Perspectives on Arctic security: an analysis of strategies, presence, and capabilities from ten Arctic and non-Arctic countries Authors: Yiqi Zhao, Kyle Hunt, Jun Zhuang Published: 2026 ABSTRACT The accelerating impacts of climate change and intensifying geopolitical interests have positioned the Arctic as a critical arena for strategic competition, resource extraction, and environmental governance. In response, countries with Arctic interests have increasingly adopted national strategies that articulate security priorities across geopolitical, economic, and environmental dimensions, among others. Yet, despite the growing salience of Arctic security, existing scholarship remains fragmented and predominantly qualitative, offering limited systematic, data-driven cross-national comparisons of Arctic strategies. This study addresses these gaps by examining the Arctic policy documents of the eight Arctic states—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States—alongside observer states China and India. Using 107 Arctic policy documents from ten countries and a human-led, AI-assisted text-mining workflow, we quantify and compare national security priorities across countries. The analysis reveals broad consensus on climate and environmental concerns, but sharp divergences in territorial and resource-related strategies: for example, the United States and Russia emphasize sovereignty, whereas Finland advocates demilitarization. Moreover, larger states such as Canada, Russia, and the United States feature prominently in other countries’ policy documents, while smaller Arctic states attract comparatively limited attention. Through a novel, data-driven comparison of Arctic security strategies, this study advances understanding of Arctic security governance and offers insights for policy development. Introduction Background The Arctic is defined as the region north of the Arctic Circle (66∘33’N; see Fig. 1), spanning approximately 20.73 million square kilometers and home to eight countries: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Currently, the region is home to approximately four million people (Arctic Council, 2024b), of which 10% are Indigenous populations from over 40 distinct ethnic groups. The remaining 90% are non-Indigenous populations who have settled in the Arctic over recent centuries, driven by industrial development, natural resource extraction, scientific research, and military activities (Arctic Centre, 2026).Fig. 1Population distribution and indigenous communities in the Arctic region.Data source: Arctic Council (2024b). Population distribution and indigenous communities in the Arctic region. Data source: Arctic Council (2024b). The strategic importance of the Arctic is growing rapidly due to three primary factors: geopolitical competition, economic potential, and climate change (Brimmer, 2023). Geopolitically, the Arctic has emerged as a critical frontier for national security, with countries increasing their military presence and surveillance capabilities to assert sovereignty and deter potential conflicts. Economically, the region holds 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its natural gas reserves, as well as vast mineral deposits. Additionally, the melting ice is opening new shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage, which could reshape global trade patterns (Field et al., 2021). Environmentally, climate change is transforming the Arctic at an unprecedented rate, with temperatures rising four times faster than the global average, contributing to sea level rise, extreme weather events, and increased navigability of Arctic waters (Rantanen et al., 2022). As geopolitical tensions, resource competition, and climate-driven challenges intensify, Arctic security is becoming increasingly complex. However, the region lacks a single, comprehensive treaty to regulate governance, instead relying on a patchwork of international agreements, national policies, and multilateral institutions. Among these, the Arctic Council serves as the main intergovernmental forum, comprising eight Arctic countries, six permanent Indigenous participants, and 13 observer countries – including China, India, Germany, and France, among others (Long, 2018). Although the Arctic has historically been characterized by low tension and cooperative governance, recent developments highlight the aforementioned increase in geopolitical competition. Russia’s expanding military infrastructure, NATO’s growing Arctic strategy, and China’s increasing economic and scientific engagement all indicate a transformation in regional dynamics. Meanwhile, the acceleration of resource exploration and the increase in Arctic shipping routes present new risks, particularly to maritime, environmental, and Indigenous security. These changes make it essential to understand how Arctic and non-Arctic countries are adapting their Arctic policy documents to address emerging threats and opportunities, and how the various national security strategies and priorities compare across security dimensions. Scope and objectives Previous research has provided valuable insights into national Arctic strategies, but it remains fragmented and largely qualitative in scope. For example, researchers have produced several cross-national syntheses of Arctic policies, offering systematic overviews of strategies released by the eight Arctic states. These studies identify shared priorities—such as security, economic development, environmental protection, international cooperation, and support for Arctic communities—while noting country-specific differences in emphasis (Heininen, 2012). They also document a trend of both Arctic and non-Arctic states (e.g., Germany, Switzerland, Poland) updating or releasing new Arctic strategies, reflecting rising international attention and potential geopolitical implications (Heininen et al., 2020). Beyond these broad syntheses, more recent work has examined individual national strategies. For instance, Puranen & Kopra (2023) have analyzed China’s Arctic policy from a comparative perspective, highlighting its evolving scientific, economic, and geopolitical engagement. Similarly, scholars have explored the strategies of Russia, Finland, and Canada, yet the related analyses remain limited to single-country or bilateral comparisons without offering a broader cross-national framework (Khan, 2023; Lagutina, 2021; Nord, 2023). Doelle & Dremliuga (2022) have likewise focused on the climate policies of Russia and Canada, examining national responses to environmental challenges without extending the analysis to a wider set of countries or policy domains. Although these studies provide important qualitative perspectives on Arctic security strategies and related policy, they are based on relatively small sets of policy documents and lack a systematic, data-driven comparison between countries. This study seeks to fill this gap by providing a quantitative cross-national analysis of Arctic security strategies. However, analyzing and comparing these policies is challenging, as they are dispersed across hundreds of lengthy documents. To address this challenge, we employ information retrieval and data mining techniques to analyze over 100 Arctic policy documents published in recent years. The research question we pursue in this paper is: What are the security priorities of Arctic and non-Arctic countries, and how do they quantitatively and qualitatively compare? To answer this question, we systematically analyze the official Arctic strategies of eight Arctic states and two observer states. By evaluating national priorities across geopolitical, economic, and environmental domains (among others), this study identifies areas of strategic convergence and divergence among these countries. Through this data-driven comparison, we provide a structured assessment that can inform future policy development and international cooperation. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section “Methodology” presents our methodology and data. The section “An analysis of Arctic policies and strategies” compares Arctic policy documents across 10 countries. The “Conclusion” section presents a discussion of the work's implications and limitations, along with directions for future studies. The Appendix includes the list of policy and strategy documents reviewed, the keyword sets for the five security dimensions we study, word-frequency analyses by country, the keyword sets for inter-country references, and figures presenting the analysis of scholarly publications. Methodology We take a policy-oriented, multi-method analytical approach to systematically analyze Arctic national strategies and policies. Our approach integrates qualitative and quantitative components in five stages. Our research process includes country selection, policy document collection and screening, qualitative summarization, comparative analysis, and term frequency analysis. Country selection We selected ten countries from the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2024a), an intergovernmental forum that addresses challenges faced by Arctic governments and Indigenous communities. Our selection comprises the eight Arctic countries – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States – chosen for their geographical proximity, territorial claims, economic interests, and strategic Arctic responsibilities, positioning them as key actors in Arctic governance. Although only these eight states possess Arctic territory, several Arctic Council observer states also exert growing influence in the region through their scientific, commercial, and geopolitical engagement (see section “Introduction”). Among them, China and India warrant particular attention. As the world’s two most populous nations, both are investing heavily in Arctic research and infrastructure, reflecting their broader aspirations as global science and policy leaders. China has conducted 13 Arctic scientific expeditions (Khanna, 2025), operates the Yellow River Station in Svalbard and the China-Iceland Arctic Observatory, and has increased its share of global Arctic-related scientific publications fivefold between 2000 and 2024 (Landriault, 2024). India has undertaken 15 Arctic expeditions (Press Information Bureau, 2025), maintains the Himadri Station in Svalbard and the IndARC observatory, and continues to expand its polar science programs. Commercially, China’s COSCO Shipping Corporation completed 14 Northern Sea Route transits in 2021 (Erdem Lamazhapov & Heggelund, 2023), underscoring its material stake in emerging Arctic trade routes. Including China and India, thus not only integrates the perspectives of two non-Arctic observer states, but also ensures that the analysis accounts for the growing role of major global powers whose Arctic activities increasingly shape the region’s scientific and geopolitical landscape. While our study focuses on these two observers, the analytical framework outlined in sections “Document collection” and “Analysis workflow” is readily extendable to additional countries should future research demand. Analyzing the policies of these ten countries provides a broad perspective on Arctic governance, allowing us to identify commonalities and differences in their strategic approaches, ultimately offering insights into potential avenues for cooperation and policy alignment. Document collection We conducted a systematic search across major academic and policy databases, such as Google Scholar and Scopus, along with the traditional Google search engine, to gather official policy documents related to Arctic strategies of the selected countries. The search was conducted using specific queries, including the different names of the ten countries, plus phrases such as “Arctic policy,” “Arctic strategy,” and “Arctic governance”. A total of 107 Arctic policy-related documents were collected, including 59 official documents such as national strategies, government white papers, and official statements, as well as 48 scholarly publications produced by think tanks, academic institutions, and foreign analyses of national Arctic policies. Our core analysis is based on 59 official policy documents. We also examined scholarly publications, with the corresponding results provided in Fig. 5 and Table 7 in the Appendix. Among the 59 official documents, 10 documents (bolded in Table 3 in the Appendix) were issued by the respective countries’ central or highest government agencies, such as the Government of Canada or the U.S. White House. The complete list of the collected documents is provided in Table 3 in the Appendix. Figure 2 shows the annual distribution of Arctic policy documents across the ten countries. Few were issued before 2009, followed by a first wave between 2009 and 2014. A sharper increase occurred after 2018, peaking in 2022 with 18 publications. This pattern underscores the accelerating institutionalization of Arctic policy-making in recent years, driven by intensifying geopolitical competition, environmental change, and broader global interest in the region.Fig. 2Annual Arctic policy publications across the eight Arctic countries and two non-Arctic countries. Annual Arctic policy publications across the eight Arctic countries and two non-Arctic countries. Analysis workflow To analyze Arctic policy documents, we adopted a human-led, AI-assisted approach that combines qualitative and quantitative components. We first focused on the 10 authoritative national Arctic strategy documents issued by central government agencies—one from each country, as discussed in the previous section and as bolded in Table 3 in the Appendix. First, one author manually reviewed these documents to extract each countries’ top security priorities (see Table 1) based on close reading and contextual interpretation. These priorities served as codes (labels) in the next step, where we adopted a thematic analysis approach to iteratively extract common categories from the set of all codes. This process was carried out in a team consisting of all three authors and resulted in a final set of five security dimensions (to be discussed in-depth in section “An analysis of Arctic policies and strategies”): (i) geopolitical and strategic security, (ii) indigenous community security, (iii) resource and economic security, (iv) environmental and ecological security, and (v) technology and infrastructure security. These manually identified dimensions (themes) served as the conceptual foundation for the broader analysis and were cross-checked using a large language model-based tool (IMA Copilot, a knowledge-base-centered AI workbench) to validate their consistency and completeness across the full corpus of 107 Arctic documents. Specifically, we used the LLM to search the entire corpus of 107 documents for additional terms and passages semantically related to each of the five dimensions. The retrieved results were then manually spot-checked to determine whether similar thematic content appeared across documents from different countries. This procedure helped verify that our manually coded themes were consistently represented in the broader corpus and ensured that no major thematic categories had been overlooked during the initial manual coding.Table 1Each country’s top policy priorities by security domain (as reported in their respective policy documents).CountryGeopolitical and Strategic SecurityIndigenous Community SecurityResource and Economic SecurityEnvironmental and Ecological SecurityTechnology and Infrastructure SecurityCanadaArctic military presenceNORAD cooperationSovereignty protectionCultural preservationHousing securitySocial servicesArctic shipping routesEconomic diversificationNatural resource managementClimate adaptationMarine protectionPollution controlIcebreaker fleet expansionSearch and rescueDenmark (Greenland)Continental shelf claimsMilitary cooperationTerritorial claimsCultural protectionEducation HealthcareIndigenous rightsMineral exploitationSustainable fisheriesTourism developmentBiodiversity conservationGlacier monitoringPollution controlMaritime infrastructure Route maintenanceFinlandCross-border collaborationNATO cooperationRegional stabilityCommunity developmentHealthcare servicesSocial securityClean energy developmentMineral explorationShipping expansionClimate researchEmission reductionPollution controlForestrySmart transportCommunication systemsIcelandArctic diplomacyRegional cooperationTransportation regulationCultural heritage protectionMedical supportSocial welfareEcotourismMarine economySustainable fisheriesEcosystem restorationPollution controlRenewable energyCommunicationMeteorological monitoringPolar rescueNorwayArctic defenseNATO collaborationSovereignty protectionCultural preservationHealthcareIndigenous rightsBlue economyOil and gas exploitationShipping routesCarbon monitoringEcosystem balanceMarine managementDigital surveillance systemsModernized infrastructureRussiaMilitary base expansionStrategic deterrenceSovereignty protectionEconomic developmentIndigenous protectionInfrastructureArctic shippingEnergy transportationResource exploitationCarbon managementClimate adaptationPollution governanceDual-use technologiesIce transportationSwedenArctic diplomacyPeacekeeping cooperationRegional stabilityCultural revitalizationIndigenous rightsSocial integrationClean energy investmentsMining industryLogisticsEnvironmental regulationsEcological sustainabilityDigital infrastructureGreen technologyRemote healthcareUnited StatesDefense strategyNATO partnershipsSovereignty protectionCommunity healthInfrastructure developmentCultural heritageArctic shippingEconomic developmentOil and mineral explorationClimate change researchEnvironmental governanceEnhanced icebreakingMilitary and civilian infrastructureChinaInternational governanceLegal compliance ScientificcooperationNoneArctic route commercializationEnergy investmentsFisheriesCarbon neutralityEnvironmental protectionPolar research stationsSatellite communicationIndiaAdherence to international lawDiplomatic strategyScientific cooperationNoneResource surveyingShipping cooperationScientific explorationGlobal climate impactMarine ecosystem researchCommunication collaborationPolar research Table 1Each country’s top policy priorities by security domain (as reported in their respective policy documents).CountryGeopolitical and Strategic SecurityIndigenous Community SecurityResource and Economic SecurityEnvironmental and Ecological SecurityTechnology and Infrastructure SecurityCanadaArctic military presenceNORAD cooperationSovereignty protectionCultural preservationHousing securitySocial servicesArctic shipping routesEconomic diversificationNatural resource managementClimate adaptationMarine protectionPollution controlIcebreaker fleet expansionSearch and rescueDenmark (Greenland)Continental shelf claimsMilitary cooperationTerritorial claimsCultural protectionEducation HealthcareIndigenous rightsMineral exploitationSustainable fisheriesTourism developmentBiodiversity conservationGlacier monitoringPollution controlMaritime infrastructure Route maintenanceFinlandCross-border collaborationNATO cooperationRegional stabilityCommunity developmentHealthcare servicesSocial securityClean energy developmentMineral explorationShipping expansionClimate researchEmission reductionPollution controlForestrySmart transportCommunication systemsIcelandArctic diplomacyRegional cooperationTransportation regulationCultural heritage protectionMedical supportSocial welfareEcotourismMarine economySustainable fisheriesEcosystem restorationPollution controlRenewable energyCommunicationMeteorological monitoringPolar rescueNorwayArctic defenseNATO collaborationSovereignty protectionCultural preservationHealthcareIndigenous rightsBlue economyOil and gas exploitationShipping routesCarbon monitoringEcosystem balanceMarine managementDigital surveillance systemsModernized infrastructureRussiaMilitary base expansionStrategic deterrenceSovereignty protectionEconomic developmentIndigenous protectionInfrastructureArctic shippingEnergy transportationResource exploitationCarbon managementClimate adaptationPollution governanceDual-use technologiesIce transportationSwedenArctic diplomacyPeacekeeping cooperationRegional stabilityCultural revitalizationIndigenous rightsSocial integrationClean energy investmentsMining industryLogisticsEnvironmental regulationsEcological sustainabilityDigital infrastructureGreen technologyRemote healthcareUnited StatesDefense strategyNATO partnershipsSovereignty protectionCommunity healthInfrastructure developmentCultural heritageArctic shippingEconomic developmentOil and mineral explorationClimate change researchEnvironmental governanceEnhanced icebreakingMilitary and civilian infrastructureChinaInternational governanceLegal compliance ScientificcooperationNoneArctic route commercializationEnergy investmentsFisheriesCarbon neutralityEnvironmental protectionPolar research stationsSatellite communicationIndiaAdherence to international lawDiplomatic strategyScientific cooperationNoneResource surveyingShipping cooperationScientific explorationGlobal climate impactMarine ecosystem researchCommunication collaborationPolar research Each country’s top policy priorities by security domain (as reported in their respective policy documents). Arctic military presence NORAD cooperation Sovereignty protection Cultural preservation Housing security Social services Arctic shipping routes Economic diversification Natural resource management Climate adaptation Marine protection Pollution control Icebreaker fleet expansion Search and rescue Continental shelf claims Military cooperation Territorial claims Cultural protection Education Healthcare Indigenous rights Mineral exploitation Sustainable fisheries Tourism development Biodiversity conservation Glacier monitoring Pollution control Cross-border collaboration NATO cooperation Regional stability Community development Healthcare services Social security Clean energy development Mineral exploration Shipping expansion Climate research Emission reduction Pollution control Forestry Smart transport Communication systems Arctic diplomacy Regional cooperation Transportation regulation Cultural heritage protection Medical support Social welfare Ecotourism Marine economy Sustainable fisheries Ecosystem restoration Pollution control Renewable energy Communication Meteorological monitoring Polar rescue Arctic defense NATO collaboration Sovereignty protection Cultural preservation Healthcare Indigenous rights Blue economy Oil and gas exploitation Shipping routes Carbon monitoring Ecosystem balance Marine management Digital surveillance systems Modernized infrastructure Military base expansion Strategic deterrence Sovereignty protection Economic development Indigenous protection Infrastructure Arctic shipping Energy transportation Resource exploitation Carbon management Climate adaptation Pollution governance Dual-use technologies Ice transportation Arctic diplomacy Peacekeeping cooperation Regional stability Cultural revitalization Indigenous rights Social integration Clean energy investments Mining industry Logistics Environmental regulations Ecological sustainability Digital infrastructure Green technology Remote healthcare Defense strategy NATO partnerships Sovereignty protection Community health Infrastructure development Cultural heritage Arctic shipping Economic development Oil and mineral exploration Climate change research Environmental governance Enhanced icebreaking Military and civilian infrastructure International governance Legal compliance Scientific cooperation Arctic route commercialization Energy investments Fisheries Carbon neutrality Environmental protection Polar research stations Satellite communication Adherence to international law Diplomatic strategy Scientific cooperation Resource surveying Shipping cooperation Scientific exploration Global climate impact Marine ecosystem research Communication collaboration Polar research We then used an artificial intelligence-assisted workflow to analyze all 107 documents and extract information on the five security themes that were identified in the qualitative (thematic) analysis outlined above. In other words, while a qualitative analysis on 10 documents was used to extract key Arctic security themes, we then utilized an automated framework to facilitate a quantitative analysis across the five identified security dimensions and across the 10 countries we study. An overview of our framework is presented in Fig. 3, which summarizes the technical workflow for our text mining analysis of all 107 Arctic policy documents studied herein. Each of the five steps outlined in Fig. 3 is expanded below.Step 1: Text Extraction and Preprocessing: We extracted text for each of the 59 PDF documents using Python’s pdfplumber library (pdfplumber Contributors, 2024). To improve analytical precision, all text was converted to lowercase and common English stop words were removed, reducing noise from high-frequency but semantically uninformative tokens while preserving the content-bearing words needed for analysis.Step 2: Manual Coding of Security Dimensions: Based on preliminary thematic analysis, we identified five core security dimensions—geopolitical security, Indigenous community security, resource and economic security, environmental and ecological security, and technology and infrastructure security. For each dimension, an initial set of 2–3 seed terms was manually compiled from close reading of the 10 national Arctic strategy documents initially selected for analysis. These seed terms served as anchors for subsequent keyword expansion.Step 3: Expansion of Domain-Specific Keyword Sets: To broaden semantic coverage and reduce subjective bias, we used the Gensim library (Gensim Developers, 2024) to load a pre-trained FastText model (Grave et al., 2018). We used the most_similar() method in Gensim’s Word2Vec implementation (Mikolov et al., 2013) to retrieve the top 30 semantically similar words for each seed term based on vector similarity. These candidate terms were then manually reviewed to remove irrelevant items, and the final cleaned keyword sets were restricted to the 15 most relevant terms per dimension and formed a validated domain-specific vocabulary (see Table 4 in the Appendix).Step 4: Keyword Matching and Frequency Computation: We applied a text-processing pipeline (in Python) to compute the frequency of each validated term within each document. The term-frequency (Tf) function is defined as: \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$Tf(t,d)=\frac{f(t,d)}{{\sum }_{k}f(k,d)}$$\end{document}Tf(t,d)=f(t,d)∑kf(k,d), where t represents the term, d is the document, f(t, d) is the number of times term t appears in document d, and ∑kf(k, d) is the total number of terms in d. This approach enabled us to create a term matrix for each document, recording the total word count and term frequency for the five security dimensions, as detailed in Table 5 in the Appendix.Step 5: Validation and Comparison: Representative text snippets were manually checked to confirm contextual relevance. Finally, domain-level TF scores were aggregated by country to estimate each country’s relative emphasisFig. 3Technical workflow for analysis of Arctic policy documents. Step 1: Text Extraction and Preprocessing: We extracted text for each of the 59 PDF documents using Python’s pdfplumber library (pdfplumber Contributors, 2024). To improve analytical precision, all text was converted to lowercase and common English stop words were removed, reducing noise from high-frequency but semantically uninformative tokens while preserving the content-bearing words needed for analysis. Step 1: Text Extraction and Preprocessing: We extracted text for each of the 59 PDF documents using Python’s pdfplumber library (pdfplumber Contributors, 2024). To improve analytical precision, all text was converted to lowercase and common English stop words were removed, reducing noise from high-frequency but semantically uninformative tokens while preserving the content-bearing words needed for analysis. Step 2: Manual Coding of Security Dimensions: Based on preliminary thematic analysis, we identified five core security dimensions—geopolitical security, Indigenous community security, resource and economic security, environmental and ecological security, and technology and infrastructure security. For each dimension, an initial set of 2–3 seed terms was manually compiled from close reading of the 10 national Arctic strategy documents initially selected for analysis. These seed terms served as anchors for subsequent keyword expansion. Step 2: Manual Coding of Security Dimensions: Based on preliminary thematic analysis, we identified five core security dimensions—geopolitical security, Indigenous community security, resource and economic security, environmental and ecological security, and technology and infrastructure security. For each dimension, an initial set of 2–3 seed terms was manually compiled from close reading of the 10 national Arctic strategy documents initially selected for analysis. These seed terms served as anchors for subsequent keyword expansion. Step 3: Expansion of Domain-Specific Keyword Sets: To broaden semantic coverage and reduce subjective bias, we used the Gensim library (Gensim Developers, 2024) to load a pre-trained FastText model (Grave et al., 2018). We used the most_similar() method in Gensim’s Word2Vec implementation (Mikolov et al., 2013) to retrieve the top 30 semantically similar words for each seed term based on vector similarity. These candidate terms were then manually reviewed to remove irrelevant items, and the final cleaned keyword sets were restricted to the 15 most relevant terms per dimension and formed a validated domain-specific vocabulary (see Table 4 in the Appendix). Step 3: Expansion of Domain-Specific Keyword Sets: To broaden semantic coverage and reduce subjective bias, we used the Gensim library (Gensim Developers, 2024) to load a pre-trained FastText model (Grave et al., 2018). We used the most_similar() method in Gensim’s Word2Vec implementation (Mikolov et al., 2013) to retrieve the top 30 semantically similar words for each seed term based on vector similarity. These candidate terms were then manually reviewed to remove irrelevant items, and the final cleaned keyword sets were restricted to the 15 most relevant terms per dimension and formed a validated domain-specific vocabulary (see Table 4 in the Appendix). Step 4: Keyword Matching and Frequency Computation: We applied a text-processing pipeline (in Python) to compute the frequency of each validated term within each document. The term-frequency (Tf) function is defined as: \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$Tf(t,d)=\frac{f(t,d)}{{\sum }_{k}f(k,d)}$$\end{document}Tf(t,d)=f(t,d)∑kf(k,d), where t represents the term, d is the document, f(t, d) is the number of times term t appears in document d, and ∑kf(k, d) is the total number of terms in d. This approach enabled us to create a term matrix for each document, recording the total word count and term frequency for the five security dimensions, as detailed in Table 5 in the Appendix. Step 4: Keyword Matching and Frequency Computation: We applied a text-processing pipeline (in Python) to compute the frequency of each validated term within each document. The term-frequency (Tf) function is defined as: \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$Tf(t,d)=\frac{f(t,d)}{{\sum }_{k}f(k,d)}$$\end{document}Tf(t,d)=f(t,d)∑kf(k,d), where t represents the term, d is the document, f(t, d) is the number of times term t appears in document d, and ∑kf(k, d) is the total number of terms in d. This approach enabled us to create a term matrix for each document, recording the total word count and term frequency for the five security dimensions, as detailed in Table 5 in the Appendix. Step 5: Validation and Comparison: Representative text snippets were manually checked to confirm contextual relevance. Finally, domain-level TF scores were aggregated by country to estimate each country’s relative emphasis Step 5: Validation and Comparison: Representative text snippets were manually checked to confirm contextual relevance. Finally, domain-level TF scores were aggregated by country to estimate each country’s relative emphasis Technical workflow for analysis of Arctic policy documents. This multi-stage approach ensured conceptual depth and reduced the risk that high-frequency, low-significance terms would distort the results. It allowed us to systematically identify policy priorities, areas of mutual interest, and points of divergence across countries. An analysis of Arctic policies and strategies In this section, we present and compare the Arctic policies and strategies of various countries to explore their differences, underlying motivations, and potential implications. Our analysis draws on 59 official Arctic policy documents (see Table 3 in the Appendix). Methodological details are provided in the section “Methodology”; here, we present the results and interpret the key patterns and implications. Insights from official Arctic policy documents In recent years, Arctic security has grown increasingly tense as countries worldwide have introduced Arctic strategies and expanded military presence in the region. In this subsection, we analyze the 10 official policy documents (bolded in Table 3 in the Appendix) of the eight Arctic countries plus China and India, focusing on their security strategy and categorizing our findings into five core security dimensions: geopolitical and strategic security, Indigenous community security, resource and economic security, environmental and ecological security, and technological/infrastructure security (see Table 1). To provide a clear analytical basis, we first establish the conceptual framework that guides our assessment of national Arctic security strategies. These five security dimensions were inductively derived from a close reading of ten authoritative national Arctic strategies, complemented by themes recurrently emphasized in prior Arctic security literature (e.g., Heininen (2012) and Heininen et al. (2020)). The five dimensions—geopolitical and strategic security, Indigenous community security, resource and economic security, environmental and ecological security, and technological/infrastructure security—are closely interconnected rather than discrete categories. In practice, these dimensions mutually influence one another. For example, technological and infrastructure capacity underpins geopolitical and strategic security, while environmental change directly affects Indigenous community security. Resource and economic security both shape and depend on infrastructure development, and it can also determine the pace and direction of strategic engagement. Geopolitical priorities, in turn, affect how resources are exploited and how technological systems are deployed. Recognizing these interconnections ensures that our framework reflects the complex and overlapping nature of national Arctic strategies, rather than treating each dimension as an isolated policy domain. Geopolitical and strategic security focuses on national sovereignty, military presence, and regional stability, reflecting the geopolitical competition and strategic interests of Arctic and non-Arctic countries. Countries strengthen their influence through defense strategies, territorial claims, and diplomatic efforts. The Arctic has become a focal point of global geopolitical competition. Canada, the United States, and Russia prioritize sovereignty and military presence to safeguard territorial integrity and enhance strategic deterrence. NATO member countries—Norway, Finland, and Sweden—emphasize regional stability and alliance cooperation to address emerging security challenges. Denmark (Greenland) actively participates in international governance while asserting its Arctic territorial claims, whereas Iceland and Sweden advocate for peaceful cooperation and demilitarization of the region. China and India, adhering to international law, seek to expand their Arctic influence through scientific and economic cooperation. As major powers accelerate their strategic positioning in the Arctic, the risk of miscalculation and potential conflict is growing, particularly over control of Arctic shipping routes and the expansion of military infrastructure. Indigenous community security emphasizes protecting Indigenous rights and livelihoods, ensuring their well-being and resilience amid environmental and socio-economic changes. Arctic countries adopt diverse strategies to ensure the well-being of indigenous populations. Canada, Norway, and Finland focus on cultural preservation, social welfare, and healthcare to enhance local community resilience. The U.S. and Russia prioritize infrastructure development to improve healthcare and economic conditions. Sweden, Finland, and Iceland invest heavily in public healthcare facilities to address the challenges posed by extreme Arctic conditions. As climate change intensifies, indigenous communities face worsening living conditions, potentially leading to climate-driven migration and socio-economic disruptions. China and India, as non-Arctic countries, have limited engagement with indigenous communities, primarily through cultural exchange initiatives. Resource and economic security concerns the sustainable development and management of the Arctic’s vast resources—oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries—while promoting economic diversification and the expansion of Arctic shipping to balance growth with environmental protection. The Arctic’s abundant natural resources make it a strategic economic hub. Canada, Norway, and Russia focus on oil, gas, and mineral resource development to strengthen energy security and economic growth. In contrast, Finland and Sweden prioritize sustainable development, investing in clean energy, logistics, and ecotourism. China, through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative, promotes the commercialization of Arctic shipping routes, seeking a balance between economic interests and strategic influence. Russia dominates Arctic shipping, particularly the Northern Sea Route (NSR), while the U.S. and Canada focus on ensuring maritime safety and freedom of navigation. The increasing shipping activities pose challenges related to marine pollution, regulatory oversight, and legal disputes over Arctic passage rights. Environmental and ecological security addresses the impacts of climate change, pollution control, and biodiversity conservation. As the Arctic undergoes rapid environmental changes, policies focus on sustainability and climate adaptation. Climate change poses a significant challenge to the Arctic. Norway, Iceland, and Finland have implemented measures to monitor carbon emissions, reduce greenhouse gases, and control marine pollution, aiming to mitigate environmental degradation. The U.S. and Canada emphasize climate adaptation policies to build resilience against extreme weather events. Sweden and Denmark focus on biodiversity conservation and ecological sustainability, enforcing regulations to curb industrial exploitation in sensitive Arctic ecosystems. However, the Arctic is warming at approximately four times the global average (Rantanen et al., 2022), and permafrost thawing threatens to release massive amounts of greenhouse gases, further exacerbating global climate change and disrupting infrastructure and ecosystems. Technology and infrastructure security cover the development of critical transportation, energy, and communication infrastructure, along with advancements in search and rescue capabilities, icebreaker operations, and digital connectivity to enhance accessibility and resilience in the region. Arctic infrastructure development is advancing rapidly. Canada, the U.S., and Russia have invested heavily in search and rescue capabilities, icebreaker fleet expansion, and dual-use infrastructure to enhance operational readiness in extreme conditions. Nordic countries focus on digitalization and smart transport systems to support sustainable growth. China has invested significantly in satellite communications and polar research stations, leveraging technology to bolster its governance influence in the Arctic, while India focuses on scientific cooperation and communication networks to support research initiatives. As infrastructure expands, cybersecurity threats are becoming critical challenges that require immediate attention. The comparative analysis of national Arctic strategies reveals several cross-cutting risks that recur across countries and policy domains. First, geopolitical competition remains the most prominent and frequently mentioned concern. Multiple strategies, particularly those of the United States and Russia, emphasize sovereignty protection and strategic deterrence, reflecting a gradual militarization of the region and aligning with earlier observations by The Arctic Institute (The Arctic Institute, 2025). Second, resource-related disputes continue to shape regional dynamics. Conflicting claims over navigation rights, exclusive economic zones, and access to oil, gas, and fisheries illustrate the tension between economic development and jurisdictional control (Regens & Beddows, 2024). Third, climate-driven threats—including permafrost thaw, sea-ice loss, and extreme weather events—pose long-term risks to infrastructure, ecosystems, and Indigenous livelihoods, as also noted by Payva Almonte (2023). Finally, the rapid expansion of digital and physical infrastructure introduces new vulnerabilities such as cyber threats and logistical fragility, particularly in energy and transport networks (Cassotta et al., 2019). These interconnected risks, derived from the comparative patterns observed in our document analysis and corroborated by prior research, underscore the multidimensional complexities in Arctic security. They illustrate how geopolitical, environmental, and technological pressures converge, shaping the evolving balance between cooperation and competition in the High North. Insights from a broader set of Arctic policy documents Building on the conceptual framework developed in section “Insights from official Arctic policy documents,” which identified five core dimensions of national Arctic security strategies—geopolitical security, Indigenous community security, resource and economic security, environmental and ecological security, and technology and infrastructure security. In this subsection, we expand the analysis from a qualitative review of ten key strategy documents to a broader corpus of 59 Arctic policy documents. We primarily apply term frequency analysis to quantify how different countries emphasize these five dimensions in their Arctic strategies, while also incorporating targeted qualitative evidence to contextualize the quantitative patterns. Figure 4 presents these cross-national patterns. Clear contrasts emerge in national emphases. Several notable trends emerge. Russia demonstrates a dual focus on geopolitical security (10.7%) and resource-economic security (39.8%), consistent with its prioritization of sovereignty, territorial control, and the exploitation of Arctic resources. The United States allocates 12.6% to geopolitical security, and places substantial attention on environmental and ecological security (34.5%) and technology and infrastructure security (12.9%).Fig. 4Term frequency distribution across key Arctic strategy areas for 10 countries (official documents). Term frequency distribution across key Arctic strategy areas for 10 countries (official documents). By contrast, Nordic states place a stronger weight on environmental and ecological security: Sweden (44.7%), Finland (41.1%), Iceland (38.3%), and Norway (38.8%) all place environmental protection and ecosystem resilience at the center of their Arctic policies. At the same time, these states also allocate substantial weight to Indigenous issues (e.g., Norway 17.7%, Sweden 15.4%, Finland 12.2%), underscoring the political salience of Indigenous communities across the Nordic Arctic. Denmark similarly foregrounds environmental (35.2%) and resource-economic security (38.7%), though with less attention to geopolitical dimensions (5.9%). Canada stands out for its unprecedented emphasis on Indigenous community security (38.7%), far higher than any other state, reflecting its domestic reconciliation agenda and governance partnerships with Inuit and First Nations in the North. Resource economics (17.7%) and environmental security (19.6%) are also present, but less pronounced than the Indigenous focus. Observer countries such as China and India prioritize resource and economic security, particularly regarding Arctic shipping routes and access to resources. China’s Arctic policy devotes 37% of its focus to this domain—especially through the “Polar Silk Road”—while India allocates about 35.3% to resource exploration and the potential of maritime trade, viewing the region as an emerging component of global supply chains. Attention to technology and infrastructure security is generally lower across all countries, but is most visible in Russia (22.5%), the United States (12.9%), and Finland (12.5%), likely reflecting their investments in polar logistics and surveillance infrastructure. Most other countries allocate under 10% of their Arctic policy attention to this domain. These results underscore both shared priorities—such as environmental protection—and persistent divergences, especially regarding sovereignty, Indigenous governance, and resource exploitation. In sum, while Arctic coastal states such as Russia and the U.S. emphasize sovereignty, security, and control over resources, Nordic states foreground environmental stewardship, and observer states like China and India prioritize economic integration and resource access. Canada’s distinct focus on Indigenous security further differentiates its Arctic strategy. These patterns reveal both areas of potential collaboration—such as environmental protection—and zones of strategic divergence, especially regarding resources and territorial governance. While these radar-chart results illustrate where different countries place their stated emphasis, they do not capture how such priorities are enacted in practice. To address this, we complement the quantitative patterns with qualitative evidence linking policy priorities to concrete national actions. The United States’ emphasis on geopolitical security is reflected in its 2009 presidential directive (NSPD-66/HSPD-25), which designates the Arctic as a region of vital national and homeland security interest and underscores the principles of “freedom of navigation” and expanded military presence of the United States Coast Guard (2013). Its attention to environmental and ecological security aligns with its sustained funding for the Arctic Climate Research Commission et al. (2019) and new coastal resilience programs in Alaska, U.S. Government Accountability Office (2023). Canada’s focus on Indigenous peoples aligns with its co-management agreements over Arctic wildlife and land use, Arctic Council (2025), as well as the establishment of Indigenous-led Arctic councils such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (2018). China’s prioritization of resources and economy aligns with its promotion of the “Polar Silk Road” State Council Information Office of the PRC (2018) and investments in Arctic shipping infrastructure through the China Ocean Shipping Company (Ng et al., 2025). Similarly, Russia’s strong sovereignty orientation is evident in its continued expansion of Arctic military bases Boulègue (2019) and the large-scale development of Northern Sea Route infrastructure Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East & Arctic (2022), while Finland’s environmental priority is mirrored in its Arctic biodiversity strategies Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2021) and its leadership in Arctic Council working groups on conservation (Arctic Council, 2020). These examples are selected to illustrate how document priorities correspond to real-world actions, not to provide an exhaustive case study of each country. These qualitative observations contextualize and reinforce the quantitative findings, showing that the thematic emphases identified in the policy documents are closely connected to tangible state actions. They also highlight the diverse pathways through which countries pursue their Arctic interests, from environmental stewardship and Indigenous partnership to trade development and territorial consolidation. An analysis of inter-country attention within Arctic policy documents In the previous subsections, we analyzed and compared the key focus areas of Arctic policies among various countries. In this subsection, we examine how much attention countries give to one another, focusing on the frequency with which they are mentioned in official Arctic policy documents (using the keyword set listed in Table 6). Such “mutual attention” offers insight into the roles of different states in Arctic affairs and their relative priorities in strategic interaction. We employed a term frequency analysis to quantify the number of times each country is mentioned in the Arctic policies of others. To further standardize the results, we calculated the percentage of mentions by dividing the number of times a country is referenced by the total mentions of all countries within a given policy document. As shown in Table 2, the frequency of references offers an indirect measure of the level of attention and priority that Arctic countries place on each other. This measure provides an indirect indicator of the salience and policy priority assigned to different actors. The key findings from this analysis are presented below.Table 2The frequency at which countries (rows) mention other countries (columns) across their official Arctic policy documents.The frequencies are standardized and reported as percentages by dividing the number of times a country is referenced by the total mentions of all countries within a given policy document. Table 2The frequency at which countries (rows) mention other countries (columns) across their official Arctic policy documents.The frequencies are standardized and reported as percentages by dividing the number of times a country is referenced by the total mentions of all countries within a given policy document. The frequency at which countries (rows) mention other countries (columns) across their official Arctic policy documents. The frequencies are standardized and reported as percentages by dividing the number of times a country is referenced by the total mentions of all countries within a given policy document. Russia as a central focus in Arctic policies Norway (45.9%), Canada (38.2%), Finland (31.6%), and the United States (33.9%) all devote significant attention to Russia in their policy documents, reflecting its central role in Arctic geopolitics, security, and resource development. At the same time, Russia’s own policy documents rarely single out specific states, instead referring more generally to “other Arctic countries,” emphasizing a regional framing rather than bilateral relationships. Norway appears with a 100% reference rate, as it is the only country explicitly mentioned in the Russian Arctic policy documents. This reference reflects Norway’s recognized sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago under the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which grants Norway full jurisdiction while ensuring other signatories certain economic and scientific access rights. The United States and Canada are also prominent reference points The United States is frequently mentioned in the policies of Canada (24.7%), Finland (19.4%), Denmark (19.1%), and China (18.2%), underscoring its importance across security, research, and governance agendas. Canada likewise appears prominently in other countries’ documents, particularly those of China (21.0%), India (23.5%), and Denmark (30.7%). This indicates Canada’s significance as an Arctic coastal state and its role as a participant in regional governance. Regional interaction among Nordic countries The Nordic states—Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland—demonstrate moderate levels of cross-referencing in their Arctic policies, generally ranging between 5% and 20%. For instance, Norway refers to Finland in 17.5% of cases and Sweden in 13.1%, while Denmark makes references to Iceland at 13.2%. Iceland, in turn, cites Denmark and Norway at 14.6% and 15.7%, respectively. These patterns suggest that Nordic countries consistently recognize each other as relevant regional partners and maintain a steady level of policy interaction. Such references reflect both shared challenges in the Arctic and the practical need for regional collaboration, even as national priorities diverge. Non-Arctic states: selective attention and limited recognition China and India, as non-Arctic states, concentrate their Arctic policies on a small set of major powers. China’s Arctic policy references the United States (18.2%) and Russia (18.2%) while giving little attention to smaller Arctic countries. India shows a similar pattern, directing 23.5% of its references toward Canada and another 23.5% toward Russia, with minimal mentions of others. In turn, their recognition within Arctic states’ policies diverges: China receives moderate attention (7–9%) across several Arctic strategies, reflecting acknowledgment of its activities in shipping, research, and resource development. India records the lowest level of references among the states analyzed, suggesting that despite its stated interest in Arctic science and energy partnerships, it remains a peripheral actor in the broader policy discourse. Overall, the distribution of inter-country references highlights a clear hierarchy: Russia and the United States dominate as focal points, while Canada serves as a secondary actor with both regional and external relevance. Nordic states show moderate mutual attention but ultimately place greater emphasis on larger Arctic powers. China and India selectively engage with key Arctic actors but remain marginal in terms of how often they are themselves referenced. These patterns reveal the layered dynamics of Arctic politics, where cooperation, rivalry, and differentiated roles coexist within the evolving governance framework. In sum, a comparative analysis of the official Arctic strategies of ten nations reveals a complex, multi-layered configuration shaped by both convergence and competition. Section “Insights from official Arctic policy documents” established an analytical framework comprising five core security dimensions: geopolitical, Indigenous, resource and economic, environmental, and technology/infrastructure. Section “Insights from a broader set of Arctic policy documents,” drawing on term-frequency analysis of 59 official policy documents, identified distinct national priorities: the Nordic states emphasize environmental stewardship; Russia and the United States focus on geopolitical security and resource control; and Canada uniquely prioritizes Indigenous security. Section “An analysis of inter-country attention within Arctic policy documents,” examined inter-country references, confirming a diplomatic hierarchy anchored by the United States and Russia. To broaden the perspective, we also analyzed the 49 scholarly publications (discussed in Section 2.2) in the Appendix. The results show that the overall strategic pattern remains broadly consistent—Russia and the United States continue to stress geopolitical security, while China and India concentrate on resources and economic development—but notable shifts appear. Canada’s strong emphasis on Indigenous security in official texts is less prominent, while Norway’s visibility increases; Iceland assigns greater weight to geopolitical concerns. In addition, inter-country mutual attention derived from scholarly publications shows Russia and the United States still as the main focal points and persistent cross-referencing among Nordic states, yet China is cited far more frequently—particularly in Canadian and Indian documents—and references to both Canada and Norway increase relative to the official corpus. Conclusion Our study systematically analyzed 107 Arctic policy documents, with particular emphasis on 59 issued by ten Arctic and non-Arctic countries, to compare their strategic priorities on Arctic security. The findings reveal marked differences in how countries frame their Arctic agendas: Arctic coastal states generally emphasize sovereignty, security, and resource protection, while observer states place greater weight on economic development and scientific research. Nordic countries tend to integrate environmental protection into their security strategies, whereas Russia places stronger emphasis on territorial consolidation and military deterrence. Discussion Our study builds upon and extends earlier comparative analyses of Arctic policy documents, most notably those by Heininen (2012) and Heininen et al. (2020). These works provided valuable qualitative syntheses of national Arctic strategies, identifying broad patterns of convergence around environmental protection, sustainable development, and international cooperation. However, their analyses were primarily descriptive and centered on a selected set of documents, leaving the relative weight of different strategic priorities unexplored. The present study contributes to this literature by offering a systematic, cross-national comparison of the stated priorities of Arctic and two selected non-Arctic states. The findings confirm several of the tendencies highlighted in previous research—such as the Nordic countries’ strong environmental orientation—but also reveal new and differentiated patterns. For instance, Canada places a significant emphasis on Indigenous community security, Russia emphasizes sovereignty protection with intensive resource development, and observer states like China and India have emerged as increasingly visible actors in Arctic policy discourse. This work moves beyond general qualitative observation to demonstrate how countries balance geopolitical, environmental, economic, and societal objectives within their national strategies. The analysis, therefore, refines and extends the insights of Heininen and colleagues by documenting, with broader empirical evidence, how Arctic governance is diverging toward distinct policy pathways rather than a single cooperative model. The findings offer several important insights. The structural divergence between Arctic states prioritizing sovereignty and security and observer states focusing on economic and scientific engagement suggests the potential for growing strategic competition in the Arctic. At the same time, opportunities remain for functional cooperation in specific domains such as scientific research and environmental protection. Strengthening multilateral governance mechanisms centered on the Arctic Council could help ease these tensions. Moreover, the strong emphasis on environmental protection among Nordic states suggests they could play a leadership role in developing cooperative environmental governance frameworks, while Russia’s ongoing militarization underscores the need for confidence-building measures to prevent escalation. In sum, our study shows that national Arctic strategies are shaped by geographical position and resource endowments, producing divergent security priority pathways. While environmental protection is widely recognized as a global concern, sovereignty and defense remain central to Arctic coastal states, whereas observer states are more focused on trade and scientific presence. These contrasting priorities collectively shape the evolving Arctic security landscape, highlighting both areas of potential cooperation and sources of strategic friction. Limitations While our study presents a large-scale cross-national quantitative comparison of Arctic strategies, it is not without limitations that warrant consideration. First, the analysis is based primarily on publicly available policy documents, which may not fully reflect internal strategic planning or actual resource allocation. Second, the study focused on stated policy priorities rather than implementation outcomes, so it does not assess the extent to which national investments align with stated goals. Third, the use of term frequency (TF) analysis as the main computational method presents inherent limitations: while TF provides a transparent and reproducible measure of word salience, it does not account for term distinctiveness or contextual meaning. Finally, among Arctic Council observer states, this study included only China and India and did not cover European observers such as the United Kingdom, which has been highly active on Arctic security, and Germany, which plays a leading role in Arctic research. This choice helped ensure geographic balance by including major Asian actors, but it may also limit the breadth of perspectives represented, particularly from Europe. Future studies could address these methodological limitations by expanding the sample to include active European observer states, incorporating multiple coders for qualitative analysis, and applying complementary computational techniques—such as TF-IDF weighting, topic modeling, or contextual semantic analysis—to better capture policy priorities. Further, future research could extend the analysis to examine how stated policy priorities align with actual investments and implementation outcomes, offering a fuller picture of the policy-practice nexus. Strengthening transparency and coordination mechanisms will also be essential to advancing security, economic, and environmental objectives in an increasingly complex Arctic context. Supplementary information Appendix Appendix