Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever and critical care readiness amid Afghanistan’s returnee crisis Authors: Hayatullah Takal Published: 2026 Since October 2023, Iran and Pakistan have returned or deported more than 5.4 million Afghans [1], a reverse-migration crisis unfolding just as Afghanistan’s donor-dependent health system undergoes its own, independently documented collapse. Since January 2026 alone, around 150 humanitarian-supported health facilities have closed or suspended operations for lack of funding, and the 2026 national health response remains only 17% funded [2]. This compounding emergency carries a direct, and so far unaddressed, implication for critical care. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is endemic across the Afghanistan–Pakistan–Iran border region, and unlike many zoonoses discussed only at the public-health level, it is a genuine critical care disease. Severe cases present with haemorrhagic shock and multi-organ failure and require ICU-level supportive care, blood-product transfusion, and strict infection prevention and control — not barrier nursing by bedside staff alone, but consistent protective-equipment use and isolation precautions applied to every category of staff, including laboratory, cleaning and transport personnel, to prevent nosocomial and healthcare-worker transmission. National surveillance recorded 899 confirmed cases and a 20.6% case-fatality rate in Afghanistan between 2018 and 2024, with sharp seasonal peaks around Eid-al-Adha driven by informal livestock slaughter [3]. The severity of hospitalized CCHF in this exact setting was already evident two decades earlier: an outbreak centered on Herat city between July and October 2008 produced 30 confirmed cases and a 33% case-fatality rate, with fatal outcomes concentrated among patients whose only identifiable exposure was direct contact with livestock meat or blood rather than a tick bite [4]. The returnee crisis intersects with this burden in ways of direct relevance to intensive care. Border crossing points function as de facto encampments where informal livestock trade and slaughter occur, during the same tick season in which CCHF transmission peaks. Critical care capacity to absorb a severe case arising here is already thin: ICU beds, blood banks and isolation-capable wards are concentrated in a small number of urban tertiary centers, while border district and provincial hospitals function largely as basic emergency departments, often a considerable — in places multi-hour — road transfer from the nearest facility capable of transfusion support and isolation. Meanwhile, the facility closures already documented [2] are stripping out precisely this referral infrastructure: functioning blood banks and cold chains, isolation capacity, and referral pathways from border districts to tertiary ICU care. Elmi has rightly argued in this journal that critical care readiness in fragile, conflict-affected settings should be understood as emergency infrastructure — oxygen, blood, referral pathways and trained staff — rather than simply a count of ICU beds [5]. We would extend that framework to a specific, foreseeable scenario now unfolding: a large returnee population moving through CCHF-endemic border districts at precisely the moment when the referral and blood-supply infrastructure that the clinical response to this disease depends on is measurably contracting. We propose three low-cost actions for emergency departments and ICUs in Afghanistan’s border provinces, understood as additions to the outbreak-management and infection-control work these facilities already do, not a standalone critical-care initiative. First, extend existing triage, screening and infection-control protocols to explicitly cover CCHF, isolating any patient with unexplained febrile haemorrhagic illness from first contact rather than relying on ICU staff to recognize a case once it has moved through the facility. Second, explicitly protect a minimum functioning blood-transfusion, cold-chain and diagnostic capacity at these facilities from further closure. Third, establish a standing referral pathway from border reception points to the nearest functioning ICU, mirroring the vaccination and surveillance teams already deployed at these crossings for an unrelated pathogen. None of this is achievable without the staff trained in both outbreak response and critical care that border provinces currently lack. No single actor can deliver all three: the Ministry of Public Health retains formal responsibility for border-adjacent hospitals and would need to mandate the protocol and referral elements; WHO’s country office is best placed to extend the surveillance infrastructure it already coordinates at these crossings into a clinical pathway; and protecting blood-bank and diagnostic capacity is more plausibly delivered by the international organizations already funding emergency-department support in border provinces, for whom this would extend an existing program rather than create a new one. No study has yet measured whether CCHF incidence or severity is changing within this specific returnee population. Given the scale of movement, its overlap with peak tick season, and the documented contraction of the infrastructure needed to manage severe cases, we believe this constitutes a critical care preparedness priority, not only a public health one. Strengthening bedside capacity cannot substitute, however, for measures that keep severe cases from reaching hospital in the first place: health education for returnees on safe livestock handling and tick avoidance, and closer integration of livestock and early-warning surveillance around border crossings, would reduce the load on a critical care system that has little capacity to absorb it. Acknowledgements Not applicable. Abbreviations Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever Intensive care unit Author contributions Hayatullah Takal conceived and drafted the correspondence and approved the final version. Funding This work received no specific funding. Data availability No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study. Declarations Ethics approval and consent to participate Not applicable. This correspondence does not involve human participants, human data, human tissue, or animal research. Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Footnotes Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. References Associated Data Data Availability Statement No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.