History of drug pricing reform in the United States: from policy foundations to latest reforms Authors: Sujith Ramachandran, Arman Arabshomali, John Coster Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractThis article examines the historical evolution of prescription drug pricing policy in the United States from the 1960s through 2025, highlighting how incremental reforms have produced a complex and fragmented system. It traces the foundations of drug pricing across Medicaid, Medicare, the Veterans Affairs (VA) system, and the 340B Drug Discount program, emphasizing the development of key pricing benchmarks such as Average Wholesale Price (AWP), Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), and Average Sales Price (ASP). The analysis details major legislative milestones affecting drug pricing, including the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022, and explains how these reforms reshaped reimbursement, rebates, cost of the prescription drugs, and access to medications. The article also identifies the various consequences of policy design, including the Medicaid “best price” provisions, growth in state Medicaid program supplemental rebates, and changes in prescription drug spending and reimbursement. Understanding the trajectory of policy reform is critical to identifying opportunities for improving affordability, access, and transparency in prescription drug markets.Keywords: prescription drug pricing, drug pricing policy, Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, 340B, Medicare Part D, Inflation Reduction Act, pharmaceutical policy, health policy The complexity of US drug pricing is cumulative and self-reinforcing. Today's fragmented system reflects 4 decades of incremental statutory reforms layered onto foundational pricing benchmarks (AWP, AMP, ASP, 340B ceiling price) and federal pharmaceutical purchasing programs (the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, the 340B Drug Discount Program, Veterans Affairs pricing, and Medicare Part D). The complexity of US drug pricing is cumulative and self-reinforcing. Today's fragmented system reflects 4 decades of incremental statutory reforms layered onto foundational pricing benchmarks (AWP, AMP, ASP, 340B ceiling price) and federal pharmaceutical purchasing programs (the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, the 340B Drug Discount Program, Veterans Affairs pricing, and Medicare Part D). Reforms tend to generate the problems that later reforms must fix. Across programs, policies designed to reduce drug costs or expand access have repeatedly produced unintended consequences, prompting further corrective legislation and adding new layers to an already intricate architecture. Reforms tend to generate the problems that later reforms must fix. Across programs, policies designed to reduce drug costs or expand access have repeatedly produced unintended consequences, prompting further corrective legislation and adding new layers to an already intricate architecture. Effective future drug pricing policy reform depends on understanding this history. Emerging policies, including Inflation Reduction Act Medicare drug price negotiation, international reference pricing “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) demonstrations, and pharmacy benefit manager reforms, interact with existing statutory structures, and evaluating them requires a clear grasp of how that structure was built. Effective future drug pricing policy reform depends on understanding this history. Emerging policies, including Inflation Reduction Act Medicare drug price negotiation, international reference pricing “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) demonstrations, and pharmacy benefit manager reforms, interact with existing statutory structures, and evaluating them requires a clear grasp of how that structure was built. Foundations of the prescription drug architecture in the United States Total prescription drug spending in the United States is estimated to be $467 billion as of 2024, demonstrating a 7.9% growth from 2023, and accounting for 9% of total healthcare expenditures.1 Despite these significant expenditures, access to prescription drugs continues to be a challenge. As many as 21% of adults report not filling a prescription due to cost-related barriers.2 Such barriers lead to poor management of chronic conditions and an increase in overall healthcare expenditures.3-7 Prescription drug policy reform faces a unique set of challenges because of the complexity of the policy architecture that governs medication access in the United States. This complexity is a result of repeated incremental reform policies that have changed drug pricing benchmarks, restructured federal drug purchasing programs, and modified drug reimbursement methodologies. In order to recognize existing avenues and priorities for drug policy reform, it is important to examine the historical evolution of prescription drug pricing policies and identify gaps and unintended consequences in the current system. Therefore, this article aims to provide a summary of key updates to prescription drug pricing policy between the 1960s and 2026. In particular, the article will focus directly on the legislative and regulatory policies that have led to the development of the complex landscape of drug pricing benchmarks and reimbursement processes currently used. In order to provide a succinct summary of policy updates, the article first explains the foundations of the drug policy architecture in Medicaid, Medicare, Veterans Affairs (VA), and pharmacy reimbursement, and then examines key reforms to these programs from more recent legislative and regulatory updates. To provide context for the motivations and intentions with each effort for reform, this article will lay out unintended consequences resulting from each policy and how it motivated the next corrective legislation/policy. A complete list of abbreviations is provided in Table 1. Table 2 presents a chronological summary of the major legislation, regulations, and policy events discussed in this article. Table 1Table of abbreviations.AbbreviationFull formAACActual Acquisition CostACAAffordable Care ActAMPAverage Manufacturer PriceASPAverage Sales PriceAWPAverage Wholesale PriceBBABipartisan Budget ActBPBest PriceCBOCongressional Budget OfficeCMSCenters for Medicare and Medicaid ServicesCODCovered Outpatient DrugCPI-UConsumer Price Index for Urban ConsumersDIRDirect and Indirect RemunerationDRADeficit Reduction ActDSHDisproportionate Share HospitalFDAFood and Drug AdministrationFFSFee-For-ServiceFQHCFederally Qualified Health CenterFSSFederal Supply ScheduleFULFederal Upper LimitGLOBEGlobal Benchmark for Efficient Drug PricingGUARDGuarding US Medicare Against Rising Drug CostsHHS(Department of) Health and Human ServicesIRAInflation Reduction ActMCCAMedicare Catastrophic Coverage ActMDRPMedicaid Drug Rebate ProgramMFNMost Favored NationMFPMaximum Fair PriceMMAMedicare Modernization ActNADACNational Average Drug Acquisition Costnon-FAMPnon-Federal Average Manufacturer PriceOBRAOmnibus Budget Reconciliation ActPBMPharmacy Benefit ManagerPDLPreferred Drug ListPPAPharmaceutical Pricing AgreementVA(Department of) Veterans AffairsVBPValue-Based PurchasingVHCAVeterans Health Care ActWACWholesale Acquisition Cost Table of abbreviations. Table 2Chronological summary of key US prescription drug pricing legislation, regulations, and policy events.#Abbreviation/keywordFull nameYearDescription Foundational legislation & pricing benchmarks 1MedicaidEnactment of Medicaid (Title XIX, Social Security Act)1965Established a joint federal-state health insurance program for low-income populations; prescription drug coverage was optional and varied significantly across states.2MedicareEnactment of Medicare (Title XVIII, Social Security Act)1965Created federal health insurance for Americans aged 65 and older; did not include an outpatient prescription drug benefit until 2006.3MCCAMedicare Catastrophic Coverage Act1988Established Medicare's first outpatient drug benefit using AWP-based reimbursement; repealed in 1989 due to beneficiary financing backlash, but exposed cross-program price variation. Medicaid Drug Rebate Program & related reforms 4OBRA 1990(MDRP)Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990/Medicaid Drug Rebate Program1990Created the MDRP requiring manufacturer rebates to states using AMP and best price metrics, with CPI-U inflation penalties for brand-name drugs.5VHCAVeterans Health Care Act1992Required a 24% non-FAMP discount for the Federal Supply Schedule, created the 340B Drug Pricing Program, and exempted federal prices from Medicaid best price.6OBRA 1993Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 19931993Authorized states to use drug formularies which allowed states to negotiate supplemental rebates beyond federal statutory amounts through preferred drug lists. Medicare Part D & Part B drug pricing reforms 7MMAMedicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act2003Created the Medicare Part D drug benefit with private-plan negotiations, a noninterference clause barring federal price negotiation, and ASP + 6% reimbursement for Part B drugs.8DRADeficit Reduction Act2005Required AMP-based Federal Upper Limits for generic drugs in Medicaid and authorized CMS to develop acquisition cost surveys, leading to NADAC. Affordable Care Act & post-ACA reforms 9ACAPatient Protection and Affordable Care Act2010Created line extension penalties, the AMP cap on rebate liability, and the 5i AMP calculation for drugs predominantly sold through nonretail channels. Initiated gradual phase-out of the Part D coverage gap with mandatory 50% manufacturer discounts on brand-name drugs during the donut hole10NADACNational Average Drug Acquisition Cost2012Transparent, invoice-based pharmacy acquisition cost benchmark developed by CMS from monthly retail pharmacy surveys; adopted by nearly all state Medicaid FFS programs.11BBA 2015Bipartisan Budget Act of 20152015Extended CPI-U inflation rebate penalties to generic drugs in the MDRP, effective 2017, strengthening Medicaid's inflation protection framework.12COD RuleCovered Outpatient Drug Final Rule2016Required states to transition Medicaid FFS reimbursement from AWP to actual acquisition cost methodology and conduct cost surveys for dispensing fees.13BBA 2018Bipartisan Budget Act of 20182018Accelerated the Part D donut hole phase-out and increased manufacturer brand-drug coverage gap discounts from 50% to 70%. Recent reforms (2020-2026) 14VBP RuleValue-Based Purchasing (VBP) Best Price Rule2020Allowed manufacturers to report multiple best prices tied to value-based purchasing agreements, enabling outcomes-based contracts without triggering Medicaid best price.15ARPAAmerican Rescue Plan Act2021Repealed the AMP cap on Medicaid rebates effective January 2024, allowing total MDRP rebates to again exceed 100% of a drug's AMP.16IRA (MDPNP)Inflation Reduction Act—Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program2022Established the Medicare Drug Negotiation Program for Maximum Fair Prices; MFPs excluded from AMP but included in Medicaid best price.17IRA (Part D)Inflation Reduction Act—Part D Benefit Redesign2022Capped annual Part D out-of-pocket costs at $2,000, limited insulin copays to $35/month, eliminated catastrophic-phase coinsurance, and expanded low-income subsidies.18DIR RuleCMS DIR Fee Reform (CY2024 Final Rule)2024Banned retroactive DIR fees in Part D, requiring all pharmacy price concessions at the point of sale to improve transparency.19MFN/GENEROUSMost Favored Nation Pricing—Medicaid Demonstration2025Manufacturers agreed to offer Medicaid programs international-benchmark prices via supplemental rebates through a 5-year CMS demonstration program.20GLOBEGlobal Benchmark for Efficient Drug Pricing Model2025Mandatory 5-year CMS model testing whether tying Medicare Part B drug inflation rebates to international pricing generates savings.21GUARDGuarding US Medicare Against Rising Drug Costs Model2025Companion mandatory 5-year CMS model to GLOBE, assessing international benchmark-linked rebates for Medicare Part D drugs.22Trump Rx PlatformOnline Prescription Drug Cash-Purchase Platform2025Trump Administration announced an online platform for cash-price drug purchases intended to offer prices lower than insurance plan rates.23Orphan Drug ExemptionExpansion of the Orphan Drug Exemption2025Congress expanded IRA exemptions from Medicare negotiation to include orphan drugs with multiple rare disease indications, costing an estimated $8.8 billion over 10 years.Abbreviations: AMP, Average Manufacturer Price; ASP, Average Sales Price; AWP, Average Wholesale Price; CMS, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; CPI-U, Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers; DIR, Direct and Indirect Remuneration; FFS, Fee-For-Service; FQHC, Federally Qualified Health Center; FUL, Federal Upper Limit; HHS, Department of Health and Human Services; MDRP, Medicaid Drug Rebate Program; MFP, Maximum Fair Price; non-FAMP, non-Federal Average Manufacturer Price; PBM, Pharmacy Benefit Manager; PDL, Preferred Drug List; VBP, Value-Based Purchasing; WAC, Wholesale Acquisition Cost. Chronological summary of key US prescription drug pricing legislation, regulations, and policy events. Abbreviations: AMP, Average Manufacturer Price; ASP, Average Sales Price; AWP, Average Wholesale Price; CMS, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; CPI-U, Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers; DIR, Direct and Indirect Remuneration; FFS, Fee-For-Service; FQHC, Federally Qualified Health Center; FUL, Federal Upper Limit; HHS, Department of Health and Human Services; MDRP, Medicaid Drug Rebate Program; MFP, Maximum Fair Price; non-FAMP, non-Federal Average Manufacturer Price; PBM, Pharmacy Benefit Manager; PDL, Preferred Drug List; VBP, Value-Based Purchasing; WAC, Wholesale Acquisition Cost. Pharmacy benchmarks: the Average Wholesale Price As prescription drug benefits began to be included in major health insurance programs such as Medicaid and commercial insurance, the late 1960s saw the launch of the architecture underlying the payment systems for prescription drugs. Payers reimbursed pharmacies for dispensing prescriptions based on the drug's wholesale price published in pricing compendia. This benchmark, the Average Wholesale Price (AWP), which is set by manufacturers, was used by nearly all pharmacies because it allowed for a margin between the pharmacy's Actual Acquisition Cost (AAC) of the drug and the reimbursement amount.8,9 The AWP benchmark was formalized and became prominent in federal drug policy with the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 1988 (P.L. 100-360),10 which established Medicare's first outpatient prescription drug benefit. The MCCA called for prescription drugs to be reimbursed, as part of the methodology, at an undiscounted AWP and a $4.50 dispensing fee for participating pharmacies.11,12 Although MCCA was repealed in 1989 due to beneficiary backlash against its financing structure, the statute's reliance on AWP exposed significant concerns about price variation across government programs.13,14 These concerns prompted hearings in 1989 in the United States Senate Special Committee on Aging, led by Senator David Pryor (D-AR),15 which revealed that different federal purchasers were paying vastly different prices for the same medications, with no clear methodology for establishing what constituted a fair or actual market price. For example, Medicaid was paying a different price than the VA for the same drug, while both were government funded programs. The problems with AWP extended well beyond MCCA's brief existence. AWP was never based on actual wholesale transactions; rather, it was a list price published by compendia such as Red Book and Medi-Span, typically reported by manufacturers themselves without regulatory oversight or verification.16 Around 2000, a wave of litigation emerged challenging the integrity of AWP as a pricing benchmark.16 State attorneys general and private class-action attorneys filed lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers, alleging that companies systematically inflated their published AWP figures to fraudulently overcharge state Medicaid programs and commercial insurers.17,18 These lawsuits resulted in substantial settlements and a widespread recognition of the flawed nature of AWP, culminating in AWP being set to no more than 1.2 times the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC)—defined as the manufacturer-derived list price—for branded medications.16 Nevertheless, this flawed benchmark continues to serve as a critical cornerstone in many payment mechanisms underlying today's prescription drug reimbursement systems.19,20 Foundations of drug pricing policy in Medicaid After the enactment of Medicaid in 1965, coverage for prescription drugs for beneficiaries remained largely inconsistent and varied from state to state. Hearings organized by the US Senate Special Committee on Aging in 1988 and 1989 led to the recognition that states were unable to negotiate drug prices in Medicaid, in turn prompting the inclusion of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (MDRP)21 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990 (P.L. 101-508).22,23 The MDRP established a new framework requiring manufacturers to sign rebate agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and provide quarterly rebates for Covered Outpatient Drugs (CODs)24 to states in exchange for Federal matching funding being made available to the states for that manufacturer's drugs. In addition to paying rebates to states, manufacturers would be able to obtain formulary coverage of their products by the states, a quid pro quo arrangement known as the “grand bargain.”25 These rebates were calculated using 2 novel pricing metrics: Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) and “best price.”26,27 AMP was defined as the average price paid to manufacturers by wholesalers for drugs distributed to retail community pharmacies, calculated net of cash discounts, free goods, rebates, and other price concessions.26 This metric was created specifically because existing benchmarks like AWP and WAC did not reflect actual transaction prices or manufacturer revenues. “Best price” was defined as the lowest price available from the manufacturer to any purchaser in the United States, initially including federal purchasers.26,28 The statutory rebate formula currently requires manufacturers to pay states the greater of 23.1% of AMP or the difference between AMP and best price for brand-name drugs, and 13% of AMP for generic drugs.21,29 OBRA 1990 also included an inflation penalty provision for brand-name drugs.30 This part of the rebate statute requires manufacturers to provide additional quarterly rebates to states when increases in a drug's AMP compared to a baseline quarterly AMP exceed inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U).30 This inflation component of the rebate program was extended to generic drugs in 2017,31 as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-74),32 and has since evolved into a foundational program underlying the drug pricing architecture in the United States today. Together, the MDRP and the inflation penalties help reduce net prescription drug costs to state Medicaid compared to most other programs in the United States. While states received mandatory rebates from drug manufacturers that participate in the MDRP, a new law—OBRA 1993 (P.L. 103-66)33—allowed states to use drug formularies in the management of their Medicaid prescription drug programs.34 This allowed states to eventually leverage additional rebates from manufacturers, known as “supplemental rebates,” by creating price competition among manufacturers for brand-name drugs that were in crowded therapeutic classes. While the states' pursuit of supplemental manufacturer rebates was not envisioned in the original statute, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) determined that this was acceptable as long as “any such agreement will achieve drug rebates that are at least equal to the rebates set forth in the Secretary's rebate agreements with manufacturers.”21,35 While states have to cover all drugs of a manufacturer that has signed an agreement with the Secretary of HHS to participate in the MDRP, states began to use preferred drug lists to create incentives for manufacturers to provide additional supplemental rebates to states for placement on the state's Preferred Drug List (PDL). The ability of states to use supplemental rebates has allowed them to negotiate discounts on top of the MDRP.36,37 In 2024, state Medicaid programs collected $58 billion in statutory rebates, with 12% accounting for supplemental rebates.38,39 Finally, the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 (P.L. 109-171)40 also made critical changes to drug reimbursement in Medicaid. It required that manufacturer's reported AMP be used by CMS to set a Federal Upper Limit (FUL) for multiple source drugs, which dictates the maximum amount of federal share for drug ingredient costs.40 Generally, this is set at 175% of the weighted average AMP for generic drugs. For brand-name drugs in Medicaid, reimbursement is based on the AACs for the drugs.40 Drug pricing in the VA program and the launch of 340B An unintended consequence of the MDRP quickly became apparent: because Medicaid rebates were tied to manufacturers' “best price,” and entities such as the VA, Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), and Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) had historically received the deepest discounts, manufacturers eliminated some of these preferential prices to avoid triggering higher Medicaid rebate obligations across the entire larger Medicaid program.41 This threatened pharmaceutical access for vulnerable populations served by these providers. Congress responded with the Veterans Health Care Act (VHCA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-585),42 which accomplished several critical objectives. First, it required that manufacturers that wanted their drugs on the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), a list of drugs and prices which can be used by certain Federal programs to purchase drugs, must provide a statutory minimum discount based on a new metric called the non-Federal Average Manufacturer Price (non-FAMP).43 The non-FAMP represents manufacturers' net revenue from sales to all domestic purchasers except federal entities, accounting for all discounts and rebates provided to the commercial market.43 The statute requires manufacturers to provide at least a 24% discount from non-FAMP for drugs listed on the FSS, though the VA could negotiate deeper discounts. This amount is known as the Federal Ceiling Price (FCP). The VHCA also created the VA Master Agreement that manufacturers would be required to sign to participate in Medicaid, 340B, VA, and Medicare Part B.43 Second, the VHCA established the 340B Drug Pricing Program, which provided statutory ceiling prices to specified covered entities including FQHCs, Ryan White HIV/AIDS clinics, DSHs, and other safety-net providers.44,45 The statute allows these entities to purchase drugs at a 340B ceiling price, which is essentially the Medicaid rebate amount, in the form of a discount. Specifically, the 340B ceiling price is calculated as the drug's AMP minus the Medicaid rebate for the quarter. In addition, the statute exempted these VA and 340B Federal prices from the Medicaid definition of “best price,” so manufacturers would not also have to base their rebates to states on these Federal drug prices. The 340B program is another foundational pillar of drug policy in the US, with spending on 340B drugs increasing from $6.6 billion in 2010 to $100 billion in 2025, driven in part by factors such as growth in drug spending, increase in facility participation, and integration of off-site clinics and pharmacies.46,47 Foundations of drug pricing policy in Medicare It took Congress 38 years to add an outpatient drug benefit to the Medicare program from the time Medicare was originally enacted in 1965. The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 created the Part D prescription drug benefit and reformed Part B drug reimbursement. For Part D, Congress established a market-based model in which private plans and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) would negotiate prices with manufacturers and pharmacies. Notably, the statute included a “noninterference” clause explicitly prohibiting the federal government from interfering in the negotiations between the private plans and manufacturers or pharmacies, or establishing a formulary.48-50 Part D was designed from the beginning to operate through competing private drug plans that contract with CMS. The noninterference clause constrained the federal role within it, barring the Secretary from negotiating drug prices directly or establishing a national formulary. The plans were responsible for negotiating discounts with drug manufacturers and reimbursement rates with pharmacies, rather than them being determined by CMS. For participating Medicare beneficiaries, the Part D program provided a standardized benefit structure. This included a deductible, an initial coverage period that provided drug coverage until a set threshold in beneficiary annual drug spending, followed by a period of lack of coverage (called a “donut hole”), until a catastrophic spending threshold was reached. The maximum allowable out-of-pocket cost for each prescription was set as a percentage of drug costs, within each benefit phase. The Part D program has since proved to be exceedingly popular, with over 54 million enrollees in 2024 (80% of all Medicare beneficiaries) and $128 billion in annual spending as of 2023.51 For Medicare Part B, which covers physician-administered drugs, the MMA replaced the problematic AWP-based methodology (AWP minus 5%) with a new benchmark: Average Sales Price (ASP) plus 6%.52 The problem lay in the AWP benchmark itself rather than the size of the statutory adjustment: because AWP was a reported list price untethered from actual transactions (as described above), the AWP minus 5% formula still reimbursed providers well above real acquisition cost and created wide, gameable spreads. Anchoring Part B reimbursement to ASP, a transaction-based average, was intended to close that gap. ASP is defined in statute as the volume-weighted average of all sales by a manufacturer to all purchasers in the United States, net of rebates, discounts, and other price concessions, excluding sales to federal purchasers and sales at nominal prices.53-55 This shift to ASP was intended to align reimbursement more closely with actual market prices and reduce the spread-based incentives that had contributed to AWP inflation. Together, these foundational policies established the architectural framework that continues to shape pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement in the United States, creating distinct pricing dynamics across Medicaid, Medicare, the VA health system, and the 340B program. Overview of Medicaid drug pricing reforms The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 (P.L. 111-148)56 included many policies that represented landmark changes to drug pricing policy. First, it created a line extension penalty for manufacturers' CODs in the MDRP, which essentially carries over the inflation penalty from older formulations of CODs to new formulations of CODs in certain circumstances.57 This has made it more difficult for manufacturers to simply launch a new formulation of a drug to circumvent the inflation penalties on the older drug, without considering how the inflation on older versions of the drug affects the total rebates that the manufacturer has to pay to states on the new drugs. Second, the ACA created the AMP cap, which limited manufacturer liability for MDRP rebates to states to the value of the drug's AMP for the quarter.24,58 This was a significant concession to manufacturers, as manufacturers’ inflation on some drugs had been so excessive that it resulted in manufacturers paying more in rebates in states than they received in revenue from the sale of the drug.59-61 This produced a class of drugs in the 340B Drug Pricing Program colloquially referred to as “penny priced drugs,”62 whose ceiling prices fell so low that the drugs were priced at only a penny. However, the AMP cap was repealed in the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) of 2021 (P.L. 117-2),63 allowing overall rebates paid to states to once again exceed the cost of the drug starting in January, 2024. Finally, ACA also created the 5i AMP calculation; the 5 categories of drugs subject to this calculation include infused, injected, instilled, intraocular, and implanted drugs.64 The 5i calculation was created because infused and injected drugs have become one of the fastest-growing components of drug spending; ensuring these products carry an accurate AMP determines whether states can collect rebates on an increasingly expensive category of medicines rather than losing rebate revenue through a reporting gap. This calculation allows manufacturers to include nonretail sales in the calculation of a drug's AMP when the number of units of the drug sold to nonretail purchasers in a quarter is greater than 70% of total units (as finalized in the COD Regulation in 2016).65,66 Because the original MDRP statute only allowed for the inclusion of retail sales in the calculation of a drug's AMP, and many of these 5i drugs' sales went through nonretail outlets, manufacturers were having a difficult time calculating an AMP, and states could not collect rebates on these drugs without a reported AMP. The development of the 5i AMP allows states to bill manufacturers for rebates for certain drugs that are not traditionally dispensed through retail pharmacies, such as injection and infusion drugs.65 The pharmacy reimbursement algorithm also changed with the enactment of the DRA of 2005,67 which allowed for CMS to develop a survey of consumer purchase prices for prescription drugs. This allowed CMS to contract for the development of a retail pharmacy drug acquisition cost-based pricing file.27,40 Starting in 2012, CMS worked with state Medicaid pharmacy directors to create the National Average Drug Acquisition Cost (NADAC), an invoice-based transparent pricing benchmark for payment for drugs under the Medicaid Fee-For-Service (FFS) program.27 The survey includes pricing for brand-name and generic drugs based on pharmacy invoice prices that are collected monthly from retail pharmacies—chain and independent. The file is published monthly and is used by almost all Medicaid programs to reimburse pharmacies in their FFS Medicaid programs, and is the subject of many recent calls for reform of drug pricing benchmarks.68 To make the policy of cost-based pharmacy reimbursement consistent among the states, CMS finalized the COD rule in 2016, requiring that states use cost-based reimbursement for both their drug product reimbursement and dispensing fee payments.66 This regulation finalized the move of state Medicaid pharmacy programs’ FFS reimbursement for CODs away from an AWP-based methodology to an AAC-based methodology. It also required that states pay both drug and dispensing fees based on acquisition costs and conduct surveys to justify what they are paying.66 These methodologies are not required to be applied to Medicaid managed care programs. To assist manufacturers and states pay for high-cost drugs, CMS made a significant change in the MDRP “best price” reporting policy in a regulation that was finalized in December 2020.69,70 The change allowed manufacturers to report to the MDRP “multiple best prices” for a drug if tied to a value-based purchasing (VBP) agreement.69,71 This policy change allowed manufacturers to offer VBP programs in the commercial market without triggering the best price provisions in MDRP. The regulation allows manufacturers to report a non-VBP best price and a VBP best price to Medicaid for a drug with a VBP arrangement, and allows states to also participate in the manufacturer's VBP program if they wish. Overview of Medicare drug pricing reforms Starting in January 2026, Medicare Part D beneficiaries were able to access federally negotiated prices for certain prescription drugs from community retail pharmacies for the first time through authority granted to the HHS Secretary under the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-169).72 This marks a historic shift from the private sector negotiation model established when Medicare Part D was launched in 2006 under the MMA of 2003 (P.L. 108-173).54 In order to facilitate this new program, the law modified the noninterference clause to allow the Secretary to negotiate directly with drug manufacturers for the prices of some drugs that were used in both Medicare Part D and also Medicare Part B. The IRA did not change the prohibition on the interference in the negotiations between Part D plans and pharmacies. The negotiated prices—called Maximum Fair Prices (MFPs)—are exempt by statute from a manufacturer's calculation of its AMP, but included in the “best price.”72 These new MFP prices are applied by the pharmacy at the point of sale, meaning that the beneficiary benefits from the lower prices negotiated by the Secretary if they are in a deductible phase or if they have a coinsurance on their drug.73 Furthermore, CMS instructed manufacturers to include the MFP discounts in the calculation of the ASP. However, CMS also indicated that it would not publish the ASP value for a Part B drug that also had an MFP.73 The criteria for the selection of drugs for negotiation are quite notable because of the dynamics it introduces to the pharmaceutical marketplace. As per statute, a qualified single-source drug will be selected for negotiation if it accrues at least $200 million in annual Medicare expenditures, as long as it is a small molecule drug that was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at least 7 years ago, or a biologic drug that was approved by the FDA at least 11 years ago.74 A drug is exempted from the program if it has generic competition, is highly likely to face biosimilar competition, or is an orphan drug with only 1 approved rare disease indication. In 2025, Congress expanded this list by further exempting orphan drugs with multiple rare disease indications so long as they have no nonorphan indications, increasing Medicare prescription drug expenditures by an estimated $8.8 billion over a 10-year period.75 As of early 2026, the first 2 years of negotiations have concluded successfully with considerable discounts negotiated with the manufacturers of 10 drugs in 2024 (which went into effect in January 2026) and 15 drugs in 2025 (which will go into effect in January 2027).76 The structure of the Part D prescription benefit itself has undergone significant shifts since its inception in 2006. The ACA initiated a gradual phase-out of the “donut hole” and reduced patient liability during this period by requiring manufacturers to provide a 50% discount to brand-drug prices.77 Through the BBA of 2018 (P.L. 115-123),78 Congress sped up the phase-out of the “donut hole” and increased manufacturer discounts up to 70%.79 The IRA made further changes to the Part D benefit structure by eliminating the 5% beneficiary coinsurance during the catastrophic phase as well as capping total annual out-of-pocket costs to $2,000. Additionally, the IRA limited monthly cost sharing for insulin products to $35 for all Medicare beneficiaries, eliminated cost sharing for adult vaccines covered under Part D, offered an optional program to smooth monthly out-of-pocket costs (referred to as the Medicare Prescription Payment Plan), and expanded benefits for individuals that previously only qualified for partial benefit under the low income subsidy program.80 CMS has also been very active in determining how pharmacy price concessions, which are a form of Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR), should be treated under Part D. That is, while the pharmacies and plans would engage in a process to determine a “negotiated price” that the plans would pay to pharmacies to dispense a prescription, often times these negotiated price payments would be reduced by DIR fees.81,82 Pharmacy performance-based DIR fees grew exponentially, leading to pharmacies facing substantial financial pressure from having to pay fees to Part D plans they couldn’t predict at the time of dispensing, impacting cash flow. However, a CMS rule change in 2024 banned plans from imposing DIR fees retroactively. Instead, the Part D plans had to apply these price concessions at the point of sale, improving transparency but potentially changing pharmacy reimbursement models significantly.83 This creates significant cash flow issues for pharmacies as they are often paid significantly less than the cost of the drug being dispensed. To compound the pharmacy cash flow conundrum, the Medicare MFP program operates such that the Part D plan reduces the payments to the pharmacies at the point of sale to the MFP price, and the pharmacy has to wait to receive a refund from the manufacturer of the negotiated drug in order to make the pharmacy whole for its acquisition cost of the drug.84 Upcoming reforms in drug pricing policy The past 4 decades have witnessed repeated incremental policy reforms onto an already fragmented drug policy landscape, leading to a highly complex, unnavigable system. In 2025, the Trump administration pushed to bring lower international drug prices to federal programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. The White House announced that several large drug manufacturers entered an agreement committing to providing state Medicaid programs the prices that they are offering in a basket of international markets.85 These prices, known as Most Favored Nation (MFN) pricing, would be provided to Medicaid programs in the form of supplemental rebates to states through a 5-year demonstration program that would test whether use of MFN pricing would enhance savings for states on certain drugs covered under Medicaid.86 In December 2025, CMS formally announced the launch of 2 different mandatory manufacturer Medicare drug participation models: the Global Benchmark for Efficient Drug Pricing (GLOBE) and Guarding US Medicare Against Rising Drug Costs (GUARD) models.87,88 These 5-year models would assess whether tying the Medicare Part B and Part D drug inflation rebate program to international pricing could generate savings for Medicare. These demonstration programs are enabled by the statutory authority possessed by CMS to test demonstration models aimed at reducing costs through the Innovation Center, and are an illustration of the nonstatutory pathways CMS can leverage to influence drug pricing. In February 2026, Congress passed reforms to business practices of PBMs within Medicare and commercial insurance programs.89 The Trump administration announced the launch of an online platform to facilitate cash purchase of prescription medications at prices cheaper than those available to insurance plans.90 Many of these recent programs are still in need of further details, but they warrant close attention to examine their impact on prescription drug pricing and access. Supplementary Material Contributor Information Sujith Ramachandran, Department of Pharmacy Administration, University of Mississippi School of Pharmacy, University, MS 38677, United States; Center for Pharmaceutical Marketing and Management, University of Mississippi School of Pharmacy, University, MS 38677, United States. Arman Arabshomali, Department of Pharmacy Administration, University of Mississippi School of Pharmacy, University, MS 38677, United States. John Coster, Division of Pharmacy, Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services, Baltimore, MD 21244, United States; Medicare Drug Rebate and Negotiation Group, Center for Medicare, CMS, Baltimore, MD 21244, United States. Supplementary material Supplementary material is available at Health Affairs Scholar online. Funding This manuscript was not funded. The authors received no financial support for this work. Conflicts of interest Please see ICMJE form(s) for author conflicts of interest. These have been provided as supplementary materials. The authors do not report any conflicts of interest. Please see the ICMJE form(s) for author conflicts of interest, which have been provided as supplementary materials. Editor/editorial board conflict declaration No Health Affairs Scholar editor or editorial board member is an author or contributor to this manuscript. Notes Associated Data Supplementary Materials