enim fa£ii Untumi indebiti foluti repetitionem competere cibi nntom eft. Ln9. ff, d,(a Jgooraatiam Ma ooo jurii ptodciTe, ncc ftuhlt folere (ttcciun, led wnaUbiUt difcufEoBi m K\unb. XVin.] Of Miftakes of Law. 387 9 difculBon, had pafled with veiy little attention in the cafes affe£hed by it in the Englijb courts^ that the opinion of Vin-' musy appeared to be beft founded, as it arofe from the application of the rules of natural juftice, upon which this right of adion radier depends, than upon any pofitive rules or artificial reafoning ; to which I added that I conceived (as it may now be thought enroneoufly) that it might bepofitively fiatedj that the opinion waa adopted in the Englifb law, and in fupport of this opinion referred to the cafes of Ancber v. The Bank of England ^ Doug, 638. Bize v. Dixon^ kT. R. 285, and to the opinion given by Lord Kenyan at ^j^ PriuSf and which has been contradided in the cafe that haa Cnce occurred. The two former authorities were not adverted to ill the cafe lad mentioned, and upon a very frequent and (as far as lies in my power) an unprejudiced confideration of thofe cafes, it ftill appears to me impoffible to reconcile the determinations which they import, and the principle which, though not exprefled^ they neceflarily involve, with a negative anfwer to the queftion at prefent under confideration. In the firft cafe, the payee of a bill of exchange reftrained its negotiability by anindorfement,dire£iing the drawees to place it to a particular account. Afterwards it was negotiated with a forged indorfement, of the name of the perfon to whofe credit it was to be placed, and a third perfon having paid the money for the honour of the payee, to the Bank of England^ the payee was allowed to recover the amount. As to the obferva- tions ariling from that cafe, I think, ift. That it is impoilible for znj diftin£iion to be made between a payment by the drawer himfelf, and by another perfon for his honour, and in fa£l no fuch dif- tindion was taken or adverted to in the cafe. If the drawer was not himfelf liable to the payment of the bill, he was not liable to indemnify any other perfon who, knowing the circumftances, had paid it on his account ; but if he did think proper to adopt the a£b as his own, he was certainly at liberty fo to do^ but then, if he adopted it at all, he muft adopt it throughout, and the retrofpeAive approbation, which is equivalent to an agency, muft have the fame tStO, as a proper agency arifing from a preceding authority i and, with refpetfi to that, it is an undifputed propofition that the z6t of an agent, within the limits of his authority, muft be in all re- fpe£ls confidered as the ad of the principal, ad. It is impoffible to fuppofe that in this cafe there was any ignorance of fad ; the. only fa£t upon which the qiieftion of liability depended, was the indorfement adually appearing on the bill : it is not ftated, nor is it to be fuppofed that that indorfement was not read by the |>erfoa who made the payment, and even if it had not, the negled; would have been too grofs to have been the foundation of any right Ddz of 38« APPENDIX. [Numb. XVIDL of adion. 2^, No circumftancis of fraud, opprc{Ik>n> undue in* fiuence, or any other of the grounds upon which the a&ion for money had and received is founded, are alluded to as having ex- ifted, or, from the nature of the thing, were likely to have exifted, to as to have formed an ingredient in the decifion of the cafe« 4th, There was a difference of opinion in the court as to the e£feA of the indorfcment, it being held by Mr. Juftice Bul/er, contrary to the opinion of ^rd Mansfield^ and Wtlles% and AJbhurfly J. that it was not reftridive ; and upon the legal queftion, whether it Mra« fo or not ? the whole difcuflion turned. After the judges had given their opinions^ Lord Mansfield faid, ** The whole turns on tlic quedion whether the bill continued negotiable ? as the cafe ft^ds at prefcnt let the nonfuit be fet afide, and we will confider without its following as a confequence, that the ignorance of one man under no moral obligation, and intending no gratuitous dona^ tion, (hall be to another a title of adventitious acquifition. It fnay be ftated as a general principle^; that money paid witI)oot adequate caufe is fubje£i to repetition, and when the only caufe of payment is a miftake of law, the adequacy or inadequacy of fuch caufe is the important point to which this whole difcuffion is tp be referred ; and if no other caufe of payment appears, and it is eftabliflied that money paid under a miftake, whether of law or of faA, may (except under fpecial circumftances) be reclaimed, and It is doubtful whether fuch miftake did or did not exift, there can be no injuftice in adopting the propoiition of JPotiUr, that when it is uncertain whether a man has paid what was not due from him knowingly or erroneoufly, it ought to be prefumed that the pay- fnent was made erroneoufly, and that he fliould be allowed to re« claim it according to the general principle that in re obfcura melwf f/ffowre repetitioniy quq/i adventitio lucrot^ and alfo according to th« Other general principle already adverted to, as founded upon thii principles of natural reafoning, that nemo prefumkur donare. The cafe of Lowry v. Bourdieu was minutely oblierved upoiH in Numb. X Vin.] Of Miftakes of Law. 393 in tb« Effay on the a£lion for money had and receivedj it appear- ing to the writer Uiat the decifion was correfily rights but that the difcuffion of it by the different judges did not entirely pro- ceed upon fixpilar principles. The faAs of the cafe are^ that the plaintiff made an infurance upon an Eqft lAdia voyage^not having a iixeCt interef^ in the (hip, but being a creditor of the captain by bund, and the bond being dated as the fubje£l of the infurance. After the voyage had been performed, and all rifque (fuppofing the policy valid) was at an end, he brought hi^ a£lion for re^ Cum of the premium| infifting, that as he would not have been en« lided to recover in cafe of a lofs, it had been paid without con- fideradon i and it was held by a msyority of the judges, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Judice Willf^^ that the aAion could qot be maintained ; the pofition which I endeavoured to eftabliih was^ that where money had been paid upon a void contingent contraftj not attended with criminality, and the one party availed himfelf of the illegality of th^ contract, to avoid the performance of his own part of it, the other was entitled to a return of the money which was psud; and that this cafe did not fumifh any exception tP that principle. The more particular examination of that point would be here irrelevant. Upon the quedion how far the cafe afiefis the rule now under difcufCon ? I would in the fird place examine how far the point involved in the determination, without adverting to any of the obfervations which accompanied it, is or is not applicable. The prefent quedionis, whether a fum of money paid merely in confequence of a midaken idea, that it could have been legally exaAed, is or is not fubje£l to repetition ? The quef- tion in Lowry v. Bourdieu related to a fum of money paid as the confideration of a profpeAive contingent engagement, and reclaim- ed on account of the ipfufSciency of the original engagement^ at a time when it was clear that the advantage dipulated for could not have been obtained, however legal or obligatory the/ engage- ment might have been ; tlie contingency upon which the advan- tage was to arife, having become impoflible. It is obvious that the two quedions are perfeAly didin£l, and I conceive it may be judly afferted that a decifion againd the right of repetition in the (attet, concludes nothing as |o the former. Nothing could be more clear, than that after the rifque had been run, there was no ground for a repetition of the money in point of honour and con- fcience,and if not, the principle is admitted on all hands that there could be no fuch right in point of law. If then the cafe of Lowry V. Bourdieu concludes nothing upon the fubje& by its mere deter- miqation, as the decifion of law upon the particular fa&s^ it re- mains to fee whether the obfervations relied upon in fupport of it can \ 394 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVHr. can have any greater effcGti The opinion of Lord Mansfield was that as the contrafl was upon a gaming policy, and againft an ad of parliament, the trourt would not interfere to aflift either party, according to the rule that in fart deliBo potior eft conditio defendentis. It is plain that this ground has nothing to do with the payment of money, under the miftaken idea of a previous legal obligation. The opinion of Mr. Jufticc Willes was, that the plaintiff fliould recover, for that it would be very hard' that a party fhould lofe, when he had paid under a mere miftake. — ^I conceive that this opinion, as applied to the particular cafe, and inafmuch as it did not embrace the confideration of the point how far the plaintiff in honour and juftice was entitled to a return, did not fully meet the cafe, but it certainly contains nothing to militate againft a general right of repetition. Mr. Juftice Afiburjl w?s againft the right of return, but his only obfcrvation was, that the contraft was a gam- ing policy, not adverting to the fa&, that that very circumftancc was the whole foundation bf the plaintiff's claim. ^Fhe opinion ©f Mr. Juftice Bullery which muft be ftated at length, is as fal- lows : ** It is very clear to me that the plaintiff ought not to re- cover. There was no fraud on the part of the underwriters, nor any miftake in matter of fa6i. If the law was miftaken, the rule applies, that ignoraniia juris non excufat. This was a mere gaming policy without intereft. There is a found diftin£lion between con- trails executed and executory ; and if an a^ion be brought with a view to refcind a contraA, you muft do it while the contra£l con- tinues executory, and then it can only be done on the terms of reftor- ing the other party to his original fituation. There was a cafe of Walker v. Chapman^ fome years ago in this court, where a fum of money had been paid, in order to procure a place in the cuftoms ; the place had not been procured, and the party who had paid the money having brought his a£iion to recover it back, it was held, that he fhould recover, becaufe the contra^ remained executory $ fo if the plaintiffs in the prefent cafe had brought their z€t\ox\ be- fore the rifk was over, and the voyage finiftied, they might have had a ground for their demand ; but they waited till the riik (fuch as it was, not indeed founded in law, but refting on the honour of the defendant) had been completely run. It makes no difference whether the premium was paid before the voyage or after it." The queftion is. Whether the obfervatlon, « that if the law was miftaken, the rule applies, that ignorantia juris non excufat^^ thus cafually and incidentally applied, is to decide the important and cxtenfive point at prefent under confideration ? The rule in its terms is fufficiently fatisfied, by holding that no man (hall, under the pretence of an ignorance of the law> excufe himfelf from the performanw Numb. IVin.] OfMiJiakes ofL,aw. 395 performance of his own obligations, or acquire an advantage, ov avoid a detriment, when he has omitted ufing the means ordained by law for thofe purpofes. Applied to the immediate fubjef): mat- ter, it has no reference to the point, of money paid under a miftaken idea of a preceding obligation. Applied generally and indifcri- minately, it is inconfiftent with the idea ezprefled. in very unequi- vocal terms in the fame opinion, that the money can be recovered back whilft the contrail remains executory and contingent ; for even in that cafe, the claim can only be money paid on a confidera^ion^ which could not have any legal tSt€t ; the opinion which admits the party to reclaim the money, whilft by the terms of the contra£l be may have a chance of benefit, but not afterwards; is totally op? pofite to the general ground, that he cannot in any cafe reclaim money paid under a miftake of law, and the feveral inftances in ^which it has been held that money paid upon fuch confiderations may be reclaimed, whilft the event is contingent, or when the event has been unfavourable to the receiver, and he has taken ad^- vantage of the invalidity of his promife, are inconfiftent with the pofition fuppofed to be involved in the cafe of Lowry v. Btmrdieu^ that money paid under a miftake of law can in no cafe be reclaim- ed. If then the propofition is not univerfally true, I conceive it may be fairly argued that there is nothing in the cafe adverted to fufficient to counterbalance what may appear, upon due confidera- tion, to be the true conclufion with refped to the fubje£t of the prefent inquiry; and if ths queftion previous to the laft'decifion iwas open to argument, it will remain to confider how far, fince that decifion, the difculfion of it is precluded by abfolute audio- rity. Upon this fubjeA I (hall not add any further obfervations of my own. It will be recoUedied that the argument only refers to the general propofition, and not to its application, or to die ex- ceptions which may be admitted in particular cafes. Unlefs the fubjedi is fo concluded by authority as to be no longer open to argument, I conceive that no ftronger argument can be neceflary in indicaung the true conclufion, than the opinion oi U Aguejfeau^ that one man cannot profit by the error of another, whether of law or fa£k, without abfolutely contradi£%ing a feries of propoC- tions, every one of which is a firft principle of natural juftice. If, upon the refult of a fair inquiry, it ihould appear that money paid under a mere miftakeu idea of legal obligation^ without any purpofc 296 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVinL purpofe of gratuitous donation or liberalitji and for die payoKot €>f which there was no moral duty, is fubje^ to repetition, it feems to follow, as a ncceflary confequence, that a promife of payment founded merely upon fuch miftake cannot be obligatory : for thcie certainly are many cafes in which an a£t, voluntarily done, wiB continue valid, notwithftanding a naked promtfe to do fudi a£l could not have been enforced, as is the cafe with regard to all ads of mere liberality ; but it would be abfolutely contradifiory, that a pron^ife to do an ad (hould be legally enforced, while the a£k it- felf, if done without fuch promife, would be liable to be idfciiidedk But admitting it to be eftabliflved, that the ad:, if done, muft be fuiFcred to remain ; admitting that a man who has contrive^ to get' a cafual advantage by the lofs and ruin of another,i$iiot lOrbe diiturhed in the enjoyment of it, it does not follow as a confer quenoe that ^ promife to confer fuch advantage without any f flequatc caufe can be enforced confidently with the corred prio* ciples of legal reafoning ; the particular queftion, whether an in- dorfer of a bill of cxcliange, making a promift to pay with a know- ledge of circumftances by which he is legally difcharged,bttt wtthont knowing the legal confequences, is bound by fuch promife, is an ixk* ftance of this defcription ; 4nd the true decifion of the pavtio^ queftion, depends upon the mie expo&tion of the general principle. I (hall not here enter into difcuflion, how this ignorance of the le^^ confequences is to be proved ; but will take it as an afcertainedi fad, obferving by the way, that if ^' evidence upon that fubjed i^ indifierent, it is rather to be prefumed that a man did not withpijt any motive intend to renew an obligation^ from which he was le^ gaily difcharged, than that he did } and (hat even fuppofing his knowledge of the law ta be admitted, and fuppofing that he io* tended to enter into a new obligation^ (the ^e being unaocooiii panied by any circumftances amounting to a new confideration,} it would be very difficult to reconcile a lisdiility founded on fuch a promife, with the ordinary principles of the law, upon the topics to which I ihall advert in the difcuflion of the queftion to whidi I confine myfelfi and which aflumes the ignorance of the law to be an undiluted, fad, and the fuppofition of an eufting legal obligation to be the only caufe and foundation of the pnK mife. I will alfo. remove Qut of the difcuflion all confiderations^ founded upon th^ mode or circumftances of the promife. I will not rely upon the kind of evidence by which acknowledgmentSs or promifes are frequently obtained or proved^ by the tricks of a^ artful perfon knowing the defe^ inteaded to \fQ i^emedied, and OWtrivin^ Komb. XVniO Of Mi/laies of Law. 39^ contmuig to furprize from the ignorance of another a corredion of ity by taking advantage of indefinite expreffions extorted by tpnor or furprizei or not unfrequently fabricated by perjury. All thefe are accidental circumftances, but circumftances of very fre« quent occurrence, againft which the legiflattire has in particular inftances placed a guard by the ftatute of frauds ; they are circuni« ftaoces to which the fubje among the fureft touchdones of legal refponGbilityk In the ac» tion of indebitatus affum^tt^ the confideration is ufually every things and the adiual promife nothing. In the cafe of bills and notes» the promife is only inferted in the declaration, for the conveni* ence of adding the ordinary money counts ^ the bafis of the a&ton is the liability upon the original contra£l ; but here the hypQthefis fuppofes that liability not to exid \ and it is impoffi- ble to lieny that an appfehenfion of liability, and an a dual liability are perfe£lly difti&£k not only in form but in principle ; if then the promife and Aot the liability is the ground of adion, it mud either be adtnitted that the confideration dated of an a£tual liabiUty is falfiej and that the ground is therefore mfufficient, or» £ e a adly. 404 APPENDIX. CNumb.Xm adiy, the pfopofition above aflumcd as true, and which it will be diflkult to contefti viz. that no adlion can be maintained on a promife» unlefs it is founded on an adequate confideration, nor un- Icfs fuch confidcration is alleged, and the allegation fupported by proof, muft be rcjeaed as falfe ; or clfe 3dly, a fimiiar falfehood inuft be imputed to the propofition lad mentioned, viz. that an apprehenfion of liability, and an aftual liability ate pcrfcaiy dif- t\n6t. And if this part of the argument is objeded to, as founded upon rcafoning which is technical and artificial, let it be remembered, that I do not reft the opinion whith I am endeavour- ing to fupport merely upon that mode of rcafoning, but that I have prcvioufly deduced my ubfcrvations from fources of a diflPcrent nature j that my prefent objeft is to manifcft the fame conclufion, as equally refulting from the mod extcnfive principles of gene- ral juilice, and from the ftri£left rules of technical pra£lice. To the preceding arguments, I would .add a (hort reference to feme cafes in \%'hich the invalidity of a promife has been judicially held, to refult from the inadequacy of the confideration. In Xartfi V. Htfgkesy before the Houfe of Lords, cited 7 T. R. 350., the fubftance of the declaration was, that the plaintilT being in- debted as adminiftrator promifed to pay perfonally, and it was hoklen that there was no fufficient confidcration to-^upport this demand, againft the adminiftrator in his perfonal capacity, for he derived no advantage or convenience from the promife. In the cafe of Milchlfin v. Hawfofiy (to which the preceding is a note,) it was dated that the Iiufband was indebted for work done for his wife before her marriage, and in confidcration thereof, promifed to pay. The hulband was only liable jointly with his wife ; and by her death would be difcharged ; and fuch joint liability was held no confidcration for his fcparate promife. In Pear/on v. Henrjj 5 71 R. 6. an adminiftrator fubmittcdto arbitration ; the arbitra- tors found a fum due from the intcftate's eftate, but did not award pnyment ; the plaint! (T offered to prove, that when the defendant entered into the arbitration bond, he had eiprefslj undertaken to pay what might be found due ; the evidence was rejeAed ; and when the cafe was brought before the court, Mr. J. Buller faid, that fuch evidence would not avail the plaintiff in that aAion, for the a^^ion was brought againft the defendant as adminiftra* tor ) and if there were no afiets, the perfonal promife of the ad- miniftrator would be nudum paBum. Now in the two former c^ thefe cafes, there was an a£lual though fpecial liability to do the 'a£l promifed ; but fuch fpecial liability was no^ held to be any confidcration for a general promife j the laft one is only men- tinned as confirmatory of the fame doctrine \ but .if a fpecial fub* fiftinj Numb. IVIIL] OfMiftakes of Law. * 405 fifting liability is no eonfideration for a general promife, much lefd (hould a mere fuppofcd liabiiity, when all aAual liability had ceafed, be allowed to have a more extenfive operation. A valid conddera- tion mud in general confifttn £ome thing which is to the advantage to the defendant, or detriment of the plaintiff, but the defendant has no advantage of induce him to undertake the payment of a debt, from which he is legally difcharged, the detriment to the plaintifF which is requilite to form a valid confideration, is a detriment which he is indueed by tlie promife to undertake, and not one to which he himfelf is already fubje£i, and which he has no legal right to fliift upon another* And with refpe£i to the queftion of moral obligation, I have already propofcd the confideration of the queftipn, how far, when the law pronounces upon which of two .innocent parties a lofs is to fall, and there is no fpecial reafon to throw it pn the other, and a promife is made merely under a miftaken idea of legal obligation* any principle of moral duty preceded, accompanied or refulted from fuch promife, Co as to give it a legal validity and cfied, I have already difclaimed, re- lying upon the argument deduced from the beggarly evidence by which thefe promifes are fupported, and the artful contrivances by which they are obtained by cunning from ignorance ; I have argued the cafe as free from thefe objeAions \ but the tendency pi a difiereat conclufion on the legal queftion to produce fuch evidence, gud fugged fuch contrivances, may, in clofing this part of the fubje£k, l^e referred to as an additional reafon, for fupportiag what I have endeavoured to eftabliOi as the general principle, and for evincing its juftice and propriety. It may be faid th^ wgi" Jantibusnon dermUnt'tbus jura Jubvettiunt ; but this rule rather operates to evince the propriety pf deciding where the IoCIb ihaH originally fall, than to encourage the experiments of art upon ignorance,* in transferring it from one perfon to another, and, however rightly ihe law may encourage vigilance, the general ruie^ of juftioe m^ift be ever at variance, with the feizing at adventitious advan- tages by one man, in oppofition to the legal right of another, with the triumph of artifice and cunning over ignpraace and weaknefs. I have thus far endeavoured to forget, that any foreign fyft^m of jurifprudence may, with rcfpe£^ to the queftion in difcuffion, have a tendency to aflfift in tliQ illuftration of our own, but there appears to me to be fuch an analogy between the a&ion oiinitbU tatus ajfum^ty and xhe^paSittw pecunU confiitut^ of the Roman law, Uv^t I think there woul4 be more afFe<^ation in omitting to n^yiipe the accordance which occurs to the mind, than there can be of real pedantry in the introduction of it. It mufl be recolle£led, £ e 3 that 4K>« APPENDIX, [Kumb. Xm lliat fbe very term nudum paffumf as importing a promife invalid for waQt pf ^onfi« P. a. c. 6. C }. tQ Numb.XVniO O/MiJlakesofLaw. 407 to thofe who are dnpofcd to attend to the inyeftigatlon of legal principles. I am aware that fuch difcuflions are by no means a favourite branch of (ludyi and I do not indulge the idea that the prefent attempt will be admitted as an exception. To the charge of prefumptionin quedioning the conclufions of judicial authority, may be added that of afcribing a difproportionate impbrtance to the queftions examined. I certainly feel a different impreflion upon that fubjeft, and hope that the importance of the queftions themfelves^ confidered with relation to their confequences and cfie^is, has.atleafthad fome co-operation with the wilh to fupport former opinions^ not hazarded upon the impreflion of the moment, but founded upon deliberate though perhaps erroneous confidera- tion. In thus endeavouring to promote a familiarity with other laws, I am fure that I fhall not, defervedly at Icaft, incur the imputation of indifference to our own, but in this difcuinou as in all others, I am defirous of witnefTing fuch a uniformity between different fyflems of jurifprudence, as refuhs from corre£k and proper ap<* plication of the general principle^ of natural reaibn, and univerfal jttftice* Ee4 DISSERTATION ON MISTAKES OF LAW. By M. D'AGUESSEAU. I. EVERY man may be contemplated with relation cither to the public order of fociety, or to the particular engagements which he contrails with other men ; from this twofold idea, refults the dif^ tin£lion which the Roman jurifts feem to have eftabliflied between the public (late and the private. II. In the (irft of thefe afpe£ls, a man is committed with the^ law itfeif ; it is with the law alone that he contrafls, that he engageSi that he binds himfelf, with refpeft to every thing which regards the general police, and the exterior order of fociety j it is to the law alone tliat he is accountable for his infradion$ of it. III. In the fecond afpe£V, on the contrary, a man has only to regard the pcrfon with whom he contrads •, the law does not punifli an ignorance which relates only to a matter of private right; although it eftabliflies this right in the fame itianner as the public law \ it only regulates it with reference to the interefl of indivi<« duals, and the lofs of the rights which might* have belonged to them is the only penalty which the law attaches to thofe who, by their imprudence, have merely infringed {bhjfe) the maxims of pri-* vate order. IV. As the public order regards the public utility dire£)ly, while the order of private right only regards it indircflly, the firft ought always to be confidered as more important and inviolable than the laft. V. As public law only regulates the mod exterior adions of men, it is more cafily to be conceived and obferved than priv/ite. Of Numb. XVm.] Qf Myites ^ Law. 40^ Of the fifty books of which the digeft is compofed, there are more than forty entirely devoted to the explication of the rules of prirate right \ and there is almoft the fame proportion in the code of jfu/linian, VI. From all thcfc differences we may deduce this general coa- fequence, that although ignorance of legal obligation is always reprehenfible^ it is however much more criminal, when it violate^ the maxims of public order, than when it merely affedis fome rule of private right. I ft, Bccaufe the law is always in the right, and as in matters of public order, a man only treats with the law, there can never be that compenfation of mutual faults, which often ferves as an cx- cufe to thofe who treat with other men upon any thing which re- lates to private order (n). 2d, Becaufe the perfon who by miftake contravenes a pri- vate law, does no injury to any one but himfclf j while he who through ignorance violates a public law, or rather a law of public order, attacks as much as in him lies the whole ftate of civil fociety, and direftly oflfends againft the general utility of the community. 3d, Becaufe the public law (by which I mean that which ought to be praftifed by all the citizens) being much more fimple, the perfon who is ignorant of it is much more inexcufable. VII. Then by a neceffary confequence of this principle, igno- rance of public order ought always to be puniflied, although the quality of the pcrfons, the nature of the laws, and the variety of circumftances may very much increafc, or diminifli the degree of ptinifliment. VIII- Then, that which is loft by an ignorance of the public law, is loft without refource, fince this ignorance, fo far from ferv- ing as an excufe, ftands in need of one itfelf* IX. Much lefs then can an ignorance of public order be a fuf- ficient reafon for recovering an advantage, which a party has failed to acquire \ for how can that ever be the objeA of re- compence which may be deemed fortunate in efcaping punifh- mcnt ? But as thefe rigid maxims cannot always be obferved with regard to private right, it is neceffary to premife fome general notions, which may ferve to difcovcr the real principles that are applicable to this fubjeA. (#) This rcafoA osft ^ ickoowlrdgei to be rttbct fascifiil iban folid. I. It 4to APPENDIX. pjumb^XVItt I. It is naturallj juft that one man Aiall not be enridied by the detriment and injury of another (a), II. That which is ours cannot j without our own aAjbetnns* ferred to another (i). But confent or even negled is here underftood by the name of «n a£l. Fi. yac* Goibof* adbancce reguhm. III. There is no obligation without a caufe }— a confequence of the preceding principle. The principles of equity and juflice give a right to reclaim what belong to one perfon and is without any caufcj in the pot feflion of another (r). IV. That which is null in itfelf produces no efied ; theoi if there is no obligation in the beginningt becaufe the promife is made without a caufe, the obligation before payment may be refcioded| after payment the thing paid may be reclaim- ed {i). Hence arife the a£tions cimdiffio indebtti^ condiSio Jine ciu^a^ con^ iiBio caufa data^ caufa mnfecutflr^Tj^di condiHio eh tur^m vel injujiam caufam* Tot. Tti.ff. (9* Cod. V. It is the fame whether there is no caufe, or an unjuft caufe (/] at firft, or whether the caufe for which the obligation was con? tra£ied has failed. Whether the promife was from the beginning without any eaufe; or whether there was a caufe which ceafed, or failed, there is a right of repetition. (/) L. i. ^ %. ff^ de Cond. Jim Caufa. It it evident that whatever has been received by any perfon without a juft caufe, or for a caufe which is no longer juft (^), may be 'reclaimed. If a payment be made by error on account of any of thofe (tf ) Jure natiir« sqaum eft, neminein cum alierias detrimento «t injuria fieri locvple* dofCBi. L. fto6* ff« de R. J. L. 14. AT. de Cond. Indeb. {h) ]d quod fioftram t&t fine aoftro hSia ad alcauin transfeiri noa poteft. L, 11.. ff. de R. J. {t) HjN eondidioez bono et arquo introduda, quod alterioi apud alttfrnm iioe caofa ^eprehciiditiir, reWMare confuevit. L. 66. ff* de Cond. Indcb. {i) St ab initio non coofiftic obligado quia fine caufa prooiifTani eft, ante folatiODein ipfa obHsado, poft folutioneis quaotitas foluta condicttttr. L. i. ff. de Coodic. fiae cattfa. (f) Tbit doai not mean an illegal coatraA* lor 10 refpcA to that it 11 an cftaUiAcd priaciple that both partiea being in equal turpitude there it 00 repetitioa. (/) Siie ab initio fine cauil promjffom eft» t^t fuit cauia promittoidi, qo« finiu •fi, Kd fecota ood eft^ dicefidum eft condiAioni iMum efie. (|) Cooftat id demoaB condici poffe alicuf^ quod vel non cx jnfii caofl ad cum per- vtait, vcliedit ad non juftam flnfiin. Di€k< Leg. $ 3. ibid* CSlttfeSi Komb^ZVIIL] €fMiJlahsrfLmo. 411 cattfes, which are of no avail or ttkSi in law, there U a right o( Tepeotipii (eU«ving himfelf to be the owner, and not knowing the right of the perfon really en- titled. But if be has a knowledge of the fads upon which thit title is founded, it is decided by this text that an ignorance of the legal right refulting from them is of no avail. {J) Nonquam in ufacaptiooibvs juris error pofleflbri prodeft^ et ideo Proculus alt, & per errorem initio venditionu tutor pupillo audor fad us fit ; vel poft loogum tempus fcodirlonis peraAum, ufucap! non pofle : quia juris error eft. (r) Si a pupillo emero fine tutqrir auAoritate, qoem poberem eflie putem ; dicimua ofucaptionem fequi, at hie plus fit in re quam in eziftimailoQe. Quod ^ fciaa pupillom cflcy putca umcn popillis liccre ici fMt 4m toMru audoritaw •dminiftrare, noo capic» iifu quia juris error aaUi prodeft. punifhes 4U A I» ? E N P 1 X. [Ilumb. tm, puniflies hj the lofs of the propertf, that was the fubjefk and occafion of it. But the firft cannot be maintained, and bow is it poffible to prove the fecond ? Even fuppofing that a perfon who miftook the law deferved to lofe his property, how could that prove that the other deferved to gain it ? And that for this Gngle reafon, that the perfon who erred wag no^ acquainted with his right. In a word, who will maintain that for this error, the one deferved to be ftripped of the property which belonged to him, the other to be invefted with that which did not ? This is not all ; it nuift be further maintained, that an obligation without any caufe, or founded upon a caufe which was falfc, un- juft, and illegitimate, could be valid} that that which is null could produce tSc&$f that the law could not eftabliih that favour* able remedy, to which it gives the name of conditio Jtne caufa^ or condUiio imlebiiif and that thus converting all obligations without caufe into forced donations, it regarded. all thofe who contrafied from error in point of law as real donors. To avoid all thefe inconveniences, notliing is more fimple than to give the rule of law all the extent of which it is capable. Emr juris inc$mpinJiu non prodefi \ then it is of no advantage to cither -p^xtj^nequere^nequijlipulatori prodefty to the one, becaufe it is not. juft that his fault (hould be of any fervice to him, and that (le ihould derive an advantage from his own error \ to the other, be- caufe there is not a fingle law in the whole fyftem of jurifprudence, which eftabliflies that an error of another ihall of itfelf, and with- out &ny other caufe, be a legitimate title and a juft means of acquifition.- All thefe principles being allowed, it appears eafy to decide what are the confequences which ought to refult from an error of law. For I ft. The queftion relates either to acquiring, or tolofing. If it relates to acquiring, an error of law is neither an excufe, nor a title, except to minors and others, who are aflifted even in refpedl to gain, ntfi mimribus aliifque quibus etiam in lucro fuccurritur* L» J. j 6, isf/eq. de Minor. And in this principally confifts the difference, between cnor of law and error of fa£k. In erpor of faft, (fays Cujas ad L, 8. f de jur. 1st faEl, ignor,) there is not any diftin£tion between gain and lofs, in error of law there is {a). See L* 1.4. 8.^* dejur. IsffaBf ignor. When the queftion relates to keeping, or to avoiding the lofs of («) In euoffc (kOX aoA diftioganatw 4«iuul « compeodjii ; ia cnwrjwit iiftift* what Numb. XVin.3 Of Mijiakes rfLaw. 415 what we already haye, the difcordant opinions of the interpreters can fcarcely or not even fcarcely be reconciled {a) \ and leaft you fliottld accufe^the modem interpreters alone, you may confult the Bafilican interpreters, among whom there is a very great dif- feniion upon this fubjed. For they expound the words in Z.. 7. jf, dejur. 1st fa^i Igmr- antia^ that an ignorance of law does not injure thofe who are feeking their own (i), as follows : For inftance, a perfon ftipulates for a flave to be given to him of the value of twenty guineas ; the flave being dead before any delay, the promifer fuppoGng himfelf to be ftill bound by the (tipulation, pays the twenty guineas. The law ^aiGfts him, be- caufe his claim is founded upon the lofs of the money, and he is entitled to repetition. The error is manifeftly an error of law. The promifer is igno- rant of that trite and common' rule \ that the debtor of a fpeciiic thing is liberated by its happening to periih if he is not guilty of any delay in the delivery. But becaufe the queftion relates to avoiding a lofs, the error of law does not prejudice him ; nay even though the money was aAually paid, it may be reclaimed, which is particularly worthy of obfervation, as we fliall obferve in the fequel. But 'in the following article, the Bqfdican interpreters feem to have taken up quite the oppofite opinion \ for they fubjoin thefe words, except thofe who pay what is not due from an ignorance of /Ar lavf% as in X.. i. C&d. p, iZ. AnatoHus fays, a perfon who pays money which is not due through ignorance of the law, has not a right of repetition, but if he pays it through an ignorance of fa£t he has (r). ^0 temam vultus mutantem Protea nodo. But who (hall wonder at fo great a difcord amongft the interpreters of the laws ? For the laws themfelves appear to be difcordant with each other. For Dioclejsan and Maximian (late in the law. Cum quis. Io«. Cod. dejur. Isffa5t\ ign. That where a perfon ignorant of the law, pays money which is not due, the right of repetition ccafes, for repetition is only allowed in cafes where what is not due is paid in confequence of an error («) Vis ac ne. vix pusniDtcs interpretinn ieoteatjc . in coacordtam rtduci] pofla videnlur. (^) fu:Is igrorantia fuam pctentibui non oocet. (r) Excipc «'.os qui jas ignorances indebitum folveriot. Vt L« |. Sec* AnatolSoi alV . Qoi pel crroreio jurit indebluis p«cuaiatfi fiohit, noo rcpetit \ fa atttein pei isaorantiatt fafii, repctit. 41 6 APPENDIX. f Niimb. XVffl* in fa£t (d). Here the various ways in which a thing is not due are not diftinguiflied } but it appears clear. that whatever is paid, through an error of law, without being due, cannot be reclaimed, and that there is no right of repetition, except for what is paid in confequence of an error in h£i. i\ But the very title of the jfl W Cod, de condiElione fine cauja fliews the contrary \ for it is an undoubted principle of law, that what it promifed either without a caufe, or for an unjuit caufe, may be re** Covered back. Stcfupra^ No. VI. (p. 411.) Add. law 40.^ de Cond, Indeb, << He who has a perpetual exception may reclaim what is paid by error. But this is not perpetual : for if the exception is given for the fake of him with whom the conteft is, as in the cafe of the Senatus confultum Velleianum^ the payment may be reclaimed ; but where the exception is given in odium of him to whom the money is due, there is no repetition ; as if a fon under the power of his father, takes money by way of loan contrary to the SemUus conful" turn Macedonianumf and after he is his own mafler pays it, he has no tight of repetition (^).*' In this law every body will eafily perceive the queftion to relate to error of law, who obferves, X . That it is evidently to be co11e£led from the very tenor of the words, that the perfon who paid was ignorant that he might pro- te£l himfelf by a perpetual exception, ^ti exceptionem perpetuam hahet^folutumper erroremrepetere pateji. Therefore what is paid by error or ignorance of the exception may be reclaimed. This is the fenfe which the words taken in themfelves feem to bear j but if a perfon is ignorant that he has a perpetual exception, of what is he ignorant but the law ? 2. That this manifcftly follows, not oifly from the words but alfo from the very reafon of the law ; for what di(lin£lion does the jurift ufe to explain the diftiti£kion between thofe exceptions of which an ignorance does prejudice, and thofe of which it does not ? Does he feparate an error of fad, from an error of law? On the contrary, he plainly joins them together when he (hews, that the ftrefs of the queftion is placed in the very nature of the exceptions themfelves ; that fo'me are favourable^ which, ac- (d] Cum qiiis j«s ignorant indebitam pecuniam folveric, csffat repetitio : per ignor« antiam enim fa^i rcpeiitionem tantum indebiri foluti competere tibi noium eft* (^) 2an txctptknem perpttyam tahit^ filmtum per errtrem repetere p^ttft, Sed hacnon ell perpetauoi ; DttnA quUcm ejus caufa exceptio datar cum quo agtcur, fclutum repettre potett, ut accidit in Seoatttt Confulto (ocmpe Velleiaoo) de intcrcefltonibus, ubi vero In Odium cjag, citl dtbenir, eaccptio dator, perperam folutum noo repctitur, veloti fi filial fifT'iliaa contra Macedoniaaum^ mutuaa pccuaiam accepcrit, ec Taierfuiulias fa&in i^ verily nonicpetit.' coidiug NaiiiB- i VIII.] 6f Mijiakes of La^ju. 41 7 cording lo Cujas^ dcftroy even the natural obligation ; others odious, which arc rather deftimental to the creditors, than pro- fitable to the debtors, introduced not in favour of the later, but in odium of the former, and which therefore only dcftrojr the civil action, and not the natural obligation. ' From this rule, almoft all the di(lin£lion between law and fa£t is a departure {exulat), it fully appears, that this famous dillinc- • tion has no place in the rule itfelf, which is entirely founded upon diflerent principles. Therefore, tliis difpofition may be extended to error in law. This may alfo be colle£led from Cujas ad leg. 66. Jf* de Cond* IfM. In addition to th;s, the right of reclaiming what is paid without being due, is not founded upon any pofitive law or edi£l, but was introduced into pra£lice by adopting the principles of natural equity ; for nothing is more repugnant to equity, than that what is paid without being due in any manner, ihall not be fubje£): to be reclaimed. And as this aclion (as Papinian fays) reclaims what belongs to one perfon, and is without caufe in the pof- feffion of another, why (hall it not revoke what is given by error of law ? For an eirror of laW can never be allowed as any caufe. Ladly, Pftpinintiy the life {viva vox) and oracle of Roman jurif- prudence, confiders himfelf as having embraced the whole fubjedt by a finglc diftinftion, ini. 7. fa" 8. de jur. Is^ fuB. ignor. An ignorance of law does not thofe avail, who are defirous of acquiring, but does not injure thofe who merely feck their own. L. 7. (^i). An error in law does not fubje^ any perfon to the injury of lofing his property (li). L. 8. lliercforc wherever the quedion relates to avoiding or re- pairing a lofs, an ignorance of the law does not induce any pre- judice. This being the cafe, who will fupporton thcone fide, DtodeftanzxA Maximiliauy plainly maintaining that money paid by an error of hw cannot be recjlaimed ; and on the other fide, the jurifts and the fpirit cf equity itfelf, exclaiming that an error in the law (hall not injure tliofe who are feeking their own, or, which is the fame things ifaall not injure any perfon in regard to die incurring a lofs. («} Juils igoonntia naa prodelt acqutrere Tolentibuiy f«um vero pctendknt noccu {b) Error fa£bi ne ninibut quidem in damnit vel compcn'ii's obe.ly juris autem errrr fi*c fvinloUin compendiit pxodcft. Ciettrum omnibus juris exiot ia damnii aoDitteada |tj Aix noo nocec. Vol. II. Ff The 4i8 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVtir. The glo&t and the doftors of that ftamp, {ajfeche^ which was the cafe with aliaoft all before the time of Cu/as, would avoid this mntinomy, by holding that the term indebiti in the law^is to be taken not generally^ but ftri£Uy. Cum quis C. de Cond. Indeb. ' A diftin£lion is therefore to be taken according to the glofs, and the common opinion of interpreters. The difpute relates either to money, which, is due naturally, but not civilly, and then what is paid by an ertor in fa£l may be reclaimed, what is paid by an error in law cannot. Or, on the other hand, it relates to what is due civilly, but not na- turally, and in that cafe what is paid may without diftinAion be recovered back. Or what is paid is not due, either cii^Iy or naturally, and i& like manner may without diftin£lion be recovered back. Or laftly, it was due both by natural and civil law, but by means of an exceptidh, was in the fame predicament a» if it had not been due ; and in this cafe the exception was either dilatory, perpetual, or doubtful. If it were dilatory, an error of law would prevent the repetition, an error of f aA would not. If perpetual, there is a further di{lin£lion \ either the exception is favourable, and what is paid may be reclaimed, whether paid by an error of law or fa^ \ fuch as the exception of Senatusconfultum Villeianum. Or it is odious, and the money which is paid may be reclaimed, if paid by an error of fa6i, if by an error in law it can- not. Such is the Senatusconfultum Macedonianum. Laftly, if the exception is doubtful ; the right of repetition attaches without diftinflion. In this diftin£lion of the glofs, which, as ufual, fiows rather muddily {lutuUnter)^ there are many things to admit, and many to rejeft. Its denial that the law of Diockftan and MaximSian^ extends to the payment of what is not due, either civilly or natoraUy, is to be very particularly attended to, as we fhall mention hereafter. But the pofition that what is natorally due, may be reclaimed when it is paid from an enor of fa£l, as if a perfon under an enor of fa£i, pays money which he could retain by virtue of the Senatus- confultum Macedonianutn^ is, as we (hall prove, plainly and evidently repugnant to all the principles of law. The further obfervation that what is due civilly, b^t not natu- rally, may be reclaimed whether paid by an error of law or of fafl, feems altogether dubious and obfcure, not to fay falfe \ but of this ftUb hereafter. ^ If Numb. XVIII. J O/Mi/iakaofLaw. 4^9 If we are unwilling to follow the authority of the glofs, which u fo egregioufly erroneous, the diftin£^ion of. Cujas is next to he conlidered, and yery attentively examined- It occurs in Leg, 8. ff* de jur. isf foB. Ignor. Lib. I. ^^* Pap. It alfo occurs in L. 7. eod Lib, 19. ^^. Papin. where Cujas does not feem to agree with himfelf . When he afterwards expounds the folemn, and often repeated [decantatam) diftinAion between law and fact, and gain and lolsy he concludes as follows : In reclaiming what is paid without being due, an error of law ^ 18 injurious : for neither a man or a woman can reclaim what is paid) through an ignorance of laW| as in L. Regulx. § Penult y tst UlU dejut. foB et ign, L* cum quis Cod. eod, L. Error, Cod. ad. Leg. Falcid {a). For the obje£l of a perfon who reclaims what he haa paidi is to regain what he has loft, not to avoid lofing what be- longs to him, and then his foUcitude relates to gain and not to lofs» A perfon miftaking the law is allifted fo far as that he (hall not lofe, not fo far as that he (hall be relieved from having loft ; for a perfon who endeavours to recover what he has already loftf is feeking for a gain, and not guarding himfelf againft a future ]oh{b). The diftin£iion of CuJas then comes to this ; that if the error of law appear before the payment, there is a right of retention, lb diat the error fhall not hurt } but if the payment is compleat, if the lofs has happened, if the oh]t€t of a perfon miftaking the law, is' not that he may keep what is his own, but that he may recover that which is now become another's, then he comes too late, as he can only complain of having been deceived and circumvented by himfelf. Which diftin£lion, although at firft view it may feem reafon* able, yet upon a further examination, will be thought hard and unjtift, and not lefs contrary to the authority of the laws, than to the principles of right and equity. For it is repugnant, (a) In all thefie Uwsy except the law cum j ait , the queflion' rclatet to perfoni who had paid the entire amount of kgacies, horn which they were entitled to dedud the fourth parl^ at the Falcidian portion. {t) Item Gondiceotibui indcbita foluta juris error nocet s nam neqoe maa, neqne fmmoM pottft condicercy quod iodebitum per jurii Igoorantiam folvit ; ut in L. Rtgulsp § penulc Is olt. ff. de jar. U h€L ignor. L. cum fmt (*)f Qod. eod. L. trr^Tf C. ad Legem Fald« diam : quia coodicit quod foWit ; id agic ut acqoirat quod amiiity non nt, qood fuum eft, non amittat denique fi»liicitua oft de lucro, non de damno. Erranti in jort fubveaitnr ns foam amittat, non etiam ne amilerit; nc damnum /aciat, non etiam, ne feoeric : damnn £ida quia bfcdU £icerc ftadtt, locrum'capat, non daoBaafaftsiuai aaoUtor. Ffa , 0,To 42d APPENDIX. [Numb. IWl I ft, To the law itfclf which Cujas interprets; for what fays Papinian ? Omnibus juris error in damhis amittenda rei fui non nocet. There clearly all the diftindion ceafes. Whoever contends for avoiding a lofs, is not injured by an error of law. The reafoning of CuJas is obvioufly too fubtle, for any body to be deceived by it; for he diftinguifhes between- ar perfon guarding againit a future lofs, and one who endeavours to repair a lofs already incurred; as if a perfon having loft what was his own, were catching at a gain in aiming at 'its recovery ; or, as if the jurtft, whenever there is a queftion of lofs, had feparated an impending lofs from an cxifting one. But if the words of Papinian feem to favour the opinion of Cujasy (for he fays, that error docs not hxirt in damnis rei fu£ amii' tenda^ which words in a certain degree feem to include the future bat not the paft,) let him tead the fame law in the Bafilieans, where the fame words are thus rendered : an ignorance of the law induces no hurt to any one wifhing to feek his own, juris ignt' rantia in damno nemini nocet fuum petere volenti^ or, as it- is in the Greek, to r)w aT«»Tvm» proprium repefere^ for that is the genuine fi unification of rv airetitxcou. But Cujas denies that that can be called mine which I have al- ready paid to another : for it has already become the property of the other perfon, therefore when I rechim it I am demanding what rs not mine but his^^ This is plainly an empty fubtilty, as? will eafily appear to any perfon who attends to it. But that the whole of this quibble {caviilatio) maybe more.conipleatly deftroyed, we muft examine upon what rcafon of law the right of reclaiming what is unduly paid is introduced ; whether it is becaufe the money that was not due remains, even after payment, the money of the perfon making the payment ; or becaufe equity will not allow any man to in- creafe his affluence with the fpoils of another, arrd to enrich him- fclf by another's detriment, {nlicnis fpoliis ditefcere et cum alterius dt" trimento locupletiorem fieri^ notwithftanding what he has received may by fubtilty be denominated his own. If the firft reafgn is preferred, the argument of Cujas will hold good : for who can doubt but tliat money which is paid immedi- ately hccoTCits^ fummo jurej the property of the perfon receiving it? l3ut if this is allowed, the repetition of what is unduly paid (con* dicfio ittdebiti) will almoll entirely ceafe in every cafe whatever; for whether it is paid by error of faft,or by ignorance of law, the fame principle will equally apply : for it is plain, that the thing paid is not now mine but another's. And it is not neceflary to go far for argumcmsi by which th;s may be dcmoudrated *, for the very -Numb. XVm.] Of Miftakes of Law. 421 Tcrj term conditio alone is fufScient to manifeft it. For when a perfon fues for his own, he is faid, not condicere but virfdicare^ and the owner never ufes a condi£bion except in an action of theft \ and this is in odium of thofe who are guilty of theft,, and who are liable in feveral different kinds of adiion, as Jujiinian in^^. Liftit. it AEi. $ 14* If therefore it can be indifcriminately faid, of every conditio wdebiti^ that it is a repetition of a thing which has now become the property of another ; either the a£tion mud be en- tirely abolifhed ; or it mud be confefTcd that it cannot be rightly withheld from a perfon miilaking the law, merely upon the prc« text, that he is fuing for what is not his own, but another's. It feems therefore, that we mud adhere to the other opinion and rather fay, that the aQion is comprized in this (ingle princi- ple ; that it is naturally unjud, that what belongs to one man fhould without caufe be detained by another \ which reafon equally ap- plies jn favour of every perfon afting under an error, whether of fa£l or law, and therefore it cannot eafily be explained, why the repetition fhould be denied in the one cafe, and allowed in the the others certainly Cujas does not explain it, by the fubtilty, that the money which is already paid does not belong to the payeo but to the receiver. But what he fubjoins, that a ri^ht of repetition is not allowed El cafe of an error of law, becaufe the perfon who fues for wliat is another's,. is catching at again {lucrum capiat) j cannot be very cafily proved to tlwfe who prefer the principles of right and equity to the fubtilties of law: For although it may with fome degree of fubtilty be faid, that a |)erfo8i feekkig to recover what he has lofl, is catching at a gain, yet in truth he ©nly defires to repair an injury which he fuiFers ; he fues that he may oat continue to fuffer a lofs^ not that he may acquire a gain {w perdidirJt, non ut lucreiur). But what is the dif- ference, if you merely attend to natural equity, between a lofs which is future and one which is pad \ fo that a perlbn who is repairing a lofs already palled, fliall be faid to acquire a gain, and ope who wards off a lofs that has not arrived, diall only be fjid to avoid a lofs ? Neither of them acquires any thing, neither of them is made any richer ; the one endeavours not to lofe, the other to be re- lieved from having lod; the one, whild the lofs is dill impending, keeps what he was about to have loft, the other recovers what he has already lod without a caufe. Each protedls himfelf by the fame oracle of the Jaw j that ignorance of the law fhall not injure 9ny one in matters of lofs. This was perceived by Cujas himfelf; *who may be called at once the m^ker and dedroyer of the didindlion. Ff3 ' For 4" .APPENDIX. [Numb.XVIIL For when the difcuflion relates to a womanj who being ignorant of the law, and not knowing that (he is entitled to a prefetence in daiming her portion, allows the other creditors to be fadsfied. Cujas ad iand. Leg. 8- de jur. isf foB. ignsr, plainly and ingenuoufly acknowledges, that ihe fhall recover her portbn from thefe creditors, left her error (hould fubjed her to the injury of lofing it, at its erediioribus mulierem datem fuam rew^ caturam^ ne in damno amittenda dotis fua error ei noceat. But in this cafe it is plain, ift^ That the queftion relates to a lofs which is paft, Thisa{H pears as clear as day, from the words of Cujas himfelf . 2d, In this point there is no diftinAion between men and wo*t f repetition is not to be denied, that is to fay, if I owe it neither naturally nor civilly, utjt indebitum folver4 per juris ignorantiamy non mihi ideo deneganda efieondifftQ, putayji id nee naturaliter nee civUiter debut. And yet a little afterwards, when he cafts his eyes upon the law Ji quiSf his fear of allowing the exiflence of an antinomy, makes him fall into the groflefl: cohtradi&ion, for he concludes the whole difputation as follows : << In this queftion of eondHiio indebitij that is called indebitum^ which is not due by any kind of law, that is, the diflference is be- tween error of fadi, and error of law, fo that what I do not owe by any law either civil or natural may be reclaimed, if paid by an error of fa£k, but not if paid by an error of law." (a) How then fliall this reconciler of laws be reconciled with himfelf? ad, The diftindion of Cujas is not only repugnant to the law which he interprets, but alfo to feveral others \ a few inftances will be fubjoined. And in the firft place, all the laws which fpeak of the conditio fine caufay are in oppoiition to the dtftindion of Cujas^ until it (hall be proved that an error of the law is to be accounted as a juft and legitimate caufe of payment. Next may be adduced the laws already cited with commenda« tion, .which expound the principles of the cotidiSfio indebiti, and in which it is frequently indicated that this adion was introduced tipon the ground of right and equity, to recover what belonged to one perfon and was held without any fuf&cient caufe by another. But that fomething more particular may be ilated, we {hall firft take notice of i. /^6,J^.dejur, Dot. i» 64»jff^. de Gondii. Indeb. l^ In X. 46. J 2. de Jur. Dot. are thefc words, pater etiamft falfi (a) In h»cquxftlone de condidione tndcbiti, indebitum dicitur, quod nuUojure debe- tar^ id eft» in hoc untum indebiti geneie, valet diflerentU inter eirorem fadi et errorcm 59nt: puCayqoodnuUojore debai nee cmli oec natuiali, fi pcrarortm fadi foWi, fC-* pctiA J fi per crrfrem jurii} noa repcum. F f 4 extftimant 434 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVIH. ^ exiflimans f€ fiiia debitorcm ejfe dotem promtfiJJH^ ohiigahitur. The father, although he falfcly fuppofes himfelf to owe the portion to his daughter, (hall be bound. Here Cujas himfelf takes notice, and properly, that the queftion relates to a daughter in the power of her father, otherwife Julianiu would not rightly affirm dotem deieri ; in this cafe therefore, the father being under an error, is only obliged b:;caufc he is na* turally debtor of the portion, and the caufe of piety is fufficient to oblige him, although the promife was founded in error : but this rcafon would ceafe in cafe of a daughter who was emancipated \ therefore it mud be agreed that the law refers to the cafe of \ daughter remaining part of her father's family. Cut if we once admit this, it follows that we mud confefs the queftion to relate to an error of law ; for between a father and ^ daughter remaining under his power no obligation could fubfift, no adion could be maintained, the father who fupppfed himfelf to. be indebted to his daughter, could not be under any error except in point of law ; for although the iaOt was doubtful, yet the whole fubjedi depended on the law, as the father ought to have known the facl, and if he confidered himfelf to be certain in refpeft of that, he ought not to be ignorant that an obligation, which in faft was entered into between a father and a daughter, was void in law ; therefore whether there was or was not any error of facl admixej with the error of law, is of little confcqucnce, Gnce in cither cafe the fubje£t is reduced to an error of law. Neither can it be fuppofed, that, the father was debtor to the daughter without prejudice to the right of paternal authority, as in the cafe of her pofTcffing adventitious property : fpr in the time of Jtdianusy who is the autlior of this law, the name adventitious /r- ctJium was fcarcely known in the law, and to ufe the words of Juftlnian in § i. hiJlU. quib, alien, licet vel nofh~~>Olim quidquid ai fiUos perveneraty exceptis videlicet cq/lrefijtbus peculiis, hoc paretUibtu Juts acquirehantjtm ulla diJlinQionc^ et hoc it/> pafentumjiebat^ ut etiam ejfet eis luetitia alio filio vel extraneo donare, vel venderey vel quocumque tmdo vahteratity appUcare, For Conjinntine firft made an exception of the property coming from the mother^ of which he ordered tha^ the ufufruft only fliouldbe acquired by the father ^ fuccceding em- perors made other additions which it would be fuperflupus to par* tirularize. It is certainly clear, that previous to the t;m,e of Cck-^ JtantitUy nothing but the cajlrenfe peculimn {a) was exempt from the parental autliority, and it was impoffible for that to belong to 4 daughter, » - (4) The property gifcn to a foo mider the authority of hU ft^thcTf for tbt putpofes of war, or vcijuired by hiao in war« •TherefoPCi Numb- ?:VIII.] Of Mififi^^^ rf If^^ 425 ThcTcfoTC, to return to the fubje£l, the law rcIatcsTto a daughter under the authority of her father, therefore the father was under .w error of law. For what reafon therefore is he obliged ? Bccaufc he erred in the law i By no means ; but becaufe he difchargcd a natural duty: for this is the true reafon of the law which Cujas himfelf embraces, and which may be colledled from or rather is proved by tlie very rubric (title), under which the lav is placed : but if the father remain fubje£t to the obligation, upon the ground .of his haying midaken the law, the fame thing mull be decided in the cafe of a father who had emancipated his daughter , but it applies fpecially and excluGvely to a father retaining his parental authority, therefore the error of law is little regarded, and the father is obliged not on account of the error, but on account of the natural duty. A much flronger argument in a cafe nearly fimilar, may be drawn from law 64. de Cond. Indeb, The words of the law arc : Si quod Dominusfervo debuity manumtjfo fcivlty quamvis extjllmans ft Je aliquA tenerl aHione tanun rcpetere non poteritj quia naturaU flgnovit debitum : ut tnim libertas naturaU jure coniitietur^ et domhmtio ex gentium jure intro(\uEla eft^ ita debit i vel non debit i ratia in condic'^ fione naturaliter inteliigenda ejt. Certainly an excellent law, and which feems to remove all am- })iguity from this queftion. That the cafe refers to a manifeft error of law is indubitable. For the mailer fuppofed himfelf ' to be liable to the Have in fome aflion, y/hich opinion doubtlefs deferves the name of carciefb, and grofj;, and fupine ignorance, {foluta^ et crajfiy etfupina ignora/Uiay) ferrps derived from the laws themfelves. Docs Tryphonius the author of ^he law impute that to the mafler ? By no means, he does qot pronounce tliat the right of repetition {hall be taken away, becaufe the mailer miflook the law, and bec^fe aflidance is to be given not to folly but only to error j but folely becaufe the matter acknowledged a debt due by the rules of natural equity [quia Do' minuf fiflturale agnovit debit um). Therefore, on the contrary, it may be concluded, that if the debt wai not due by the rules of natural equity, if the maftcr was Qot bound by any kind of law, he might reclaim what he had paid. For who can imagine that Tryphcnius would have pafTed over fa plain and ready a ground of decifion, if it were clear that a pay- ment once made by an error of Jaw, of that which was not in any /nannerdue could not be reclaimed ? But tlie jurift not only refolves the queftion propofed, but lays down 426 APPENDIX. [Numb.XVlir* down a new and general rule of taw, by the af&ftance of which all queftions that can arifc in the difcudion of this fubjeA^ may be ^lily decided. This rule is explained by an elegant diftin£lion : libertyy fays he, is a natural right, that is, all men are naturally free ; therefore all men are bound by the ties of natural obligation ; on the con ignorance of the law. Or we look into the rules of natural equity, on which the whole law of repetition is founded, and then we admit the right of reclaiming of what was not naturally due, although paid under an error of the law. Aut ver^ ipfam nature aquitaUm infptcitnus, qud fiilicet tffta condiilio indebiti continetur, et tunc repetitisnem pecunU naturaliter indebita, quamvis errore juris folutjt, dari agnofcimm : not on account or for the fake of this ignorance, or becaufe that ought to afford any benefit, but from a conlideration of what is equitable and right ; as it is naturally i^njuft, that one man fhall with- out caufe be enriched by the ruin of another : wherefore the right of repetition, {condt^io,) as it repels that injury, is called byjuriftsa natural right. But if this diflinftion is approved, the folution of the law which b oppofed to it will be very eafy. For it mud either be faid, that the quedion in that law relates to drift right, the error of law being alone regarded, without re- ference to the principles of equity, and without impugning the rule, that what belongs to me cannot be transferred to another without rov confcnt or default. Or the term . ittdebilum, which in itfcif is equivocal and an\hi- gnous, Numb. X VUl-] 0/ Mijiakes of Law. 429 guouSy as is obvious to every body, mud be underftood to refer, in the law in queftion, to that which in truth is naturally due } but cannot be civilly enforced ; for if this were paid by an error of law it cannot be reclaimed ; both becaufe there was a caufe for the payment, which prevents the repetition, and becaufe the debtor appears by the payment to have acknowledged the na- tural obligation. But to this interpretation it may be oppofed, th?: if it were ad- mitted, the term indehihim w6uld be ufed in different fenfes in the law J for in the firft part of the law, it would mean what was na- turally though not legally due {a) ; and in the fccond part, where it IS faid, per ignoraniiamfafli tantusn indebiti foluti repetitionem com- peiere^ the fame term would defignate what was not even naturally due. For if it were naturally due, it would be hardly poffible to fup- port what the emperors anfwcr in the fame law, that having been paid by an error of fa£l it may be reclaimed : for whether my recognition of what is really a natural obligation, arifes from an er- ror of faft or an error of law, it fecms to be anundifputcd principle of law, that I am not cntitli:d to repetition. If therefore this fccond folution is inadmidible, we muft apply a third, and freely acknowledge, that this law is not to be taken abfolutcly, (prafntcte acdp-emlaniy) as if the emperors had intended iiltogether to include (excutere) every kind of indebliumf (nor docs the difcufEon relate, directly at leuft, to indebtta^) but meant to pro- pofe a general rule concerning error of faft, and error of law ; and to declare, that >yhat was paid without being due might be re- claimed, if paid by an error of fa^ti othcrwife if paid by. an error of law j but to leave it undefmed, what kind of indebita (hould /be included in the rule, as that was not the fubjedl in.quef*- tlon. But it will be afked, what diftinflion will remain ia the con-^ dtclio indebitit between error of law and error of faft, fo that we can properly fay with the emperors, that what is paid by an error of law cannot be reclaimed ; but what is paid by an error of faQ may ? For the money or other thing is either naturally due, or it is not ; if it is, it is to no purpofe to dillinguifh between error of law and error oii^€t\ for there is no right of repetition "in either cafe i but if it is not, the right ought in either cafe to be admitted. To fatisfy thisqueftion, it muft, above all things,be acknowledged, that if there was no cafe in which, what was naturally due Could be recovered back after having beea once paid, the diftiudlion («] Cum quW jui ignorans iadttltaai pecucism (b'lerit, ceflat repciitio. between 43d APPENDIX. [Numb.Xm between law and fa£^ would be ufelefs and unmeaning^ at leaft with regard to the conditio uiJeiiti, But the cafe is far otherwife } for it often occurs in the courfe of the law> that what is naturally due may be reclaimed after having been paid. It will be fufficient to adduce two examples : The firft is the Lfx Fa/cidia (a), in which Robertus properlj obferveS} that the retention of anatural debt is introduced by the bw itfelf ; therefore there would have been no right of repetitioni after the heir had difcharged the entire legactesy if a natural debt once paid could never be reclaimed. This» however, is demed by 1. 9, Cod. ad L. Faldd. The fuppofitlon, therefore, that the diftinftion between a natural and. a civil debt, is the only one that can prevail in refpe£t to this queftion, is not true ; nay, the contrary fttfficU cntly appears: for here, although a natural debt is immediately in contemplation, yet fomething further is requifite to decide whether there is a right of repetition or not, and what is requiied^ except the famous diftin&ion between, law and fa&; by the afliftance of which the emperor Gordian decides, whether the bar can reclaim what he has paid to the legatees, beyond the amount of three fourths of the property, for he fays, as follows : error faSH, quarta ex caufa Jidei commiffi non retenti repetitionem non impe£t; is atitem qui fciens fe pojfe retinere^ univerfum reftituit^ condiEtionem non habet $ quin^ eiiamfijus ignoraverit, cejfai repetitio ? Therefore there is no reafon for confidering the di(tin£iion be* twcen law and fa£l, as perfe&ly idle. Upon this law it may alfo be obfcrved by the way, thgt it throws a great light upon the law Cum quis. dejur. \sf foEl. ignor. for what does it import by the term law {/us) P It is the Falcidian law, and other provifions of the fame kind, by which a perfon may defend himfelf civilly, from the payment of what he naturally owes. But it does not appear at all inequitable, that the. debtor (hall not be { allowed a right of repetition, in confequence of his ignorance of this law, as he is always nqturally indebted. Therefore, in like manner, when the law Cum quis ufes the term yur, that kind of hw or right may be underftood, by which the debtor is allowed the benefit of an exception or retention, and which thus always fuppofes the exiftence of a natural obligation. A fecond example may be found in L. ^i exceptionem, 40.^. di Cond. Indeb. ante^ where it is. demanded whether a debtor baring a perpetual exception, may reclaim what he has paid by error, and- («) The \et Falcidw prote£lt4 tbe Iwir froa pajfiog more tlua three foortfas of (tb« {mcccIImb to tbe les«toefc 4 the Numb. X Vm.] Of Mi/lakes of Law. 43 1 the jurift diftinguiflies between whether the exception is intro- duced in favour of the perfon who owes the money^ or in odium of the perfon to whom it is owing ? in the firft cafe» the repetition IS allowed, in the ftcond, not ^ but here' there is no diftindlion be- tween a natural and a civil debtj nay the di(lin£tion is abfolutely difallowed : for if the only queftion had been, whether there viras a natural obligation or not, it mud be anfwered indifcriminately, that there is no right of repetition ; for, whether the exception were allowed in favour of the debtor or in odium of the creditor^ it is certain that, in either cafe, the natural obligation remains, as there is need of an exception. Therefore, the diftinfiion of a na« tural and a civil debt is not fufficient ; as there are other diftino* tions, by which in many cafes a natural debt, after having been paid^ may be reclaimed. • But from all this it follows, that what appeared to oppofe the fecond folution above given of the law. Cum quis, may eafily be anfwered. For we faid, ift, that the term indebitum might be underftood of what was due naturally, but not civilly, but that thrs folution or interpretation might appear doubtful, becaufe, in that cafe, the term indebitum would be ufed in the fame law, in two fenfes plainly dif- ferent from each other, inafmuch as it is decided in the" fecond part of the law, that that indeUfum only can be reclaimed which is paid by an error of fa£l, and then it certainly feems that the term cannot be underftood of what is naturally due; for the creditor cannot reclaim that, even though he made the payment under an error of fad, and that therefore the term in the firft part of the law would be only referrible to what was only not due civilly, and in the fecond part, it would be referrible alfo to what was not due naturally. But this conclufion appears to proceed wholly from a falfe principle ; for it fuppofes tliat what is not due civilly, but is due naturally, can in no cafe be reclaimed, which we have. al- ready demonftrated to be falfe in feveral cafes ; but if this is once admitted, then the term in queftion has, in the law^ quis, one uni- form (ignification. So that the fenfe is, that what is naturally due cannot be reclaimed if it is paid by an error of law ; otherwife, if it is paid by an error of fa£l, of which a diftinguiihed example occurs in the before mentioned law 9. Cod. ad leg. Falcid. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the threefold folution of the law, CumquiSt which is above propofed. ' But I am inclined to think it ought to be admitted, chiefly for three reafons, in addition to thofe already alleged. The firft is deducedfrom the Rubric itfelf, under which the law Cum ji/ij^ is placed, viz* under the title dejur^ lifaQ, ign* in which there 43^ APPENDIX. [Numb*. XVIir. there is no queftion concerning the term indtbitum ; nor is it any objeft to expound the various interpretations of that word, or to define in what cafes the condiilio indrhin iliall or (hall not take place. Moreover it is certain, befides other things in which they diflfer, that there is this great diftinclion, that, fpeaking generaily and abftraftcdly, an error of fa£i dofs not prejudice a claim of lepetition, but an error of law does. Therefore the declHon of the bw, and the intention of the legiflature are abundantly fatisfied, wlien an interpretation is given to the law cum quis^ which clearly and plainly admits a difference between an error of law and an error of fad, but leaves untouched a queilion not touched upon by the law, to wit, the di£Fercnt kinds of cafes to which the term indehitum may be applied. But another rojifon is much ftronger. For it appears, from what lias been already faid, that one or the other of the laws, that is cither the law cum quts^ or the laws 7 and 8. Jf, dejur, etfoB. ign. require interpretation and di(lin£bion. For if the law cum quis is to be underwood abfolutely, Ih)w can that ftand which Papinian fays in L. 7 ^ 8. de jur. et foQ. ign, Tliat error of law hurts no one in matters of lofs ? Therefore m that cafe, the diftinftion between future and paft loft will be to he fupplied in the anfwer of Papitiian^ according to the opinion of But if the words of Papinian in the faiil laws, are to be undor- ftood fimply and without diftinftion, the opinion of Gordian on tiie law cum (juif will appear manifeftly abfurd, unlefs you fo temper it th.u it fliall prevail in matters of ftrift rijjht, without being ex- tended to what is due equitably and by the law of nature ; or laftly, tliat it may be confidered as containing a gencratrule fub- j-£l to f;ivcral exceptions. Therefore, fincc an interpretation and di(lin£lion muft necef* farily be made in the oue law or the other, it remains to inquire which dlftinfiion appears to be the more juft and equitable ; that which reds upon this fingle foundation, that he who demands die repetition of his own is catching at an advantage, and that what ahnoll every man would denominate a lofs, (hould only be called fo when it is future, and can iViU be avoided } but that when it is pnft and can no longer be avoided, but can only be revoked aod repaired, the reparation fliould be confidered as gain : whether that diflin£Hon (hould be preferred which fubverts feveral laws, and the very principles of equity itfelf, which ordains that one man lliall, without caufe, be enriched by the r4iin of another i laftly, which in a great meafure abrogates and ann :lj tlie title in the digeft^ and code, of conduligjine caufa ? Or Numb. XVIll.] Of Mijiakes of Law. 433 Or whether there (hall be fubftituted in its roonii that much more fayovrable diftinftion which is aided by natural reafoni by equity, by all the laws, with one iingle exeeption, that may be called rather ambiguous than contradi jeSi to Repetition, The queftion is how to expound what is laid do^hi fimply^ and ^enerall^i that what is paid by miftake, without being due, may be reclaimed ; whether it is confined to error of fad, or extends alfo to error of law. For error is twofold, being either of hSt or law. An error of fa£k takes place, either when fome faA which really exifts is unknown, or fome fa£^ is fuppofed to exift which really does not. On the other hand, when a perfon is truly acquainted with the exiftence or non-exiftence of the fa£ls, but is ignorant of the legal confequences, he is under an error of law. Z. i,J\ dejur. et fan, ign. (a). If a perfon makes a payment knowing that he is not indebted, it is agreed on all hands that he has not any right of repetition. L. i. $ I. [b). L, .ft nonfor* tern 26. § indebitum 3. (c). de cond. indeb. iov a payment which is fubjed^ to repetition, if made by niiftake, amounts to a donation, if made with full knowledge. L. Cujus, 53. jf. de reg.jur, {d). And on the other hand it is a clear rule of law, that a perfon is intitled to repetition who pays what he does not owe, believing through a miftake of i^6t that he does. L. 6. {e) L. 7. C. de cond* indeb. (/). i. Error, 7. C. de juris et fa^ ignorantia. {g)» The (.«) IsBoraotia vel ft/Sti vel juris eft, § x. Nam fi quit nefciat deceffifTe eum, coiut bo* iMTUfli poflefEo defcrtar, non cedit el tempui. Sed fi fciat qoidem dcfuo^bim eile cogna* tttoit nefciat autem proximicatit nomine bonorum poiTeflionem fibi deferii ; aut ft fciat fcriptom beredem» nefciat autem quod Icriptis keredibui bonorom pofleffionem praetor pro- flaittit, cedit ei tempufy quia in jureeirat. Idem eft & fratcr confanguineua defuoAi els'* dat matfcm potJorem e(&. {A) Et quidemi fi quia indebitom ignorant folvitf per hanc aAi^nem coodicere^poteft : ied fi fiuena fe non debcre folvity cefliit repetitio. (e) Indebitum autem folutam accipimut non folum fi omnino non debeatur, fed et d per aUquam esceptioocm perpetuam peii non poterat ; ^uue hoc qooque rrpcti potexii j fiiA fcteot fe tutum ezceptionot folrtt. {d) Cojut per enovem dati repetitio eft, ejus confulto dati donatio eft. (r) Si per ignotantiam hCki not debitam quantitatem pro alio folviOi^ et hoc tdito xt€to re provinciae fuerit probatum, hanc ei j cojut nomine folota eft, reftitoti co agente provU debit. (/^ Fidei comisifliim vei legatom indebiium per errorem fafti iblotumiTepeti pofife ex* plorati jurit eft. Ig) Eiror faai, Afcdiim fioito oegotio, nemiai Bocet; nam caifa ^ccifa relareento talS ooa ialaaiiur* / G g 3 only ' 438 APPENDIX. [Numb-XVin. only queftion Uf whether a perfon is intitled to condiflion or reptd- tion, who has paid what he did not owe, being mifled by' an error of law. Moft of the later writers are in favour of the negative. CuJ, ^.ohf, "^g.Duar.adtit.decond.indeb. cT.DonelL i comm. 21. Brencbmfi^ 2, ajf. .36. Perez in cod. decond. indeb. 1 2. The ancient interpreters take theafErmative fide oftbe queftion, and are followed by Zai^ airubr^ Jecond. indeb. n, 5. Sichard^ ad.rubr. et L. cad. eod. Wefenb* par eod. n. g.Thuldeny L. eod. n. 4. Grotius, lib. 3. introd, adjurifp. Batdtv* C* 30. Chriftin, Vol. 3. decif. 8. Bachov* difput* 4. de a3. thef. 17. But before we open our own opinion, fince the queftion relates to a payment of what is undue, (indebilumi) it will l)e worth while to examine what juridical writers means by that term. And no body doubts that^ that is to be confidered as undue, which is not due either civilly or naturally. But fuppofe a debt is due civilly but not naturally, or e converfo ? If it is only due civilly, that is^ if it is due by an obligation, which produces no equitable claim ; fo that fummojure, it is fubjecl to a right of a&ion, but may be repelled by a perpetual exception, it is confidered as really imdue, and if it is paid by miftake may as fuch be reclaimed. L.Ji mn fortem^ 26. ^3. {a), L. qui exceptionem^ 40, {h). L.Ji quis^ 43. (r). X.. ex his emttibuSi 54. \d), ff. de cond* tndeb. For fuch a demand is only nominally, and not really due \ not being due by the law of nature, nor in effe£t by the civil law. L. 3. $. i. ff. de pecun^ conflit. (e). X. nihil interejt^ i\2, ff. de reg, Jur, (/). But what is naturally due, although fummo Jure it is not civilly fo, is in this refpe£l con- fidered as a real debt^ and therefore although it cannot be recovered, when it is adually paid, even under a belief that it might have been fo, it cannot be reclaimed ; as appears by feveral authorities. i. naturales^ 10. ^f- de obL et aci, {g). L. indebiti. 15. (h)^ L.f fana 19. (/). L^ ft mn Jortem. 26. J {ibertus. 12, (il) !#• yuUi^ (j) Videantr, r. 437. ' (^) Vide«ot«,4i6. (r) bi qu)i iurniret ft dart ntn opfoMttrt, ab orani ^ontentionc dtfccdetur : atque iu {0- lutam pecuciam repett non poflTe. (t/) Vide ante, 41 1. («) Si qu'« anrem corftUoenti qood jure civil! debcbat, jure pnetorioDon debebat, \i cft| I>er except ionem : an conftuucndo teneatur^ quatrimus f Et eft venisii ut [&J Pos* ]toiiHis fcribity eum noo teneri ; qui;i dtkita jmr'^ut non eft pecunia^'quar conftttuta eft. (/) NihJlintffeft, ipfo jure quia aAionem non habeac, an per ei^ceptionem infirmecur. it) ^^Atu^alea obligationcs non eo foio aeftimantur, ii adio aliqaa earum oosBuie coa- petitt verumettam eo, fi folura pecunia repcii oon poteft, {b) Indebiti fOlotl condi6kio naturaliaeft. £t ideo d qaod iti folttts acceific, veait m condidiooeoi : utputa partus qui ex ancilla; vei quod allvvione a€ceffit; imo et frufim quoa iay cui foluium eft, bona fide percepit, in condid^ionem ▼eoient. (t) Liber tua cum fe putaret oprraa pairono debere folrit, condlcere eum non pefir^ qoamvis putans \t obligatum. Julianus fcripfit, natura enim operas patrono debuit. (i) Si ponrar caufaejut, cui debctur, dfbJtfr UbcxaCiM cfl, nataralu obliptio nueoct \ cl idco ibiutum repcti aod poteft. Numb. X VIIIJ Of Miftakes of Law. 439 nus^So* {a), ff. di cmd. tndeh* L. 3f. § ttit.ff. quod quifq. jur. (i). And iincc that which is naturally due, may be made the fubjeA of compenfation, it is highJy reafonable that no repetition of it (hall be allowed when it is paid by miilake. But even where the debtor has a perpetual exception, if it is for a caufe which does not deftroy the natural obligation, ftill there is no right to re- claim what has been paid by mifiake. Such is the exceptio rei judicata \ the fentence of the judge cannot deftroy the natural obligation, arifing from the confent of the party ; and therefore^ JuRanus and Paulus have decided that a real debtor who has paid the debt, after having been difcharged by a judgment, has no right ^ of repetition, dm L Juliattus, 60. de cond. indei. To the fame principle, many refer the exception of the Senatus^confultum Ma* cedwianum. For if a fon, while under the dominion of his father, boRows money, and pa}s it after he becomes his own matter, he has no right of repetition, as he is under a natural obligation. Zt. g. infin.etL0,feq.{c),ff.defenatufc. Mac. Another reafon for de- nying the repetition, is. afligned in qui exapiionem, 40. ff: de cond. indeb, {d). but that does not always apply, as appears by the be«- fore mentioned law of Julianus. And in this cafe, I think a dif- dnAion fhould always be made, between an error of law and of faft. X.. ult.ff. de fenatufc. Mac. {e). And therefore, here the term deUtum may be applied to what is due only naturally, and indebitum to what is only due by the ftridnefs of civil law. We here apply theexpreilion of a natural debt, according to its ancient iignifica- tion, as having all the effects as well of a civil as of a natural ob- * ligation ; the right of adion only excepted (y). But if even the natural obligation is exprefsly difapproved by the cinl law, as in the cafe of a woman engaging as furety, L. ft muUer^ 16. ^ i*(gY od fen. • • («) Jatianus mwn debttorem poft litciB conteftatam^ maoentc adbuc judicio, negabat loifentem repetere poiTe : quia nee abrolutus, oec condemoatui repetere poflet* Licet coim abfoltttus fit, natura tamen debitor pennanet, fimilem^e efle ei dicit qui ita pro« miftt JSve fuvit tx Afim vtmritfivtim vtiurlt : quia es una caufa alteriua folutionis origo fioficifeituri (S) Ex hac caufii iblatum repeti non pofls. J^uliaaut putat ; fuperefl*e eoim oaturalein cauCiaiyqac inhibetrepetitionem. (f) Echi tameoy qui pro filio famllias fine voluntate patris ejus inrerceiTeruntnon re- petent | acqoin pcrpetua cxceptione tati funt. S«d et ipfe filiut et tamen pon repecit t quia hi demum folntHm non repetant, qui ob pKoam crediiorum adione liberantuTi non qttonitm exonerare cot lex voluit. Qjianqoam autcm folvendo non rapecunt. L. 9. Quia natoralit obtigadonwoet. L. 10. (mmiirae non retentc repetitinnem ron Im- pedit. It autem qui fciens fe |)on*e rctiitere [oDivexfum reftitoit] coodidlootm oon habet t Quinetlain jni ignoiaverit cefla repetitio. (/) Vide ante, 437. (r)H«c conditio es bono ct «quo IntradoQa quod alterms apod alteram fioectnft teprcbenditur, tevocare confuevit. yi) QuKCttD^ue per cicepiionem perinu poflunti ia compeQlatioaefl) noiiTCfuant Numb. XVin.] Of Mifiakes of Law. 441 §1.^ ie pecun. con/Hu (a). L. 7. ff. defidej. (i)« ^e pnetor, if the fad is clear, does not allow an aAion for it \ in a doubtful cafe he only allows it fubje£i to the exception, X*. nam^ po/tquam. q.f, de jurej. ic). by which he (hews that it is not confidered as a debt, and who can fuppofe, that if it is paid by niiftake, it is not fubje£l to repetition ? For it is a firft rule of equity, that one man ought pot to be enriched by the detriment of another. Z. nam hoc 14* de cond. indeb, {d). Therefore if any perfon fhould obtain a pro- mife from another by fraud, I cannot think that what is paid on account of fuch a promife, although by error of law, can be re- tained, and that a man fltall be allowed to take advantage of his own iniquity, upon the mere pretext that the money was paid by the other party> under an ignorance that he would have been pro- tefted by an exception of fraud or fean And that we may not appear to fpeak without authority, the text of L, 7. jf, de cond. ob turp. caufam. {e\ where Pomponius fays, that, if money is ex- uded on account of a ftipulation extorted by force, it is a cafe for repetition, is evidently decifive upon that fubjed. And Julianus anfwers after Ncrva and AtilicinuSy that money paid by a perfon who fuppofed himfelf toowc it, when be could have been proteflcd by an exception of fraud, may be reclaimed. L, qui fe debere. *]• ff.de eondic, caufa data.{f) There arc fimilar paffages inZ,. cum. is 3a. ji.{f) L.ft quis 43. (A) L^ftfidej. s^.ff. de cond. indeb. (1) L. 5. 4:od. («) Vide Mte» 438. (6) Quod eotiQ folutttm repeci dou potefti coovenient eft hujai otturalit obligationif ^dejaflbicai accipi pofle. ((} Nam poftquaoi juratutn eft, dm^garur a^io : aot fi cootfoterfio crit, id eft, ft am- ^l^tur, an ju8jur«&duin datum fiC| exceptiooi locus eft. ^d) Vide antr, 410. («) Ex ea ftipttlaiioct, ^uae per vim eitorCa efler, fi exada cflct pecnnia, repetitloBev ffle conftaf. (/) QS^^ ^ debtre pecuniam malieti potabat, juITu ejus, dotis nomine promt fit fponloy et folvit} noptiae deinde non iDtercciffruDt : qusftiom eft, utrum ipfe poieft tcpccem, [earn] pecuotam, qui dcdiftet, an mulier } Nerva et Atil'icinttfl refponderunt, quuniaa pataflet qoidem dcbeic pecuniam, fed eiceptione doli mali tueii fe poCoitTer, iufum ra* pctituram, fed fi com fciret fe nihil mitlmi debere promifit, mulierii efle adionem» aaoniam pecuoia ad earn perdneret ; fi autem vere debitor fuidet, e( ante noptiaa (blviflcC« et noptue fecotae non fuilTent, ipfe poflit condicere, caufa debiri intrgra mulicre ad hoc Iblttoi. manenu, at »d nihil aliud debitor compelbtur, oifi ut cedat ci condl^llcia Bdionc (^) Fidejuflbr, com {MCilTitar, ne ab eo pecnnia petarnr, et per ittprudentiam folverit condicere ftipulatori potertt : et ideo reus quidem maoet obligatua, ipfe auttm fua cicep. done tutus eft \ nihil ^im intereft fidejullor an heres ejus fotfat* Quod fi huic fidejuilbii S«ttf herci eztiterit et fotYcrit, nee repetet et liberabitur. (5) Si quia juraflet ft dart non> •fftrtere^ ab omni contentSone dlfceditvr : atqne itt lUutam pecuDiam repcti pofie detenduum eft. (I) SI fidejuflbr jure UbentQ9| folverit errore pecantam, repeteati Donoberttj fi veto W^ pronitcendi per errorasi et tpft po.1ea pecualam foUerit^ aoa fcpetet, cum prior Macio* 443 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVUL cod. eod. {a). And it is evident that in thefe paiTages, the queftion is refpe£ling error of law, as they relate to the ad^s of the party himfelf) and no perfon can be ignorant of his own a£^s without the grofTed negligence, and an ignorance of that kind is fimihr to an ignorance of law. X.. 9. ^ 2*ff. dejur. etfoB. ign, {b). for no perfon can pretend to be ignorant of his own ads. L.'j.ff. ad fenat. VelL (r). adde L. tnandatumy 57- ^. mandat. {d), L. I. pr^Jfn tit in pojf. leg. (f )• I am alfo influenced by the conlidera- tion that in the whole title of tlie PandeSsy de cendic. indeL althoH^ it is rather diffufe, the right of repetition is ueTcr applied folcly to error of fad> or denied to error of law, but is referred generally to error, whether what is paid was not due in any fenfe, or whether the claim of it could be repelled by a perpetual except tion ; fo that it is to be underftood that the right of itpetition is not prevenfted by the nature of the error, but by the kncwl^e of the perfon .making the payment and by diat only, as is clearly proved as well by the laws i. $ i. {f). Ji mnfortem 26* § %.ff. tod. (g). as by the reafon which is affigned, why a perfon cannot reclaim iolnuOf qa» fuit biUa, natunlc ?1nculiu& non diflblvit* nee civile, 6 reos promiu^ Unebatur. ^(«) Slapatre rm)ncip4tos, ei non intra tea^ra pntftitata jiut hooorario fueeefifti quidquld iadebitum poliea per errorem (utpote patch fucceilbii) dedifti ejus condidioBeB, tibi competere non eft incerti juris* {h) Sed fafii igaorantia ita denum cvique non nocet, ft non ci funma negligcnlia ebjiclatur ; quid enim fi omnes in civicatc fcianti quod ille folut Ignorat ? £t rede Labeo dcfinlt fcienciam neque curiofiflinu neque ocgltgentiifiini hominia acciplcndam ; voiud ejus qui ejdn rem diiigcnter inquirendo not^m habere poQit. (r) Quanquam igiturfidejuflTor, doli replicatiane pofita^ defenfioDen» eaceptiooii amk- tat, nullam tamsn repiicationem^advcrrus mulreiem habcblt*: quia fafii aon poteft igao- rantiam praeiendere. Sed non ttU iniquum, dart negortorum adioaem in dcfentbren ^ quia mandati caufa per Senatttt-conAiltum conftitoitur irri», ec petunia flAejuflbiis liberatur. (J) Mandatum diflrahendorum fervoruro, defunftOf qui mandatun fofc«pit» intercidifle conftliit; quooiam tatnen heredes cjuierrore lapfi, non animo itnpdi fied cxfeqoea<}^ quod defundus fiue fecerat, fervos vendideraot* eos abemptoribus ofiicaptot vidcri placujt : icd vendiciarom ex provincia rcTcrfum, Publiciana adione non utiUier adorunii cans cxceptiojuili flomlnii caufa cognita deturi neque opporieat euoiy ^oi ccrti hominis fidcm elegir, ob errorera auc inDpsritiam heredum, adfici daoino. («) Si quis, cum vecitas eflet fitis accipere, acciperit an repeci fatifdatio lAa poffity ■! kerrs condicat libcratlonem ? £t quidem £A] fcieos hercs lodcbiittfla cavity repetcre son poflity quid deinde fi ignoiavic remiflTam fibi fatisdationem poteft condiccre. Si vero hoc non potuiiTe remit ti crediderUy nunquid condicere poffit, qui jut ^noiavit; adboc tamen benigce quit dixerit fatirdationrm condici pode. Quid dcind^ fi commifla fit iiipulaiio ? Fidejuirores putamus exceptione uti poHey an noo } ct magb eft, [nt] utaattt exceptione : quia ex ea caufa ioterceOit fatifdatio, ex qUa non deblML lf)f.t quidem ft quis indebitum igoorans folvit^ per hanc adionem ooadlcere pottft i fed n fciens fe non debere folvit, cel]*at repetitio. ig) Supra duplum autem ufurae et ufuranim ufarci nee in ftipuladonen dedoci ace cxigi poITuQt ; ct fclutflc re^ctuntury qucaadmodtmfiitorarttmiifiuanuD ttfiuv. 4 ■ what Numb. XVin.3 Of Miftakes of Law. 443 what he has paid knowing it not to be due from him, viz. that he is prefumed to have given it. i. 53.^. de reg.jur. (a) L. 7. cod. de cond. ob eauf dat. which certainly cannot be faid of a perfon who thought himfelf under the obligation, and necefllty of paying. X. i. fr.ff. ut in pojfi leg, (3) the refciflion of a fecurity is allowed, in cafe it was given by one who was ignorant of the law, but denied, if it was given knowingly. In the laft place, I am chiefly influenced by the kntimtnt oi Papinian, in L. S. ff. dejur. etfaB.ign. (r), that ignorance of law is not injurious to any one in refpe£l to lof- ing what belongs to him, (amittend^ reifita:). This appears to me plainly to indicate, that what is paid even by an error of law^ without being due, may be reclaimed \ for if we deny this, we mud necefiarily acknowledge, that an error of law does fubje£l a man to the lofs of what belongs to him, in oppofition to the judgment of Paplnian. Neither do I fee how any anfwer can be given to this argument without a cavil : for certainly the anfwer which rs given in fapport of the modern opinion, viz. that the perfon mak* ing the claim does not contend de re amittenda, but de re amissa, is nothing more ; for if a man, by paying through a miftake of law what is not due from him, fo lofcs his property as to have no recovery, then his midake has the effeft of injuring him in damno atniitenda ret fua* . And the queftion relates not to the time of inftituting the a£lion, but to that of making the payment, and JPapinian denies that a perfon miftaking the law thereby lofes his property, that is, fo that he can never recover it. And it is almoft {tantum non^) ridiculous to fay, that a perfon would derive a gain from his error of law, merely by recovering his own property back 9gain, for that having been transferred to another, it would be a new acquiiition. * As if a man did not fuflfer any lofs in the de- privation of his property, {quaft damno non afjiciatur] qui dominium rei/ua amittit^) or the reparation of a lofs was to be regarded as a gain. Nothing can be faid to be a gain^ except after deducing the lofs \ and the adiion in queftion is only for recovering the amount of the. lofs that has been fuftained. And the declaration of Papi^ nian in Z.. T*ff- dejur. etfaEl. ign. {d), that ignorance of the law, is of no detriment to perfons feeking their own, is referable to aU who only endeavour to avoid a lofs. Neither is the L.ffidejujfor. %9* $ I.^. mand. (/). at all at variance with this decifloni for there the cafe is propofed of two perfons, each contending for the avoidance of a lofs \ a debtor who was intitled to a perpetual ex* ception, and a "furety, who, with a knowledge of the fa£^s, dif- ^barged the amount of the debt \ and it is ruled that in this cafe the (4) vide tntei 4)7« (() Vide aote, 441. (t) Vide ante, 412. ^ (i/) Videaate, 41 »• («} Vide aa(e, 41 \% furety 444 APPENDIX. [Numb. XVUT. furety has not any a£lion mandati againft the debtor, but nothing is faid with refpeft to his right of repetition againft the creditor. The fame paflages clearly {hew the error of thofe who maintain that there is no difference between a knowledge and an ignorance of the law. Suppofe the peifon who receives the money mif- takes the law, (hail he be charged with theft {a) ? Or if he knows tliat the money is not due to him and yet pretends that it iS) (hall he be free from that imputation, on the ground that the other party *who miftakes the law, is to be regarded as having a£led knowingly, and as having made a donation. V'td. L, ^4onsam, i8.^. de cond.furtw. {b) L.falfus^ 43' P^* jf- defurt. (r) What then is the conclufion ? An error of the law is of no avail to thofe who are defirous of making an acquifltiou. d. L.^i^f. dejur. etfaBAgn. of which there are examples, in L. /^.ff. eod. {d), i. Jo.ff. de henor. poffl {e)* L, nunquam^ Z^'ff' ^ Hf^^^P^if) -i- H- <^- dejur. etfaB. igfu (^). but it is no detriment to thofe who only feek their own property, and contend againft the injury of loGng it. d, L* 7. tt d. L. 8. And what is faid in law 9*^. W. (£). that ignorance of the law is injurious, is to be underftood as meaning that it ihall not afford any advantage, that (hall not be attended with any gain *, but not that it fliall be adualiy produdive of lofs. For it muft be remembered that error of law, as was before obfervcd, only prevents a party from being deprived of the right of repe- tition, provided there is not any natural obligation. But if the payment was founded upon fuch a debt, as would give a juft ground of retention to the perfon who received it, the diftinflion is to be made between error of law and error of izfk \ and a re<- petition is to be allowed in the latter cafe, but not in the former. {a] The term thcfti (furtum) has a much more extenfi?e application in the Rtwuu than in the Engiifi law. (^) Qi^oniam furtum fir, cum quii Indebitot nummot fciens acceperit, videndum H pro* tuia(Gr fuot numroos fulvaty an ipfi furtum fiat ? £t Pomponius £pilloUruro» lih. 8. ipfum condicere ait ex caufa futtiva : frd ct rre condicere, fi ratum habeam, qucd inde^ ^itum datum fit ; fed altera condtAione altera lollitur; (c) Falfui Creoitor (hoc eft ii, qui fe fjmutat creditotem») fi quid accepcrit, furtum fecitf nee nummi ejus iicnr. (^) Juris i^noiaotiam in ufucapiione nrgatur prodefTe $ fiiEti itro ignorant'^m pro» delTe conflat. («) In bon >rttm pofTeffionibus Jotis ignorantia non prodefl', quo minus dies cedar, rt ideo heredi ioililutOy et ante apertat labulai dies cedit : fatiacft enim, fctre mortuom dlc^ firque pnximam cogn^tum tu'lfe, copiamque eorum* quos confuleret, habuiHe ^ fcientlam citim non (hunc) accipt, qua jurifprudenribus fit} fed earn quam quia aut per fe habeat» •ut confulendo prudeotiores adfequi poteft. '/) Vide, ante, 413. is) Qh*'"**^* '** ^"^'^ °'^ faminii jut ignorantjbu* fubvenlri foleat ; attamen coona xxitem imperfc^am locum hoc ncn habere retio Principum ftatuta declarant. [b] PtCj^uU cA ju-fi ^ifidcm ign9ren:iim cuijut ntccrf, fa^l vera ig/ioranlUm aoff neeert. Therofore Numb. XVin.] OfMiJiakes of Lav). 445 Therefore If I have borrowed money whilft under the authority of my father, and paid it after becoming my own mafter, I am not intitled to repetition if I only miftake the law, but it is otherwife if I miftake the fa6^. Arg, L* qui exceptwnem^ 40. de cond. indeb. {a)» L. 9. in Jin, cum L. fequent. juB. L. u/tim, de fenatus conf. Macadon (3). I difcharge a truft impofed by the will of a teilator, which is defective for want of the proper number of witnefles (r). $ uh. inft. dejideicom, hered. (rf). I pay the whole of a legacy without retaining a fourth to which I am intitled by the lex Falcidia. I am intitled to repetition in cafe of error in fa£t, but not of error in law. ' X. 2. cod.Ji adv.folut. (<)• Zr. f^cod. decond. indeb. (/")• L, 9. C. ad leg, Faldd, {g)* not merely becaufe I am bound by my error of law, but becaufe the natural obligation arifing from the will of the teftator, gives a juft caufe of retention. Arg. L. 2. C defideicom. (£). Z.« in teftamentot 38.' de fidei libertat. (1). L. ^. ^Jl quisf iS*ff* ^^ ^^^' *^^^^ ^** ^ ^^^' (*) -^^^ ^ think the fame fen- timent is intended to be conveyed by Grotius, lib, ^, introd, ad {m) Vide ante, 416. (^) Hi qui pro filio familias fioe voluntate patris e}ut intercefTetunt folvendo non re- peteot. Hocenimet Divos HadrianiM conftituU et poteft dici non repetituros. Arquiti pcrpetua ezcepUoac loU funt^ fed et ipfe filius ct camen non repetit : qu<« hi demum folu* tuna noo lepctont, qui ob paeoam credilorum aAiooe libcrantur, noo quoaiana exonerare eos lex voluit $ 5. QjumquaoB autem folTcndo non repetant 1. 9. Quia naturalii obligatio, I. f o. {<) SI it» cttiy dum 10 patria poteftate eflet^ mutua pecunia data fuerat, pater fami' liaa faAus, per ignorai^tiaiii fadl, novatione fada, earn pecuniam expromis tc fi petitu^ ex ea ftipttlacione» in fortum excipieadum erit (J) Thia fe^oo haa not any relation to the right of repcticloo. (f) Indebito legato licet per errorem juria a minore foJuto repeiitioneai ei decern! \ S •ecdom temputy quo reftitutionis triboitur auxUiumi exceflerit, rationis eft. {/) Vide, ante, 437. {l) Vide ante, 440, ^b\ Et fi inutiiiter fidejcommiirum rcliftum fit, taroen 11 hercdes comperta Toluatate defunfli) praedU ex caufa fideicommim avo (uo prsftiterunt ; frufira ab hercdibut ejusdc ea re quaeftio tibi moTetur, cum non ex ea Tola fcriptura, fed ex confcientia reU^ fidei- aomniiffi defoaAi ?oluntati fatiifadum tfft videatur. (i) la teftamento quod perfeAum non erat* alumnae fuae libertatem et fideicommilTa dedity com omnia ut ab intcftato egilTent, quaefit imperator an [nt] ea caufa 6deicom« miffi manumifla foiflet ? Et inter locutus eft. Etiam ji mbtlah inteflato pater paiffit^ prUtt taminfilm wunumltttrt tarn fuau pattr diiixifit ; proounciavit igitur, fi^e earn manumiffsm tt idn fiJtUomwttJa etiam ei profftatida, (k) Si quia rogatua fit» fraceft* certa fugtitifate, uxtrifua bereditatem rtftituere^ et is fine deduQioac reftituerit, Celfus, lib. 10. Digeftorum fcripfit, magii pleniore officio lidci praeftandae funAum maritum^ qnam donaflety videri. £t re^am ratioDem huic fen* tentia Celfua adjecit, quod plerique magia fidem exfolrunt in hunc cafum, qoam dooant s aec de fuo potant proficifci quod de alleno plenius reftituunt, voluntarem defundli fecutiy nee immerito fcepe credimua aliquid defunddm voluiiTe et tamen non rogaflfe. Que fenteotia habet ratianem magia in eo^ qui non erat deduAa quaru rogatua reftituere, et tamea Integram fidem praefthiti omilTo fenatus confulti commodo: hie enim vere (idea cxfoUity voluntatem teftaiorit obfecutus. Hoc ita, fi non per eirorem calculi foeiti ccetemm indcbiti fideiccmmifli cflb repeUtiofica nulla dubitatio e.l. jurijp. 446 APPENDIX- [Numb-XVIIL jurifpr. Batav^ c, 30. And it is to thefe ar otlier cao&s of a fimi- lar nature^ that we ihould apply the pailages in the code^ in which a right of repetition is denied in cafe of error of law, or confined to cafes of error in fa£);, as in L, 10. cod, de jur. et faB. ign. (j). L, 6. cod. de cond* itideb. (^). For the mere circumftance of mj having miflaken the law, does not alone give you a juft reafon for retaining what was not in any manner due to you ; and in this €afe it is better to favour the right of repetition, than the acquifi^^ tion of an adventitious gain. L.41, §1, ^. de reg.jur. (r) («) Vide Mte, 414. (^) Si per i^nountiaiB hSti turn dcliitao qaiatiutemy pro alio folvifti^ et hecadito TcAorepioiiacisfueric proiiacuiDyhiiic ci» cujas aomiae fohtu eft, rcftttui co ignite pro- -videbit. (r) Melitti eft fiieit repetittoni qoam adTentitio locro. ( 447 ) NUMBER XIX. SELECTIONS FROM THE PLEADINGS OF D'AGUESSEAU. SiyCE the greater part of this volume was printed^ it has oc^rred to me to embrace the opportunity of ivferting t1^ two following fpedmens of the pleadings of U Aguejfeau^ in his chamber of Advocate Ge- ueraL The nature of thefe cotnpo/itions^ as being the counfels of an affeffor t9 the parTiament of PariSf is explained in the preliminary obfervations rfthe preceding number of the Appendix^ and alfo in the general In*^ troduBion to the prefent work. The fir/l of the following feleHions is an entire pleading upon the quejlion of legitimacy^ in a cafe where the adultery of the wife was clearly manifeft^ and there was confiderahle reafon to infer ^ hut not ab^ folate ground to conclude^ the mn-^iecefs of the hujband^ I have fixed upon this produilion as an in/lance of co^incidence with the Engli/h lawy and as a perfpicuous explication of the general principles which pre- vail with refpeBto thp important fuhjeB of the difodffion. The other is an abridgment of the two pleadings ^ in the cafe of the Princes de Conty, from which I had inferted a few extraSs in the courfe 4jf the prefent volume^ previous to my forming the intention of giving this more extenfive view of them. The following is a flight fketch ofthefubjeBs embraced in this caufe : The Duke de Longuevtllcy who was alfo Abbe d* Orleans ^ being a per» fin of a weak frame of mind^ hut having a teftahle capacity^ made a will by which he gave his property to his brother the Count de St. Pol, whom he in/lit uted his heir s and in cafe of his death without iJfuCf he in/tituted his mother Madame de Jjongueville as heir, praying her at her deceafe, to £J^ofe of the property in favour of his Couftns German the Princes de Contyj and by a general ciaufe dirtying that his willjbould avail as a te/lament, a codicil, or in any other way by which it lawfully might. Afterwards he niade another will, whereby 448 APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. the right y before intended for the Prifices de Cantj, tvould in efeSI di" vUve upon Madame de Nemours^ bis halfjifler as heir by bloody hut tuhich latter ivUl was impeached on the ground of infanitj / and it was an undifputedfaH^ that he was in a very fiort time aftenvari^ in ttfiate of abfplute madnefSf which continued until his deaths dur^ ing a period of fever al years i the Count de St* Pol, and Madam ek Longueville^ having died before him. The firfi pleading was upon an appeal from afentence upon a fiat ht/Htuted by the Prince de Conty^ and admitting him to prove by wit- neffeSf tit incapacity of the te/Iator at the time of the fecond will: it being the courfe of the law of France not to allow a proof by witRefes, without an exprefs fentenccfor the purpofe. Upon the hearing of this appeal ^ thefirfl queflion waSy with refpeB to the validity of the title of the Princes de Conty, under the former will^andin' volved a difcuffton of the general rules of the Roman Law^ re/peHifig tefia- tnentarydifpoftionsy which was followed in the Province where the quef- tion arofe. Originally a will could only be made by the inftitution of em heir^ and in cafe of the death of the injlituted heir before the iefaior^ §rhis refufal of the fucceffion^ the wMe nmll became void; afierviarii the ufe offubfitutions was invented ^ by which a different heir might he appointed^ in cafe of the fucceffion not being taken by the firfl ; but iiis was merely an alternative^ and if thefirfl did take the fucceffion^ the fubftitution could not attach. At a latter period fideicommiffa' ivere invented^ by which the inflituted heir was directed to re/lcre the fuc- ceffion to a third party. Thefe were analogous ^ partly to trufis^ and partly to limitations in remainder in the Engli/h LaWf but {reverfn^ the cafe of a fubjlitution) could not take effect , unlefs the fucceffion bad been taken by the inflittited heir. A codicil {according to oneftgnification of the term) is of nearly cetempo^ • raryHnflitution^ and it a prayer ^ which has an obligatory force addreffed to the heir by bloody to perform the difpofttions which it contains ; and a claufe dire fling that a teflameut fball take effeB^ as a codicil {called a codicillary claufe) gives the tejlameni the fame effeB as a proper codicil. The points e/labli/hed in the appeal are^ that the difpofttion to the Princes de Coniy was afidei commiffum^ and as the heir firfl infUtuteJ^ and the heir who wasfubfitutedy both died befre the teflator^ it could not take effeEl in that charaEler^ but that by virtue of the codicillary claufe^ the difpofttion was obligatory upon Madame de Nemours, the heir by blood. This being ejlablifhedy the objeBions to receiving ^ proof by wiinejpi^ efthe incapacity of the teflato^ at the time of making the fecond nvitlt which were founded upon the reafonahlenefs of the will itfelf and upon certain other inflrunients executed about the fame time^ were taken int^ con/ideration, the general principles rcfpccfing the capacity oftejlators were Numb.XIX.3 SeleSlionsfromD^AgueJfeau. 449 nvere expounded^ anditwasjhewn thai aprorfby ivitnejfes was necejfary to elttctdate tbefd&j and that no conclufion ojfanity could be dranvnfrom the infiruments themf elves. The proof by witnejfes having been taken, a general fentence nuas pro* munced in favour (f the title under thefirft will, and fupporting the al'» legation of infanity as offering the fecond. And the fecond pleading is upon an appeal from that fentence. After examining feveraV exceptions to the witnejfes, it was firfl fbewn that the former fentence had effe5lively decided upon the validity of the firfi wills as the proof adduced only re^ lated to thefecondy and would have been nugatory, unlefs the court had eJlMi/bed the validity of the firfl. It was then fbewn that evenfuppof^ ingthe queflion to be entire, the fame concltifion ought to be drawn.* The general nature of the fanity requifite in cafes ofteftaments, andthe prin-^ ciples applicable to the proof of it, were fiated with more particularity^ Themferences arifingfrom nvritten infiruments were examined^ and it being then efiablififed that the cafe mufi be decided by witnejfes, the par-- tictdars of the evidence were obferved upon terminating in a conclufion ofthefaB of infanity ; and lafily, the argument that the will might be made during a lucid interval^ was dif cuffed and refuted. It will perhaps be thought that the conclufion of infanity might, under the eircumftances, have been drawn with much lefs difficulty, .as the faBsfeem toofirong to be reconciled with any other fuppofttion, and the ^^fi^<>^ may perhaps in other refpeBs be looked upon as toofiorid and diffufe ; but the knowledge, and ability, and eloquence which it exhibits, will, I hope, through all the imperfeBions of a tranfiation, difplay the very mafierly talents of its author. The abridgment which I have made conftfts in the omijfton of the ar^^ guments of counfelyof the refutation of an argument that the Prince de Conty was entitled to a decifion, independently of the effeB of the co^ Scillary claufe^ and of the repetition in the fecond pleading offomeofthe fiatements, and obfervations in the firfi. The pleadings as preferved are infaB only preparative notes, found in thepoffeffton of the writer at his deceafe, after an interval of 50 years. The pleadings aBually pronounced were not read, or repeated, butfpoken in the language fuggefiing itfelf at the time. It is f aid in a prefatory advertifementy that the fire which animated him at the time of fpeaking^ excited Jlill mere brilliant images, morefublime thoughts, more forcible refleEHons, than tbofe which prefented themfelves at the time of compo- fttion, fo that the pleadings which firihe the mofi in reading would have even afuperior firength and beauty, if it had been poffible to print them us they %vere pronounced. Vol. II. Hh CASE ( 4SO ) CASE OF THfe fclEUR BOUILLEROT de VINANTES (a),* The queftlon nlates to the Jlate of a child^ whofe mother had coth eeaUd her pregnancy ^ and had been condemned for adultery^ without tk fentenee declaring the child to be a bajlard ; the hujbatid having km only abfentfrom his wife three months. This caufe is as much difttnguiflied by the name and merit of thofe who have been engaged in it, as by its own importancei wluch has juftly attradied the attention and concourfe of the pub- lic. The arret which you are to pronounce will for ever eftabli(h the real principles for deciding upon queftions of parentage \ which arc the foHd foundations of the different dates of civil fociety. You have heard the fon of a guilty mother, dlfavowed by him whom he calls his father, imploring in your audience the authority of the laws, the force of prefumptions, the name and favour of marriage. ^ You have feen an unfortunate hufband, compelled to renew tfat recolle£iion of the crime of his wife and of his own difhonoor; always equally to be commiferated if you pronounce againft him, whether blinded by his paffion he difavows his own blood, or obliged by the authority of the law to acknowledge as his fon, one whom adultery has introduced into his family. A third party appears in the caufe, but it is only to increafe the doubt and uncertainty of it ; and the deftiny of tlie child whofc Hate is the fubje£^ in difpute, isfo unfortunate that he cannot find a certain father, either in the honourable conne£lion of marriage, or in the criminal engagement of adultery. Great as his misfortunes are, he (hould look forward to a more favourable deftiny, fmcc in his defence an illuftrious proteAor has entered upon a career, wliich will be equally glork>U9 to himfelf^ {s) This p*eadins. «ai proflOTQCCi ill J693 } ud it ihf »3d b the paatcd coU Numb. XIX.J Seleilionsfrom D^AgueJfeau. 451 and advantageous to the public {a) • His name alone will be a favour- able omen to thofe whofe interefts he fupports, and his merit will not require the afilftance pf his name, to render him the ftrength of the weak, and the afylum of the unhappy. What muft have been the joy o£ that great man who revives in him, if he could have been witnefs of this aufpicious oiitfet, and ieen the heir of his name defend the caufe, of the pupil whom he had taken under his protedion, with the fame eloquence which you daily admire in him, who, in the advancement of juilice, fup- ports with fo much dignity the caufe and the interefts of the pub- lic. Such is the recompencc which heaven allots to virtue, fuch are the benedictions which the Scripture has promifed to the juft, and has accomplifhed in the perfon of that great Magiftrate, whoiie name will endure as long as this aflembly. Ecclefia/Hc, Ch. 35. — ^4. Mmrtuus efty et quaft non efl mortuus : Jimtlem enim reliquitJibipQ/lfe. . The iz(k which gives rife to the prefent conteft, is as clear as the decifion upon it is important. Nicholas Bouillerot, Jteur de Vinantes, Maitre JTHotel of the duchefs of Orleans^ in the year 1664 married Maru^Anne de LauMy who was then about 12 or 13 years of age. This marriage, which was happy in its commencement, was followed by the birth of feven children whofe ftate is certain : death has taken away five of tliefe, two of them only now remain, and the appelbnt in- fills that he is a third. Whether the condudi of the Damede Finanta was for a long time innocent, or whether her irregularities were kept fecrct, nothing appears to have difturb^d the tranquillity of the marriage until the year 1690, or rather until the birth of the appellant. His birth, which confirmed the fafpicions that the hufband had already conceived againft his wifct appears to have determined him in pre- ferring an accufation of adultery. We ihall ftate in the fequel, with more particularity, the cir^ cumftances which accompanied the birth of this child, and the in- ferences which have been drawn from them, to prove that he owes his life to the criminality of his mother. But we cannot for- bear obferving at prefent, that his birth was for a long time con- cealed, and that the knowledge of it was ftudiouily withheld from the hun)and, from the public, and the church ; that even tho ntirfe to whom he was intrufted was not informed of the fecret of his origin } and that he would not even yet have received the cere- mony of "baptifm, if the cure {b) of theparifli, being apprized of the ■ (tf ) M. Chretien de Lamoignon^ fon of M. de Lmoigaofi i lh«o firll AdTOcaiB Gea«» sal, and graadfon of the firft prefideat Lamoif nwt {h) Anfwcrios to RcQor. H h a ncg^cStf 452 APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. negle<£t> had not urged the Dame de VinanUs at length to acknow- ledge her quality of mother, by having the child baptized in her name. The circumftances of this baptifm are the ftrongeft proofs which are oppofed to the child whofe (late is in difpute. Three months after his birth, an unknown woman of another parifh, brought him at lo o'clock in the evening, of the year 1690^ to the church of la Pcrte Loupiere ; {he declared that he had been baptized {a) ; that he was the fon of Marie de Laune^ wife of the Zieur de Vinantes\ ((he did not name thefatheri) no relations were prefent at this ceremony. The nurfc was the god-mother, the beadle the god-father, and tlie fpiritual birth of the appellant in the church was as much concealed as his natural birth was obfcure. The nurfe took him thence with her with the fame fecrecy. But what- ever care was taken to conceal this ceremony, the (hades which kept the knowledge of it from the hufband were removed. The birth of this child, the myftery with which he was bringing up, the obfcurity of his baptifm, awakened his former fufpicions, and he thought it time to inllitute the charge of adultery againft his wife. He rcprefented to the Lieutenant Criminal, the juft complaints which he alleged himfelf to have againft his wife. He ftatcd that he (hould equally betray the interefts of his own honour, and that of his real children, if he any longer deferred demanding vengeance of a crime which was but too certain. He ftated all the circum- ftances, the fufpicious rcfidence of his wife in a houfe in the coun- try, the continual vifits of the SiVi/r ^inquet^ the fecret birth of an illegitimate fon, conceived during his abfence, and who could only be regarded as a living proof of the irregularities of the mother. The hufband was fo unfortunate as to prove by a great number of witneflTcs the fcandalous deportment of his wife. They men- tioned fcveral important fadls ; the pregnancy concealed from the public ; the (till more fecret delivery 5 the &teur ^inquet alone apprized of the birth of the child whom he difavows ; his almoft parental cares ; the repeated confefHons which the mother had made of her criminality ; and her contradictory declarations refpe&ing the ftate of her fon. All thefc grave, important, and deci(ive fafls, obliged the judges to award a judgment for her apprehenfion. Condu£led to the prifons of the ChdteUtj (he at firft confefTed her crime, and fooa afterwards repenting of her fincerity, (he furnUhed, by her denial, (Irongcr p:x>ofs againft herfelf, and even againft her fon, thai| (he had done by her acknowledgment. {A Tfvir 11 rpriakled, (ordoye»] u sppeats.bj tb; fequel. Note ia the orlsiaal. Numb* XIX.J Seleilions from D^AgueJfkau* 453 Her'procefs was carried on and perfedied } the witnefles were examined and confronted \ never was a crime more clearly proved % the fentences of the firft judges> condemned her to all the puniih- jnents direfted by the authentic. The property of her portion was adjudged to her children, the ufufrudi to her hulband. The Sieur ^uifuptet was condemned to baniflimentfor contumacy. The appeal which Marie de Laune inftituted againft this judgment ferved only to render her difgrace the more public. The fentence was confirmed by an arrit^ to which there has not even yet" been any oppofition. ^uinquet was more fortunate; he furrendered ; he purged his contumacy ; he appeared criminali but the number of ofienders» and the forbearance of the huiband during a long fcene of public difturbance, excufed or diminiihed his crime. The fecond fen- tence moderated the punifliment pronounced by the firft ; and the court foftening ftill farther the feverlty even of the latter judgment, condemned him only to pay the hufband his cofts. Such, Sirs, was the commencement^ the progrefs, and the termi- nation of the accufation preferred by the hufband againft his wife, and againil the laft accomplice of her mifcondud. It is time, however, to ftate the procedure which was inftituted, to aflure the ftate of the child, who had received his birth during the long continuance of the illicit intercourfe, between the Dame de Vinantes and the &eur ^itnquet. Whether Maria Berthelot^ his nurfe, was abfolutely ignorant who ^nras the real father, or whether her ignorance was only aiFedled, flic at firft required to be paid for her care of the child, by Mag- deleim Landry^ who had placed him with her immediately on his birth. Magdeleine Landry declared that the child did not belong to her, and that ihe had done nothing except by order of the Dame de Vinantes^ to whom the nurfe muft look for payment. Upon this declaration, the nurfe aiCgned the &ieur de Vinantes before the Bailli de MotUargu s and took the fame conclufions againft him. The caufe was referred to the Requeues du Palais. The father difavows the perfon who is alleged to be his fon, and demands that the Sieur ^inquet (hall be obliged to acknowledge him. A tutor was appointed for the child, to defend his Itate. The caufe was folemnly pleaded at feveral audiences. A fen- tence was pronounced, appointing a difcufllon of the principal queftion, and dire£^ing, that in the mean time the child (hall be pTovifionally allowed the fum of 500 livres a-ycar, from tlie pro- perty of bis mother. Hh 3 The 454 APPENDIX. • [Numb. XIX. The parties hare refpe£lively appealed from this appointment. Each fide equally demand an abfolute judgment in their own fa* vour ; and contend that the caufe will never be more ripe for judgment than it is at prefent, and that you ought now either to confirm the ftate of the child> or reftore to an unfortunate hut band the tranquillity which he has been deprived of, by the cri* minal condu£i of his wife. On the part of the child whofe ftate is conteftedy you have heard the different kinds of proofs which were introduccdi by cuftom, in an age of ignorance, to prove the reality of birth, and to aflure the legitimacy of children, and without dwelling upon thofe ar- guments which are always equally uncertain and dangerous, the cafe was refted upon an explication of the principles eftabliflied hj the Roman jurifprudence, or rather by equity and public utility. Of however great importance the certainty of filiation and legitimacy may be, it mud be admitted that nature refufes the proof of it, becaufe it depends upon the unknown moment of con- ception. Such is the difpofition of the laws, and tliis maxim is not ^ vain fubtilty of the juriits ; it is a principle founded upon natural reafon, and common to every fyftem of jurifprudence. In deftdl of legitimate proofs, txrcourfe muft be had to prefump- tions. If'thcfc are of great importance in other cafes, they arc decifive with rcfptSt to filiation, and it is with that view that the laws have fixed the number, and determined the nature of tliem. The mother is always certain, the father is uncertain. Where amidft this uncertainty (hall we find tlie rule for aifuring the ftate of children, but in the legitimate prefumption, which the name of marriage induces in favour of thofe who are born under its facrcd proteftion? L. ^.ff* d^ in jus. vocando* Pater is eft quern nuftU de^ menftrant. The dignity of marriage, the prefervation of families, the order of fuccellions, the unanimous concurrence of writers; eftabliflied this rule as an inviolable principle \ your arrets have always fol- lowed it in their dlfpofitions, and as the law gives it the whota force qf its authority, it can never be invalidated except in thofq cafes, whidi aro indicated by the law itfclf. Juiifts recognize only two circumftances, which canbalimce thq force and authority of this prefumption. The firft, is the abfence of the hufband ; the fecond, an in-, firmity which will not fuflfcr him to ckim the name of a father. Whatever colour may have been given tp this caufe» it is impofGblc Numb. XIX.] Sekdions from D^Agueffeau. ASS Impoffible that either of thefe exceptions can be applied to it. The argument deduced from the abfence of the Sieur de Fin- antes f i$ a frivolous pretext^ deftroyed by the circumftances that were adduced to eftablifh it. It 18 true that he was abfent for three months> but the pregnancy of his wife might have preceded his abfence, or been fubfequent ta his return, without infringing the rules of nature or probability \ and befidesi when the diftance between the place of his refidence,^ and that of his fervice,' was fo inconfiderable, who can tell whether he w^s always feparated frooi his wife, and whether his continuance at Paris would ever be conCdered as interrupted i If this abfence cannot juftify his difavowal of his fon, what weight is there in the other arguments, by which he would ex- clude Ae light of truth? If it is contended that the arret which adjudges the mother to be criminal, has declared the fon to be illegitimate, it is anfwered in the firft place, that the child was no party to this arrity and in cafe it is adduced againfl: him, he formally declares his oppofition to it ; but further, he maintains that it cannot be regarded as any ' prejudice againft him ; that no confequence as to his ftatc can be drawn from the crime of his mother, and that flie might be guilty without his being illegitimate. The difpofition of the law, Mlles^ II. $ 9* ad legem Juliam de AdulteritSy may be fuccefsfully applied to this caufe. Non utique crimen adulterii quod mulieri ohjiciiur^ infanti prajudicaty cum pojjit et ilia adultera ejfe^ et impubes defmiElum pat rem habuijfe. In'fafl fo far is this arrft from containing any thing which can be oppofed to him, that he conceives it to be entirely in hif favour. The hufband, blinded by his paflion, feeks to punifli the mother in the perfon of her child ; he difavows his own fon ; he alleges his birth as one of the principal proofs of the adultery. The procefs is inftituted. The prcfumptions, the indicia^ the conje&ures are examined. The mother is condemned, but the fon is not excluded from the family of the hufband ; and this filence with regard to him is a formal judgment in his favour, fince having been bom during marriage, and not having been declared a baftard, he muft neceflarilybe a legitimate child. If the Sieur de Vinantes would oppofe to his fon the declarations of his wife, the fon will invoke in his favour the authority of the law, which does not fubje£l the ftate of children to the abfolute power of their parents, i^or, in a matter of fuch importance^ liften H h 4 \o 4S6 APPENDIX, [Numb. Ill, to declarations which are as fufpicious in hSt, as they are ufeleis in law. The perfon who makes thefe acknowledgments]; is a woman accufed of, a crime, animated by the defire of avenging herfdf upon her huiband, or intimidated.by the fear of the punifliment (be had merited, feeking to deprive her huiband of a legitimate hdrj or wi{hing to purchafe his clemency, at the price of the (late, and fortune of her fon. If the crime of the mother, the arrii which condemns her, the difavowal of the father, can never prejudice the quality of the appellant, he hopes that by afluring his (late, you vidll coniinn the moil authentic title by which the birth of children can be proved. But if the court has any diflSculty in pronouncing at prefent abfolutely in his favour, he maintains that the fentence of tho requites du palais^ muft at any rate be deemed invalid, becaufe it is repugnant 19 all the principles of law \ which unaniipoufly give provifion to thpfe in pofTefRon of their ftate, and befides that its execution is impoffible. It only allows aliment to the appellant, from the property of his mother. Now his mother has no pnn perty, (he loft it by her crime : it was adjudged tp her hufband, and to the other children whofe ftate is not difputed, and even if the court (hould defer the judgment of this caufe yntil the time of his majority, he infifts that the favour of the prefumption in his behalf, the quality of the conteft, and the very name of maniage are fudicient titles, for adjudging him a provifion until he is con^ firmed in the peaceable poiTeflion of his- ftate. However ftrong thefe confiderations may be, their authority is balanced by the very name of the father, in the perfon who oppofes them, by the judgment which he pronounces againft his aflerted fon, by the prefumptions which he borrows from the fadls, by the proofs which the declarations, and the condud): qf his ^ife, fumiih him with againft the ftate of the child, He admits that the authority of writers, and the jurifprudence of arrets^ feem to oppofe an inyincible obftacle to him, in the common and eftablifhed maxim, that Pater U ffi quern nuptia ie- tnotiflrant* It is however this principle which he calls in queftion. He offers to fhew that this rule, however general it appears, is not without exception, that it only forms a probable prefumption which may be deftroyed by evidence to the contrary. It is fuppofed tha\ the inclinations of a huiband and a wife are conformable to their ftate, aiid to the obie^ of their engagements The Humb.XIX.3 SekStimsfromD'Agueffeau. . 457 The law does not attend to the abfurd caprice of a bufband, Z. 6^ ff. di his quifui vtl al.jur. ^icum uxorefud affidue nwratus^ nolit filium agnofcere'j and whilft the birth of children can be afcribed to a legitimate fource, the law will not fuppofe criminality, in order to didurb the peace and repofe of families. Such is the nature of this prefumption ; probability and the ap- pearance of truth are the foundation of it } but as it frequently happens that nothing is more diftant from the reality of trudi than the appearance of it, and asfalfdhood itfelf has often the femblance of probability, this prefumption is like all others which depend upon the fame principle ; they may be deftroyed by other argu- pients, and if that probability from which they derive their only force, is combated by more folid reafons, the judges reje& thefe delufiye phantoms {fauffis lueurs^) to give their fuffrages to the real light of truth. This is the judgment even of the jurifts themfelves^ who autho- rife the prefumption. The title under which it appears is entirely foreign to queftions of ftate. The cafe in which it is propofed, has no relation to the quality of a legitimate child. If this rule had occuned under the title De Statu hominum^ and not in that de in jus. voccndo^ the jurift would have developed its principle, its confequences, and its exceptions i the purpofe for which it was mentioned, rather required it to be propofed than examined ; he thought it fufficient curforily to indicate it, and it is pot to be concluded from his filence that it can never be impeach* ed, fince this omiflion is fupplied in feveral other titles of the law. If we glance over all the difpofitions of the laws upon this fub«- je£t, we (hall find that the fame probability, which occaCons this principle to be eftabliflied, with regard to children born in mar- riage, has . induced the jurifts to extend it to children who owe their exiftence to a concubine.; and as in this laft cafe, nobody doubts but that the argument may be repelled, it ought to be acknowledged that it is of no higher authority in refpecl to marriage. The whole title de agnofcendU liberisf may be conCdered as a general exception to the rule. Pater efl quern nuptue demonftrant. The law diftinguilhes three kinds of cafes, in which the quality of filiation, and legitimacy, may be contefted. The child is born either during the marriage, or after the fepa- ration of the hulband and wife by a divorce \ or laftly, after the ^ilTolotion of the marriage by death. ^ow in all thef(p cafcs> the law teaches us that the ftate is not entirely 458 APPENDIX. [Numb.XIX. entirely aflured, that the mere name of marriage does not place it out of the reach of examination, that it may be aflailed by every kind of proof, that an oath may be required from the mother, and that even after (he has taken it, the legitimacy of the child may be difputed. The law makes no didinflion ; every kind of argument maybe received, inability, abfence of the hufband, enmity, forced ^r vo« luntary feparation, the difavowal or the acknowledgment of the father ; in a word, every proof refulting from the circumftances of the cafe, that natural convi^iion, thofe filent indicia, which time, or place, or perfons may furnifli upon thefe occafions, proofs the lefsfufpicious as tliey are the more fpontaneous. Juftice admits all thefe elucidations, and never did they occur in greater num- bers than in the prefent caufe. The crime manifeft, public, acknowledged, the abfence of the hufband at the time of the conception, the prefence of the adul- terer, the pregnancy unknown to the hufl)and, the domeftics and the neighbours, the birth of the child made d fccret, the ceremonies of his baptifm drferred, his nurture a fecret ; the denial of fo evident a faft, in the interrogatories of the mother. Who can believe that this child was the pledge of a legitimate union, when we fee a mother folicitous of concealmeht, placing ^er child in unknown hands, fearful that the confidents of her mif- fbrtunc might betray it, (lifling the fentiments of nature towards her own blood, acknowledging that the birth of the child is a necef^ fary proof of her guilt ; declaring to fome of the witneHes that he j6 not the fon of her hufband, renewing this declaration at the face of the altar, in the regifler of baptifms, which contains the moft folcmn proof of the ftate of individuals ? However great the favour of ordinary prefumptions may be, can It be compared to fo many different proofs, which are not Icfs flrong againft the Sieur ^inquet^ than agalnft the perfon to whom he has given exiflence? Accomplice in ^he diforders of the mo- ther, he alone was deemed worthy to witnefs the birth of the fon; depofitary of the fecret, he betrayed himfclf by his care in the nurture and maintenance of the child. It is hoped that you will not fuffer him to add to the injury, which he has done to the hufband, the mortification of giving him . heirs in fplte of himfelf, and obliging him to divide his fortune, between the children of his marriage, and the offspring of adultery, and treating as his fon one whom he can never regard, but as sk conft?nt proof of the infidelity of his wife. Laflly, the Sieur de ^inquet alleges in his favour the authority of your arrlt^ which docs not fubjeft him to any punifhroent. If Numb. XIX.] Sekilions fi^om D^Agueffeau. 459 V he is guikyi his guilt is divided with many others> and he is fur- prized to find the Sieur de Vinantes fixing upon him alone as the objed of hi^ fufpicions. He advances the fame principles which were urged on the part of the child. To thefe he adds circumftances of fa£t^ perfonal. to himfelf i he produces a certificate, tG^ihew that he was abfent at the fame time as the huiband. He contends that the parental cares which are now imputed to him, are fa£ls which may flatter tlie vengeance of an irritated hufband, but cannot detra£l from thofe inviolable rules which public order has eftabliflied, and which you never can maintain in any caufe more diftinguifiied and important than the prefent. With respect to ourselves, after having laid before you the refpc6live intcrefts, and the principal arguments of the parties^ it might feem that the natural order of the cafe would oblige us here to examine a preliminary queilion, which, in the Roman lawy always preceded the judgment in caufes of ftate, fuch as that at prefent before us; that is whether we ought at prefent to en- quire into the condition of the child, or defer the judgment until he attains his majority ? But this queftion appears to us of flight importance, and when we confider the ftate t)f the conteft, we do not fee any obftacle which requires you to fufpend the judgment of it. We know that the laws are watchful, to preferve the honour and dignity of families ; that they take minors under their protec- tion 'y that their weaknefs is the meafure of the defence afibrded to them ; and although their tutor is charged with all the circum- fpedtion of the law, and his power is compared to that of a father, and a mafter, the jurifts have deemed it dangerous, to allow the ftate of a child to depend upon the fidelity of his tutor, and hold that this important judgment which is to be decifive of the whole for- tune of his life, ought to be deferred to a more mature age, when the minor, capable of defending himfelf, can only impute the failure of his caufe to his own negle£l or misfortune. Whatever refpe£l we may have for the decifions of the great men, who are the authors of thefe laws, we tliink it may be affirmed that Qur ufages have not adopted them, that nothing is more common, than to agitate in this tribunal queftions of ftate on behalf of a minor, and even of a child under the age of puberty ; and that on the other hand it would be difficult to find any in- fiances, of a pra£tice conformable to the R^man jurifprudence. But befides, even if this caufe was to be decided by thofe lawsj and had been pleaded before the Praetor, who propofed the eiHifum fariemanum, it would be eafy to ftiew that- we might be allowed to 46 and as they are uncertain in their iiature> the proofs upon which they are founded can never have that cha* Ta£ler of fimmefsand evidence which is capable of producing an entire convi£lion, and forming a perfedi demonftration. AUthe wit of man, all the prudence of judges, confifts in deducbg from a known fa£i, a certain confequence by which they may attain the kno^edge of another fa£l that is doubtful. If it were permitted to enter into the detail of diiferent proofs^ it would be eafy to (hew that they might all be referred to this general rule ; and that it is only by the fuppofition of one fadl as certain, that they lead the mind to the difcovery of another which is obfcure and difficult. Thus when it is certain, that a perfon accufed had an intereft to commit the crime imputed to him, it is concluded to be pro- bable diat he did commit it ; when minority is clear, it is eafily prefumed, that there was inequality in a contraA {a) \ and laftly, if a child is bom in the courfe of marriage, it is natural to believe that the mother is innocent, and that the hufband is the real father. Such in general is the nature of thefe arguments. Let us how- ever examine wherein they are diftinguifhable, and whether fome of diem are not more favourable and efficacious than others* Every prefumpti«n is founded upon the natural connexion, which fubfifts between the truth which is known, and that which is fought for ; and as this conne£tion may be more or lefs necefiary, it is evident that the prefumptions may be more or lefs infallible, and that the degree of certainty will depend upon the relation, between the fad which is known and that which is not. If it is a neceflary conne£lion, it is impoflible that the firft truth can be certain, and the fecond, doubtful \ the prefumption is then confidered as the moft certain proof, and will alone produce ^ per- fed convidlion in the mind of a judge. Thus to (hew the falfity of an inftrument, it is proved by authentic teftimony, that the perfon by whom it appears to have been (ign« cd, was abfent on the day of the a£l being pafTcd \ this fad alone is a fufficient proof of the fabrication ; becaufe if the abfence is cer« tain, it is impoflible that the a£l can be true. (a) Go prefame facilement la lexion* 4 If, 4^2 APPENDIX, [Numb. XIX. If, on the contniry» the hSt to be proved is not abfolutely a neccf- fary confequence of that which is certain^ the prefumption is only probabki and then the do£tors make a diftindlion, the prefurop* don is^ either exprefsly recognized and approved by the lav, or it is not fo. In the firft cafe, although the argument is not fo ftrong as to exclude all proof to the contrary, it is neverthelefs confidered as true, until it is deftroyed by invincible arguments. If the law does not authorize the prefumption, it fubmits it to the prudence of the judge. Let us apply thefe principles to the prefumption before us. Two chara£lers are eflfential to a prefumption to render it decifive, or at leaft to have it confidered as the truth until it is deftroyed. The firft is, that it be founded upon a neceflary and infal- lible connexion, between the fa6l which is known, with that wliich is to be proved. The fecond, that it be authorized by the law. Let us examioe whether thefe two chara£ters accord with the prefumption under examination ? Whether it is infallible ? Whether it is legi- timate? The fad fuppofed from which the confequence is drawn, that faitr efi quern nuptU denumftrant^ is the certainty and truth of the marriage, and that being afcertalncd, it is concluded that the child bom under the facred name of marriage is legitimate. But is this conclufion necefiarily infallible, indubitable ? Does its certainty exclude every proof to the contrary ? We think we (hould abufc the time allowed by the court for the judgment of this caufe, if we were to dwell upon the proof that nothing is farther from the fad. We (ball not here repeat all the difpofitions of the laws, which have been cited in fupport of this principle. The whole of the title de agnofcendis liieriif is full of thefe dc- cifions. The jurifts every where acknowledge, that iiotwithftand- ing this prefumption in favour of children, the father may always difavow them, provided he can (hew by certain proofs that they owe their exiftence to the guilt of their mother. Even the iSlence of the father, his tacit acknowledgments, the omiflion of the requifite formalities, cannot deprive him of the right of con** tefting the birth of the perfon alleged to be his fon. £/, uxoTi denuntiante fe pragnanUm^ maritus non negaverit^ Jivt ntaritus nigUxerit facere qua ex Senatusconfulto debet ^ natum cogUur emnimodo alere^ caterum recujare poteritjilium, L* i. J 14 (9* 15* jf. de agn. lUtris^ . The Numb. XIX*^ Sek^onsfrom lyAgueffeau. * 463 The efie£l of the prefumption, according to this IaW| is confined to obliging the father, even when by his filence he has acknow- ledged the (late of the child, to provide him with aliments ; but even whilft it ordains this provifion, he may refufe him the quality of a legidmate child. We forbear adding to this authority all the others which have been cited. The court muft remember the fbrce and folidity with which the maxim was proved, and beGdes we think that the prin- ciples which we have eftabliflied, refpe£ting the quality of pre- fumptions, are fufficient to {hew that this common argument, not being founded upon an infallible confequence, can only be con- Cdered as a probable prefumption, as a powerful conjedlure, but a9 one which may be combated by proofs more ftrong and convinc- ing j and if it were poflibleto doubt this maxim, it would be fuf- ficiently eftabliflied by the very name of an adulterine baftard \ a name which could not be known to the fcience of jurifprudence, if it were impoflible that a child conceived {a) during marriage could be illegitimate. But if this prefumption^ has not the firft condition^ which is neceflary to. render it decifive, it has at leaft thfe fecond, which is fufficient to render it legitimate. It is written in the law, it is invefted with its authority, it has a chara£ter which every writer on the fubje£l, and which 'your arrets have always re- fpe£led. Public utility, the «epofe of families, the tranquillity of mar- riages, are the folid foundations upoi^ which it is eftabliflied, and the lame reafons which originally occafioned its introdudion, have induced you to preferve it in all its force. Let us add another motive whicl) renders this prefumption al- moft inviolable, that is the impoflibility which commonly exifts of proving the contrary, and in a cafe of doubt, the law always prefumes in favour of the innocence of the mother, and the ftate of the child. - Let us combine thefe principles, and conclude with all the writers, that if this prefumption is not infallible, it is at leaft very legitimate, and that if^n the one hand it is open to a proof of the contrary, on the other it is conGdered as the truth, until it is deftroyed. But what is the proof which the law allows to be oppofed to it ? This it will be eafy to explain^ \r} the fame principles. (tf) This is not quite correal u tlM term ii applied to the UieyitiflMtie child of a mif The 464 APPENDIX. [Numb.Xa The prefumption capable of oppofing that of die hw, ought to be written in the law itfelf ; it ought to be founded on an infallU ble principle^ before it can de(lro]r a probability fo great as tbt which is the foundation of this proof. Now it is evident that^if we adhere to thefe maxims^ there ait but two exceptions to the general rule, both of them founded upon aphyfical and certain impoilibility of the prefumption being true. They are contidned in the law itfelf, which gives the definition . of a legitimate fon. Filium eum definimus qui ex viro et uxore ejus nafcitur,fedJifng(H mus abfuiffe maritum, verbi gratia per decennium, Jcdfi ea valetudine fuit ut generare non poffit^ hunc qui in domo natus ejl^ licet vicims fcientibuSifiUum non ejfe. JL. 6.ff. De his qui fui vel alieni juris funt. There, are then only two proofs, which can be oppofed to fo favourable a prefumption. The long abfence of the hulband, and we may add conformably to the fpirit of the law, that this abfence mud be certam, and continual. Incapacity^ either permanent or temporary, is the fecond. The law allows no other, and it is evidently impoflible even to imagine any other, fince fo long as there is neither abfence, nor any ob- ftacle which feparates thofe whom marriage has united, it will nevef beprefumed that the hu(band is not the real father. Let us now apply thefe difierent principles, to the particular circumftances of the prefent caufe. We might decide it at prtffent, and as no proof has been gi?en either of a long abfence, or of any other impediment, the prefump- tion of the law ought to fubfift in all its force. Yet as it has been argued that the combination of all the dif- ferent prefumptions, arifing from the faAs of the cafe, may be compared to the general exceptions contained in the law, we are obliged to enter into the difcuflion of thefe arguments, and there- by finifli the examination of the eaufe. The abfence of the hufband, the prcfencc of the adulterer, the fecrecy which was given to the pregnancy of the wife, and the birth of the child, the circumftances which accompanied it, the obfcurity of his nurture, the cares of the Sieur de ^inquet, the declarations of tlie mother, the difavowal of the father ; thefe are principal grounds which have been urged in oppolition to tlie le- gitimacy of the child. To anfwer tjjicfe arguments, we feel It pur duty, in the £rft place, to Numb. XII.3 SekSlionsfrom UAgiieJfcau. 465 to afcertain the fafis, and afterwards to examine the inferences which have been drawn from them. We hate not here to treat of one df the ordinary qucftions in cafes of ftate, to determine whether proof by witnefles (hall be ad* mitted. Tliis proof has already beeh made, in convifting the mo- ther of the adultery of which (he was accufed ; and it is contended ' that the quality of adulterine baftard in the fon is thereby proved by anticipation. It is in the information, then, that we are to feek for the proof of thcfe fa£ts. The firft is the abfence of the hufoand for three months. Tlxe fccond, the prefence of the adulterer. Both thefe fafts appear from the informations. The eighth witnefs ftatcs as follows: {Jiere the depcfttion m*as read,) Befides the proof artfing from this evidence, the mere quality o£ the hufband fupports the fa61. He had the honour to be an officer of the Duchcfs of Orleans^ and he produces regular certificates^ that he ferved his quarter during the months of Jprily Majy and Junty in 1689. The proof which the ^leur de ^inqxiet oppofes to this argument does not appear to be of much importance : He produces a certi- ficate of his being prefcnt at the review at Montargis^ on the 4tli of Maj^ 1689. He adds an attedation which fliews that he was ferving that year in the fecond battalion of the Orleanmh. But what inference is to be drawn from thefe attedations ? The firfl proves that he was abfent a fingle day, in May^ and the other fpeaks in general of his fervice, without (hewing either its com- mencement, its continuance, or its concluGon. The certainty of thefe two fiifts then cannot be difputed : Tlie abfence of the hufband for three months, and the prefence of the adulterer for the fame time. The fecrecy of the pregnancy, the darknefs and myftery with which it was endeavoured to cover the birth of this child, are not Icfs manifefl. {The depofition of the fifth witnefs read,) The public was ignorant of the pregnancy ; the birth of the child was concealed ; the endeavour to fupprefs the knowledge of it Is attefted by this evidence ; and the depoGtions, which we are about to read, confirm ftilT fartlier the truth of this itnportant faa. In all the circumftances which accompany the birth, we equal- ly recognize the fear of the mother to render It public, and the care Vol, IL I i ' which 466 APPENDIX. rNamb.XlI. « which was taken by the Sieurde ^tnquet of the child of whom k is alleged to be the father. The detail of all thefe fa£ls appears in tlie dcpofition of Ma^- deleine Landry^ the only depofitary of th^fccret of her miftreis, and the only witnefs of the birth of the appellant. {Her depiction read,) The fafts which regard the ^ieur de ^inquet are alfo confifmed by the depofition of the ninth witncfs, who went to fetch him at the time of the delivery j and by the teftimony of the fixtccnth witnefs, who declares that he brought to the Valet of ^dnquei cloaths fuitable for a child of three months old. The circumftances of the baptifm, not lefs important thanthofe already mentioned, arc exaflly dated in the depofition of tk feventh witnefs. Laftly, you have heard all the different declarations of the mo- ther ; exprefs declarations related in the depofitions of the witnef- fes ; and tacit declarations, ftronger than the mofl formal acknow- Icdgments, in all her condutl, in the pains to hide her pregnancy, and to conceal the birth of the child, who (he tliought would be regarded as a proof of her guilt. Let us add a lafl fa£^ ftill more confiderable : (he not only wlfli- cd to conceal her fituation daring the continuance of her preg- nancy ; fhe even ventured to deny both the pregnancy and the delivery in the face of juilice. She thought that (he fliould pro^ nounce her own condemnation, if fee acknowledgcH the birth oi her fon. Such are all the proofs which refult from the information; proofs fo confiderable when they are combined, that even the principles of law and the mod certain maxims feem to become doubtful, when we confider fo great a body of unfufpicious tefti- mony concurring to fupport the prefumption, that the perfon who claims the date of a legitimate child is the fruit of his mother's criminality. Let us not, however, abandon the authority of the only princi- ples which can aiTure the birth of individuals ; and let us not be & overcome by this multitude of prefumptions, as to weaken tk foundations of civil fociety. The arguments are probable, but tliey are not. invincible ; andtc^ begin with that which appears the mod fpecious ; tlie abfence of the hun)and does not appear fufiicient to throw doubt upon the date of the fon. Two conditions equally efiential arc abfohitdf wanting for the produdion of that effcSt f the length of its con- tinuance, and the didance between the placesr The Numb. XIX.] SeleSiions from UAftteJfeaUk 467 The abfence of the hufband began in March^ and ended in ^une. From his departure to the birth of the child there was only a period of about ten months ; after his return there was a complete interval of feven months \ and in each of thefe cafes the laws have decided in favour of the legitimacy of children. But befides, who can be fure, that the Zieur de Vinantes was fo afliduous in his fervice, that he was not abfent from his duty a. Cngle day ? Who can prove that in fo fmall diftance as twenty leagues he never came to his country houfe ; and fhall the ccr-^ tainty of the (late of a child, and the quality of legitimacy^ be aUowed to depend upon fuch a fa£b as this ? But it is faid, the wife of the 5/Vwr de Vindnies has been con- different judgments have been given according to the difference of izQts. There art fome which reje£l the demands of thofe who pre- tend to have been bom in wedlock, without having either proofs or poffeflion of (late. In the prefent cafe the. birth o£ the child was proved, as well as the refidence of the ipother with the hufband; who only alleged an abfence of three months \ and the arret which, in declaring the mother criminal, did not declare the child to be illegitimate, appears to havQ. been founded upon this circumftance. Note ia th oripnal. U3 PLEADING ( 470 ) PLEADING (a)- Pronounced in two Audiences^ the lajl on the loih of January In the Cafe of the Prince de Conty and the Duchefs dc Nemours. Upon an appeal frpm a fcntencc of the Requites du Palais^ which ordained a proof, by witneflesj of the time when the in- fanity of the jiibc d* Orleans lad male iflue of the houfc of Lo7igue\nliei commenced. I. Whether the caducity of the injlitiition wducej the cadudtj ef an inpittition^ conceived in terms of requefl and purely fidci-com- miflary. II. Whether a codicillary claufe in this cafe fupports the fidci: commiflary fuhfiittiiion. III. Whether the author of this fubfUtutioft^ having executed a fecond teflament^nvhich changed thedifpoftionof the frfy a donatim and fcveral other aHsj and having fix months aftemvards httn placed und^r an interdiction for infanity^ P^oof hy ivitneffes could he admitted of the i/ifanit\ having cotnmenred' at the time oftht teftament. The circurpftanccs of exterior fplendour that accompany this caufc, the grcatnefs of the parties who are waiting in fuf- pence for the judgment which you are to pronounce, and every thing which attrafls, this day, the attention, the wifhes, and the concourfe of the public, muft, (fuch is thefeverity of our duty,) be forgotten at the outfet of this difcourfe^ "Whatever refpcfl: we may have for the parties, wc fliall not hefitatc to fay, that we are no longer here to regard the perfon of a prince, whofe valour, whofe virtue, and whofe royal anceftry wc honour in common with all Europe, nor the inheritrefs of the fortunes of the houfe of Longueville^ who feems to bring here the favour which belongs to a name of fuch exalted celebrity 5 and in (a) Ko. 37. of the ptiatcd CiUedioQ. > 6 order Nuinb. X IX . ] Sele^ions from D^AgueJfeau. 47 1 order to avoid the equally dangerous influence of a prepoiTelBon, faTourable or adverfe to the one party or the other, we can only contemplate them to day, as they are contemplated by juilice - herfelf. Divcfted in her prefcnce of thefe exterior advantages, they lay at her feet the fplendour of their dignity \ they fubmit all their grandeur to the empire of the law, to receive from its oracles the certainty of their deftiny. Let us leave to thofe who have the good fortune of being mer^ fpeftatbrs of fo Uluftrious a conteft, the pleafure of remarking that a caufe, private in its nature, appears to have become public ; that the intereft of an individual is regarded as the interefl of all ; and that, whatever variance there may be in opinions, the views and wiflies upon the fubjedi are at lead in unity. As for ourfelves, we will venture to declare, that an interefl: flill more great and elevatpd attaches all our application ; it is the in- tereft which the public ought to take in the decifion of a caufe where t|ie grounds of determination appear to be in confli£l with each other ; where the intention of a teftator is combated by an oppofite intention \ where fanity and incapacity appear to be equally probable ; where the favour of the teftamentary heirs is balanced by that to the heirs by blood ; and where' we are to feek for, to difcover, and to edablifli the folid principles of human cer as this ad is one of the mod important which we have to examine in the fequcl of the caufe, fufier us to attach ourfelves fcrupuloufly to, an explication of the time, the place, the form in which it was paiied, and the principal difpofitions which it contains. This teftament was made the ift of O^ober^ in the year 1668; fix months after the donation of He^chatel^ and thofe which accompany it. It was made at Lyonsx in the houfe of the priefts of the ora,* torv. It is clothed with all the folemnities prefcribed in the Rman. laws, and preferved by the ufage of thofe provinces, which fallow the rules of the written law. It is a nuncupative teftament, that is to fay, a teftament diftat-^ cd Hy the teftator^ and figned by him in the prefence of feren wit- neflc&and a notary. Of thefc fevon witneffes, fix were priefts of the oratory ; the ft'vcnth was an ecclcfiaftk, not belonging to that congrega- tion. In Numb. XIX,3 SeleSiions from UAgueffeau. 475 In poiitt of form there can be no impeachment of fo folemn an a£i ; that is a iz€t which all the parties equally acknowledge. If we pafs from the exterior folemnity of the z6t, to die fub- ftance of the difpofitions which it contains, we may remark at firft the pteamb]e» all the terms of which have been taken notice of, in order to throw Ibme fufpicions of fuggeftion upon this £rll tefiament. It is obferved that one of the principal reafons ftated, as infpir;- ingthe Abbe with a defign of making a teftament, // that then may be noprocefsfir his fuccejjion amongjt his relations and friends. After having given an account to the public for the reafons of his condud, he enters into ffie detail of his difpofitions } and beginning by what relates to his funeral, he forbids all kinds of ceremonies, he will have neither pomp nor funeral oration \ in* different as to the place of his burial, he defire| that his body may be interred in the parilh of the place where he. may happen to die ; he regulates the number of maifes, and the quality of the prayers which he wiihes to be faid for him after his death. He joins to the difpofitions concerning his burial, fome pious legacies : he gives 2o,ooo livres to the poor of his eftate, and leaves an annual fnm of fix hundred livres for a mii&on there every year. The domeftics and other perfons who had been long attached to his family, are the third obje£t of his regard ; he leaves them life annuities : we (hall only obferve one of thefe legacies, it is that of 800 livres a-year to Porquicr, and we obferve it becaufe it hat been made ufe of to juftify his condud at the time of the laft tcftament. * • Thefe difpofitions are followed by two different inftitutions, ' the one particular, the other univerfal. The particular inflitution is made in favomr of Madame de Lon^ guiviUe his mother, for the fum of 30,000 livres ; and, in order to fatisfy another formality of the written law, he inftitutes each of his relations whofe omiflion might prejudice his teftament for the fum of 100 livres. The univerfal inflitution is cpmpofed of feveral degrees. We may take notice o^four. The firft is the inftitution of his brother. The fecond com* prizes the children of that brother. In the third, Madame de Lan» gmville is appointed in default of the two firft degrees s and laftly, th« teftator intreats her to difpofe of his eft&s in favour of the Princes de Contj» But as this claufe makes one of the principal difficulties of the ' caafbi and is the foundation of the othei; queftions of hm^ which have 476 APPENDIX. [Numb.XnC. hare been brought before you, we think it is our duty to ftate k fully without changing any of its eficntial terms* << And as the inltitution of an heir is the chief and founda- <^ tion of every teftament and lad will ; the teftator has made ^ and inftituted as his. univerfal heir, Charles Paris JfOrleatu^ ^ Camti de Saint Palf his younger brother, and after him . his ** lawful children, preferring males to females ^ and in cafe of the •^ death of the faid Comtek before or after the teftator, without << children, the teilator has fubftituted his honoured mother, ** humbly intreating her to difpofe of the faid goods at her death, *^ in faTOur of the Princes dt Conty his couGns german." Thefe are the terms in .which the inftitution and fubftitutxans are conceived } you obferve the four degrees which we hare for abandoning Tome of tiie eflatcs, in order to extinguifh a debt) which was equally favourable and legitimate. The Abbi himfelf demanded the confirmation of this opinion } and the court by an order of the 2d of September ^ i^Jo, per- mitted him to treat with his mother upon tlie conditions approved by their relations. It fcems that it was iirft intended to execute this order with difpatch, and we fee that proper perfons were appointed to value thfc eftates, intended to be given' to Madame de Lon- guevilU. But whether there were found, in the fequel, fome unexpe£led difEculties in making the valuation, or whether it was judged more proper to defer the execution of the plan, until the Abbe (hould attain his age of majority, which would only be five months ; it appears that thcfe firft projefts remained in fufpence until January^ 1671. If we are to enter into the detail of the condu£l of the Abhi during this time, that is to fay, from his emancipation to his majority, it is not ufelefs to obferve in the outfct, that when the order permitting him to treat with his mo- ther was obtained, he had already left Paris on the 13th of uiuguft preceding. Let us not inquire as yet into the reafons and motives of this departure, let it be as you pleafe> an tSc€t of his natural volatility, or a fage precaution of his family *, this is what we are to ex«> amine hereafter. It is always a certain izGty that he fet out from Paris on the 13th olAuguJly 1670. It is in the courfe of this journey, that the greater part of thofc fads which have been mentioned to you, without being precifely and formally alleged, are afierted to have taken place. It is dur^* ing that period of time, that he began, as it is maintained, to fhow the fad, but infallible pre(ages of the misfortune which afterwards attended him ; or, to fpeak more corre^ly, that he is ftated to liave exhibited the too fenfible proofs of his imbecility. If we follow him exa£ily in the courfe of his journies, we fee him firft go from Paris to Orleans^ accompanied by fome gen- tlemen, and a fmall number of domeftics, he fets out in the Orleans coach, Which he had taken entirely for himfelf and hit attendants. He arrives at Orleans on the 30th of Augvjly and ftays there till the 48o APPENDIX. . [Numb. XIX. the pth of Siptember^ In a common inn \ where his own expence^ do not amount to forty fols a day. The 9th of September y he goes by water to Tours y from Tours to Angers i from Angers to Nantes \ and in all thcfc di£R:rent cities, hi$ expence is upon the fame fcale as at Orleans. The 14th of November^ after having employed more than two months in running through the provinces which are (ituate along the coafl of the Loire^ it appears that he took the rcfolution of re- turning to Paris. He engages the coach at Angers^ and follows the common road till he comes within one day's journey of Parish that is to Gue de Lore^ a village (ituate half a da^s journey from Chartres. He there meets a footman of the Comte de St. Poi, and immedi- ately takes the refolution of quitting the Angers coach, and retom- ing to Orleans. Wliat was the caufe of this fudden change ? , Shall we attribute it to a fudden impulfe of which nobody could prevent the cSc& ? Shall we rather fuppofe that the news which he received fiom Paris induced him to cake fo unexpe£ted a refolution ? Tliif is a point upon which we are abfolutely ignorant, and whick we can only difcovcr by conjediures. Let us follow the Abbe in this fudden return, and fee what were his proceedings. He hires three horfes and three chairs, and is followed only by two attendants ; he arrives the fecond day, by a crofs road, at Orleans. The reft of his cjomeftics continue their route to Paris, and do not return to him till a long time after. We fee by the accounts of his expence, that he remained from the 2oth of November, to the 29th of December, that is for 39 daysi in a common inn at Orleans, at 40 fols a day. Dalmont his ecuyer, and his other officers, came there towards the end of December', Dalmont quits him on the .29th to return to Parir, and the fame day the Abbe embarks a fecond time upon the Loire, to fee once more the city of Tours, and at laft he refumes the route for Paris ; and, more conftant this fecond time than the firft, he arrives there the 15th of January, 167 1 } being only three days after attaining his majority. He (laid there from the 15 th of January, to the 6th oi March following, that is, near two months ; and it is in that interval of time, that he executed all the a£ls which have been ftated to yo» fo much at length. The fird afl is of the x6th of January^ that is to £iy« the day after Numb. XIX* J Seleff ions from D^AgmJfeau. 48 1 after his arrivali the laft is of the third of March^ that is> two days before his departure ; the firft ad can only be conGdered as an execution of what had been propofed in Augufi preceding for the payment of Madame de LonguevilU, His majority having taken place in this interval abridged the formalities, which were neceffary to alienate the property of a minor. It is no longer as l£ling under the authority of a confultation of relations, that he treats with Madame de LonguevilU^ his ma^ jority put him in pofleflion of perfeft liberty j he not only treats for himfelf but alfo for his brother ; he a£is and flipulates for him^ and promifes to. procure his ratification as foon as he attains the proper age. Dlfpenfed by his majority from going through the delays of a Taluation, inftruded himfelf as to the value of the eftates, he fixes a price in concert -with his mother ; and be*- caufe this price was not equal to nine hundred and fifty thoufand liyresi he engages to pay the remainder, and at the time of the contrafl he promifes to give forty thoufand livres to Madame de jLongHevilU, This aft was executed the day after his arrival in the forenoon. Scarcely was it figned, when he began to execute it, by borrow- ing from M. Voiftn the fum of forty thoufand livres upon three contrafts, for annuities executed the twentieth of January, by the Abhi as well in his own name as in that o^his brother. Xhe thirty-firft of January^ he executed another inftrument, equally impoftant with thofe already nlentioned, as to the Infer- ences which have been drawn from \u Every thing in this inftrument is confidefable, the parties, the place, the notary, the time, the execution : thofr who executed are on the one fide, the Prince de Cohde, then Due d^Angnien, as bearing the fpecial procuration of the Prince de Condi, his father, and on the otliet the Abbe d^Orleans, who engages as well for himfelf as for his brother. The place where it was executed Is the Hotel de Conde, and the notary who keeps the minute of it, is the one employed by the famtlyof Longuevilte, The titne is the thirty-firft of January, and the'procuration tranf- CTibed at the foot of the projeft of this contraft, in which no al- teration is made, is dated the fifteenth of January, the day of the ^bH*s arrival* Tinally, the effeft and execution of this aft are to give to the utbhe and his brother, in payment of intereft for the portion of Jb£adame de LonguevUhp die barony of Mejle, for the fum of one Tol.il Kk huQdr<:A •' aU appendix. [Numb. XIX. i ■ I (hould be aflured by the prefence and (ignature of the AhU Such are all the a£ls executed by the Mbe (P Orleans^ during his ftay at Paris ; two days after the laft of them he fet out in the coach for LyonSfWixh the fame domeftics who accompanied him in his former joumies. It appears that from Lyofu, he went firfl to Provence^ and after- wards to Stra/hurgb, and that he took the waters in Germany^ about the month of September : this is all that we know of his joumies from the fixth of March ^ 167 1. During all this time he wrote fevcral letters, he audited his accounts, (igned releafes, bills of exchange, and dirc£iions which wiere necefiary for the expence of his family. In general we fee no veftige of that neceflary counfcl, which it is inliited that hi; family had given him ; there are only two or three pieces in which it is intimated, that he took the coui^fel and advice of the ^Icur Dalmont, Thus pailed about fix months from his leaving Pani^ and with- out examining what was then his real fituation, it is certain that in the month of OSlober it was thought that there was no other waj of the preventing the noife which his infanity, whether ancient or re- cent, would make in the world than by (liutting him up in ani^% They at firft chofe HautefelUy M^here he was conduced by the Siewr de Afercaut, by virtue of a letter de cachtt from the king ; thej removed him afterwards to that of Chezal Bemlt in £^j, and after- wards to that in the diocefe of Lizieux, where he continued duriug the remainder of his life. Although he had entirely loft his liberty, they hefitated in pub- licly depriving him of his civil life by a juridical interdidion. They even deferred it until the year 1672, in order to deliberate upon the condu^l which (hould be obfervcd in the adminifbatioa «f hb property. It was on the nineteenth of Jqpuaryy 1672, that a fmall num- ber of his illuftrious relations aflembled, to give their op'mion upon the condition of the Abbe d^OrUam. Mndamede Longuevi/Ie, the Prince de ConJc, the Due dtAnguUn^ the Princefi de Conty, the Comte de St. Pa/, were the only relations who attended at this aflembly. The refult of their deliberation was, that as long as the affairs of the AUe would permit, they (hould.make ufe of the procurations vrhich he had given in February, 167 1. That Madame de Longueville fhould continue to prefent to ti.e benefices and offices which might become va^^nt^.by .vinu *\, I Numb. XIX.3 SeleSlions from UAffxeffeau. 485 of the procuration given to her j that Porquier fhould adminiftcr the efF^cls and revenues as he had hitherto done, conformably to the procuration of the twenty-fixth of February^ 1671. At length in the month of Marchy 1672^ the malady appeared abfolutely incurable, and Madame de LonguevilU had recourfe to the fad, but necefFary remedy of an interdidion. She ibitcd in the memorial which (he prefented to the king, that the Abbe d" Orleans ^ her {on y /even or eight months after his tutelage luas fni/hedy and he had attained his majoritjy having undertaken divers JQurnies in foreign countries y by reafon of the fatigue nubicb ke had undergoney and the kind of life which he ledy was rendered incapeiU of managing his affairs. The whole family were afTembled, and gave their opinion in fa- vour of the interdiftion ; and the greater part, of them, in order to fliew the nature of the malady of the Abbe d^OrleanSy called it hisfre^ fent infirmity y and fpeak of the afiions which he had committed in Germany ; from which exprefllons it is fuppofed that great aflift- ances maybe derived in fixing the commencement of the infanity. Before pronouncing the interdi£lion, the king commifEoned tftonfteur Tubeuf Maitre des Requetes^ to interrogate the Ahbi JPOrleanSy and to receive the depofitions of the domeftics employed about his perfon. Neither the interrogatory, nor the depofitions of the witnefles are now adduced ; but it is highly probable that the jf Me pronounc* <^d his own condemnation by his anfwers, and that the witnefles confirmed tlie proof of his infanity, as the king a Qtort time after- wards gave an order for his interdiclion. Madame de Longtsevilie was appointed curatrix, and the letters patent gWing her that charafler were regiftercd in this court. Such was the courfe and termination of the rational life of the Abbe d*Or!eansy in which, as has been already obfetved, we may diflinguifh two periods. The one of undifputed faulty, during which he made the dona- tions of Netifchately and the teftament of which the Prince de Canty demands the execution ; and this fird period finifhed about the month of Augttjiy 1670, (hbrtly after his emancipation. The fecond, doubtful, obfcure, full of darknefs and uncertainty," in which he made the donations, and the Veftament relied upon by Madame de Nemours y as defeating that of 1668, and this lattet period commences with his emancipation, and terminates about the month of OBobery 1671. It feems, that after having follovjred him to that fatal moment, in nehich he ^entirely loft the life of a reafonable being, we may pafs at once to the time when he loft the Kfe of nature, Cnce his con- K k 3 «. dition r 486 APPENDIX. [Numb.XIX. dition was afterwards no more than a protracted death ; but as the parties contend thatt they can derive an advantage from fbmc a£ts which took place in the family after his interdi&ion, it maf be neceflary IhortJy to ftate them, and thereby terminate the recit- al of the principal fa£is of this caufe. The Comti de St. Pol only furvived a (hort time the interdic- tion of the Abbe d^ Orleans^ and the houfe of LongueviUe received m the fame year two mortal blows. The firft of which deprived the Mbe d'Orteans of his reafon ; and the other, the Comte de St. Ptl of his life. He was killed at the famous paflage of the Rhine ; and if France beheld on this occafion the greatnefs of his valour, (he only beheld it to augment the grief which (he experienced at his lofs. The right of revcrfion which the Abbe d* Orleans had always re- tained in the donation which he made to his brother, would take cffcGt by his death, and reftore to the Abbe the large property of which he had divefted himfelf in favour of his brother. The family afTembled to deliberate on the manner in which this right of reverlion fhould be e:cercifed, in the name of the Abbe tPOrleam. They confidered that although this condition was impofcd on the donatory, in the donations of the twenty-third of Februarj^ 1 67 1, he was notwithftanding at liberty to engage and hypo- thecate the property that was fubjefl to the right of revcrfion } and the family thought that, according to this claufe, they ought to begin by paying the debts contrafied by the Comte de St. Pol. They gave a ftill more extenfive interpretation to this daufci and decided that it was fulEcient in itfclf to fupport a legacy of five hundred tlioufand livres, which the Comte de St. PolhzA given in favour oTthe Chevalier de LotiguevUle\ and all the relations agreed tliat this legacy fhould be paid out of the efFeCls, comprized in the donatio? of the twenty-third of February ^ 1671 » this opinion wai confirmed by an order of the court. ' Madame de Longueville rendered fealty and homage to the king in her quality of curatrix, for the property comprized in the donation. ' She obtained a gift of the feignorial rights, which was revered in the chamber des comiesm From that time (he continued to cxercife the functions of cura- trix until her death, which took place in the year .1679* After her d( coafe, the charge was at firft divided between the Prince de Condi aiul Madnme de Nemcurs, and afterwards was cxcrcifed fblcly by tlic Prbicc dc Cofulc. Numb. XIX.3 Seleffiws from D^Agueffbau. 487 Ail the accounts of the curatorfliip were rendered to bim» and amoneft thefe the ordinances, the bills of exchange, and the allow- TSaiSS^ of accounts figned by the Abbe d'Orleans^ in the fecond periodj that is to fay, in the time which we have called a period of darknefs and uncertainty, are adduced as pieces free from fufpicion and as approved titles between the parties. The Abbe tPOrleans died on the fourth oi February, 1694, at the age of 48'; and with him was extinguifhed for ever the race of the Dius de LonguevilU* A race happy in its origin and progrefs, by the fplendid anions of the illuftrious perfons whom it produced ; unfortunate in its termination, whether by the prematute death of the Comte de St, Pol, or by the (till more melancholy and deplor- able life of the Abbe d'Or/eans. Fourteen days elapfed after his deceafe, without any other tef- tament appearing than that which favoured the pretenflons of the prince de Conty\ at length on the eighteenth of February, the widowof Porquier brought to the Lieutenant civil two fealed pacquets, the one fealed with the arms of the houfe of Longuevi/Ie, the other with the arms of Monjieur P^quier\ on the firftwas written, Teftament of the Abbe d* Orleans s on the fecond, Demijffion du gouoernement de Normandie, tsfc. des places de Caen, Dieppe, Pont'de* FArche, \^ Bailliage de Caen. Madame Porquier declared that both the infcriptions were the hand-^writing of her deceafed hufband ; (he added, that neither of thefe pacquets had been out of her hands fince his death, and re- quired them to be opened. The lieutenant direAed the parties intereiled to be cited^and on the fame day, in the prefence of the counfel of Madame de Nemours, the two pacquets were opened ; in the firft was found the tefta- ment of the twenty-fix th oi February, 1671, accompanied by two loofe pap^s, one of which appears written in the hand of the Abbe d^Orleans, and has been recognized by the Requites du Palais / it contains eighteen names, to each of which there is a line drawn to the fum which correfponds with it \ and it appears that this is a memorandum of legacies, which the writer intended to give to fome perfons of his houfehold. The other paper is in the hand-writing of Porquier, who has entitled \t,projeEi to a codicil which the Abbe d^ Orleans nvijbes to make in cor^rmation of his teflament. At the end of the laft line are thefe words, in the hand-writing of the Abbe f Orleans ; To Dalmont, the carriage and its appur- tenances. The fecond packet was opened on the fame day, and contained Kk4 the a88 appendix. piumb. XIX. the fire ^pointments of the Mie tOrkam^ figned oa the t^'cnty-fixthof Jvirworj?, 167 1. The produ£^ion of this teftament did not prevent th^A^i ie Conty requiring the execution X)f the firft \ he appeared, qq the fifth of Jldarch^ 1694, before the Requites du Palds^ and de- manded, ns tedamentary Iteir, to be confirmed in the pofleflionof til the efiFcfksy of which the tedator bad power to difpofe; and ft the fame time he commenced tlie fame adion in a diffeiem Aaracter, by requiring the deliverance of the univerfal legacy, as he calicd the difpofition of the Abbe ^Orleans givbg him the fucceflion. Mad^nu ie Nemoursy in her defence agaiaft this demand, de- elared at firft, that ihe did not admit the jnrifdiflion of the poim *, aor that of the other judges of the realm fo f^ as relates to Na/. ^hatel \ and with refpe£l to the other property, {he mCfted diat the teftament upon which the title of the prince de Conty was fouoded, Mras void, and befides that it was revoked by that of the twenty- fixth of February^ 1 67 1 . The Prinee de Conty relied upon arguments of law in oppofition to the firft defence \ but he was obliged to borrow his arguoients in oppofition to the latter^ from the allegation of fa£ts; and being unable to contend that a firft teftamcnt is not l^lly revoked by a fubfequent one, he is reduced to contend that the teftator was deprived of the ufe of his reafony and notoriouly in a ftate of infanity for fix months, and more, before the tcftainest of 1671. He has alleged this fad by a precife declaration ; he tequiits to be admitted to the proof of it ; the fentence has given him dot permiffion. Madavude Nemours has preferred an appeal, and I^ quefts the court to difmifs the Prince de Conty from his demand, this is the point to which the whole proceedings are reduced* Sueh are all the circumftances of fad \ fuch is the nature of the aAs which have been ftated to you. We have felt it a duty, in a cafe which is no lefs fplendid than important, not to omit any of the fads that have been propofed, either by the one fide or the other, however trifling and infignificant fome of them may appear; and we alfo conceive it to be our duty, to lay before you with the fame ezadnefs the arguments 4)f the refpedive parties. [7%^ above extraB extends from p. 249. to 274. The arguments of the refpeBive parties are next detailed at lengthy extending to f* 302. The pleading then continues asMlows*'} Such, firs, is the real ftate of th: corur guide. But fince the law of our duty is fo far from permitting us to remain in filence upon this occafion, that it impofes upon us the honourable neceflity of addrefiing you, in the name of the puUic, whofe interefts a^e repofed in otir hands ; after having fatisfied you, that if we dare not hope to fulfil the whole extent of our mi- niftry, wc have at leaft fufHcient knowledge to feel and tremble at the weight of it, we ihall no longer defer the explication of what we conCder as the real ftate of the caufe. You have to pronounce upon an appeal from the Requites iu Palais, which permits the Prince de Conty to prove by witnefles, that the Mbe JPOrleam was in a ftate of infanity, fix months aad more, before the making of his teftament. Madame de Nemours contends that there is at prefent fuiScient room to invalidate the fcntence, and to difmifs the Prince de Cont] from the principal demand, which is the fubje£i in difpute. Although the fcntence is in appearance only interlocutory; it Numb. XIX.]] Sele^ionsfromD^jigueJfeau. 491 it is neverthelefs certain that it decides* a great part of the principal queftions of this caufe ^ to be convinced of which it is fuffictent to confider that the defence of Madame de Ntmours is compofed of two different parts : flie contends firft» that the Prince de Confy has no title at all } and fecondly, that even fuppof- ing he had one, it was revoked by a; fubfequent teftament, which cannot be impeached by the teftimony of witnefles. If the firft defence of Madame de Nemours is juft and legltimatef if (he can prove that the teftament, from which the Prince de Conty derives his whole tidcj is a void and a ufelefs difpofition^the fecond defence becomes fuperfluous j and if It was once decided that the Prince de Conty had no title, you may fee what would be the nece£- fary confequence. If he has no title, he has no quality; and if no quality, no a£iion ; and if he has neither a£lion nor intereft in the caufe, why fhould he be admitted to prove a fa£l which to him would be abfolutely indifierent \ fince even fuppofing the infanity to be certain, it would be Madame de Nemours who would take advantage of it, and it would only {hew that the Abbe had died without a teftament. But, on the contrary, when we examine this revocation, when the Prince de Canty 1% admitted to prove, that it was made by a per* fon in a ftate of imbecility, it is implied that he has a folid in« tereft, a legitimate a&ion, a certain quality, a fubfiiling title; and this is what the Requites du Palais have done. It is true they have not pronounced exprefsly on the quality of the Prince de Conty^ they have not formally decided that the firft teflament was not an invalid title, but they have decided it tacitly by receiving his demand, which could have no other folid foundation; and it is thus that the court frequently decides upon bars or pre- fcriptions oppofed by either of the parties ; by admitting the a£kion which is contended to be extinguiihed or prefcribed, it difallows the bar orprefcription; and this tacit judgment is not lefs ftrong or lefs decifive, than if it had been exprefsly and formally pronounced* We may then conclude from thefe reflections, that tlie feiitence (hould be confidered not as a mere preparatory judgment, which leaves the rights and arguments of the parties entire ; but as a Sentence of adjudication upon the firft queftion of the caufe, that is to fay, the folidity of the title, and which pronounces an inter- locutory upon the fecond queftion, with refpe6l to the revocation of the fame title. The appeal from this fentence then brings before you the ground and fubftance of the conteft, and fuch is the condition of the parties, that if you reverie the fentence, you pronounce at the fame 49« A P P E N D I 3t. [l^umb.XlX. fame time a definitive judgment upon the very foundation of the difpute i ?ind if, on the other hand, you confirm it, you leave the latter part of the caufe in fufpenfe, until after the depofidon of witnefies ihall have enlightened the reltpon ofjufllce («)• Thus the advantages of the parties are fo unequal upon this occafiot), diat the one may abfolutely gain the caufe and cannot entirely lofe it; whilft the other may wholly lofc, but cannot gain it. After having ftated the true deciiion of the fentence, which docs not appear to be fo indifferent as has been reprefented, we (ha3 ibllow the natural order which the two principal queftionsofthe caufe prefent to the mind, and exuminc in the two parts of this di{. courfe, the two teftaments which arc the fubjcft of it. Has the firft teftamcnt become void ? Was the fccond capable of revok- ing it ? Tothefe two points the whole corjeft is reduced. To difcufs with fome degree of order the firft queftion ; that is to fay, the invalidity of the difpofition, we ihall confider it under the two different afpefls, in which it has been prefented to youbj the rcfpeftive parties. We Ihall examine firft, xht fidei-commifary difpofition itfclf, ind . as diftin£k from the reft of the teftamcnt \ we (hall endeavour ta penetrate into the mind of the teftator, to found the depths of his intention, and (hall not confider it fufCcient to have di(covered it, unlefs it appear conformable to the maxims of law, and the in* violable rules of Roman jurifprudence. We (hall aftenvards con(ider it as conneAed with the codicil- lary claufe, of which we (hall endeavour briefly to explain the origin, the nature, and the effefts. But withdut dwelling longer upon the plan and decifion of this caufe^t 1^^ ^s proceed to the examination of the difpofition coiifidcr- cd in itfclf, and independent of the other claufes of the tcftamentj and as the Roman jurifts themfelves acknowledge that there is no thing more abftrufe or fubtle in the whole fyftem of law, than the queftions which regard the nature and force of fubftitutions, you will permit us for the purpofe of giving as clear an explanation cf them, as the extenlive nature of the fubje£l will admit, to premife fome general principles, from which we may collefl the kind and quality of the fubftitution, upon which you are to pronounce. By a jttft and folemn law all fucceflions devolved upon the heirs by blood \ and the founders of the i?omtfff jurifprudence were of opinioii, that to deprive them of it, it was neceflary to make a law not kfs juft or folemn than the firft} and becaufe it would have been equally atbfurd and impo(fible to make one general law derogating from (a) EclMfir U retiiwm dt hjmfiu it a ntxj vfual exfitfioB la thdc pleadipsi. this Nuinb% XIXO Selections fr but as an authentic and folemn law. The whole people were witnefles to thefe private laws, in the fame manner as to the laws which regarded the interefts of the public. This was not all| the teftament was not only a public law by its exterior folemnitiss, it was fo likewife by the forms in which it was nece£* fary to be exprefled. The teftator who di£lated an inviolable law to his family, was bound to fpeak in the fame manner as the legtf- iator who propofed a law to the whole Roman people, and hence arofe that rigorous necefiity, which was only abrogated by the emperor Conjiantine^ of uGng in the inftitution of heirs, and even in legacies, words confecrated to the laws, and which the jurifts' call dire£l terms, terms which are imperative and fuited to the majefty and power of a legiflator. The premature death of the inftituted heirs, w their refufal to accept the quality of heir, frequently eluded the execution of this law. It was to remedy this inconvenience that they invented the ufe of dired^ and vulgar fubftitutions, in order to fupport, by a long fucceiHon of heirs, the execution of the intention of the teftator. Nobody is ignorant of the nature of thefe fubftitutions. They were not, properly fpeaking, any thing elfe than a fecond inftitu- tion, or, If you pleafe, the inftitution of a fecond or third heir, in cafe the firft did not take, the property of the teftator, whether for want of power or inclination. To this mode, which was the only one permitted until the end of the republic, a fecond was added in the time of the earlier em- perors. Teftators who had hitherto fpoken only in the language of command, began to make ufe of innreatie:?, by which they rc- quefted the inftituted heirs to render their fucceiEon, or a part of their effecls, to fuch perfon as they thought proper to appoint. The law wliichhad not hitherto authorized this difpofition, did not at firft impofe any neceffity of accompliftiing it. As decency, good faith, and natural equity were the only foundation of it, they alfo formed the only obligations which engaged the heir to execute it \ and if he betrayed the laft wifties of the teftator, he di(honoure(t himfelf, without lofing the.fucceiIion. Augujtus firft avenged the teftator againft this perfidy. H9 madf . th^t a matter of inviolable neceffity, which in its principle was only an engagement of honour; and fidei^comnijfa from thenceforth became a^requent a^ lej^acie^ andiOthcr direct difpo/i- tio{is». . If 494 APPENDIX. [Numb.XlX. If tlic terms of rcqueft in which they were conceived were Ids folemn^ they were more efEcacious than the dircft terms which formed the eflence of a teftament ; they might be addrefled not only to the inftituted heirs when there was a te(lament| but alfo to the legitimate heirs, when there was not. Hie £iivour (hewn to the intention was fo great in this kind of difpofition, that they fecm- ed to have been apprehenlive of weakening it, if they had made the execution of it depend upon the lead folemnity* The ufe of fidei-commiffa induced the jurifts to diftinguilb two kinds of fubftitutions, for we do not fpeak here of pupilkrj fubftitutionsy which have no application to the prefent caufe. The firft kind of fubftitution was that which they called direft md vulgar, on account of the ufe of it being common, and per- mitted to all teftators, and with refpe£b to all kinds of heirs. The fecond is that which we have called zJidei'€ommiJfarj fub- ftitution \ but which the juriils almoft always exprefs by theGngk term oi fidei-^ommijfa. Here it will not be immaterial to make apaufe, in order exa&Iy to compare thefe two kinds of fubditutions ; their different charac- ters are abfolutely eflcntial to ihe dccifion of this caufe. The vulgar fubftitution is, as we have already obferved, nothing ctfe than a real inftitution of an heir. Secunda h^tredis inftitutity is the expreflion of all the jurifts ; a fecond inftitution, which does not require lefs folemnity than the firft, and which does not give lefs right in refpe£b of the entire fucceflion. The one is pure and fimple ) the other is conditional, and can only have its cBe& on failure of the inftitution ; hence it follows, that as often as this effeo- tial condition is wanting, that is to fay, wherever tho inftituted heir takes the fuccef&on, the vulgar fubftitution muft fail ; a£ii bsreditati evatiefcit^ is the expreflion of all the laws ; and it would be a paradox in jurifprudence to aflert in general, that the* fttc- ceflion can be taken both by the inftituted heir and the party claiming by way of vulgar fubftitution. Thus this inftitution has, as it were, a double chara£ler. As an inftitution, it ought to be invefted with all the folemnides which the civil law has eftabliihed for the validity of teftaments. ^ As a fecond inftitution, it can never have efied, except where the party inftituted in the firft inftance does not become aAually the heir \ an eflential condition to which the fate of a vulgar fubfti- tution is infeparably attached* kfidei'^mmijfum has two chara£ters dire£tly oppofite to thofc which entirely conftitute the eflence of a vulgar fubftitution. Firft, it may be made by any kind of expreflions. Every thing which explains^ or rather^ every thing wloch in- duces Numb* XlX.2 SekSlions from D^AgueJfeau. 495 duces a prefumption of the intention of the teftatoti is fafficient to fupport this kind of fubftitution. But what chara£lerizes it (till more particularly, and manifeltd how entirely its nature is oppofite to that of a vulgar fubftitution^ is^ that whereas the one is irretrievably extinguifhed, as foon as the iirft heir has taken the effedsy thct other, on the contraryi only de- rives its operation from his adiually taking them. 'fhey are then made upon two conditions dire£Uy oppofite. The one fuppofes that there is no heir, the other on the contrary fuppofes that there is one. The exiftence of the inftituted heir annihilates the vulgar fub- ftitution ; the exiftence of the inftituted heir caufes the fidet-cwn-^ mijffary fubftitution to fubfift. The one difappears the inftant the fticceffion is acquired ; the other, on the contrary, derives its force from the fucceflion being a£tua]]y taken. What caufes the cefla- tion of the one is the confer\'ation of the other ; and what is an eflential defed in a vulgar fubftitution is a neceflary condition for the execution of ^fidei^commijfary one. Let us then compare the claufe in the teftament of the Abhe d^OrUans with thefe clear and certain notions of the nature of fubftitutions. But to do this the more eafily, let us ftate the very terms of the ^aufe, and endeavour to difcover their real meaning. The inJUttUton of an heir^ being the foundation of every teftament and declaration fflaft will, he has made, and inftituted as its umverfal heir Charles-Paris tOrleanSy Comte de Saint Pol his younger brother^ and afier him his natural and legitimate children^ preferring males to females J and in cafe of the death of the /aid Comte de Saint Poly brfore or after the teftator^ vtithout natural and legitimate children^ then the teftator has fubftitutedy both vulgarly and by way offidei^commiffion^his honoured mother^ humbly requefting her to difpofe of the faid property at her death in favour of the Princes de Conty^ his coufinsgerman (a). Tou fee, Grs, that the intention of the teftator was to make four different degrees of heirs, or rather of fucceflbrs. He names, firft, the Comte de Saint Pol as his heir : here is the £rft degree of inftitution, and he charges him with a fubftitution («) Ecant rinftitotioo d'heriiierle chef et fondement i% toot tefhment et ordonnanct de dernier voloiit^ a fiutec inftkae fon hericicr aniverfel Cfaarlet-Paris d^OrleanSy Comte de Saiot Pol, too frere poio^ et apres lul fei enfanta natareli et iegitimes, preferant Ira mSlea anx ftmelki ; et fesant le dit feigneur Comte de Saint Poly a mourir avanc ou apr^ le dit fcigaeur tef(aiair» fant eoAiota oatuiela et IrgiciiDea ; aax dtts caa et ibacun d'cux )ft dit/eigoeor teftatear a fobftiiueet fobftitue vulgairemeot, par 6dei commify la dlie dame Aaoe Geoeriefe de Boatboo ia trca bonoree tnere j li fuppliant trea -humblirmaot de difpolcr dca dltt biena \ die teaaoti moiirir^ ea favenr de M. M. les Poocei 4c Cmtj dot tffT^ffT MIIBttllt* ^ — -- 496 APPENDIX. [Numb-XlX. in favour of his children ^ but as that erent has not taken place, we may pafs over the fecond degree, and proceed immediately ti> die third, which is that of Madame de Longunnlk. How is the fubftituted to the Cbmte de Saint Pel ? The intention of the teftator cannot be doubted. He declares himfelf, that he in* tends that flie (hall be fubflltuted both vulgarly and by way iAfidth cfmrniffton. Let us develope thefe exprefiions, and fubftitutc the thing for the terms ufed to fignify \U What was the intention of the Alibi dP Orleans i when he faid he fubftituted her vulgarly and by way oifidei-^emmiffion f Let us not feek for the explication of theclaufe dfewhere than in the claufe itfelf. He has marked t)ie cafe in which the vulgar fubftitution might take place, and alfo the caie in which xiit fidei^commiffary fubftitution might have itseffe£l. And in cafe of the death of the Cotnte df Saiat Pol before the tefiatcr^ here is the cafe of the vulgar fubftitution,^ /n^ri&^r^/, hdresmterit^ or, after the teflcdor without childreny here is the cafe of the jUei- cwnmiffary fubftitution, that is to fay, that if the Comte de Saint Pol cannot be his heir, Madame de Longuiville (hall \ and if, on the other hand, the Comte de Saint Pol^ after having become his hdr, ihould die without children, he (hall render the efie£ls of die tef- tator to Madame de Longueville by reafon of the ^dei^ommiffarj difpofition. The laft degree of fubftitution which comprifes the Princts de Contyt is not more difficult to explain than the two preceding; it is fufficient to read the terms in which it is conceived, todifcoTer that it is no more than a Cimflt fdei-^ommjj/tsn. Requefting her {la fuppliant)^ &c. All the terms of this claufe evidently fhew that the teftator in- tended only to make zjidei-commij/ary fubftitution. zft. We fee the terms of requeft, which are confecrated by law to the ufe of fdei-commijary difpofitions, terms which can never accord with a vulgar fubftitution, which, as we have faid, is only a fecond inftitution equally folenm with the firft, and confequentlj cannot be made by expreflions which are oblique, precarious, and indire£i, fuch as thofe made ufe of by the Able d'Orleatu. ad. We obferve thaf the teftator has expreiTed the cafe in which it was to take efred,and that is only and precifely tixe cafe oizjUa- commiffary fubftitution. Let us here refume the terms of the teftament, requefling her [Is fuppliant), &c. upon her death {elk vivant it mourir)^ &c. ' It is tlicn only at the momei)ft of her death that the teftator charges her with rendering the efFeds to the Princes de Conty. He funpofcs then that fhe will have taken the fucceflion durbg her life. Now, as wc have already obfervcd, this is a cafe direAly 8 oppolite Numb. XIX.^ SeleSions from ly Aguejfeau. 497 oppofite to that of a vulgar fubftitution, which on the contrary fuppofes that the fucceflion will never be taken by the firft heir. ia a word, the terms of this fidei'commifflon^ are the fame as thofe of the law, Epi/lolam, 7$* £• Muiier, in the digeft, ad/enatuS" conftdt. TrebelL which the jurift calls the words of ^fidei-:'jmm\f- fary difpofition. Fidei^commifit in btc verba ,• rogo te ut id quod ad te ex bonis meis pervenerityfaciaspervenireadfilium tuum. If it is faid the teftator has only changed his expreflion, out of refpe£^ to his mother : in the firft place it may be anfw,ered, that this refpe& did not prevent his fubftituting at all events, the Prindes de Conty to his mother. Or where indeed is the want of refpe£^ ? As a fon he owed every thing to his mother. The law of nature would not permit him to have any other fentiments* As A teftator he owes her nothing. The civil law fubje£bs every thing to his difpofition* His liberality which was purely gratuitous, with regard to Madame de Longueville^ had no other rules ^than his inclination : and who can imagine that Madame de Longuevii/e, would have been ofiended at finding herfelf obliged at all events,* to leave the property of her fon to the Princes de Conty^ that is, to lier natural heirs, to thofe whom nature, the law, their rank and their merit, would induce her to wifh for her fucceflbrs ? But befides, we can only know his thoughts from his expreflions, which are the natural images of them. He has expreffed himfelf in a different manner, then he had a different intention ; and we can never regard this claufe otherwife then as a real Jldei'^com^ miffary fubftitudon. Let us examine whether the failure of the inftitutionis fufficient to annul fuch a fubftitution, or whether the defedl may be repaired by prefumptipns of the teftator's intentions ? Whatever oppoiitxon there may be, between the maxims which have been propofed to you by the refpedive parties, concerning this difficulty ; we have at leaft this advantage, that they are at length agreed upon two general principles, which we may take for granted as rules eftablilhed by the laws, explained by the doAors, and confirmed in this caufe by the admiffion of the one party and the other. The firft principle is, that as long as the teftament fubGfts, a sviere bitemiption of the degrees is not fufficient to interrupt the coiwfis and progfcfs of a fubftitution, and that when a degree hap^* p«AS Co fail, diat whidi is next in fucceflion take« its pboe» and Is iacitbd to all ttt rif^ts. ThiMDtr iflftancci fuppoTe that the €W^ i# ^dfnt P^* iacafii <^ Mm dc«lb ^irfdiottt children, hadheen merely oharged with reQ» ^erbig Ae eflefti to if A&fMT dlr Zo^i^ttp^ Vol.. U. LI wA, 498 A P P E N D 1 X. [Numb. XIX, vilUj in her turni had been charged ^ith reodermg them to tlie Princes de Conty^ the death of Madame de Longufvilbj bcfote that of the Comte de Saint Poi, would not have excluded the Princes it Conty^ for ever, from the fuccefTion : on the contrary, they would have ftood in her place, and would have received the property from the hands of the Comte de Saint Poly inftead of receiving it from the hands of Madame de Longueville. This principle is founded upon the common mxratii fuhfittutus fuh/iituto eft fub/Ututus injlituto^ and although the 27th and 41ft lawS) ff. de Vulg. et Pupitt. Subft. only eftabliOi this maxim, with Tcpid to vulgar fubflitutions, the fentiments of the dodors have ^th reafon extended them to Jidei^commijfary fubflitutions. Cujci decides it formally, not only in the confultation which has bees cited to youy but alfo in his Commentary on tlie 27th law, and the reafon which he gives, is taken from the very nature and prin- cipal chara£ier of a fidei-commijfary fubftitution, which has nu rule more certain^ or more inviolable than the intention of the tedator. Now it is evident that when a teftator eftabliflies feveral degrees in his fucceflion, it is not for the purpofe of excluding the md dillant, but to inveft them with it only after thofe who precede them in the order in which they are mentioned, (fuch is the ei- predion of the law,) as well as in the order of the teftitor's bene- volence and affedtion \ fo far, therefore, is the interruption of rather the failure of a nearer degree, from excluding one tk is more remote from the right, which the tcilator haS giYcn ia his fuccefiion, that it only ferves to approximate it and remort the obftacles, which retard ordiminifli its expectations. We (hall not adduce at prefcnt the opinions of other cxpoliton. We might cite almoft all who have written upon thefe fubjeds. Wc (hall content ourfelves with obferving, that Af. MnynariX^ coUe£led feveral decifions of the parliament of Touloufc^ vbkii have confirmed this maxim by their authority, and that Faber^ii 'ftands alone in his book de^ Errcribus Pragmaticorumf againft unanimous fentiment of other writers^ candidly admits, that tk queftion has been adjudged conformably to the general opinion by the fenate of Chambery. The fecond principle, which is more' important^and more eib- tial to the decifion of this caufe than the fir ft, is one upon which all .parties have .agreed in their laft replies, that is, that as a genera! rule, the fate of the teftament is attached to that of the inftitubos •of the heir ; that the particular legacies are as it were borne down •by. the ruin of the inftitution, and that the rigour of the law t^ gards thofc as. deai.)i^idiovi( a teftaj(u^nt> who* after having nadc * one, Numb. XIX.] Se eSiioris from D^AgueJfeau. 499 one, have not had th: good fortune to revive in the perfon of the inftitutcd heir. But k is contended tliat a general exception ought to be made^ in favour of univcrfal^J«-<:^/wf/i^. [Tht examination And refutation of this argument occupy 15 pag's^ from 315/^330; 'Ofhich are here omitted.'] But if the c'aducity of the inftitution is always followed hy that of aticfdei^ommijfary difpofition, when we confidcr the tcftament merely as a tedament, ought we to decide the contrary when it is r;'gnrded as a codicil ? That is a fecond queftion of law, which . wc have to examine, with regard to the title of the Prince de Ccntym Remember here, if you plcafe, Sirs, the terms in whid this daufe is conceived. We will repeat'them, in order that we may i!ie more eafily examine its nature and efFeds. He declares that he wills ^ that his teflament Jhall avail by way of a nuncupative tejiament^ and if it cannot avail by way of teflament^ it Jhall avail by way of codicil ^ donatio caufa mortis, and every other dif pojitien in the nature of a lajl w/7/, by which it may lawfully prevail ^ndhefxfuHJi. Tlic terms of this claufe are very extenfive. They comprife all kinds of difpofition, and fufEcIently indicate that the teflntor de- figned that his lad will (hould be executed, under whatever form it might be confidcred. It feems at firft that the mere reading of this claufe w6uld bs fufficient to decide the conted in favour of the Prince de Conty. The only ground which renders the fidei^conimiffary difpofition incffctf^ual, is a failure of the inditutlon } now this ground ceafes^ the inftant theteftament is regarded as a codicil \ fo far is it from being necefiUry in an indFument of that nature, that there (hould be an inditution of an heir, that it would be void if there was pne ; and the greated favour, or rather the grcated condefcendence of the jurids is limited to converting into an univerfal fidei^om^ mifftony that which bears in a codicil the marks and chara£ter of a direft inditution, and fince the inditution of an heir is not only ufeltfs, but forbidden in a codicil, may we not reafonably con- clude, that the failure of the inftitution does not annihilate the other difpofitionSi which occur in fuch an zGt ? Whatever appearance of truth t^ere is in this propofition, it is attacked by a great number of obje£^ions w^ich appear very ccm- £derable. In the fird place, it is faid that the Prince de Conty can no longer have the aid of the codicxUary claufe) after having folemnly L 1 2 renounced 500 APPENDIX.' [Numb.XlX. renounced it. Such you are told is the rigorous difpoGdon of the 8th law of the Cod. decedidl{a)^ which decides that all variation and inconftancy are forbidden upon this fubje£l \ and that the perfon who has once taken the quality of a teilamentary heir, cannot after- wards claim by virtue of the codicillary claufe^ which fuppofes the .teftament no longer to fubfift. But in the iirft place^ we may aflc thofe who offer this argument, where is the la W9 where is tlie ordonnance which regulates this pro- ceeding amongft us in fo rigorous a manner ? And although, for the dccifions of qucftions of rights we are obliged to follow the authority or rather the reafon of the Roman lawj who can fup- pofe that in regulating the proceedings before the Requites du palate it was neceffary to go and confult the formulx and terms of ac- tions which were eftabliihed by Roman lawj and which widi us an fegulated by more equitable principles ? BefideS} we might maintain with a great deal of reafon, that we are not precifely within the cafe of that law 4 that it fuppofes two rights united in the fame perfon, the one by virtue of a dire£^ inftitution ; the other by virtue of an Ob- lique and fidet^commiffdrj fubftitution, to be prefumed from the codicillary claufe. And the emperors Arcadius and Eim- rius obliged him who had thefe two different titlesj to confine himfelf to one of them ; the choice was opened to him at die •commencement of the action, but when once made could not be varied, but here the Prince de Conty has not made anjr elec- tion. He has united the two rights in his demand, wichont attach- ing himfelf to die one rather than the other. He has demanded to be admitted as teftamentary heir, and he alfo claims by virtue of the codicillary claufe, by demanding a deliverance of the legacy from Madame de Nefnours as heir ab inteftato. We cannot deprive him of either the one a£Hon or the other, and we may even fay that tliere is no more reafon to deprive him of a right which be has in execution of the codicillary claufe, than of that w)iich he claims by virtue of the inftitution. He has chofca the one, as he has chofen the other, the two qualities unite andaie blended in his perfon, and if the seafon oppofed to him was juil, he might lofe l^th the one. quality and the othdr, as he has cquall; affumed them both. (4) SI qvli tgfre ex teftmmtto qaoKlwe mtte, five rcrlpto, five fiae fcrifCoft CMfcfio, «4ft JMdiBttc valaeric ; id filei*coinAtffi profccatiflom adU^iccKCupiect, ndaiBtfcr* ttihtantr. Ttnntm enimsbd^, m idicum colqvm fro fuo ntgraoidi dcfiderio coftopdi- mui t ttt ediJii ilhsd. ftncitmot, fi tdlator Mesf tef^amentttm> in todtjh fn aixU ttiam y v^ltre complexut fit : ^ul hmdStatcm petit tb ifCtt ImeDttonlt tmn^'a, etran Wlifi eltsvfid! hvbeatpoceatitah ftkni fe, aniat ela^boot. alctrki fiUidftvni pnrdiftie. ^* • • '. . . 'm lifotnb. XCf,.'} SekSimsfrmi UA^effeau. 501 All that Madame de Nemours can conclude from this law» in regard to the prefent caufc, is> that the Prince de Conty ihould bq obliged to make his option at a given timet and declare whether he will have the title, of which he demands the execution, regarded as atedament or as a codicil. Then there might be fome colour for this pretence, but at prefent, it cannot be faid that the Prince de Conty has renounced either of his rightSi becaufe he has propofed both of them equally. The fecond obje£lion, that has been made againft the codicil^ lary claufe, is one which it does not appear more difficult to dcftroy. They have cited the authority of a doftor, who has written, a treatife upon the codicillary claufe, in which he fays, that it can have no efiefl, when the force and nature of it have not been ex- plained by the notary. What probability, fay they, is there, that it was explained to a man, who has not yet learned to diftinguifli his relations from his friends, as appears by the preamble of hii tedament ? ^ The principle which this author eftabliflies, may be juftly con- teiled \ but, even admitting it, what will be the ccnfequence, fup7 pofing it was neceifary that the notary (hould explain the force and efFe£l of the codicillary claufe ? Shall it not be prefumed that he has done fo, and fliall the performance of lail wills depend upon tlie proof of a fa£l of tliis defcription ? If fuch a point was propofed iii your audience, and an allegation was offered, that the notary bad not explained the effeft of this claufe to the teftator, would you admit the proof of it ? Is not every tlung, which is of the fub- ilaijce and eifence of the aft, proved by the aft i^felf , and when a teflator is endowed with fanity and rcafon, will the intercfl: of the public permit you to receive proof, that he did not undeiftand the claufes which he lias himfelf figned ? They may f;iy as much as they pleafe that this claufe is a claufe of ftyle ; for that very reafoji it is rather to be prefumed that the teftator underilood it, and if tins liberty was once allowed, parties would foon demand a right of proving that a fane and rcafonable teftator did not comprehend the eflence and confequences of a derogatory claufe, or of a general revocation, and nobody is more intereded than Madame de Nemoun^ in contending that proof (hall not be permitted that a tef- tator did notunderdand what he has flgned as his tedament. You fee then. Sirs, that this objeftion is not lefs contrary to the particular advantage of Madame de Nemours^ who propofes it, than to theintereftof the public: let us proceed to the other arguments, that have been urged againd the' codicillary claufe, — ^arguments much more important thaitthofe which have been already conflUered. L 1 3 You 5^* APPENDIX. [Numb. XX Tou haTe been told that it was neceflarj to diftingniih bet\rcen two kinds of codicillary claufes, the one vague and general, fuch as that in queftion ; the only cfFtft of which is to fupply the dc- fedls of folemnity, and never tliofc of intention. The other prt- cife, exprefs, and particular, by which a teftator requcfts by name, his legitimate heirs, to execute his lad will i and as this hft kind of codicillary claufe is a new will of thrf teftator, it is doubdcd fuflicient to fupply any want of intention in the teftament. They have fupported this rcafoning by the authority of Jamei Godefroy^ upon the Theodofian code, who hys it down as a cenaio maxinii that the mere codicillary claufe cannot fupply the defed of intention, or repair the vices which afie£t the fubftance of the teftament. * • Here thefe two circumftances are united. The defcft of intention, as the Princes de Conty are only ap- pointed under a condition, which has never taken place. An eflential vice which affeds the fubflancc of the teftament. Can there be a greater defe^l than die failure of the inftitution, which, according to all the jurifts, is tlie foundation, the baGs, the life of the teftament ? Before we anfwer this obje£lion, which is die only one that^as any colour, we muft take a curfory review ioS the general principles which the law has eftabliihed concemiog the nature and eSkCt of codicils, in order that we may afterwards I make a juft application of them to the codicillary claufe. Without enquiring here, into the origin of this difpoGtion by . way of codicil, which may be juftly called a teftament according to die law of nations, and which in tStOt is the only one, of which we have retained the ufe ; let us barely remark, that a codicil is nothing elfe than a requeft addreflcd by a dying man, to his heir, by which he intreats him to execute a will lefs folemn than a tef- tament. Hence it arifes, that according to the firft principles of Ronwn jurif^rudence, direA terms and imperative expreffions are abfolutcly unknown in this kind of difpofition, and whilft diej .are cfientially necefiary in teftaments, they are fatal m codicils. A teftator commands, but he who makes a codicil entreats. The one ordains, as invefted with the authority given him by the law ; the other fupplicates by virtue only of the power, which nature feems to have attached to the prayers of a dying man. IjCt us pnufe a while upon this juft and natural idea of a codicil, which can only be contefted by thofe who have not any rinfhiR even of the f^rft principles of the civil law. Every codicil is natural- ly and cflcntlally an efficacious prayer {une frUreEHfiXE) (0}, afup- («) The word enijie appears from other pleadiagi to be t term of firticultt tnergf ift tli« French jur'if|.rusieace» pllcatory Numb. XIX. SekSllohs fnnn D^Agueffiau. 505 pitcatorj intention addSreficd to thofe wI\o have already the title of heirs. By virtue of this prayer, which is always fure '-to obtain what it demands, this intention is certainly efficacious; and we may fay of teftators, what was formerly faid of kings, that their requefts are commands. But it is always a prayer, it is always a fuppli- catory intention, and it is that which diftinguiflies it eflentially from a teftament. As there are two forts of heirs, the one teftamentary and the other legitimate, there are alfo two forts of codicils : and their difference is founded upon the difierent t]ualxty of the perfons to whom thofe prayers, which form the whole elTence of codicils, axe addrefled. The codicils of tliefirft kind are thpfe which are made (accord<» ing to the language of the laws) ad teftamentumy which are regard* ed as a fequel, as an acccfiary, as a dependency upon the teftament \ becaufe in this cafe it is only to the inilituted heir that the tef« tatoT addrefles his requefts. Hence it follows that this kind of co- dicil follows the nature and deftiny of the a£): to which it is at- tached ; and, as it fubfifts, if the teftament fubfifts, it is alfo ex- ttnguiihed with the teftament. But there is alfo a fecond kind of codicils, independent of a teftament \ and thefe are fuch as every man, having a teftamentary capacity, makes without making a tef- tament. And whereas in the firft, the codicil is regarded as a prayer addrcfled to the inftituted heir; in the laft, it is always confidered as a prayer to the legitimate heir. This diftin£lion is clearly eftabliihed in the law, 16. ff. dejure coiu'tll. where the jurift explains it in thefe terms : Ei ut manifefiius dtcam^ intefiato patrefamilias mortuo, nihil deftderant codidlli^fed vicem uflamenti exhihent^ tejlanunto autemfoBoy jus fiquuntur ejus* Such is the nature of a codicil, and fuch are its different kinds, and, this being premifed, nothing appears more eafy, tlian to ex* plain the efie£ls of the codicillary claufe. What is a codicillary claufe? It is a difpofition which has the efied of changing a teftament into a codicil, of fubftituting in tli« place of an ^bfolutelawa requeft, which is often more efficacious, to caufe that which cannot ^vail as teftament according to the ilrittinefs of the law, to be executed as a codicil according to the rales of equity. But as we have diftinguilhed two forts of codicil- lary daufes, the one attached to a teftament, the other indepen- dent of a \eftament, what will be the efied of the codicillary claufe, in that favourable converfion which it makes of a tefta* ment into a codicil ? Will it be to make fuch a codicil as follows the nature and deftiny of the teftament, or on the contrary, a co- L 1 4 dicil 504' APPENDIX. [N^inb.XIX« (ficil which will fubfift by ididf* widiout tny lieccflkry relatioQ to any other a&j without any dependence on a teftament ? It is not difl^cult^ but It U very important^ to anfwer dais queftiom We fay firft» that it is not difficulty becaufe it is evident that t codicillary danfe can never make a codicil of the fitft ktod, that is to fay, a codicil which is infeparably attached to the deftiny of a teftament ; for fince it is the teftament itfelf, to which it gives the form and nature of a codicil, to what teftament ihall it be attached, as there is no longer any fubfifting, and the teftator has only ^dded this important claufe to fupply the default of a tefta« ment, to take its place and be executed as a fettled intendon, (cmmne volonte enixe) in cafe the teftament cannot have cSeA as a folenm ad ? Now if it is abfurd to fay, that a codicillary claufe can ever render a teftament a codicil of that kind which the IkW calls n^ pcndicrrH et fiquelam iefiarmnti^ what conclufion can remam» but that the force and virtue of this claufe confifts preciiely in making a codicil of the fecond kind which fubfifts of itfelf, without borrowing its life and being from the teftament ? We fay, in die fecond place, that it is important to anfwer this queftion, however cafy it may be to decide It, becaufe from this fingle anfwer we may deduce all the principles which regard the codicil-^ hry claufe, and the folution of all the objedions by which it is contended to be ufelefs, under the circumftances of the prefent cafe. In fa£l,- if the nature of die codicillary clatlfic is to render the teftament to which it is added entirely fimilar to a codicil, that would fubfift withouf the fupport of a teftament, the de- finition of this claufe will be tl)e fame with that of fudi i codicil. Now what is the definition of this kind of codicil, if it is not^ as we have already curforily hinted, a prayer addrefied by a dying man to his legitimate heir, by which he conjures him to accomplifli his laft wifhes ? For fince every codicil is eflentially a ftipplication made to the heir, and as there axe two forts of heirsy the one teftamentary and the other legitimate, from the moment that this fupplication can no longer be addrefid to the teftamen-* tarylieirs, becaufe the law fuppofes there not to be any Imdk^ it neceflarily follows, that the legitimate heir i^ its only objeA. ^ The whole nature and force of the codicillary claufe then is in« eluded in thefe two principles, which we ought not to be called upon here to prove i firft, diat this claufe is made to fupply the defeA of a teftnmentary heir, and confequently that it fuppofes there not to be any fuch licit ; fecond, that it has the ttkfX of fubftitoiiiig tht k-i!imatc heir, in die place of the tefta^ientary heir, by thole ' ciEcacious lfmnb.XIX.3 SdeSHmsftvmiyAguefeau. 505 cfficadotts and energetic prayers, which every teftator is prefiimed' 10 addrefa to his heirs by bloodj by the mere terms of the codicil* hry claufe. What is the , natund confequence of this definition and theTe principles ? it isj that you are notj as has been attempted in this caufej agaiaft the moft clear texts of the civil law, againft the una* nimous concurrence of all the dodors, without any one exception^ to diftinguifli two forts of codicillary claufes ; the one etpreCi^, formal, fupremely eiEcacious, addrefled by name to the heirs by blood I the other vaguci general, claufes of ftyle rather than oif intention, and which can at moft only repair fome defers of to* lemnity. It is agreed, that if the codicillary claufe which we are examin* ingt was conceived like thofc of the firfl; kind,, the pretenfion of Modame JU Nemours wquld not be maintainable, and that fiie would be without difficulty chargeable with the fidti^Mimifflnn^ in favour of the Prince de Coniy. Bat it is contended that as the codicillary claufe in the tefta- ment of thtAbbe iT Orleans, is only conceived in genetal terms, it does not contain any formal prayer which is obligatory upon Madame de Nemours* \xi the firft place, we Ihould be glfid to aflc thofe who prcpofe this diftin Alon where they have found it. Is it ia tbd Mxt of the law ; is it in the fentiments of the doAors ; i^ it in tbd aiidioricy of decided cafes ? they have not as yet cited any law Which' efta^ bliihes it, any do£ior who follows it, any judgment which eoiU firms it. Let us paufe a moment to weigh the force of this ar- gument ; although it is negative, it almoft forms a demonftratxon in regard to the prcfent queftton. If it were true that this diftm^iion of t^o kinds of cddicQIary clauies was known in the law, it would dqubdefs be a firft prin* ciple and a fimdamental maxim upon the fubjeA* But if that was fo, how would it be poffible for the fcrupulou# exattoefs of the counfel of Madame de Nemours, who have extended, their re^ fearches to laws, the moft indifierent, and the moft temdCe froln the prefent cafe, not to have found in the whole range of the law, at leaft fome obfcure and difficult text, from which they might deduct by a doubtful interpretation, this important diftin£tion upon which their whole defence Is to turn ? How could this ufeful and neceflary principle have efcaped the attention of all thejurifts, in die infinity of laws, tefpefting teftaments ? How happens it that Ju/linian has made no mention of it in his Inftitiites? How does it happen that of all the ancient and modem interpreters qf the law, pregnant with diftinAions, fertile in qucftions, authors of $o6 APPENDIX. CNumb. XK.' » of tn infinity of novel doftrincs, which arc frequently repugnant to ^the text of the laws^ none have hit upon this eifential differ- cnce, between the different kinds of codicillary claufes ? Let it not be faid that a mere comparifon of fome laws is fuf- ficient to manifeft this diilin£lion. In ibme, as for inftance,in the law, Titiaf 12* ff* ^^ 'V* ^ift^^* {") the heirs, ab xnttfiato^ arc fwminatim^ and exprefsly requefted by the teftator, to accompliib the difpoCtions of his teftamenty in others as in law 8. C, deccdic. the teftator merely fays, that he wills his teftament (hall avail as a codicil, ^r» codiciilis €tiam id valere[h)i and that from thcfc different formulse, we may and ought to conclude that one codicillary claufe is often very different from another. Th6fe who make this difficulty, forget that wc arc examimngi not the form, but the efie£l of the codicillary claufe. If we were only inquiring about the form, the divifion would be very imperfed, they might not only diftinguiOi two kinds, but alfo reckon up five or fix, of which we have examples in the Digeft, airf it is (hewn by Cujas, and all the other expofitors, that the number is not determined ; that there is not in regard to this fubjed, any fixed inviolable formula, which confifts in a certain arrangement^ of words : the good faith that governs thefe difpofitions, which were fortunately invented to mitigate the rigour of the law, does not fu£Fer them to be conjined within fuch narrow bounds; every exprcffion, even every c let it a^ail as a codicil^ could he more exprefsly condemn the new di(lin<£^ion of two kinds of codieillary claufes ? Cujas does not exprefs himfelf lefs precifelf than Bartdus^ when he fays, upon the title of the code, i& jUW« €9mmiffsf that if thQ teftament becomes void, the jidet-^mnafa which it contains are not due from the heirs of by blood, oJim^MB tamen deherift ah inteftato fuccedefttes rogati probantur vel rggati itiUl* Kgantur «v generali tt fimplici fermone teftator is vel ex claufula codicil^ iari. You fee, Sjrs, that this great interpreter of the law, in like manner with Bartolus^ confiders the codieillary claufe as equira^ lent to an exprefs prayer, made to the heirs by blood, and that he would have regarded the diftinflion which is p^opofed to yoiii as a paradox in the principles pf law. It is with relu£lance that we detain you, by proving fo much at length fo certain a principle; but as this is the capital pmnt upon which all the ai^uments o( 'Madame de Nemours depend, it was abfolutely neceflary to confirm the principle by all thefe re- de£kions* after which nothing will be more eafy than to anfirei the difficulties which are oppofed to the codieillary claufe* Thofe who have defended the interefts of Madame de Nemc&rt^ agree that if the teftament of the AUe iTOrleans contained an ex4 prefs prayer, addrefled to the heirs by blood, the cafe of the Prvut (fe Cent] would be indifputable : now we have ihewn by general principlesj by the authority of particular .laws» by the fentimcnti («) The Engtlfii lawyer wtU of covrfe hut be ftnick with the recoUeaba of a tfjitdly tty^cdtepHfteifle. Kumb. XfX.;i SekHionsfrom D'AgueJeau. '569 of expofitor$9 that it is the fame thing to rcqucft the heirs hy name and to rcqucft them in general by a codicillary claufe : where then can be the difBculty ? Let us however anfwer a little more at length the two principal objcSions, by which they would elude the power and efficacy of this claufe. We have already glanced at them in pafling. It is faid, in the firft place, that the codicillary claufe was only ap- plied to repair a want of folemnity, and not an cflential defeO:, in .the fubftance of the tcftament, fuch as a failure of the inftitution. After the principles which we have eftabliQied, three very {hort reflexions will be fulHcient entirely to deftroy this firft objec- tion. So far is it from being true, that the codicillary claufe cannot re-* medy die cflential def eft of the failure of the inftitution, that it was prccifely for that purpofc that it was introduced. It was only, as we have fo often faid, for the purpofe of fubftituting the legitimate to Ac tcftjimcntary heir. If the inftitution was not void, the codi- cillary claufe would be ufelefs, and it is now argued that it fhall be deftroyed by the very circumftance which is the caufe of its fttbfifting, and that it fliall lofe its efficacy prccifely in the very cafe for which its affiftance is reforted to. IjCt U9 go further, and add, in the fecond place, that however (lightly we confult the principles of natural reafon, we fhall agree that Mfhat diftinguifties a ceftament from a codicil, an infthution iirem ^fidei-comnnffioni is a mere fubtility of civil law, which only confifts in the term Heir. What is a teftament ? DireBa hrediiatis dati§. What is an unlvcrfal fidei-commifflon ? Obliqua hereditaiis Jatjo. What they have bodi in common is a donation of the |MK>p«rty of the teftator. Wherein do they difict ? In this, that the one is made in terms of command, the other in terms of rcqucft^. Now what is there in all this but a mere formality which neverthe* lefs, by the rigid principles of law, occaiions, as we have fhewnj a failure of the teftament ? If theti it is agreed, that the codicillary .claufe has the force of repairing the defers of folemnity, it mpft be agreed, that it is fufficient in this cafe to remedy the failure of Ac tettament, founded en^Iy upon a rigorous folemnity. TkMtUy, and this is the third reflexion which we opppfe to ^is objeAlta) if is certain that the want of Jblenmity renders the in- -ftittttidii^cHd and inisfieAtta], in the fame manner as the previous ^Aecdife df ^e inftitnted heir. Now if they are obliged to admit, go further, and (hew, that the confequence to be deduced from this reafoning would be dircdlly contrary to the intcrefts of Md^ dame de Nemours. Let us grant to thofe who adduce this argument every thing they require : the codiciUary claufe has no efFeft upon codicils, all our tcftaments arc codicils, the- very ^eftament we arc cxamini-g can only be regarded as a codicil \ but what will be the conclufion that may be expected from all thefe fuppofitions ? Surely the fol- lowing, according to all the principles of law. If it is a codicil, there is no inftitution of an heir, the a£l not being fufceptible of that operation. If there is no inftitution, then all the dire£t difpofi- tions become oblique, then the inftitution of the Cofjite de Saint Pd and Madame de Longueville becomes z fidei-commiffion j if it is only regarded as ^jftdei-^ommi/Jion, then it is of the fame nature with the difpofition in favour of the Princes de Conty. If it is of the fame nature, there is no need of recurring to the converfion of a jft/ci- commijfary fubftitution into a dire£t fubftitution ; if this converfion is ufelefs, if the inftitutions and fubftitutions formed by the tef- tament are all of the fame kind, then by a neceflary confequence, admitted by the counfel of Madame de Nemours themfelves, the interruption of degrees cannot defeat the laft fubflitution ; then whoever is fubftituted to the fecond heir, is confidered as fublVi- tuted to the firft, then the difpofition has not failed, then the tef- tament fubfifts by itfelf ; and in effe£l, when it is faid, that it would be abfurd to admit a codiciUary claufe in a codicil, it is not be- caufe it is contrary to the fpirit and nature of a codicil, but becaufe k would be fuperfluous and redundant. U the whole effeA of it is to make a codicil of a teftament, why (hould it be added to that which ts a codicil, and can be nothing elfe } itwould be a derifory difpofition for a teftator to lajj I wiU that my codicil Iball avail as a ciMiicilr Nothing Numb. XIX. 3 Sekdions from D* Aguejeau. 515 Nothing further is neccflary to confirm the truth of what we obferved in the outfet, that this reafon is offered ^uite out of place^ that it would have a great degree of plaufibility in the mouth of the Princes de Conty^ but in that of Madame de Neinoursy can only ferve to form an invincible argument againft her. Let us finifli in a few words, every thing relative to this que& tion, by the anfwer which we think ought to be given to the laft ob}e£lion ; and which has only been propofed in two papers, that have been placed in our hands within thefe two days. Let us retrace, in the firft place, the nature of the laws upon which it is founded. A man who fuppofes himfelf only to have one heir, and who, notwithdanding, has two, makes a codicil by which he charges the only heir whom he is apprifed of, with ^fidei-commiffion ; after his death there appears a fecond heir, it is demanded in the firft place, if he can be fubjedled to the perfor- mance of ii\t fidet'Comml/JiGfif as to the part and portion which be- longs to him ; it is next demanded, if the co-heir, whom the tef- tatorhas exprefsly charged with tl fidei^cotntnijfion^ is fubjeft to the whole or only to a moiety. Upon the firft queftion,P/j/i/i/fl/i does not doubt but that the new heir, who is abfolutely unknown to the teftator, (hould be difcharg- ed; the fecond queftion he confiders more difficult, but upon prin- ciples of equity, he is induced to adopt the opinion that the^ft/W- CQmm'iffion ought to be reduced to a moiety. , We do not examine at prefent, whether this interpretation has not more fubtlety than folidity, whether it would be received amongft us, and whether there would not be a greater degree of reafon in conclufions dlreftly oppofite. In a word, whether it ought not to be^decided, that as the teftator intended to charge with 7k fidd^ommvjjlon^ the heir whom he knew, it ought not to b^ prefumed that hp would be ftill more difpofed to have charged the other whom he did not know, amd that it is difficult to conceive,- that he would have cut off, in favour of an unknown perfon> ai moiety of the legacy which he gave to ^t jideUcommiJfary. Without combating prefumptions by prefumptions, and effacing one colour by another, let us take it for granted that the interpre-* tat Ion of Papinian is the only one that is juft, the only one that is equitable, the only one conformable to the principles of lawi We confefs that, even upon this fuppofition, it is t)ot cafy to divintf what confequence can be deduced from it, for the decifion of this caufe. There is fo great a difference between the one cafe and thtf ot]ier, that it is aftoniflnng how it (hould enter into the mind ol M m a anf 5*6 APPENDIX. [Numb. Ill, any body, to make an application of it to the tcftament we arc now examining. What is the rcafon upon which Papiniari, and after him Ca/V/, found their determination ? It is only upon the ignorance of the teftator, cum exlflimaret ad folam cotifcbritiam fuam bona pen^ntura. It iscafy to perceive the principle of this decifion. Fidei'commijfa are only fupported by the intention, which i» their life and foundation. Now it cannot be fuppofed, that the tedator hail any intention in rcfpeft to a perfon of whom he had no knowledge, and whom confequently he could not believe to be his heir. Perhaps he would alfo have diminiflied his charge* upon the fucceflion, if he had feen that it would be divided among feveral perfons. His intention is uncertain, and in order to afTurc the perfeft execution of \^c fidei^ommyjiotiy it ought to be cenaln. In a cafe of doubt, the heir is to be favoured \ and as the mind of the teftator cannot be certainly known, they come as near aspof- Cble to the fpirit of nature and the law, which incline in favour of the heirs by blood. Let us fee, however, whether this principle has any application to the prefcnt cafe. Is that ignorance which is fo decifive, or whidi is rather the only principle upon which Papinian founds his dc- clfioni to be found in this caufe ? Shall it be faid, that the AiV: d* Orleans was ignorant of the number and quality of his heirs, that he erred, cither in fad, by fuppoGng that Madame de Nemsur, was not his fitter, or in law, by perfuading himfelf that his fider was not as nearly related to him, and as capable of fucceediiig him, as his brother. This is van all, it not only cannot be prefumed that he did not know his real heirs, it may even be demon ftratcd to be impoffiblc that he could have any perfon in view in tlie codicillary claufc, except Madame de Nemours. Let us follow up our firfl ideas; the codicillary claufe is a pVaycr addrefled to the legitimate heirs, and the jibte d*Or/eans had only three of this quality, the Comte de Saint Polj Madame de Longut- vil/ey and Madame de Nemours. He addreflcs himfelf to the two firft, in the inftitution, he charges them by name, witli thejWW- ccmmt/ftGn in favour of the Princes de Conty^ he addrefTes himfelf, to the lail, by the codicillary claufe. Why fo ? Becaufe one of the principal cafes, for which that claufe is. added, is the caducity of the inftitution ; that is to fay, the previous deceafe of the tvo inftituted heirs. Then there is one cafe, in which he fuppofcs that the two firfl heirs will not be in a condition to liften to his prayers, and to obey his direflions ; and notwithftanding that he ftill cmunues to fypplicate and to make himfelf be heard. To whom Numb. XIX.] Seledions from D^ Agttejfeau. x 517 whom then' can he addrefs himfelf, if he has no other obje£l than his legitimate heirs, and two of thefe are fuppofed to be dead ? Is it not evident that he mud only have in conten^plation the third, the only one who exiils, that is to fay, Madame de Nemours^ and confequcntly that (he is, as we have already obferved, almoft m^ tninatim charged i)y the teftator. After this we (hall not anfwer feveral objeftions fimilar to thofe wc have already examined ; for inftance, that which is deduced from tcftaments that are void for paffing by a child, in which it is properly decided that the codicillary claufe cannot have any cfled, but upon the principles which we have already eftabliflied, that is to fay, becaufe i^ is fuppofed in this cafe, either that there was no will, or if there was one, that it was unjuft. H?re the will is certain, here the will is juft, the power of the teftator and his will go together, and equally fupporthis difpofition. In lieu of going into all thefe ufelefs queftions they might have introduced two others, which would have a much greater con- nection with the real nature of the teftameht. The one would have been, whether the Prince de Conty was rot obliged to have waited for the death of Madame de Nemours ^ before he could inftitute his demand ; and we fhould huve thouirht upon this queftion, that zjidei'commijjion^ of which the performance is not exprefsly fufpended by the teftator, is a ^xtknt fidci-commif" Jio7ty and may be demanded immediately upon the deceafe of the perfon making it 5 and bcfides, that even if it* were not de- xnandable until after the death of Madame de Nemours^ it would Hill be a prefent right in the Prince de Cottiy^ a^d that he might demand the confirmation of it by all the ways capable of main- taining it, fo that the delay may not prevent his difcufting the qucftion, by the examination of witnefles. The fecond queftion is, whether Madame de Nemours would not at leaft have a right to the dedudion of the fourth part, on account of the Trebellian portions ; but this queftion would have appeared to us to be premature *, it relates to the execution, and not to the validity of the title, and at prefent we are only inquiring into the validity. £uchj Sirs, are all the refle£):ions which we have confidered it pur duty to make upon this firft pai^t of the caufe, that is to fay, upon that which relates to the title of the Prince de Canty. They arc reduced to the Ongle propofition, that the rigour of the law ^ould have rendered the inftttution void, and confequcntly have defeated the fdei-commi/ftGn, if the codicill;ury daufe bad not given )t a favpurable fuccour and fuppon^ Mm 3 Let 5i8 APPEND I±. [Numb- XIX. Let us now proceed to the titles of Madame de Nemours, kt u* fee whether they derogate from thofc of the Prince de Conty, and whether the teftament upon which he founds his title, not having failed in itfelf, is not at leaft .revoked by the a£ls which follow^ ed it. The firft of thefc aSs is the donation ; the fccond, the tefta- ment of the 26th February y 1671. We fliall not enlarge at prefcnt upon what relates to the firil, it might furnifli matter for a long diflcrtation, which would confift in examining in what cafes a donation revokes a legacy, or a jJii- commiffion^ and whether there is any diftinftion between particular fdei-commiffions and univerfal fubftitutions. We (hall onlyobfem in general, that it would feem very difficult to fupport, at the fame time, an univerfal donation and an VLvXvtiizXfidei^commrffiony haTing different objects. It is true that the donation was only of prefent property, and xht fidei-commij/lon included future ; but on the other fide, we fee that in the donation, the Abbe d'Orleam ftipulates for a right of return in favour of Madame de Newours, after himfclf, and confequently, it feems that the Princes de Coaty had ccafed to be the obje£); of his aSeftion and his bounty. > Without enlarging upon this queftion, we think it ought to be decided upon the fame faft of infanity, by which they impeach the teftament that immediately followed. If that a£l is the worL of a perfon deftitutc of reafon, the donation has the fame defect, jhere being only three days interval between them. If the Ahhi was in a date of fanity at tlie time of making the teftament, he was likewife fo at the time of the donation. If he was in a date pf imbecility, at the eqcecution of the fecond of thefe ads, he was fo likewife at the making of the firft } and as they only offer to de- ftroy the laft a£l, which evidently revokes the firft teftament, upon the fingle ground of infanity, let us enter upon this great and im-: portant queftion, which is more difficult than all we have hither- to examined, which is truly worthy of the attention of the public, and ftill more worthy of the regard of juftice herfelf. The general capacity of doing ads is founded upon a natural law, that of making a teftament is the effed of a civil law, which nffi^rdsto mankind a kind of confolation for their mortality, by per- mitting them to revive, as it were, in the perfons of their fuccef- fors, and procure themfelves an image and a {hade of immortali- ty in a long fucceiGon of heirs, who may be a lafting monument of ^he wifdom and bounty of the teftator. And as the capacity of every man is eftabliflied upon both the pne and the other of thefe laws, there are two kinds of caufcs which . fnay deprive )iim pf it s the one |ou&ded upon a natural reafon. Numb. XIX.3 Selefiions from UAgueJfaau. 519 which IS alone fuiEcient to annihilate or fufpcnd the power of the teftator; the other, although edablifhed likewife upon - a natural reafon, requires the authority of the civil law to deftroy that liber* ty of entering into engagements and making difpofitions, which the law gives to every pcrfon after a certain age. Thus, for inftance, the law depriving pcrfons in a ftate of fury ©r imbecility of the faculty of making a teftament, is a law pure- ly natural, and does not require the aid of any pofitive law. Not- withftanding the filence of legiflators, it will be always true that a man deftitute of underflanding cannot make a valid difpofition* As long as reafon (hall fubHit among men, the confent of all na- tions will authorize this maxim, and by a neceffary confequcnce of this principle, it is manifeft that, even before any interdiftion, a madman is abfolutely out of the ftate which is requifite to make a valid teftament. It is not the authority of the magiftrate, it is that of nature herfclf, which pronounces his interdiftion ; the judge does no more than declare it, but it is cftabliflicd, indepen- dently of his miniftry, from the commencement of the infanity. It is not the fame with regard to a prodigal. Although the caufe of his interdidlion is founded on a natural reafon, which does not fuiFcr the deftiny of a family to be placed in the hands of a man, who only poiTeiTes his property to deftroy it, and who only ufts it to abufe ; yet as this reafon does not produce ai> abfolute incapacity, it is neceflary that natural law iliouid be confirmed by civil ; and until the miniftry of the judge has determined the ftatc of the prodigal, he may ftill enjoy the liberty which is common to all men. This difFcrcnce, which does not require to be proved, is clearly ftated in the firft and fecond fedlions of the Inftitutes ; quihus mn ' ejl permijfum facere tejlamentutn, A madman, fays Juji'inian^ from the moment he is in that con- dition, cannot make a teftament any more than an infant ; the one has loft his judgment, the other has not yet attained it ; tejiameri'' turn facere non pojfunt impuberes% quia nullum eorum artimi judicium eji; itanyfurio/ij quia mente carent. But a prodigal only lofes this power, from the time when he is deprived of the adminiftration of his efFe£ts j prodigus cui bonorum fuorum adminiftratio interdicfa ejly teflamentum facere non potef i fed id quod ante fecerit quam interdi^io bgnorum Juorum e% fiat J ratum efim What is the natural confequence t6 be deduced from this firft principle, the truth of which is recognifed by all the doftors, who have written upon thefe fubje^is i When it is pretended that av* teftament is null^ oi> accQunt of the incapacity pf tbe perfon mak« Nm4 ing 540 A P P E N D 1 1. [Numb. XIX, ing tt| It is ntctSkrj to dtftinguifli between a madman and i prodigal. With regard to a prodigal, if the teftament is prior tQ the in- terdiftion, his difpofition cannot be impeached. It would be in vain to offer any proof that the caufe of his interdiction, that i^ his prodigalityi his diflSpationy and the diforder in his affairs elided previous to the teilament| fmce even if all this were ell;;. bliflied, the teftament would ftill be fafe \ however certain they might be, they might ferve as the foundation of an interdidioii) but could not operate as fuch in themfelves. On the contrary, when the queftion jelates to the teftament of a madman, although it was made before his interdiction, the caufc of the teftamentary heirs is not yet fecure ; an4 fince the ftate q( madnefs muft neceifarily precede the interdiction, which is only a declaration of it ; and as the madnefs is ^n itfelf fufficient to de« ttroy the teftan^ent, it is competent to offer a proof of this hCt \ the reafbn is evident j it is the fa£i, the i^adncfs itfelf, which as it were pronounces the interdi^ion. In a word, prodigality, however certain it may be, docs not fuiScc to render the prodigal incapable. Madnefs, if certain and evi- dent, is a complete interdidion in itfelf. Hence it arifes that in regard to the Qne, a proof by witneficsis |reje£bcd^ bccaufe the interdiction in the cafe of the prpdigal, is inore a matter of law than of hGt ; and as it can only be eftablKh- cd by a judicial fentence, it can only be proved by the fcntence ^^tfelf ; whild on the other hand, in the cafe of a madman the in- terdi^bion is more a matter of h€t than of law, and confequently it may be proved by all arguments, which are received to eftabliih the truth of fa^s, of whatever nature they may be. Thus, in regard to prodigals, there is only one kind of inter- 4i£^ion ; which is that pronqunced by the jud^c, but with regard to a madman, there is as it were a double interdiClion and a double ♦ • • • ■ • incapacity, the one natural and the other civil ; and although the jirft is neither fo folemn nor public as the fecOnd, it is neverthekfs the mod (Irong, or rather it is the only real one, fince the fccond only follows and imitates the firft; and the magiftrate feems only tp interpofe his judgment, in order to join the authority of the law to that of nature. The fecond interdiQion, which we call civil, can only be proved by writing, that is by the judgment itfelf, which declares rather than forms it j the firft, on the contrary, can rarely be proved by writing, and confequently it may and ought to be proved by witneifes. If this firft principlcj drawn from the comparifon we have macje betweq Kumb. XIX.]] Sekeiions from D'Agueffeau. $n between a madman and a prodigal^ is oppofed on account of its being impoflfiblc to admit fuch proofi without attacking the firft ^elements of the law and of the oi:4onnances which do not fuffer the Wthority of written afts to be impeached by parol evidence; we coiifider it to be eafy to anfwer this obje£llon9 by a diftinf^ioa equally folid ^th the iirftt ^tnd which we aiTume as a fecond prin* /ciple that cannot be called in. queilion. There are two things to be copGdered in all kinds of ads, and - ^oft particularly in teftaments. The firft is the fubftance of the a£tj the difpoGtions which it contains, and we may add its form and folemnity., The fecond, is the capacity of the .perfon executing it ; in a word) we either confine our attention to the zQi confidered in it- p:lf, or we contemplate the perfon who has figned it. When there is nothing before us but the a£l> when there is np queftion but of the truth of what it containSj then . it may be ad« mitted as a general rule, that parol evidence cannot be admitted in oppofition to what is contained in an authentic a£t, and that for two reafons ; fir(l| the common maxim, that parol evidence can never be put in competition with written, when the -queflion re-r lates to a matter which may be the fubjeck of a written aft ; and fecondly, becaiife the proof is perfeft by the aft itfelf. Thus for example, when they have omitted to fp&cify upon a teflament, that it was read a firft and fecond time \ diftatcd, &c. (/tf, reluy nommc, diEle^ &c.) it would be to, no purpofe to demand a liberty to prove that all this had been aftually done, becaul^ public utility requires that the proof of a faft of this kind fhould not be fought for elfewhere, than in the teftament itfelf. But when they do not (lop at the fubftance and folemnity of the ac), when they call in queftion the power, the capacity, the ^i%t ditlon of a teftator, who can contend, that nothing but the aft it<*> felf can be a legitimate proof of tliis ? Shall it be fald that whcQa queftion is made, whether a man was a major or a minor, at the time of entering into an engagement, you fliali onlyconfult the aft itfelf which he has executed, and if he ^here makes a falfe declaration, fliall he be bound by that falfehood, becaufe It is written in an a£^ | Shall you not rather feek in the public regifters, for the proper proof of the faft in queftion ; and if thofe are loft, (hall not the minor be admitted to prove even by parol evidence, that be way fuch at the time of entering tnto the contraft f In a word, no two things canbd more diftinft and feparate than the truth of the aft, and the capacity of the party executing it ; the one is certain, inconteftible, proved by the aft itfelf; but with re- gard to ^e othef J the aft ^upp.ofes itj and does pQt prove it, unlefr it 522 ' APPENDIX. £Numb.IlX. it (hall be faifthft thcnotary isthc judge thereof, and that, aIthou«rh he IS no more, than the inftrument, the organ, the interpreter of the teftatorj he is neverthelefs to decide upon his (late and ca- pacity. But if this propofition cannot be fuftained, if your judgments iiave permitted a proof of the incapacity of a teftator, even where the notary has fet down, that he was of found underftanding,what ought we to decide in the prefent cafe, where thcfe words do not occur, and where the notary only fpeaks of the foundnefs of body, and fays nothing of that of the mind ? Although no con- fcqucnce might be drawn from this omiffion, to raife a prefump- tion of infanity, for all the reafons that have been dated to you-, it ferves neverthelefs to remove the fcruple which fome authors hare had, where the notary has declared that the teftator was of found mind and underftanding. But not to dwell upon a fa£l of this quality, let us return to the train of principles which we think ought to be eftabliflicd for the decifion of this fccond part of the cvufe. The teflamcnt, confidcrcd in itfelf, is not then a proof of ttc capacity of the teftator, the notary is not a judge of it, and how ihould he, as he only fees the teftator for a moment ? Can he penetrate, in an inftant, into the bottom of his heart and the ferrets of his foul ? Folly and wifdom are equally invifible, if confidered in •themfelvcsi they arc only difcovered bywords and external afiions, 'and thofe a£^ions are frequently fufpended for a much longer time than is neceiTary for making a teftament. Let us conclude then, fince the capacity of the teftator is as it were an extrinfic faft, and foreign to the aft itfelf, of which the Dotary cannot be the judge, that the teftament alone is not fuf- •ficient to exclude a proof by witnefles ; beeaufe, in a word, it is "not prccifely the a£l which is attacked, but the perfon of the tef- tator, and if the teftament is attacked, is it only indire&ly a«nd confequentially. It was perhaps with reference to the proof of this capacity of the teftator, that the firft Rowan laws required fuch fcrupulous folemnities in the execution of teftaments ; it was not folely to render them more authentic, that -they required th^m to hare the whole Roman people as witnefles. It was aifo to render the ca- ipacity of the teftator entirefy certain by the teftimony of all his fellow citizens, who would have ftood up to oppofe the aft of the teftator, if they had not rccognifed his fanity and capacity. But after teftaments became fecret and domeftic, and as the -prefcnce of two notarie^j or of one notary and of two witneffcs •^ fufficient with us to Kndci* ^em .ai^thentici i^ cannot b^ W 5 M Numb. XIX,] SekSionsfrom D'AgueJfeau. 523 that fo fmall a number of witneiTes, who do not know the teftator, and who are perhaps ftill lefs known by him, ihall exclude the ad- miilion of a more folemn and perfefl: proof. When once the condition of the teftator is juftly doubtful^ it is proper that a great number of witnefles, who may be heard with refpe^ to a fa£i of this kind, fhould fupply whai it left (hort in the a£k itfelf, and that they (hould, after the death of the teftator^ do what the whole Roman people, in witnefling the teftament, former- ]y did in his life, by proclaiming aloud the madncfs or fanity of the teftator. \ ^ All the do£lor$ have unanimoully followed this opinion, and j not one has been cited who has oiFered to combat it. Your judgments have confirmed it upon many occafionsy-as they ! have been obliged to admit on the part of Madame de Netmurs. But they contend, and we believe with juftice, that it ought not to , be taken as a fettled maxim, that proof by witnefles ihould never be refufed. *. The diverfity in your judgments upon this fubjed will be fuf- ^cient to eftablifti the real maxim that ought to prevail in the j .deciiionof thefe queftions. There are judgments which admit it, and that is fufEcient to ftiew in general, that fuch proof is often ad* miiUble \ there are others, which reje£l it, and confequently ihew that it is not always admiiGble* Let us then aflume it as a certain truth, upon which perhaps we liave been- too di&ufe, that it is in general a perverfion of maxims, to contend that parol evidence ought to be rejeftcd, on account of the common rule contra Jcrlptum tejlimmmm non-fcriptum teftimonium jion admiititur. Such were the principles that we had the honour to propoie to you in the caufe of Bonvalet, and it was only on account of par- ticular circumftances, that we thought it would not be proper to allow a proof by witneflTes, of the infanity of the teftator. Let us examine then the particular circumftances, and the im- portant prefumptions which in this caufe are oppofed to thefe ge- neral maxims. We may dif^jnguifli two kindsi the one are derived from the teftament itfelf, the other from the contra£ts and other a£t$, which precede, accompany, and follow it } but before we enter upon this examination, it will be proper tp make ai> obfervation which is ge- neral and common to all thefe prefumptions. You are not now called upon to decide what was the real ftatc .jof the jiibe d^ Orleans when he made his teftament, you are not pbliged to pronounce tfpon the proofs alleged on the one part, or .(fn fhp pthe]> wbcthqr to prove l^is fenily or infanity ^ that is not the ftatc 522 'APPENDIX. {Numb-IIX. It (hall be faid^ that thcnotary isthc judge thereof, and that, although he is no more, than the inftrument, the organ, the interpreter of the tcftator, he is nevcrthelefs to decide upon his ftatc and ca- pacity. But if this propofition cannot be fuftained, if your judgments iiave permitted aproof of the incapacity of a teftator, even where the notary has fet down, that he was of found under(tanding,what ought we to decide in the prefent cafe, where thcfe words do not occur, and where the notary only fpeaks of the foundncfs of body, and fays nothing of that of the mind ? Although no con- fequence might be drawn from this omiflion, to raife a prefump- tion of infanity, for all the reafons that have been dated to you •, •it ferves nevcrthelefs to remove the fcruplc which fome authors hare had, where the notary has declared that the tcftator was of found mind and underftanding. But not to dwell upon a fa£l of this quality, let us return to the train of principles which we think ought to be eftabliftied for the deciCon of this fecond part of the cvufe. The teftament, confidered in itfelf, is not then a proof of the capacity of the tcftator, the notary is not a judge of it, and how jQiould he, as he only fees the teftator for a moment ? Can he penetrate, in an inftant, into the bottom of his heart and the fecrets of his foul ? Folly and wifdom arc equally invifible, if confidered in •themfelvesi they are only difcovered bywords and external aftions, and thofe a£iions are frequently fufpended for a much longer time than is neceiTary for making a teftament. Let us conclude then, fmce the capacity of the teftator is as it were an extrinfic faft, and foreign to the aft itfelf, of which the notary cannot be the judge, that the teftament alone is not fuf- •ficient to exclude a proof by witneffes ; becaufe, in a word, it is -not precifely the aft which is attacked, but the perfon of the tcf- tator, and if the teftament Is attacked, is it only indire£Uy and confequentially. It was perhaps with reference to the proof of this capacity of the teftator, that the firft Roman laws required fuch fcrupulous folemnities in the execution of teftaments ; it was not folciy to render them more authentic, that -they required th^m to have the whole Roman people as witneflcs. It was alfo to render the ca- pacity of the teftator cntirefy certain by the tcftimony of all his fellow citizens, who wotild have ftbod up to oppofe the 2& ^ the teftator, if they had not recogntfed his fnnity and capacity. But after teftaments became fecret and domeftic, and as the >prefence of two notaries, or of one notary and of two witneffes •^ fufficienc with us to Kudei* them .ai^thenti^) i\ ca&n^t b^ ^^ r 1 i Numb. XIX,] SeleSHons from D'AgueJfeau. 523 <2iat fo fmall a number of witneflcs, who do not know the teftator, and who are perhaps ftill lefs known by him, ihall exclude the ad- miffion of a more folemn and perfe A proof. When once the condition of the teilator is juflly doubtful, it is proper that a great number of witnefies» who may be heard with refpefl to a fa£i of this kind, fhould fupply whai it left (hort in the ad itfelf, and that they (hould, after the death of the teftator, do what the whole Roman people, in witneffing the teflament, former- ly did in his life, by proclaiming aloud the madnefs or fanity of the tcftator. V ^ All the do£lor$ have unanimoufly followed this opinion, and ' not one has been cited who has offered to combat it. Your judgments have confirmed it upon many occafions, as they ! have been obliged to admit on the part of Madame de Nemours. ! But they contend, and we believe with juftice, that it ought not to be takei;! as a fettled maxim, that proof by witnefles (hould never be refufed. k The diverfity in your judgments upon this fubjed will be fuf- £c!ent to eftabliih the real maxim that ought to prevail in the j decilion of thefe queftions. Thtre are judgments which admit it, find that is fufficient to ihew in general, that fuch proof is often ad- xniflible ; there are others, which reje£l it, and confequently ihew that it is not always admiiGble. Let us then aflume it as a certain truth, upon which perhaps we have been too diffufe, that it is in general a perverfion of maxims, to contend that parol evidence ought to be rejeftcd, on account of the common rule cantrafcriptum tejlimonwm non-fcriptum te/ihnomum jton admittitur. Such were the principles that we had the honour to propoie to you in the caufe of Bonvalety and it was only on account of par- ticular circumftances, that we thought it would not be proper to allow a proof by witncfles, of the infanity of the teftator. Let us examine then the particular circumftances, and the im- portant prefumptions which in this caufe are oppofed to thefe ge- neral maxims. We may diQiinguifli two kinds, the one are derived from the teftament itfelf, the other from the contrads and other afts, which precede, accompany, and follow it ^ but before we enter upon this examination, it will be proper tp make ai> pbfervation which is ge- neral and common to all thefe prefumptions. You are not now called upon to decide what was the real ftatc jof the Abbi d* Orleans when he made his teftament, you arc not pbliged to pronounce Upon the proofs alleged on the one part, or ^09 fhf pther^ whether to prove Us feaiiy or infanity j that is not the ftatc 514 APPENDIX. [Numb-XX ftate of the caufe. If you were under the neceflity of pronouncing to day upon the validity of this fecond teftament, if you could neither cxpedl nor hope for any further elucidation of the fa£ts which are doubtful, obfcure, and bqurvocal in this caufe, then yoa would not liave to look for what was certain, but mud fatisfy yourfdvcs with that which appeared lead doubtful ; for want of a clear and evident truth, it would be neceflary to take up with a glimmering appear- ance of it ; not being able to find convincing proofs, you would be reduced to the necei&ty of looking for conje<5tures, and under the impoffibility of certainly difcovering the true, muft reft fatisfied with the probable ; but fo far are you from being in that (itua^ion, that l^ermiflion is demanded to bring proofs of an infanity, which was complete, glaring, and generally known tQ all who approached the Abbi dfOrliam. Thus on the one fide, it Xecms fufficient for the p^rty requiring to be let into his proofs, if he can fliew that the caufe is doubtful and obfcure, if he can combat fads by fadis, if he can weaken the proofs, extenuate the prefumptions, diminifh the force and weight of the indu£iions and conjeAures thaC are oppo&d to him. If he •can go fo far as to (hew, that all the arguments on the part of Madame ie Nemours are not invincible, that the a£ls, the lettcn, the condu£b of the Able cC Orleans^ in a word, that all the circum- fiances of the caufe may be interpreted in his favour, not indeed ii) a manner abfolutely deciiive, but at leaft capable of balancing the interpretations of Madame de Nemours ; we cannot, without in- juflicCf withhold from him a proof, which only tends toafluredic prefumptions of the one party or the other, to fortify their argu. fnents, and to give to the truth that charafier and evidence which it at prefent wants* On the other fide, it is not fuiEcient for Madame de Nemour^ to (hew that herarguments have more force than thofe of the Prnct de Contyt that her prefumptions are ftronger and her conjectures more probable. That would be fufficient, if you were obliged to decide the caufe as it at prefent ftands, but (he muft further (hew, that her proofs are of fuch a nature that they exclude all proof or prefumptipn to the contrary, that it is impoffible to explain, or even to fuppofe, the hGt$ adduced by her, without concluding certainly, invincibly, inconteftibly, tliat the Abbe d^Orkans enjoyed a full liberty of mind ; and that it would be ufelefs to admit a proof of his pretended infanity, finoe fuch proof would not only be iqnpoffible but is already repelled, by the foroe and evidence of the arguments of Madame de Nemours, \^ithout doing that, ihe may render the caufe doubtful, ob- fcurC| -. umb. XIX.] Sele^ions from D*Aguefeau. 525 fcure, Uncertain, but (he will iiot render it more favourable for hcrfelf I on the contrary, it fcems that fhe will thereby labour rather for the Prince de Contj than againft him. This doubt, this obfcurity, this uncertainty, is precifely what ought to induce you not to con- firm at prefent, the firft will in farour of the Princt de Conty^ but merely to allow him to go into a proof by witnefles. Such, Sirs, is the only point, to which this caufe is at prefent re- duced J fuch is the rule by which, we think, it will be proper to judge of the prefumptions ,that we arc now to examine. If they exclude all reafonablc doubt, we may conclude at prefent that it will be proper to rejed the proof. If they leave yet great room for doubt, if the arguments of Madame de Nemours herfelf become prefumptions againft the fanity of the teftator, then we arc clearly of ophiion, that the natural effeft of fuch doubt is to infpire a wi(h for enlightening it, by a proof which will be equally juftand seceiTary. After having made this firft refleciion, which applies equally to all the prefumptions that we are to examine, let us enter firft, into thofe which are borrowed from the teftament itfelf. This teftament, you are told, bears the marks of the perfcft ca- pacity of the teftator 5 the wifdom and favour of his difpofition arc invincible obftaclcs, infupcrable barriers, to the pretenfions of the Prince de Conty. The wifdom is allowed ; there is neither obfcurity, nor Gngula- rity, nor contradiftion in any of the claufes of this aci j he re- wards his domeftics, he gives the remainder of his fortune, to the Comtt de Si. Pol his brother ; couKl reafon and wifdom themfdvea have made a more judicious difpofition ? The favour of this difpofition is not lefs certain, it only tends to reftorc things to their natural ftate; what can be more favourable than- a rctjirn to the common tlifpofitions of the law ; the law it- felf, which gives the property to the ncarcft relations, is not more wife or favourable than this teftament. If theheir^ by blood are fonictimcs admitted to a proof by wit- nefles, in oppofition to a teftam.n: which deprives them of a fuc- ceflion deftined for them by nature, it is unprecedented to extend this privilege to ftrangers; fuch are the prefumptions which Ma^ dame de Nemours borrows from the teftament, and which, by their importance, deferve to be examined with attention. It muft be agreed that the wifdom of a teftament is, without doubt, a very ftrong prefumpcion of the fanity of a teftator. It was upon the authority of this prefumption, that the feni^te of Rome formerly confic;i^ed a teftament made by a perfon in a ftate of infaaityi becaufe there was nothipg unreafoxiable in his difpofi- tion* 526 APPENDIX. [Numb.inC. tion. They fairly prefumed diat it was made in a lucid intern!) and they forgot the certain madnefs of the teftator, in contemplat- ing the good fenfe of the teftament. It was upon a fimilar colour that the emperor Leo, the philofopher, decided in his 39th Novel, that the teilament of an interdided pVodigal ought to be executed, provided it contained nothing unworthy of the chara£ler of a man of prudence. But however favourable this prefumption may be, it has not diofe characters which arc neceffary to form an invincible pfefumption, capable of excluding all proof to the contrary ; there is no law which precifely authorizes it, and befides it is founded upon a h(k which has not an eflenUal and neceffary conne£lion with the fani' ty of the teftator.- Upon what is it founded ? Upon this fingle xtafoning, the teftament is wife, therefore the perfon that made it is fo likewife ; but it always remains to examine who it was tbt made it, whether it is the re^l produAion of the teftator, or whether it may be fufpe£led that any other I.:^ had a hand in it. In a word, before you prove the fanity of the teftator by the tefta- ment itfelf, you muft begin by eftabliftiing that the teftament was made by the perfon whofe name it bcars^ .* this the teftament alone can never prove. What then is the force, what is the .-aturu. ^STcft of this pre- fumption ? So far from excluding proof, it is this prefumption itfelf which eftabliflies the nectffity of it, (ince if the teftament contained difpofitions that were abfurd, impoflible, extravagant, no other proof is neceflary to dcftroy it. If proof is neceflary, it is principally where the difpofitionoTthc teftator contains nothing contrary to reafon, and all the favour of this prefumption is reduced to obliging the perfon who contells it, to prove the infanity of the teftator j whereas if the teftament itfelf rofe up againft its author, if it was the firft witnefs of the weaknefs of his mind, it would be for the teftamentary heir to prove the fanity of the teftator. This diftinclion is clearly marked by two precife laws, which eftablifli the principle that we have propofed. - In the one, the difpofition of the teftator was palpably abfard, he commanded his heirs to throw his afties into the fea ; it was demanded, whether the heir ftiould be obliged to accomplifli diis conditioujto which the jurift anfwered, that they ought to beginwidi examining whether the teftator was in his fenfes, when he impofed upon his heir a condition fo contrary to the difbates of piety : but that if the heir could diflipate this fufpicion by folid proofs, he ought to be admitted to the fucceflion without being obliged to obey this abfurd direfiion. Hoc prius in/piciendum eflne hmoy qmtalcm Nuflfib, XnCJ SekSHans from D^ji^uejfeau. 527 conditionem pofuity fteque compos rmntis ^ffet. Igituvy ft perfpicuis ratumibus h^c fufplcto amoveri potejl^ nulla modo legitimas heres dt hero^ ditate controverfam facit fcripto bendin L. 27. ff» de coodit* in^ Jlitut. In the other, on the contraryi a father had made a fenflble dif- pofitioDf which his fon could only impeach on the ground of in* ianity. The emperors, DtocUfian and Maximian, fubjtded him to the neceflity of proving this fz& ; adfeverationi tua mentis eum compotem fmjfe rugantis fidtm^ adejfe probari convenit. Z»* 5. cod* de codicils . Let us add to thefe refleflions and authorities that, ndtwithftand- ing thefe reafons, it would perhaps be difficult to attack the tefta* ment of the Abbe (T Orleans by parol evidence, if this difpofition had been olographic. The prefumption would then be entirely in favour of the fanity of the teftator, we fhould fay, as in the cafe of Bonvalei, where we found this important circumftance, that it is difficult to con* ceive a perfon who has Io(l his underdanding, to have fufficient patience, docility, and fubmiffion, to write with his own hand a teftament, containing a long train of difpofitions. Although it might perhaps be dangerous to decide in general, that proof of in* fanity fliould never be admitted againft an olographic tedament, which contains nothing inconfiftent with fenfe and reafon, it mud be at lead confefled, that this proof fhould only be allowed very rarely, and under very particular circumdanccs. But does the quedion here relate to an olographic tedament, as in the cafe of Bonvalety and a tedament in which the tedator made a kind of inventory and exa£l memorial of his property, to a tedament bearing the manifed figns of intention, of fanity, of ca^ pacity ? We have here nothing but his mere fignature, it is the only part which the a£l itfelf proves that he had in it, the red is a prefumption which may be combated and frequently dcdroyed by other prefumptions. Thus all who have examined the force and authority of this conjecture, which is derived from the good fenfe of the teda- ment, have entered into this dldin£lion* Even tliofe who have been cited on behalf of Madame de Nemours^ that is to fay, Mantica and Boeriusj regard th<5 good fenfe of the teda- ment as a mere prefumption, which, to make ufc of their expredions, rejicit onus proband! in adver/arium, and the only principle which we can follow upon this fubjecl, becaufe it is the only one that is equally fupportcd by reafon and authority, is included in this pror pofition. , . Either 52» APPENDIX. lT^amb.»t Either the teftament contains wife and judicious difpoCUons^ which induce a prefumption of the fantty of the teftatoT,.aDd then it is for the party impeaching it, to prove that he was m a (late of infanity at the time of making this difpofition. Or on the contrary, the teftament itfelf induces very (Irong fuf- Sicions of weaknefs and derangement^ and then it is incumbent oo le inftituted heir, to fupport his title by proving the fanity of the teftator. Without adding any thing further upon this firft point, let us proceed to the favour of the inftituted heir, and examine if it is more capable, in its principle, of precluding the demand of the Prince de Contj^ Wc may in the firft place a(k whether it is true, that you hare to decide between the Prince de Conty on the one fide, and an heii by blood, inftituted in the teftament of the A6be d^Orleam, who unites in her perfon, the choice of the teftator with the deftination of the law, and in this double chara£ler is entitled to particular favour, on the other. Is it the Comte de St. Pol who propofes this argument? He would doubtlefs have united thefe two qualities. He would haTe been heir by the law of nature, and alfo by the law of the teftator. But he died a long time before the jibie d^ Orleans^ and widi him expired that favour, which was particular to himfelf. Madam it Nemours iu^ not fucceedcd to that prerogative which diflinguifhed the Comte de St. Pol from every other heir by blood. She was not appointed by the will of the teftator, and if the laft teftament ihould operate to her advantage, it is only on account of the claufe which revokes the firft } (he can only be confidered here, as a legitimate heir who would deftroy one teftament by another, by {hewing that the Aibe d*Orlearts died without a teftament, and confequently that the fucceflion belongs to her. Thus this favour towards the heir by blood, which is fo much relied upon, is the fame thing with the prudence of the teftament; and the argument is precifely the fame with that which we hare juft examined. It could only have a different chara£ler in the mouth of the Comte de St. PoL But fuppofe he had propofed it himfelf, and that he had pro- pofed it with that double favour which would have been peculiar to himfelf \ would it have been fo efficacious as is contended on the part of Madame de Nemours ^ We might fay here, that it is furprifiirg that fo imperious aa argument was never forefeen either by Memcbius in his treatife on Prefumptions, or by Mantica in his treatife oax Conje£ittfes for the interpretation of laft Wills \ and that it has sot been fiound pof* CUe Numb* XIX J SeleSions from. jyAgueJfeau. 529 fible to find out any authority, in fupport of what is dated as fo infuperable a bar. We may even a(k tbofe who allege it, what is the reafon of this filence \ we may add, in order to put this dif- ficulty in a ftill clearer point of view, that nothing is fo eommon with thefe authors, as the general and ordinary prefumption, in favour of the heirs by blood. Thus for inftance, in order to ex- amine the force of a derogatory claufe, they inquire what is the quality of the heirs inftituted in a teflament, where this claufe is not contained ; and fome of them go fo far, as to have it implied, if the heirs by blood are appointed by the fecond tef- tament. We might adduce an infinite number of fimilar examples, and after this obfervation we might always afk, why this prefumption, which is fo common, fo natural, fo favourable, has been fo gene- rally overlooked by all the writers upon the fubje£l ? What can they anfwer, without intirely rejefting the principles of reafon, except that there are no two queilions more ditFerent, than the will of a teflator and his capacity ; in the firft, a perfonal favour towards the heir may be urged with fuccefs, and as that is greater with refpeft to heirs by blood than others, it is a circum- (lance which may be fairly adduced to dcmonftrate the force and efficacy of the teftator's intention. In the laft, on the contrary, this favour is impotent, and this circumftance is ufelcfs \ becaufe before you examine what was the will of the author of tlic teftament, and wliat ought to be the juft interpretation of it, you muft begin by eflablifhing that he had a will ; that he was capable to will, to difpofe, to ordain. Now this capacity is abfolutely independent of the name and quality of thofe who appear to have been the obje£ls of his difpoCtion. When the only queftion is as to the de- gree of v^ill, it may eaflly be prefumed that it was ftronger in /avour of the heirs by blood than of ftrangers. But when you are inquiring into the exiflence of a will, then the favour towards the heirs cannot form any infuperable prefumption, becaufe it is evi- dent, that though you may fupply in favour of the heirs by blood, a defect of exprcfEon or folcmnity, nbthing can ever repair, even with refpe£l to them, an abfolutc defcA, an entire abfence of will. But let us go further, and judge of the truth of tins. maxim, by its confequcnces. If it was once received into praftice, that you ought to decide upon the fanity or infanity of a teflator, upon a principle of favour tourards the heirs whom he appears to have chofen, what incon- renicnce, what abufe would not the public have reafon to appre- hend in future, refpeSing the teftamcnts of perfons of doubtful capacity ? Will it be difficult to lend the aid of another's will to a Vol. IL N n man ' 530 APPENDIX.' [Numb. IIX, man whom tde etce^s of difeafci the approach of death, or a fettled infanity have deprived of the ufe of his own? Will there be wanting means to compofe with art, a wife and judicious difpoC- lion, to which the tedator, either from furprife or weaknefs, has contributed nothing but his (ignature ? And if any one of the legitimate heirs is inftituted in tliis teftament, in vain will the laws have decided, that a perfon deftitute of underftanding is incapable of dictating an inviolable law to his pofterity j in vain will natural rcafon have in(lru£led all men, that infanity is a fa& which caR hardly ever be proved except by witiieHes i to reafon and to law, they Mill oppofe tlie obje£iion, that the tcftament is wife, and that there is an heir by blood, the principle of favour to whom ihall fupport the whole of the difpoGtion. Let us even admit that this argument might be conGderable, if there was only one teftament. But the cafe here is very different, the teflator has made a former tcdament, in which he had initituted heirs, not lefs favourable than in the lail ; the ConiU de St. Pai yrns as much appointed in thst a^ in the fecond, Madame de Lcnguevilte was next to liim, and finally, the Princes de Coniy, The principle of favour then is eqUal on the one fide and on the other. \i Madame de Nemours pretends, that tlie laft teftament ought to be fupported merely on account of the name of the Ccmte de St. Poly the Prince de Conty may anfwer, that that name is at the head of the firft teftament, and that the favour is augmented by the name of Madame de LongueviUe, alfo heir by blood and mother of the tcftatof. If it is faid, that the heirs indeed were equally fa- vourable, but that they had more intercft in the fubfiftence of the laft teftament, becaufe by tliat the Comte de St. Pol was not charged with any fubftitution ; it is on the contrary precifely for that reafon, that the firft teftament is the more favourable of the two. The firft etkOt of this fubftitution is to appoint Madame de Longuevilky and to join, as we have faid, the principle of perfonal favour towards her, to that for the Comte de St. Pol. The fecond is to tranfmit the property to the Princes de Ccntj v and might hot the teftator, who faw that Madame de Nemotfrs bad no children, and that even if (be ihould have any, they would ncc bear his name, naturally wifli that his property (hould belong to Princes, whofe illuftrious name would fo well accord with the fplendour and dignity of his own ? If then the fecond teftament is more favourable than the firft, with regard to the intereft of the heirs by blood ; the firft is more favourable than the econd, by the wifties and inclinations of the 5 - teftator; Kuolb. XEt.] Seieilioru from t)* A^uejj[eau. 531 « teftator ; and in this (Cdnfli£l of oppofite favour, fhall it be allowed that the favour of the heir is To great, as to be abfolutely triumphant over that of the teftator ? And under what circumftances ? At a timet when you are not inquiring in a dfe of doubt, which teftament ought to be preferred, but are only to decide whether it (hall be per- mitted to remove this doubt, to diflipate thefe clouds,, to throw light upon a caufe which is obfcure, doubtful, and uncertain. In (hort, without going into any longer diflertations, this quef- tion feems to be precifely decided by the lad law,^. de inju/lo rapto. A teftator had made a teftament by which he had in* ftituted ftrangers, as his heirs. He fell into a ftate of infanity^ and broke the tables of his teftan^ent, taCulas {teflamenti) incidit ; the heirs by blood maintained that the teftament was de jure re- voked, the inftant the teftator himfelf had lacerated it ; the inftitut*- ed heirs contended that the teftsitor had fallen into a ftate of in- fanity, and made this laceration in one of the paroxyfms of his fury ^ the jurift decided, tliat if the fa£l was fo, the teftament was not revoked. You fee then. Sirs, that the prefumptions which refult from the aA itfelf, may very well impofe upon the Prince de Conty^ the neceility of making the proof which he deiAands, but can never debar him from the right of doing fo. Let us examine, however, whether the other prefumptions, which arc as it were exterior to the teftament itfelf, are inconteftible proofs of the fanity of the Abi^ d'Orleans, and let us always remember the important reflexion with which we fet out, that in order to give thefe prefumptions the chara£let of certainty which is necef* fary, they are not only to be fuch as are probable, but they muft, at the fame time, be fufficient to exclude all reafonable and legiti- mate doubt. « In order to examine them more diftinfily, permit us to make a fuppoiition, which may throw, confiderable light upon thi^ laft part of the caufe. Having confidered the inductions drawn from the teftament it- felf, let us fuppofe, for a moment, that this teftament now ftood alone, detached from the other ^Q.s which accompany it, deftitute of their afliftance, and without any other fupport'than its own good fenie and favour. And let us fuppofe, that under thefe circum^ ftances, the Prince de Conty had offered to prove, both by writings and witnefles, the imbecility and weaknefs of the teftator's mindj would the decifion of the caufe in that cafe be very difEcult ? We obferved at the outfet,' that it would be proper to diftinguifh tliree periods in the life of the jihbe d'OrleanSy a firft period of cer- tain and undifputed fanity, which terminated a ihort time after his N n a emancipation \ Si^ APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. emancipation ; a fecond period of infantty proved^ adtautted, per- petual, ending only with his life, and this fecond period^ hj the Gonfeflion of Madame de Nemours herfelf, beginning about die month of Oifober^ 1671 ; a third period, full of darkaeis and ob- fcurity, interpofed between the other two ; it is this interTal be- tween fanity and madnefs, which Madame de Nemetsri wonhl add to the period of fanity, and tlie Prince de Coniy, to that of mad- nefs. And after having diftingutlhitd thefe three periods, we ihaO ob- (enre, that whether we confider what preceded this doubtful inter- Tal, or direct our attention to what followed it, it will be difficolt not to conceive violent prefumptions capable of authorizing, and even in fome degree of anticipating a proof by witneflbs^- And what would thefe prefumptions be ? WeJbottldreprefent to you at firft, a man who, aceordii^ to die language of Madame de Nemours herfelF, had received bom nature a fimple rnind^ low inclinations, a particular humour, a fordid avarice, a levity, an inconftancy, an inftability, which could only be fjidsfied by continual joumies, equally ufelefsto himfelf, and incon- fiftent widi the not only of error but extravagance, is afcribed to the AhtS d^Or^ leans \ and that part which is a work of confummate prudence and good fenfe, is regarded as the tfftOt of extrinSc fuggeftion. To proceed, how have theyjuftified before you, the difgraceftd favings of the Abbe d^OrUans ? The abfurdity and indignity of all his joumies ; the obfcurities and degradations that appear in his letters i There is no anfwer upon which they have fo much relied, as a comparifon between the period of his firft and of his fecond teftament. Is this to juftify the Abbe fOrleans^ at one of thefe periods, or rather to accufe him in both, if not of a complete infamty,at leaft of a great weaknefs of mind, which, in a man of this quality, is not very far from imbecility ? Let us continue to mark the chara&er of the Abbe d'Orleansi as it has been traced on the part of Madame de Nemours herfelf. Scarcely was the Abbe ^Orleans emancipated, when an afl&ir of importance to him was agitated, the payment of his mother^s portion \ at a confultation of the relations, thejr give him power to tranfa£b with her upon certain conditions ; and at the verjr time they are making thefe preparations, when they are prdfenttng a requeft to the parliament in his name, for the completion of thi^ objeA, we ice him ftart off, upon a fudden, on an unmeaning journey ? We . do not dweU upon his avarice which appearg chrpughout. After having ftaid nine days at Orleans ^ twelve at Tours, and ab<>ut as long at Saumur, without defign, and without utility \ after having run over fome provinces fituated on the Loire^ he takes the refolution of returning to Paris, in the carriage of Angers \ he takes the ordinary rout, h^ arrives at Gue de Lore, aday'tf journey from Paris, there he finds a valet of the Comte de St. Pols and we fee him immediately returning upon his^ fteps, with fo much precipitation, that they could hardly find three horfes for him and the ^wt> domeftics who followed him ; the reft of his family continue their routel, and arrive at Pans \ and durii^ this time he returns to Orleans, he there ftays thfarty*eight days to- gether in a common ina^ living upon 40 fob ^^tf^ and if he leaves N tt 3 * H/ 534 APPENDIX, P?umb.XlX. it, it U for the purpofe of embarking, on the 29th of Decemhtr^ on the Loire. What important affair obUgcd him to ei^fc himfelf tp the rigours of winter, and the peril of navigation, at fo inconTtnient a feafon ? The defire of feeing the city of Tours^ which be haj alrea4y feen, where he had ilaid i% days, and which he had only left the 23d of SepUmbiry about- ^uro months before ? He ftajs there 10 days, and returns at laft to Paris ^ on the 15th of January. We do not dwell on all the circiimftanccs of thefe joamles, but how can they explain that fudden and unexpcded change^ which induced him to quit the. route for Paris to return to Or- kansf to pafs there 38 whole days, to go afterwards to TourA Wat it his bufinefs, or cnriofity? But hitherto they have neither been able to difcover the one, or to render the other probable. Can any other caufe then be imagined for this cliange, than a de- rangement of mind in the Abbe iPOrleans, or a precaution of his family, who avoided as much as they could letting him appear IP Paris without neceffity ? And becaufe they mud wait two months for his majority, (a period of which you ivill obferve in fbe fequel, that they took advantage as foon as it arriyedi) there is reafon to prefume that his family found he ^as returning too foon, and left him at liberty to trace back his former (leps, in or- der to get through the time, until age, rather than reafon, would render him capable of entering into contraAa* If we do pot fuppofe one or the other of thefe reafpns, the fact of Gue 4^ Lore appears inexplicable *, it is ufele(s to (lop and ex- amine, which is the more probable. It might, perhaps, be difficult to prove that the caufe of this uneipe£ted return was a real mad- nefs, a frenzy, a wildnefs of mind which nobody could ^ontrouli becaufe there is little probability, that if things had come to that extremity, fo illuftrious a family would have left the Abhi for 38 days at Orleans without his principal officers, as is proved bj the accounts.' But if this firft reafon is not fvifficiently eilabliOied) we can imagine no other than the fecond ; and this valet of the Comn de St. Poly whom the Abbe d" Orleans met at Gue de Lorcy and at the fight of whom he difappeared, makes us very reafonably pre- fume, that he brought fome order of the family, which yras ^e oc- cafion of the prompt departure of the Abbe d'Orleans. JjfX it not be (aid in anfwer to fo important a fa£l, that there isi parallel circumftance in the journey of |he former period*, for befides that the anfwer is not advantagous to Madame de NaneurSi as we have already faid, we do not find any fuch example in all the ^c^ounts of that period. We fee iixdced| that the Aitc dOrkunSi is Numb. XIX.] Sek^ions from D^A^uefeau. $i$ in running over a province, returns many times to the fame dty; but his having taken the refolution of returning to Paris, having followed for 60 leagues, the ordinary route in a public carriage, to within one day's journey of Pdrisi and then, all at once, changing his dcfign,fetting off at the fight of a domeftic of the Cotnif de St. Poly in an equipage fo little fuited to his quality of pried and Duke de LongueviiUf hiring horfes at one place, and chairs at another, this, once more, is a thing of which we have no example in the whole courfe of his former journies. Reprefent to yourfclves tlien, Sirs, a man of this chara£ter, in every thing that precedes the time which we have called a doubtful interval, between fanity and infanity, but join to it every thing which followed that fame interval, and what do you then petceive? T^o things equally evident. The one is the madncfs, the im- becility, the fury of the Abbe d'Orieans, The other, thp uncer- tainty of the time when it commenced. The fir(t cannot be at all doubted, and is the fecond lefs certain ? Nothing can fix the commencement of the infanity, if we look at the caufe, without reference to the written documents. Every thing which Madame de Nemours alleges to afcertain it, renders it ftill more uncertain. She makes ufe of the memorial prefen ted by Madame de Longue* ville, ihe alleges the authority of the relations'j let us examine whether either the one or the other of thefe proofs is fufficient. Let us take the very termssjf the memorial of Madame de Longue^ vilie ; (lie. ftates to the king, that the Abbe d*OrleanSy her fon, fevcn or eight months after his tutelage was complete, and his attaining his majority, having taken different journies into diftant countries which had altered his health, he was not in a condidofi to adminifter his affairs. We cannot help obferving here, the uncertainty, the embarraff- ment, the obfcurity of thefe expreffions, which feem at firft as favourable to the Prince de Conty as Madame 'de Nemcurs j for if the madnefs commenced feven or eight months after the tutelage was finiflied, the teftament fupported by Madame de Nemours fails within the fatal period which is indicated by this memorial. The tutelage was finiflied by the emancipation, which was on the 2 2d tA July, 1670; the teftament is of the 7,6^ oi February, 1671^ it is then within the feven months ftated in the memorial. If on the contrary, we only begin to compute from the day of the majority, the Abbe ePOrleans was not really in a ftate of in- fanity, until the month of Auguft or beginning pf Septevder^ N a 4 TbefQ 536 APPENDIX. [Numb.XIX. Tbefe two dates iare mutually contradiAory and deftruftiTe of each other. But let u^ even fuppofe, which indeed is the moie probablci ^at Madame de Longuruille intended to refer to the laft, then Madame de Nemours^ who borrows her authority^ will not agrte with her; and confequently this authority will only ferre to render the commencement of the infanity ftill more uncertain. At what time does Madame de Nemours contend that the Akhe d" Orleans fell into a (Ictc of infanity ? It was, according to her, in the month of Offoher, 1671, that upon going from Stra/turghy to Sarreiwrgf an unexpe£i:ed accident, a fiftdden fright, extinguiih- ed for ever the light of his reafon. At what time, on the contrary, does Madame de Longueville fix it, according to the explicatiou which Madame de Nemours gives to her words ? feven or eight months after the 12th of January^ 1670, that is to fay, the be* ginning of September at lateft. Suppofe the eight months to be complete, the time would end on the 12th of September, and con* fequently one of the letters, which Madame de Nemours 7Ldducc% to prove the fanity of the AUe d^Orleans, was written during the time of his infanity, that is, on the 1 8th of September. There is nothing then more uncertain in this caufe than the efiential point, that is to fay, the commencement of the infanity. The report of the relations furnifiies a ftill weaker conjeAurc upon this fubjefl. It is true, as you are told, that they make ufe of the expreflion prejent infirmities^ but they have not taken notice that the expreflioa i$ ufed at two diflercnt times, in the month of January, and in the month of March, If the word prefent is taken ftrid:ly, and we admit the fine fpun inference which they offer to draw from it, it would follow that the relations have contradicted themfelves, as they make ufe of the fame term at two different times ; and if the word prefent in the report given in March, excluded all the time that was paft, they could not have made ufe of it in the month of January pre- ceding. Bqt it is clear that tliis term does not imply any ex- clufion of 'the paft, as we cannot doubt the infanity of the Mhi d^Orleans, from tlie time that he was confined by the order of the king, which time goes back fo far as the month of OBobcr, 167 1, and confequently, this expreffion is not fufEcient to fix and precifely determine the time of the commencement of the infanity* It is added that there are (bme of the relations who fay in con* firmation of their opinion, that the Abbe Jt Orleans committed fome irregular actions in Germany^ then he had not committed any bcr fore, a falfjC (onclufion iimil^ to the fonncr> 9 weak and trifling prefumption. But Hamb. XIX.] SetiOipfuJrm I/Afffffeaiu (S3ff But not only U everything wanting, n^ich cun ^Ott^hAjfixibc commencement of the infantty, we may add, th^t n^tjiUTajl f e^0^ Aifficiently {hews that we cannot juftly fix it at the tiipe^ when (thr ^Ue tT Orleans was put in a ftate of confinement. . / ^ It is uncertain how far it will go back, but if is. certain, evea now, or it leaft it is more than probable, that it muft go further back than that. Who can believe that upon the firfl; indication of folly, they would have proceeded at once to fuch an extremity, with regar4 to a perfon of the name and birth of the jttbe J^OrUam f Nothing but an impoflibility, of concealing this melancholy fpedlacle from the eyes of the public, or a want of prudence an4 good fenfe, could oblige a family to take the painful refolution of proclaiming at once its grief, and its fliame» Can the one or the other of thefe ever be afcribed to (b ilialn trious a family, as that of the Ahhi £OrUam f Shall it be faidt that means were wanting tg defer fo painful a difclofure, that they could not do that, which every day is done by private individu^ in the mod obfcure families ? C6uld they ilot by a feqret and domeftic judgment, have confined him for a time, in one of theic country manfions ? Shall' it be contended that perfons as much elevated above thq generality of mankind, by the extent of* their underftanding, as by the grandeur of their birth, would not have thought of taking fii reafonable a precaution, as waiting for a delay, which could noC be otherwife than falutary *, that they would have wanted prudence or counfel, upon an occafion when the fentin^ents of nature would fupply the place of prudence, and where natural tendemefs alone b fuperior to the wifeft counfels. If neither the power nor the will were wanting upon this oc«« cafion, to the illuftrious relations of the 4ibe (TOrUans g can the public doubt, but they would have deferred as long as it was pof- fible to throw an indignity upon him, the difgrace of which would in fome degree recoil upon tbemfelves, and that nothing but ftricl neceflity, and the defpajr of ever effe£luating a ^ure,* would have induced them after every delay, to recur at laft to the autliority of the king, to avow the misfprfu^iea Mrbieh had happened to them, and to obtain from him a letter de Cachet^ ioi\ the confinement of the ^bc ^Orleans f An4 let* it not the iaid, that this was done, without exqiting any notoriety [tclat)^ , Cati aiqr) tWg be more doltf ul fpr perfqns of this rank, than to b< oUigedi to aipprife the kifig himfelf of their calamity ? Could fuch an order be carried into execution without the public .being iitformcd of \t\i, and could they flatter ttyunfelvf a, da^ a whole fDQqi^^iy.WMld 7 witnefs 538 APPENDIX. [Kumb. XIX. \tritnefs in filence the madnefs and imbecility of a perfon of this rank ; the mod formal interdidion is lefs notorious than fuch a remedy; one who 'is under an interdiflion often retains a per> fonal liberty i they do not even confine all who are in the condition of imbecility. This fe verity is only Ufed againft fuch as are in a ftatc of fury. Let us combine then all thefe circumftances *, let us recal then every thing whidi has preceded that doubtful interval, between faulty and infanity ; the character of the Abb?^ mind, his journeys, his extravagant condud^, let us join what followed it, and above all the important remark) that we have nothing as yet to fix the com-i mencement of the infanity, that on the contrary every thing feems to concur in fupport of the prefumption, that it commenced long before its difclofure to the public by the detention of the Ahbi iTOrkafUf and after that is it poflible to doubt, under aJl the cir- cumilanceS) if nothing appeared but the teftament itfelf, that a proof by witnefles ought to be allowed ? If any doubt could be entertained of that, it muft at the fame time be decided, that fuch proof can never be received ; that what- ever prefumption may be alleged, the teftament alone will be its own defence, and deftroy before hand whatever may feem adapted to oppofe its execution. But if this prefumption is equally abfurd tind untenable ; if the public has a fubftantial intereft, to oppofe the fuppofitiou of teflfi* ments } if the law can never lend its power to a madman, or give the chara^^er of a legiflator to an ideot, it muft be alfb agreed, that there never could be a ftronger ground for the admiflion of proof, flian under the ctrcumftances to wiiich this caufe is reduced, where we muft fee, (which cannot be too often repeated, becaufe it is the decifive point in the caufe,) on the one hand, the indifputable ex- iftence of infanity, and on the other the abfolut« impoflibility of fixing the commencement pf i^ by any other proof than the de- pofitions of witnefles. It remains then only to examine, whether what accompa- nies this teftament, can change the ftate of the caufe and fupply its deficiencies, that is to fay, can inconteftibly prove that the infanity had not commenced at the time when the teftament was made. We (hall reduce thefe circumftances to three principal heads, the folemn ads pafled by the Abbe d'Orleans^ his perfonal condudl, the judgment and approbation of his family. We may in the firft place make two general obfervations, upon all thefe circumftances. Firflj \t 18 a felf-evtdenttratfa> that firnity or in£tnlty are twoqna- liucs Numb. XIX.3 SeU&ionsfrom D^Agueffiau. 539 lities of the mind, equally iiiTifible with the mind itfelf, tnd as we 5I0 not know the minds of other men^ except hj their wordt, or their exterior aAions, neither can we difcover in any diher manner^ the difpofitions of the fame mind. . But amongft the a£Uons4 which are as it were the natural figot of the afiedion of the foul, there are two ktnds» the one b perfonal, fo attached, fo inherent, fo clofely united to the perfon^ that it is impoflible to fuppofe them to be his without recognising his fanity and capacity. Thus, for inftance, let a magiftrate have exaftly fulfilled all the duties of jttftice ;*let him Jhave exercifed all the funiiions of his (lation publicly, wifely, conftantly, can it be doubted that in fuch 91 cafe he has fufficient judgment and underftanding to make a teftamentary difpofition, and could any parol evidence be allowed in anfwer to fo ftrong and infupcrable a prefumption ? It would be the fame with any other public fun^iion, exercifed at the time of making the teftament. The nature of thefe func* tions docs not permit the a£tion of the perfon who fulfills them, to be fupplied by the miniilry of another. But there are others, of a diredly oppofite kind, which may be the a& of another's will, and in which the perfon doing them may be merely pafllve. Thus, for inftance, in the cafe of acontraQ, it may be often con* tended that the party contributed nothing but his fignature, the reft may have been fupplied by the counfel, the aid, the miniftry of another ; in a word, there is nothing in fuch an ad confidered merely in itfelf, which is nece&arily and certainly produced by the mere will of the perfons executing the inftrument. The fecond refle£lion which is only a confequence of the firft, ]^,that ^here 19 a great difference between contradsand teftaments; the law fuppofes the one to be fo appropriate to the perfons ex- ecuting them, that the defedi of his will can never in any manner be fupplied, whereas the others do not require an .equal degree of ^ifcretion, of underftanding, or even of intemion. On the part of Madame dt Nemours^ they hare denied this dif- f in£tion between the capacity which is neceffary to make a contra&, and that which the law requires for a teftament. It is regarded aot ,99ly U ^ ^^^) diftii>ciion, but as one which is contrary to all the principles of few, But fo £ir is it from being novel or unjuft, that we think it nuy be faid to be as ancient as the fyftem of juriiprudeace itfelf, and ihat without it, it would be impoiSble to fuftain feveral of the moft wriolabjc l^^w^. ^e ihaU not atf em^t at ^refcnt to prove it by a long ^numera* tbi| 549 •" l^BV^Ht)lX. t»ttmb.Xa, tion of aB die eaiSn, in which- ie is clearly eftablifliedt we flufl only mentiba ^t^, whieh are 'known to every body, and dettuMu ftrated in an jnytucible manner. No body is ignorant that even pupils before the age of 14, mty ina)te !a valid cootorad, provided it is with the afleht of their tutor. We do not fay, that the tutor can oblige himfelf in their name, we fay, (and it is a principle known to all, who have only read the Inftitutes Cf^Ju/Unian^) the pujMls might oblige themfelvcs with the aflent of their tutor, yet they could not make a teftament. But not to travel out of the French jurifprudence, can any body doubt, that contrads made by minors are good in tbemfelves, dut they produce a legitimate obligation, and that until they are de- ftroyed by letters of refciffion, they are to be executed as a£ls paffed by perfons of full age ? They may engage their property by all kinds of contra£is} the laws of the church, and the ftate, regard them as Capable of efledually contra£ling the moft important, the moft folemn, and the moft inviolable of all engagements, fuch as oiarriage, and religious profeffion. Tet at the time that it is per* mitted to them to difpofe not only of their goods and their for« tune, butalfo of their perfon and condition, the fame law declares them incapable of difpofing of their efiefts by teftament. Let us add to this firft example, another proof of the fame dif« tinAion, which is not left certain or lefs convincing ; a perfon may engage by the miniftry of a procurator, and when the procuration is general he (b completely adopts the credit of die perfon in whoni he confides, that, without knowing it, without exprefs^ intending k, he enters into all kinds of obligations ; but can any body contend that it is poi&ble to make a teftament by procuration ? And whatever confidence a teftator may repofe in the probity, and uo- derftanding that there Ihoiild be contraQs* It is not neceffary that there ihould be .teftaments; never va«* there a community fubfifting without the aid of fome engagement* There were many which for a long time refufed their citizens tke authority of making teftaments. The foundations of d^il focietyt of commezoe, of police, of government, would be overturn- ed, if it was rendered difficult to contra£l engagements; on the con- trary, the fpciety, the commerce, the government of ftatcSy might fitbfift without teftaments. The faculty of contrafking is conformable to ntuial taw, to the law of nations to civil law. The liberty of making teftamenta is an invention of the law of natimis, authorizod ^by civil law, but appears contrary- to the law of nature, which, by death, deprives a man of all the rights that he could exercife over his property- Contrails are always favoured, teftaments are often the reverie, and nev«r was there tay jurifprudence^ in which dnt propo£rion was more true than, the law of France^ Such are the natural . cbara^ten, which diftingufli contrafls from teftaments, (hall we then be furprifed if th& laws have per* mitted inafaktfid to ^{pofe of their pnq>erty, more eafily by a con- trad than a teftament ? In a contrail the flighteft capacity is fufficient, becaufe it is cmifomvible to common right, and befides fome reliance may be had^ in the integrity of a perfon with whom it is made ; the party' may Ukt counTcl and fign widiout precifbly knowing the extent of his engagementi by reafon of the confidence which he places in the probity, the underftanding and experience of thofe whom he confults> But in a teftament, it is neceflary that this underftanding, this- e^tperience, this capacity, fltould bdong to the perfon who makes \U It is not indeed forbidden to a teftator to. ufe the affiftance of counfel; but fuch counfel only regards the form of the ad, and not the fubftance< It is for the teftator to think, to deliberate, to esuunine, to confult !hiinfelf» to interrogate himfelf, in one word» 'TO WILL : the lawyer only gives him his advice, in order to lend to his thou^xta the ^preffions of die laws, and to join the exterior fMn 10 the matter and fubftai^ce of the a&, which ought to be produced by the fole will of the teftator. \ iVitt hayiig madd diefe. general irefiedions upon. contraAs, and other adions, by which the fanity or infanity of a teftator may^ 54^ APPENDIX. tNufab-XlTj be prored, let us ezamine what is the inference thaf may be drawn from llie diflferent z€ts which were executed hy the AUf tOrUans. Recolle£l| if you pleafe, all the circumftances of time and man- tier> in which theiie inftrumentft were executed* THE TIME. X. The majority of the Abbe i'Orleans^ which he attained on the X2th of Jamsary 167 1 ; the firft ad is of the x6th, on the re- tum from that journey upon which the incident of Gui de Lore took place. 2. The whole interval of time in which he executed 21 a£ls, from the 15th of January y to the 6th of Marci, is only two months and ten days. He feems to have only returned for the purpofe of executing them. He had fcarcely arriyed when he finned the firft i he had fcarcely figned the laft, when he fuddexdy departed. THE MANNER. We may confider them at firft, in general, and afterwards ex* amine them in particular. When we confider them in geneiaif the firft glance will be fufficient to fliew, that they all tend to two different obje£l8. The one to regulate whatever might relate to Madame de Longut^ The other enurely to ftrip the Abbe d^Orkans. The firft of thefe defigns was executed by the tran(a£iion of the 16th of January^ and the contra^ for the annuities accompanied it, in which we fee the Abbi giving away 4000 livreSj and rclinquifli* ing feveral eftatef for the payment oi Madame de LengueviUe. It may be alfo faid, that it was executed by the tranfadlion ^th the Prince de Cende^ which only regards the payment of the ar- rears of the portion. . Finally, it was executed by the donation to the Cemte de Si* Polf in which there are three important claufest that relate folely to the intereft oi Madame de Longueville. The firft, is the obligation impofed on the donatary, to execute all the ads which the Abbe had pafied with his mother, for the payment of her portion. The fecond, the obligation of confirming die diichaxge which he had given her for die famiture, and jewels contained in the inventory. The diird, the obligatioo to difchaige her from an account of die tutelage. Ihc Numb. XIX.] SeleSlions from D^AgueJfeau. 543 The fecund defign, to wit, that of (tripping the Abbe d^OrUsns of all his property, appears manifeftly : 1. In the untverfal donation. 2. In the particular donations, to fome o£ the domeftics. 3. In the teftament. 4. In the appointments. 5. In the procurations^ for the adminiftration of the e£fe£l8 refervcd. It is true, that it is faid in the procurations that they ihould be revoked at the pleafure of the Abbe d'OrUansj^ but that is of com- mon right as in the fame manner is the obligation to render an ac* count : and it muft be always remembered as the refult of thofe ad^s, which pafled from the 23d to the 26th of February ; that in three days time, a perfon of full age poflefling effefts, to the value of three millions of livres, no longer retains any property, that there is no longer any thing confiderabie of which he can difpofe \ and that he ftrips himfelf even of the adminiftration of the ufufrudl rcfcrved to him. It is contended that there is nothing extraordinary in this cir* cumftance; that we fee (imilar examples everyday in inferior fami- lies, and that it is not furprifing, that the elder branches, in taking upon themfelves an ecclefiadical condition, renounce their property in favour of the younger. But, in the firft place, i^'ithout examining wliether there are fo many examples of this gcnerofity as they would perfuade you, will they find any example of the particular circumftances occur- ring in this caufe ? The heir of an illuftrious family renounces not the poflci&on of fome confiderabje eflates, as a principality or a duchy, but all his efFcfts, referving only a fum of flstty thoufand livres^ and a mere ufufrud. He, as it were, pronounces an interdiction upon him- felf, and if he can difpofe of any thing, it is only of what is to accrue after his death. This is not all. At what time does he make fo confiderable a donation ? Is it at an advanced itate of life ? He is hardly of age, when he hafteiis to ilrip himfelf of every thing. By what is this immenfe donation followed ? By a teftanient in favour of the donatary himfelf. And wherefore is this teftament made ? It is not in favour of the teftator, and for his confolation, as the laws exprefs it, (ince he had already made one, more conformable to the inclinations which he would naturally have, in which the Comti it St. Pol was inftituted. It is entirely in favour and for the intereft of the folc univcrfal le- gatee^ wI>o has no otlicr advantage in this change, than a dif- charge f44- APPENDIX. CNumb.XlX. diarge from die fiibftitutions, and a hope of fucceflUnsi wUcb might afterwards fall to the jtUe J^ Orleans. After having dated the two principal yiews which naturally pre- fent themfelTes to all who examine thefe ads in general, let u» enter into the detail, and combine all the circimiftances which hsre been offered to your attention by the one party or the other. ' l.^TThf^aiifaftion with Madame de Longaeville (a), Qb&nECy if you pleafe, upon this zCt, that it is impoffible to ^^^mctnA'tiic-jiibc d'Orkans could even have read the longdif- fybntfon^ which it contains* He arrived at Paris on the 15th of %. tfuarj in the evetiing*-4ie figned this ad the following morn- ing. Let it not be faid that this z€t was completely prepared before the departure of the Abbe d*Orleons^ and that there was even a confultation of relations by which he was authorized to pafs it« The ftate of things was much changed after that; it was then pro- pofed that the cftates (hould be valued by propet furveyors : in the fequel, the valuation was made by the parties themfelves; thus, it was not the fame ad which before had been refolved upon. It was an ad entirely new, which demanded a long meditation, and at laft they were reduced to fay, that it was not furprifing that the Abbe if Orleans had figned the ad on the faith of his counfel) as it is nothing more than is done by the moft fenfiblc people every day. But if that is fo, the ad can no longer be faid to be of any confequence, fince it does not inconteftibly prove the fanity of the perfon figning it. It is not neceflary, fbr the admiflion of the proof demanded, \ss demonftrate that all thefe ads prove the infanity of the A\^ f Orleans ; it is fufEcient to (hew, that they are not certain indica- tions of the fanity and freedom of his mind. 2. The grants of annuities, which follow this ad, have not more force or authority than the ad itfelf, of which they are only the confequence and execution.. 3. The fale of the eftate of Uejle^ made by the Abbe df Orleans to the Prince de Gondii has nothing moreperfbnal than tfie ads preced- ing, nothing which cannot be fupplied by the miniflry of another. You muft remember the important circimiftance, from which it may be prefumed, that the Abbe dOrleans contributed nothing bat his fignature. The projed of the ad was completely prepared before the arrival of the Abbe df Orleans. The procuration of the Prince de Condi to fign it, is of the 5th of January^ and is at the foot of the projed, in which no change was afterwards made, vA (4] TnadaJSaan la Uie citU Uw omibi a gosb^ rooufe. although Numb. XIX.3 SekSions fi-om ly Aguejfeau. 545 although the fignature was deferred until the 31ft of January^ the fa^ will always remain, that it was completely prepared, inde- pendent of the will of the Abbe tP Orleans* 4. The donation to the Comte de &• Pol combines the two principal features of all thefe a&s, that is to fay, the defign of giving a complete difcharge to Madanu de LonguevUkf and that of entirely ftripping the AUe t Orleans at his property* They adduce feveral arguments to efface the colours wUch cover this donation, but as thefe equally regard the other ads, we ihall defer anfwering them until we have gone through the par- ticular circumftances of the bj&s which follow. S» The life-annuities require nothing more than a mere fig- nature. 6. The fame obfervation applies to the appcnntinents to the governments. 7. We have already examined the teftament, but we cannot forbear adding here, that the proje£ls which accompany it only render it mors fufpicious. Of thefe projedsy one is in the hand-writing of the Abbi d'Or^ leans^ the odber in that of Porquier : they both contaiii a memo-' randum of legacies to different perfons. There are three words added to the laft in the hand-writing of the AbbJ iFOrUans, by which he gives to Dalmont his carriage with the appurtenances. None of thefe legacies, except that to Pcrquier, agree in amount with thofe vinritten in the teftament. It is even difficult to conceive why thefe projeds of codicils are inclofed in the fame paper with the teftament. It is faid to be becaufe they might ferve to ratify it, but why were they not followed in naaking it ? for it is almoft impoffibte that they could be fubfequent to the teftament. But to difmifs all kinds oi ufelefs inquiry refpefiing a fa£l of this kind, let it be fuppofed, that thefe projeds without date were prior to the teftament, or fubfequent to it. SuppoHng them to be prior, the intention of the Abbe d^ Orleans was only to make a co-^ dlcil confirmatory of the teftament of 1668 ; for you will recoi- led, that one of thefe projeAs is intitled, projeB of a coHnl^ ^iKrhich the Abbi ff Orleans wiihes to make in confirmation of hit teftament. Now, if the fecond was not yet made, thefe words can only be applied to the firft ; and if that is fo, the projeft lA^ould indicate an intention contrary to the laft teftament, which is fo far from confirming the aft, that it deftroys, and almoft entirely annihilates it. liCt it be aflamed that thefe projefis were fubfequent to the laft teftament — it muft then be fuppofed that they were made within Vol. II. O'o two 546 APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. two or three days after. The teftaaent is made on ^e 26th of Febhiary ; it was depofited in the hands of Porquifr, with the pro* jedts which accompany it» before the departure of the jihbS iTOr^ /etMs. Now it is agreed on all hands that that took place fercn days after the teftameiK ; then it is in this interval that he mail have made thefe codicils or proje&s of codicils i and what greater proof can be defired» either of the uncertainty of his will, or of his being ignorant of the latter teftaments which he had only figned a few days before i What explanation can be given pS this cirqumftance ? But kt us go on with the circumftances which relate to the other a£is. . 8. The procurations given, whether to Madame de LangueviUe or to ParquUrf are fo far from being inexplicable, without fop- pofing a ftate of fanity, thai they feem ftill more to confirm the fufpicions of the coiitraXy, fince thereby the family place them- felves beyond the reach of apptthenfion that he might abufe the adminiftration of the revenues which were left to him. Finally, the reimburfement of the Marquis de Bou^/eroMf-aik ad which required iK>thing mote than his fignature. Such are the general and particular reflexions which may be made upon the circumftances of thefe afts confidered in tbem- felves. Let us fte, however, what force they can have in the exdu&Ki of parol teftimony. In the firft place, they are not thofe aflions which are fo en- tirely perfonal to the party doing them, that they cannot be fup- plied by another. It was only rcquifite that the Aiii d'Orkatu ihould retain fuificient liberty or docility to (ign them ; nodiing more was requifite for rendering them complete. Secondly, all thefe ads, except the donation and teftament, are only common contrads, for which the law does not requite the fame degree of will or the fame capacity as for teftaments. Thirdly, tliefe contrad^ were palled by a man, who, if not in a ftite of adual imbecility, was at lead very near to that condition of fury and infanity, in which he pafled die remainder of his days, an infanity once more, of which the commencement is uncertain^ and which may go back to tlie very time of thefe ads. Is a pe- riod of feven or eight montlis, or even a year, too long a time for examining the quality of derangement in a perfon of the rank of the Aibe fPOrUans^ in the hopes of a cure ? And if it is agreed, that they ought to defer his confinement for at leaft that interval, then the greateft part of the ad^ will fall within this time, and the weaknefs of the prefumption wilt be evident. in one word, if the infanity is once prored^ nothing can be more Numb/ XIX.3 Sekdionsfrom D^AgueJeau. 547 tnore eafy than to fhew how thefe adis might have been pafled. ^ Thefe two fa£ls have nothing incompntible — ^is it impoffible for a man to have figned fuch a£ls> and to have been at the fame time in a ilate of imbecility ? On the contrary, the fignature of thefe a£ls may be fuppofed, without excluding the fa£l of infamty) and confequently this is not an invincible prefumption. Finally, do thefe contrafte exclude all kind of doubt? Is the interpretation of the Prince de Cmiy^ in fuppofing that the family had it in view to take advantage of the remnant of docility, in order to terminate a part of the affairs of the houfe of Longutville^ and to place him afterwards in a ftate of real and fubftantial interdiction ; is this interpretation, once more, not equally probable, when com- pared with the character of the Ahbi d^Orleans^ as the fuppofition of that imaginary generofity to which Madame de Nermurs would afcribe the donation and the a3s accompanying it ? Suppofe for xi moment that the family of the Ahbe d^Orleans wifiied to delay having -rccouife to the mournful remedy of inter- diflion : there is nothing unlikely in this fuppofition witli refpe£l to any kind of family,, but we may fay, that the fplendour of the il- luftrious houfe in which we fuppofe that this defign may hav& exifted, gives it that high degree of probability which almoft bears the chara&er of certainty. Let us fuppofe dill farther that in this defign they wilh never- thelefs to take precautions againd the perfon whom they confider to be in a flate of imbecility, that they wi(h to tie his hands fo as to put him out of a condition of hurting himfelf or others. What would they do in this fuppofition^ which is only a confequence of the former ? Would they not begin at firft by making him lofe the property of his effefts by an authentic donation ? But becaufe it would not be juft to reduce him to fimple maintenance (which could only be done by a folemn interdiction), would they not re« ferv^e a confiderable ufufrud proportioned to the dignity of his birth ? ^ Would they not afterwards induce him to make a teftament^ giving recompences to his domeftics in order to attach them to his fervice at a time when he would be no longer in a condition to give them any marks of his afie£tion ? Would it not be a fequel of the fame family counfel to make him Cgn procurations which might give them the managenient of the ufufru£k that was left ? And finally, might they not give him a kind of infpe&or and domeftic curator, without whom he could not even audit the ex- pence of his houfe ? Such are all the precautions which prudence SECOND PLEADING. In the Cafe of the Frmce de Conty and the Dachels de NemourSy Pronounced in fever al Audiences^ the laji on the 1 4/A (f March 1698. Upon the appeal of Madame de Nemours^ from the definitire fcntence of the Requites du Palais^ in favour of the Princo de Conty* J. Whether the quefttons decided In 1696 could be revived i undft^ pofing the matter to be entire, ^whether the fame decifton ought net to prevail ? II. Whether the great number of aHsyfigned by the Abbe d'Orleans, about the time of his making a fecond teftamenty nvere a proof of hisfanityy or of the intention of his relations to place him in ajlate of interdiSHonj having knowledge of his infanity ? m^ Whether his inftfnitjf at that time nvas fufficiintty proved by imtnejfes f FIRST audience- Whatever confequence the name of the partied, the numbec of the queftionS) the vaft extent of the fafls^ may have given to this caufe^ we think it may be affirmed, that nothing renderi^ it more fingular and important than the nature and quality of the principal queftion, which is this day fubmitted to youf: judgment. Tou have to pronounce, not upon one of thofe queftions of ftate, which relate to the birth or condition of parties, (exterior qualities written in public regifters, preferved in authentic monu« ments, and of which the principal proof is derived from the authority of the law itfelf,) but upon one of thofe doubtful and difficult queftions, of which the only fubje£l is an invifible qua- lity, th;^t , frequently conces^s itfelf from the moft enlightened wit- 554 APPENDIX. [Numb. IK. witneflets an interior difpofidon, of which i&s and writings are only an obfcure and imperfed image } in a ^-'ordy when you are to decide upon the ftate of the mindi much more than upon that of the body* If this queftlon appears difficulty when confidered in general^. what will it be when we exanuae ity^-in the- cafe before us, when the perfon whofe ftate is the principal fubjeA of conteft, can neither juftify his accufed reafon^ nor furniib u& himHelf with the proofs of his infanity. The perfon is wanting* while we are examining the quality^ which of all others is mod peculiarly perfonal. It is not a queftion of prefent fanity or infinity, that is the fubjcQ of this caufe j it is a fanity or infanity which is paft, and you haTc not only to decide upon an invifible quality, but alfo on a quality which no longer eslfts. And in what manner to decide ? In a confiid of aAs (c), contrary to each other, in a combat of witnefles, mutually attack- ing and deftroying e^h other. Npr is this all, not only arc a{b balanced by ads, not only are witnefles combated by witneilb, but this combat takes place in every a£l, this contrariety occurs in every witnefs^ contrafted with himfelf ; fuch is the uncertainty of the proofs, or the ability of the pleaders, that there is in this caufe, no a£t, no witnefs, that does not furoifli alternatelyy arms to ^|ich pf the parties. Tou have frequently feen, In the courfe of a long pleidiagt the fame voice which fecmed one day to declare in favour of fanity, regarded on the next as an equally ftrong atteftation of madneft , and in the roidft of this equality of advan- tages, where each party feem» to have pcoved tlie fa& that be has advanced } truth becomes obfcured, darkncfs is increafed inftead of being diflipated, and every thing which remains tOLthe fpe£laton of fo obftinate a combat, is doubt, obfcurity, and uncertainty. Finally, as if it was little to decide fo difficult and extended a quef- tion of fa£t, there are added to it the mod fubtle queftions of law; and after having oppofed a£ls to a£ls, witnefles to witnefles, they introduce a fimilar combat of laws and cxpofitors, and the law be- comes not lefs doubtful than the fa A. Such, Sirs, is the important fubje6l of your deliberation, calcu- lated to perplex us by its difficulty, to overwhelm us by its grandeur, and even to deter us by its immenflty, if we only confulted our own forces, and were not fupported by the great and painful attention that the court has given to this long aflair; if .we did not know, that it was equally informed with ourfelves as to all Hoc (tf) Tbe word A3i \a thii place, n io |eoeraI thr^aghottt tbdc plttdingi, neaoi wtUicfl ioftiumeasft detaa Numb. XIX, SekStlomfrom D^Agueffeau. ^f^$ detail of fads ; if we were not perfuaded that our mimftry was Te« ducedy to combining and recording the different fa^ls, gndtp bring* ing before your eyes^ as with one ftroke of the pencil» tlie lively and prccife images of th^ principal circumftanceSy which arc to form the matter for your judgment. To do this with the order that the vaftnefs of the fubjed de.* mandsi we ihall begin by diftinguifliing three periods or epochat in the life of the Abbi df Orleans. In the firft, a (hite of fanity is certain and admitted. In the fecond period it becomes doubtful $ one of the parties attacks and combats it, the other fuftains it, and this period com* prebends every thing which pafled from the month of Jul^^ 16709 to the month of QStober^ in the year following ; at which time the madnefii oi* the Abbi d^OrUans obliged his family to have him put into confinement. Laftly, in the third period^ we have the fame certainty as in the firft, but in the one, it is a date of fanity, in the other a ftate of in- fanity acknowledged by both the parties \ thus the extremes of the three periods, which we diftinguifh at the outfet of this caufe, are equally luminous; the middle alone is obfcure and overwhelmed with darknefs. It is this obfcurity and darknefs which we mull this day entirely diflipate, in order to add this doubtful and equi* vocal period, either to the certain period of fanity or to -the certain period of infanity. Thefe three periods are conGderable, not only in refpe£i to die ftate of the Abbe ^Orieam^ but alfo in refpe£l of . the ads which form one of the nioft important parts of this caufe. In the firft period, we find the firft teftament, that is to fay, the title, the foundation of the demands of the Prince de Contj, and the fubjed of all the queftions of law, which have arifen in the <:attre. In the fecond, we diiCpover the fecond teftament, the donationt and all the ads which accompany it ; that is to (ay, one of the principal proofs, either of the ftrength or weaknefs of the Abbft underftanding. Finally, in the laft period, we obferve an infinity of ads, which on the one fide are contended to be a confirmation, of thofe which were done in the fecond period i and invincible obftades to all who ihall ofier in the fequel to attack thofe fame ads« Put without dwelling longer upon the advantages of this dif* tindipn, which will be fufficiently obvious in the whole progrefs of the caufe, let us proceed to the explication of the fads, and begin with thofe whidi relate to the firft pertodi that is to £iy, cvctj ' thing Ss6 APPENDIX. [Numb.XK. thing which pafl^d from the birth of the AUi d^Orleons^ to the month of Julyy 1670, when his &nity firft becomes the objcft of fttfpicion. If we were fpeaking to judges who 'are lefs informed, we might begin with mentioning the ftate of the family of the Abhi iOr- kansi the two marriages of the Duke de Longuevtlk^ his father, both ef them equally Ulttftrious by the honour which he had of re* newing the ancient alliances of his houfe, with the auguft blood of our kings ; we fhould obferve, that Madame de Nemours owes her birth to the firft of thefe marriages, that the fecond was fol- lowed by that of two children, John Louis Charles (POnieans^ born \n 1646, whofe ftate is now the objed of your judgment; and Charles Penris df Orleans ^ Comte deSt. Pol, bom in 1648 ; we (honld afterwards trace the portrait and cbaraAers of thefe two brothers, charaAers fo difierent, that the one feemed bom to obey, the other to command ; the one condemned by nature to obfcurity and re- tirement ; the other deftined by the elevation of his genius, ercn more than by his birth, to fill the moft eminent fituadons. But all thefe fafts are perfeftly known to you 5 we have already ftated them at the time of the interlocutory fcntence, and we arc loaded with fuch a multitude of neceflary circumftances, that we ought at once to retrench all thofc which ferve rather for orna- ment than decifion. We (hall content ourfelves then with mentioning, that the jf^ie ^Orleans conceived from his infancy the defirc of entirely devoting bimfelf to ecclefiaftical f unflions. After an education fuitable to the dignity of his birth, his firft ftep, at an age when he ought to have (hone forth to the world, was to enter upon his noviciate with the yefmtTy in order entirely to renounce all fecular engagements; iriiether his health did not permit him to fupport the fimple and . painful life of that condition, or whether from difguft or incon- ftancy, it is certdn that he did not continue in it long, bat he left it without fofing the fpirit of his iSrft vocation, which led him to nn ecclefiaftical condition. He retained the habit, and finally received the charafler. He joined to this natural inclination, a violent paf&on for taking joumies, not only from a motive of curiofity, which is common to all men, but with a kind of inconftancy and difquietude peculiar to himfelf, and which led him frequently to change his place, with* out any other defign than that of changing it. We Icam from the accounts of his eipence, that he fpent al^ moft the whole oiihe years 1667, 1668, 1669, ingoing from city to city, from prorince to provi|ice| followed by a (mail number Numb. XIX.] SeleSionsfrom D^Agueffiau. 557 of attendants, returning frequently to rhe fame placed hp bad jaft quitted, living with a frugality and parfimony little proportioned to the fplendour of his name, and frequently even a&amed of bearing it, and affeding to take that oi Meru^ in order to have the liberty of travelling as a private individuals content with indulging, in every place, his unquiet and laborious idlenefs. CbampaigfKf Burgundy^ the LyonnoUf Provence^ Italy j were the provinces and countries which he ran through in his long courfeSf but without ilopping to give you an exa£k journal, and a regular itinerary of his travels, let us confine ourfelves to the principsJ ia- ftruments which he has executed, and the a£l8 which alone cav be of confequence in this caufe. Three of his joumies are marked by a^ls which equalh diftinguifh them. \Tht Advocatt General here took a view of the imations cf Neuf- chateli of the Jirjl teftament and of the emancipation^ fimilar to that contained in the former pleading i and afterwards proceeded at fillows.'\ Scarcely had this public proof, this (blemn teftimoay, b^n given of his fanity, when, according to the coun&l of the Prince de Conty^ he obliged his family to repent of it, by the fad but in- fallible prclagcs which he gave at &aint Maur, of tjie approaching lo&of his reafon. It is then precifely at this point, that the firft period of the jlHi d'Orleans terminates : we have hitherto walked in the light, we have obfi^rvcd the joumies of the jihbi £Orkansy we have remarked the ftriking a£U which have diftinguiihed them. Hitherto, every thing is certain and agreed upon between the panics, but now all becomes doubtful and uncertain \ we enter upon a region of darknefst where we can only catch a glimpfe of truth, through the thick veil* with which it is covered, until you Ihall Iiave diffipated the clouds which furround it. In the fecond period as in the firft, we find joumies and written inftruments, but journies and inftruments fo equivocal^ that on the one fide they are regarded as invincible proofs of fanity, and on the other they are made ufe of as an evident demonflration of the contrary. All the' fads whi(;h relate to then^^ are 'naturally divided into three claiTes, or three diffei^ent parts. Thofe which precede tl)e. lad teftament of^ the Abhi iOrUans^ thofe which accompany it, thofe which follow it. Th^fe which precede it are almoft necefiary; thqfe which accompany it are. a^lijUgly efiex^ial \ thofe which follow it are ufeful*, 55« APPEtlDlt. [Numb. ITU. ufeful ; kt us apply ourfelres to this orders and begin with the circuntftances which precede the time of the laft tcftainent. Wc have told you that the counfei of the Prince de Coniy infifts that it was at St. Mmtry that they obferted the fanity of the A\^\ iOrkans graduaUy diminifli and his imbecility increafe, by a pro- grefs equally fenfible and lamentable. We (hall lay before you, in the fequei of this caufe, the proofs by which they contend they have cftabHflied this fad| and thofe by which Madame de Nemours op- pofes it. Let us at prefent only follow the (leps of the Abhe JtOr^ leaniy as they are known by folemn a£ls, and other written cri* dence* After having paiTed about three months at 5/. Maur^ he comes to Paris. He ftays there till the end of Auguft \ be fe^s out on the 30th'of Augufl^ to take the journey of the riTcr Loire^ a joumef which is of great importance iq this difpute, a journey of wUch the fubjedi the motive and the end have become one of the quef- tions of the caufe, a journey, in fliort» wliich has produced that mol- titude of witnefles, who have occafioned, in every city^ the fsime divifion, the fame oppofition, the fame combat between the fanitj and infanity of the Abhi JF Orleans^ which has taken place to-day, in the tribunal of juftice. Whilft the AhU dT Orleans is engaged upon this journey, his re- lations deliberate upon one of the mod important affairs of his family, upon the payment of the large fums which were due to Madame de LonguewUe ; they permit the Abbi d*Orleans^ and the Comte de St. Pol, to give up a certain eftate to her, according to a valuation to be afterwards made. The opinion of the reladons is confirmed by a fentence of the^ ad of September, 1670 ; but this plan was not executed until after the majority of the AUi d^OrleanSi and his return to Paris \ thus, there is nothing to pre- vent us following him in his route, and running over the principal provinces, which were the witnefles either of the ftrength or the weaknefs of his mind. He fet out in a hired carriage, accompanied by an alfrnner^ a gentleman, two valets de cbambre ; he arrived at Orleans, he takes up his abode at a petty inn there, called the Plough; he continues there nine days, he purfues his joumies, goes to Blots, ftays twelve days at Tours, the fame time at Samur^ makes a deviation to fee the Chateau de Richlieu, refumes again the courf.; of the river Liin, ftays fome time at Angers, defcends as far as Nantes, where he makes a ft ay of three weeks, leaves it on the lath of November, returns to Angers, and the rigour of the feafon obliging him to finiih hi:3 joumieS| he takes tbe refolittim of retuming into the 4 bofom Numb. XIX«3 Sdedions from D^AgueJfeau. 559 iK>fom of his £imily. He comes by die common ftagCi and ar* riYCs at Gue de Lore^ one day's journey from Paris^ he there finds a Yalet of the ComU de St. Pol^ and ail at once he changes his defign ; either Toluntarily or by cohftratnt, he abandons his firft proje£k> he refumes the foute of Orleam^ he hires three faorfes at one phcCy and diree chairs at another, and followed by two of his domefticsy whilft the others continue their courfe to Paris % he returns upon his fteps, and by a crofs road aniyes the fame CTcning at Orleans. Such, Sirs, is the grand h€t of Gui de Lorif of which all the circumftances have been obferved upon with fo much art, in the oppoGte pleadings of this caufe — ^is it neceflary that we ihouldhere fctrace the colours which have been given on the one part, and on the other, to this important iz€L ? they were too liirely to be fo foon efiaced ; on the one fide you are told that there was nodiing extraordinary in this change of route and defign ; the former jouraies of the Ahhc iPOrleam fumtfh a thoufand fimilar inftances of inconftancy. We (ee him frequently returning to the fame places, leave a city as if he was never to be ^ere poflible to advance the moment which the public have fo long expedted \ but the vaft extent of the fubjed obliges us to defer ftill further the explication of our refle£tlons upon fo important a caufe, and we fhall not offer them until we have ftated the fa£bs which refult from the refpediive proofs, by reading the depofitions of the wit- iieiles on the one fide and the other. SECOND AUDIENCE. We began the explication of this eaufe by- giving you an €sz& account of the eflential circumltdnces of fa£b| 'and the principal arguments of the parties* We now ptG|ge«d:to Uy before jtsu^ tbe P p 2 proofs SC4 APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. proofs of the hiftory of the life of the Abke tPOrleanSi wluch ate to au^ent ftill further the obfcurity and uncenalnty Aat pre- vail in the whole of this eonteft, and to reprefent M. de Lm^ ville in that donbeCul cftate between reafon and madnefs) in wfaidi one fet of witnefTes depi£l him as a man of unqueftionable fanity, and anotl)eri on the contrary, as a man in a ftate of public and notorious ideotifm. But that the proofs may be more nani- feft and aflured, ve fliall divide every thing that we have propofcd to difcufs in this audience into two parts. We fliall firft contemplate the proof with refpeA to the qualh? of tlie witncfles, and examine the general and particular exceptions that are oppofed to them. We ihall afterwards conGder it with refpcfik to the nature, the force, and the weight of tlieir depofitions. In the firft point, otir view will be directed to the perfons. In the fecond, we llnl] confine ourfelves to the fads, and this laft part will be almoll re- duced to reading the depofitions of the principal witnciTes, witli- out blending tlierewith any of thofe ingenious commentaries which are frequently more adapted to excite our admiration of the genios of the interpreter than to elucidate the text and letter of the depofition \ and we wifh it was poffible for us to make the 2& and witnefles always fpeak for themfelves, without adding any thing of our own in a caufe of this importance. Let us enter, then, into the examination of the exceptions to the witnefles* We do not examine at prcfent the tnitli of wk has been urged, that even fctting afide all the witnefles excepted againft by Madame de Nemours^ there is ftill fufficicnt in the in- queft of the Prince de Conty to form a complete proof » While the? urge the argument they do not give up thfc witnefs excepted againft •, and how could they give them up, when, in all tk other parts of the caufe, they have referred to them as eflcntial ind dficifive of the conteft. We may, then, for the prefent, pafs by this firft obfervation; and there is nothing to difpenfe with our examining the exccptioDs; on the contrary, every thing obliges us to do fo. Let us bcgi- with thofe which Madame de ifemours has propofcd againli k witnefles of the Prince de Conty. There are two kinds of exceptions, the one general, and foundci upon the rules of law, the other particular, and deduced from fossi important fafts. We do not comprife under this name of genera! exceptions the fufpicions which they have endcavoufed to throv upon the rcfpe£livc inquefts. We ihall not Ipcak of thofe nil we come to tlie parallel of the twp teftimonhl proofs. We only eKamim at prefent tht general exceptions which are funuibcdbjr Numb. XIX.] Selc^ions from D^Jgueffeau. $6$ the law, and which are reduced to the two principal grounds of age and poverty. And becaufe there is a vaft career before us, and the mere read^ ing of the depofitjons of the wituefles will occupy a very confider- able time, permit us, Sirs, without entering into long diflertations^ to lay before you plainly aad Cmply the general principles which < the feutiments of our bed praflifers, and the authority of your judgments have eftabliihed upon this fubjeA. The firfl principle is, that there is no ordonnance which fixes the number and quality of exceptions $ tlierefore, upon thefe occafions» they may fucccfsfully ufe the authority of written reafon, {a) as it is expounded by our dolors, and tempered by ufage and pra£lice. The fecond principle, founded upon the authority of that which, after the example of the grcateft magiilrates who have ever ap* peared in this aflembly, we have juft called written reafon, is, that the power of giving evidence is a kind of natural liberty granted to all to whom the laws do not exprefsly refufe it. Let us examine, then, what relates to the exception of age, ac- cording to thefe two principles, and let us fee what is prcfcribed upon this general exception by the civil law and by ufage. In the Roman law, there was only one didinclion upon this fub«» je£l, which was between the pcrfons who had or had not attained the age of puberty ; becaufe, at the age of fourteen, perfons were capable of making teftaments, and of executing all kinds of con* tradsby themfelves,andconfequently, of being witnefles of the ac-r tions, the engagements, or the lad difpofitions of others. AmongftuSj astheageof difpofing of property by teilament is much more advanced, there is a diflinflion between two kinds of witnefles* The one are called injlrumental witnefles, that is, thofe who utteft the truth and faith of written a£l$. Parties may chufe thefe as they pleafe ; but, becaufe their fun£lions approach to thofe of notaries, and as they divide with them the confidence of the laW| it is not fuflicient for them to have attained the age of puberty, but 'ti is requifite that they (hall be of fuflicient age to make a teila* ment. The cap:icity of the witnefs ought to follow and imitate that of the teftator \ a maxim which is too familiar to require any proof. The others are wimcfles of the ordinary af^ions of life, for- tuitous witnefles prefented by chance, and who cannot be chofex| by the perfon producing them, witnefles which the law has been obliged to admit with more facility than the others, to prevent the proof of fa£ls being rendered impofliible \ and thefe may be* of tW9 )(indsj perfons of tl)e age of puberty, and perfons under it. • • • (tf) Vu. the Rooun U^ft P p 3 from $66 APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. From the mometit of attaining the age of puberty, it would be impofllble to find any law, or ordonnauce, or judgment, or writer, ' who excludes them from giving teftimony, and therefore none has been cited. Before the age of puberty, the cafe is more difficult \ tlic ordon- nance permits the judges to receive thera even in criminal proceed- ings, where the favour of abfolutioh, or the importance of proof ought to render it more difficult, with a refervation of af- terwards examining the nature and quality of their depo- fitions. Hen^e refults an invincible argument, that there can be no dif* ficulty with regard to thofe who arc of the age of puberty \ an4 therefore this doubt has never been ferioufly propofed. Upon what then have they doubted ? Upon a queftion which might arife in this caufc — an pubes faEius pojfit ieflari de to quodvldit in pupUlari itiaU ? The glofs of the civil law upon the § 6. — Ttpi INSTIT de teftameniis ordtn, has decided in the affirmative. Maf earduSf one of our moft excellent pra^ifers, decides in the fame manner. For ourfelves, we arc of opinion, that it ought to be reftrained to thofe who approach the age of puberty. This is the opinion of Jean Andriy a famous interpreter of the canon law. Thus, wit- neffes arc either inftrumental or not. In the firft cafe, the age of 20 is neccflary ; in the fecond, that of pijberty is fufTicicnt ; and i witnefs who has attained that age may depofe to what he hasfecn fhortly before his attaining it. But this queftion is at prefent immaterial. Only two witncffes were under the age of puberty at the time to which they depofe, and their teilimony is not of fuiBcient importance to detain us longer in the difcuflion of it. Let us proceed to the general exception of poverty, and examine it as it applies to the law a.-vl to the fadl. 1. How Is It to be confidered in point of law ? The law 3 ff. de tejiihusy places poverty as amongft the qualities which the judge ought to examine in the perfon of witneflcs ; but it joins, at the fame time, the character of the witnefs, his man-s ners, his conduft. It fays, at firft, that the judge ought to con- fider an egens fti. He docs not flop there, but adds, /// lucri raufi fuid facile admittot. Poverty, then, is not fufficient ; it muft be a poverty which, with all the circumftances that accompany it, makes it eafy to prefume, that the witnefs is capable of all kinds of crimes, provided the hope of gain be held out to him, ut lucri €aufa quid facile admitfat. Thus we fee, that the glofs fays ex- prefsly, that perfons in a ftate of poverty are often admitted^ quia mn Numbb XIX.J SeleHibns from D^AgueJfeau. 567 non tarn ex facultatibus quam ex fide teflis idoneus itftimafur el in/picHur eujus propofitijtt^ What was dated to you of the property that was rcquifite with the Romans to exclude the exception of poverty,, does not rehte to witneiles but to accufers, who were not allowed to inftitutc an accufation unlefs they had at lead 50,000 federces. But becaufe, in general, it is difficult to make this inquiry as to the mannersi the character, the reputation of a witnefs, where the parties do not allege any precife faft, and confine themfelves to the general exception founded upon poverty \ our do£):ors and our ufage redrain this exception to the fingle cafe of mendicity^t which forms a drong prefumption of the venality of a witnefs. This is the do^irine of Mafcardt4s ; if a man goes from door to door, ffttatim. This is the opinion of Le Brun, in the book intitled Proces civil et criminel : we often find more probity and fidelity in poverty than in affluence. I^t ^s proceed (o the particular fa6^s. I. There is no proof of the mifcondu£ii the doubtful chara£lert ^c venality of any witnefs. 2* No proof of mendicity. 3. What proof is there even of poverty ? A certifigate that they were not in the rolls of capitation ; but this is a very equivocal proof. Perfons are often omitted through influence or negligence^ or a feigned poverty, ^ Andj ladly> this exception would only remove the tedimony of fix or feven witnefTes, whofe depofitions are not confiderable. Let us enter at prefent into the details of particular excep* tions. Thefc have been properly divided into four clafies : decrcts (^), law-fuits, animofities for favours refufedj a drong attaclunent for the Prince de Conty^ FIRST CLASS OF EXCEPTIONS. Decrets* Thcfe are alleged againd Martineau, Du Perron^ Le Ge^i de Cbafeatifort, Jouanne, and his wife FeuilUufe^ five of the witncffes. Martineau. -^Tht exception againd him mud be difallowed. The decret was purged in 168 8. The fentence only pronounced a compenfation of expences. The matter in difpute was only a trifling quarrel. (n} Wtrranti for apprebeniton on a criauoal cbtrst. Pp4 Le 5«5 APPENDIX [Nuinb.XlX, Li Gun de CiaUaufiri. — It is pretended that there is an equivth cation in the name j but this U yery immaterialy for the wttneb i$ of flight importance. Joumme pffd hu nv^.-^Yivt decrets have been adduced: we have examined them all. There is an aiEgnation to be beard, a perfonal adjournment, an order for an arreft. But what do «c find on the other fide, upon one of the deprets i — a (entence which purges it, and condemns JouAnne in three livres reparation^ Upon another, a fentence given in favour of the wife, and coo. demning the oppofite party } upon the three others, comprpmiiici iwhich liquidate the damage and colls at very moderate funis. As to the foundation of thefe procefles, it was merely 4 quantl between two neighbouring inn^keepers, each of Aem wiilnng to get the cuftom of perfons paffing by. The accufatioAs were very triili&g } but it is faid the public are not fatisfied, afid our mimftry is ap- pealed to.. And do they not kno^ the precife difpofition of die article 19, of title 25f-of the ordonnance of 1670, which enjoins, indeed, the lung's procurator to proceed ag^inft thofe who are charged widi capital crimes, or others fubjedl to corporal puniftiment, aotwith- ftanding any compromife between the parties \ but, at the &me time, diredls th|t, with regard to all ptherS| the compromife (houid be executed without any profecution. Now what was the matter in the cafe in queftion ? Some blovs that pafied between the fervants of two inns, on account of fome guefts, which the one wiflied to hare to the prejudice of the other. Nothing could be more fufceptible pf accommodatipn bet^reen the parties. FouiUeufe.. — This is an important exception, becaufe ihfi depolU tion is important ; and, befides, the decret is not purged: but it muft be confidered in point of law, and in point of faA. As a general principle, it is not true that the ordonnance has de- cided that a decret, in all cafes, without diftindion, is a fufiicient exception. The ordonnance, in truth, dpes not permit this fad to be al- leged as an exception, without fupporting it, and producing the decrets \ but it leaves it to the prudence of the judge to examine the circumftances which accompany Uic decret, in order, after« wards, to decide whether the exception is available or not. Now what is the diftin£iioa which ought to be followed oa thefe occafions ? Either the accufatlon is in its nature grave ; and then the pre- fumption is againft the accufed, until he has purged the decret. ■ lie Numb. XIX. j SeIe6Hmsfrom lyAgueJfeau. 5^9 He cannot before be confidered as a man integrafamM^ et tiUf in^ Or, on the contrary, the nature of the accufation is flight, and could not produce any punifhrnent capable of impofing the fiighteft ftigma ; and, in this cafe, it would be unjuft for the decret to bare more efieA than the fentence itfelf. In regard to the fa£k, two things are to be conGdered : One, the nature of the accufation : they would reprefent it as x rape {a) ; but in the plaint which is before us, and contains a detail little fuitable to the dignity of this audience, it only amounts to a mere debauch, preceded, as it is alleged, by promifes of marriage ;. but that is a ufual colour. C9a!Jiigiom rocat { hoe pnetexit nomSne eulpam. ymf, JEn, lib. if* * It is not the relations of the girl, but herfelf, and ihe alone who pomplains — fp there is no appearance of rape* * But what dillipates any fufpicion is, that we do not fee that there has been any purfuit from the time of liTuing the decret to the prefenty— an entire and profound filence. 2. The particular circpmftances of this a^ir. ^irft Circum/lance, "^e decret was never executed j and let us not fufler any ambiguity upon the fignification of it.-. It is very -well known a decret for taking a perfon in cuflody is not in itfelf a matter of notoriety, it is nothing unlefs it is executed, or a pro- clamation is made for the perfon, and an inventory taken of his efFeds. Here there are none of thefe proceedings 5 if there had been, they would have been produced — therefore FouilUufe had no legitimate and judicial knowledge of this decret ; how then could he purge himfelf from it ? Second Circumfiance. The marriage of the girl, fince the decret. which has indiredily extinguiihed the accufation; (he had more in* tereft in not profecuting than he had in not being profecuted ; and how could FouilUufe himfelf have purged thp decret without di& honouring her, and troubling an accordant marriage ? What can be imputed to him under fuch circumftances ? Third CircumRame, What would have been the termination of fuch a fuit ? FcmlUufe would have entered an appeal — ^he would have been condemned to have paid fome trifling fum of money to a charity, and fome damages. Such condemnations do not induce any brand of infamy — he would have remained sategrd fatrut^ Caa die decrei, then, have more ctkSt than a condemnation i {m) Accordiog H thit tftw ^ Fnoee, the term ripe wet applied not only to violence^ |0t i^fo to My^q> aa4 tven to mvfi|liiif a pcrCoo into aa improper marritce, §£CONQ 57© APPENPIX, CNumb.XII, SECOND CLASS OF EXCEPTIONS. Law-fuitSy or Caufes therfof. This is an exception which is good in general ; but it ought not to be abufed. It is neccflary that it fliould be a ferious, real con* teft, capable of exciting hatred and animofity, and not a law-fuit which is only fo in name^^-^n affeded one^ at leaft in its duration, for the purpofe of forming a matter of exception. Agalnft whom is this kind of exception taken ? 2. Againft Defgourreoux, — But this is a fuit which might be agreeable to Madame de Nemours^ as it tended to confirm the fc- cond teftamcnt, by which (he impeaches the title of the Prince de Cdnty ; a fuit which did not prevent the oncers from keeping up s correfpondencc with him, and writing to him the day after your confirmation of tlic former .fentence, to come to Paris^ and appear ti a witnefs for Madame de Nemours, 2, Againft Foillard. — ^This exception is more pTaufiblc. He will have the fame caufe of fuit as the Prince de Conty in fupportof the firft teftamenti in which he is a legatee of an annuity of t^Ivc Hundred livres ; whereas he is only entitled to a fum of 48oolivTci in the whole, under the latter \ and, bcfides, he is named a tciU- mentary executor. As to the quality of executor, that is a charge, or at mod no honour, which he has not accepted. There i$ i\o appearance of his accepting it; but, on the other h^nd, it. is a circu'milance which proves the probity of the witnefs, and tlic confidence which was placed in him* As to the diflPerence of the legacies, Madame de Nemours has no intereft in oppofing the argument which would apply againft fc- veral witneflcs in her own inquefl-, but the difference is not conCder* able to a perfon advanced in years. Some would take tlie annuity, others the legacy, according to the ftatc of their family. We are not to include here any thing concerning the anears of an annuity, which he has independent of the two teilaments. Add his known probity. 3. Againft Dafflottj le Leu^ Mademoxfclle le Baftier^ three dom?t tics of Madame de Longueville^ to whom (he has given life an- nuities by her teftament. What is this fuit ? An aflignation both to the Prince de Coafj and Madflme de Nemauri^ as heirs, perfonally, and by way of hypothecation, upon the effedb, for the payment of the an- nuity* What cppofition can there be to this demand ? It is agreed h^ fore Numb. XIZ'l ' Sele£lions from UAgueJfeau. 571 fore you that Madamt di Nemours was liable for her part } and can it be difputed that ihe was liable by way of hypothecation fo^ the whole ? This affignation was made on the 19th oi Augufty 1694^ it is referred to the court of Requite; du Palais i and there no oppo&- tion is m^de to it. In the mean time the caufe proceeds between the Prince de Contj and Madame de Nemours. The fentence, which allows a proof by witneiTes^ is confirmed the loth of January^ 1696} and no defence is made againft the demand of thefe three perfons. antil the 19th of January^ the day on which the Prince de Conty begins his examination. And what is the defence i It is reduced to thefe words. Nai riceivMi and unfounded^ Does ihe offer to pay her part^^ Does (he contend that it is already paid ? Nothing of the kind. But Madame de Nemours ^ it is f^^id, has been obliged to pay the whole i What is the confequence of that ? A recourfe againft the Prinft df Conty, and not an e;(ception againft the witneflcji. THIRD CI^ASS OF EXCEPTIONS. Animofities for favours refufed. This exception is propofed againft three of the witnefles^ Grap'* fin^ DefgourreauXy Tiffter. Witli rrlp^ft to Grapp'tn, they have 'given in evidence a letter, by which he requcfts the wardrobe of the Abbe iOrleans, and % gratification. But does it appear that they were refufed to him 2 By no means, and befides what would be the confequences ? Could not a valet df chamhre requeft a recompence for his fer-> vices^ from the heir of the Abhi iOrleans^ without rendering himfelf incapable of declaring what he knew refpe£ling the ftate of his mafter. Defgourreaux. He requefted a gratification in lieu of. an equi^ page. He requefted Guilloin to prefent a petition. He wrote on the 13th Aprils 1695, to aik for the payment of his falary, and he ftates himfelf to be very forry, that Madame de Nemours was fio long in determining, and that he wiflied to know what charge there was againft him, having nothing to reproach himfelf with. We may make the fame obfervations upon this exception as upon the preceding ; it would be difficult on fuch account to find fault with an ancient domeftic ; does it appear that the requeft was refufed ? On the contrary, you fee that they endeavour to eon- ciliate him, by letters written immediately sfter you confirmed the {entence^ admitting the proof- Father 57^ APPENDIX- [Numb. XIX. Father Ttffter. A diftin&i6n muft be made between the letters, which are admitted, and the placets, which are difavowed. In the letters he requefts nothing for himfelf, but merely die payment of one year's falary, which was due to his' brother ; a chalioe and fome books for die AUey ef St. Georgis. Theie is one in which he fays, that he wiflies his requeft may fucceed, fo as to fpare him the chagrin, which the fequel of tliis afiair might caufe him ; terms which have no reference to the pretended menaces, which he is fuppofed to have thrown out. It is true that in the placets, which it is pretended were joined to the letters, he requefts the continuation of a penfion rf 500 liTres, which Madame de LotiguevUh caufed to be given him during the life of the AbH ^Orleansy but befides that thefe placets are neither acknowledged nor Cgned, can it be fuppofed that a prieft, that the member of a religious fociety, honoured with moft of the confiderable employments of his order, that an old man of % about to appear before the fupreme tribunal of the fovereignjtidgc, would, out of revenge for fuch a rcTufal, commit a perjury in the face of juftice, and render himfelf guilty of the blackeft fallehood that ever was committed, as he is not content with attelling the infanity of the Ahhi d'Orleans\ but he rauft add an infinity of cir- cumftances, which would be an aflemblage and multitude of crimes combined in one. Let us finifli what regards thofe three witnefles, by three reflcc- tsona common to them all. 1. They are.witnefles who are almoft abfolutely neccfiary. It would require very ftrong arguments to rejed tliem. 2. By deferring to grant the favours which were requefted^diey might be reduced to the inipofiibility of depofihg againft Madme ^ Nemours^ for it might be expeded either that they would not depofe at all, for fear of bfing the fruit of their fervices, or at leaft that, if they did depofe, their depofitions might be rendaed ttielefs by afcribing them to the refufal of thefe favours. 3. If we attend to probability, in obferving the favours which were demanded on one fide, and deferred on the other, and feeing jAe witnefs in fufpeive until after his depofition, will it not be moft natural io conclude, that it was not the refufal of the favour which induced the depofitipn, fince the favour was not as yet re- fufed, but on the contrary, that it was the depofition which in« dttced the ref ufiil i liCt us proceed to examine, (he roujiT« Kumb. XIX.3 Sekillons frcm D^AgueJfeau^ 573 FOURTH CLASS OF EXCEPTIONS. Attachment to the Prince de Cmtj. This laft exception relates to M» and Madame de Silly. Wc are of opinion it ought not to have been propofed* It is pretended tliat they are officers of the Prince de Conty, be- caufe they are keepers of the Chateau de Trie; which belongs to him. ^ The tcftament of Madame deLonguevilleAiiTip^tes this colour. She gives to de Billy and bis wifei a habitation in the Chateau de Trie J with the appointments amounting to 400 livres a-year^ and in cafe her heirs (hould difpofiefs them, which (he does not think likely, and requefls them not to do, (he diredis the fame fum to be paid to them during their lives. They are not then officers of the Prince de Conty, but legatees of Madame de Longueville. They do not even enjoy the habitation, but refide upon a neighbouring edate. All the right of the Prince de Conty would conGft in taking away from them this habitation. He might do fo in legal ftridl- nefS| but there are ties of honour and propriety in the requefts of Madame de Longtievilley which, amongft perfons of this rank, may have all the ciFc£i of obligation and command. It is added with refpe^ to Madame de Billy, that (Ke has affiim- ed the quality of lady of honour to Madame de Longueville, but in fa£i, (he performed the fun£lions of that iituation, and how does (he exprefs herfclf refpefting it ? She fays, that (he fervcd Madame de Longueville^ in quality of lady of honour. Such ex- ceptions are too vague to weaken depofitions of this importance. We have not taken notice of thcfaft of the Chalice, purchafcd by Foillard, nor of the gift which Defgourreaux received from Abhe d'Orleans, at the time when they now reprefcnt him to have been in a ftate of imbecility; becaufe thefe are contradlclions of their tellimony, of which we (hall have to fpoak in the fequel, rather than in examining the exceptions. Such are die exceptions then which are taken on the part of Madame de Nemours, They arc reduced to fome fufpicions againft Foillard, on account of fome diffiirence between the legacies in his favour, and the two teftaments ; ;md to difa}lowing the two witnedes, who were under the age of puberty, together with le Geai de Chateaufcrt* Let us now pafs to the eafy and fammary examination of the exceptions which the counfel of the Prince de Conty have propofed againft the witneiTcs of the oppofite fide. i Let 574 APPENDTX. [Numb-XE. Let ns firft attend to what they have faid, concerning the de- pofition of the mod illudrious witnefsj in the incjuelt of Madame Je Nemours, It is unneceflary to add the name of the late M.U Naifif Maitre des Requites^ We avow, and the public will do us the jufticc to be perfuad- cd, that we grieve to feel ourfelvcs reduced to the painful ficccf- City of examining the general fufpicions by which they would ofFcr to weaken the authority of a witnels fo worthy of our vcnc- ration. It feems as if we were obliged to examine a reproach againft virtue itfelfj virtue which a long life has confummatcd, and which a precious death that appeared prematute, thottgh at the age of 8o> has confecrated to immortality. Why is it not permitted to usj inftead of entering into a dif- cuilion of this exception, to render to the illui^rious perfon who is now no more, the tribute fo juftly merited of a folemn effuCon of praife, which, coming from us, would be confidered rather as an efFuGon of the heart, than as a produdion of the mind. We ihould reprcfent him to you in the temple of juftice, where his ardent zeal for truth, and his immoveable firmnefs in well doing, have frequently given confolation to innocence, and caufed iniquity to tremble. We (hould fhew him unto you at the foot of the sdtar, joining the example of a perfe and we obferved that the queftion of the firft teftament was decided in the £une manocri that the court ordinarily deddes upon queftions yoLtll. Qjl of 5/8 APPENDIX. [Numb. SIX. of prcfciiptlon or eftoppel: when it is judged that a prefcription i$ not fufficiently eftabiiihed^ the court frequently contents itfelf with admitting the a£lion without giving any exprefs judgment as to tlie prefcription; but will it be faid, that the court has not judged definitively upon tlie prefcription by their admitting the aftioo to which it i'J oppofed ? Suppofe, for inilance, that Madame de Nimoun had oppofed a prefcription to the Prince de Contfs demand of bcin^ admitted to proof. If the court had, notwithdanding, permittd the proof to be made, could it afterwards be contended that the prefcription, without having been fpecially refcrved, could be ad- mitted as the foundation of a frefh difpute. This, Sir, is what we had the honor to reprcfent to you at the time of the former pleading, in order to apprize you of the un- portance of the fentence which you were then to pronounce. We entered afterwards into an examination of the queftions of law, which occupied at lead one half of the long addrefs, which the extent of the fubje£l obliged us to make ; you pronounced that celebrated judgment by which you freely and fimply confirmed the original fentence, without even adding the ordinary claufe, that it fhould be M'ithout prejudice to the rights of the parties. It is not for us to offer to carry our views and reflexions furthn; we, together with the refl of the public, refpeft that myftery which forms fo efTential a part of the religion of your judgments: yoo alone can know, whether, in the deliberation which immediately fol- lowed upon our conclufions, you took into confideratlon die queftions of law, and whether you intended to decide concluHTdj upon them. As for ourfelres, who only propofe our refleclions with trem- bling, and who can only derive our information from the exiCTior declarations of your judgment, we are perfuaded tliat its dif- pofition necefTarily implies a decifion upon the validity of the firft te (lament. Two reafons, wliicli we will mention in a (ingle word, equally perfuade us of it. The one, that it would appear contrary to jufticc, to have ad- mitted the Prince ae Canty to a proof in which he Would have iic intereft if the firft teftamcnt vjj longer fubfifted, without hating previoufly examined not only the appearance bat the validity of his right, and without being perfuaded that that right being cenaln in itfelf did not require any proof by witneffes, except to deftroy the only obftacle which could be oppofed to it. Could it be puffible that with any hefitation rcfpefting this title, a proof woolJ he admitted of fo diffictilt a nature ; that entertaining a doubt cf the validity of the firft teftament> you would have permitted the Prixt Numb. XIX.3 Seleilions from D^Aguejffeau. 579> Prince de Ccnty to attack the fecond; and that the law being un- certain^ you would, without a confident aflurance refpe£king that) have pafled to an examination of the fa£t ? For in fhort. Sirs, and this is the fecond reafon which perfuades us of the real prejudication of your fentence — Was the fa£^, of which you admitted the proof, of any confequence, cottld.it be in any degree relevant to the decifions of the queftions of law? The point in queftion was, whether the previous deceafe of the inftituted heir had rendered the firft teftament void, and in order to come to a judgment upon that mere queftion of law, if it was ordained that the Prince de Conty might prove that the teftator was in a ftate of infanity at the time of making the fecond. Can any thing be more divifible, more di(lin£i:, more independant,. than thefe two queRions? The firft is abfolutely preliminary to the fecond, and the fecond is entirely ufelefs in the decifion of the firft* It was not then with reference to tlie queftion of law, that you admitted the proof, it was only with reference to the queftion of £si£i, and this laft queftion could never have been examined, or difcufTed, or decided, without having formed a judgipent upon the firft : without that the parties would have been engaged in ufelefs pro- longations, in immenfe expence; and when they had fatisfied your fentence, when one of the parties had examined eighty-five wit- nefles and the otlier feventy-fix, it would have been faid, it is not upon the circumftances of fa£l, but upon the points of law that the caufe ought to be decided^ thus the permifGon which you had granted would be ufelefs^ dangerous, contrary to equity and to juftice. Such^ notwithftanding, Is the fenfe which they would put upon your judgment, and which they do not fupport by any other reafon than the mere name and general quality of an interlocutory fentence. It is true, that in general, an interlocutoty referves the rights of the parties entire, but that is upon the queftion to which the interlocutory fentence relates, and not upon the queftions preliminary to it. , To exprefs ourfelves more clearly, you had to decide upon. two queftions, the one of law, which confifted in determining whether tlie firft fentence was valid \ the other of fa£t, in which it was to be decided whether (h& fecond was competent to revoke it. Was it upon the firft queftion that you paiTed the interlocutory fentence? was it to decide this queftion of law that you allowed the examination of 160 witneftes? The mere proportion !s abfii^rd: upon what then did the interlocutory fentence turn? upon the queftion of fa£l, that is referved and remains entire, but -the firft is decided, as it was abfolutely preliminary to the fecond* Qjq % We 580 APPENDIX. CNumb.XlX. VTe mt^i dtfpcnfe with entering anew upon the difcuffion of the queftiMft of Isw, upon which we probably occupied too great a portion of your time upon the former pleading; but as we (hall ahrsyt diftmft even evidence it&lf, until it is confirmed by tk au^boiritf of four )ttdgments» we Ihall ihortly recapitulate wha: Hfe have tlfcsdf (bted moct at length upon thefe queflions; ve Ihall eiamilie the new arguments which are faid to be cow hea^^ fefwardt ^^d we fliall endeavour very fummarily to fiicv Aat even if the ftt||j}eft wu ertire it would be (lill propd to dcdde m ftvour of the validity of the firft teftament [ij^ a ntapihtMm ef tie Jmmr arguments in fitppcrt tftit fi$b unie^ ikefofi rmB^ hefrxeeied asfilbwsfl Againft fo many ttaibos fortified by the unanimous fendmentof ^e do6orst without ita having been found pofEble, fince the mz waa before difeufledy to dileower even one who entertains the coo- tfary opinton» except in the caie of paffing over a diiUi which !$ die that we muft not overlook the learned^ the judicious, and the juft commentary, which the Prefident Fabtr lias made upon this law. He has examined it in the fifteenth chapter of the fourth book of his Conjeffuresy and he demonftratcs irre* (iftibly, that we muft rejedi the negation of this law. There are two principal reafons for his opinion. T. The jurift Ulpian would contradiQ himfelf, and that in one and the fame law. For in the $-7 *, he eftabliQies the principlCf that the heir in the fecond degree may be charged with the fidei^ lommiffion in the fame manner as the firft, and in the $ 9, which is that whereof the terms have been ftated to you, he would decide that the heir in the fecond degree would not be charged, as if it was tiot always to be prefiimed when there are no circumftandea to the contrary, that the teftator Intended to that which was in hit power, and that he could never have it in his contemplation to make the fidii^ommtjfton depend upon the uncertain event of tfat acceptance of the inheriunce by the heir of the fixft degree. That would not be the oQly coatradiAion with whidi XJtfian Would be charged. He decides in the law 6t ds legai f • IW if only one of die legitimate heirs was cbaiged with {ti& fidei-iomfi^lfi^^ his replication would not prevent the Jidei^eommiffkn being due from his co-heir to whom that part would accrue, H He fii^ fubJlHutus cum JuQ Mere confejuetur ad ereftentem ftrtknem « Nee tntom proslaa kooorvm foflsArb, ?««m laMorit npmgm ikHsm«Mfa» foflumnt. t Si TItis 1^ M«Tio hfRdibiM iailinMb, yi ysdiiatfaanKn^ufbi^ • TStIo Aibinta kgaverit, ft faiiqttlt l^rct t&t, ccatoa, aequc Ma^iit iMrcdiCMSA idierit trccMts Ticrot (kbebit § i. JuliasM qitidea ait, ii alttr fz Ustfimit hctc^bat n^iidllftt pot- doiMn, can tflbit tb CO Md-conoMk flcliQi, ctthmtoa qw BOO cA co^ci dttm Md* coimniir«i pralhit pofdoocm tala U cohmSim fiat oncn pcniacit, r»t p <« i eTciiptum Sef is that of the caducity of the in* ftitution; that is to fay, the previous deccafe of the two inftituted heirs. Then there is a cafe in which he fuppofes that the two iirlt heirs will not to be in a condition to hear his prayers and obey his words, and notwithftanding he continues to pray, and to make his voice be heard. To whom then can he addrcfs hinjfclf ? If it is true, that his obje£^ is his legitimate heirs, and that two of them ' are fuppofed to be dead, is it not evident that he can only regard the third heir, tlie only one who exiils; that is to f.iy, Alcdame tie Nemours ; and that confequently, as wc have aheady liiid, (lie is almoft by name charged by the tellator. But if this teftament cannot be regarded as having failcd'of it>. cfFeft, as it isfupported by the codiclILiry claufe, is it then revoked ' by the donation, or by the fubfcquent teftament? This is the fccond part of the caufe. The donation forms a queftion of law, but one which is ufLlef::; the teftament, a queftion of fuel, but clTential, We fay, that the donation forms an ufclefs quclllonof.law, for to what is it reduced? To decide whether, according to the rules of law, an univerfal donation of prefcnt effects revokes an an- tecedent teftament. Two grounds have been ftated. The incompatibility of the titles, but tliat is a proportion contrary to found jurilprucfence; tlic donation diminifties the profit of the fuccelTion, but it does not affect the fubftance of the inftitution; but befides, here is a con- ditional donation, the right of reverfion always continued a property in ths donor ^ could that have been oppofed to the Covite de Saint Pul? Second ground, change of intention, that might form a difEculty, not that it is true, that the property having been given without any charge to the Comte de S/. -PcV, it would not be again fubject to the charge ii> reverting to the donor; but pj^ncipally on account of the claufe inferted in the donation, and which referves the right of retinue to Madame de Nemours after the Abbe d^Orleans, a very ftrongprefumption, to which, as it feems, nothing could be oppofed except the ftriclnefs of the law; but fuch a prefumption not- withftanding does not in itfelf deftroy a teftament. For inftance, could this point be oppofed to Madame de Longueville the inftifi^ted heir? Now from the ii^ftant that the inftitutiqn is admitted to iubfiftj xH^ fdei'C^tnmiJfion whiph is attached 19 it fubfifts alfo* She Qj\ 4 could 584 APPENDIX. tNumb.XlX. could not take the eSe&s wrthout the charge of reftitution; (he could only receive them to render them according to the dif- pofition. But once more, after having reduced this queftion to its real difficulty, let us fay as we have faid upon the former occafion, that before we examine what was the will of the jiUe tOrleans^ we muft be afTured that he had a will; now this is the very queftion in difpute, fince the time of the donation is three days before that of the teftament| and when it is contended that the Abbe ^Orleans was in at ftate of infanity. And in order to evince ftili further the inutility of this queilioo, let us fay in one word, either the donor was in a ftate of fanity, and then why look for conjectures of bis intention; and whether he did or did not mean to revoke the firft teftament by the donation f Can his intention be doubtful if his {anity was certain? Is it net written in his teftament, which followed the donation? Or on the contraryf he was in a ftate of infanity; and in that cafe how could he change his intention, not having any to change? We Ihall ex- amine in a moment the a£ks by which it is pretended the donadon was confirmed* Let us reft the point upon this (Ingle reafon, the fad is always decifive. If he was fane, the fecond teftament proves that he intended to revoke the firft. If he was infane, he could not revoke it either by the donation or the fecond teftament. At length we are arrived at the decifive point, and the real knof, at the eilential queftion, we might almoft fay the only queftion of this long conteft* Hitherto we have treated of feveral queftions, which might appear more proper to fatisfy the inclination or the pre- judices of the parties, than to enlighttn the religion ef the juipii and carrying our exa£lnefs even to a fcniple, we have deemed it not allowable to retrench any part of the caufe by a kind of pre- mature judgment and anticipated cenfure. We have preferred expoGng ourfelves to the imputation of faying things which might be ufelefs and fuperfluous, rather than to the reproach of baring omitted any which were ufeful and ncceflary*, and we are perfoadcd it was our duty to reprefent at iirft this caufe, as it appeared in the mouths of the parties, before we endeavoured to exhibit it as it ought to appear in the fanfbuary of juftice. But after having fatisfied in this refpeA every thing which the delicacy of our miniftry could require from us, we enter at prefent upon the more important and difficult part of our obligations^ which confifts in en- deavouring to difcover the light of truth from amongft the doudi of darknefs that encompafs its and to place it before your eyes not covered with thofe extrinfic ornaments which frequently only embellifii in order to difguife$ but on die Contrary^ divcfted of all exterior Numb. XnC] S*le&ittujhm lyjgueffeatt, 585 exterior advantages, reduced to that natural ftace of purity, of fimplicity, of finoetitf, in which it ought to piefent itfelf to the eyes of juftice« But what is this important truth which we are in purfuit of ? You Icnow, Sirs, that all the difficulty of this caufe is re4uced to examining, whether the jMc d^Orham was in a ftate of ca- pacity or incapacity at the time of making his laft teftament ? Such is the only objed which we are this day to contemplate, and fuch at the fame time is the deplorable lot, fuch the «}elanchoIy deftiny of the bonfe of Lpftgttiwihp fo ilhiftrious in its origin, fo glorious in its progrefs, fo fplendid in its decline, that all which remains of its paft grandeur, is, the fingle queftion whether the laft heir of fo exalted a name fell fix months fooner,or fix months later, into, a ftate of infanity ? Thus terminate the fortune and elevation of fo many heroes. Their fucceflbr dies an ideot, we have not| even after his death, the confolation of being allowed to doubt die truth of his infanity. The calamity is certain, the date of it alone is doubtfid. ^ months are all the fubjed of this celebrated conteft which is palEng before you, and the mag- nitude of which only ferves to proclaim ftill more loudly, the emptinefs of grandeur, and the inconftancy of fortune. ' But before we enter into the examination of this queftion of fa£l, fo important and fo difficult, we think it is abfolutely necef- {zrf to eftablifli, in a few words, the general principles by which we may judge of the merit, of the force, and, above all, the prefer- ence of die oppofite proofs. And that we may do this with order, let us firft endeavour to find out what is in general that incapacity rudence. 6 What 586 APPENDIX. [Numb.XiX. What fays that great man, who was, at the fame time, an ontor, a philofopher, ai\d a jurift i (and to comprife more than ail this,) vhat does the opinion of Cicero teach upon this fubje£l ? Two different ftates divide all men, if you except the really lage (a). The one are deprived entirely of the ufe of reafon, the others make a bad ufe of it, but there is not fufficient reafon for declaring them to be in a (late of folly ; the one are deftitute of the light of reafon, the others have a feeble ray, which condufis them to a precipice i the former are dead, the latter ill ; thefe ftill preferve an image, and a (hado^ of wifdom, which is fufficient for filling in an ordinary manner the common duties of focietji they arc deprived of a real fanity of mind, but can lead a common ufual kind of life ^ the others have even loft that natural fentiment, which binds mankind together by the reciprocal performance ef certain duties'. Let us apply ourfelves to this laft character, which is the moil fenGble of all, and to which the application is the moft cafy. A fine petfon, in the fenfe of the law, is one who can lead a com- mon and ordinary life ; an infane perfon is one who cannot even attain the mediocrity of thefe' general duties. Mcdiocritstm ^fficiorum iueri et vit£ cultum communcm et ufttatum. But amongft tliofe whom their weaknefs places below the lad degree of men of common underftanding, the jurifts diftinguifii two kinds. The one only fufFers a fimple privation of reafon ; the weaknefs of their organs, the agitation, the levity, the almoft continual in- conftancy of their minds, place their reafon in a kind of fafpea> Con ahd perpetual interdiction, and caufe them to have the de» nomination of mentt captiy in the laws, and in the writings of the jurifts. In the otiiers, the alienation of mind is lefs a natural weaknefs, than a real malady, frequently obfcure in its caufe, but violent in its efFedls, and which, like a wild bcaft, feeks continually to break the chains that bind it, and it is this malady wliich properly bears the naipe of fury. The former, fays BaldtUy have an obfcure and concealed fury, the latter have a (Iriking and msRiifeft infanity. The laft are in a ftate of drunkennefs, of tranfport, of frenzy. The firft approach rather to tlie ftate of infanity, an extreme dc- crepitude, their reafon, like that of an infant or a dotard, is im» pcrfcdl or worn out, but they are both equally incapable of mak- {•) The word yig*, being ufed in the Frenth linjutfe to exprefs both the elewtion af wiCtom, ftiid ■ common ftate of £uMty, hu an cffed in tbii dUcaffioi), vvfaicb caoooC eaiiir be retaiiM^ in uanflation. 5 »«g Numb. XIX.3 SeleiHonsfronijyAgueffeau. 587 iiig a teftamenty becaufe in the one reafon is almoft extin£^^ and in the other it is tied and bound by the violence of their com- plaint. If thefe two ftates agree in this point, they are neverthelefs dif<- tinguiihed by feparate charaAers. The ft ate of fury is more violent^ but it fometimes admits the hopes of cure. The ftate of mere infahity is more tranquil, but it is almoft al- ways incurable. The one is fufceptible of paroxyfms and intervals, it rifes all at once, it diminiflies in the fame manner. The ether has not intermiflions fo marked, becaufe the cavfe which produces it, that is to fay, the weaknefs and debility of the organs, is nearly equal and uniform. Finally, a declared fury is fo obvious and evident, that it would be fuperfluous to diftinguifh the degrees of it, with reference to the incapacity of the teftator, becaufe it is certain that all furious pcrfons, as long as their fury continues, are abfolutely incapable of making a teftamcntary difpofition. On the contrary, mere weaknefs of mind is more fufceptible of degrees, and of confiderable differences ; the incapacity increafes and diminifties, in proportion to thefe degrees, and thefe diiFer- ciices : but who can fix them in general,' who can mark precifely the frontiers, the almoft imperceptible limits, which feparate ix>- fanity from fanity, who can number the degrees, by which reafon declines and falls into annihilation ? This would be to prefcribe the limits of that which is illimit- able, to give rules to folly, to be bewildered with order, to be loft with wifdom. The doubtful and uncertain point, at which reafon difappears, and where incapacity becomes evident and manifeft ; can only be fixed by the particular circumftance of each individual cafe. All that can be faid in general is, that this incapacity ought never to be examined with more attention, than in deciding not upon a mere contrad, but upon that ad, which of all others de- mands at once the greateft degree both«of capacity and will, that is, a teftament. The law which fubftitutes a teftator in its place, which inveftt him with the power and charafler of a real legiflature, which grants hkn the right to change, to difcompofe, to abrogate the natural and favourable order of legitimate fucceflions, requires at the fame time from him^ both a capacity proportionate to the im- portance of his piiniftry, and a plenitude, and if we may fo cx- prefs ourfelves; of a fuperabundance of willj and therefore^ it ren- ders 58» APPENDIX. CNumb-XIX; (krs him capaUe of all kinds of contn&B, previouily to imptd^ ing him with capacity* neceflary for making a tcftament. Every body knows that pcrfons under the age of puberty, bat approaching to that agei may contra£t, with the aut^rity of their tutors ; but who ever conceived that the prefence and authority of their tutor could render them capable of making a teftament ? Minors contract amongft us, with the hopes of reftituttony but they make a valid contract (a) : this is not all, the laws of the church and the (late give them the power of engaging themfelves, by the mod folemn and indiflbluble ties ; and at the fame time that the law permits them to difpofe not only of their fortune, but of their ftate, and their liberty, whether by marriage or religious profefBon ; the fame law declares them incapable of giving tbdr cife^ls by teftament. In the intention of legiflatures, the progrefs of the will foHowsi and imitates that of the capacity (i) A perfon may engage him- felf by attorney ; he may, by a general procuratioUj fo far throw himfelf upon the fidelity of the perfon whom he entrufts, that without defigning it, without even knowing it, he may enter into alt kinds of obligations ; but w!)o will fay that he can make a tef- tament by attorney ? However fpecial the procuration may be, whatever may be the probity of the perfon entrufted with it, however wife the difpofition, the teftament will be always null, becaufe it is not fufficicnt that a teftament fhould be a judicious a&, it muft be the appropriate a£^, the perfonal aA, the fingk zGt of the teftator : he may take the allUUnce of counfcl; the law does not prevent it i but he muft always be himfelf the arbiter of his intentions. It is for him alone to pronounce, to decide, to will : never can his mtiII be fupplied by the miniftry of another; if the jurift gives his advice to the teitator, it is only as to the form and not as to the eiTence of the a£l ; if he fpeaks, it is only to lend to the thoughts of the teftator the neceflary fuccour of legitimate expreftions. And what is the reafon of the two differences between a coo« trad and a teftament } it is founded upon the tnoft pure fouices of found jurifpnidence* We (hall only point at them in pafling, tha we may enter upon that which more nearly concerns the real ftate of the caufe. It it eflenttal to human fociety that there fhould be contra£U; it is not neceflary that there fhould be teftaments ; there are many flourifliin^ ftates, which have long vefufed to their citixens fi» («) Mmofiiy could mt, tcmdlmg to tbt bw of Framtt^ bt AneA si a wtXtn of di- ftnyi, aM wt^oaly tolievcaMe by an oAioo commeaced wicbia a timilad daM^ Ik ihi •vicilTion of the contr«ft. {h) Thefe iltuiiMtraai an oot fi^pportad by tbc Ar^/^ law; Numb. XIX.3 Sekdionsfrom D^AgueJeath 589 Tight of making a tcftament. Was there ever any .which de- prived them of the faculty of contrafling all engagements ? The faculty of engaging is conformable to every kind of law, the law of nature introduces it, the law of nations augments it^ the civil law perfe£ks it. The faculty of difpoGng by teftamcnt is the nature of civil law, or at mod of the law of nations , but it is contrary to the law of nature, by which death deprives a man of every right over his property. In a coutrafl, each of the contraftors has an infpeflor, or tathcr a cenfor, in the perfon with whom he contra£ls ; and even if he (hould be deceived, his heirs may frequently have rediefs againft his engagement. In a teftament the teftator himfelf is his own cenfor, his own judge, his only infpc£lor, his will is inviolable, he is the fole ar- biter of his difpofitions. The entering into contrafis is favourable, and almofl: always accords with the law ; teilaments are often odious, and every tef« tator. begins with thinking him felf more wife than the law itfelf; in fa£l he ought to be fo, when he has the right to abrogate it. After this is it a(loniflnng» if the laws have granted a liberty of entering into a contra^i at an earlier period than that of making a teftament, if they have willed that contrails (hall be more fa- voured, more common, more eafy to make than teftaments, if thc]^ are content witli a mo cular, circumftanclal, fupported and approved by the fa£ts which it includes. The number of the witnefles demands a little more examina^ tton, and furnifhes matter for two queftions in this caufe. The iirft, which does not require a long difcuflion, confifts in fet- tling, whether a fuperiority in the number of witnefies is fuiEcient to form a confiderable and almoll decifive advantage ; a queflion which ought only to be treated in one of thofe tribunals, where they reckon up theit doctors on the one fide and oti the other ; where the induftry of the patty confifts in citing a great number of authorities, and that of the judges is limited to counting them, ; but which ought not even to have been propofed in the moft auguft fenate of the world', where the Opinions of the do£lors, suid the fuflPrages of the witnefies, are not counted but weighed. Non enim^ fays the law, ad multitudinetn refpici oportet^fed adjirtceram teftimoniotum jidem et telUmonia quibus totius lux veritatis adRftit* ii 21. § 3.^. detejfihus. Befided, if the witnefles had confined themfelves to the genera^ fad of fanity or infaruty, if they had faid oh the one fide, ihi Abbe d^Orledns appeared to us to have loft his reafon^ and on the otherg ke appeared to us a man of underjidnding t fome advantage might be derived from the plurality of the witnefles ; but they have all entered into an erplication of particular fa£ls, and it is in thd comparifon of thofe fads, rather than in that of the nximber of witneflS^s, that the examination of the proof ought to confift. *The fecond queftion, much more important that the firft, re- lates to the particular fads, and confifts in adjufting whether thofe iads which are only attefted by a fingle witnefs, may neverthc'* lefs enter into the number of chrcumftances, which conftitute the general proof of fanity or infanity. Without entering into long difiertations, let us attend to the dif« tindion Which is eftablifhed by the .unanimous fuffrage of all the expofitors ; their authorities are coUeded by Mafcardus^ in his treatife de Probatmibus ; and this fubjed appears to have been R r 2 rerjr 596 APPENDIX. [Numb. III. very fully invcfllgatcd by Feiinus, one of the mod illuftrious com- mcntp.tors on the decretals. The matter to be proved, is either a certain^ Hngle, determinate fa£l} and then we mud apply the common maxima unus tejl'umllus tejtis^ becaufe this being an eflential fa£b, it is ncccflary that the depofitions of two witneiTes ibculd concur in eflabliiliihg the tnidi of it. Or on the contrary, the queftion relates to a general faci, a habitj a multiplicity of adlions, from which only one confequence can be drawn, and then it would be both impoITible to require two witnefles upon each fa£i, and unjuft to rejedi the depoGtions of fingle witneflesj refpe£ling individual fadis. We fay in the firfl place, that it would be often impoflible to require from a party, that each fa& (hould be proved by two wit- neiTes. For infanity or faiiity are confpicuous in all places, and at all times, and yet the fame perfons cannot always be prefem at this multitude of afiions \ but if it were abfolutely required, that they (hould all have feen the fame a£lion, it mud then be fuppofed that a perfon, whofe (late (hould become the fubjed of conted, would be always furrounded by a croud of witncflcs, faithful and a(Dduou8 fpe6lators of his condu£l, who might at fomc future time fpeak to the fame circumdances of fanity or is- fanity. But not only is this fuppofition abfiird and impo(Cble, we add that it would be unjud to rejed the depoiitions of (Ingle wit- neiTes, upon individual fa£ls. The general i^Qt is, the only one of which you have ordabed the proof, and you know that in this caufe, although Madame it Nemours contended that it was neceiTary to allege particular fa& of infanity, you paid no regard to this argument, but purely and fimply confirmed the fentence, which admitted the proof of die general fa£l of infanity; the particular fa6is are iniinite, how would ^it be poflible to allege them all in an interlocutory proceeding? the witneiTes are left at liberty to chufe them, and to propofe them as fo many proofs of the general fa^ ; but this general fad i* always the fubjefl matter of the proof, and the principal objed of judicial enquiry; it is fui&cient that all the witnefies (hould fay, that the perfon, whofe date is conteded, appeared to them to be fane or infane : it is not nece(Tary that they (hould all agree iu the reafons which they aflSgn for their judgment : they are con- formable and accordant as to the principal fa£^, they only differ m refpe^ to particular circumdances, they go to the fame point, by diifercnt routes, and thofe who are feparated in the means, are united Numb. XIX.] Sekahnsfrom D'AgueJeau. 597 united in the end. It is the fame, as if two experts concur In de- claring an inftrument to be falfe, bat found their opinion upon different obfervations, when they are examined feparately j docs there not refult from their unanimous judgment, although founded upon 'different motives, a proof as ftrong as any which can^be given, de* pending upon the fcience of experts ? In the fame manner, wit- nefles give their te(limon)i rcfpe£llng the ftate of a man ; one wit- nefs brings forward one fa£t, another adduces another \ they all equally pronounce a conformable judgment upon the (Irength or wcaknefs of his mind. * Can it be pretended that the proof is not pcrfed, becaufe each circum (lance is not attefted by two witnef- fes? do we not know what takes place every day in quedions of ftate, efpecially thofe which regard filiation and Itgitimacy, that it is very rare to find two witnefles,^ who bring forward precifely tlie fame fa£l? One eflabliflies one prefumption, another furniflies another conje£lure, and it is from the affembtage of all thefe pre- fumptions and conjectures, that the proof is formed: an in- finity of atoms compofe one body, and although each in particular feems to have no extenGon, they form altogether an extended fubdance; many rays of light, which feparately have not any fenfible luftre, produce when united a fplendid radiance, fo many particular fa£ls form one general fa£l. Let us finally add, that in thefe cafes, as we have been told on tlie part of Madame de Ncmourj^ the witnefTes enter as it were in- to a participation of the fun£lions of the judges, whofe judgment they fometimes anticipate \ and as it is not necefTary that the fame fads fhould determine all the judges, and although fome of them are influenced by one fad, and others by another, it is ftill faid that they are all of one opinion, when they all agree in favour either of faulty or infanity ; fo witneiTes ought to be regarded as unanimous, when, from different particular fads, they all draw the fame conclufion as to the general fad. The writers, and particularly Mafcardusy after having dated fome of thefe reafons, draw this inference — Non tamen de neeeffi^ tote requiritur quod ftnt contejies fed fatis erit utfaltemjingulares^nt^ quia et tunc re5le probabuttt furorem. Let us, however, acknowledge that in criminal matters, our ufage has redrained this opinion within more narrow limits, and that when the quedion turns upon the general fad of ufury or ex- tortion, although regard is paid to witnefies who depofe to particu* lar fads, it is required that there fhall be a certain number, to form a proof from their united depofitionsi and that ten witnefles to- gether only avail as one. But befides that this principle was never introduced into civil caufeSj it would be ufelefs in this cafe, where Rr3 diere 598 APPENDIX. [Numb.XIX. there are on the one fide and on the other, not only lo and 20 witnefles, but 76 on the one fide, and 85 on the otheT, and con- fequently much more than would be fufficientj to form a proof even of particular fa£ls. Let us now penetrate iiito the interior of the proof, and endea- vour to include in three or four general principles, every thing which regards the nature of the faSs, and their different favour, in the parallel which may be made of the oppofite inquefts« The firfl; principle, as we have already (lightly mentioned, is,tlut there are two kinds of fa£ls. The firft is a general fa£l of fanity or infanity, and this hGt alone is not fufficient ; the witnefs mud explain the reafon of it, or rather of the opinion which he has formed of the ftatc of the tct tator. Non creditur tefli nlft reddat rationem din'tjuu This is the common axiom of all the writers. In.cale of a vifiblc faS, where he might fay, / havefeen it, he is believed upon his oath ; but in the examination of an invifible quality, where he can only fay, Ihelieu itf he ought to alBgn a reafon for his judgment, and as an expert cannot be attended to, if he merely fays, / deemfucb a vfriting tok fatfe, without dating his rcafons, fo a witnefs upon the fa£^ of in- faulty is not intitled to credit, if he does not fubmit both his judg- ment and the reafon of it, to the intelligence and fuperior autho* rity of the judge. The fecond principle which refpefts the particular fafls, that Ibould appear in the depofitions of witneffes, is, that notwithftand- ing the general prefumption, which is always in favour of (anity, thofe who allege infanity have one great advantage over thofe who mflert the contrary. The latter can in general only prove negative fads, for to con- ftitute a poGtive fa£t of fanity, it is necefTary that it ihould not only inconteftibly (hew, that the perfon who is the author of it, could not do it without being in poflcfTion of his reafon at the par- ticular moment ; it muft be alfo (hewn that he could not perform fuch an a£lion, without being in a (late of fanity, both in the time preceding, and in that which follows it. Without that it may very well prove a rapid and trandtory moment, but not a fixed and con- ftant habit. On the other hand, mod of the fa^s of infanity are politive ; a fingle a£tion may fometimes fuffice for a perfefi proof of folly, hecaufe there are fome a<^ions, which bear fo marked a chara£^er, of illuGonj of derangement, of alienation of mind, tbt it is impofGble for a man in his fenfes to commit them. Such is the unfortunate condition of men, that they may in a fingle mo- ment give convincing proofs of their folly \ whilft a whole courfe of life is hardly fufficient to cftabliih a firm, certaiii^ sind evident opinion Numb. XIX.] SekSlionsfrom UA^aJfeau. 599 opinion of their fanity. In a word, a perfon in a (late of infanity may perform fenfible. afbions. Then fuch a£lions do not prove that a teftator is not in that ftate. A fenfible perfon cannot com* mit a llriking and diftinguifhed a£l of folly. Then one fuch a£lion abfolutely excludes the prefumption of a found under- flanding. Then if there is an oppofition in the proofs, if a great number of witncffes appear on the one fide for fanity, and on the other for infanity j if the conflift becomes entirely doubtful, by what rule can it be dtfcovered ? This is the lad maxim which remains to. be examined. Two rules, both of them certam, and which feem neverthelefs to favour the two oppofite parties, occafion all the difficulty which arifes in eftabliihing this maxim. On the one fide it is certain, that negative witnefles ought never to be compared with pofitive. Two pofitive witnefl^es, fay all the writers, ought to outweigh a thoufand negative ones. On the other fide it is not lefs certain, that witnefles who depofe to fanity, are much more favourable than thofe who allege infa* nity. Two. witnefles of fanity, fay the fame writers, are preferable to a thoufand witnefles of infanity. How are we to reconcile thefe two principles, which appeaf to be equally certain, and at the fame time feem diftin^tly oppofite f We think, that without having recourfe to the fubtilities of foxne interpreters \ without examining whether infanity is more a privation of fanity, than fanity is a privation of infanity; or whether infanity is only a negative ftate, or on the con* trary, a real and pofitive difpofition; without entering into thefe diflertations, which are more adapted to the fchools, than to the majefty of this audience, it is fufiicient to attend to a fingle diftin^ion, which appears to us to be fo manifeftly founded 00 reafon and natural equity, that the mere ftatement of it will ferve as its proof. The witnefles who have been examined on the one fide or on the other, either confine themfelves to the general fa£l of infanity or fanity, or on the other hand, they have ftated particular fa£ls^ which ought neceflarily to ferve as a proof of the general fa£l« If their depofidons are general, if they are fatisfied with faying^ that the teftator appeared to them to be in a ftate of fanity, or that he appeared to be in a ftate of imbecility \ then the favour of fanity ought to prevail, and that for two reafon^ the one that in cafe of doubt, the balance ought always to turn on the fide of leafon, as on the fide of innocence. The otlier, that the two proofs are in this cafe equally imperfe&i and hccaufe . neither the Rr4 one 6oo APPENDIX. [Numb. III. one or the other of the parties has proved what he has alleged, wc ted upon the general and natural prefumptlon of faniry. But if the dcpofitions are circumftantiali if the witnefies have entered into a detail of the pT^fs of their judgment, then it is tio longer upon a principle of favour, upon the general fad, that the caufe ought to be decided j but upon a comparifon of the particular fa£ls, in which the one have tlie advanuge of being poiitive, and the others^ on the contrar]^, are for the mod pan only negative ; and this di(lin£bion is clearly marked by the authon themfeives, who fay, that two witneflVs of fanity ought to out- weigh athoufand of infanity. ^iod pt^ddpfn veram tjfeif{ihckvt the words of MafcarJus): quando i/ii paucicres deponcrtnt mfpedt plur*s auttm in genere, ^ What is then the Ccife, according to thi,s author, in which the favour of fanity ought to outweigh the number of. wiincfle* to the contrary? It is, when the witnefTcs in favour of fanity give a reafon for their judgment, enter into a detail of facts; deponunt infpecie\ and on the contrary^ the witnefies of infanity only lUtc the general faft, plures autem in.gencre. In cafe this conflict and contraction appear even in the pani- eular fa^is, propofed on the one fide and on the other, all the maxims which have been urged on the part of Madame de Nimsurs ought to have their application. It is in this conjun£l cafe, that rtll the prerogatives which (he alleges become fo many decifivs arguments, and that in cafe of doubt, the favour of the heir by blood, of a defendant, of a perfon in poflcflion, of one whofe pre- tenfions accord with wriiten inftrumcnts, ought j»rithout difficulty to be preferred to a ftranger, to a demander, to a party not in poffeflion, and to one who indireftly combats the iuflruments, by accufing their author of infanity. Wc have perhaps dwelt too long upon thefe prelin^inary tc- fleftions. But wc thought that our minlftry absolutely obliged us to inveftigate them, both becaufe this part of the caufe was the mod neglefted by the parties, and becaufe it is abfolutely neceflary to agree at firft upon certain ruUs and meafures, by which we may decide upon the weight and importance of the oppofite proofs. Let us now enter into the detail of thefe proofs, in which little more will remain than to recapitulate ttie faCts, and afterwards to apply the principles which we have hitherto endeavoured to eftablifh. Let us begin by the proof founded upon the written adls ; this is the firft in the order of time, and it has the advantage of being appealed toby both the parties. Numb. XIX.] Seledions from jyAgueJiau. 60 1 We might fay ac once with fufficient probability^ that this ex- amination is become ufelefs and fuperfiuousy after the former folemn judgment which you h^ve pronounced upon this conteft. We might reprefent to you, that all thefe afls do not form an invincible prefumption in favour of the fanity of the Abbe d^Ot'^ leans^ fince, notwithdamUng all thefe a£ks, you have admitted and ordained a proof by witnefles. It is true that they have adduced two or three new %0i%^ but thefe are of flight iniportancej and contain only a mere fignature, without any other indication^ any evident mark of the will and reafon of the perfon who figned tliem. Shall we venture to go ftill further, and without violating the profound refpcft which is due to the fecrccy of your judgmentSf may we enter into the fan£iuary of juftice, and endeavour to pe- netrate as far as we can into the motive of the fentence which you have pronounced ? Shall we be permitted to propofe our feeble conjcdtures, and to fay to you, with that difEdence and re- ferve which ought to belong to us, that the moft apparent reafon of your judgment is the principle which we have dated, and in which we are confirmed by your judgment, " that written aAs are no dire£l proof of fanity, except when they arc entirely per- fonal, and appropriate to the party executing them, and that^ otherwife they only form a prefumption, liable to be conteded and even deftroyed by a contrary proof"? Now you have deemed that all thefe a£ts have no charaAer, which evidently (hews them to be tlie work of the perfon executing them \ that on the contrary, it might be prefumed that his family had more fhare in them than himfelf, and that at leail the fad being doubtful, and depending upon the ftate of the Abie d'Orham^ nothing but a proof by witnefles could enlighten this doubt, and remove this difficulty. But although you have not confidered the ads as forming a decifive prefumption, you have not judged that they can form no prefumption at all, and you only intended to join to that prefump- tion, tlie aflillance of a greater proof : thus we are obliged onco. more to difcufs thefe adls, in order to examine precifely the ex^ tent of the prefumption refulting from them. They are didinguiflied into three clafles, with rrferAce to tho three different periods of making them. The firft precede the teftament. The fecond accompany it* The laft follow it. Let us begin by examining the firft, that is to lay, thofe which were made before the return of the Ahbe t Orleans to Fta/is^ tod^ which is the fame .thi9g9 up to the tune of bit majority. What 6oa APPENDIX. [Numb.IlX. What do we find in this firft period ? Two arrits^ fomc aSs of adminifiration, fuch as receipts and diredions for the common expence of his family, and laftly two letters, the one of Madame de LonguevilUf and the other of Metayer^ The arrets do not require any explication. It is fu(Ecient to ob- fcrvc their date. The firft was pronounced on the 2 2d of July -^xt confirms what had been agreed upon by the relations, it admits the letters of emancipation, which the king granted to the Abbe d'Orleansy and the Comte de St. Pol. It is ufelefs fo dwell upon examining the inferences deduced from this fentence. It is not comprifed in the time to which the court has decided the proof to be confined ; it can only be made ufe of to defeat fome anterior fa3s, which have been men* tioned by three or four witneiles, on the part of the Prince de Conty, But without anticipating at prefent what we are to ob- ferve in the fequel, concerning the proof by witneflesj we only re- mark at prefent, that the fingle confequence which can be deduc« ed from the fentence of emancipation, is that the fads which previoufly occurred, were not regarded by the relations as indubit- able figns of a formed infanity, but as equivocal anions, which might receive a favourable interpretation, Cnce they did not pre- vent them from confenting to the emancipation. The fecond arrh is of the ad of September y 1670 \ it permits the Abbe d^Orleansy and the Comte de St. Poly to relinqutfii certain eftatcs, for the purpofe of paying Madame de Longuevi/ie. But, beCdes that this arret is precifely at tlie commencement^ and within the fix firft days of the time to which you have coo- fined the proof by witncfl'es, who does not fee that it was a mere formality, a matter of ftyle, in which the Abbe f Orleans could take very little part ? And in faA he paid fo little attention to the confequencea of this affair, that without waiting for the ftance as eflential and necefTary in the difcharge which he (igns, who fubmits himfelf Voluntarily to the infpe£lion of fuch an at- tendant, and who places himfelf under the yoke of a domeftic curator? It is true, that this important izdt did not take place until four months afterward; but it muft be obferved, that it goes back almofl to the time of the teftament, for the month of March is comprifed in the general difcharge, and the teftament is of the 26th February^ having an interval of only a few days \ therefore, although the fad did not take place til! fome time afterwards, its confequence and intention is applied to the time which imme- diately follows the teftament. Such then is the time in which all the afls were paiTed, all in the firft moments of majority, all in lefs than two months, all between the adventure of Gue de Lore, and the fad refpecling DalmonU But at what place were they pafTed? Was it in fome remote corner, where the Abbe d*Orleatis had no other counfel than himfelf, no other afTiftance than tliat of his oum inclination? It was in tlie middle of Parisy and in the bofom of his family. And who are the perfons with whom he engages in the moft important of thefe adlsi It is his family themfelves; if we except fome contrafts, from which we can draw no other inference than of his mere fignature. It is not then the cafe of a man who contra£ls freely with all kinds of people, who enjoys the peace- able polTefEon of his eftate, and who is tranfading perfonally the moft important aflfairs with ftrangers, which forms at leaft a ftrong prefumption of the public opinion^ that he is in a ftate of fanity. He had not then one of thofe charaders of mind, which are firm, folid, exempt from nil fufpicion of their condud, in which madnefs is regarded as an unforefeen accident, as an unexpeded misfortune, as a thunderbolt which heaven darts upon the earth, to manifeft the weaknefs and infirmity of human reafonj on the contrary, it was the cafe of a man whofe genius was below mediocrity. 6o8 APPENDIX. [Numb.XlI. mediocrity, of uncommon levity, of extraordinary inconftancy, low inclinations, a fordid avarice, 'an obfcure life, dtflionouring the great name of L(mguevtlU\ his continual excurfions without con- nexion, without utility, without defigo, were the true, the faith- ful pidiure of the agita^tion of his mind. His incapacity was fo great, that if we believe Madame it Nemours^ he was ignorant at the age of twenty, and at the time of the firft teftament, whether his fucceflion would belong to his relations or his friends. Who then, once more, are the pttrfons who fpeak ia thefe afis? On the one fide, a family attentive to coticeal its misfortune, and to make difpofittons fuitable to its grandeur and dignity ; oq the other, a man fufpeAed of derangement of uncierdrinding, perhaps already fallen into a ftate of infanity, but certainly in the approach to it. Let us follow the other circumftances; let us examine thfc number arid nature of thefe ad^s. The number fumiflies reciprocal arguments to both the parties. According to Madame de Nemours^ their multitude irrefifiibly (hewt, that the Abbe dfOrleam was in the peaceable pofleilion of his ftate. If we attend to the Prince de Contyy the number of thofe ads m itfelf afibrds a violent prefumption of weaknefs of mind, in the perfon executing them. They do not permit him to return to Pan/, until his age rendeted him competent to make an engagement; hardly is he arrived, when they load him with the fignature of a£l8. Is it not vifible, that they are in a hurry to take advantage of the remains of his docility ; that they wilh to anticipate that fury which was rapidly advancing, and the fatal moment in which it would be necefTary to place him in a ftate of confinement ? And what is the nature of all thefe z€ts1 is there any one which, by^its difpofitions, by the claufes which it contains, by the refer- vations which are made, bears an evident chara£ier of the fapity of the Abbe d'Orleans? In the firft place, we muft retrench the greater number of thefe a£ts, fuch as the contra£ls for annuitiest the ratification of an inconfiderable exchange made by Madame de Longuevillef in the capacity of tutoref«, the acquittance given to the Marquis it Beuvron, the warrants for penfions*, in all tiiefe ads there is nothings perfonal, except the mere fignature, and we have ihewn you that that is not fufiicient to diflipate the fufpicion of infanity. To what then are all thefe z&s reduced? We can only reckon five that are of importance, except the teftament itfelf, which we ihall examine feparately. And what are thefe five eflential a£ii? The Numb. ^[IX.] SeleSiions fro?n Ty Aguejfeau. 609 The tranfaftioa of the i6th January with Madame de Lcngtis^ villey the aft of the 31(1 with the Prince de Conde^ the univerfal don:\ticn of tlie 23(1 of Fcbnurry^^ in favour of the Comte de Saint Pcly ami fin. lily, the two procurations of the 26th Pdruary, The tranfaftion in itfclf, has nothing which is proper and par- ticular to the jlbifJ iPOrkans^ noilun^ \vhich can be regarded as hi$ work, and in a word, nothin;^ p'^rfonal : nay further, tliere is a kind of demon Rrr-tipn that he did not k^lo^V' iht detail of the claufss of this acl; and that he fi;jned upon the faith of his counfel, and upon the credit oF Aladavie de Longueville. You recolleft the date of this a6l, it is of the i6ih Jarwaryj 1671; the Aibe d*Or-' ieans arrived on the i5th, in the evening; the act is very long, it re- quited a lead a day's reading, for a man fo little vcrfed in buCnefs as the j^hhe d*0r!cansy and it occupied more than eight days medi- tation on the part of thofe who prepared it. Yet, this long, important and difficult afl: was figned m the morning; it was im- poffiblc for the Ahbe d^Orlenns to have read it, underttood it, and examined it in all it- parts; and let it not be faid, that in the month oF September^ his relations had permitted him to enter into the tranfa£lion with liis mother; things had changed their complexion fince that time. As he was then a minor, his relations only psr- iTiitted him to rclinqulfli the eflate upon a regular cftimate; but after his majority, he fixes the eflimation himfelf, he regulates the price of the lands, and all the claufes which are the natural confequences. Tliis aft is entirely dilTerent from that which w^s projcfted; and once more this act was examined, approved, and figned hy him in the fpacc of a fingle morning. The fccond aft, that is to f.»y, the tranfaftion by which the Prince de CsnJe gave the cftate of N(JIe in payjTient, was not indeed figned until fifteen days after the Abbe d*0rleans*s return to Paris; but it is at the fame time true, that thefc fifteen days were not employed in deliberating upon the conditions t)f the treaty, fince thefe were all regulated before his arrival; the pro- cJuration, by virtue of which it was executed, is at the foot of the treaty, fo that nothing could be added to it; now the procuration -was figned on the i^th January, that is on the day of the AbbPs arrival, and fcnt afterwards to Paris, whh the treaty completely prepared and ready to be figned. It was figned in this ftate,' and is it not evident, that independently of the confent, of the will, of the examination of the Abbe d'Orleam, the aft was refolved upon and fettled, and only waited for the mere formality of £gnature. The two procurations do not raife any particular ptefumption of Xinity, they are like all the reft of the afts, which only fpeak as it Vol. II. S 8 were 6io APPEND IX* tNttmb.XlX. were by their mere fignature. It is even contei^dedi that thn form a proof of infanity ; it remains then only to examine the donation; and that it is the only a£t in which there art font clattfes capable of inducing a ptefumptron of fanity. Such) for inftance^ are the referration of an ufufru^i of fixty thoo- fandlivreSy which appears too great for a peffon in aftateof imbe- cility, the refervation of a grofs fum of 6o»ooo livresy the moiety of the Hotel de Longuevillef and the furniture, the power of difpofiog by teilament of the revenues of two years, immediately fucceedkg the death of the Abbi irOr/eatu. But on the other fide, they remark an univcrfal fpoliation, an abdication of all property* an affectation of inferting daufcs, which did not concern the Abbi iTOr/eanSf and which bad no other o|)je£l than the interefts of Madame de LonguevilUi and in this conflict, in which each party pretends to have the advantage, conjectures multiply, prefumptions increafc on the one fide 2od on the other, and the proof becomes doubtful and uncertain. On the one fide, Madame de Nemours contends, that all the aCts, and principally the donation, are fo many legitimate proofi of the liberty, the fanity, the pcrfed rcafon of the Abbi d^Orhnij that all of them are judicious, reafonable, ufeful, neccfTary, and proclaim the fanity of their author. What could he more fenfible, than to take advantage of the firft moment of his majority, to ex* ttnguifh the moft favourable debt of his family, by giving the edates in payment to Madame de LongttevUlc ? Could he refufe to rec<;jve the eftatc of Nejle^ by which the Prince de Conde difchargcs Ithe ^cbt owing from him? Was it not proper to give up to the Ccmte de Saint Pol, all the rights and advantages attached to ftniority, which he had himfelf folemnly renounced, by confecn* ting himfelf to religious ptofefTion; but at the fame time, was it not right to referve a confiderable ufufruCl, a habitation fuitablc ; to has birch, a liberty confiueil w^lthin reafonable limits of difpofin; j rttl ceMin foms? In iliort purpofing to take long joumics, and t? go out of the kingdom, ^ could he have made a more foitabl; divifion of hit confidence, than that which he did make beti^ea: Medwrne de Longuei>ille and PorqUitr in the t^o procuntioci, by giTing to the one the nomination to offices and benefices, and to the other the adminifttation of his revenues ? On the other fide, the Prince de Conty tells you, that diere are two general views, arifing both from the contracts and.tte do- nation, the one of which (hews, tliat the Abbe d* Orleans bd chs Tery fmalleft (hare in all thefe aCis; and the other difcorers, dut they ftre much le(s the titles of wifdom than the proofs of infanity; ixnce all tl^fe zS^ have no other objeCt than to (trip him of his 4 d^ j^umb. Xtit.] SekSiohs fhfh lyjgueffeau. 6x i cffedsf to place him beyond the reach of injuring others and himfelf» and in Ihort to reduce him to a kind of fecret and domeftic interdidion, Jefs ftrikhig, but not left efficacious than one which might be more public and folemn. It was not the advantage of the Mii tPOrUanSf which was the tobjeA of all thefe a£l8» but the intereR of Madame de Lcngueville, and of the whole family of Lohguroille$ and is it poflible to have any doubt of this firft tefiedion^ when we fee that in the mod iih^ )i>ortant of all thefe titles» they have inferted an extraordinary clatlfe» a claufe contrary to the principles of law, Whieh do not admit one jperfon to ftipulate and contrad for the interefts of another \ a claufe by which the Comti de Saint Pel was obliged toot only to ratify the tranfajiion which the Abbi d*0rleatis had nyule with Maddoie de Longuevi/Ie and the Prinee de Cmdig but alfo to difcha^ge Madame de LofigueviUe from the jewels with which (he was tharged by the inventoryi and from a general account Of the tutelage? Is it poffible, after this» to doubt of the real motive, of the fingle principle of all thofe ads, and Can it be fuppofed, that they were the work of the Abbe d^Orkant^ When his intereft is the only one Which is neglejiefd ? In three days, the eldeft branch of the Hmtfe de t,mguein(fep fcarcely of age, without any apparent teafon, is ftripped of aO his property) the donation takes from him his prcfent efFedis, the teftament which they get him to make deprives him of the dil^ pofition of his future « They leave him indeed a handfome ufufrtt£l to give fome colour to the ^{k\ but if they give it him Vith one hand they take it away from him With the other, Cnce^ by the procuration which they make him fign at the fame moment^ they interdid him at lead in point of h€t from the adminiftration' of his ufufrud. At laft, to put the final feal to his interdiAion, they give him an infpe£lor, a kind of donleftie curator, whofe prefence, advice^ and counfel, he a ihort time afterwards thinks neceflary, for the allowance of a trifling accompt of ezpences. Such, Sirs, is the fubftance of the two contrary prefumptions^ which the fame a&s fumifh to the oppoGte parties. It is for you to decide upon their plaufibllity, to judge of their weight, and to turn the balance, which is aimoft equally fufpended between dio one conjeAure and the other. But for ourfelves, fince our mixiiftry obliges us to give an explidc opinion upon this confliA of prefumptions, two icfledions preient themfeltes, the fitft of which it fuperfluous^ becaufe the fecond appears to be quite fufficient. Ia the firft place we ihould obferve, that we cannot contemplate aH the drciimftancei which attend thjefe ii£h» without admitting Ssa that 6iz APPENDIX. [Ntbb. XlL that there is in the pTefumptions offered on the part of the Prina ie Conty a degree of probability fo fenfible and fo appareiUi that die mind can hardly rcfufe its afil-nt to them. And we add, in the fccond place, that it is not neccffary diat thefc prcfumptions fliould outweigh thofs of Madame de Nmcurs^ it is fufficlent that they {hould be equal, ;ind in cafe of this perfed (Equilibrium, nothing but the proof by witneflcs can turn the balance and fix the uncertainty of conjedtures. To explain oar opinion more particularly, the prcfumption which the Prince de Ccrttty derives from the a£l$ themfclves, is mere ftiong than that of Aladame de Ncmci/rs, It is true, that on the one* (Idc it is difficult to reconcile thc-m, an4l particularly the donation, with tl\e fuppofnion of fanity, and that on the contran, it is eafy to accommodate them all to the hypothefis of infanity. But who can doubt of the firll point, when he examines what IS really done in the principal atls under confidcralion? We know that it is fufiici^ntly common in great and illuftrious families, for the elded member, who tic votes himfclf to the fcrvicc ©f the altar, to transfer to the younger the great advantages or- dained for him by nature j therefore we fhould not be furpriiltl to fee the ylf'at' cCOrlenNS give ro th.e CcwU de Saint Pol the lord- fliip of Nt'ufihniely renounce liis government, and even make a eonfidcrablc donation of his moH. ciiiiinguilhed territories. But this is not what paiJVs in the donation that we are ex- amining; it deprives tlie uitve (P Orleans ot al! Linus of propcrn* it is not only the fplcndid titles ii'.coir.patiWe with the obfcuruv of his own life; not only duchies aji hands without referving any propoty, except a moderate fum act fufEcient to difchargc his icilamcnt. He reduces himfcif to the ftate of thofe whom the culhcrity of juitiee only intciditls from the dlfpofition of their principal, leaving them the adminiftratioii of their revenues; and u[^on what oce.ifuui does he make thii iacrificc to the Cot: it t de Sair.i PclP Is it t n account of aji eftablifh- mcnt worthy of his bjtb. and his great qualities? Are there anj ©ther apparent caufcs? Do the age, the infirmity, th« temper of the Ahhe d*OrUans^ infpire him with this entire and univerfal renunciation ? There is nothing of the kind, no occafion, oo new conjunflure, no probable reafon, except that having attained hii majority, his ^age has placed him in the condition of rendering himfelf deilitute, and of being the inftrument> as he was already the fubjcft, of his own intcrdi£lion. The principle of difcretion then did not require from the Ah^ J'CrUans what he did upon this occaConj 6n tlie contrary, if he had Kutnb. KTl.'l Sekflions from D'JgueJlau. C 1 3 had any underftanding, it is difficult to fuppofc that at the age of twenty*fwe, he would have caft away his patrimony by his, firft piece of liberality, and by one fingle donation deprive himfelf of it was lefobedi that until a folemn interdi&ion, they (hould contmue to ad bt virtue of the procurations! the fta^ bf fury itfelf did not derange ibt meafuies of the family} and in fa£bf had they not phced ^ ^Ui JtOrleani in a fituation in which the moft extravagant fuiy did not require any altcr^tioni becaufe he was already impoteat, difarmed, incapable of hurting himfelf or others? Let us fuppofe that the family of the Abbi^ f Orleans had b izOi the defign which is imputed to them^ and of which the a{b excite very ftrong fufpicions} let us fuppofe^ that they in- tended to diveft the Abbt (TOrleans of all his efie&s, and tb:, wifliing to fare themfelyes the pain of a public interdi£tion, thej fought the means of aofompliibing a private and domeftic mter* diAioUi which, as we hate already faid> had lefs notopety, but not lefs ctkdt than a folemn and authen^c judgn^ent; this defign hzi nothing in it which is not at onc« lawful and probabki i^ woold be even probable in a private familyy and it approaches ahnoft to certainty in a family fo exalted as that of the A^bciPOrle^Hj. But thfs defigp once fuppofed, what meafures would they tak to carry it into execution? Would it not be necefiary iA to make him fign ads for terminating in a difcrcet, equitablci ui Teafonable manner the greateft affairs of the fainily? 'Vi'^oidd they not afterwards make him give to the C^mte Je S^^i ^ol a libeity which himfelf could only abufe? and was it not a mattered prudrnce to impofe upon the do^^atory the eflential condition oi executing all the a£ls which the ftate of the Abbe tTOrteans m^ have rendered doubtful? Would they not, in'ftripping him of tbe property of every ^ipg whicK he pofie^ed| leave him an ufofncl > proportionate not only to his prefent ftatc, but to the unceruis event of his recovery? And becaufe they could not intrufthk with the adminiftration of this ufufru^i was is not natural to ^ake him fign procurations? In fine, becaufe it was not pollibk to prevent his regulating at leaft ^he ordinary expencc of hii cdablifhment upon his joumiesi would tbey not place ova hu condufl a wife and faithful infpeftor, who might prevent furpiik from the inferior domeftics, and aflure the family df the regulaiit] yrith which every thing would be condu^ied? Such are air the precautions which it feems pofiible for hunas prudence to take, in executing a plan which contains nothing im^ probable in itfelf, and fuch at the fame time are thofe vtud have been adiually taken. What then is the confeqoence to be deduced from this fuppofition? If the family intended^ fecret interdi£lion of the Abbi d*0rltvis thef Kumb. XIX.J SekWomfrom D^Agtiefeau. 6 1 5 they would have taken all the meafures which we have reprefent- ed. Now they have in fzGt taken all thefe meafures. Then it is more than probabley that they had fuch intention. Let us judge once more of the will by the works, of the intention by the ac^ tions, of the defign by the event. Every thing which they could doy if they had had fuch an obje£l in view^ they have a£tua11y done. Then we may fuppofe that this view was the real principle and motive^ which prevails in all the a£ts« From the bofom of thefe prefumptionsi in the midft bf thefe . zCUf sfliies the lall teilament ; an a£t in which the^reare two things to be conlidered. I. The general prefumptions of the wifdom of the teftament| and of the favourable fituation of the heirsj have already been pro- pofed, and the court has decided that thefe grounds were not fuf? ficient to dtfallow a proof of infanity. 2d. A great number of particular circumftances^ which fortify the fufpicions of infanity. 1. What was^he motive of the* todament ? None was necef- fary. He had gi^en every thing by the donation. It is even pre- tended that the dqnation had taken away the charge of fubftitu- tion, no preCpnf benefit engaged him to make this difpoiition. Why prefs him fo much, except for the appijehenfion that he would even lofe the faculty of making his fignature i 2. The depoG): of this teftame^t> the univerfal legatee becomes the mafter of it. 3. The inexplicable circumftance of the papers found with the teilament. Thefe were cither made after the teftamcnt or before. |t is impofEble and abfurd to fuppofe they were made after. The jtUe (TOrUans depoHted his tellament as foon as it was made, and fet off himfelf eight days afterwards. Could it he fuppofed that he intended to change all the legacies without exception ? F^r in the proje£ls they are all difierent from the tellament. They mull then have been made before. But if that is the cafe, what is the date of them ? Perhaps they were n^ade long before. What is the defign of them ? To confirm the tellament ? If he made them before the fecond, it was the fird which he intended to confirm i then he never in* tended to, change it i then there was a furprife. What arguments are oppofed to all thefe prefumptions, which arife againft the tellament, as well as the z€ts which accompany it ? We have obferved three principal ones. The firil, that a charge of this defign^ this pretended concert o^f the family of the ^tbe (TOrlfans, was injurious to the memory pf the illuftrious relationsi who compofed the moil noble and S s 4 principal 6i6 APPENDIX. [Nainb.XlX. principal 'part qf it. But this topic was more adapted to excite tlic eloquence of the orator, than tp afford a principle for the deciHon of juftide, and does not appear to us to be fq cle^r inppint of fa£i, as they would perfuade you that it is. ' * If the afts which were paflcd by the Abbe tTOrlcnns were not all fuitable to the (late of his family, to the grandeur and dignity of his houfe, if they were not fuch as he would have figncdhb- felf, if he could have been apprized of liis fituation, fuppofingit to be fuch as is contcncU'd by the Priticc de Conty^ there might be fome ground for the rcafons wliich have been alleged, fcr f:>ying that it was not probable that rehstions ret \ch illiiRiious^v their virtue than their birth, would have ::bnr\l the credulity, tli: facility, tlic docility, of a pcrfon dcdituto of UMderlb.ndir.^, to make him Cgn all kinds of acls contrary to Ills real intcrefls. But what have they nude bin) do (we nre fpcaking upon tl-,! fuppofition of the Prijue de Ccftfy^) wliich h.c wculd not hi\t done himfdf, if he had pollened an sdcqu'.:te knowledge ? Ads which were innocent, acls wliich were necedary, acts which could hardly be deferred, acts, in fliort, in which the welfare and fpLr,. dour of the family cf LougucvUU were involved. If at fuch . conjuncture, in whicli it is mere cafy to blame what has bcc; done, than to find out what it is beft to do ; if lindcr ;h- ap^f^- Jienftons of an approaching ftate of fury -^ if to prevent the cor.- fcqucnccs of an in't^-rdielion, and of n long Hate of c9tnroul ; if to prevent the Comte de St. Pot from falling into the twofold mif: fortune of being the brolner of a madman, and of being only hi) younger brother in rel^uion to the* property ; in fliort, if to give i certain form to a!l the affairs of a g'eaf family, they made ufccf the remains of docility, which were found in a weak and dcnngd undcrflnnding •, if iht y did in rcfptft to him what is done ever? day in the cufc of minors, and what the Roman law permits to be done with refpec^ to thofe who arc under the age of puberty ; tL: Is to fay, the getting them. to Tign acls, which they neither coulj nor would intend to fign of thcmfelyes : under all thefe ci:- cumftances, is it nccrfTary to revile an illuflrioift family, whica wanted neither underftanding nor difcretion, which did what thcv could, rather than what they wifhed ? Should we not, on the con- trary, commifer^te them, excufe them, and wifh that it mayneva happen toourfclves, to be reduced to a fimilar conjun£ture, where good counfels are rare, where cenfure is eafy, where the evil is evident, and where the remedy is doubtful and uncertain ? The fecond general argument, by which they would combat the prefumption, which the Prince de Cctity derives from the z€t% them- felvesj is more conCderable, You have been told tliat the a^s re- t •• • . I Numb. XIX.3 Selections from D*Jgu^au. €ij per the fufpiclon, and t;hat they cont^ia claufes which cap onlj agree with the fuppofition of fanity. It piud, in tlie firfl place, be admiUcd that fiftch ' claaCss only occur in the donation. The other a£^6 contam . nothing, which is either neceiTarily or probably a proof of faoity, in the perfba figning them. ^ , But what arc thefe claufes in the donation, which fo mnnifedly repel even the flighted fufpicions of fuch a concert ia the family ? 'Ilic ufufruct, you arc told, is too confiderable f why leave 60,000 Itvrcs a -year, to a perfon out of his fenf^s, and who did not be* fore commonly fpend more than thirty i Why give him befides a grofs fum of 60,000 livres ? Why referve to him the tnoittf of the Hotel Je LmguevilUp with furniture of the value of 100,000 livrcs ? In fliort, why referve the liberty of nvaking a teflament ? Why ftipulate a return in favour oi Madame de Nemours? One general principle is an anfwer to all thefe obje£lions. It is fufficient for rendering all thefe rcfcwations probable, to fup- pofe in general, that the family had forefeen a cafe which might jirr'ive, that is, the recovery of the Abbe d^ Orleans* It would not be jud in fuch a cafe, that he fliould be reduced to an ufufru£^t which might be fufncient for a perfon in a (late of infanity, or tliat he {liould have nothing to difpofc of either for the purpofe of rccqmpenHng his domedics, or for other juft aad fuitable Could they bcfules, at lead without publicly declaring him to \>*z out of his fenfes, referve to him a lefs confiderable revenue ? ^ould they exclude him from the Hotel de Longueviiky or take nway from him the furniture, which was neceflary for occupying it.? Woyld not this have bccu falling into the inconvenience which tliey wiftied to avoid, the recognizing his infanity, and furnifliing ^ written proof of it ? The^ faculty of making a tedament which was referved to himi {ay they» the donation is an inviolable title, whether ire ctn amine what preceded it, or contemplate what followed it. That which preceded it, is the letter which Meiayfr wrote to St. Biuvif by order of the AiH iOrkans^ a letter which he ap- proved by fome words in his own hand, and which proves, &j diey, demonftratively, that the donation is the a6l pf his wilL - What fellows, is the approbation of the family, the canfirma-> tion of the king^ the preci(e authority of your fentence. Let us endeavour in two words to anfwer thefe lail objeftiodS| aiyl begin with the Ictt^ of Metayer* What are ^ circumftances of it ? I. Why did not the Aibi Jt Orleans write it himfelf ? Noatfw could be of greater importance tot him* He was not one of thofe who are afraid of the trouble of writing themfelves. We fee him wri4og upon affairi of no ccvifequenqe, entering into Ae moft infignificant details, record that he had ^aken care of fumifliiog the chamber of his Mcujer^ and a ^h9,urand other things of the Ulx kind, which Ihew that he wiQied e^ery thing to pais through hss own hands \ and that he did not eyen negle£k ihol^e cvesj to which it was entirely beneath his dignity to attend. Yet we fee him here, upon the moft important pccafion of his life^ bonow the hand of his almoner. This is ^e firit circum- ftance. a. What' are the great affairs which prevented his. writing himlelf ? Tou have already feen in the depofition of the wit- nefles. He was 30 days without any occupation at Orleans \zi the utmoft, acooiding to Madame de Nemours^ one hour of his time was deftined to the celebration of the mafe, and if we believe the witnefles of the Prmee de Canty^ he was occupied in ronning about the ftreets of Orleans^ in jumping upon his fhadow, in dancing upon the ramparts. Such are die important caufes, which prevented his writing himfelf refpe£king an ad, which was to dtveft him of all his property. 3. What does he call this a£i, or ratber, what is it called by his almoner ? A treaty which he vras about to make with the Cmte de Si. Pel. It is true that the donation is fubjeft to feveral con- ditions, but the name of a treaty is sot very fuiuble to an ad of this ^umb. XIZO SeUaionsJrm UA^Jfeau. ^19 this nature. Is it even proved that the projo£l of this a£l was ever fent 10 the Alhe i Orleans^ as they have ventured to aflert ? The letter does not fay fo ; on the contrary, it dates that Forqider had orders to communicate thb treaty to SaifU Beuve^ and if the AUi iPOrUam had feen it, fo important a circumftaace would not ham been omitted in the letter. ^ ^ How was this letter to be delivered ? It is not confided t»^ the ordinary courfe by ijouriers. Dalmont is to be the bearer of it, Dalmoni who did not return to the AbH JPOrUans until die month of Heamher. DalmorU who, as has been proved by iSm witneflesy and as appears by other circumftances, was in poileffioa of the fecret of the family. Dalmont^ in fliort, who fcts off as foon as the letter was written. It is dated 00 the a8th» and I1& goes on the a9th« 5. In what manner does the AUe tPOrUant ajqprove of thii letter ? Let us repeat the terms of his addition ? ^ Be diligent that I may be able to fay to you with joy— /ii vxam pacU.'^^l am wholly yo^rs.— Tour fervant.-«£very thing which Metajer has told you of my intentions is true^-^Adieu, without adieu*'* We do not think that thefe terms clearly manifeft a great dab rangemcnt of underftanding, as has been infinuated; but they prove that upon the diligence of Sain/ Beuw, and thofe who wese {employed in preparing the zSt, depended the return of the AUf f'OrhofU. Bi diligent that I maj fay to joti nvithjcy^ &c. and doci not this irrefiftibly prove, that he was not yet at liberty to return fo Parisf that the orders of the family prevented his entrance, jintil the a£ts were prepared and ready to be figned i Let us add to all thefe reflexions, that there was an interval of two months between this letter and the donation, and that even if it were proved that the Abbe tOrkans was in a ilate of ianity (hen, it ^ould not follow that he was fo two months afterwards i and under all thefe circumftances, let us admit that this letter is ilill a doubtful tide, and an* equivocal argument which each of the parties by turns apply in their own favour, and which ferves much lefs to prove the will of the AbH d^OrUatu^ than to (hew the authority of his family. But is that which followed lefs confiderable, than that which preceded the donation ? You remember what was called a coo» j^rmation. The relations of the AUc d'OrleanSf being aflembled to deliberate upon the mode of admintftering his affairs, have always fpoken of the donation as an inviolable title, which ought to be carried into execution. But had tKe relations any authority to impeach it i Could this a£l| invcftcd as it was with a iblcmn and autheatie fonUf €2o APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX, ferm, be annihilated by their changing their minds ? Suppofmg even that they had the power, would they have had the inclina- tion to deftroy their own work ? and if the fuppofition of the prince dt Ctmty is true, would they not on the contrary affure, by the continuation of their fuffragcs, the execution of an aft whicli from them derived its birth, as it was afterwards indebted to ihem for its prcfervation ? BcHdes was this qucfllon ever agitated, was this doul)t ever darted in any aflcmbly of the relations ? Hkd any of them an intereft to conteft, to combat, to deftijoy this do- nation ? And how can the afts of the family of the donor be coniidercd as a confirmation of the donation, Cncc eVery thing which was neccflary to rnife the flightefl: queftion was equally wanting, that is to* fay, the poM-er, tlie inclination, the intereft^ and the capacity ? This is not the only kind of confirmation, which Madam 4 Nemours alleges in favour of this title. The king, it is faid, has authorized it by his letters patent, and yourfelves, the depoGtarics of his fovereign juftice, have added the laft feal to its validity. But what arc all thefe confirmations ? This is a matter which it Mrill not be very difficult to explain. The king has confirmed the 'donation, by receiving the fealty and homage of the dpn^itcry, rand of Madame de Longuevilte in quality of curatrix after the do- nation ; in remitting to the one and the other the reliefs vhich were due, in ordaining the execution of fome recommendations of the relations founded upon the fame title. The court has coo- firmed it in the fame manner, by granting to the lord qf a feignory, the focdal profits arifing upon a change of property by the donation. In truth. Sirs, it is furprifing that in a caufe fo extcnfive, fo difficult, fo full of real queftions, they (hoyld mingle fuch fafts as thefe, fafts which had been already urged upon the interlocutory pro* Ceding without fuccefs and which now appear to us to be ftiU more inefficacious. For to draw any conclufipn from them, how many falfe fafts mud be fuppofed ? i. That he who confirms an aft, without having any cognizance over it, gives it a nevV de- gree of force and authority, contrary to the common opinio^ of jurifls and canonifts; and particularly of Charles Dumoulhiy who explains in fo learned a manner, in his treatife on the Cujtti'n ^PartSy the rule of law, ^n ccnfirmat nihil dot* 2. It muft alfo be maintained, that when the king receives fealty and homage of a new vafial^ he intends without any examination, without any preceding conteft, without any judgment, thereby to confirm tl\c title by virtue of which the new vaflal ha% taken the fief, and that he who prepares the record of having rendered fealty and homage, or at mod he who ^gns it, thereby prejudges all the queftions, which Numb, XIX.] Seledions frem D^ Aguejfeau. 6Ji which may be afterwards formed concerning the vaiTars right of property. Laftly, they muft go further, and fuppofc that, when you oblige a new poflefibr to pay tlie dues which belong tQ the lord of the fee, although the queition cannot be agitated by this lord, yet you decide from thenceforth upon the goodnefs, the force, the execution of the contract, and that thofe who have an intereft, can never impeach the transfer, upon this fingle ground, that the party acquiring the eflate has been obliged to render the fdbdal rights and fervices. If all tliefe fuppofitions are eqiully abfurd, the queftion of the donation is then entire \ the letter of Metayer which precedes itj the different afts which follow it, cannot deftroy the inference , derived from it, nor the feveral prefumptions which arife from this fpoliation, of this abdication, of which it i^ the flrongeit proof of any in the caufe. But after having fliewn you, tliat tlicfc prefumptions are not in- jurious to the illuftrious family of the Abbe (TOrleatiSi after having , fliewn you that they are not efF.icj:d by the claufes of the a£ls, nor by all the circum (lances which precede and follow them, it remains to . aiifv/er a laft objeftion deduced from the confequences of the Pr'mci (!'- Contyfi demand ; or rather, wc may abfolutcly diJpenfe with an- -fwering it, becaufe this objeftion rather npplies to the interefts of the pirties than to the decifion^of juftice. It is pretended, that if the tef- tnmcnt was to be overturned, its fall would bear along with it that of nil the contrails, and that what the Prhice ek Ccnty would lofe on the om fidv;, would be much more confiderable than what he would gain on the other. But it was for the Prince de Conty^ that ii. It was for his counfcl to forcfce, to examine, to prevent if poflible the confequencjs of his demand. Wc contemplate them, but arc content with contemplating them, wltliout enquiring particularly what would be the points relied upon by Madame de Nemours^ in - the cafe which (lie fuppofes, or what would be the Prince dc Cy7jfys ground of defence. Wc fufpend our judgment in that re- fpc£l *, happy if we could fufpend it as to all the reft j and with- out choofing to decide at prefent, whether the fate of the contrafts ought to be the fame with that of the teftament, we will content ourfelves. with faying, that the parties implore from this auguft tri- bunal not the counfcls of its prudence, but the oracles of its juftice. Let us here paufe a moment^^ flightly to recapitulate what wc have already faid, refpeding the principal ads of the caufe, that is to fay, the afls of difpofition. You have feen that all thefe afls have nothing perfonal, or which bears the chara£ler of the will and capacity of the Aihe d^Or/eani. You have remarked all the chrcumftanccs which accompany them, the time, the place, the pcrfonij tii A^PENbli. [Nomb-tdTi jgcdskOf die number of tbe a£fci» their nature ; all feem to concur to eftablifli tbe prefumption of that judicious contronlj of that neceflary concert of the family of the jtUe J^Orltans^ to pronouocc againft him^ a kind, or favourable, or friendly interdiction. LafUy^ we conceive that we have (bown that the objefHons of hfadome it Ktmouri do not remove this appearance, which fo properly and naturally belongs to all the circumftancesof tlie caufe« We go however ftill further, and are of opinion that it is not even neceflary, that this ptefumption (hould appear to be moie ftrohg than that of Madame de Nemours, It is fufficicntiftk dediiflions of the refpe£iive parties are balanced, that they are cquaf on the one fide and on the other, in order to be conrinccit that it is not by the a£ls that the caufe (hould be decided. Thde afts may be doubtful, uncertain, equivocal, giving equal weigbt to each of the oppofite prefumptions* Upon the view of tbofe a£ls, the balance of juftice remains fufpended, until the proof bj witnefles inclines it to the one fide or the other* But before we pafs to this fecond proof, we muft (hortly ftate it» aAs of the laft period^ that is, tliofe which have pafled fubfe- quent to the teftament. We obfcrve in them the fame diftindion which has been taken notice of, in refpeA to the afls of the time of the feamd tdlament. There are a£^s of difpoCtion and thofe of mere adminiftrabOD< The ads of difpofition are all of the fame nature ; the nomination to a benefice which is only announced in the aci of indu£iion, a temiflion of feignoral rights in fa^ur of M* de Montefdult before the notaries of Marfeilles^ the gift of the fucceffion of a baftand made to Defgoureaux at Strajburgh. But are there in thefe three a&s the chara&er of perfonality which we look for ? Do we M* cover in tbem any z€i which proves the reafon of the jdbbi iOr* leansy except Kis mere fignature \ and is it not fufficient fox recon- ciling that to the fad of infanity, merely to fuppofe that the family ftill deferred his interdiditon, and that until that decifive moment, it was requifite that the a£ts of alienation (hould be figned by him ? The firft of thefe is more than probable, the fecond is a neceffary confequence of it. The zfk% of adminiftration are reduced to bills of ezehange, to allowances of accounts, to letters. It is true that they have adduced direflionss and bills of e^ change, fome written, others figned by him, which do not indnce any fufpicion of infanity, but there is one fo extraordinary b its form, that it entirely outwei^ the authority of all the otherSi You remember the obfervatioos which were made upon ihis biD of Numb. XIX.[] SekSiiofU from D^Agu^au. 623 of eschange. tt is written on the whole length of a iheet of papeTi and the jliK JPOrltatu adds at the foot> Bien que iPauirl^ nunn fiit^ je promets de ft en ienir eqmpUm There muft be fome ftult in the word8> bat withont flopping to exanrine the confe- quence of that» let us attend to a more material obfervation. 'fhe Ahhi (^Orleans thought then that the bill was void if it was not in his hand writing, fince he caufed thefe words to be added, ^hich contain 'an exprefs approbation. It was neceflary then to write this approbation with his own hand, for if the bill appeared informal becaufe written by another perfen, how could & intend to repair that defe£l by an approbation entirely written by the hand of another? He Ibould at leaft fign this approbaticm which appeared fo eflential, and yet he did not do fo. He is content with figning the bill, afid how does he fign it^ It is to be obferved, that this approbation written at the foot of the bill, only takes up about half the fi2e of the paper, and his fignature is at the fide of this approbation and not below it, and it is made in a circle in order to reach the writing of the bill. This piece which as you fee is more than ftifpicious, is of the 5th April y 1 67 1, that is to fay five weeks after Ab teftament, it is ufelcfs to draw any further inferences from it* Its quality, its ftate, its appearance fpeak fufficiently for themfelves. It is con« tended on the part of Madame de Nemours^ that the Abb( ^Orleans intended that the fame fignature (hould ferve both for die bill of exchange and for the approbation at the foot of it, and therefore lie had placed it below the firft and at the fide of the laft; but ihall thi^xabfurd defign, ft ill more abfurdly executed, be regarded as a proof of underftanding} and befides, what man in his fenfes, intending to approve an zGt not in his own 4iand writing, and thinking fuch an approbation neceflary to render it valid, would not write the approt^ation With his own hand? This has not been anfwered, and in fa£t it appears difficult to anfwer it. The allowances of accounts might appear a more confiderablc proof of the capacity of the Abbi d*Orleansy but the inference deduced from them is ftrongly oppofed by the important izQt which we have taken notice of, by that domeftic infpe£tion of Datmont, of which we have already fpoken, an infpedion tlie necefiity of which was recognized by the Abbe d'Orleans, an in- fpe^iion to which he himfelf fubmitted. The proof of this appears in writing in three different places, and particularly in that im- portant chargp which he gave to Peray his valet de chambre, in the prefence and by the advice and counfel of Da/mcnt, and as in this difcharge are comprifed all the accounts from the beginning . of March to the i6ch of Ju/y, it is clear that the inference gors bjck 624 APPENDIX. [Numb.XiX. back to the time of the tcflament, ar.d forms a very ftrong prc- fumption of wliat wc have already obferved to you, that after having ftripped the -//35 tion we arc now exclufively to attend. We obferved, in eftablifhing the general principles upon the the fubjefl, that all teftimonial proof ought to be contemplated in two different manners, by its exterior furface, that is to fay, by the number and quality of the witnefTes, and by its iiiterior fubftan^, that is, by the multitude and inf^portance of the fad^s. Let us now apply thefe general rules to the particular circum-* ' ftances in this caufe'^ let us examine, firft, the exterior of the proof, and make a fliort parallel of the number and dignity of the witnefies, in the one inqueft and in the othen We (hall not dwell upon the obfervation, that !n one there are 85 witne^Sj and in the other 76. This difference is not fuf^ ficiently confiderable, Co influence Uie decifion of the caufe } and befides, tl we deduct from the 85 witnefies of Madame it Nemourif thofe who axe abfolutely negative, who merely £iy that the AUi Vol,, a Tt d'Orleofu 6i6 APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. ^Orleans did not dppear to them to be in a (late of infamty, or that he appeared tp them to be a perfon of good fcnfc, if we ukc away a part of 25 witncflTcs, who were examined at St, Marie aux Mines^ and who, only dcpofing to the fame fa£ls, are, according to the ordonnance, to be reduced to the number of ten: If wc make thcfe juft and neccflary retrenchments, the witnefles of Madame it Nemours will be fewer than thofc of the Prince de CofTtj. But to return to our principles, the numbtrr of witneCcs cannot be very material, except in the proof of a fingle public and general fad; but when the general faft abfolutely. depends upon particuhr fafts, the number of witnefles becomes ufelefs, and the particular fails are alone dccifive. Neither fl^.ould we enlarge upon the quality and dignity of the witnefles. If we except on each fide certain imporunt witnefles, of whom we fiiall prefently make a comparifon, the advantages of the parties are in this refpedi nearly equal ; we find in each of the inquefts, priefts, members of religious focieties, gentlemen, tradefmeiT, artifans, and perfons of the loweft condition i there is fo little difference in this refpeft between the inquefts, that it doci not require any longer con(idenition. ' If we make a comparifon between the more important wi^ ncfles, that is, fuch as wer? in the family of the Able tOrkcn;^ of Madame de Longueville^ or of the Cotiite de St. Poly and had an opportunity of being the mod exa£% obfervers of a pcrfcn they ought to confider as their mader ; you will doubtlcfs be furprifed at the confidence with which it has been fo often aflferted, on the part of Madame de Nemours^ that the witnefles of the Princes A C^nty ought not even to be placed in companion with hers. Let us begin by retrenching from this number iT/. /r A*j:ff, whofe tcftinrony ztlone trould be worthy to decide this celebntcd difference, if it was as confiderable by the faft^ which it contains, as it IS tlluftrious by the name and virtue of its author. But if we except tlus fingle witnefs, to what are all the other domeftic witnefll's in the inqueft of Madame de Nemours reduced ? 'flier: arc only two, whofc quality can give any partica}ar weight to (kir depofitions ; the one is David^ fecretary dei comtnandements of the Duhe de LohguevtUe^ the other is Peray^ valet" de chambre to the Ahbe d'OrleaftSf but of thefe two, P^ray is juftly excepted to, David then is the only confiderable officer who remains ) for wc *do not fuppofc that they can feridufly rely upon tl)i depofition of Niocty und his wife, whofe otitj knowledge cftnGfts,* in faying, thej know nothing about it, except that Madame tfir' AV?jj thinks, v/.thout being able cd atnun it, tLu fhe hai'lidht tht5tfi^ in iiiC^fihtel de Loffgueville, a page of the CvmU di St. Pol, • ...J Tta who I 1 62« ' APPENDIX. [Nuinb.IIL who comxmmly attended the Mie d^Orliani^ and his ptbicipal MaHre it UoUU whom Madame de Nemours at-firft chofe for ok of her witnefTes, but afterwards rejected, expelling him to ke unfavourable to her. Let us alfo include Zfxjrr, who from hii free accefs in the houfe de LenguivU/e, from the confidence of the Prince de Cotrty, of Madame de LongutmHe^ and even of the Mi d'OrkanSf from the infpedion of his conduct up to the vnj time of his death, mny be deemed as important as the domcftic wit. nefles. Here are 40 witnefTesr foch as a^ perfon would wHh for if he had not| inch as he would chufe, if it was cuftonutr. upon theie oceafionsi to fele^l a ltd of witnefles, as they fdcd a Jift of relations, fuch, in {hort» that they cannot even find two on -the part of Madame de Nemours^ who could, wc will not fay, balance their authority, but even enter into a comparifon with them, and diminifli their fufiragc. It is true, that after this wc find in the inqueft of the Prirni' Centy, fcven or eight domeftics of an inferior order, sod whot fjuality is fimilar enough to diat of the witnefTcrs of Madame it St-mours \ but the eflcntial difieitnce whicli is obfcrvable, ii tbr in tlie inqueil of Mada$ne de Nemwrs^ thefe witnefles have hard* ly any body at their head to render them rcfpcAable, vfaeitas> thofe on the Prince de Conty are fuppoited by 40 principal of* ficersi whofe teftimony communicates its force ajul virtue to tKe depofitions of die fubaltem officers, and gives them a degree of certainty, which they perhaps would not have in themfelveti After having made this examination, and parallel of the qoafitj of the witnefles, we might now enter into a comparifon of the fadts, but we think it neceflfary previonfiy to difcufs fome gene- ral fttfpicions which each of the parties oppofes to the ioqued of the other. On the one fide they accufe the perfons employed by the Pmu d$ Ctfff/y, of liawing affigncd the CbartreatM at Orleans^ and of having aftenwards prevented them from giving their teftimony, -becaufe they forefaw that their depofitions would not be fuch 2^ was wiihed for. But if they are not deceived in their concIuGon^ in this fad, the counfei of Madame de Nemours fliould begin with applying the fame exception to themfelves, fince we fee ^ «6er having affigned die Sieur David de Marpri^ they bre Tieverthelefs prevented him from depofing in die inqueft of AU- dame de Nemours \ and he wcould never have been examined, if die counfiel of the Princt de Cmt^^ who had intelligence of this pro* needing, had not afligaed him todepofe in his. • Hiey afterwards throw out (bme fufpicions of fotidtationi and even cf fubomation of witnrffet;, and Madame de Nrtmomrx pre* * tend! Numb. XlXJ} SeleShns from D^Agu^eau. £29 tends to have the proof of it in the depofition of a wknefs of jtngirtf who fays, that the jihU de Jumeau^ and the Dame de Ruj came to requeft him to give them a declaration figned by him i but faefidea tbaC it only appears by the depoGtion of this fit^gle >vit- Tiefsi that they have taken any improper means, to obtain from htm a favourable depofition, we think we may fay in a word, that it is furprifing they fhould rely upon thefe kind of fafls, on the part of MMLtnu de Nemours \ when three poHtive witnefles, in the inqueft of the Prince de Conty^ concur in depoitng that a eavalier, difgnifed as a monk, prefied* them to depofe in favour of jM^me de Nemours^ offering ftrong menaces if they did not, and advantageous offers if they did, and left them, faying, yoii hmve to do with a (Irong party. Laftly, we cannot help taking notice here of a fafl, which took place at Saumur, with refpeSk to a perfon of the name of Borate When (he appeared before the commiffary, indead of prefenting the proceis of her allignation, (he prefented her depofition ready Writtttu The procureur of Madame de Nemours demanded an acknowledgment of this \ the commtffioner granted it, and went to hear mafs, after which he "Vas called upon to interrogate the witnefs upon this fa£l. The witnefs declared that as it was a long time fince the fads to which fhe depofed had taken place, (he requefted one of her neighbours to write, under her dilation, all the ctrcumftances, which (he from time to time recolle£ked, and^ that (he had caufed them to be read over to her, before (he came to give her depofition, as (he could not either read or write. Whatever we may fay of the truth and confequences of this fad, we (hall always think it much lefs important, than the nimpur pf the approaching canonization of the Abbe d^OrUans^ l^en out at Orleans and elfewhere, and fpoken to by feveral of die witneffcs^ in the inqueft of the Prince de Conty. lliree wit* neffcs from Orleans depofe to it particularly ; amongft the reft % Carmelite^ who is the 35th witnefs of the Prince de Conty^ deelareSy that a perfon employed by the agents of Madame de Nemours^ aflsed him if he had not feen virtuous anions performed hj tie Abbe Orleans^ and faid that he was a faint. But why feek in the inqueft of the Prittce dt Conty^ for the proof of this fail, of which yoo difcover all the con(eqoeiices, fince it is. contained even in the inqueft of Madame de Nemours i^aAhee 43di witsicft dedaves that he came to Paris upom the folicitatton of a perfon o& behalf of Madama de Nenmurs^ who: tcrid him ditt flic didt not care for ^ fuccei&an o£ the AiH tPOrkans, but ibat Ao ipified tttfliew^tfaathehad:lifedasa)Sdnt* AfitttfaiS|'Sisst.weflialLkiMDe itto be jo^gedt w^^ T 1 3 partiot 63^ APPENDIX. [Numb. XIX. parties has moft mtereft in wifhing that thefe fufpicions had never been intrpduced» we fhould have thought ourfcl?es war. ranted in pafling over them in fi]ence| if the parties had not made them a coniiderable point in the eaufe ; we have flated the h(h without drawing any inference froim them. We even wifc that it was pof&ble to blot out the remembrance of them, and all that we can fay and think upon this fubjc3 is, that if it be true diat the blind zeal of inferior officers has induced them to take thofe oblique and indired (leps, of which we would always willingly doubt, we are at lead perfuaded, in common with the public at large, that they have herein a£ked contrary to the intention, con- trary to the fentiments, contrary even to the orders, of the parties whom they have the honour to fcrve ; and if the parties thcmfcl?cs could have the flighted fufpicions of it, 'they would revolt even more than ourfclves againd fuch conduft, and would be the firil to difavow it, with all the publicity which their wounded honour would require from them upon fuch an occafion. L:t us fufpend then our judgments in this refped, and without dwelling longer - upon the external parts of the proof, let uscn- ideavour to penetrate into its interior fubdance, and confine our- felves to the examination of two qucdions of fact, which involw all the difficulty ojf this caufe. Was the jfbie (TOrLans in a date of formed infanity ? That is the fird qucdion. • Is it to be prefumed that the infapity was conftant, or on the contrary may it be fuppofed that there were favourable intenals, in which he might make his tedament ? This is the lad and not the lead important part of this ca\ife. After having read the prin- cipal depofitions on the one {ide and the other, it only remaini to conned), to arrange, to date the fads in fo plain an order, that you mny deduce firom them all the confequenccs which are necef- fary for the proof of fanity or infanity. But as fanity is oonfonn- able to the order of nature, and infanity is contrary to it, as the one is prefumed without any proof, and the other ought to be proved^ we will exai^iine fird, whether the Prince de Ccmty has cdabi idled a cafe of infanity, and afterwards wheOier Madame di ilimaurj has edabliftied a date of fanity in fo incontedable a manner, as to dedroy all the prefumptions of infanity, or at leaft to reflder them doubtful, equivocal, and uncertain. Let us here follow the general divifion, which has been traced by tlie parties tbemfelves; let us confider the A^e d* Orleans in two diffeKcnt ftaces, let us diEinguHh two perfons in one, a public perfon whom we (hall* contemplate in his eccleiiaftical fun&ioxis, a private pcffon whom we Ihall confider in Ms pritate I. a&ions. Numb. XIX. 3 ScleSliQnsfr9mD^A^uaffeau. ^ji 5^£lion8. Let us ;idd to thefe twogeiural fa^s, 4 third, not lefs important than the prectilingy that is the jp(lgnv:ut which ftrangerSi which his ciomeftics, and his pwn family pronoynced upon his fituation. To this the whole propf of infanity is reduced* We Ihall not oiftii>guifl\ it any longer by places^ but by the kinds of a<^ions ;and that wc may bring before yoa> as in fo many pic- tures> all the fads of the fame clafsi each of which makes one of the particular traits, of which the general character of the jibbe. d* Orleans was compofcd, h t us examine tirt^, what the Pnm^ de Cent J has proved cone turning tlie eccleliaftical fundi ions. Of thefc Ve may diftinguilh four kind;> : Prayers anwl otlicr acU of general piety. Exhorta|!ons, catechil'rnsi preachings. Confeflions-^-The mafo. Thefe four articles deferve to be examined feparatcly. Let us begin with the prayers and other a£l!» of general picgr. How were thefe performed by the Jbbe d*Oi leans i You rcmeniber the account given by the witnelUcs. ^ ♦ That continual agitation in the cliyrch of $/. Maur^ which Follard depifts in his depofition. The ^lli ^Orleans was reft- Icfs, agitated, going fonietimes to tlie altari fometimes to the facriilyi retyrmng to the choir, palBng along the nave, running to trhc bejls. All the people, witneflcs of this unfteadinefs, behold him with aftoniihmcnt, and his quality of Due de LotiguevilU r;:ndcrs the fcandal ilillmorc glaring; but thefe were only equi- vocal figns, feeble forerunners of infanity, which wc maypafs flight* ly over, as they did not prevent his emancipation. Let usrefume tbefucceffion of fa£ls. Let us fee ih^Mbe d Orleans go to Twr/, enter the mona fiery of M'lnimes^ require to be gon* ^ludled to ihjc chapel of S/. Francis de Pauley pray the perfon who took him there to leavf him alone to repeat the fervicc, thunderout with a loud voice when alone ip this chapel, Deusinadfutorium^ in the fame tone which is ufed in a full chant, fcarcely flaying there time enough to fay a Aliferere^ fays the wjtnefis, come oyt immediately afterwards without having faid his bfeviary, walk deliberately in a fmall wood in the mid(l of a fall of fnow, fly precipitately at the fight pf his dqmeflics whq cam^ in fearch of him, and leaye the members of the cqnvent aflonifbcd at the derangement of his mind. Let us fee hi") afterwards arrive at Saumur^ walk with precipi* tancy along the quay without a hat, running h^re, and there as a man pofiefled (fo/time un extravagant f)thfik are the words of the yritnefs, enter the ii^n calling aloud Kv^»iXi«rw, Ku^miXiiow; this ^'e Icaro from a w](nefs of Madame de Nitn^uts; continuing 'hit Tt4 «S» 'APPENDIX. . CNunib.IIX. retitil in llie inn) and perfevering in this ezetrife undl lie got into lihc dumber that was prepared for Um. htt us examine what he did at Saumuf* He goes into i church celdyrated by the devotion Bf the people of that piomce, called the church of Notrt Dame da Ar£lles. He falls upon hit knees befbre Ae image of the virgin, pours out his benedidioai with an unufual elevation of his armS| rifes in a hurrj, leaves In hat upon the ground* runs to the chapel of the late M*di Senm^ crofles bimfelf three or four times, enters into the fanfiinry, mounts upon the fteps of the altar^ makes three grand benedic- tionsi returns with precipitation to the baluftrade of the giot altar, crofles himfelf again, gives the fame benedt£lions,nui$wi& the fame quicknefs out of the church, leaves his hat there ; \n people run after him, bring him back into the church, to the phoe where he fell upon his knees at his entrance. The perfons who (aw the£e fads pronounced the fame judgment of his infanity. This is not At only inftanee, of his giving extraordinary 4x- nedi£tions which were regarded as figns of folly. At a village near Orleans^ he walked at 'a great rate along a wall* Every bodj was filrprized to fee him coming with this precipitation, making at every ftep profound genuflexiona, ^'if hewas at the holy facnneot; blefling hi/nfelf eagerly in rifing, his meeting the witnefs vho r> counts this faJi, did not divert him from this painful and abford exercife. At length he returns to PariSf where he is often met on die grand quby, mumilingf fays a witnefs, in his diurnal; he b feenat the {lofpital of Charity, firving tbefurgeorCs fcj/, having on afi tfna^ (ceint d'une ferviette) carrying the platflir^ faying that he had m greater pUafure. than in feeing them cut eff an arm w a leg^ running away as foon as any body appeared by whom he might be knovn^ or concealing himfelf in the beds of the patients^ and making every body who faw him exclaim, . that he had loft his uada- ftanding. Iiet us add to thefe fa£ts, one which is fubfequent indeed to the laft teftament, but following it fo clofe that it may be joined vidi the others ; it took place about fifteen days after the teftaiQent The Aibi d'Orleans enters into the church of La BreJU^ (a village ill tlie neighbourhood of Lyon^j) he there finds the people affem- bled at a folemn feftival, the fermon having begun in^he middle ctf fhc parifli mafs. He enters, having his night-eap under his sim, with his hat; he goer to afk with a loud voice for weftmenta Untik celebration of mafs from the CurCf who WM hearing the fosion ; t|)e Cure anfwersthat he will give them him n %0W ^1 the grand msft mafi Ts fini&ed« He is to sndignaiit at thts^nf^er^ that lie itiM out vidi prectpitatton, lets Us night-cap (all ixi'the chufdi> and fets' t)ff in an inftaht from the place. At the diftance of two leagued' he difcoven the lofs of his ntgfat-capi fends a man exprefs to look fof it. They appeafe him by tellin|^ him, that they will buy him a new one at Ly9fiff and in fad, it appears by the regifters of his rry • • • ' . lor 634 APPENDIX- (T^umb.XlX. for what the AM tOrUoau had dotie at imnt Samfon le Jngers; i circumftancc which pcrfcQly accords with the relation of the wit. nefies of the Prince de Conty. In what manner did he procure auditors? He preached to the beggars in the ftreet, he feized them and pinched them to coaipel them to hear him. He preadied to his dome^ics at Angers; if they fell aflcep or laughed, he went to pinch them, or give them blows under die chin, to force them to attend to him, Laftly, how did he acquit himfelf of this important miniftrj? Thofe who heard him, (late that there was no meaning in what he faid, he became the fubje£^ of a thoufand indecent railleries in the pot-houfcs where he catechifed; and one of the moft common fruits of his exhortations was the mockery and derifion of thofe to whom they were addrefled. Madame de Longueville was feized with grief, {he herfelf related many wild circumftances, and amongft others, that which has been read to you in the depofition of Texier^ and what the Abbi d^ Or learn faid to an aifidant of the cook, My brother y do not call me any linger his higbnefsy call me bis lownefj, (Monfrercy ne tri appelle plus fin alteffe^ appelk mei plutdt fa petitejp) Such were his indru^tion^ Next fee what was his chirader with regard to confeflion. We may diftinguiih here two kinds of fafts, the one particular, the other general, which, altlwugh ferious in themfclvcs, are ftill more confiderable, becaufe they include a perfeA proof of the particulars. Let us run over, thofe fads which are already known to you b? the relation of them having been (b often read in your audience. By how many difierent charafiers have the witnefles delineated that furprifing paflion, that excefs of furious zeal which made the . x^W^ ifOr/fflff/ always dcfirous of confefllng all kinds of pcrfons at all times and in all places ? Some of them defcribe him to you as either employing prayers or ufing menaces, others rcprcfent him as giving money, of which he was naturally avaricious^ as even making ufe of a^ual violence to oblige the domefticsof the Houfed Longucv\lU to confefs themfelves to him, and that without its being proved that he had ever obtained permiflion in Paris^ He would influence a footboy by fear of a cane; and, not content withthefe flight meafures, he threatened to pull out his tooth; he went further, and forced an iron crow into his mouth to make him fall before his feet and confefs his fins; he endeavoured to tempt a pried fuf* pended by the biihop of Angers^ by offering hi'm his ccedit and iponey, provided he would confent to his blind ardor to fill a minidry, of which his family judged him ir^oyipetent. He ob- tains by furprife upon his joumies permiflions to ^e confefiion«| and how does he obtain them? Is it after aa examination of his papacity Numb. XIX.] Sefedionsfrom D'Affieffiau. 635 capacity and morals? It is, on the contrary, by means that would be criminal in a.perfon in poflcffi^n of rcafon. He fuboms an cccldiafticy he fends down by a valet -de chambre a purfe full of crowns, and the pcrmiffion granted him at this price becomes at once the fad proof of the Abbc*s derangement of mind, . and of the other's corruption of heart. If any body afks him by what title he confefies, h^ anfwers, that he laughs at the reBor^ the biJLops^ the nrchkijho^^ that he is of the blood royal, and has a right to cof^efs. Sometimes he fays, that he has a general permiljton from the Arch^ hijbop of Parisy who could not give a general permiflion, and who never appears to have been willing to give even a particular one. . It is necefll\ry to add to all thefe fa£ls, which prove the un- limited pnflion of the Abbe d*Qrleans for taking confefTions, a detail, which would be almod infinite, of the extravagancies which he fell into in the exercife of that awful miniftry. Shall we fpeak of the times which he chofe for taking con* feflions? You remember what he did at Nantes, you know that ke called up the (lable and tailor boys at four o'clock in the morning to oblige them to confefs to him. . At what places, did he take confe (lions? You have feen him confeiling the ftable boys in the ecurie, thd tailor boys in the place where they flept, a chipiney fweeper in the inn-yard, where the Abbe d*Orleans fat 00 a l.adder to take his confeflion, and afterwards gave him a piece of money as the reward of his complaifance. They have wifhed to raife an ambiguity upon the fa£l of the confeflion of a valet of the ecuriei it is true, that a witnefs fays, that one of the valets whom the Abbe confefled was ill, and died two days afterwards ^ l^ut the fame witnefles (hew that he confcfTed feveral others, and one of them wa^ fo little ill, that he on the fame day got drunk. You remember particularly the grand fa^ of the prifoners of Nantes^ whofe confeflfion the Abbe d*Orleans went to purchafe : ^U tbofe who had the weaknefs to receive his money confe(red to him every day;, even a criminal already condemned to the galleys accufed him of having revealed his confeflion, and faid that he ought to be burned. Tlie Abbe d* Orleans believed him upon his word^ and gave him money not to mention it. In (hort, having been the obje£l of contempt to the valets and fervants of tlie inn, and the unhappy fport of the prifoners at Nantes, he returns to Paris, and, poflefied by the fame defire of taking confeifions, he goes to the monaftery of Picpus; he there ex- amines all the places of confeflion, tries them one after another, and docs not find any that fuits him; and although a ladder had appeared before a proper (ituation for taking a cpnfei&on, no place ^ will do npw but .the facriily^ There fatisfied with th^ fituation of the 6^ APPENDIX. P^owIkXIX. the ronfeflfOQtli He.ftys tliat lie ^vould eonfefs fa eight, tem «• dozen Iioun together. The fvperior oC ebemo&aftery is vitne&of this htH, axid is equallf aftoniihed tt the weaKnels o( dte JUe fOrkani^ and at the patience of his lamily. Let lie aifo add the fad ipoken of by JMardj that iiBpensot mtelfigence which was given of what pafied at the Ht^iid ^ Cimritf to the ahnooer of Madnm it LBngiinilU^ that the JUi iOfhant abfidutelj infifted upon oonfeffing the patients, and Ait his fmy earned hin^ fo £ar> dial he gave fome of them abfoludoQ without their having confefled to htm. But there are paxtieolv fads enough wttboot this; let us proceed to the moie goaeiii oftes which confirm aU the others* And what are thefe general fi&s? The firft is the continual attention of Madmme d$ Lm^fmSk^ to prevent her fon hem taking confeffions; an attention* pvmd b]^ tlie ofdeft which ihe gave to Madamu it BtUj to watch him iaher koufe; bj thoTe which ihe gave to MHajer to picvnt permifioof being obtained by furprife for the Ahhi £OrUans^ orders wUA Mftajer has executed* Tins it net denied on the put of MUtm it tlirmurs. '• The )ccond hSc is the indignation of Madame d^ iMpmSkj irhcn (he learned that the wife of one of her officers had had dw #eaknefs to confefs to her fon* How does flie fpeak of ^s adkm? $he (aid // wat an abufi if tttjaeramentj. The laft hCt is the letter which the late Priart dt Caaii^m^t to dve Archhiflnp of Lywt^ to requeft him to revoke a penoifios which die AUe JfOrkamt had obtained from him by furprifci under the name of JJm of Pami. 9iaQ we fay after this, with Madam$ de Ifemcurf, thst if Madame de iMguevilk and the Prinee de Cmiy prevented the MU d^OrUans hem taking confeflions, it vras becaufe they thought that fimftion too humiliating for a nobleman of his quality? But who can fuppofe that (b great a prince and fo pious a princefs cooU think that the fun&ion of a judge in the facred tribunal of penitence, diat Ae jauguft exercife of die fupreme power of bind- ing and releafing was beneath the moft elevated birth? It ha| often been faid, that the ftate of a (inner, who, in the bunible pofture of a criminal, implores for favour, was a humiliatioB nfcful but painful to nature; it has never hitherto been heard, weMicvt it has never been thought, there was any thing low and humiliatiiij in the fuhAion of a confeflbr ; and if Madame de League^dlU hsi contemplated it in this manner, (whick aflbredly was verj % from the dignity of her fentimentS|) would ftie have (aid, era upon fuch fttppo(ition> that it woe an. ahjt |f ihe. Jaetaematy ts . confcii Ntmb. XIXO Sileffions frm IfAffieffiau. <57 confefs to the Alhi JTOrltam ? Who does not fee in the force of this expfdOion wliat ihe thought^ what (he fek upon the fituation of her fon? But Ictus go to the fad oTthe mafs^ where we find as with refpefl to the confeiEons, both particular £iAs and general i pa^- ticular fa£ls which regard either his exterior appearance in faying mafs» or his manner of faying it, the fingularities ^i^ch were ol^ ferved in it, the Indecencies which he committed^ or the impreflions which his condu^l in this refped made upon the mind of the fpeAators. Habited as a poor prieft, and frequently unknown^ he afieAed to appear as a mendicant. He ate an albwanci rf poitage wiii its fingers^ in the porttf^i lodge of the JacMns, in Jo tffenji^ a mannef^ iimt fome faeriftans refufed to let him have the vejlments* His eagemefs for faying mafs led him to alight from horfeback in paffing a church at Angers. He hardly allowed them to take off - his fpurs» and continuing in his boots, he invefts himfelf in the facred habits; he goes to fay the mafs in this condition. A prieft and one of bis domeftics remonftrate with him, he burfts out a laughing and remounts his horfe. It is true, that one of the wit- nefles of Madame ds Nemours pretends that the Bijbop of Angers^ to whom an account was given of this faA, anfwered, that there was nothing indecent in it. If this anfwer was really given, we doubt very much, whether all the circumftances could have been explained to him. But let us procted to fa£ls of more importance. In what manner did the Ahhi if Orleans celebrate mafs? With fo much precipitation, that every body was fcandalifed at it. He fell into fingularities which were never feen in any other perfon. Wc fee him twice make a ftop in the middle of low mafs, to preach to two peafants of &aint Maur, and fome domeftics of file Hotel de Lonpaville, But what (hall we fay to the grave and fcandalous indeccnciet which took place both during the continuance of mad, and afterwards I During the mafs, Gra^ ftates to you what took place in faying ite mjjaejl^ he adds aloud, ^< let them put aftiak on the gridiron for hroaifajl!* Madame de BUlj relates another adventure ib fad and painfol to Madame de Longueville, who was punifiied for her cmioGty in hearing him fay mafs. Between die gofpdl and the oblation he intemtpts the iacrifice, and with the tone of a perfon in a ftale of agitation, he fays alond, '< give me a ciamherpotJ* He repeats the Cime thing feveral times very quick, and goes froip the altar, and, withomt mafs being finiffied, he run9 from one fide to the ff38 APPENDIX. p^uftib. Iff. % Other, crying out more than thirty times, " a pijfer^ a p\ffer!* Wc repeat thefe words with pain, but fince they have been heard with grief in the temple of religion, we may be permitted to repeat them with the fcntimcnt in that of jufticcj and in faft, flic had fecn too n^uch. This fa£l only pafTed in the prefcnce of Madame di LonguevilU^ of Madame di Billys and a little boy, who fenred !ic mafft to the Ahhi ^Orleans; but feveral other domeftics of the family, that is to fay, Foutlleufe^ Gajiine^ Follard^ and Dafton^ all faj that it was fpoken of in the Hotel de LonguevUle^ as a trait of in- ianity. GqjUne mentions all the important circumftances of it, and accords perfcftly with Madame de Billy, How have they combated this ftriking fafl ? They tell you ihit it was not probable; but in the firft place can they el ode a fad proved, by conjedures and contrary probabilities ? BeGdes, vhcre is the want of probability? It is faid, that many circumftances muft con(:ur before fuch a fad is admitted as probable; and what are thofc circumAances? is their concurrence fo difficult? In the firft p]ace> it requires a wifli in Madame de JLongunnlle to judge for herfelf, of the manner in which her fon faid the mafs. Is there any thing in that which has not the appearance of being true? It was requifite that flic fliould wiih to obferve it without its being known. Nothing more fenfible and natural. It was neceflary to execute this defign, that flie flioul4 go acrofs the (court of the) Hfsitl dt Long'ueville^ and liow could flie do that without being obferved? There were a thoufand ways of preventing it, but ' you fee that after all flic did not fucceed, fince fome of her domeftics knew of it at the time« Finally, it was requifite that no perfon fliould be prcfent at the Hotel de Lotigueville^ to attend the celebration of this mafs; and what difficulty is there in believing that? What izGt could ever be certain if fuch objections to its probability were fufficient to render it doubtful ? I>.et us finifti the fafts relative to the celebration of the mafs, and for th:R purpofe let us recal what pafled at Orleans in the Church dts Cannes. Two witneffes, both priefts, both regulars of the fame order, teftify this faft. The Abbe d'Orleans faid the raafe with a great precipitation ; he returned to perform his thankfgiving in the fanduary, threw againft the credence * a platter whidi they prefented to him, and threw d6wn a wax taper, whicb was broken into feveral pieces. A regular pr'rcft afcendsthc altar, opena tliB tabernacle to give the communion tcp fi^eral pcrfons who -were at the feet of the baluftr^e, and at that moment the com> •munion cloth being on the baluftrade, the Abbe ^Orleans leaped * A cuphoird foi keeping the ^»cc uid other tb'tii(s vfed in the cdebnuka of auC^ brifldj Numb. XIX.3 SeleSiitms from D^AgueJfeau. 639 brifkl^ over it, aiid ran on tip-toe with an extraordinary and . fcandalous precipitation. Two perfons who were apparently hi$ domedics wiihcd to follow him, and leaped after him over the baluftrade. The prieft called out again ft the indecency of this a£tion, and is to-day the firft witnefs of it. It is true, that the other ecclcfiartic who fpeaks to the fame faft, fays, that the Abh6 iTOrUatis parted as in leaping (p^Jf^ comnte en faltant) over the baluftrade; J^ut he agrees in all the other circumftances, and thi§ cxpreffion Irardly changes the nature of the a£lion: they both add, that the fame thing took place at two different times. From hence it has been inferred, that the adion is not very indecent, as the Carmelites would not in that cafe have fuffered the Ahhi J*Orleans to have* come a fecond time to fay mafs in their church; but if their having too great a refpe£i for him prevented their rc^ fufing him the veftments^ if their complaifance degenerated into a real meanncfs, what has that in common with the faft of infanity, which is now the obje£t of 'inquiry? And can fuch colours as • thcfe efface fo marked an a£lion, and fo ftriking a trait of derange- ment? And let it not be faid, that the witnefles who relate this fad, did not regard it as a proof of infanity; the one (aid pub- licly, that it was not fuch an ajlion as could comq from a perfon in his fenfes; the other, that the Abbe d^ Orleans muft have had a very weak mind to fall into fuch improprieties. Here id a firft' example of the impreffion which thefe and other (imtlar a£tions have made upon the .minds of the fpeSators. There is another 'more ftrong related. by a domeftic of the almoner of Madame de LonguevilUf who fliews, that his mafter was one day obliged to force the Abbe d^Orleans from the altar, between the cpiftle and the gofpel, becaufe he was not in a condition to per- form the facrifice. AH thefe particular fafts become more probable by the general fafts ^hich* accompany them. If thefe fafts were not certain, why was the inclination, which led the Abbe d*Orleans fo conftantly to wifh to fay mafs, regarded as ^- kind of fury f Thefe are the terms of the witneffes; whence urofc that deep difpleafure, thofe piercing affli£iions of Madame ' de Longuevil/e,' whtjm fome of the wiknefles repr^fent as penetrate^ with grief, -batheH in .tears, proftrated* to the ground, groaning before Godi and ojfttiteg her heart* iti his prefence,- when 'flit learned that her fcftr Had faid the malsi' and feeking to expiate his irregularities by the tears of her repentance I Why {faoiild (he ffend to certain churches tty defire that they would not admit tnc Abbe d^Orleans to the celebration of the mafsf In ihort, why, from that forrowful day, when (he faw with hef own eyes what (he wi^ dii^svlty wo*ld have believed, if it • * "- had ■ had been fritted to her by others^ did (he abfolutely foAii kit heiag alkwcd to fay mafs, fo that frbm that .dme he only laid it by foipriie^ and ^thout her knowledge, as we are affntd bt Jhrenl of the witnefles? If there wat nothing more in the emit thanthefe general fafts, would they not be. fit£Ectent to induce yftij reafonable fufpictons refpeAing the fads eonneaed with the celtbration of the mafs? But we will not dwell upon them at ncfenty we fiiallbe obliged to touch upon them agamjnamoacDL And after having Ihewn you in four difierent piflurcs, what was the character of the MiS tOrkam in every thing lelating to lui ceclefiaftical fundions^ let us contemplate him in the fecond point of Tiew» which we before diftinguiflied, that b to fay, as a private perfon^ and let us fee what were his aC^ions m tbt chaiaAer. Madneis if an invifible quality, at we have obferved (ereral iinies, bu^ it difcovers itfelf, it prefents ita pi&ure^ it betrays and accufes itfelf by tlye mod ordinary a^^ions. The habit, tUe exterior appearance, the converfations, the pit» the walks, every thing which we fee, every thing which we hcax, give a public and ftriking teftimony of the fecret and interior dif- pofitions; there is nothing, even the manner of earing and drioloDgf the time dedined to deep, and the other fondions of nature, which may not fumifli proofs of infanity. Let us run over thefe points in a very few words, and eadeavont to difcover in them the lively and faithful Image of the J&ki What is the pi£birr which all the witnefles have draVn of bis habit and exterior appearaacet He was frequently met in tbe ftreets, the mod frequently in a (hort caflbck, dzefied^ fay fame, u a village pried, (un HybernouJ, fay others, as a meadlcantprieft, fay a greater part of the witnefles, all over dirt, fikc an idost, or a chairman, crvttS cmntne un Fol^ cu C9mmi un Portcur it CUfa^ thefe are the diflcrent expreflionsi never chufing to diaage his linen, in a date which was horrid to behold^ frequently covered with vermin, adds one of the witnefles.. He vraa itmonfirated with on this date, fo indecent for a peribn of his quality, he anfwered fo muici ibi hetttri and be vfwld brnti a Jbki ma/h / ^bammSf mMcb migbi never be ebangeii a lacge hat. Sapping over his flaouldeis, covered hb £ice in a ridiculous nuiner, to which ht added for an ornament a brandi of box} urn iaHetier^ the toD gat^4eeperof tf bridge (eised his hat, and when he gave it him bid ogsini the jiU6 tOrktm^ fuiprifed with not finding his brandi of bQx, had a quarrel mtb him upon this fubjed. Ladly,wefind^^ P4W7J, in a fliort caflock (enfoutaneUe)^ sMid in white docki^gl^ dej aA^him if he had taken tboie of hi| soacbmaaj ^ anifmT^ Numb. XIX.3 SeUSlionsfromU Apiejfeau. 641 much the better ; and if we can add any fafls that follow tlic teftament, and which took place in lefs than two months after- wards, we might fay, that he was feen without breeches or drawerSf going to take his letters of orders to a fecretary of Martigues in Provence: and that Bollard^ afliamed of feeing him in this con- dition, obliged him tp return to his houfe, and prevented his faying mafs. He joined to this exterior condition difcourfesj which the wit* nefles regard as proofs of infanity. Some of them have feen him talking to himfelf in an inn yard^ others have feen him laughing aloud without any thing to excite it : a great number of the depofitions fhew, that he fpoke with great precipitatUnf that he hardly fpoke two words that had any connedlton^ that he began a hundred things and did notfinijb any, that he held, an infinity of extravagant difcourfes. Some of them even giye us in- (lances of his converfation, fuch as that which he had with Madame de Billy: you fufficiently reco]le£l it, ^nd we conceive the anfwer which was given to it did not appear to you to be very fatisfa&oryi fuch alfo is the difcourfe which he had with the mtnefs who propofed a hunting party to him; fuch, laftly, is that fpokcn of by Pendrig the apothecary. It is unneceiTary to refer to them at prefent with more particularity: we haften therefore to fa&s of greater importance. To the habit and difcourfes of the Abbed*Orleans% let us add, his running about, his promenades, his gait, and all the circumftances accompanying them* No defign appeared in all his rambles, but that of running about at the inftigation of his inquietude. The ftreets of Paris were the mod ordinary place of his promenades, and the moft common expreflion of the witnefles is that he run thejlreets. He goes to the place of the Palais Royal, throws money to the hackney coachmen: they afk him if he would take a coach, he gives no anfwer, and goes away on foot without faying any thing. He fets off to go to Angers^ and when he has gothalf way, he changes his mindandgoes to Picpus^ With whom does he take his promenades? frequently alone, without anybody knowing what is become of him; or, if he fufferd any company, fometimes he chufes that of an apothecary, at other times fome tailors, or barbers' apprentices, and he never teftifies more joy than when be fays that he has been living, fqu'il a fait la vie J with his good friends the fraters. Such are the terms of the witneffes. But at what hour does he begin? frequently at fix or feven in the morning, in the month of January and February. When does he finifh them? fometimes at eleven at night. Vol. II. Uu His 64* APPENDIX. [Numb.XlI. His gait Is not Icfs fingular than his promenades: a precipitaton and extraordinary quicknefs are the fenfible image of the levity of his mind; always in a fweat, like an ideot (unfol) goii^ abnolt always on tiptoe. Such were his general habits, as proved by the witnefles. Let us join fome particular fads. When he \m at Saint Maury he had hardly arrived at the Porte Saint Antmne^ vlien he jumped from his carriage and run away fo faft that nobody could follow him. At Orleans^ lie was feen to leap upon hisjbadcfw^ ianang upon the ramparts of the city^ kicking away every thing which lay hejm him. At Partly an apothecary who marks the impetuofity of Hs courfe, depofesi at the fame time, that he always gave him the higher part of the pavement, and made him pafs the iirft at all the gates. It is little to have (hewn you the quality of his promenades, and the Angularity of his gait ; we mufl; alfo ilate in a few words the principal adventures which took place in his continual rambles. He twice pafled the bridge without paying the pafTage; the firiltiine the gate<^eeper ran after him, and would have given him a blow if he had not been prevented by a fifler of one of the maids of Madame de Longueville; the fecond time the gate-keeper feizedhis hat and that of a page who followed him ; fortunately a woman belonging to the Hotel de Longueville lends him a few pence, he goes to redeem his hat, and flies into a rage againft tlie gate-keeper for having taken away the branch of box. Is it neccfTary to recal to your recolledion the ridiculous combat which he had with the little boys in the court of the Hofplid ^' Charity? Madame de Billy defcribes him as running like them, drawing them, and drawn by them. When preiled to come away, he aflced her if ihe would be of the party, But what appears to us to be the lad degree of his infirmity, is the deplorable ftate in which feveral of the witnefles have feen him purfued in the Jlreets by the liitle boys^ who threw dirt at km^ made him drop his haty and foll&wed him with continual beetings^ which did not feem to give him any uneaftnefsi a faft almoft in- credible in all its circumftanccs, if it was poflible not to believe what is attefled by a witnefs at Saumury and four wimeffcs of Parisy all uniform in their depofttlons. Shall we be aftonifhed after this at the anxiety, reprefcnted by fome of the witnefTes to have been felt by Madame de Longueville^ Tcfpefting the continual ramblings of the Abbi d'Orltans? Some frefh account was given to her every day ; and had fhe not reafon fo fear in the end that fome tragical adventure would terminate, in riu iinftjrtun.itc manner, fo deplorable a life ? Let Numb. XIX.] Seleilions from D^AgueJfeau. 643 * Let us finifh the pifture of the private life of the Abbe JPOrkansy by the facts which relate to the neccffary functions of life, fuch as eating, drinking, and fleeping. We have already mentioned the joy which he tedified when he faid that he had been living with his good friends the tailors or barbers; it was with fuch perfons as thefe that he delighted to eat and drink. At NanteSy he eichorted the wife of a journeyman tailor to confefs to him, and he afterwards fent for a pot of wine, which he drank with her. At Paris^ you have feen him go to beg an allowance of pottage at the gate of the jacobins, and eat it with his fingers: and thefe are the moft honorable places which he chofe for his repafts. We have already reprefented him going to what the witnefies call the carharets borgnes it des gargottesy where nobody ever enters but the very lowed: dregs of the people. His manner of eating is regarded by many witnefies as a mark of his derangement. He eats with perplexity and inquietude, and in a manner exciting horror; exccflive fometimes in his abdinence, and fometimes in his intemperance; fometimes he pafles two hours in a cabarette and drinks one fmall glafs of wine; at other times he falls into real excefles; and we fee the heir of the houfc of Longuevilley the ninth duke of his race, get drunk in taverns, which a common fhopkeeper would be afhamed to enter. His ileep is not more regular than his repads; he fleeps little, makes a great noife during the night, prevents thofe who lie under him from fleeping, goes to the beds of his valets, and makes them go into his. This fa£t is even depofed to by one of the witncflcs of Madame de Nemours^ who fays, however, that it was bccaufe his own bed was too foft. That reafon might very well prevent his lying in it, and induce him to order another; but not to make one of his fervants fleep in a bed which a counfellor of Angers had procured exprefsly for himfelf. After this, Sirs, you will excufe our entering into the details which have appeared before you refpetting the other fiftidions of life, you remember the faft of the pan at BhiSi of the FauteuU at Rtchlieui the names alone will recal to your recollection the in- decent a£tions recited by the witnefles. No anfwer has been attempted to what pafled at Richlieu; but they would efface what pafled at Blois^ by the mere negative depofition of the mafter of the inn, who faid that he never heard the hOt mentioned in his family ; as if fuch a negation could deilroy a pofitive fa£l proved by the depofition of Grapin, who faved the Abb^ d*Orleans from the hands of the cook, who ran after him, and who relattS the i^(k at the time to the other domedics wlio now dcpofc to it. U u 2 \Vh?x €44 APPENDIX. tNumb.XlX. What remains after all thcfe fails but to add, that if yoa believe fome of the witnefTeS) his weaknefs was fometimes changed into fury^ and gave die (ad prefages of the ftate into which he fdl a fhort time after ? He ran fometimes after his people, beating them and abufing them; the WoTth of Madame de LmguevHk alone retained them in his fervice. In the midft of a conyerfatioQ fall of levity and extravagances he all at once feized Monf. di Mj\n the throat } he quitted him laugliing like an idiot, and faidi M, de Billy J you are a good man* He did another a£t of the famcldnd with regard to a footman ; he took up a fpit in the kitchen, and would have run through Fouilleufey who was obliged to let him go, not being able to follow him in the ftreets : Fouilkufe efcaped tk blow and only had his waidcoat pierced. At Lyonsj a ihort time after the fecond teftament, three beggars followed up their prayos with blows, becaufe, under pretence of drawing a tooth for one, he endeavoured to take away his handkerchief. At Vakncty he imagined that Grapin had beaten him, he fell a-crying, and lan after him, faying, to the prevoty to the prevot^ you have beaten apn^. But we have faid more than enough as to the two firft gencnl fafts; the ecclefiaftical fun£lions and private anions: let us proceed to the third general fa£t, which will be much ifaorter, but not lefs important than the two others, and this fa A is the judgrocnt whid^ was pronounced refpe'£ling the ftate of the Abbe d* Orleans, We do not call upon you to obferve, that all the witnefles, except one, who confounds him with a different perfon, believed him to be in a ftate of real madnefs; it is a certain fad, but th(re are others more eflential. ■ Three kinds of perfons have formed a judgment upon the ftate of the Abbe d* Orleans \ and the judgment of all of them is the fame:— Strangers, the domeftics, his OMm family. Strangers— of this you have already feen many proofs; for what would thofe children fay ' who gathered around him, who followed him in the ftreets, who hopted after him, who offered him fo many outrages? Do they not render an unfufpicibus judgment of the public, and conflant opinion of his madnefs? Do not thofe who followed him at the Hofpital of Charity^ and wlio faid, 35 he went away, that he had loft his fenfes, pronounce the fame judgment? Let us add to all thcfe fafts, the names which were given him at different places, and which are fo many proofs of his infanity, the more ftrong as t}*ey are the lefs afFefted. At Or leans y they call him a kajut, which, according to their diale£t, is a fool. At Nantes^ they fay in the prifons, that he has a ftroke of the giblet in his bead; and in the inn, a ftablc boy has the infolence to call him with impunity tlic Able de haute folium The Numb. XIX.] Sekaionsfrom D'Aguspatu 645 The domeftics do not judge more favourably: we learn from a great number of witnefles, that hfc folly was the mod common lubjed of their converfation. They point at him \v\i\\ their fingcff they forget what is due from them to him» and he is the c0ntinu.1l fubje£l of their railleriesi fometimes they touch their foreheads, to Intimate to thofe who did not know him, the deplorable ftate of his reafon; fometknes they fay to thofe who fpeak of him to them, it is a great pity to be a fool; fometimes they call him qmongft tliem- felvesy n all the eccleiiaftical fun£lions, and Numb. XIX.]] SekSlions from lyAgueJfeau. 649 and all the mod fimple and common aAions of prirate life ; ix4ien we examine the fingularity of his prayers^ the abfurdity of his exhortations,, the general and particular irregularities of his con- feflionS) the indecencies which he committed in the celebration of ' the ma&, the diforder and want of conne6lion of his converfationsj the indignity of his exterior appearance, the wildnefs of his rapibles, the meannefs of the places and companies which he frequents, the fad, the ridiculous, the humiliating adventures, which occurred to him, his irregularity in eating, drinking, fleep- ing, and in all the details of his life ; when we join to all this the opinions of ftrangers, the difcourfes of the domeftics, and above all, the unanimous fufirages of all who approached him ; finally, the judgment and condu£^ of his family; can there yet remam a ita/bnable doubt in any body's mind, can it be fuppofed that a perfbn in fuch a fituation (hall be ranked amongft the number of wife and reafonable perfons, capable of difpofing of their property? Shall it be faid, that he was capable of filling that mediocrity of duties, of proprieties, of offices, which is the loweft degree of reafon ; and do we not, on the contrary, fee that all the moft com- mon duties were efiaced from his mind, all propriety forgotten^ all the offices of civil life entirely violated ? We add further, thefe i who (hew us that in the houfe of a Counfillor of the prefidial of Angers^ the Abbe d^ Orleans Uy in the bed which had been aiCgned to his valet, and made him lie in his : none of thefe fa£ls are much adapted to give a high idea of the underftanding of their author, and they accord perfe£ll^ with the fafts of the Prince de Conty. There is a fecond clafis of facEts, conGfting of fuch as are ab- folutely adverfe to Madame de Netmurs. You remember the two witiiefles from Saumur and Angers \ their dcpoiitions have been read to you on the one fide, and on the other. You know that one of them defcribes the Abbe ^Orleans as entering the inn, and reciting with a loud voice Kt/^ic iKn^t, till he got to his chamber ; then he (hews the valets laughing behind him, when he related the hiftories of which we do not enter ii|to the detail, and making figns of derifion ; that the Abbe d^Orleans having gone to the capuchins, the witnefs faid to the attendants, your majler has rfcapedf and advifed them to go and (lay in the fuburb, leji any thing Jhould be found out ; terms which are fimple and natural, and fufiiciently manifeil the judgment which was entertained con- cerning the fituation of the Abbe ^Orleans. The other witnefs alfo defcribes the entrance of the Ahbe d^Orleans into his inn : as afeminariflj having his beviary under his arnti he obtains a chamber by the credit of his attendants i he afterwards mentions the two adventures of the lanthom. The Abbe d^Orleans went alone at fix in the evening, with a lanthom in his hand in the ftreets of Angers^ to the gate of the epifcopal palace ; they followed him at a diitance, and took notice that when he got there, inftead of going in he tunied back and return- ed leifurely to the inn. Anotheic time, at the fame hour he came into the public place with the lanthom in his hand, walked round the walls, and without having done any thing returned to the inn ; and the hnfbiind of the witnefs related thefe adventures as fo many a£ls of folly. The inference is too clear to require that we fliould (top to draw it. Finally, there is a third clafs of fa£^s, which ar« favourable to Madame de Nemours* They are confined widiin a very fmall number. There are three general fafts, and five or fix particular ones. The firft general fa£t is, that the infanity commenctd at the I ' end 654 APPENDIX. tNumb-m. end of September^ i^7i> from "whidx Madame de Nemours c(»- cludesi tliat it had not begun fix months before the teftament o( February^ 1671, But it would be much more reafonabk to con- clude, as follows : the Prince de Conty has proved that the 4iif de Orleans was in^a ftate of infanity at the end of 1670, and the beginning of 1671 ; then it is not true, that the infanity did not commence until September y 1671. What are the proofs adduced by Madame de Nemours, to th- bliih tlie truth of this important fa^ ? They are of two kinds. • The one has already been examinedi and found infufficicntat the time of your former judgment; fince, if you had been conmad by the written evidence, that the infanity did not break out tmtil the month of September, 1 671, you would not have aUcynrcd a proof of its having comtnenced a long time before. And, in fad, notliing could be more imperfeS and equivocal than thcfc proofs j the one of which is taken from the confultation of the relations in January, 1^72, wherein they call the malady of the Jl^ d^ Orleans, a prefent infirmity ; by which, it was contendedi that tliey meant to excIuHe all the time that was paft, and to confine themfelves precifely to the prefent moment, when they intimate fome hopes of obtaining a cure, as if it was not ufual upon diis kind of confukations, never to fpeak of the infanity as defpente and incurable. The other proof was founded upon thetennsofi memorial of Madame de LonguevUle; terms which appeared to you very ambiguous at the time, becaufe they contained two incom- patible dates. It is there reprefented, that feven or eight months after the expiration of his tutelage, and his attaining his majoritj, the Abbe iOrleaus having taken joumies into foreign conntiies, was found to be not in a condition to adminiiler his afiairs, by reafon of the fatigues which he had undergone, and the kind of life which he had led. If you begin to reckon from the tine when the tutelage finiihed, the teftament falls within the time afligned to the ftate of fury ; if, on the contrary, you only reckon from' the time of his majority, the fury did not begin undl about the month oiAuguJi, or the beginning of September ^^ and akhoogh this laft computation appears jnore probable, becaufe Madam it Jjongueville joined to this calculation of time the travelling in Germany, you however did not confider this piece as decifivc, «¥hether on account of its uncertainty, or on account of its being impoflible for Madame de Longueville to exprefs herfelf otherwiie, without impeacliing the a£ls which were the work of the family-) or whether, in fine, becaufe thefe terms might very well refer to riiL' comnj^nccm.'nt of the fury, and not to that of the nacre b- fanity. Numb. XIX.] Sele^ions from D*A^eJfeau. 6$^ fanity. And this is the diftindion with which we are about to anfwer the new proofs now adduced in.fupport of the fame faft. We have taken notice of three. * The firft is a confultation, without date or name, of a phyfician at Strajburgy which is applied with tolerable probability to the Abbe (TOrieans, but which fays nothing that can ferve to deter- mine the commencement of the infanity ; he only fays> that there is a very great heat in the bowels of the patient, on whofe behalf he had been confulted, and that, in order to faevent the confequences tvhich have already caufed fome unfortunate accidents ^ it would be pro^ per to make him take cooling draughts ; and what is there in all this from which we muft conclude that the infanity was recent? On the contrary, he fpeaks of accidents which had already taken place, but docs not iix either the times, or phces ; he fpeaks alfo of a preceding confultation : all this leaves the commencement of the infanity as uncertain as it found it. Thefccond proof is derived from the accomptsofthccxpence ofthe Abbe d* Orleans ; by which we fee that couriers were fent to Paris ^ with the news of the melancholy (late into which he had fallen ; and upon this occafion there were extraordinary movements, of which there was not any example in the time preceding. The laft proof is drawn from the depofition of two witnefles of Sarrebourgy who ftate the firft attacks of fury in the Abbe d^ Orleans J after having faid, that hitherto he appeared to them fufEciently reafonable. There arc two things in this depofition, the one that the Abbe d*Orleans appeared fuf&ciently reafonable, until thefe firft impetuofities, from which they would conclude, that he aftually was fo y but this faA is abfolutely deftroyed by liie writings adduced by Madame de Nemours herfelf, I. The memorial of Madame de Longueville fixes the com- mencement of tlie fury 8 months at longeft after his majority. Thefe 8 months expired on the 1 2th of September j therefore, if we were to attach ourfelves fcrupuloufly to this memorial, we muft fay, that from the 1 2th of September ^ that is to fay, before the miflion of Saint Marie aux Minesj and before the journey to Sarrebourgy the Abbe d^Orleans was in a ftate of fury. a. The confultation of the phyfician at Strafburgh was previous to the Abbe iCOrleans going to Sarrebourg, and it marks a declared ftate of infanity. 3. The depofitien of Pernyy one ef the principal witnefies of Madame de Nemoursy pofitively affirms that the fury broke oUt at Saint Marie aux Mine}, Judge after this of the credit due to the witnefies, who fay that he appeared rational at Sarrtbourg, 6j« APPENDIX- [Numb-XH. The other circumilance of thefe depofitions, which ances %ith the accompUi relates to the fending of couriers to Pom, and the firft attacks of fury ; but there is nothing in this which con- trsKlids die cafe of the Prince de Conty. He does not contend that the Abbe ^Orleans was in a (late of fury, at the time of the tefta- ment; he only alleges mere infanity : and the fuppoGng a change iiDt from fanity into infanity, but from infanity into fury, is fuf- ficient to reconcile all the fads which are indicated bodi by the accompts and the witnefles. The fecond general faQ, propofed to you on the part of Maiam de Nemours, receives alfo the fame aniwer. They have patticu- larly called upon you to obferve, that no precaution was taka again ft the infanity of the Abbe d* Orleans, before the month of O^ober, 1671} that they do not appear even to have attempted cither his perfcA cure, or the alleviation of his complaint, or fought for even . a kind of confolation, in the application of the moft ordinary adiftances of medicine. But as to all the precautions which could be taken againft him, the kind and character of his infanity did not require them nmii ' the month of September i it was calm and tranquil^ if we acept two or three emotions of fury wliich a menace appeafed *, and the argument which is drawn from the want of care in applying the remedies of medicine might be very confiderable, if it did not prove too much, for it might be (hewn by tlie fame reafoning, that the Abbi d*OrIeaM was never in a (late of infanity in his life; fince it does not appear that, even at the time of his fury firit breaking out, any remedy was applied. At Bourges, we only find a confultation of phyficians, but we do not fee that any thing was done in confequence of it. What then is the only concluGon that can be drawn from this obfervation i It is that to all appearance the derangement of the Abbe d*Orleans increafed by degrees, and in confequence of a weaknefs in the organs which increafed with it» and to which any application was con(idered as ufelefs. But, without wi(hing to exercife our conje£lures any further upon this point, let us pafs to the third general fa£l, which lie* dame de Nemours has proved by her inqueft. This iz& is, that the Abbe d*Orleans appeared to the greateft part of the witnefles, who have depofed in favour of his fanity, to be a perfon of good feofe \ but this is precifely what the do&ors call the general fa£l, which can only approach to a real proof, when the vritnefles add, that they were always about the perfon whofe (late is contefted, fo that he could never commit any extravagant a£lion without their having been witnefles of it* Here. the witnefles neither have faid fo, Kumb. XIX*3 SekSllons from D' Aguejjfeau. 657 fo, nor could fay fo; none of the witneflcs commonly attended the jib^ d* Orleans except Per/tyy who is a very exceptionable witnefs, fo that the depofitions in this refpeft only contain a mere negative, which has no more force than if they had only faid, we have never feen the jikbe d'Orleans commie any aftions of infanity. The laft general faft, which Madame de Nemours has relied upon more particularly, is the full and entire liberty which was enjoyed by the Abbe d* Orleans: maftet of his aflionsj fole arbiter of his condud; they not only never thought of fcrecning him from the malignant curiofity of the public; they ncvef even charged any domeftic US follow him, to watch over his condu£l, to prevent the unfortunate a£iions which might befal him; and in a (late of complete infanity, according to the witnefles of the Prince de Conty^ they fuffered the eldeft branch of the Houfe of LotiguevtlUy and a prieft, to appear publicly in all the cities of the kingdom, and to proclaim the weaknefs of his mind, the diibonour of his race, and the blind facility of his family. Although this argument only forms a prefumption, and a (implc probability, which is not capable of deftroying poGtive proofs, it muft neverthelefs be admitted, that it would make a great im- preflion if it was not combated by two anfwers, that appear to us equally folid. , ^ I. It is true, in general, that to enjoy a perfe£i liberty is a pre^ fumption of fanity, but at the fame time it mud be admitted, that to abufe that liberty, as was done by the Abbe JPOrleans^ is a (Irong proof of the contrary. There is hardly any a£lion in general, which may not accord both with the chara£ler of a man of fenfe and a madman; but what diftinguifhes them is, that the one does it in a reafonable manner, and the other, by his manner of doing it, evidently demonftrates his folly. A man of reafon and a madman may both be mafters of their conduA, but the one utes becomingly the power which he has over himfelf, the other abufes it unwor*- thily; or rather, the one governs himfelf, the other is governed; the on^ condu£ls himfelf by his reafon, the other is dragged along by his infanity. It is not tlien enough to (hew that the Abbe d' Orleans was free, if they do not deftroy the fa£ls, which prove that he made a bad ufe of his freedom. If it is yet infifted, that this libertjr ihevtrs at leaft tlie judgment of his family refpe£ling his fituation, fince they. would not have allowed him it if they had thought him capable of committing the aftions, whifch arc ftated by the witneffcs of the Prince de Conty ; we fay, in the fecond place, as we faid yefterday upon another occafion, that the family was more to be commiferated than blamed; suid that we mud hear their reafons befor^l^e can VoL.IL Xx prouounce 6s8 APPENDIX. [Numb. Iff. pronounce a foHd judgment upon their condud. Perhaps tk? would have told us, that if they had offered to put any conilnlnt upon the Abbe d^Orleansy he would have fallen immediately into that declared fury, which took place a few months afterwards; that by leaving him mader of his adions, they prolonged for fome months the duration of that calm and tranquil folly, which vas a fmaller evil than a ft ate of fury; that perhaps they ftiU retained a hope of cure, which they muft have abfolutcly renounced, if they had placed any reftraint upon his condud; laftly, that then were but two things to chufe, the one to leave him at perfcfi liberty, the other to place him in abfolute confinement; the latter would have been the mod fimple; but, befides that it might W appeared too harfli, and perfcms hefitate a long while upon thcfe occaGonSt before they go to fuch extremities*; taking tkij part would not agree with the necefiity which there was of making the Abbe (TOrlearu execute the feveral a£ls, which were neccffaij for the good of the family. But why fearch longer for conjeduia and colours, * when we find the truths themfelves written in the depoGtions of the witnefles ? RecoUeft, if you pleafe, every thing which we have already ftitei concerning the judgment of the family, and, above all, thofe in- portant refletlions of the principal witnefles of the Princt ii C«j), which (hew it to have been very plain, that they would have con- fined the Abbe d'Orlearu during his ftay at Paris^ if the impomot affairs of the family had not obliged them to defer the executioa of this defign; there are ipmt who go flill further, and whoattdl that Madame de Longutvillt told them, that (he was obliged to manage him, and fupport him for the welfare of the family. In fo delicate a conjtmAiire, what could they do better than fend him to travel under another name, with a fmail ntunber of cbofeo domeftics, to bring him back the moment of his majority, fordu purpofe of tying his hands and fecuring all his property to thi Ctmite de Saint Pol; to make him fet ofi^ immediately afterwards, and to flatter his volatility and Inconftancy by continual jonmiesi until his reafon (hould be re-eft abliihed, or his inianity, con* verted into fury, could not be reftrained within any reafonable bounds ? Such appear to have been their intentions; and, once more, i^ it eafy to take a better part? Shall we repeat that cenfure is mud more eafy than counfel ? But, under all thefe circumftances, it is certain that the general faft of liberty can no longer be conQdeied as decifive. Let us enter into the examination of particttlar faA$. There iiei great THIpber, which are either indifferent or cquirocaL SDcb Numb. XIX.3 Seledions from D^AgijeJfeau. 639 Such are the fermons» the exhortations which he made to the domedics. Upon this fubjedl we have only to join the witnefles of the Prince de Conty^ with thofe pf Madame de Nemours^ to find not a prefumption of reafon» but a proof of madncfs. Such is the hGt of the vifits and exhortations to the patients in the Hofpital of Charity. You have feen the circumftances with which they were accompanied in the inqueft of the Prince de Conty, Such are the pious and Chriftian convcrfationsy of which fome witnefles fpcak in general^ without applying any of them in par- ticular. Thofe fragments of fcrmons, which it is faid the Pere Cheran approved when they were recited to him by the Ahhe f Or- leans; that Latin converfation which the vicar of a village faid that he admired; all thefe fad^s are vague, general, indefinite, fufcepti- ble of all kinds of interpretations, according to their particular circumftances, which are not at all ftated by the witnefles. The deputation of Chateaudun^ which the Mit d' Orleans re* ceivcd in the cloifter of the chartreux, is not a more decifive fac^ than the preceding. The witnefs only (hews, that he received it with chagrin, and that he fent his officers to the almoner, and con- tinued the converfation which he had begun with a chartreux. What 18 there in this which is to cSzce the fufpicions of infanity ? It is of the fame kind with that other fa£^ which has been brought forward with fo much anxiety, that the Abbe d*Orleans, attentive to the rank which he derived from his birth, always took precedence of the Bi/bcp of Angers. Does this fa£l prove any thing elfe, than that the habits naturally contra£led from his infancy, were not at all times obliterated from his memory? Let us add, that another fad, upon which they dwelt a long time, is not lefs indifl^erent than thofe which we have already mentioned. It is that related by the Sieur David, who fays, that the jitbS d*Orleans kept his table, and that feveral perfons of di(lin£lion dined with him. But this took place very feldom, fince we learn frqm the wit- neffes of the Prince de Csnty, that the moft miferabia yot-houfes were the places which the Abhi ^Orleans commonly chofe for taking his repafts. Even fuppofing he had frequently eaten at the Hotel de Longueville, what conclufion could be drawn from it? Has it ever been con- tendtd, or could it be contended on the part of the Prince de Conty, that becanfedie AtH d^Orleans was in a ftate of infanity, he could never take liis meals at his own houfe ? Who are the perfons of diftin£iion referred to? Only one is mentioned) which is the Ziiur ArnaM. EYery body knows that Madame de LonguevUle honoured him with her particular efteem and confidence, and even X X 2 when €66 APPENDIX. [Numb.XK. when die jibhS d'Orleans was placed in confinement, he was not concealed from a perfon of the charafler mentioned by the witnefles. What remains then if we take off all the ufeleft fa£ts in the inqueft of Madame de Nemours? Two principal fa£ls. The one regards his ^cclefiaftical funfltons, the other the honour which he had of taking leave of the King before he kft PariSf after making his lafl teftament. Let us begin with the ecclefiaftical funAions. Let us, in die firft place^ take off all the hSts which took place on the miilion to Saint Marie aux Mines. A crowd of reafons prefent themfelves to defeat the authority of the witneflesi who fpeak of it, and the circumftances which they relate. ^ In the firil place, diefe fads have not receivedj or rather they could not receive any legitimate contradi£tions in the inquell of the Prince de Conty. Within what fpace of time is his proof con- fined, both by the original fentence, and the judgment which con- firmed it ? To fix months preceding the teftanient which he oppofed. Provided he has proved, that in thofe fix months, and principally at the very time of making the teftament, the Abbe d'Orleans was in a ftate of perfe£t and notorious infanity ; he has fatisficd all that your judgment required from him; he could not prove any thing more ; and if Madame de Nemours wiflied to prove the fanlty of the yihbS d^ Orleans fix months after his teftament, (he ought to have articled that fa£l, as the foundation of a folid indudloa again ft the proof of the Prince de Contjm It is here fuppofed, on the part of Madame de Nemours, that die Prince de Conty had put it in ifiue, that the commencement of the infanity was fix months previous to the time %f the teftament, and that on the other fide, Aladqme de Nemours had articled, that the infanity did not com- mence till fix months after the teftament. If that had been the cafe, a great advantage might have been derived from the witneffes of Saint Marie aux Mines, becaufe their depofition would have been entirely conformable to the oppofite faAs alleged by the re- fpe^ive parties; but it is not in that manner, that the faQs bre been alleged in the artides; it is not true, that each of the parties have alleged different fa£^8 oh their refpeAive fides. The Prince de Conty has exhibited his articles, and what is the fa£i which be alleges ? It is, that the infanity had commenced fix months before the teftament. Madame de Nemours has not propofed any oppofite fa£l, (he has confined herfelf to a mere negative; and if you have permitted the witneffes to be examined, it was not in compliance with her demand, for fhc had not made any; but to fatisfy the difpoiition Numb. XIX.] Sele8ions from D^AgueJfeau. 66 1 difpofition of the ordonnancc,. which requires that the proofs fliall be always reciprocal on civil queftions^ aiid in faft, why has (he ex- amined the witneffes of Saint Marie aux Mines? Is it to prove, that the infanity only commenced at the end of September 1671? but this faft was never alleged by any memorial, it is only to de- ftroy the proof of the Prince Je Conty^ by a negative argument, and to conclude, that the Abbe ^Orleans was not infane in the month of February 1671, fince he was in a Rate of fanity in th^ September following. But this inference lofes all its force the inftant it is remembered, that it was not alleged at the time of the interlo- cutory proceeding, and that confeqi^ently the Prince de Conty could not be required to combat by his witneffes, a faft of which hd" might well be ignorant, becaufe it was without the limits of the time to which his proof was to be confined. If he could have examined witneffes upon thefe fa£ls, perhaps he might have deftroyed them in an invincible manner; perhaps he might have (hewn, that thefe eeclefiaftical functions, which are now fo much relied upon, were like the others, an effe£l, a confe- quence, a proof of the infanity of the Abbe ff Orleans \ perhaps he would have (hewn' that he had committed indecent a£tions, like thofe mentioned in his own inqueft; and Ao we require any other proofs to be perfuaded of it, than thofe which are derived from the witneflcs of Madame de Nemours herfelf, who could not help letting drop'fome traits of the charadler of the Abbe d^ Orleans? We learn from one of them, that he went out in his furplice in • the portal of the church, and chat he there called to the perfons vrho were palling by, to come and confefs to him; and what might we not expeft from the witneffes of the Prince de Conty, w'hen even thofe of Madame de Netnours, who once more had not in this refpedl, and could not have any legitimate cenfor, cannot but raife doubts and excite fufpicions? But let us go further, and obferve, that thefe witneffes of Saint Marie au$c Mines can prove notliing, becaufe they prove too much; for if we believe them, we muft be perfuaded that the Abbe ^Orleans was much more reafonable at the eve, and almoft in the. very arms of his fury, than at the molt diftant period, (ince we do not fee him in his confeffions fall into the fame irregularities which the witneffes of Nantes impute to him, in a manner fo precife and uniform. And this is not all, for we mud believe that Madame de Longueinlle, who before the journey of the River Loire^ who before all the anions of infenity, which the Abb? d" Orleans com- mitted upon that journey, and during his ftay at Parisy had never- thelefs given directions to his almener to prevent his getting permiffions to take confeffion; that notwithftc^nding all thefe new X X 3 fads. 661 APPENDIX. [Numb-XlX* H£i$i notwithftanding the rapid and continual augmeatatian of Ae infanit^, Madame de Longueville had the weaknefs to (but her m upon the fituadon of her fon, and to leave him in pofieffioa of a liberty which he never merltedt and of which his laft adionsien> dered him abfolutely unwouhy. What then was the caufe of this complete libertyi of perfoniun| all kinds of ecciefiaftical fun£iions at Saxnt Marie aux Mm^ which the Abbe d^ Orleans enjoyed for the fpace of fix days? The Traufe is not difficult to be guefied at; the diilance from Paru^ the fplendour of his namc^ which dazzled the people there, and made them admire as an excefs of zeal, what was only the eiled of a blind inipetuofity; the abfence of an almoner and of Gafim^ whom Madame de Longt^eville had particularly charged with pie. venting her fon from faying mats; the impoffibility which the othei officers found of confining him vrithin the bounds of reafoti, and the fear they might have of probably precipitating what at laft was only , deferred for a few days, that is to fay, the ncctfiityof putting him inta confinement. Let us make anotlier obfervation upon thefe faflg. Wliat prtceded them, and what followed them? What preceded them you bow; it is vrritten in the depofitions for the Prince de CoNty\ yoa know what Giiftines and FoUard have flated of the condu£l of the Abbe t Orleans %t Lyms^ and in Provence. Tlie fcandal which be caufed at Lyons^ by his indecencies even in the confeiTional, tbe adventure of the three beggars, from one of whom he wiihed to draw a tooth; the irreverence, the trouble, the agitation withwhidi he faid the mafs, at I/ire in Pr9vence\ forgetting the greater pan of the prayers, and leaving the perfon who ferved him in doubt whether he had performed the a£l of confecration. Laftly, that Jlate of folly, which was fo confpicuous, that they were obliged to make him take off the facerdotal veftmenis, when he went out of the facrifly; and many other circumllances, which we do net repeat. Such are the fa^s whi^h preceded the miflion; but what followed it was a declared fury, as Madame de Nemours herfelf admits; and who can conceive that this miffion, placed iivtk mid (I of fo many zQl% of fury, could have been fo reafonableasAe witnefles would perfuade you? But what completely deftroys all their credit, is, that Madamtii Nemours herfelf appears in oppofition to their tcllimony, and is obliged tS contradift them by her' written evidence, and her other witnelTes, What fays that memorial of Madame de Longtu^fi wliich Madame de Nemours would have you fo ftrifUy adhere to in fixing tlie precife epocha of the infanity? She fhews, according (o the fenfe of Madame de Nemours )i€r(df> that the AbbciOrluns was Nttmb« XIX.3 Sele6iionsfrom UApjieffew* 66^ was reduced to this fad condition, feven or eight months sifter his majority. This expreffion cannot be extended beyond the end of the eighth month, and that finiihed on the 1 2th of September^ and it was precifely on that day, that the miffion of 'Saint Marie Mix Mines commenced ; thus this miflion, according to the literal application of the memorial of Madame de Longueville^ and giving it the utmoft poflible latitude, is wholly included in the period of the infanity. Let us alfo fee that Pemy^ one of the principal witnefles, or^ tather the only important witnefs of Madame de Nemours, if he was not exceptionable, informs us that it was in the courfe of the miiBon of Saint Marie aux Mines, that the jiibe d* Orleans fell into the firft tranfports of fury, with which he was attacked, and yet not one of the 25 witnefles of this place would allow us to entertain the flighted fufpicion of infirmity or weaknefs of mind. They all reprefent the Mbe d* Orleans as a Saint, an Apojlle of Germany full of a pure and rational zeal, in the whole courfe of this miflion. Tliere are even witnefles of Madame de Nemours, who go ftill fur- ther, and who, contrary to 'the memorial of Madame de LongueviUe againft the depoGtion of Pemy, attefl: the fanity of the Ahb^ d*Orleans, even at Sarrebourg, where be did not go till fome days after the miflion of Saint Marie aux Mines. Judge, Sirs, of the credit that ought to be given to tlie wit- nefles, who neither agree with the pretended proofs in Mnriting of Madame de Nemours, nor with the depofition of her principal witnefs ; who place wifdom in the midft, in the very bofom of madnefs ; who, by proving fo much, prove nothing } and who, not having any legitimate contradidor, have fallen into the fam« licentioufnefs in the matter of their depofitions, in which the ab- fence of an almoner had thrown the jibbg d^ Orleans, in regard to his ecclefiaftical fund^ions. Let us confine ourfeves then to the witnefles who have de- pgfed to the time allowed by the former judgment. We find three kinds of funAions proved by the depofitions of a great number of witneflTes, feyeral of whom add, that the AbH f Orleans filled diem in a very fenfible manner. The firft and m^^ important is that of prieft, the fecond that of deacon, the third that of mere clerk, in die afliftance and cele* bration of divine fervice. It would be ufelefs to enlarge upon the importance and weight of thefe faAs, and pardcularly of the grand UBl of the <^elebradon of the mafs. That is in truth all that can form a real difliculty in diis caufe } without that we venture to fay, that it would hardly appear fufcepdble of any. All the other fads are itfclefs, indif* X X 4 ferent^ 664 APPENDIX. [Numb.XIX. fercnt, equivocals frequently more approaching to infanity than to rcafon. This one feems at once efiential, pofidve^ capable of ba- lancing all thofe that are dated by the witnefles of thePnW ie Confji it has that character of perfonality which we inen« tioned yefterday ; it is one of thofe adions proper to the pofon doing theni> more ftrong than the (ignature of the greiteft number of a^isy and which being once proved feems entirely to exclude the lead fufpicion of weaknefe of intelle£l. Tet it has been oppofed by fuch powerful anfwers, that we do not think that this grand affair can be in all its circumftances regarded as decifive, fince it is, on the contrary, from this very fafi, that they oflFer to deduce the principal proofs of infanity. Let us examine the propofitions which refult from it. To decide upon their force we muft didinguiih two that reqnbt to be examined feparately. The one is derived from the aflion itfelf. Can we be per- fuaded that a perfon who was capable of exercifing this vene- rable myftery of offering the auguft facrifice, which is tie fummary of our religion, that this fame man had not fu£Edeiit will, or fufficient power, for the making a teftament ? The fecond prefumption is drawn from extrinGc circumftances, and efpecially from the filence and forbearance of the illullrioQi relations of the jiibi i^OrUans. Who can believe that Madam de LonguevilU would have authorized, by a mean compliance, a multitude of facrileges and profanations ? for fuch is the cele- bration of the mafs by a madman. Let us anfwer to the firft prefumption, as we have already done to that which is drawn from the entire liberty allowed to the AlAi d^Orleans ; and let us fay in a word, that to perform a reafonable aflion in a reafonable manner, is a great proof and almoil i certain fign of the pofleflion of a reafonable mind \ but to do an a£l of reafon in a manner full of extravagance, is to fumi(h die mod irrefidible tedimony of madnefs. To be free, and to ufe that liberty wifely, is to be wife ; but only to be fo ill order to abufe fuch freedom, is the revcrfc. Let us fay the fame as to the faft before us. To celebrate the mafs, widi the gravity, with the application, the coUefled mind, which fofacrcd an aftiott requires, is to give the public a driking proof of reafon^ but to celebrate the mafs with agitation, with trouble, with irreverence, to accompany it witli afiions unworthy not only of a prieft, but of tlie lowed degree of human reafon, to profane the miiiiftry bf fcandalous indecencies, is the height, the lad degree to which a folly exempt from fury can attain \ yet this is what occun'^d to the Ahhc d^Orlcaiis. It Numb. XIX.] Seleiliohs from TyAgueJfea% 66 s It 18 not neceflary here to recal to your recoIle£lion the fafbs which have been ftated, that ptecipitationi that general irreverence which is fpoken of by the witnefles, that leaping over the balus- trade of the altar, at the time when he was preparing to receive the mod auguft of facramt^^s ; that difcourfe which imbecility alone can render credible, as it alone can excufe, we fpeak of that order given in faying Ite mijfa eft; to put a fteak upon the gridiron ; that other adventure fo affeding to Madame de Longueville ; laftly that fad lieceiEty to which the almoner of Madame de Longueville was reduced, when he obliged the Abbi d^Orleans to defcend from the altar between the epiftle and the gofpel. AU thefe fa^is arc prefent to your minds, and are fufficient to efface whatever prefumptions can be drawn from the celebration of the mafs. And in fa£l, Sirs^ what could we expeA from a man, who fell into fuch excefles as have been related of the Abbe d^Orleans ? Let us not divide thofe ecclefiailical functions, which their unity ihould render infeparable. How could a man, who was under the impulfe of a real fury in refpe£): to confeiEons, (we do not repeat the proofs) be in a condition to celebrate the mafs with difcretion ^ How could it be hoped that he would difcharge this miniftry with reafon, after all the proofs of infanity which he had given, in his preachings, and in every thing which had reference to his ecclefiaftical funftions ? Could he have been deranged in all the reft and reafonable only in thTs ? Even if it was foy as there are fome madmen who ihew confiderable fenfe upon particular fubje^is, could this fa£): deftroy the proof of all the reft? * But no. Sirs, it does not deftroy it \ on the contrary it confirms itf and gives k full convi£lion. So far ardthe dignity and the fan£Uty of the afUon from juftifying the fanity of the Abbi d* Orleans^ that they on the contrary place his infanity in its very ftrongcft point of view. To what excefs of madnefs muft he have arrived, when neither the majefty of the altars, nor the fear of God, before whom even the angels are as nothing, nor the dignity of the ceremony, nor the concourfe of people, could fix the levity^ the caprice, the abfurd emotions of his mind? And if an ancient conceived himfelf to mark all the crimes of thofe who did not refpe£l the fan£lity of the temples, when he faid Alii in capitolio fallunt^ acjiilminantem pejerant Juvem g what can be fufficient to (hew the extreme infenfibility of a man who commits aflions of infanity in the face of the altars, and at the very time when, as a minifter of religion, he is ready to ofier to the true God the only facrifice worthy of hia acceptance ? It 665 APPENDIX. [;Numb.XlI. It is true that they have not proved that thefe glaring aAtons of foHjr occurred to the Jhhe d^OrUans^ whenever he caught an opportunity of celebrating mafs ; but is it neceflary to (hew that he committed every day prodigies of derangement, in order to fupply melancholy proofs of his ordinary and habitual fituation? Is it not fufficient if even in the celebration of the mafs, he (hewed Ibme of thofe indubitable ^gn^ of folly, in order to warrant the general concluGon, that he wsts in a date of real infanity ; fincc it is viGble that a reafottable man can never fall into fuch a- travagancies, and that no man who does fall into them can juflly efcape the imputation of folly and lofs of undcrflanding \ If it is alked how it happened, that upon fome occafions no public and vilible mark of infanity efcaped him ? we (hall anfwer, that nothing is more common than to fee infane perfons perform fcafonable anions, efpecially when they are influenced by a particular paflion for fome kind of action \ becaufe the {ame follj which infpires them with the general deiign to commit fud aAion, alfo gives them an idea of performing it with aU iti ex* terior perfeAion, and without omitting any of the circum- fiances which they confider as neceflary to it. We are not called upon to enter into the interior of the foul, ftill lefsto penetrate, by an adventurous curiofity, into queftions which are infinitely beyond the reach of our feeble underftandings, to know whether the AUi iOrleans had a fufficient power of mind, and what degree ia fufficient in the adminiftraticn of the xsaSi. It is with relu£lance that we have fuflered an argument, upon which we think that we neitlier could nor ought to enter into an examination. There are fome truths which we ought to honour by our filence, or at leafl:, which we muft fubmit to the bifliops, and other depofitaries of tradition; contenting ourfelves wid) the humble and fincere confeffion of our ignorance, upon erery thing which rehtes to the inward difpofitions of other perfons. And in fa£k this is what can only be known by God. All that the witnefllcs have related only regards the exterior adions. Now tills exterior migbt» at certain times, be fufficiently regular in the Abbe JPOrleans^ without eilablifliing a certain proof of fanity. It is even poflible that the witneflcs who fpeak of it, may neither have been capable, nor fufficiently attentive, to judge of this exterior regularity } and this is even very probable when we examine the quality of thofe who relate the fa£l, and who are fome of the inferior domeftics of the Houfe de LongueviUe. But without entering into this difcuflion, let us refi upon diis grand reflexion which appears to us fufficient. The celebration of the mafs with wifdom, is one of the ftrongeft prefumptions of the Numb. XIX.} SiUaiomfrm UApjteJfeau. 667 the found and regulated difpofition of the prieft ^o celebrates It ; but the mafs faid with irreverence, interrupted with fcandalj and profaned by indecencies, which it is even painful to mention^ is the very ftronged proof of infanity. But if that is true, as nobody can doubt, how are we to explain the patience of the family of the Abbe d^OrUans ? This is the fecond prefumption which refults from the fa6l of the mafs, and which, although it appears at firft entirely decifive, is however not tnore ftrong than the firft, when it con>es to be examined ; on the contrary, we may fay that it is deftroyed, in a manner ilill more invincible. Let us diftinguiib, upon this point, two periods in the life of the Ahbi d^Orleans. The firft, that which preceded the important and decifive fad of this caufe^ that is the iz(k of which Madame de LongueviUe was herfelf a witnefs. The fecond, including the time which followed it. Up to that time Madame de LongueviUe doubted of her calamity^ (he ftill flattered herfelf by indulging a hope of cure ; -ihe was, It is true, even more exalted by the fan£lity of her life, than by her birth \ but (he was a mother, and (he thought perhaps that it would not be poffible to keep her fon in a ftate of continual de* pendance, and he was fometimes allowed to a£l without any fuperintendant of his condu£i. Yet although there was ftill fome doubt and fome uncertanty in her mind, (he from that time took every precaution to prevent the Abbi d^Orleans from being ad- mitted to the celebration of mafs. We learn from feveral wit- nefles, that ftie fent to give notice to the fuperiors of the church not to admit her fon to fo facred a miniftry \ but it muft be allowed that thefe intimations had not any great tfkGtf .and the Abbi f Orleans ftill found too' many opportunities of exerciCng the fa* eerdotal fundions. We muft even admit that it does not appear^ that during the journey of Orleansy Madame de LongueviUe charged his almoner to prevent his faying mafs, as (he had charged him with preventing his receiving confeifions ; therefore it feems very probable, that it was not until the teturn from that journey, that Madame de Longuevil/e, finding the weaknefs of the Abb( d^Orleans confiderably increafed, took more efie^ual precautionB to prevent his faying mafs* But after that adventure which (he faw with her own eyes, (he no longer took any meafures*, Madame d^ Silfyt the Sieur^Qa/Hnes^ and fome other witnefies apprize us that flie abfolutdy forbade her fon being allowed to fay mafs, and if he fald it afterwards, the fame witneflcs inform us, that it was by fturprize, without the J^owledge of Madam de I^fnguevUU, mi by the 1u>fortunate coUufion 668 APPENDIX. ' [Numb-XlX, collufion of Porqukr^ who was afterwards the depofitary of his tcftament. We (hall not enlarge upon the funAions of deacon which he cxercifed onljr twice in the two months next. adjoining to the teftament^ one of which was at the inftitution, where his mad- nefs was not Imown^ and the joy of performing this fun£lion pre- vented its appearing at that moment. We (hall not fpeakof the functions of clerk^ which he does not appear to have cxercifed within the time to which the proof is confined. The fa£l of the Abbe d' Orleans havbg taken leave of the king, is only proved by a rumour which took place at the Hotel de Longui^ ville, and befides it amounts to no more than a mere matter of ceremony, which he might be fuppofed capable of performing at a time when his folly was as yet fearful and docile. But after having (hewn you, that there never was a proof more certain and convincing than that which arifes from the inqueft of the Prince de Conty ,• after having (hewn fou that it is not de- (troyed by that of Madame de Nemours, but on the contrary^ con- firmed in feveral particulars , it only remains very (hortly to dif- cufs the laft queilion of this caufe. The firft queilien was, whether the infanity was proved ? the fecond is, whether it was continual, or fufceptible of lucid intervals, in which tt might be prefumed that the teftament was made ? In refpefl to the law, there are three objeAs upon which we (hall make very fummary reflexion J. 1. What is a lucid interval, and whether there is any ground foe confounding it with an adion of apparent reafon ? 2. In what kind of folly the law prefumes fuch intervals ? 3. In what manner it ought to be proved? Let us follow thefe refledlions, and examine (irft, what it is that the jurifts call a lucid interval. Two conditions difcover the real idea of it. The firft, is the nature of the interval ; the fecond, its duration — its nature^^lt muft not be a fuperficial tranquillity, a (hadow of repofe, but on the contrary, a profound tranquillity, a real repofe i it muft be not a mere ray of reafon, which only makes its abfence more aipparent when it is gone, not a flafh of lightning, which pierces through the darknefs only to render it more gloomy and difmaly^not a glimmering which unites the night to the day ^ but a perfe£t light, a lively and continued luftre, a full and entire day* interpofed between the two feparate nights, of the fury which precedes and follows it ; and, to ufe another image, it is not a deceitful and faithlefs ftillnefs, which follows or forebodes a ftorm^ b«t a fure and fteadfaft tranquillity for a time^ a teal calm, a per* * - fca N\imb. XIX.] Seledions from D^Agueffeau. 669 fed ferentty^, in fine, without looking for fo many metaphors to reprefent our idea, it muft be not a mere diminudon, a remiflion of the complaint) but a kind of temporary cure, an intermiiRon fo clearly marked, as in everynrefpefb to refemble the reftora|ion of health. So much for its nature. And as it is impoflible to judge in a moment of the quality of an intenral, it is requifite that there fliould be a fufficient length of time, for giving a perfe£l aflurance of the temporary re-eftabli(h« ment of reafon, which it is not poflible to define in general, and which depends upon the different kinds of fury, but it is certain there muft be a time, and a confiderable time. So much for its duration* Thefe refle£lions are not only written by the hand of nature in the mind of all men, the law alfo adds its charafters,ln order to engrave them more profoundly in the heart of the judges. There are two important laws upon this fubj£i: i.The law i8. § i*^* Zr. 41. 77/. 2. de acq. veL amit. poff[{a)* It fuppofesthe cafe of a perfon in a ftate of fury, who appears reafonable, who contrads, who acquires, who takes pofleflion \ his folly is fo concealed that the vendor is abfolutely deceived, and yet fo certain that the jurift decides ; he does not acquire the pofleflion. What terms does he make ufe of to mark this condition, in confpeBu inumbrata quietii / and in what does the fliadowofrepofe confift i in the two conditions which we have marked, its natures this is only an exterior tran* quiUity i if they had paflTed this firft furfact, if they had entered in- to the fanfluary of reafon, they would have found him under the a£lual flavery of his fury, which was only in a ftate of tranfitory fl umber ; its duration^ it is only a moment, which paflcs in confpeBus it is nothing but a glance, a fleeting light, a fliort and rapid view. 2. The law 6. cod, L* 5. Ttt. 70. {b). de curatorefuriofif &c.de- («) Si furiofo* quern Aic meotia efle exiftiflHUy eo quod forte in confpeAu inumbratc quteCii fuit conftiiutus, rem tradiderit : licet ille non ertt edeptas po(1effiMlein« tst pef> fidere definUy fufficic quippe dimitcere pofleffiooeiii) etUm B non Cransferas. Iliad enim ridicalom eftf dicere, quod non allter Tult quit dimittere, quam fi Ctansferat : ino vulc dimitteret quii exiftimat ft trantferre. (&) Cum aliis quidem hofflinibut cootiottutn furiofig infortunium accldati alio autem saoribns non fine laxamento aggrediatui^ led in quibufdam ttmporibus querfam eis inter- aifl^o perveniat, et in hoc iplb mulu fit differentia^ ut quibufdam breves iodncir, aliis majores ab hujufmodi vitio inducantur : antiquitas difputabaty utrumne in mediii furoris intenrallis permaneret eia curateriajintercefTiOy an cam furore quiefcente finlta, iterum mor- bo advenieilce redintegraietur? Not iuqoc ejua ambiguicatem decidenteti iancimva (cua incertnm eft in hujufmodi furiofis hominibus, quando refipuerint, five tx longo, five ez propinqno fpatio» et impoffibile eft, et in confinio furoris et faoitatis com fieplus xonftituiy et poft longum tempos fub eadem cfife variecate, ut in quibufdam videatur cdam peqe fiiior tffe remotva) cnralpiis creadonem non efTe fioieodam, ut in quibos dam Tideatnr etian pene furor efle remotos : fed maoere quidem eam donee ttiii furiofus viv it; quia non eft peae tenptti in quo hujufmodi mor^s defperstur* cults 672 APPENDIX. [Numb.IlX. But let us leave the expofitors and proceed to the laws, they furniih us with three arguments, two negative, and one pofi- tive/ Firjl negative Argument. They could not cite a fingle law, whidi fpeaks of intervals, with regard to thofe who are merae capti: on the contrary, all the laws which fpeak of them refer folely to perfons in aftateof fury. Second negative Argument. We fee that they admit furious perfons in their intervals even to the fun&ion of a judge. Law 39. ^. de judiciisi L.$. Tit. x. but was any thing of the kind ever heard of in cafe of a mere deftitution of reafon ? Third Argument^ which is pofitive, and which forms a kind of demonftration, derived from the law 25. Codt de nuptiis* It was fome time before a queftion, whether the children of per^ Ions who fell into a (late of infanity, were obliged to wait for their confent to marry, and there is a progrefs in the law upon this queftion. It was firft decided only in favour of daugh- ters. Afterwards in favour both of fons and daughters of a perfon who was mente captus. With refpe& to the fon of a furious perfon, the doubt continued until the time of Juftinianj who decided, by the law which has been cited, that they (hould alfo be allowed to marry without waiting for the confent of the father \ till then it feems to have been necefiary to obtain a particular permiflion, or to wait for a lucid interval. Hence arife the invincible arguments. Why fliould they permit that to the fon of a perfon mente cop^ tiiSf which was not allowed to the fon furvft^ except that the law did not piefume there to be any intervals, in which the former could confent, and didprefume them in regard to the latter? There is no other ground of difference. Then-the prefumption of law is eftabliflied, not only by negative, but alfo by pofitive argu- ments. Let us now afcend to the higheft degree, that is to reafon, which is the fource of thefe laws. Two efiential reafons are the foundation of them. I • The nature of mere infanity, which being commonly die effefi of temperament, is rather a weaknefs of organs, an habitual evil, than an accidental malady. It is otherwife with refpefk to fury, which may have a temporary caufe, iititich.is ibmetiaics cured and frequently fufpended ; and, to make ufe of the elegant terms of the author of the fadium^ diftributed by Madame de Ne* nwwrs^ Numb. XIX.] Sele^ions from D^A^ffeau. 673 mours^m 1673. ** Infirmity of mind, particularly when it 1$ the ** cflFeft of temperament, is not cured by fucceeding years ; they " only ferve to fortify the complaint, which may even be con- " fidered incurable, being a privation which can never return to <' being, and exiftence." This was applied to the infanity of the Abbi tOrkans. 2. Even if nature may admit of intervals in a cafe of fimple in- fanity, (a queftion which mud be left to the profeflbrs of medicine,) Jurifprudence cannot recognize them : for the grand rule is, de his quanonfunt^ et qua non apparent^ idetn efl judicium. We may obfervc the paroxyfms and the intervals of a furious perfon; how can we know the changes in an ideot which are almoft imperceptible ? This conflitutes the very definition of in- fanity, according to Baldus^ detnens qui nullum extrinfecus ojlendit furwm^ qui habet furorem latentem. It livesj it nouriihes itfelf within, and gives no figns without: for inftancej thofe who are only touched upon a fingle fubjedi, have the marks of underftanding in cv6ry thing elfe. Now if we do not fenfibly perceive the depar- ture of reafon, what indication can there be of its return ? Let us come to the third refleflion^ how (hould intervals be proved, even in a cafe of fury ? Many expofitors have thought that, femel furiofus femper pr^t-^ fumiittryuriofus* But there* is a furer diftindion . ^ Either they have not proved the fa£): of intervals, and then they are never prefumed, however reafonable the ad may be^ unlefs it is in its nature entirely perfonal, and to thiS) the paflage of Bartolusy which has been cited, muft be reduced. Or it is proved there were confiderable intermiflions, and then if the a£t is reafonable, the prefumption will be for placing it at the time of the lucid intervals. As to the fa£t, there are two points to examine, the one what is xhc kind of folly, the other, what proof there is of intervals. Let us firft fee what is the kind of folly. It certainly is not a ftate of fury, except fome momentary attacks ixrhich it was eafy to (lop in an inftant. This is pfoved by art be delivered to the buyer, or le give earneH to bind the bar- gain, ii. 201 2. Cafes on this (latute* ibid^ toi 3. Weighing off' goods is a de- Kvery within the ftatute* 202 BARS (Legal) TO OBLIGA- TIONS. t. Nttare of fuch bars* i. 449 2. Different kinds of* ibid. See further Oailf, Fre/cription^ ' t BASTARD. See Legitimacy^ BENEFICIARY HEIR- Who is fnch, i. 3339 mot* («}• BILLS OF EXCHANGE. I . The drawer, acceptor* and ia- dorfers of a bill of exchange, are all liable for the whole amount to the holder; but payment by any one of then) is, as againft him* i difcharge of all the others* ii. 62. CESSION OF ACTIONS. 1 . A debtor* who pays the whole of a debt for or with another* has a right to demand of the creditor a ceffion of his adions* and claims againft the otiier debtors* i. 160. 359, 360 2. But, where a ilranger pays a debt to which he was not liable* and without having any interefl to difcharge it* the creditor if not obliged to cede him hia adions* if be does not tfatnk proper, • 360 3. A creditor, who has put it out of his power to cede his adions* lofes his right of folidity* and his demands againil furetiesp ib, 361 — 367 CODICIL. 1. DiHindion between teftamefltary and legitimate codicils* if. 503* 2. Eifed of codicillary claufes* 513 and foL COMPENSATION. I • Co(npen(ation defined* i. 408 2. On what principle founded* 409 3. Compenfation may be oppofed again II debts of money* or of confumable things* unlefs it be a fpecific objed* ibiei, 4. So* againll debts of things fufceptible of it* from whatevei caufe the debt proceeds* 410 J. But not againft a demand of reftitation for things plundered, ibid. 6. Nor, 69z I N D E X» 6. Nor, by a depofitary, again fl a demaifd lor relloring the depofic, i. 4lO» 4i i 7. Nor, againft the debt of a fum of money bequeathed for fude- mrnce* - /^/ ih, 15. Illudratioos of this principle, 7—12 l6* Whether infurances are good confiderations, 13 — 17 17. Of the neceflity and fufficictacy of a conlideration, agreeably to the law of Engiafuf^ 1 9, 20 1 8. A promifc, or bargain, with- out a confideratiop, is void, in what cafe, 20, z 1 I 19. What amoanti to a foficienr conlideratioo, ii. 2%-^%^ CONSIGNATION. I. Nature of a confignation. L 376 a* Though not an adaal payment, it is equivalent thereto, i^iJ^ 377 3. To be valid, it ought to be pre* ceded by offers of payment, which place the creditor im dV- meure, ikJ. [And fee title Ojert ofFajmnt.] 4. Proceedings ncceflary to obtain a confignstion, H, 37S 5. EfFed of a coafignadoa ; it dif. charges the debtor, 378 6. The ang mentation or diroinii* tion in value of what is coafigned enures to the proik or lofs of the creditor, if the confignation is validy iiid. 7. A debtor, who has coofigaed money, cannot withdraw it, and infifl on the confignation bdng void, ilij. 8. Whether, after a vftlid cooflg- nation made, if a debtor with* draw the money configned, the debt revives as againft faretaes, iM. 379 CONSTRUCTION. See Agreement, 6. CONTRACTS. 1 . What a contra^ is, i. 3, 4 2. Didindion between a contiafi and a pollicitation, S< 4» > 3. What is of the ciTence of a con* tra£l, i. { 4. What things are of the nature of the contrad, i. 6 $. Things accidental to a coacrad, h 7« and mete* 6. Divifion of contrads iaio re- ciprocal and unilateral, L 8 7. Confenfoal contra&s, and con. tra^s real, f. 9 8. Divifion of contraAs into con- tra6ts of beneficence, mixed con- trads, and contrada of motml interefl, i, 10 9. Cooomota^ve and aleatory ooa- traCls, ih. il to. Principal and acceflary con* Ua^s, i. 11 II. CCA* INDEX. 6S5 f I* Contract regulated by mere natural jufticc* and tbofe which are AibjeAed by the civil law to certain rules or forms, i. 1 1 1 2* What is nccefTary for the form, muft b« diftingoifhed from what is necefiary only for the proof, i. 13 13 Defeds in contra^Sy /^iV. [Sec Error 9 Force,, Fraiul, Int- quality^ Confideraiion[wi2Sii of}. Obligation, 7.] 14. Where a coatrad is compofed of feveral parts, whether the ille- gality of one part afFeds the whole, ii. 17, 18 15. Who are capable or incapable of contradingf i. 29—32. ii. 25 .—32 [See Drumktnf2tfi, Infant, Inttr- diS, Lunatic, ff^omen»] 16. What may be the objedt of contrafls, i. 32 fl^. We are deemed to contrad by an attorney duly appointed, or if we afterwards ratify his contrad« [See Jgint, jfturniy,'\ 1 8. A partner is deemed to con- tni6k for his partners^ in what cafes, 49 19. Of the eiFeft of contrafls* 50 ^o A contra^ has no effed, ex- cept with regard to things which are the obje^s of the agree- menty ihiJ. Zi. Nor, except as between the contracting parties^ 52 Z2. Limitations of this tvlt, i6, 93. A perfonal contra£^ cannot be apportioned, ii. 45 ^4. A contradt, which upon the face of it is regular, may be im- peached as ttfurious, 222 ^j;. The execution •( a contrad, no proof of a man's capacity, . r r 59>*-S93 Voncernmg the Interfretaiian of Contraffs. fee Agreement, 5— 19; Pre/itmption,ij» CONTRIBUTION. |, How far one furety may compel another to contribute to the debt fpr yyhich they are jointly bound, U. 78> 79 2. All who are eqoaUy liable to a common demand^ ought equallj to fa [lain the burthen of diu charging it. ii. 78,79.80 I COPIES. I • So long aa the originals arc in exr iftence, copies are no proof, i. 489 2. Of copies made by judicial au- thority, the party bctog prefent or duly fummoned» 49P 3. Copies made in the prefence of the parties, but without the ao- thoricy of a j odge, 49 1 4. Copies made in the parties' ab- fence, and without their being judicially fummoned, ihid, 492 5. Copy of a donation, tranfcribed into the regiller of infinuations, is no evidence of fuch donation^ .493 6. Secus, if the mfin nation had been made at the donor's re* quell, and he had finned the regiller, ihiJ. 7. Informal copies, what, ibid, 8. Such copies, if antient, are evi« dence againft all perfons in de« fault of the origin al, 492 9. Copies of copies, 494 CREDITOR. I • O f the effed of obligations with refpedl to a creditor, i. 86 2. A Creditor may proceed againft his debtor for paymenii ib, }. In what cafe he may oppofe compenfation, fee Sit- off. 4. Though a creditor may proceed againll his debtor^ he has only jus ad rem* not in rtf i. 86, 87 5. A creditor cannot proceed aeainft a third perfon detaining what is due to him, 87 6. Exceptions to this rule. — Frau- dulent alienations made by aa infolvent debtor, 88 7. Where a perfon is obliged to do any a6^^ the creditor cannot com- pel fpecific performance, 89 8. Secus, where the obligation is not to do any thing, /^/i. 90, and note (a). 9. What perfons are implied in the term '' Creditor,** . 332 See further Ceffion of Anions, 3 ; Payment j ^erm of Payment ; Stt off. CROSS. 686 INDEX. CROSS-EXAMINATION. I. The imporuncc of crofs-rxami- aationy and extent to which it is adinifiible, coaiidercd, ii. 267 — 269 DAMAGES, and INTERESTS. I. Explanation of the term, i. 90 9« Where 00 fraud exifis, and a debtor is incapacitated from per- formance of bis obligation^ to what damages he is liable, 91 3« In general* debtors are anfwer- able only for damages, incurred with refpedt to the objedl of the obligation, and not for fuch as •re foreign to it, i^, 92 4* But a debtor it anfwerable for extrinfic damages, if they were io contemplation in the contrad, 5* So, if be fubmitted to them, Mtber ucitly or exprefsly, iiiJ, 6. Where no fraud is imputable, the debtor is liable only to the bigheil fum, at which the dama- ges might be calculated to amount, 95 > 9^ 7. But, in the cafe of fraud, he is liable to all damages indifcri- minatelyt 97 8. But this liability does not ex- tend to remote confequences, which are not necelTarily con> nefled with his fraud, iS, 98, 99 9. A debtor if liable for damages and intereds, not only in cafe of non- performance, but alfo for de- lay of performance, 99, and nou, 10. What damages are due in cafe of delay of payment of a debt, 100, 101, nc/i, lOZfttoti, DEBTOR. See jiIitrHati*vi OhligationSf 4, 8—1 3 ; Qtjfion o/Mlions 1 » 2 ; Credit or. I Damages ; Deleft Demeure\ Joint and ftveral Obligations ; Pajment, Ttrm of Payment, DEED. 1. Dillinfiion between deeds and private lyritings. ii. 164 2. Definition o( a deed, 1659 and ncte» ^. No particular mode of deHTer* ing a deed neceflkry, ii. 1^5 4. Signature is efleatial to a deed,i^. 5. One partner in trade cannot bind another by his execuiioi of a deed, ihu, 6. Where a perfoa is empowered by letter of attorney from soo- ther, to execute a deed, ^r. it mud be done as the ad of the party himfelf, 167 7. Where a deed is abfolately void in its execution, fubfequent de« livery may make it good as i deed then firft executed, ihii. 8. In giving deeds in evidence the deed itfelf ma ft be prodocedi qq. lefs a fatisfa&ory excufe can be given, ihii, 9. What excufe deemed fafficiest for not producing a deed, 16S 10. If a deed is pleaded witht profert, . nothing can difpenie with the adual prodadioo d fuch deed, i6g 1 1* Proceedings where neither the original nor the counterpart of 2 deed can be produced, 170, sod nau, 12. The recital of one deed io another, how far admiffible is evidence, 176 13. An inquisition pofl mortem is good evidence of a deed, ihii. 14* Where a deed requires iorol- ment, a copy of fuch iorolmest is fufficient, ihid. i;^ 15. Of the rule, that a deed mol be proved by the fubfcribJBg witneifes, 171 16. Exceptions to this rule, ihii, 17. Where ftrbfcribing witncffcs are dead, beyond the Teas, or after ftri6l enquiry cannot be found, their hands may be proved, iiiid, 173, 174,175 18. Where a fubpcenaed witneis did not appear, and a wrineo acknowledgment of the piny was proved, the deed was allow- ed to be read, 17S 19. The rule, requiring proof by an attefting nitnefs, extends to a cancelled deed, ih, 20. Proof of band P writing admif- fible, \ii [And fee Hand-*writing.'\ 2(. Net INDEX. 687 SI. Not neccffary that fabfcribing witncffcs fliould fee the party execute the deed, ii. 177 2j. Cancelled deeds, how far ad- miffible in evidence. 178, 179 ^3. Alteration of deeds by a ilran- ger in an immaterial point* does not avoid them* 179 24. SectiSf if it be a material point; or the party executing alter the deed, though not in a material point, fW. 180 DELEGATION. I .* Nature of a delegation, abd how it is made, i. 392 2. Efi-eds of a delegation, 395, 394 3. Whether the delegant is anfwer- ^le for the infolvency of the fubftitute, 394 — 396 4. Difference bet\veen delegation, transfer^ and fimple indication, 396 DELAY, DEMEURE. X. When a debtor is deemed to be en ifemeun, i« 83 a. Effeds of dimmre or improper delay, ^ 1^. 84, 8$ 3. How delay is purged, 84 4. Delay or neglect of one of fi^f- ral debtors i/t /olido aife^s his co-debtorsy ad con/efoandam et perpetuandam oiligatioHem, noH (id . augtTidamt > 5 > » 15^ DISCUSSION. ^. Origin of the exccptioti of dif. cudioP) i. 262 2. What fureties may oppofe the exception of difculSon, 263 3. In what cafe the creditor is fob- jedl to difcuffion, and when the exception of difcaflion ought to beoppofed, ihid, 364 4. What goods the creditor is * obltgtd to difcnfs, 265,266 5. Not property belonging to the debtor out of the kingdom, 265 6. Nor, property in litigation, ihid, y. Nor, property hypothecated by the principal debtor, when the principal debtor has alienated i^ and it is poiTeiTed by third perfon^i iii^» 8. A furety for one of feveral debtors in /olido may demand the exception of difcuffion of them all,' i. 265 9. At whofe expence the difcuffion ought to be made, 267 10. Whether the creditor, who has failed to make the difcuffion, is refponfible for the infolvency of the debtor, ii. 268 DIVISIBILITY. 1. Nature of a divifible obligation* i. 171, 172. 179 2. Di(lin6^ion between civil and intelttdtual dtvifibility, 172 3. Obligations /« /aciendo, and im non fadendo^ as well as in dandof are divifible, when the obje£t of fuch obligation is fufceptible of being divided, or executed by part?, ^ 173 4. The obligation to deliver a piece of land, whether divifible* 176^ 177 ;. The obligation, refultine from the- bequed of a fum ror the building of an hofpital, or for fome other purpofe, is divifible* 178, 179 6. Nature and effed^s of divifible obligations, 1^9 7. Obligations become divifible on 'thie part of the debtor* or of the creditor, when either of them leaves feveral heirs, ihid* 8. Firft effedl of the divifion of an obligation on the part of the debtor.^-Eacb heir is liable only for the part of the debt for which he is heir, 1 80 9. Firft modification of this iffeQ^^^ With regard to hypothecatory debts, each heir being poflTefifor of the property hypothecated, is bound hypothecatorily for the whole; though he is perfonally lia- ble only for his part of the debt,i^. 10. Second modification :^^ln regTLrd to debts of a fpecific thing, only the heir of the patrimonial ef* feds, of which fuch fpecific thing conftitutes a part, is liable; the heirs of other kinds of propeKy are not liable, Hid, 11. Tkird modification c^^hetwtea feveral 681 INDEX. feveral heirs, wbo fucceed to that branch of the property, which contains (be thing fpeci- iically dae» the creditor may fue him, to whofe lot it falls, for payment of the whole, in what cafb, i 180, 181 ta. FoMTth meJtficati0m:^Wheti a debt confifts in the iimple refti- tution of a thing, of which the creditor U proprietor, and to which the deceaied debtor had no ticle» hit particular heir, who is in pofleffion« is liable to the reftitu- tion of the' whole, 181,18a I), Fifth moilffoatioM T^-Any one of the heirs, by whofe aA or fault a rpeci6c thing has prriflied, is liable for the whole debt, and the others are liberated ; unlefs a penalty were ftipulated, 182. 183 14. If the thing perifli l^y the fault or the fr.«ud of feverai of the heirs, they are each bound ia fili4lo^ 1 84, 185 15. ^MT/i^ im has a right of repe- cition on giving another^ 170, 171 INDICATION. t. It may be indicated in con* trads to pay to a third perfon not only the thing due, but alfo another thing in lieu of it, or a lefs fum than what is due from this debtor, i. 339, 340 2 • Whether payment of a lefs fum to a perfon indicated liberates the debtor entirely, or only to . that extent, , ^ 340 J. An appointr * «y oe made to pay a third perfon at a dif- ferent time and p^ace from thofe agreed upon for paying the creditor, i. 340 4. An indication may depend. upon a condition^ 341 INDIVISIBILITY. 1. Nature of an iodiviiible obli* gation, 1.172^173 2. Different kinds of indivifibility* 3. Firft, abfolute, or indiinduum coniraSuf ibid, 1 75 4. Secondly, of obligation, or iff- dividuum obtigatione^ 1 74 5* Thirdly, oi^ymttn^individuum /olutiontf 176 6. Whether the obligation to de- liver a piece of land be indivifi- ble, ib, 177 7. The obligation of doing a day'a work is indivifible, 177, 178 8. So, the obligation of doings piece of work, 178 9. General principles concernine the nature and effcds of indi* vifible obligations, 19 j 10. Difference between indivift- bility and folidity, 196 1 1 . In indi viiible debts, the debtora or creditors, or their heirs re- fpe^lively, are creditors or debtora of the whole ; but not totaliur^ ib. 197 1 2. Effeds of the indivifibility of obligations in dando aui infacitn* dot with refped to the heirs of the creditor, 197 13. Each heir may demand the whole; but on failure of pay* ment, he can claim damages only for the part for which he is heir, '97^ >99 14. Effed^ pi indivifible obliga. tions, in dando aut in facitndo^ with refpefl to the heirs of the debtor, 19^ 15. Firft cafe ; when the debt is of fuch a nature that it can only be acquitted by the particular bcir of the debtor who is afligned, 200 16. Second cafe\ when the debt may be acquitted by each of the coheirs of the debtor feparately, ib, 301 Zaa XT, Third 69% INDEX. ^^. Third cafe, when the indi. I INQUISITION POST MORv vifible debt cao only be acquit- ted jointly by all the pcribns obliged, i. 20J tS. O* the efFeft of iodiviGblc obligaiionf, in nonfacitndo^ ih, 103.204 INEQUALITY. r. Inequality vitiates t cOtttraft, i. 2t a . What amaonts to inequality by the civil law, '*• *^ 3. Of inequality in the cafe of minors, . ^3 4. How far inequality is fufficicnt to fct aiide a contrad, 3 3» ^4» note (tf } . INFANT. I. An Infant cannot contra^ by himfelf {)^y the civil law) ; though he may by the roiniftry of his tutor or curator, i. 29 «. By the Englijh law, infanis^arc altogether difabled from con- tra£ling, except in the cafe of neceffaries, and of ads in their nature beneficial to tbemfelvei, ii. 29 3« But their decdi are now only voidable, 3^ , INJURIES, AND NEGLECTS. I. Explanation of the term, i. 70, 1. Infant! and madmen are inca- pableofthem* 7< 3. Inco/ication is no excufe, 71 4. Perfons interdidcd for prodi- gality arc liable, ih- 72 5. Parents or guardians are refpon- fible for the injuries of their children, in v^hat cafe, i. 72. II 40 6. Of the liability of mafters for the injuries or negleas of their fervants, ihid. ii. 41 ^. The ftatate of frauds docs not extend to a promifc of making a fpecific fatiifaaion for an injury, ii. 199 See Toint and Sef., and payable one part to him and the other to B,^ 19 a feveral obligation^ 60 8. And the releafe of the one is no prejudice to the other, ib. 9* A covenant made to tenants in common generally^ may be con- ftrued as feveral ; and why. ii, lo- A releafe of one of feveral, who are entitled under a joint contrad, is a difcharge from the others, 61 II. Of joint and feveral obliga- tions» againil feveral perfons, 62 II. In the cafe of a bond or cove- nant, exprelTed to be made J3int!y and feveraily, the creditor may proceed againil all in one joint ad*on, or leparateiy againft each of them, iL 13. Bat the obligation mofl be treated as wholly joint or wholly feparate, ib. 65, 66 14. Cafe?, in which facisfadion made by an/ one 19^ as agamil the creditor, a liberation of all the orheriit 62, 63 . [And fee Bill cf Exchange, i.j ^5* At) obligation, coturndcd generally by feveral psrfocs, is Joint, aolefs it contaio fo.iicctiing to render it feveral, 63 16. DilFerence between a joint ob. iigatior* and an obligarton in/oii' do^ ib, (j^y and nQtu% 17. DebtSy contra£(ed by partners in trade, are joint debts, and caa be fued for only again ft all the partners, or the furviving part« ners jointly* in what cafe, ii. 6j 18. Exception, the cafe of a part- ner who had given a feparate bond ; and whofe feparate eftate was held to beliable, as well as his joint eilate, 66 19. Where one of feveral joint debtors' dies, the creditor has only a legal remedy againft the furvivorsy ih. 20. Exceptions to this principle, ih. a I . In what cafes truflees, execa« tors, and affignees of bankrupts are feverally refponfible, ih* 22. In cafes of injuries, a right of adion for the whole damage lies againft any one of the perfons liable, * ih* 23. In contrails, where an aftioa is brought againft ftveral, if it cannot be fupported againft «//» it wholly fails, 67 24. The purfuit of one or more of feveral debtors, who are each refpedively liable for the whole, does not bar the right againft the others, iiiiU 2 ;. Where two perfons are boand jointly and fi^irally, a releafe to one is a difcharge to all, 68 — 77^ and aa/ri. See CwtrihtUion^ JOURNALS. 1. What is written in the journals Of domeftic papers of individu- al.«, confiitutes no proof in their favour, i. 48$ 2. But, if it tend to bind the fub. fcribing party , it will avail againft him if iigned, ibid. p So, if it tend to liberate a debtor, it is binding though not (igned, 486 4. Concerning the journals of tradefmc:n, fee Tradi/men'4 Bouku JUDGMENT. 1. What judgments have the au« Wionty of ret judifota, i* S.H 2. Their kinds ipecified, 534, ^3^ 3. What degree of authority rei judicata judi^mer.ts have, irona Z z 3 which *94 INDEX. wbleh tbere U no appeaU though they are fubjed to it, >• 53S 4« When jadgmeott io the lalt refort h a ve it , ibid, 536 j. Io what cafeijodgnifnts may be impeached by a requite civiltt fee Requite Ci*vile. 6. Judgments, from which the ap- peal ia no longer receivable, 539—54* y. Againft what jadgments the ap- peal is. declared to be loft, 542, t. Difference between a soli and ao improper judgment, 544 I}. A judgment is noil, when the objeA oT its condemnation is on- certain, iiid. 10. So, when the objeft of con- demnation ts impoiGbie, 54; 11. So, when a jodgmeot pro- noonces any thing contrary to the laws, it* 12. So, when it contains inconfill- ent and contradictory difpo- fitions, ^46 13. So, when it pronooncea on what was not brought before the jodge, f^/V. 14. And, when it difmifles a de- fendant from a demand in which he had acquiefced, i6id. 15. All judgments, founded on proceedings againft perfons who are incapable of being parties to a judicial proceeding, are void, ^ ^ . ^ 547—549 l6» So, where they are given by a judge under certain difabilities, Hid, 17* Or, by the non-obfervaoce of the rcquiliie formalities, 5^0 1 8. An adual adjudication is not only binding 00 the parties; but, where a perfon had paid a debt, and (on being fued for it) could not find the receipt, and paid it over again, it was held he could not recover it, after he had found the receipt, ii. 348 19. How far the judgment of foreign courts, or of courts not of record, are liable to be con# trovcrted, 349, 3^0 ao» A judgment can only be con- clufive between the parties, or ^ofe deriving title under them, 350 21. Exception to tbls mle.-vA judgment is evidence agunft other parties, whenever cbe matter in difpote is a queftioa of public right, and all perfona ftanding io the fame fituation sue aff«r61ed by it, ii. 3^0, mate {a). 22. A judgment in one adion is a bsr in another adion, 3$ >» 35^ 23. But in cafes of rjedment, a verdiQ in one caafe is not ccm* dufive in another, 352 24. In decifioDs that operate ia remf the judgment is binding againft all perfons^ on wbac ground, . . 355 25. Application of this principle to cafes of condemnation in the ex* chequer, and to cafes of prise, ilud. 354, 355—35^ LAW. 1. Natural law is at leaft the medi- ate caufe of every obltgatioo, 2. There are fome obligatiocs, of which either natural or pofitire law is the only caufe, ibi/^ 3* Of the diftinAion between law and fad, ii. 360, 361—364 4. Of the effeA of ufage upon the law, 3^4—367 5. How far the dodrmc, that ** every man mufl be taken to be cognizant of the law," ex- tends, 39*^39$ MifieJus im Law, fee Uf/hda. LEASE. AH leafes of lands, for longer term than three years, muft be in writing, or they will only have the force of eftates at will, iL 19), LEGITIMACY. 1. So long as the birth of cbil* dren can be afcribed to a legiti- mate fource, the law will not fuppofe criminality, ii* 457 2. In what cafes the quality of legitimacy and filiation may be contefled, i^. 458 3. Difcuflion of the prefomptiocs for and againft legitimacy, ia the cafe of the Sieur de yisamfes, 459-4^6 ^. A chad INDEX. 695 4« A chiM mty be legitimate » if born of a woman rending with her kufband* though (he may have been guilty of mifcondu£l« ii. 469 LENGTH OF TIME. I. Of the ftatutes of ItmitationSf and of prefomptiont founded on length of time, ii. 120 a. Limitations of time for bringing certain adlions^ itiJ. 3* If credit be given, or a debt be contraded on a condition, the time of limitation cannot com- mence till the expiration of fuch credit or performance of the con- dition, 121 4* Conftru£lion of the limitationi of time allowed to perfons fpeci* fied in the flat ate of limitations, 122 5* When the time, allowed by the ftatates of limitation, begins to run, no fubfequent difabilitiei can Hop it, 123. 128 6* Length of time is no bar in the cafe of a truft, 1 26. 1 30 7. Limitation of this rule, 130-^ 132 8* Time allowed for entries into lands, and for foftaining an ejed- »ent, 127 9* The Hatuce of limitations can only operate in the cafe of an adverfe pofleffion, ihiJ. 128 I a Period of time allowed for bar- ring claims, or proteQing a pof- feflbry enjoyment, 128, 129 XI. How far private grants, re- cords, or a£ts of parliament may be prcfumed from length of time, 13J.134, i35» 136 12. After a lapfe of 20 years, equity will prefume a demand to be fatisfied, or a right extin- guiihed, provided there are no intermediate ads, by which thai prefumption is repelled, 129 13. Length of time 00 bar in cafes of fraud, ibid, 150 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Sec Length 9/ Time. LITERAL EVIDENCE. See Parol Evidena. LOOSE PAPERS. !• Loofe papers, tendirtg to oblige the party writing them, thoufib found in the hands of the perion in whofe favour the obligation is purported to be contraded, are DO proof againft the party writing them, N i. A87 2. Loofe papers* found in a traded man's book, are no evidence* 3. What degree of evidence is to be given to a difcharge, written but not figned by the creditor ; and which is found in th^ debtor's pofieflion, 486* 487 LUCID INTERVAL. I. Nature of a lucid interval* u. 668 3. Duration of, neceflary to give perfect aflurance of a temporary re-eftabli(hment, 669 3. In what kind of folly fucb inter- vals may be prefumed, • 671 MADNESS. , See Liauu^* MANAGERS. See Jgent. MANDATORES PECUNIA CREDENDiE. 1. Explanation of the term, !• 294 3. DiftinAion between them and fureties, . 295 3. Of the obligations of Miiai/itforr/ pecunia credtnda^ 294 — 299 MAP. A map of lands, how far idmiffibfb as evidence, ii. 161.293 M ASTERS. 1. Of the liability of malle>i for the injuries or negleds of their fervants, i. 72. ii. 40, 41 2. They are bound for the injuries of their children and fervants, when they have not prevented them, i. 30^ 3. And for thofe which they could not prevent, if (he fervants com- Z z 4 mitted 696 INDEX. nitted them id tbe fanAions to wbichthey wereappoiDted, 1-305 4« They are not anfwerable for the contradls of their fervants, unlefs thefe had been iotrofted with fome bofinefa to which the con- traflt relate* iM. 306 MISTAKES (io L«w). 1. General remarks on this fab- jed, li. 369 and/Qll. 9. MoBfey p«id by miltake cf law is recoverable by adion. 379. 387 —389.391 3. Hoiv far Britifi cobrts of judi- cature are bound by errors io law, ^ 383, 384 4. Diflertation on this fubje6l by Af. D^AgueJftaut 40S and foil. If a payment be made by error #.on account of any caufes which are of no avail in law, there is a. right of repetition, 4 1 o, 4 1 1 6. Error of law gives np perfoo a right of acqoifition, 412,413 7. DiftinAion between errors of law and errors of fadl, 4x4-^430 8. Opinion of Fitmius how far a fnm, paid by error of law, with- out being due, is lobjeA to repetiiioD, 437 NATURAL OBLIGATIONS. |. Of nataral and civil obligations, according to the R^man and French laws, v i. 108— z 1 1 NECESSARIES. |. Infants may conuad for necef. faries, ii. 29 s. What ihall be deemed neceU faries, ^ ih, 3. Hufband is anfwerabie for ne- ceflaries fupplied to his wifr, NON-PERFORMANCE. See Damages* NOVATION. I. Definition of a novation, i. 380 9. Different kinds of novations, 3S1 3, What debts arc ncceffary tp I cooAitttte the fnbjed of a con- tion, i. 3S2-"3g4 4. Who may make a novation, 384 5. In what manner a novation ji made, 3^5 6. The conient of tbe creditor, or of Tome perfoo id his behalf, ji reqnifitr, ibid, 386, 387 7. Whether the grant of id sbqo- iiy for the pric« of a fum due b; the grantofj oectiTarily indodei a novatton, 3^7"~3S9 8. To render a novatioo valid^ there rouft be fometbing differed in the ad /rom the former obii- gation, 389t393 9. May be made withoot the coo* tent of the former debtor, 3^ 10. EfFed of a novatioo :— it hbe. rates all tbe parties boood, bj extinguilhing the debt, with all its acceflaryhypothecatiosifiM 11. Unlefs fuch hypoihecatiOBsbe transferred to the new debt, with the confent of the party to wboa the hypothecated things belong, ibid, 391 See OehgatioM. NUDUM PACTUM. Nudum padum, what, ii.xo OATH. 1. Of oaths for the performance of agreements, u 63 2. How far iuch oaths arc valid or nor, 64 3* Valid pniy in point of con- fcicnce, ' 65 4. Oaths to perform impoflible or illicit engagements are Dull, $5, 66 j^ Whether os^tfas, extorted bf violence are obligatory or not, 66-68 6. The obligation, refulting from fuch oath, does not defcend to the heir, 66 7. Oaths, attefling a pfotnire which has been obtaJDcd by fraud, are not binding, 68 8. Of the oaths of the partieno civil fuit?, 56) ^. Decifory 03th, ivbat> i^'^- INDEX. 697 TO. In refped to what things the decifory each may be deferred « i. 564 1 1. In what cafes it may be dePr- rcd» ihid. iz. Whether any proof is necef. fary, toenabie a plaintiff to defer thif kind of oath, idiJ. 5659 566 13. it can only be d^ftrred by, or tOt perions having the difporniun of their rights, 567 14. Confequert'y, neither by nor CO minors, nor infoivent perfons, ibid. 15. A procoreur cannoCy 568 i6« A perfon^ to whom the oath is deferred, muft eithef take it or re- fer it back* 00 pain of lofing his caofe« ibid. 17. The decifory oath derives its cffedt from the agreement of the parties^ 570 18. Therefore, if the party by whom it has been deferred, would have jud caufe of reftiiution agatnil the agreecnent, he may, by obtaining fuch reftitutios, de« ^roy the eiFed of the oath, 572 I9» O^ tho oath of a party interro- gated upon fafls and articles, 573 20, Suppletory oath, what, 574 Zi, What things muil concur to warrant the appiicatioa of this oath, 575 ss. Example's of iii complete proofs, which the judge may fupply by oath, ibid. 576 93. Of Jurttmentum in littmf or the oath deferred by the judge in or* der to determine the amount of the condemnation, 577 and /oil, OBLIGATION. I, Definitioo of the term obliga- tion. 1. I, 2 2. What is ED imperfe£k obliga- tion, I 3. What is a perfeA obligation, 2 4« Diflin£lion betweeo natural and ci%il obligations, ibid. 5. Diviiion of obligations into natu- ral and civil, 103. 108 [Ste Natural Obligations.] p. Into pure and iimpiCy and con- ditional, and thofe which are contraded under various modifi- faiioAS, 1 08 7. Into liquidated and aDliquidatetf* i. 109 8. Alternative, fee ^///nrA/iV«0^« ligations, 9. Indeterminate, fee Indettrminati Obligations, 10. into principal and accelTary^ 106, 107 11. Into primary and fecondary* io5 12. Two kiiids of fecondary obli- gations, 107 13. Of theefleoce of obligauona, a 14. Caufes of obligations, 3 [See ContraBs, ^afi ControBs^ Injuries, and NegliBs^ Law.] 15. Want of obligation vitiates « contra^, 29, 29 16. Between whom an obligatton may fubfift, 74 17* Corporations and communitiesy ihiJ. i8. But not between ideots, in^ fants, or madmen, except in cer« t^in cafes, *j^ 19. Of the obje^ of an obliffation, ibid. 76 20. All things in commerce, 76 21. An indeterminate thing, pro« vided it be determinable,^ ibidm tt. Things future, in what cafe, ibid. 77 23. Things belonging to a third perfon, 78*79 24. But things out of commerce cannot, jg 2;. What ad may be the objedl of an obligation, ibid» 26. It mult be an ad, pofiible ta itfelf, ib. 80 27. But it mud not be contrary to law or to good morals, 80 28. The party, in whofe favoi>rthe obligation is contracted, ought to have an appreciable intereft, ib. 8 f , and noti» 29. OftheefFfdof obligations, 82 30 Of the obligation to give, ibidm 3 f . Of the obligation to do or not to do any a£^, 84*8$ 32. Effe^ of obligations with refped to a creditor, 86 [And fee Creditor.] 33. Of tlie different modificatione under which an obligation may be coatradedj fee Coaditioms. 3|. Aa <99 INDEX. 34* An obligitioa cannot depend on the fiogle ^iU of the con- trading parcy, 1.115 3^. Though it maj on that of a third pf rfun, ihid^ 36. Of obligations determinable on a certain condition, and of thofe which are limited to a certain time, 1 29. 1 30 37. Of obligations M^/rVtf between feveral creditors, and alfo on the part of the debtors, fee SoliMtj^ and Jmnt ami Sivirml OUiga- tkns. 38. Of the extingnifiiment of obli- gation f, fee C9mfujkm, Ctn^figna'- //mv, NrvatioM, FayMHttg Set^of. 39. An obligation becomes extin<^« when the objeA of it ceafes to be fofccptible of obligation, 430 40. Where a perfon, to whom a fpecific thing was due under a lucrative title, becomes owner of it under another lucrative title, the claim in refped of it is ex- Xin&i ihid, 41. Expofition of the rule, Dmit emwfit iairativa in tamdem rem ei piffinam twcumn non poffimt^ ibid. 431,432 42. Obligations of a certain fpe. clfic thing are extinguiflied with the extindion of that thing, 432 43. An alternative obligation is not cxtingoilhed by the extindion of one of the things doe in the alternative, 433 44. The debt of a certain quintity or the obligation of an indeter- minate thing, is not extinguiihed by the extindion of the thing dtie, ibid, 45. Where the obligation re!ates to a thing, indeterminate in it- fe)f, but conftitnling part of a determinate fet of things, it is ex- tinguiihed by the excindion of all thofe things, 43 f 46. Where a thing is not totally dcftroyed, the obligation fabfifts for the remainder, ibid. 47* The lofs of the thing doe does not extinguifh the obigation. whrn it happens afier th<; Jet>tor is placed en demeure to ^ive it, 48. When thr thin^ ^'ue 114s pe- riflied by the aa or fialt of de principal debtor, or after he bi been placed in demunt the cl^ for its value fabfifti againa him. felf and his heirs, and alfo agaiaf his fureties, i, ^36, 437 4^. Co»/rtf,v/rfw»y2, if the thing has periihed by the ad or ftolt of the furety, 437, ^jg 50. So, where the thing perilba by the zSL or faalt of one of feveral debtors MyWi^tf, the other co-debtors are liable, 431 ^1. Secus^ in the cafe of co-hcinof a debtor, if it perifh by the ift or fault of one of them, '^ J 2 • Where a debtor exprdilj tikei the rifk of the thing upon hio. felf, he continues liable, thovgk fach thing do not perifli by hii aa or default, ihiL 439 53. Whether an obligation, euii- gttiihed by theextinOtoDoftke thing due, is fo far deflrojrcd ai not to fubfift with regard CDasy part of the thing which may re. main, or with regard todKrigkts and adlions belongiag ra the debtor in reference thereto, 440 54. A debt, which is contrsfied only for a limited time, or nstil the occurrence of a certain a»- dition, is extinguiflied by the lapfe of that time, or by the fal. filjnent of that cooditioDi 4431 5^. Difference between ^tfruA and Ronuue jaws on this fabjed, iU 56. Obligations are exdogmfhed by refolutory conditions, 4441 445 57. Regularly , obligations are not extingniQied by the death of the debtor or of tbe creditor, 44c, 4;^ 58. What claims are exbogDiftked by the death of the creditor, 4^6 59. What claims are extingsiihed by the death of the debtor, /i. DIVISIBILTTY OF OBLIGA- TIONS. Sec Divifibtlity^ hdivijihiluy* . OBUGA, INDEX. «9> OBLfOATlONS PENAL* See Pinal Obligations, OFFERS OF PAYMENT. j» To whom and by whom an ofFer otighc to be made, in order to render it efFeAual, i« 377 2. Ic muft be of the whole fum, unlefa ing fomething elfe in lieo of the thing due, ibid. 10. Difference between this paft andafurety, #^.316 1 1. By the pa£l eonftituta pecuniae a perfon may bind himfelf more ftriaiy, 317,318 12. This pafldoes not extingnifli, bot modifies, the former obliga. tion, 318 13. The obltgatiofi, arifing horn this padl, is not a pure adhefioa to the former obligation ; it may forviveit, ib, 319 14. Difcharge of one obligatioa extingnifl&es both, 319 — 325 15. Of the kind of pad by which a perfon promifes the creditor to give him certain fecorities, 326 16. Analogy between this kind of paa and the Englijh adion of indebitatus affamffii^ xu 405, 406^ PAROL EVIDENCE. 1. Parol evidence, what, 1*499 2. General principles on the ad- miflion of parol evidence, 50c^— S04 3. A party, who had it in hia power to procure a ^ proof ia writing, is not admitted to give parol evidence when the fubje^ exceeds 100 livres; aniefs he have a commencement of the proof in writing, ^01 t ^. But^ it (hoald feem that, in the EngUfi^ yoo 1 N D B X. Mmglijh ]«w« every verbal com- municationy not inconiiftent with wrictcD minaces^ may be allowed » ii. 204 5* Parol evidence not allowed to £11 up a blank that was Icfc in a will for the name of a legatee, 6. Nor, where verbal declaraiions were made refpeding a will, 205 ^. Sech» as to a blank left in the bifliop's regtfter, ihid. S* A grantor of an annuity not allowed to (hew by parol evi- dence, that it was intended to be fubjed to redemption* ' * 206 9. Parol evidence not admiflible to coouadid a written agreement/ ibnl* 207 10. Cafesiin which the propo&iion, that writing is open to contra. di£kion or explanation in regard to matter of fad* has been con- irmed, s,q% 11. Where a devife wu made by a name and defcription equally ap- plicable to two perfonsyor places, parol evidence will be received to explain which was intended, 209 IS* A defcription* which is in it- iielf erroneous and not corre£led by the context, may confer a fuf- icient title, provided the obje^ intended is afceruined by verbal tcAimony, and there is no other to which the defcription is ap- plicable, 210 13. Sicusf where there is an cxift- ing fubjed to which a defcription may be properly applied, ihitt, I4< In what cafes parol evidence is admiilible to rebut an equity, 211 — 213 15. Where a writing itfeU does not conflitutethe very a£l under en- quiry* but is only evidence of a dtflind collateral t2.€t, parol evi- dcnce may be allowed (in rrfptfk to fuch Ht\) in the absence of, or inoppofiiion (o, wji(iiig, kg, 16. A party, vk-ho cannot prpcur*? prrot by wriiiDg:, cugnt to be kOii.iiied to give parol evidcr.ce, 17. A rartv, who has ate :C:n:.'il!v * ioii*j( i^tiiicn piooi, 0 bv 4^e aU lowed to give parol evldctce, ii- 5««»5»5 18. fiat the accident, by whick fuch writings have been loft, mail be clearly eftablKhed, ii. 513 19. If a perfon, demanding per. Riiffion ^o prodoce parol evi- dence, only allege the lofsof hii titles, without proving any ioe* vttaMc accfdeot occafioning fodi )o(», parol evidence of tbie er. iAence of fuch titles, cannot be allowed, ihU, [And fee Dr^i/, 8^11.] 20. No verbal evidence \s alloved of what has been faid by a pn. foner, when brought before 1 jullice of peace on a charge sf felony, milcfa it appear tkst bit examination was not taken is writing, 336 See jlmhi^uity^ Witu^s, PAROL AGREEMENT. See ji^reiment, 26. PARTNERS. See Joint and Sfuersl Ot&ii^ tiotu, 17 1 8. PART. PERFORMANCE. !• Where an agreement has bees in part performed, the ftitote of frauds ddes not apply, ii. 194 2. What ads conftitnte ptrt-per- formance» 1 95 , and mtn. PAYMENT. I. Of the place of payroeoc, i. \\\ 3. If an agreement contaio t»o different places for payment, pay- ment mail be made ineschplsce, in what cafes* 13$ 3. Payment cannot be madetoaof but the creditor, without bis coo- fent, ikid. 136 4* Real payment defined, 327 5. To conllitute a valid ptyBcoi, an abfolute transfer of the pro- perty in the thing paid moll be made to the creditor, 328 6. ft mud therefore be done br, or with the confent cf the proprie- tor of the thing paid, M» 7. Payment cf a thin^ by one of the heits of a dtb;of is valid, wiiQOut me cor.ientcf liicoibrrsj 3*9 8. Payment of a fuoi of mocty or oucr INDEX. 701 otHerconfumable property, which is hMafid$ confamed by the ere- duor,is a valid paymenc, i* 319 9* Though payment woald not be valid where the property was not transferred, the creditor,cao claim DO other payment, fo long as he continues in poflfefiion, ih, 330 10. it is immaterial whether the debtor, or any perfon in his name, make the payment, where the obligation confifts in giving anything, 330»33' ri. But if fach payment be not made in the name of the real debtor, it will not be valid, 330 I a. Though payment of a fam, or of a thing due, would not be valid, when the perfon who did not owe it has paid it in his own name ; yet if be afterwards be- come debtor of it, the paymei^ becomes valid, 331 13. A ftranger, who has no intereft in difcharging a debt, may comi pel the creditor to receive pay- ment, ibid 14. The obligation of doing any thing may be difcharged by any perfon, where it is o\ no impor- tance to the creditor by whom the thing is done, 332 15. Sicus^ where the perfonal ikill of the concradting party is an objed of confideration, ibid* 16. To whom payment may be made, ibid^ 17. One of feveral heirs of a credi- tor being creditor only for his own (hare, no valid payment can be made to him for more than his (hare, without the confent of his co-heir?, ,ihid. 18. Payment to any perfon to whom the creditor has tran^fer. red .his rights (notffie of fuch transfer being previoully given) is valid, ibid. 19. Payment of a debt to a perfon fuing forth an attachment of it, is valid, 333 20* Payment to a perfon, of whom there w^^s juft reafon to confider him as credttor, is valid, ibid, ai. Payment to a perfon, not hav- ing legal capacity to manage his a^ai s, is not valid, 334 I 22. Payment to a creditor under arrelt is good, provided the debt be not attached, i. 334, 33; 23. Payment to any perfon, autho- rized by the creditor, is valid a« if paid to himfelf, during the ex- iftence of fuch authority, 335, . 33^ 24. Death, or a change in the Gtuatioh of the creditor, is a revo- cation of fuch authority, whea publicly known, 336 25. The proce/s of execution, which is held by the officer whom the creditor employs to execute it, is equivalent to a power to receive payment, 3 37 26. Secuxp as to a procurator ad lifes, ibid. 27. But, by the law of England^ payment to an attorney employed to bring an aftion is valid ; thougli payment to an attorney's agent in London is not, ibid, note (/*)• 28. A power to fell does not ex- tend to receive the price, 338 29. Payment to perfons, whom the law invefts with a quality to re. ceive, for the creditor, is valid, tb. 30. But confanguinity, however near, is not a iulficient qaalic/ to receive, 339 3 1 . Payment to a perfon, indicated by a contrad, is valid, ib^ [And fee Indication.^ 32. Payment to an unqualified per* fon becomes valid by the credit tor*s ratification, which has a re- trofpedive ciFed, 344 33. So, when fuch payment has ul« timately turned to the creditor's profit, 345 34. So, where the perfon, to whom payment his been made, has be* come heir to the creditor, ibid, 3^. Payment can only be made of the thing due, unlcis the creditor content other wife, ibid. 346 36. Agreements for paying any thing elfe in lieu of wh* concerning the heirs of the debtor of an indivifi- ble debt, applies to leveral prin- cipal debtors* in what cafe* ibid. 28. 4n divifible obligations, when one of feveral heirs has con- travened* he incurs the penalty only as to die part for which he b heir* according to the % Ca/is* i. 221* 22a 19. But* according to the f . Sijor* ttmf each is bound only for the part for which he is heir* 222 20. Reconciliation of thefe texts of the civil law* t>y diftinguilhing between the cafe in which the debt is divifible tam/oluthnt qmm obligatiom (to which the §• C«/a ttftxs)t and the cafe in which the debt* thongh divifible Mi- gatitne^ is indivifible ^iWr/oiir (to which the {• Si firtem refers)* ib, 223—22/ 21. Whether the whole of the penalty is incurred in favour of all the heirs of the creditor* by ' a contravention affedting only oneofthem* 227*228 22. Ofpenal obligations, according to th6 law o^ England, ii. 8 z l^foU. 23. An impoifibility in the con- ditxon does not defeat the obli* gation ; but, in point of law* the engagement is abfolute. 8 1 24. A bond with a penalty may in equity be confidered as the evi- dence of an agreement; and pay* mcnt of it be enforced accord- ingly* ib. 82— 01 25. ConftruAion of the flat. 8 \S afV, e.w. refpeding adlions oa bonds or penal fums* 92-— 97 26. lit during an adion on a bond with a^ penalty* the defendant bring into court the principal, intereft* and cofts* the money fo brought in (hall be deemed a full fatisfadion of the bond. Stat. 4^5 Ann. r. 16. % 13. 99 27. Conflruction of this Hatnte* - ib, 100 28. A promife of paying a penalty* beyond the amount of legal in- tereft cannot be enforced, 100* 201 29. Where a bond is entered into with a penalty* the amount of^ fuch penalty only can be reeo* vered^ with nominal damages for detention of the debt* 10 1 30. Cafes illuftrative of this prin. ciple* ^ 102 — fo8 3 1 . Illuilration oftheprinciple, that the penalty fhall be deemed a fall fatisfadioo* 1 09 — 1 1 x PER- yo+ I N D E )C« PERFORMANCE OF OBLI- GATIONS, See Agrttment^ 2i, 22; Con* dition, 8—24; Confufion ; Con • Jignaiion \ No'tfutiom i PajmetU ; Sit. off. POLLICITATION. 1. What a pollicitation is, i. 4., ^ 2. Diflin^tion between a pollicica- tion and a contraA, 4 3» In what cafes a pollicitatioo it obJigatory, 5 PRACTICE. t. The identity of the TubjeA, and cao<> of the demand, it always a natter of averment and evidence, S* A v^rdift in ej'^dtmcnt in one caufe is not conclufive in anoiher^ 35« 3. A verdiA in a criminal profecu. tion is not admi^Tible as evid?rce of the fame fads in a civil pro- cedure, 359 PRESCRIPTION. f . Nature of a prefer iption, i. 4 4q, 450 ft. Though prefcriptions do r.ot extinguifh the claim, they in- duce a prefumpcioo that it is paid, ^ 450 |. Prefcription of 30 years, on what^-eafons founded, 450 4. It begtot to run only from the time when a creditor has a right CO inllitute his demand, 4^ 1 j;» When a debt is payable at (e« reral timet, prefcription begins to run, fr^ffl the expiration of the firft term for the part then pay- able, and for the other parts, from the expiration of the dif« ferent terms of payment, 452 6. It cannot ran againft a benefi- ciary heir» ihiJ, 7. Nor againft minors* though they have a tutor, ibid. %m Nor, where a creditor leaves feveral heirs, fome minors, others ol fu'l age^ will prefcription run ^if me thing be divifiblc) agaird fu%h ininois^ though it Vkill againft tbofe of full age, 1. 4p» 0. But it rnns againft infane per* fons, who have curators, 455 zo. So, againll abfent perfoos, «• though their procurator or agent be dead, ibid. 11. So, againft a fucceffion thoogb racant, 494 12. And againft the farmers of tb« -king^s revenue, ibid. 13. But not againft the cbnrcb, though it takes place in regard to profits that concern the per* fonal benefit of the church, ra- ther than the church iifeU, ibid, 14. in what marner prefcriptton is reckoned, when the chnrck fucceeds to the rights of indi- viduals agaioft whom it had be- gun CO run, or *vice nier/d^ 459 75. EflFed of the trinttnary pn^ /cription, tBid. 16. A prefcription, begun or com- plete againft a creditor, takes effed againft hb heirs, 456 ly. Prefcription takes eflTed in point of confcience as well at of law, 457 18. An unaccompliflied prefcrip- tion is interrupied, by the debtor's acknowledgment of the debt, ibidm [And fee Ackno'wiedgmeni.'^ 19. And alfo by a judicial inter* pell a tion of the debtor, 459 [See Inferpeiiation.] 20. The acknowledgment' of, or interpellation made to, any one of feversl debtors in ^ida, in- terrupts prefcription with refpeft to all (he others, and their heirs, ibid* 460. 21. A prefcription, though aocom- pliflied, is deftroyed by the debtor's fubfeqaent acknowledg- ment of the debt, 462 22. Bat the debtor muft be of foil 23. The debtor's acknowledgmeoc extinguifttes, prefcription only aa againft himfelf, and not with re* gard to third perfoos, ibid, 24. A partial payment of the debc exiinguifiies prefcrtptioa as to the debtor, ibid, 25. So, payment of arrears deftroys Che INDEX. 705 the prefcripiiQn of tn annoity, i. 463 26. S09 lentence of condemnation againll the debtor, when it ac quires the force of ns jtuiicata, ejdoguiihet prercript'^on, /^/V. 37. Prefcriptionof /ffr/^jTMr/ ap- plicable only to hypothecatory debts^ 464 a8. Origin aad reafont of this prefcription, iiU, 46; 29* It takes tt[tGt only in the cafe of hypothecations* on adks paiTed before notaries* 466 30. In what cafesy the preficription ofjix moHtbs takes place againft the adions of tradefmen* arti. fans* and other perfons* r'^V, 3 1 • Prefcription of mujtar againft tradefoieny ISt. ibid. 32. In what cafes the two laft pre* fcriptions donot ran* ibid. \(}Z 33. For what time and againft whom thefe prefcriptions run* 468—470 34. Of the foondation and effedl of thefe prefcriptions* 470 35. Of feveral other kinds of pre- fcription* 471^4^3 See LingthofTimi Solidity » 15. PRESUMPTION. I. Prefamption defined* L ^27 3. To what cafes ic may be legiti- mately applied* ii. 329 3* Different kinds of prelum ption* 1.528 4. Prefumptions juris et di jure^ ibid. ii. 329. 331 5. Inftances of prefumptions al- lowed and aAed upon, which are not really believed to have any foundation in cru|h* ii. 330* 331 6. Principal kinds of prefumptions* fee Oatb^ Res judicata. 7. Gf-neral principles refpedling prefumptionii* 3^2 8. Prefumptions of tsw* i. 529 9. Prefumptions of l<*w coi>ftitute a fufiicient proof* only when they are not dedroyed by a contrary proof* - ibtd. 10. Several inftances of this kind of prefumptions* 530 — 532 Vol. \l. 1 1. Cafes of prefumptions* which (though not eftabliftied by any law) are fufficiently ftrong to have the fame credit as .pre* furoptions of law ; faving a right to the party* againft whom they militate* to make proof to the contrary* ii. 532 12. Simple prefamptious* what* 533 13. The concurrence of feveral fimple prefumptions united is fometimes equivalent to a proof, ibid. 14. Thoogh guilt is in general to be proved and innocence pre* fumed ; yet a matter* which (abftraftedly taken) is unlawful* muft be taken to be criminal, 333 15. Cafes of prefumption from cer« tain fads* which are allowed for general purpofes* fabjed to par* ticular exceptions* ibid* 114^ 16. Cafes of ordinary prefump^ tions becoming abfolute, by ex* eluding all circumftances incon- fiftent with the pofltoiliiy of ita truth, - 334 17 Incafei of contrafi* where ho particular evidence appears to the contrary* the parties are prefumed to have contraded ac« cording to the general nature of the fubjed and the local ofage (if any) refpeding it* ibid. 33 j 18. Inftances* where' the rule— omnia prajussumtwr rit} efft a3m--^ is applied, 335, 336 19* Application of the role* omnia frafumuatur tontra ffoliatoremt 3?6» 337 20. All prefumptive evidence ought to have a proper foundation* and not reft merely 00 conje^» 4°' PUBLIC EVIDENCE. See Ms {^Authentic) ^ Kec^ds. QUASI CONTRACTS. 1. Natare of quaii concra£ls, i. 69 2. What perfoni arc obliged by qoafi coDtrads, li. 70, and n^tts, RECIPROCAL CONTRACTS. See Coutra^s^ 6. keep records may be etifiiiied as to their condition only, ii. 1^4 3. Various modes of aathcnticatio^ records^ '^« RELEASE (of a Debt]. I.. In vbhat manner the releafe of a debt it made, i. 397, and wAn. 2. Whether it may be made by t mere agreement, ihii, ^ 3. In what cafe a tadt rtleale ii prefomed, 398-400 4. Whether a releafe may be made by the mere will of the creditor, without an agreement, 401,401 5* A releafe may be made, cither wholly or in part, 401 6. A real releafe, what, '^ 7. A pcrfonal releafe, what, 403 8. AperfonalreleafetooaeoftwQ debtors in Joliht or toooeof feveral co^fureties, ao diidirge to the other, who ia debtor for the remainder, iM 9. Adifchargeofaprincipildebm liberates his fareties, M. ID, But a difcharge of (bredeiii DO releafe to a principal debtor, U, 11. Difcuffion of tbe qoefiioe, whether a creditor may \vM] receive a confidcratioa for dif* charging a furety, widiost ip. plying it in redodioB of ^ debt. 404-4«^ 12. ^ bo may make a releafe, k 13. To whom a releafe mif be made, W' ^ RECOGNITION. I , Recognitions /* artm fchntid^ what, » 495 a. Recognitions in forma communis y What degree of evidence at- taches to thefe adis, sSid^ 496 RECORDS. I. Records of courts of juftice are public evidence, ii* i;i« 2* An officer, wkofc bufinefi ia to REPETfTIGN. See JUirnsii*v$ Ohiiisims, li. REPUTATION. 1. Of the admiffibility of repots tion in evidence, ii. 290, 291 2. Inqueftionsofprefcriptioflitii univerfally admiiible, 291 REQUETE CIVILE-RE. QUETE PREoIDIALB. I. In what cafes thefe rffs/w« admitted agaioR judgrBCou a thelaft refoft, »• 53^ INDEX. 707 RES JUDICATA. T. Rts judicata ^ defined, >• 534 S. What jodgmencs have the au- thority of res jduicata^ ibid 3. Proviiional condemnations can- Ddt, ibid. 4. Nor, interlocutory fentence^, ibid. 5. Bat judgments in the laft re- fort, or from which no appeals have been prefented, have fuch authority, 535*-^5?9 6. So, judgments frdm which a p. pcaii can no longer be received, .539-S4« 7* So judgments, againft which the appeal is declared to be lofl, 542- 543 8. What judgments are null aod cannot have the authority of nt judicatm^ 544. 9. What judgments are null with refped to what is contained in them, ibid» 545 [And fee Judgment^ 9- 17] 10. What the authority of rexjudi^ cat a is, 550 11. With regard to what things it takes effefly 4J1, andyW. la. The demand muft be of the fame ihtUg, 55*— 554 13. The demand muft be founded on the fame caufe, 5 ; 4*~556 •4. The condition of the perlons ffluft be the fame, 556 15. It is immaterial whether the demand be made in the fame form of a£iion or in another, ibid, 557, and uqH. li. Between what perlons the au- thority fAns judicata takes place, 5577563 17. Concerning the application of ns judicata to the Englijb law Stt Judgment » 18; Fraaicu SET-OFF. ' I, In any actions, where there are mutual debts, the defendant may fet off the debt due to himielf againft that for which he is fued, ii. 112 a. The right of compenfation or fet-off is confined to debts only, «»3 )• The mutual debts muft be due in the fame right, ii. 1 \x 4« No fet-ofi^ can be pleaded^ where a debt in due to or from feveral per fons, jointly ^ ti^ 5. Secus, w^ere two perfens are ind k bted jointlf and federally , ib» 6. No debt can be fet off, uulefs a counter adion be maintained be» tween the fame perfons and in the fame charaders, ibid. 7. Semblif that, after notice to debtor of an affignmeu of hit debt, he cannot fet off againft that demand ag^inft one which may be due from bimf^lf, tbid. 8. There can be no fet-off in cafes of diftf'fs for rent, 1 1 5 9« Set-off can only be maintained for fuch debts as were due at the commencement of the adion» 116 SIGNATURE. I. A^s under private fignature are no evidence againll the party fubfcribing them ; when they kre in his own poffeflion, i. ^81 «• Nor, againll third perfons, in what caie, ibid 482 3. Signature is effcntial to a deed* si. 166 4* Of writings not iigned, and which tend to produce an obli- gation, i. 488 5. It is a fuSicient fignature, if a perfon knowing the contents of a deed fign it as a witnefs only* li. 197 6. The mere perufal or fettling of a draft will not difpenfc wttb a fignature of a ptrty, ibid* SOLIDITY : {Obligations in Soli do.) I. Solidity of obligation, what, i. 144 a. Efife£ls of obligations in /olido betv/^een feveral creditors,/^. 145 3* Nature of an obligation in/ohdo on the part of debtors, and how contracted, 145, 1 46 , 4. It is r.ot fulficient to conftitute an obligation infoUdo^ that each of the debtors is debtor of the whole thing, 146 3 A a 5. W*.cn /a 7o8 INDEX. }. When feveral perfont cootrad a drbt infilid^t they are debtors of the whole only as to the creditor, i- 147 6. Id what cafe the obligation of feveral debtors is held to be con- traded im/plido^ it. 14B— 150 7. In what cafe folidicy takes place, though it is not exprefsly ftipulated, ' 148 8« Partners* in refptd of tbeir joint concern, i^/V. 9* So, between feveral lotors and adminiibrators, ihU, 149 10. bo, wheie leveral perfans have concurred in an injury^ and each is liable to make reparation, IZ. An obligation i» JiJUo refuhs from teitamentSy when feveral perions are bound by the tefta- tor*s making uiie of a digandtive cxpreflion, i^. 150 I a. Of the effeds of folidicy be- tween feveral debtors, 1 ^o 15. The creditor has his elefllon to recover Irom which debtor he pleafes, i6 14. Such elefiion does po: liberate the others, until he is paid, /^/V. 15. Bt>t it interrupts the conrfe of prelcriptioD againft ail ihe others, 1 6. If one of feveral debtors in JplidPf being fued by the crediior, oppofff, in compenfation of the debt demanded, a like fum owing to him from the creditor, the other debtors are liberated by fuch comtenfation, 1^1,1^3 17. A real relcafe of the debt by the C'fditor, in favour of one o^ feveral debtors in /olidfit dif- charges ^U the reft^ 1^3 18. A mere perfonal diG:harge of one O the debtors in/olido^ does nor diicharge the rcll, ibid, 154 19 b.xtindioo of the debt in the perton of one debtor, is no dif- cliarge to the others, 1^4 20. Rf'lea'e of folidity, ibid, 31. A creditor, who acknowledges a debt^ or to h ve paid fvr his partt ii prefumed to have tacitly renounced thment, i. 15s 3. Terms, of right, and of grsce, 3. £ffe6l of a ternii and in what refpeds it differs from a coo« dition, ih* 4* A term is prefumed to be io* ferted in favour oi the debtor; though it is fometimes in fsvosr of the creditor, 13s 5. Whether a creditor can be obliged to receive before tbe term, ihid* 6. In what cafes the debt may be required i^ithin the term» 133 7. In what cafes a term is he!d to apply to a condition, and 10 a dilpofition, ihiJ. and nete (b) 134 TERRI£&S. INDEX. 7" TERRIERS. I, Terriers how far admiilible in evidence by cbe Fnnch law, i. 482,483 X. Bjr the Engii^ law they may be given in evidence* ii. t6i 3« They are in all cafes evidence againft the pkrfon. iSiii, 4. Buc not for him, unlefs figned by himfelf and the churchwar. denSf iM, TESTAMENT. See JTiU. TE3TIM0NV. See Bvidencif Parol E*videmce, Wit' TIME. 1. Of the cdmputation of time, ac- cording to the laws of England^ ii. 50 2. Conflruftion of the expreifiun, '^fromfucb a day," ibid. 3. Where computation is to ,be m^de from an ad done, the day when fuch ad was done is in. eluded, ^1 4. Import of the tern^ of a year and a day, ibid, 5* No fradion of t day allowable, ib. 6. Deviations froa this principle, 52 7. Condrudion of a months ibid. TRADESMEN'S BOOKS.' i. Tradefmen'a books, no evidence oftheadual delivery of goods therein ftated to have been fup. P'»cd, i. ^83 2. Hjw far they are evidence in their favour, ibid, 484 3. Where an entry is made by the hand of a different perfon, it makes evidence againft him, 484, 485 4. Ztcus as tOi loofe papers, found in their books. 485 5. A vague acknowledgment o\ a debt in a tradefman's book, is 00 evidence, unlefs the cauf^ of it be e^prelTed or at lead pre fumed, 484,485 6. No perfoo can ufe a trtdefman't book againft him; unlefs ho coofcnt CO its being produced againft himfelf, i ^^^ 7. Of the evidence of trtdefmen*a < books by the EngUjb laws, ii. i8y 8. No perfon can reqoire his owa books to be received in his own favour, ibid. 9. Nor can one party compel a no* ther to produce his books, ibtim 10. Whoever requires ano^her'a books to be produced, muft make his eledion whether thef ihAJi be received as evidence, ibid. 11. Cafes where books, in which entries had been made by per* fons fubfequently deceafed, have been received in evidence, x 88» 189* 190 TRANSACTION. What that teroa implies in the civil l«w» i. 4I1 iM/# («). TRUSTS. I. All deckratioDs of trail noft^ by the ftatute of frauds, be tn ^"ting, ii. 200 a. Excepting fuch as arife by im- plication of law, ibid. 3. An agreement for one perfon to be truftee for others may be road^ out by letters in which he admitted himfelf to be fuch; and fuch admiffion is equivalent to a formal declaration, ibid. 4. Where a truftee purchafes landa with the truft money, and takea a conveyance in his own pame, a truft will reiult, 3q| UNDERTAKINGS {Original and ColUuirai). 1. What are deemed fuch within the ftatute of frauds, ii. igg 2. Where the whole obligatian it confined to the perfon making a promi{c, though in refped of the benr^fit to another per /on it is not an undertaking within 'the 3. An undertaking for better fel curity is void, £^,;^ 4. Where a pcrfco, who makes an under. 7" I N D B X. undertaking, is ioterefled joiDcly wiih othertf his cogsgement is bindiDgy it. 199 UNILATERAL CON- TRACTS. Sec ContraSsf 6. USAGE. 1. In tbe conftrufiion of inftra- inent«» ufage is to be ttken into confideration» ii. 114 2. Cafes in v^rbich local cuftoms ha^^e been a'mitced to explain an inflrament, i^/V. 115 . 3. But evidence of nfage is not ad inilCble to contradi£l the exprefs terms of a written inftrumenty 1 1 5 4. Contcfloporaneoos and fubfe- quendy continuing ufage* ad- jniiUble at proper evidence to explain douotfal words in the ' iodruments tbemfclvett a 16 — 211 5* or the effefl of ufage on the lawp 364—367 USUCAPTIOM. I. Ufucaptiooy nature of* ii. 413* «. (f) tm Ignorance of ' law is of ro ad wantage in Cftfc of nfucaption, WILL. I. To conftriie a will, the intent mnft be t^ken from the whole will together, applied to the fab. jett matter to which inch wit! re- lares, - ii. 212 % Formaliues necefary to a tefta- meot^ under the Roman laws, 493 3. The wifdom of ft teftaroent is a flrong proof of the fa'nity of the trftator, S^S* 5'^ 4. D.ffcrence between tefiainents and conirads, 541 WITNESSES. X. Proof by witnciTes not receiv- able againO, or beyond what is contained in a writing, ^ i. 504 a. WullraiioM of this principle, itidn 505, 506 i 3. Any perfoa, profeCog a re* ligion that will be a tie npoo hi nit may be admitted as a wit* nefs and fworn actor diogly, 4. Therefore, the telliinoaj of Jt^ws may be, received in evi. dence, iki, 5. So, of Mahometans and Gen- toos, ^r. M, 6. 80, of Quakers (on affirmacion), except in crimin;il cafes, ih'ti. 7. H'^w far the language, manocr, and deportment of witocfles af. , fe£t their teftimony, 254-938 8 Influence of the gcoerjl chs- rader of witnelTe^ on thfir tefti* mony, confidered, 2;9i 260 9. No witnefs can be aikJed toy qu<' (lions, tending to criniioate himlclf, x6i 10. The namber of witnefef, in4 th»ir concurrence in fopportoft given aflertion, is a maitrr of importance in deciding on their tefti mony, 262—266 1 1 . How far the teftimony of t witnefs, who has depokd falidjr in any par(« is to be rejeded, 266 12. A party cannot call witDcfTei to the difcredit of others, whom he has before examined, ihii, 13. Degree of credit to be given to an unwilling witnefs, 267 14. The teftimony of one wiinc^ only, an infufficient proof. i. $14. ii. 371— 2;$ 15. A decree (hall not be made againft the anfwer of a defend- ant upon the oath of one wit- nefs, ii.276 16. Exception.— Where the eri- dence. produced by the plain* tiff, was fupported and corrobo- rated by many concorring cir- cumHances, 277 17. If a defendant in an anfwer affirm any thing, which he fc« conds by the leftimony of a iingle witnefs, and nothing is proved agajnft it, this is fof- fictent, ' 27^ 18. The evidence of ti^p wi- ncffei is necefTary in cafes of trial for high treafon, A5 33. Reqniiites to the validity of a witnels's dtpniition, f^/V. 516 24. Of (he qualhy Or competency of witnefles, and of fome par* ticDiar exceptions to their telti- mony, 1. 5i7«and/0/. ii. 298, and/b/. 625, 626 25. DiflinflioD between the quali- tiei requiiite fdr witnefTes of written a£ls, and thofe of wir« aeflcs produced to prove a fad, i.517 a6. Who cannot be witnelTes, 27. In fane perfoRS, iiid, ii. 298 28. Children» >• S'7 29. Cafes in which children may, by the law of EngJanJ, be ad- mitted as wicneflesj ii. 299 30. PerfonatinUmyy i. 518. ii* 299 31. To Support the objedion to a perfon's evidence on the ground of infamy, the record (or an actheniicated copy) of the con- virion and jodgmeot muft be produced, ii. 300 32. Whether the king's pardon reftores the competency of a wit- nefs, /^V4 33. Though a general infamy of character may defeat the credit, it does not aHedt the competency of a witnefs, ili^. 34. Sufpicionofpartiallty a ground ofexceptioato a witnefs by the civil lawy i. 518 35* Enumeration of perfons liable to this exception^ i. 5 18> 519 — 36. How far, by the law of £«• giatui, fufpicion of partiality zf* teds the leftimony of a witnefs, ii. 300, 3CI 37. Where there is a certain benefit or difadvantage to a witnefs, attending the confeqoence of the caufe one way, it operates as a* difqoalifi cation, 502— 3O4 38 Where the intereft of a com- munity are in queftion, the mem- bera of that comn unity are not, in genera!, admiffible witnefles, 304-307 39. A truftee or executor, who hat no beneficial interei^j may be adnfitced as a witnefs, 307 40. An interelleci witnefs may be examined from nee trfl]ty« ih» 308 I 41. No perfon (h^Il, by his own ad» render himfeif an incom<» petent witnefs, when a part)r has acquired an intereft in his tefli« mony, j^/V. 42. Wnere a perfon, who is ten- dered as a witnefs; does every thing he can to ub^iate any ob- jedion to his tedimony, the other party cannot refule his examina- tion, /^Wl 43. A witnefs, having an equal intereft either way, may be ex- amined, 339, 30 44. A witnefs^ who is intercited i« the event of a fuit, is not necef. farily incompetent, onlefs he has an intercft in eflabliihing the truth of his anf^er to the quef- tion propofed, 3 1 o 45. Huibands and wives, either ia civil or criminal cafes, cannot be allowed as witnefles for or againfl each other, 3 1 1 46. Exceptions. — High trealon, forcible marriage, thJ^ 4j. In trials for polygamv« the evidence of the fecond wife only is admiflible, 312 48. In all pdblic profecutions. the party injured may be a witnefs, where there is only a fine to the king, and no private advantage arifing to himfeif by fiich prose- cution, 3 r 3 49. Secujp r«4 I N D B X. 49. Suisf if then is any private ad van cage to accrae from the profecQCiony ii. 313 50. Ba: perfons, froin whom pro- peay has been ilalen, are not excepted; though eatiiUd to reAittttioa in cafe of convidion, 3«4 ,51. No% perfoQS entitled to re- wards for apprehending hig fa- way n»en» (sTc. f^V. 5a. A fuTpicion of fubornatton is an objedioQ to a wimsfs, t. 531 j^3» Whether a party grieved can be a wuntfs to prove a perj ary, ii. 315 54t A perfon^ whofe name is forged* is an incompeteot wit- nefs to prove the forgcy, unlefs he has a releafe from thofe who are icterefted in the validity of the inftrument, 31; 55. A coanfcl or attorney cannot be allowed to give evidence of natters » difciofed confidentially to them in thofe capacities by their clients, 316, 317 56. A perfon, who has given cre« dit to a negotiable inftrumeot by potting his name to it* is admif- fible. as a witnefs of f^^s to in- validate it, 318 ^7. Parents are not admifllble as witnefTes to baftardizetneirifTaCy i^i/. 319 58. Exceptions to witneiTcs by the Reman law, 564, 565 39. Perfons under age» how far incapable of being wimeiTcs, 566 60. Poverty, how far an exception to a witnef/<9 i^fV. 6i. Decrcs, 567 6s. Law*fuiu or caufet thereof, 570 63. Animofities for favours re- fufed, 57 ' 64 Attachment to a patty in- terell-'d, S7S 65. Wariher pofitive or negative witnfflTes are of moll importance to qucllions of fanity or infaoity, 599, 600 Sec Crcfs Fxaminatieti, £>«»/'• Butta/t uj U'ltneJJis. WOMEN. I. How far married womeo may con trad, i> 29. il 31 a. Ho (band compellable to pro. vide necefiaries for his wife, ii-Si 3* A wife, having commnnity of property with ber hulbftd, is deemed, as to that, to contrad in conjondion with him, i. ^0 4. Of the admiffibility of wivei and hufbandsin evidence, for or againft each other* ii. 31 1, 31s WRITINGS [Fri^Mti\. 1. Afts nnder common prirate fignature have equal credit with authentic ada againft the fub- fcribing parties, their heirs or fncceflbrs, 1 4;^ 2. Notes in writing, which are written in a di^rent hand. writing from that of the fnb* fcribing party, are not valid, unlefs the debtor write at the bottom with bis own hand, good for fuch a fumy 480 3. Exception in favour of certsin perfons, ihiL 4. Wben the fom contained in tlie body of the note differs from that for which it is ezprefled to be good, which ihall be vaKi ihu, J • A note in writing, found 10 tbc pofleffion of the debtor, is pre- fumed to have been paid or re- leafed, 481 See alfo Signatun. WRITTEN EVIDENCL # 1. Commencement of proof by writing; i. 507 2. Different examples of com- mencement of proof by wricJQg, ikid. 50$ 3. Proof ot a debt by an ad, ia which the fam is omitted, ii a commencement of proof by writing which ought CO adoiic parol evidence, ^09 4. An aA, written by the party requiring proof, cannot ferve him as a commenccacDt of proof, 5^^ 5. Excep. I N D B X. 7«$ J. Exception. — Tradcfmcn** booksy i. $1.0 <• The writbg of ft third perfon cannot be fuch cooimtncement of prooft ihU, 7. Nor if the mckoowledgment of ft debt, hj one of the heirs of a deceafed debtor, ft commeoce. nent of proof ftfaifift hit co» b€irf# ihid. 8. Nor an aA, ekher received Vf an incompetent notary^ or m« formal in itfelf, i. iBid. 511 •9. Ho«y far written evidence it admiffible to exphiin parol evi* dence, fee Par^ Entidmci» 39 10---1S See alfo jicquitiaMCi i Dstdi Writwgs i^Frivm). ' THE END« Friatti by A. Strahan, taw Printer to His Majefty^ Princcn. Street, London* ERRATA. r*i^ Pif. Line. 40 4 5 45 t •1 6r 3 8 «♦ S09 1 X9 Ml »44 I5f »3 176 ^L 7 >«$ 6*7 214 9 *'Z 7 s S a s«o 7 a»* 5 •S9 • M » &40 7 MS 7 H7 i3 »5S t% 959 *9 s6i 3« S6t 4 »«J »7 s66 4 a6S 3) 969 4 •77 16 »»7 «9 4 •91 S"? 11 374 II 11 S76 7 t 387 1 16, 1% 39* »7 40& 4 S 403 »4 % »8 VOL. n. F«r exitttmg read n/tMJhg, For a firjmsl read ^nr mrirr* Dele amtf CV0I w^irf ribf# «r« imtc fitf 11 tw§* Votiy l