The vendorification of Medicare Advantage Authors: David J Meyers, Jeffrey Marr Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractMedicare Advantage (MA) plans increasingly outsource core functions to third-party vendors, a trend termed the “vendorification” of MA. Vendors now play major roles in star-rating maximization, risk-code capture, and prior authorization, with evidence that vendor-conducted prior authorization yields higher denial rates and more appeal reversals than reviews conducted internally by insurers. This commentary examines 3 potential challenges that may be posed by vendorification: increased federal spending through non–budget-neutral risk adjustment and quality bonuses, opportunities to game medical loss ratio requirements, and weakened accountability to beneficiaries' long-term health. Potential policy responses include mandatory reporting of vendor spending and, more fundamentally, reforming the payment incentives that make revenue-generating vendor services profitable. Medicare Advantage plans outsource core functions to third-party vendors. Medicare Advantage plans outsource core functions to third-party vendors. This “vendorification” may raise federal spending, create opportunities to game medical loss ratio requirements, and shift consequential decisions, such as prior authorization denials, to entities with little accountability. This “vendorification” may raise federal spending, create opportunities to game medical loss ratio requirements, and shift consequential decisions, such as prior authorization denials, to entities with little accountability. Policymakers should require transparent reporting of vendor spending and utilization in the program. Policymakers should require transparent reporting of vendor spending and utilization in the program. What do Christmas movies have to do with Medicare Advantage (MA)? Hallmark, the card and media company, has a role in both. Medicare Advantage plans contract with Hallmark to send physical cards in the mail to their members to try and increase member satisfaction, leading to higher patient experience scores in the star ratings that determine how billions in bonus payments are allocated.1 Whether or not these cards provide a tangible benefit to members, they are a striking example of the vendor economy that has embedded itself across the MA program.2 As the MA program's $450 billion in annual federal spending continues to grow, a share of this spending flows to third-party vendors who take on core administrative functions of plans.3,4 These partnerships, what we call the vendorification of MA, may be growing and yet there is no evidence or transparency on whether the role of these vendors is beneficial or harmful to the program. Widespread use of vendors in the MA program As Hallmark's MA line of business demonstrates, star rating maximization is one source of major vendor activity. Medicare Advantage plans are rated on 30+ measures of quality. More than $10 billion is spent per year on bonuses for high-rated plans. In addition to services such as those that Hallmark provides, there are other vendors that try to boost outcome measures. Some of these services may genuinely benefit members, such as several vendors that conduct clinician outreach to improve medication adherence; however, to our knowledge, there is currently no evidence on if these benefits are real, or a cost-effective use of plan spending. Risk code capture is a second area of significant vendor attention. Medicare Advantage plans are paid a risk-adjusted rate based on Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) codes, which provide a direct financial incentive for every additional diagnosis code that MA plans capture. Some vendors use artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms to search medical records for additional diagnoses, while other vendors segment patient populations to select the patients who are likely to yield the most diagnoses. Others conduct in-home health risk assessments for plans, which MedPAC identifies as a major source of the increased coding intensity that is estimated to add $40 billion in excess Medicare payments in 2025 alone.5 Prior authorization, a utilization management strategy used by health insurers to reduce the amount that they spend on enrollee health services, is a third area where vendors play an important role. External vendors often conduct prior authorization on narrowly defined sets of services. For example, Humana works with 3 different vendors for musculoskeletal services, radiation oncology, and genetic testing. Many prior authorization vendors are now using AI or predictive algorithms to aid in their decision making.6,7 If vendors receive a cut of the savings that come from a successful prior authorization, they may be financially incentivized to deny services more frequently. For example, a recent report from the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that a post–acute care vendor, NaviHealth, increased prior authorization substantially more than plans conducted internally.8 However, understanding the impacts of prior authorization vendor decisions on patients is challenging because there is no public reporting on any vendor-related data in the Medicare program.9 Potential challenges posed by vendorification Outsourcing is ubiquitous in business, and delegating specialized tasks to vendors is not inherently a problem. Our concern is that if, in MA, the functions most profitably outsourced are those that generate revenue from Medicare rather than improve care, that delegation moves these functions further from regulatory view. The growth of the vendor economy raises 3 key challenges for oversight of the program. First, the vendor economy could drive up overall spending in the Medicare program. Because neither risk adjustment nor the quality bonus program are budget neutral, increasing risk scores and 5-star ratings can substantially increase the costs of the MA program to the federal government. Second, vendors could provide opportunities to game medical loss ratio (MLR) requirements. Medicare Advantage plans are required to spend 85% of their revenue from Medicare on patient care, with up to 15% available for administrative overhead. Under current regulations, administrative payments to vendors for services such as risk score capture need to be counted as administrative overhead; efforts that go toward quality improvement can count towards the patient care part of the calculation. This could incentivize plans to pay star-rating vendors more, because such spending may count toward patient care while also increasing bonus revenue. To our knowledge, no empirical work has documented this behavior but the current data collected to track MLRs do not include any information on vendor spending. Third, outsourcing essential functions to vendors who have little incentive to improve the long-term health of beneficiaries may reduce the effectiveness of the program. For example, vendors that conduct prior authorization, and may be paid a share of the savings they generate over a short episode of care, may be less concerned about the longer-term health consequences of their decisions, potentially leading them to deny care more than insurers do when conducting prior authorizations internally.9,10 Understanding the future of vendorification It is currently not possible to know if the use of vendors in the MA program is of net benefit or harm to the MA program and its beneficiaries given the lack of research and data to evaluate the problem. There is virtually no required public reporting on spending on vendors, and vendors are not subject to the same reporting requirements as MA plans and, as far as we are aware, there has been little to no academic research on the topic. There is a need for a research agenda to understand the role that vendors play, and more data to support that work. Policymakers should consider requiring detailed reporting of vendor spending, either through existing MLR reporting requirements or through new reporting requirements. While this increased transparency may not drive beneficiary decision making, it could allow for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and HHS OIG to better regulate the program and for researchers and policymakers to better evaluate any potential impact vendors may have, and if those impacts are in the best interest of the program. More guidance may also be necessary to ensure that vendor spending is being appropriately accounted for in the MLR. Looking ahead, vendors are likely to play a major role in the program until the root of the challenges in MA are addressed. The MA program is complicated, and vendors can help plans address that complexity. As long as plans are incentivized to capture diagnosis codes or maximize quality across dozens of metrics, there will be opportunities for vendors to step in to provide these services. Regardless of whether vendors are of net benefit or harm, reducing the susceptibility of the MA risk-adjustment model to coding intensity and simplifying the star rating program could help mitigate the large amounts of spending on these activities. Addressing such incentives for revenue-generating activities could allow greater investment in care coordination and insurance products that produce real value for beneficiaries. Supplementary Material