Strengthening One Health AMR Surveillance in Africa: From Cross-Sectoral Data to Policy Action Authors: Yusuf Hared Abdi, Sharmake Gaiye Bashir, Zakaria Ibrahim Issack Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractAntimicrobial resistance (AMR) has emerged as one of the greatest threats to global health, with Africa bearing a disproportionate burden: an estimated 1.05 million deaths were associated with bacterial AMR and approximately 250,000 deaths were directly attributable to AMR in the WHO African Region in 2019 alone. This burden reflects high infectious disease prevalence, limited diagnostic capacity, weak antimicrobial stewardship, and fragmented surveillance systems. Given that resistant pathogens and resistance genes circulate across humans, animals, and the environment, effective surveillance requires a coordinated One Health approach. This narrative review synthesizes published literature (2015–2026) identified through PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar to assess the status of One Health AMR surveillance in Africa, examine progress across the human, animal, and environmental sectors, identify major implementation barriers, and propose strategic priorities for strengthening integrated surveillance systems. The evidence reviewed shows that participation in surveillance initiatives such as GLASS has expanded and laboratory capacity has improved in several countries; however, substantial gaps remain in veterinary and environmental surveillance, laboratory infrastructure, data interoperability, governance, workforce capacity, and sustainable financing. Fragmented information systems and limited cross-sectoral collaboration continue to impede timely detection of emerging resistance and evidence-informed policy action. Based on these findings, we recommend prioritizing integrated governance structures, strengthened laboratory networks, interoperable digital surveillance platforms, and sustainable domestic financing as foundational steps, with genomic technologies, wastewater surveillance, and regional collaboration serving as complementary priorities as feasibility and resources allow. Strengthening One Health surveillance will be critical for improving early detection of resistant pathogens, informing antimicrobial stewardship, supporting outbreak preparedness, and reducing the growing health and economic burden of AMR across Africa. Introduction Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is increasingly recognized as a silent pandemic that threatens the effectiveness of modern medicine and the long-term viability of health systems worldwide.1,2 In 2019, bacterial AMR was directly responsible for an estimated 1.27 million deaths globally and was associated with nearly 4.95 million deaths, placing it among the leading infectious causes of mortality worldwide.2 Africa bears a disproportionate share of this burden because resistant infections emerge and spread in settings characterized by high infectious disease incidence, constrained access to quality diagnostics, weak antimicrobial stewardship, and persistent health-system fragility.3,4 The WHO African Region experienced an estimated 1.05 million deaths associated with bacterial AMR and about 250,000 deaths directly attributable to AMR in 2019, making it one of the most severely affected regions globally.4 Lower respiratory and thorax infections, bloodstream infections, and intra-abdominal infections account for a large proportion of these deaths, indicating that AMR has become a major threat across both community and hospital settings in Africa.4,5 The high mortality rate attributable to resistance in western sub-Saharan Africa further highlights the urgency of strengthening surveillance capacity in African countries, especially where microbiological diagnosis remains limited or inaccessible.4,6 Surveillance is a foundational component of any credible AMR response because it makes resistance visible, tracks temporal trends, identifies emerging threats, informs empiric treatment guidelines, and supports antimicrobial stewardship and policy action.7,8 In the absence of robust surveillance, clinicians rely heavily on empiric prescribing, national treatment guidelines are updated without sufficient local microbiological evidence, and resistant outbreaks may spread undetected until they are clinically and economically costly.7,9 In much of Africa, the true burden of AMR is still likely underestimated because laboratory coverage, data quality, and reporting systems remain incomplete.3,10 The One Health concept offers a widely endorsed framework for responding to AMR because resistance emerges and circulates across the interconnected domains of human, animal, and environmental health.11,12 For the purposes of this review, “integrated One Health AMR surveillance” is defined as the systematic collection, analysis, and sharing of AMR and antimicrobial-use data across human, animal, and environmental sectors using compatible laboratory standards and interoperable data systems, enabling cross-sectoral risk assessment and coordinated policy response. Antimicrobial use in hospitals and primary care, and in livestock production, aquaculture, and agriculture, creates selective pressure in multiple settings. Resistant organisms and resistance genes move between humans, animals, food systems, water bodies, soils, and healthcare waste streams.11,13 Figure 1 summarizes these bidirectional transmission pathways between the human, animal, and environmental compartments and the points at which One Health surveillance can intercept them. Figure 1One Health AMR transmission and surveillance interface. Arrows represent bidirectional flow of resistant pathogens and antimicrobial resistance genes (ARGs) across human, animal, and environmental compartments, with wastewater/rivers acting as a central convergence point for cross-sectoral contamination.Diagram of ARG/pathogen flow between humans, livestock, wildlife, wastewater, healthcare, food and soil. One Health AMR transmission and surveillance interface. Arrows represent bidirectional flow of resistant pathogens and antimicrobial resistance genes (ARGs) across human, animal, and environmental compartments, with wastewater/rivers acting as a central convergence point for cross-sectoral contamination. Evidence from genomic studies in African settings shows overlapping resistant bacterial lineages and shared resistance determinants across human, animal, and environmental compartments, reinforcing the epidemiological reality that AMR cannot be effectively addressed through a human-health-only lens.14,15 However, operationalizing One Health in African contexts faces persistent challenges, including competing institutional mandates, limited resourcing for cross-sectoral coordination, and debate over whether One Health commitments translate into functioning collaboration rather than remaining largely rhetorical.16,17 Al-Ouqaili et al and Al-Kubaisy et al provide further molecular and genomic evidence of resistance determinants relevant to this cross-compartment transmission risk.18,19 This global and regional recognition of AMR has shaped major policy initiatives over the past decade. In 2015, the World Health Assembly adopted the WHO Global Action Plan on AMR, which called on member states to strengthen knowledge through surveillance and research, reduce infection incidence, optimize antimicrobial use, and invest sustainably in counter-AMR action.20 The WHO subsequently launched the Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) to standardize AMR surveillance and facilitate cross-country reporting and benchmarking.21 At the continental level, African institutions including the African Union, Africa CDC, regional economic communities, and national governments have increasingly recognized AMR as a One Health and health security priority, although implementation remains uneven.22,23 Despite this policy momentum, One Health AMR surveillance in Africa remains fragmented. Human-health surveillance is relatively more advanced in some countries, especially through hospital laboratories and sentinel sites, but veterinary and environmental surveillance are still underdeveloped in most settings.3,24 Data systems remain largely sector-specific, laboratory standards differ, routine information-sharing is weak, and few countries have achieved genuine cross-sectoral integration of surveillance data for action.16,17 This review synthesizes current evidence on One Health AMR surveillance in Africa, identifies major implementation barriers, highlights successful regional initiatives, and proposes strategic priorities for strengthening integrated surveillance systems. Specifically, this narrative review aims to: (1) assess the current status of AMR surveillance across the human, animal, and environmental sectors in Africa; (2) identify the principal structural and operational barriers to cross-sectoral integration; and (3) propose priority actions to strengthen One Health AMR surveillance systems. The review covers all African subregions, spans the human, animal, and environmental sectors, and addresses surveillance status, implementation barriers, and strategic priorities, including emerging genomic and digital approaches. Review Methodology This is a narrative review synthesizing published literature on One Health AMR surveillance in Africa. Relevant publications were identified through searches of PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar, covering literature published between 2015 and 2026. Search terms combined variations of “antimicrobial resistance”, “AMR surveillance”, “One Health”, “Africa”, “GLASS”, “antimicrobial use”, “wastewater surveillance”, and “genomic surveillance”. Eligible sources included peer-reviewed articles, systematic reviews, scoping reviews, and authoritative reports (WHO, Africa CDC, FAO, WOAH) addressing human, animal, or environmental AMR surveillance in African countries. Non-English-language publications and studies focused exclusively on non-African settings were excluded unless providing directly relevant comparative or methodological context. Findings were synthesized narratively by sector (human, animal, environmental) and by cross-cutting theme (governance, laboratory capacity, data integration, workforce, financing, regional collaboration, and future technologies). Current Status of One Health AMR Surveillance in Africa Human Health Surveillance Human-health AMR surveillance in Africa is built mainly around hospital-based microbiology laboratories, national reference laboratories, sentinel surveillance sites, and disease-specific programs such as tuberculosis surveillance.10,25 Over the past decade, participation in GLASS and in national AMR surveillance activities has increased, and several African countries now report routine data on priority pathogens from blood, urine, stool, and other clinical specimens.10,21 Progress has been especially visible in countries supported through national AMR action plans, the Fleming Fund, and regional public health networks.25,26 Recent regional analysis indicates that the proportion of African countries with advanced AMR surveillance capacity defined mainly by GLASS reporting and laboratory participation metrics increased substantially between 2017 and 2024, while public-sector bacteriology coverage and AST availability also improved over time.25 However, increased participation in reporting frameworks does not necessarily indicate improved clinical outcomes or stronger policy translation, and this distinction warrants caution when interpreting regional progress metrics.10,25 However, this progress remains highly uneven across countries and within countries. Many systems remain concentrated in tertiary or urban hospitals, leaving primary care, district hospitals, and rural populations underrepresented in routine AMR reporting.3,10 As a result, the surveillance picture often reflects where laboratories exist rather than where the burden of resistant infection is greatest.10,25 Bloodstream infection surveillance has become one of the more informative components of AMR monitoring in Africa because it captures severe invasive disease and generates data useful for empiric antibiotic guidelines and outbreak detection.27,28 Studies from Uganda, Benin, South Africa, and The Gambia have reported substantial burdens of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Enterobacterales, and, increasingly, carbapenem-resistant organisms in bloodstream infections.27–30 These findings are clinically important because they signal narrowing treatment options in settings already constrained by limited access to reserve antibiotics and advanced supportive care, consistent with clinical outcome data showing high mortality among carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative infections despite the availability of newer combination regimens.31 Tuberculosis surveillance also contributes to the AMR architecture in Africa through established systems for drug-resistance testing, reporting, and guideline development, with recent Global Burden of Disease estimates confirming a substantial ongoing burden of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis across the region.32 Although these systems are often more mature than routine bacteriology surveillance, they remain uneven in diagnostic reach and are not always fully linked to broader national AMR platforms.25,33 Nonetheless, they provide proof that large-scale resistance surveillance is feasible when sustained policy commitment, laboratory investment, and international support are aligned.25 Key weaknesses persist. Many laboratories still experience stockouts of culture media and reagents, inconsistent external quality assurance, inadequate sample transport systems, and weak clinician-laboratory linkage.3,34 In some countries, data are still paper-based or fragmented across facilities, which delays reporting and limits the ability to detect unusual resistance patterns in real time.27,34 A recent scoping review of African GLASS-related evidence also showed that many published studies rely on single specimen types or one-off cross-sectional designs rather than representative, sustained surveillance platforms.10 Consequently, while human-health AMR surveillance has improved, coverage gaps, representativeness problems, and weak data use remain important limitations. Animal Health Surveillance Animal-health AMR surveillance in Africa remains far less developed than human-health surveillance, despite widespread antimicrobial use in livestock and poultry production and increasing concern over resistant zoonotic and commensal bacteria.35,36 In many African countries, no routine national AMR surveillance program exists for livestock, poultry, aquaculture, or companion animals.24,26 Where data are available, they often come from research projects, university laboratories, or externally funded pilot programs rather than sustained government surveillance systems.24,36 Evidence from multiple African settings suggests that antibiotics are commonly used in livestock for treatment, prophylaxis, and, in some cases, growth promotion.35,37 Poultry studies from Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya have reported frequent farmer-led antibiotic administration, over-the-counter access without prescription, poor adherence to withdrawal periods, and limited veterinary oversight.37,38 These practices create strong selection pressure for resistant bacteria in food animals and increase the risk of transmission to humans through direct contact, the food chain, manure, and contaminated environments.35,39 Retrospective surveillance data from the animal sector in countries such as Zambia show that resistant Escherichia coli and Enterococcus species are commonly detected in samples from livestock and related farm environments.40 The increase in animal environmental sampling over time in some sentinel systems suggests that awareness of the broader One Health implications of veterinary AMR is improving.40 However, surveillance remains limited by sparse laboratory networks, variable diagnostic quality, weak regulation of veterinary antimicrobial use, and poor integration with public health surveillance systems.24,36 Aquaculture and companion animal surveillance are even less developed than livestock surveillance across most of Africa.24,35 This creates a major blind spot because antimicrobial use in aquaculture and household animal care may also contribute to resistance selection and circulation, especially in peri-urban environments where humans, animals, and wastewater are closely interconnected.35 The overall picture is therefore one of partial awareness but limited institutionalization. Veterinary surveillance is increasingly acknowledged in AMR policy frameworks, but routine implementation remains insufficient in most countries.16,24 Environmental Surveillance Environmental AMR surveillance is the least developed component of One Health surveillance in Africa, even though the environment functions as both a reservoir and a transmission pathway for resistant bacteria, antimicrobial residues, and resistance genes.11,41 Wastewater, rivers, hospital effluents, pharmaceutical discharges, agricultural runoff, animal manure, and contaminated soils can all concentrate resistant organisms and facilitate horizontal gene transfer under selective pressure.11,13 In African settings with limited wastewater treatment, weak sanitation infrastructure, and rapid urbanization, these environmental pathways may be especially important.42,43 Emerging evidence from African countries shows that urban river systems, waste channels, and wastewater-impacted sites frequently contain antibiotic residues, resistant bacteria, and genes associated with clinically important resistance.42,44 A longitudinal study from Blantyre, Malawi documented environmental contamination with antibiotics and other resistance-driving chemicals at concentrations capable of selecting for AMR, while work from South Africa has shown clinically relevant antibiotics in surface waters with associated ecological and potential public health risks.43,44 These findings are important because they demonstrate that environmental AMR is not a theoretical concern but a measurable and likely growing problem across African urban ecosystems.43,44 Environmental surveillance is also relevant for monitoring the downstream impact of hospital antibiotic use, pharmaceutical waste disposal, and antimicrobial use in food production systems.11,41 Rivers and wastewater systems can integrate signals from multiple sectors at once, making them attractive targets for One Health surveillance.11,42 Yet standardized sampling frameworks, laboratory methods, risk thresholds, and reporting systems remain largely absent in African environmental AMR work.41,42 As a result, most available data come from isolated research studies that are difficult to compare across settings or over time.41,42 As a result, environmental detection of resistant organisms should not yet be interpreted as a validated direct indicator of human health risk. Wildlife and soils remain even more poorly studied, although they may serve as long-term ecological reservoirs or indicators of anthropogenic AMR pressure.11,13 The environmental pillar of One Health surveillance in Africa therefore remains highly fragmented and underfunded, despite growing evidence that resistant organisms and resistance determinants circulate widely outside clinical and veterinary settings.41,43 Integration Across Sectors Although AMR surveillance capacity has improved in several African countries, true integration across human, animal, and environmental sectors remains uncommon.16,17 In most settings, each sector still collects and stores data separately, uses different laboratory and reporting standards, and reports through different ministries or institutions.16,23 This fragmentation reduces the ability to detect cross-sectoral trends, identify transmission pathways, or generate unified risk assessments for national policy.16,17 Country and regional experiences illustrate both progress and persistent barriers. Table 1 summarizes the status of human-health, animal-health, and environmental AMR surveillance, laboratory and genomic capacity, data-integration initiatives, and main remaining gaps in selected African countries. Uganda’s bottom-up assessment of national AMR action plan implementation found limited subnational engagement, weak cross-sectoral coordination, and insufficient funding for effective One Health implementation.17 Policy analyses from southern Africa similarly indicate that even where AMR governance structures exist on paper, accountability, inter-ministerial coordination, and dedicated financing remain inadequate.23 In West Africa, regional technical working groups and harmonized tools supported by the West African Health Organization have improved coordination and laboratory support, but integration of environmental and veterinary data into a unified surveillance architecture remains incomplete.16,26 Table 1Selected examples of One Health antimicrobial resistance (AMR) surveillance capacity, cross-sectoral data integration, and remaining implementation gaps in AfricaCountry/RegionHuman-Health AMR SurveillanceAnimal-Health AMR and AMU SurveillanceEnvironmental or Wastewater SurveillanceLaboratory, AST, and Genomic CapacityData Integration and Representative InitiativesMain Remaining GapsUgandaNational AMR surveillance has expanded through hospital and reference-laboratory networks, with routine data increasingly available for priority bacterial pathogens and bloodstream infections.Animal-sector AMR and AMU surveillance is less consistently institutionalized than human surveillance; available activity is often project based.Environmental sampling and routine wastewater-based AMR surveillance remain limited.Reference and hospital laboratories provide culture and AST capacity, but geographic coverage, supply chains, quality assurance, and lower-level laboratory capacity remain uneven.Uganda has assessed National Action Plan implementation using a One Health approach; findings showed progress but weak subnational engagement, cross-sectoral coordination, and sustainable financing.Limited interoperability across ministries and sectors; insufficient domestic financing; limited environmental surveillance; need to link AMR findings with AMU data and policy action.17,25KenyaNational AMR surveillance has been strengthened through sentinel facilities, laboratory-network development, and externally supported capacity-building programmes.Veterinary and livestock AMR/AMU activities are present but are less mature and less consistently integrated with human-health reporting.Environmental surveillance remains largely research driven rather than routine national practice.Improved laboratory and surveillance capacity has been supported through national scale-up efforts, including the Fleming Fund; advanced molecular capacity is concentrated in selected institutions.The Fleming Fund has supported national surveillance strengthening, laboratory capacity, workforce development, and data systems.Sustaining gains after donor support; expansion to lower-level facilities; stronger veterinary and environmental coverage; routine linkage of AMR, AMU, and clinical-outcome data.26,38ZambiaHuman-health AMR surveillance is developing through laboratory and national AMR-response structures, although coverage remains uneven.Retrospective animal-sector data have identified resistant Escherichia coli and Enterococcus species in livestock and related farm environments.Environmental sampling exists in selected studies but is not yet a standardized national surveillance system.Animal and human laboratory capacity varies by location; culture, AST, quality assurance, and reporting infrastructure require further expansion.Animal-sector surveillance data illustrate growing recognition of One Health AMR, but routine cross-sectoral integration remains limited.Fragmented routine surveillance; weak veterinary AMU measurement; limited environmental standardization; inadequate integration of animal, human, and environmental datasets.40South AfricaRelative to many African settings, South Africa has more established clinical microbiology and AMR-surveillance capacity, including public-sector laboratory infrastructure.Veterinary, agricultural, and food-system AMR activities are present, but practical integration across sectors remains incomplete.Research has documented pharmaceuticals and potential AMR-related environmental risks in surface-water systems; routine national wastewater AMR surveillance remains limited.Stronger laboratory and molecular capacity than many regional settings, although capacity and access vary across provinces and institutions.National AMR-policy and governance structures exist; policy analyses nevertheless identify challenges in coordination, accountability, resourcing, regulation, and ownership.Translating policy structures into routine cross-sectoral action; sustainable financing; interoperability; harmonized environmental methods and interpretation; equitable subnational coverage.23,24MalawiClinical AMR surveillance capacity is expanding but remains constrained by laboratory access and resource limitations outside major centres.Veterinary AMR and AMU surveillance remain limited and are commonly supported by projects or research programmes.Environmental studies in Blantyre have demonstrated antibiotic and resistance-driving chemical contamination in urban river networks.Clinical laboratory and environmental-research capacity exist, but routine standardized environmental AMR surveillance is not established nationally.Environmental findings illustrate the value of combining clinical and wastewater/environmental data, but integration is not yet routine.Lack of standardized environmental sampling and risk thresholds; limited routine cross-sectoral data sharing; constrained laboratory and financing capacity.43Nigeria and GhanaHuman-health AMR surveillance is growing through tertiary hospitals, research institutions, national plans, and GLASS-related activities, but representativeness is limited by uneven laboratory coverage.Poultry and livestock studies report frequent antibiotic use, non-prescription access, variable adherence to withdrawal periods, and limited veterinary oversight.Environmental AMR evidence is available from isolated research studies; routine standardized wastewater surveillance remains uncommon.Laboratory capacity is concentrated in major cities and tertiary institutions; routine quality-assured AST and digital reporting remain variable.Country-level research provides important evidence on antibiotic use and resistance in poultry systems; cross-sectoral routine data integration remains limited.Weak national AMU data, particularly for animal production; informal antimicrobial access; uneven laboratory coverage; limited routine environmental surveillance and data interoperability.37,39West African regionAMR surveillance capacity has improved through national action plans, GLASS participation, regional laboratory support, and technical collaboration.Veterinary surveillance is increasingly recognized but remains variable across member states and often has limited integration with human-sector systems.Environmental AMR surveillance is generally sparse, heterogeneous, and research based.Regional training, harmonized tools, quality-assurance support, and laboratory-strengthening activities have improved readiness in several countries.The West African Health Organization regional technical working group has promoted coordination, shared tools, training, and laboratory support.Major differences in country capacity; incomplete integration of animal and environmental data; sustainable financing; cross-border data exchange; operational use of surveillance outputs.16,25East African CommunityAMR surveillance and clinical laboratory capacity are expanding, but national and subnational maturity differs substantially among member states.Veterinary surveillance is increasingly included in One Health agendas but often lacks sustained systems and routine AMU monitoring.Environmental surveillance remains limited, with wastewater and environmental studies generally not standardized or connected to national surveillance.Pathogen-genomics capacity is emerging, but sequencing platforms, bioinformatics, stable electricity, internet connectivity, supply chains, and trained personnel remain uneven.Regional collaboration and shared public-health priorities provide an opportunity for harmonized protocols, referral networks, and regional genomic hubs.Limited in-continent sequencing and bioinformatics capacity; data-governance concerns; weak interoperability; insufficient routine integration of genomic, AMR, AMU, animal, and environmental data.15,45Central and North AfricaAvailable evidence indicates heterogeneous human-health AMR surveillance capacity, with stronger systems in selected countries and important evidence gaps in others.Animal and food-system surveillance varies widely and is less consistently reported in the regional literature than human-health surveillance.Environmental AMR surveillance is uneven; country-specific research cannot be interpreted as region-wide routine coverage.Laboratory, AST, and sequencing capacity differs substantially by country, institution, and funding availability.Some national and academic initiatives exist, but continent-wide reviews should avoid assuming uniform surveillance maturity across these subregions.Limited comparable published data; need for more country-level reporting, systematic inclusion in regional networks, and sustainable cross-sectoral surveillance platforms.3,10Notes: This table presents selected illustrative examples drawn from the literature and regional reports; it is not intended to rank countries or provide a complete assessment of all national surveillance systems. “Limited” or “emerging” indicates that evidence of routine, nationally sustained, and cross-sectorally integrated surveillance was not consistently identified in the literature reviewed. Research projects, donor-supported pilots, and sustainable national surveillance systems should not be considered equivalent.Abbreviations: AMR, antimicrobial resistance; AMU, antimicrobial use; AST, antimicrobial susceptibility testing; GLASS, Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System; WGS, whole-genome sequencing. Table 1Selected examples of One Health antimicrobial resistance (AMR) surveillance capacity, cross-sectoral data integration, and remaining implementation gaps in AfricaCountry/RegionHuman-Health AMR SurveillanceAnimal-Health AMR and AMU SurveillanceEnvironmental or Wastewater SurveillanceLaboratory, AST, and Genomic CapacityData Integration and Representative InitiativesMain Remaining GapsUgandaNational AMR surveillance has expanded through hospital and reference-laboratory networks, with routine data increasingly available for priority bacterial pathogens and bloodstream infections.Animal-sector AMR and AMU surveillance is less consistently institutionalized than human surveillance; available activity is often project based.Environmental sampling and routine wastewater-based AMR surveillance remain limited.Reference and hospital laboratories provide culture and AST capacity, but geographic coverage, supply chains, quality assurance, and lower-level laboratory capacity remain uneven.Uganda has assessed National Action Plan implementation using a One Health approach; findings showed progress but weak subnational engagement, cross-sectoral coordination, and sustainable financing.Limited interoperability across ministries and sectors; insufficient domestic financing; limited environmental surveillance; need to link AMR findings with AMU data and policy action.17,25KenyaNational AMR surveillance has been strengthened through sentinel facilities, laboratory-network development, and externally supported capacity-building programmes.Veterinary and livestock AMR/AMU activities are present but are less mature and less consistently integrated with human-health reporting.Environmental surveillance remains largely research driven rather than routine national practice.Improved laboratory and surveillance capacity has been supported through national scale-up efforts, including the Fleming Fund; advanced molecular capacity is concentrated in selected institutions.The Fleming Fund has supported national surveillance strengthening, laboratory capacity, workforce development, and data systems.Sustaining gains after donor support; expansion to lower-level facilities; stronger veterinary and environmental coverage; routine linkage of AMR, AMU, and clinical-outcome data.26,38ZambiaHuman-health AMR surveillance is developing through laboratory and national AMR-response structures, although coverage remains uneven.Retrospective animal-sector data have identified resistant Escherichia coli and Enterococcus species in livestock and related farm environments.Environmental sampling exists in selected studies but is not yet a standardized national surveillance system.Animal and human laboratory capacity varies by location; culture, AST, quality assurance, and reporting infrastructure require further expansion.Animal-sector surveillance data illustrate growing recognition of One Health AMR, but routine cross-sectoral integration remains limited.Fragmented routine surveillance; weak veterinary AMU measurement; limited environmental standardization; inadequate integration of animal, human, and environmental datasets.40South AfricaRelative to many African settings, South Africa has more established clinical microbiology and AMR-surveillance capacity, including public-sector laboratory infrastructure.Veterinary, agricultural, and food-system AMR activities are present, but practical integration across sectors remains incomplete.Research has documented pharmaceuticals and potential AMR-related environmental risks in surface-water systems; routine national wastewater AMR surveillance remains limited.Stronger laboratory and molecular capacity than many regional settings, although capacity and access vary across provinces and institutions.National AMR-policy and governance structures exist; policy analyses nevertheless identify challenges in coordination, accountability, resourcing, regulation, and ownership.Translating policy structures into routine cross-sectoral action; sustainable financing; interoperability; harmonized environmental methods and interpretation; equitable subnational coverage.23,24MalawiClinical AMR surveillance capacity is expanding but remains constrained by laboratory access and resource limitations outside major centres.Veterinary AMR and AMU surveillance remain limited and are commonly supported by projects or research programmes.Environmental studies in Blantyre have demonstrated antibiotic and resistance-driving chemical contamination in urban river networks.Clinical laboratory and environmental-research capacity exist, but routine standardized environmental AMR surveillance is not established nationally.Environmental findings illustrate the value of combining clinical and wastewater/environmental data, but integration is not yet routine.Lack of standardized environmental sampling and risk thresholds; limited routine cross-sectoral data sharing; constrained laboratory and financing capacity.43Nigeria and GhanaHuman-health AMR surveillance is growing through tertiary hospitals, research institutions, national plans, and GLASS-related activities, but representativeness is limited by uneven laboratory coverage.Poultry and livestock studies report frequent antibiotic use, non-prescription access, variable adherence to withdrawal periods, and limited veterinary oversight.Environmental AMR evidence is available from isolated research studies; routine standardized wastewater surveillance remains uncommon.Laboratory capacity is concentrated in major cities and tertiary institutions; routine quality-assured AST and digital reporting remain variable.Country-level research provides important evidence on antibiotic use and resistance in poultry systems; cross-sectoral routine data integration remains limited.Weak national AMU data, particularly for animal production; informal antimicrobial access; uneven laboratory coverage; limited routine environmental surveillance and data interoperability.37,39West African regionAMR surveillance capacity has improved through national action plans, GLASS participation, regional laboratory support, and technical collaboration.Veterinary surveillance is increasingly recognized but remains variable across member states and often has limited integration with human-sector systems.Environmental AMR surveillance is generally sparse, heterogeneous, and research based.Regional training, harmonized tools, quality-assurance support, and laboratory-strengthening activities have improved readiness in several countries.The West African Health Organization regional technical working group has promoted coordination, shared tools, training, and laboratory support.Major differences in country capacity; incomplete integration of animal and environmental data; sustainable financing; cross-border data exchange; operational use of surveillance outputs.16,25East African CommunityAMR surveillance and clinical laboratory capacity are expanding, but national and subnational maturity differs substantially among member states.Veterinary surveillance is increasingly included in One Health agendas but often lacks sustained systems and routine AMU monitoring.Environmental surveillance remains limited, with wastewater and environmental studies generally not standardized or connected to national surveillance.Pathogen-genomics capacity is emerging, but sequencing platforms, bioinformatics, stable electricity, internet connectivity, supply chains, and trained personnel remain uneven.Regional collaboration and shared public-health priorities provide an opportunity for harmonized protocols, referral networks, and regional genomic hubs.Limited in-continent sequencing and bioinformatics capacity; data-governance concerns; weak interoperability; insufficient routine integration of genomic, AMR, AMU, animal, and environmental data.15,45Central and North AfricaAvailable evidence indicates heterogeneous human-health AMR surveillance capacity, with stronger systems in selected countries and important evidence gaps in others.Animal and food-system surveillance varies widely and is less consistently reported in the regional literature than human-health surveillance.Environmental AMR surveillance is uneven; country-specific research cannot be interpreted as region-wide routine coverage.Laboratory, AST, and sequencing capacity differs substantially by country, institution, and funding availability.Some national and academic initiatives exist, but continent-wide reviews should avoid assuming uniform surveillance maturity across these subregions.Limited comparable published data; need for more country-level reporting, systematic inclusion in regional networks, and sustainable cross-sectoral surveillance platforms.3,10Notes: This table presents selected illustrative examples drawn from the literature and regional reports; it is not intended to rank countries or provide a complete assessment of all national surveillance systems. “Limited” or “emerging” indicates that evidence of routine, nationally sustained, and cross-sectorally integrated surveillance was not consistently identified in the literature reviewed. Research projects, donor-supported pilots, and sustainable national surveillance systems should not be considered equivalent.Abbreviations: AMR, antimicrobial resistance; AMU, antimicrobial use; AST, antimicrobial susceptibility testing; GLASS, Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System; WGS, whole-genome sequencing. Selected examples of One Health antimicrobial resistance (AMR) surveillance capacity, cross-sectoral data integration, and remaining implementation gaps in Africa Notes: This table presents selected illustrative examples drawn from the literature and regional reports; it is not intended to rank countries or provide a complete assessment of all national surveillance systems. “Limited” or “emerging” indicates that evidence of routine, nationally sustained, and cross-sectorally integrated surveillance was not consistently identified in the literature reviewed. Research projects, donor-supported pilots, and sustainable national surveillance systems should not be considered equivalent. Abbreviations: AMR, antimicrobial resistance; AMU, antimicrobial use; AST, antimicrobial susceptibility testing; GLASS, Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System; WGS, whole-genome sequencing. Molecular studies reinforce the need for integration. Whole-genome sequencing work from eastern Africa and other low-resource settings has demonstrated overlapping genomic clusters and shared plasmid-borne resistance determinants among human, animal, and environmental E. coli isolates, consistent with active AMR flow across compartments.14,15 These findings mean that sector-specific surveillance alone will systematically miss important parts of the resistance picture. Although surveillance capacity has improved in several African countries, true One Health integration remains uncommon. While genomic studies have demonstrated clonal and plasmid-level relatedness across compartments in specific settings, broader continental transmission dynamics remain inferred rather than directly demonstrated in most contexts. Antimicrobial Use Surveillance Antimicrobial use (AMU) surveillance is essential for interpreting resistance patterns and designing effective stewardship interventions, yet it receives far less attention in Africa than AMR surveillance itself. GLASS now includes a dedicated AMU module, recognizing that consumption data are necessary to link prescribing practices with observed resistance trends.7,21 In the human health sector, AMU data collection remains inconsistent, with most countries lacking routine, facility-level consumption monitoring outside donor-supported pilot studies such as those conducted under the Fleming Fund.26 In the veterinary sector, AMU data are even more limited, as antibiotics are frequently accessed over the counter without prescription or veterinary oversight, making consumption difficult to quantify or regulate.37,38 Without integrated AMU data, resistance surveillance risks describing outcomes without illuminating their drivers, limiting the ability of national programs to target stewardship interventions where they are most needed. Challenges and Strategic Priorities for Strengthening One Health Surveillance Governance and Coordination Weak governance and poor multisectoral coordination remain among the most important barriers to integrated One Health AMR surveillance in Africa.16,17 In many countries, ministries responsible for human health, livestock, environment, fisheries, and water operate independently with limited routine collaboration, unclear mandates for data sharing, and no empowered national body responsible for coordinating AMR surveillance across sectors.17,23 This institutional fragmentation leads to duplicated efforts in some areas and neglect in others.17,23 National One Health platforms, where they exist, often have limited legal authority, inconsistent meeting schedules, and heavy dependence on donor-supported projects.17,23 Sustainable progress requires formalized governance arrangements with clear lines of accountability, shared indicators, and statutory obligations for cross-sectoral collaboration.16,20 Regional bodies such as Africa CDC, ECOWAS, and the East African Community can support this process by harmonizing surveillance standards, facilitating peer learning, and promoting cross-border AMR cooperation.22,25 Laboratory Capacity Laboratory capacity remains the operational backbone of AMR surveillance, yet many African countries still have too few clinical microbiology laboratories, limited AST capability, and insufficient molecular diagnostic infrastructure.3,25 Even where reference laboratories exist, lower-tier facilities may lack incubators, automated blood culture systems, quality-assured reagents, biosafety infrastructure, or trained microbiologists.3,34 This constrains both routine patient care and surveillance data generation.3,10 Quality assurance is another persistent challenge. Variability in specimen processing, isolate identification, breakpoint application, and data recording can reduce the comparability and policy value of surveillance outputs.10,25 Strengthening regional reference laboratories, scaling laboratory accreditation, improving supply chains, and expanding external quality assessment are therefore essential strategic priorities.16,25 Mobile or shared regional laboratory models may also support fragile or conflict-affected settings where fixed-site laboratory expansion is difficult.25 Surveillance Data Integration Surveillance data integration remains weak across much of Africa because laboratories and ministries often use separate databases, paper-based records, or non-interoperable reporting tools.23,34 This makes it difficult to link microbiology data with antimicrobial use data, patient outcomes, veterinary data, or environmental findings.23,27 As a result, potentially actionable patterns may remain hidden, and national reports may be delayed or incomplete.27,34 Digital surveillance systems offer a clear strategic opportunity. Electronic reporting, shared data dictionaries, cloud-enabled storage, and interoperable platforms linked to tools such as WHONET can improve timeliness, completeness, and usability of AMR surveillance data.25,27 Digital systems are also necessary if countries want to incorporate advanced analytics, near-real-time outbreak detection, and cross-sectoral dashboards into surveillance practice.27 However, technology alone is not enough; governance, standardization, workforce training, and infrastructure must be developed in parallel.23,25 Figure 2 illustrates how these elements combine into an integrated African AMR surveillance pipeline, extending from sample collection and laboratory testing through WHONET/GLASS-compatible data integration, cross-sectoral analysis, and early-warning detection to policy, infection prevention and control, and stewardship action. Figure 2Integrated African AMR surveillance framework. The pipeline proceeds from sample collection through laboratory testing (AST/WGS/metagenomics), WHONET/GLASS-compatible data integration, cross-sectoral analysis, early-warning detection, and policy/IPC/stewardship action.A flowchart of the integrated African AMR surveillance pipeline with six sequential steps. Integrated African AMR surveillance framework. The pipeline proceeds from sample collection through laboratory testing (AST/WGS/metagenomics), WHONET/GLASS-compatible data integration, cross-sectoral analysis, early-warning detection, and policy/IPC/stewardship action. Workforce Development A sustainable One Health AMR surveillance system depends on a multidisciplinary workforce that includes microbiologists, epidemiologists, veterinarians, environmental scientists, infection prevention specialists, data managers, and bioinformaticians.15,25 Many African countries face shortages across all of these categories, and staffing gaps are often greatest outside major urban centers.3,34 This creates bottlenecks not only in laboratory output but also in data interpretation, policy translation, and sustained system management.25,34 The growing importance of genomics, metagenomics, and AI-assisted analysis further increases the need for advanced technical skills.15,45 Yet regional assessments show that much bacterial sequencing and genomic analysis involving African samples is still performed outside the continent, limiting data sovereignty and slowing local action.45 Investments in pre-service education, in-service training, mentorship, retention incentives, and institutional career pathways are essential if surveillance systems are to become self-sustaining.25,26 Sustainable Financing Sustainable financing remains a major weakness in African AMR surveillance. Many surveillance activities depend heavily on external donors, time-limited grants, or vertical projects tied to specific countries, pathogens, or sectors.17,23 This funding model can enable rapid progress but often leaves systems vulnerable when grants end or donor priorities shift.17,23 Domestic budget lines dedicated to AMR surveillance are still limited in many countries, despite the substantial health and economic burden associated with resistant infections.23,46 A more sustainable approach requires integrating AMR surveillance financing into national health security plans, laboratory strengthening budgets, veterinary public health programs, and broader universal health coverage investments.20,23 Public-private partnerships may also help support diagnostics, digital systems, and waste management infrastructure, but they require strong governance to ensure public health priorities are protected.46 Without predictable domestic financing, integrated One Health surveillance will remain difficult to institutionalize. Regional Collaboration Regional collaboration is essential because AMR crosses borders through human mobility, trade, food systems, animal movements, and shared ecosystems.16,25 Regional laboratory networks, data-sharing mechanisms, and harmonized surveillance tools can help smaller or resource-constrained countries participate in meaningful AMR surveillance even when national capacity remains limited.16,25 West Africa’s regional technical working group on AMR provides an important example of how common tools, coordinated training, and shared quality assurance can strengthen surveillance readiness across multiple countries.16,26 Africa CDC also has an important role in supporting continental surveillance standards, regional knowledge exchange, and alignment between AMR surveillance and broader health security frameworks.22,25 Cross-border surveillance and data sharing are particularly important for tracking resistant clones, monitoring antimicrobial use patterns, and coordinating responses to emerging regional threats.15,45 Continued investment in regional cooperation is therefore a strategic necessity rather than an optional complement to national action. Future Directions Future-ready One Health AMR surveillance in Africa should be more integrated, more digital, more genomic, and more predictive, though these approaches must be adopted with realistic attention to cost, infrastructure, and workforce constraints. Whole-genome sequencing has already demonstrated major value in tracing resistant clones, distinguishing clonal spread from horizontal gene transfer, and clarifying transmission at the human-animal-environment interface.14,15 However, sequencing platforms, bioinformatics capacity, reliable power and internet connectivity, and trained personnel remain scarce in many African settings, and most bacterial sequencing involving African samples is still performed outside the continent.45 As sequencing costs decline, regional genomic hubs linked to national surveillance systems could make WGS a more routine component of AMR surveillance in Africa, provided sustained investment in local infrastructure and data sovereignty is prioritized.45 Wastewater surveillance also offers significant promise because it can capture AMR signals from entire communities and from multiple sectors simultaneously.11,42 In settings where routine clinical culture capacity remains limited, wastewater and environmental sampling may provide an efficient supplementary early-warning tool for detecting resistance trends and emerging threats.11,42 Standardized wastewater-based AMR surveillance in African cities could become an important component of future integrated systems.42,43 Artificial intelligence and digital epidemiology may further improve surveillance by supporting automated anomaly detection, predictive modeling, and integration of laboratory, prescribing, veterinary, and environmental datasets.34 Although such tools remain underused in Africa, they could become increasingly important if countries invest in digital infrastructure and interoperable data systems, and their adoption will depend on addressing data governance, interoperability, and cost barriers that currently limit implementation.34 Climate-informed surveillance should also receive greater attention. Growing evidence suggests that climate change, rising temperatures, flooding, drought, and disrupted sanitation can influence the persistence, spread, and selection of resistant organisms in environmental and food systems.47,48 Because Africa is highly vulnerable to climate shocks, integrating climate-sensitive indicators into AMR surveillance may improve preparedness and policy relevance.48,49 Conclusion This review highlights that AMR surveillance capacity in Africa has expanded, particularly in the human health sector, but true One Health integration across human, animal, and environmental domains remains rare. Fragmented governance, limited laboratory capacity, weak data interoperability, workforce shortages, and unsustainable donor-dependent financing are the most significant barriers to closing this gap. Strengthening One Health surveillance is critical because it enables earlier detection of emerging resistance, more effective antimicrobial stewardship, faster outbreak response, and improved health security across the continent. Among the many priorities discussed, governance reform, sustainable domestic financing, laboratory capacity strengthening, and data interoperability should be treated as the highest priority actions, as they underpin all other improvements. Genomic sequencing, wastewater surveillance, artificial intelligence, and digital epidemiology offer valuable future potential, but their adoption must be paced according to feasibility, cost, and existing infrastructure in African settings rather than presented as immediate universal solutions. Ultimately, resilient One Health AMR surveillance in Africa will depend on context-specific, domestically sustainable systems rather than externally funded or technology-intensive models alone. Sustained political commitment, increased domestic investment, and stronger regional cooperation will be essential to translate the objectives outlined at the start of this review into durable improvements in surveillance and health outcomes across the continent.