The Czech Bill on palliative care, end-of-life decision-making, and euthanasia in light of Belgian legislative experience Authors: Doležal Adam, Van Assche Kristof, Doležal Tomáš Published: 2026 ABSTRACT In 2024, a Bill “On Palliative Care, End-of-Life Decision-Making and Euthanasia” was submitted to the Czech Parliament for consideration. This article evaluates the Bill through doctrinal and ethico-legal analysis and a comparative perspective centred on Belgium, whose model influenced the Czech proposal. The Bill is unusual in combining, within one statute, conventional end-of-life practices – palliative care, withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, and palliative sedation – and “assisted death”, covering euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. With regard to conventional practices, the Bill gives legal form to a right to palliative care, introduces “medically inadequate treatment” as the threshold for limiting life-sustaining interventions, and embeds procedural safeguards (information, participation, mediation by an ethics committee, and judicial review) intended to enhance transparency, patient autonomy, and legal certainty for clinicians. With regard to assisted death, the proposal sets out eligibility criteria (adult legal competence, voluntariness, an incurable and irreversible illness, and permanent and unbearable suffering without any prospect of improvement) and a staged procedure: a preliminary request, independent consultation, a qualified written request, final verification immediately before the act, and mandatory ex post review by a commission based on a non-anonymous report. This article shows that the Czech Bill represents a serious and coherent attempt to bring end-of-life regulation in the Czech Republic into conformity with the human-rights standards developed in the case law of the ECtHR. It also advances several de lege ferenda recommendations that seek to synthesise the strengths of the Czech Bill and the Belgian model while avoiding identified shortcomings. These recommendations aim to ensure that any European end-of-life framework remains firmly anchored in human-rights requirements, while also taking into account the practical realities of clinical decision-making and the accumulated legal experience of European states that have already introduced forms of assisted death. Introduction In March 2024, members of the Czech Senate submitted the Bill ‘On Palliative Care, End-of-Life Decision-Making and Euthanasia’ (hereinafter the ‘Czech Bill’) to the Health Committee of the Parliament, marking the most recent stage in a longstanding legislative effort to regulate assisted death in the Czech Republic [1, 2]. The proposal constitutes a revised version of a bill originally submitted in 2020 which, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, was never taken up for parliamentary debate [3]. That bill itself built on earlier legislative initiatives from 2008 to 2016, when a ‘Dignified Death Bill’ was submitted for consideration in the Senate and, respectively, in the Chamber of Deputies, neither of which was ultimately adopted [4–6]. Although the 2024 bill was not scheduled for formal consideration, given the imminent end of the parliamentary term and the Senate elections in September 2024, it nonetheless became an important reference point in the pre-election debate. The Bill is expected to be resubmitted to the Senate for consideration in Spring 2026. Against this background, this article examines the Czech approach to assisted death, which introduces several non-traditional regulatory features, and – through a comparative perspective – assesses how the proposed framework might be optimised so as to withstand legal and constitutional scrutiny. The analysis draws in particular on the Belgian regulatory model, given that the Czech Bill was modelled predominantly on it [7] and that the Belgian framework has been subject to sustained critical scrutiny since 2002 [8, 9]. Central to this inquiry is an analysis of judicial decisions, most notably the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and of constitutional courts, which delineates the minimum standards governing the protection of the right to self-determination and the right to life. This is complemented by an ethico-legal approach that connects legal regulation with bioethical principles and values. Together, these methods enable the formulation of de lege ferenda recommendations within the European legal and ethical framework. Brief overview of the 2024 Czech Bill The Czech Bill combines two distinct domains of medical end-of-life decision-making. On the one hand, it regulates standard end-of-life practices aimed at relieving suffering and respecting patient autonomy while allowing death to occur as a consequence of the underlying disease, including palliative care, the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment, and palliative sedation. On the other hand, it governs medical interventions whose primary purpose is to bring about death itself, designated in the Bill as “assisted death”, a legislative umbrella term encompassing both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The overarching objective of the Bill is therefore to establish a comprehensive and coherent legal framework governing medical practices and decision-making processes at the end of life. Standard medical end-of-life practices In the part dealing with standard medical end-of-life practices, the Bill, above all, establishes a subjective right to palliative care for every patient whose condition requires it. Palliative care is defined broadly as “active, continuous, and coordinated care that focuses on meeting the physical, psychological, and spiritual needs of the patient, including pain management and other symptoms, and aims to ensure the best possible quality of life for the patient, maintain their dignity, and support close relatives” (Sect. 2(1)). Importantly, the proposal does not treat palliative care as a residual or optional form of care. Instead, it is conceived as an integral component of high-quality healthcare, applicable in hospitals, hospices, social care facilities, prisons, and the patient’s own home. The Explanatory Memorandum emphasises that in a modern healthcare system, curative and palliative approaches must coexist, and that the right to palliative care is a necessary precondition for dignified dying [2, 7]. With regard to withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, as well as the use of palliative sedation, the Bill deliberately departs from the traditionally employed notion of “futile” treatment and introduces instead the concept of “medically inadequate treatment”. Life-sustaining treatment is considered medically inadequate when it: “does not align with the individual treatment plan, does not contribute to saving life, preserving health, or maintaining quality of life, and provides no benefit to the patient or imposes burdens that clearly outweigh any potential benefits, thereby causing unnecessary suffering or complications” (Sect. 2(2)). This definition emphasises proportionality, patient-centred goals of care, and quality of life, rather than a narrow focus on biological survival. A key safeguard embedded in the Bill is the explicit obligation to ensure adequate palliative care whenever life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn. The cessation of medically inadequate treatment must never result in abandonment of the patient. On the contrary, symptom control, comfort, and psychosocial support become the primary goals of care. The Bill further establishes detailed procedural rules governing decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment and to employ palliative sedation. It introduces a structured, multi-step decision-making process applicable to all such end-of-life decisions (Sect. 5). The attending physician must consult the healthcare team involved in the patient’s care, and the patient (or their person of trust) must be fully informed and actively involved in the deliberations. In the event of disagreement between the physician and the patient, the matter is referred to an institutional ethics committee, conceived as a mediating and advisory body. Only if consensus cannot be reached may the dispute be escalated to a court, thereby ensuring judicial oversight and protection against arbitrariness (Sect. 9) [2, 7]. The Bill seeks to give effect to the requirements flowing from the ECtHR’s broader end-of-life case law – in particular Glass v United Kingdom, Lambert and others v. France, and Mortier v. Belgium – [10–12] which are not observed under current Czech law. These requirements include ensuring effective access to palliative care, respect for patient autonomy and informed consent, and the existence of clear legal procedures with strong safeguards governing treatment limitation and end-of-life decisions. In this respect, the regulatory approach adopted in the Bill is guided by a principle of minimal intervention: only those elements that the ECtHR has expressly identified as necessary are subjected to statutory regulation. Assisted death In the part addressing assisted death, the Bill sets out detailed conditions governing both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, with its entire design grounded in respect for patient autonomy and the right to self-determination. At the same time, the Bill explicitly rejects any obligation on physicians to participate in assisted death or to contribute to such procedures in any way; participation is left entirely to the individual physician’s discretion (Sect. 10(1–2)). If a physician refuses to perform assisted death, they are required to inform the patient or the patient’s designated person of trust without delay and to state the reasons for the refusal. If the refusal is based on medical grounds, those reasons must be duly recorded in the patient’s medical records (Sect. 10(3)). Moreover, upon request by the patient or the person of trust, a physician who refuses to perform assisted death must provide a complete copy of the medical records to the physician indicated by them (Sect. 10(4)). With regard to the characteristics of the person submitting the request for assisted death, the patient must be at least eighteen years of age and legally competent, and have made the request voluntarily and without coercion. The patient must be incurably ill as a result of injury or disease and, according to the current state of scientific knowledge, this condition must be irreversible, with the patient experiencing permanent and unbearable physical or mental suffering without any prospect of improvement (Sect. 11(1)). Suffering is not confined to pain alone but is understood more broadly to include other severe physical symptoms as well as profound psychological distress, such as loss of dignity, hopelessness, or anxiety, as emphasised in the Explanatory Memorandum. In this respect, assisted death for mental suffering is also covered by the scope of the Bill. Furthermore, from the patient’s perspective, no other acceptable solutions must remain, despite having received full information about available treatment and palliative care options [2, 7]. The proposed Czech legislation establishes a structured procedural model for assisted death, designed to ensure voluntariness, informed decision-making, and medical eligibility. This model includes: (1) the preliminary request, (2) the involvement of a consulted physician and, where the patient is not expected to die in the near future, a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, (3) the qualified (formal) request, (4) the final verification immediately prior to the performance of the act, and (5) subsequent review by an oversight commission (Sects. 12–17). The Bill also permits euthanasia on the basis of a previously expressed wish when the patient is no longer capable of expressing their will, provided that the patient is in a state of irreversible unconsciousness and experiences permanent and unbearable suffering without any prospect of improvement (Sects. 18 and 19). In such cases, the performing physician must discuss the previously expressed wish with the treating team and, where appointed, the patient’s person of trust, and may also consult persons close to the patient unless the patient has prohibited this. The physician must also discuss the patient’s condition with a second physician, verify that the previously expressed wish has not been revoked, and draw up a written statement confirming fulfilment of the legal conditions. The Bill further establishes the Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Assisted Death Procedures, an oversight body that operates exclusively ex post, reviewing each case of assisted death on the basis of a registration form that must be submitted by the performing physician within seven working days of the act. Its task is to assess compliance with the statutory conditions and to refer cases to the competent authorities if violations are identified (Sect. 21). The Commission is also required to submit annual reports to the Chamber of Deputies, including statistical data, an evaluation of the application of the law, and recommendations for addressing any identified deficiencies. Basic differences between the Czech Bill and the Belgian Euthanasia Law Unlike the Netherlands, where the statute is relatively concise because it largely codified pre-existing case-law practice [13], it was necessary in the Czech context to regulate end-of-life decision-making in a more comprehensive manner, as was also the case in Belgium. The Czech Bill was therefore modelled predominantly on the Belgian Euthanasia Law. Against this background, the principal differences between the Czech and Belgian legal frameworks may be summarised as follows. The Czech model is characterised in particular by: Inclusion of palliative care and other standard end-of-life practices within a regulatory framework that also governs active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide;Regulation of both euthanasia and assisted suicide within the law;Restriction of eligibility to Czech citizens and EU residents with permanent residence;Restriction of eligibility for assisted death to competent adults;Absence of a duty to refer for physicians who refuse to perform assisted death;A specific procedural framework for assisted death requiring two formal patient requests and a final verification;A qualified veto right for physicians within the assisted-death procedure;Stronger investigatory powers for the review commission; andAn administrative sanctioning regime for non-compliance, alongside generally applicable criminal-law sanctions. Inclusion of palliative care and other standard end-of-life practices within a regulatory framework that also governs active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; Inclusion of palliative care and other standard end-of-life practices within a regulatory framework that also governs active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; Regulation of both euthanasia and assisted suicide within the law; Regulation of both euthanasia and assisted suicide within the law; Restriction of eligibility to Czech citizens and EU residents with permanent residence; Restriction of eligibility to Czech citizens and EU residents with permanent residence; Restriction of eligibility for assisted death to competent adults; Restriction of eligibility for assisted death to competent adults; Absence of a duty to refer for physicians who refuse to perform assisted death; Absence of a duty to refer for physicians who refuse to perform assisted death; A specific procedural framework for assisted death requiring two formal patient requests and a final verification; A specific procedural framework for assisted death requiring two formal patient requests and a final verification; A qualified veto right for physicians within the assisted-death procedure; A qualified veto right for physicians within the assisted-death procedure; Stronger investigatory powers for the review commission; and Stronger investigatory powers for the review commission; and An administrative sanctioning regime for non-compliance, alongside generally applicable criminal-law sanctions. An administrative sanctioning regime for non-compliance, alongside generally applicable criminal-law sanctions. The inclusion of palliative care and other standard end-of-life practices The question arises whether palliative care and other standard medical end-of-life practices should be regulated by law, as is now proposed in the Bill. In our view, such regulation provides the most appropriate means of addressing the ECtHR’s concerns regarding procedural safeguards, respect for patient autonomy, and access to judicial review. Leaving end-of-life decisions unregulated risks misuse and undermines legal certainty; for example, empirical data from the Czech Republic indicate that patients’ preferences are frequently disregarded in end-of-life decision-making [14]. A robust legal framework – still lacking in the Czech Republic – would therefore more effectively secure both the right to life and the patient’s right to self-determination. In addition, it must be considered whether standard medical end-of-life practices should be regulated within the same legal instrument as assisted death. In this respect, the Bill is highly unusual. It combines provisions on euthanasia and assisted suicide with a statutory right to palliative care and detailed rules on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and on palliative sedation. This approach is motivated by two main considerations: to underline that access to high-quality palliative care constitutes a necessary precondition for the introduction of assisted-death legislation, and to respond to the ECtHR’s case law by addressing the absence of explicit statutory regulation of end-of-life decision-making in the Czech legal system. By contrast, in Belgium the legislature deliberately adopted two separate but complementary laws: the Euthanasia Law and the Law on Palliative Care [15, 16]. Enacted in close succession in 2002, the latter – supported by appropriate infrastructure and funding – was expressly intended to counterbalance the legalisation of euthanasia. This ensured that euthanasia would be contextualised within established end-of-life practices, so that it would not replace nor undermine broader supportive care for patients approaching the end of life, and that all patients for whom cure is no longer possible would be guaranteed adequate support [17]. The linkage of palliative care and assisted death in the Czech Bill has attracted significant criticism. Opponents argue that the two represent fundamentally distinct legal and ethical concepts and that their integration risks conflating normative frameworks that require distinct legislative approaches [18]. It has been argued that palliative care and assisted death rest on fundamentally different normative foundations and reflect distinct aims within end-of-life care [19, 20]. Assisted death involves the intentional termination of life in order to relieve suffering, whereas palliative care seeks to alleviate suffering and improve quality of life without the intention to hasten death. This distinction is reflected in their regulatory structures: laws on assisted death create carefully circumscribed exceptions to the criminal prohibition on intentionally causing death and accordingly requires strict eligibility criteria, procedural safeguards, reporting obligations, and review mechanisms, while palliative care operates within the ordinary framework of health law, focussing on access, quality standards, and integration of services. Along the same line of reasoning, the debate surrounding palliative sedation further illustrates the necessity of maintaining clear regulatory boundaries, as sedation is regarded as morally and legally distinct from euthanasia precisely because its purpose is symptom relief rather than the causation of death [21–23]. At the same time, from the perspective of alleviating suffering and enabling a peaceful death, palliative care and assisted death pursue overlapping objectives. Both address situations in which curative treatment has been exhausted and continued intervention would merely prolong suffering. End-of-life decision-making thus centres on the patient’s values, autonomy, and subjective assessment of quality of life. Practices such as deep palliative sedation – sometimes accompanied by the withdrawing of artificial nutrition or hydration – illustrate these tensions, as they alleviate suffering at the cost of eliminating consciousness and the patient’s subjectively lived experience and foreseeably, albeit unintentionally, hasten death. While doctrinal distinctions between such practices and assisted death are often emphasised, many authors question their moral significance [24–30]. Furthermore, some patients do not regard these options as compatible with their conception of a dignified death, which frequently includes self-determination and control over the circumstances of dying. Against this background, it can be argued that palliative care and assisted death need not be treated as mutually exclusive but rather as distinct options available at the end of life. Regulating them within a coherent legal framework – potentially within a single law – can enhance transparency, legal certainty, and compliance with human-rights standards. Both standard medical end-of-life practices and assisted death engage Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore give rise to broadly similar requirements, including respect for informed consent and clear procedures with strong safeguards. In conclusion, the primary objective should be to establish clear principles and rules governing procedures concerning standard medical end-of-life practices and assisted death, so that they do not become instruments of unfettered physician discretion. Provided that the framework clearly distinguishes assisted death from other end-of-life practices, it is of secondary importance whether regulation is contained in two separate laws, as in Belgium, or in a single law, as proposed in the Czech Republic. The inclusion of both euthanasia and assisted suicide While the Belgian framework is limited to the regulation of euthanasia, the Czech Bill adopts a broader and conceptually distinct approach by explicitly introducing physician-assisted suicide, which is not regulated under Belgian law. The absence of regulation in Belgium gives rise to several difficulties, as the legal status of physician-assisted suicide remains uncertain, including whether and under what circumstances it may be subject to criminal liability [31, 32]. Some institutions, including the National Order of Physicians and the Federal Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Euthanasia, have argued that assisted suicide may fall within the scope of the Euthanasia Law, since the law does not specify the manner in which euthanasia must be performed, which has been interpreted as implicitly allowing self-administration of the lethal substance. This interpretation was tested in 2015, when the Commission referred a case to the Public Prosecutor in which a physician had failed to comply with the legal requirement to consult a psychiatrist. However, in 2019 the physician was found not liable for prosecution, since the charge of poisoning – the sanction that applied to non-compliance with the Euthanasia Law at that time – did not apply because the woman had taken the lethal substance herself [33]. This decision casts serious doubt on the claim that the Euthanasia Law also governs assisted suicide. As a result, Belgian law currently contains no clear provisions regulating physician-assisted suicide. This creates the risk that physicians may avoid the strict safeguards applicable to euthanasia by allowing self-administration without exposure to criminal liability. A specific legal framework is therefore necessary to prevent abuse and to ensure compliance with Article 2 ECHR. Assisted suicide should be subject to the same conditions as euthanasia, since imposing stricter requirements on an act that is in many respects similar or less intrusive would be difficult to justify [32, 34]. By contrast, for reasons of legal certainty, the Czech Bill explicitly includes a legal framework for physician-assisted suicide. It defines euthanasia as “the administration of a lethal substance by a physician to a patient for the purpose of ending the patient’s life at the patient’s explicit and voluntary request.” (Sect. 2(5)). Assisted suicide is defined as “a procedure by which a physician helps a patient to commit suicide or provides the patient with the means to do so, at the patient’s explicit and voluntary request.” (Sect. 2(4)). Both definitions have been criticised by some authors [35], and the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic expressed a non-binding negative view of this definitional approach [36]. In developing these definitions, the Bill draws on the Belgian Euthanasia Law (euthanasia), the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act (assisted suicide), and the Luxembourg Euthanasia Law (both). More recent legislative models, such as the pending Portuguese Bill, the Spanish Law on the Regulation of Euthanasia, and the Canadian Medical Assistance in Dying regime, explicitly include the administration of a lethal substance in their definitions. The Czech Bill follows these latter approaches for its definition of euthanasia because they are more detailed than the Dutch, Belgian, or Luxembourg formulations and more clearly distinguish euthanasia from other medical end-of-life decisions. By contrast, for its definition of assisted suicide, the Bill follows the Dutch and Luxembourg approaches, although from the perspective of legislative technique it would have been preferable to also here include an explicit reference to the administration of a lethal substance, in line with the approaches adopted in Canada, Portugal, and Spain. In the Czech Republic, as in many other jurisdictions considering the regulation of assisted death, a central issue in the debate was whether, in addition to physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia should also be legally permitted, given the view held by some that euthanasia is morally more problematic. This position was endorsed by the Czech Constitutional Court, which held that, for proportionality purposes, requiring access to euthanasia is more serious than requiring access to physician-assisted suicide, because euthanasia involves a third party as the direct causal agent of death, allows less possibility to reconsider the decision until the moment of death, and therefore entails higher risks of error and abuse, requiring stronger safeguards [37]. This raises the question whether only physician-assisted suicide should be admitted into the legal order. In some jurisdictions that allow assisted death, such as a number of U.S. States and Austria, only physician-assisted suicide is permitted [38, 39]. This approach appears to be guided by several considerations. First, it reflects the principle of minimally invasive means, according to which the legal framework should interfere with protected values – such as the right to life, the prohibition on killing, and professional medical ethics – no more than is strictly necessary to achieve a legitimate aim [40]. By requiring the patient to perform the final life-ending act personally, these regimes maintain the greatest possible distance from direct physician-caused death, while still enabling individuals to exercise self-determination and avoid unbearable suffering at the end of life. Second, it seeks to ensure that the act constitutes the strongest expression of personal autonomy, since the final causal step remains under the patient’s direct control. This reinforces the patient’s will as the decisive causal factor, limits opportunities for abuse, and reduces the moral burden placed on physicians. In this respect, it has been argued that the difference in causation and, potentially, in intention may be morally relevant, since in physician-assisted suicide the patient retains control over the final act and may interrupt the causal chain [41]. However, this approach fails where physician-assisted suicide is not a viable option for all patients. Limiting assisted death to physician-assisted suicide risks disadvantaging patients with severe physical impairments, for whom euthanasia may be the only means of securing a dignified death, and may therefore produce discriminatory effects [42, 43]. An alternative model, adopted in jurisdictions such as Victoria and South Australia, as well as in the pending Portuguese Bill, permits euthanasia only when physician-assisted suicide is impossible due to the patient’s physical incapacity [44, 45]. The Portuguese Bill, developed as a compromise after many years of parliamentary debate, two vetoes by the Portuguese President, and constitutional review in which the Constitutional Court repeatedly emphasised that any assisted-dying framework must remain exceptional and strictly bounded by the constitutional protection of life, allows euthanasia only as a fallback option [45]. This design is intended to ensure equal access for severely disabled persons while preserving autonomy as the primary value and, at the same time, to confine direct physician-caused death to strictly exceptional cases, thereby minimising interference with the constitutional protection of life. The conventional distinction between euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide rests on differences in causal agency: the only descriptive difference is who performs the final causal act – the patient in physician-assisted suicide, the physician in euthanasia – yet it is difficult to explain why this difference should carry decisive moral weight [42, 43, 46, 47]. From our perspective, the causal distinction and the concerns expressed in jurisdictions such as the U.S. states and Portugal do not justify divergent legal treatment. Both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide can be morally permissible when assessed in terms of autonomy, subjectively experienced quality of life, dignity, and the avoidance of constant and unbearable suffering [48–50]. The same normative considerations underlie both practices; accordingly, either both are morally permissible, or neither is. Legislative frameworks, such as the Belgian Euthanasia Law and the Czech Bill, can be designed to include strong safeguards that guarantee autonomy and prevent abuse also in cases of euthanasia. The restriction of eligibility to Czech citizens and EU residents with permanent residence The Bill permits assisted dying for a patient who is a citizen of the Czech Republic or a citizen of another EU Member State who holds a permanent residence permit in the Czech Republic for at least five years (Sect. 11(2)). By contrast, no comparable restriction applies in Belgium, where euthanasia may be performed on any person who meets the statutory eligibility conditions, irrespective of nationality or residence. Questions arise as to the compatibility of the restriction imposed by the Czech Bill with EU law. Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (non-discrimination on grounds of nationality), read together with Article 21 TFEU (free movement of Union citizens) and Article 56 TFEU (freedom to provide and receive services), constrains Member States’ ability to adopt measures that discriminate against non-nationals. In the context of the provision of services, direct discrimination may be justified only on the grounds expressly listed in Article 52 TFEU – public policy, public security, or public health. In addition, under Article 4(3) of Directive 2011/24/EU, the principle of non-discrimination with regard to nationality must be applied to patients from other Member States, without prejudice to the possibility for the Member State of treatment, where justified by overriding reasons of general interest (including healthcare planning requirements), to adopt access measures aimed at safeguarding sufficient and permanent access to healthcare within its territory, provided that such measures are limited to what is necessary and proportionate. In the context of nationality or residence requirements for access to euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, public policy and public security are unlikely to be relevant. As regards public health, justification would typically require substantiating a genuine risk to the host State’s healthcare system, for example where the influx of patients from other EU Member States becomes so substantial that it jeopardises continuous access to healthcare for the host State’s population. Consequently, so long as patient flows remain limited, strict nationality or residence requirements imposed on EU citizens are likely to be found unjustified and disproportionate restrictions on free movement under Article 21 TFEU and the framework governing limitations on free-movement rights, including Directive 2004/38/EC [51]. The restriction of eligibility for assisted death to competent adults The Czech Bill permits euthanasia only for adults who are legally competent. This restrictive approach is explicitly justified by a strong appeal to the principle of autonomy, understood as the individual’s right to self-determination in matters of fundamental existential significance. For this reason, the draft legislation places particular emphasis on the patient’s sufficient decision-making capacity as a necessary precondition for assisted death [7]. By contrast, in Belgium the recognition that some minors possess the required decision-making capacity was precisely the reason why the Euthanasia Law was amended in 2014 to extend eligibility for euthanasia to minors with the “capacity of discernment”. Eligibility is subject to stricter conditions, including a mandatory and binding assessment of the minor’s capacity of discernment by a child psychiatrist or psychologist, the consent of the legal representatives in addition to the minor’s own consent, and the restriction of admissibility to cases of terminal illness accompanied by constant and unbearable physical suffering [52]. Euthanasia was not extended to non-terminal conditions, to cases involving purely mental suffering, or to advance directives.1 The regulation allowing minors was introduced by reference to the general principle in the Law on the Rights of the Patient, which provides that minors should participate in medical decision-making in accordance with their age and maturity and, if capable of reasonably assessing their interests, should be allowed to exercise those rights autonomously. It was further noted that minors whose maturity results from a history of severe illness may, in this respect, be comparable to adults. Capacity for discernment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and not by chronological age, since the amendment did not introduce an explicit age threshold – unlike in the Netherlands, where euthanasia for minors is limited to those who are at least 12 years old. The Belgian assessment is thus functional, taking into account the minor’s actual decision-making ability in this specific context [53]. Some controversy emerged because the Belgian model does not allow minors to make an independent decision regarding euthanasia, whereas in the Netherlands, for minors aged 16 and 18, legal representatives are only required to be ‘involved’ in the decision-making process. Several arguments were advanced in support of granting veto powers to a minor’s legal representatives. First, notwithstanding the provision in the Law on the Rights of the Patient, the legislator may maintain the general principle that non-emancipated minors lack full legal capacity and therefore require representation in the specific context of euthanasia. Second, given the emotional impact on parents, it was argued that it would be hardly conceivable to grant a minor’s request for euthanasia in the face of parental opposition. Third, requiring parental consent was said to alleviate potential legal concerns for the attending physician. On this basis, the Constitutional Court held that it was not unreasonable to require the consent of the minor’s legal representatives [54]. Although this requirement limits the minor’s autonomy compared with other healthcare contexts, the Court considered the restriction justified by parents’ right to family life and their duty to safeguard the well-being of their child. The Court further noted that parental involvement also serves as an additional safeguard by reinforcing the objectivity of the physician’s assessment. This legislative choice has, however, been strongly criticised. Commentators argue that allowing parents to veto an otherwise lawful euthanasia request is incompatible with the minor’s right to self-determination and the purpose of decriminalising euthanasia, which is to enable competent patients to decide for themselves when suffering becomes unbearable. Since euthanasia presupposes that it is the patient who makes the final decision, granting a third party the right to co-decide is therefore said to conflict with the deeply personal and fundamental nature of the euthanasia decision [55–57]. The absence of a duty to refer The Czech Bill provides that a physician who refuses to perform assisted death must inform the patient or the patient’s person of trust without delay, state the reasons for the refusal and, upon request, provide a complete copy of the medical records to the physician indicated by the patient (Sect. 10(3)-(4)). This raises the question of how the duty to give reasons and to transmit the medical records can be reconciled with the physician’s right to conscientious objection, which is also recognised in the Bill. Notably, in a recent judgment, the Portuguese Constitutional Court declared a comparable duty to state reasons unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an inadequate, unnecessary, and disproportionate restriction of freedom of conscience, in its negative dimension as the freedom not to disclose one’s personal convictions to others [58]. In Belgium, the Law likewise imposes duties to give reasons – within seven days of the patient’s euthanasia request – and to transmit medical records – within four days of a request for their transmission (Art. 14, §§ 5–6). Although this was criticised during the parliamentary debate as odd, given that it requires a physician to justify refusal to perform an act that may be criminal, the duty was considered consistent with the Law on the Rights of the Patient, which guarantees the patient’s right to information [59]. Since 2020, physicians who refuse a euthanasia request must also provide the patient or trusted person with the contact details of “a centre or organisation specialising in euthanasia law” (Art. 14, § 7). A proposal to introduce a strict duty of referral to another physician was rejected by the Council of State as infringing physicians’ freedom of conscience under Article 9 ECHR, insofar as it would oblige a physician who refuses euthanasia on grounds of conscience to facilitate its performance by referring the patient to a physician who might be willing to perform it [60]. Instead, a more limited duty to provide information sources was adopted and later upheld by the Constitutional Court, which held – relying on case law of the ECtHR – that the obligation legitimately strengthens the patient’s right to decide how and when to end life, derived from the right to respect for private life. The Court further emphasised that the healthcare system must be organised in such a way that the effective exercise of physicians’ freedom of conscience does not prevent patients from having access to services to which they are legally entitled, and this objective cannot be achieved without at least requiring physicians to provide contact details of a person or organisation capable of offering useful assistance [61]. The contrast with the Portuguese Constitutional Court’s approach is striking. A procedure requiring two formal written patient requests and a final verification The Czech Bill differs from the Belgian model in that it establishes a formalised procedure requiring two official patient requests for assisted death and a final verification immediately prior to the act. The preliminary request initiates an assessment by the attending physician, including verification of the patient’s decision-making capacity, medical condition, and suffering, consultation with an independent physician, and – where the patient is not in a terminal stage – an additional assessment by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. This stage results in a written professional opinion either confirming or rejecting eligibility. If eligibility is confirmed, the patient may submit a qualified request, which must be well-considered, handwritten, bear an officially certified signature, and include explicit informed consent. Immediately before the act, the performing physician must again confirm the incurability and irreversibility of the patient’s condition and that the patient’s will remains voluntary, informed, and unchanged. The Czech framework therefore explicitly formalises the requirement that patients repeatedly and consistently express the wish to die throughout the entire process. By contrast, the Belgian model does not explicitly require two formally distinct requests, but instead requires that the euthanasia request be well-considered, repeated, and enduring (Art. 3 § 1), meaning that it must be expressed on several occasions and that the will for euthanasia must persist between those expressions [62]. To verify this enduring character, the physician must conduct conversations with the patient over a reasonable period of time. The requirement that the request be repeated does not imply multiple written requests. As noted by the Council of State in its advisory opinion on the euthanasia bill, one written request is sufficient, but repeated oral requests are necessary [63]. Although the physician must also ascertain the persistence of the request immediately before performing euthanasia, this obligation is not explicitly formalised in the same manner as in the Czech Bill. A qualified veto right for consulted physicians Both the Czech Bill and the Belgian model require the involvement of independent consulted physicians. In both regimes, the consulted physician must be independent from both the patient and the attending physician. The Czech Bill specifies this requirement in detail: the consulted physician may not be employed by or otherwise affiliated with the attending physician, may not be a close person of either the patient or the attending physician, and must not be in any situation of potential conflict of interest (Sect. 13(2)). In both systems, the consulted physician must prepare a report based on a personal medical examination of the patient, and the attending physician must inform the patient of the outcome of the consultation. Furthermore, where the patient is not expected to die in the near future, both regimes require consultation with an additional independent expert: under the Czech Bill, a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist (Sect. 13(5)); under Belgian law, a psychiatrist or a specialist in the relevant pathology (Art. 3, 3, 1°). In both systems, the attending physician must again inform the patient of the outcome of this second consultation. Where the patient is not expected to die in the near future, assisted death may not be performed until at least one month has elapsed – calculated from the expert’s report in the Czech Republic (Sect. 13(5)) and from the patient’s written request in Belgium (Art. 3, 3, 2°). A further distinction concerns the scope of the experts’ assessment. Belgian law specifies the tasks of the consulted experts: the consulted physician must verify the serious and incurable nature of the condition, as well as the constant and unbearable physical or psychological suffering that cannot be alleviated (Art. 3, § 2, 3°). Where applicable, the consulted psychiatrist or specialist in the relevant pathology must assess the persistence and unbearability of the suffering and the voluntary, well-considered, and repeated character of the request (Art. 3, 3, 1°). By contrast, the Czech Bill tasks the consulted physician with assessing the patient’s condition, in particular the seriousness and incurability of the disease (Sect. 13(1)), but elsewhere formulates the task of the consulted physician and, where applicable, psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, more broadly as verification of the fulfilment of the conditions for assisted death (Sect. 13(6)). As a result, the Czech consulted experts are entrusted with an assessment of the substantive eligibility criteria that largely mirrors that of the attending physician, whereas Belgian law formulates the experts’ mandate more narrowly, even though in practice they will necessarily form an opinion on all eligibility conditions when examining the patient. The most significant difference concerns the legal effect of the experts’ conclusions. Under the Czech Bill, if a consulted physician – or, where applicable, a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist – has reasonable doubts about whether the conditions for assisted death are fulfilled, the attending physician must seek a further independent opinion. If the additional expert also has doubts, the entire procedure must be terminated and recorded in the medical documentation. The process may be restarted only upon submission of a new preliminary request and only if the relevant circumstances have changed (Sect. 13(6)). In Belgium, by contrast, the attending physician remains fully responsible for the final decision. Although the law requires consultation with independent physicians, their opinions are advisory rather than binding, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court [54]. The attending physician may disregard those opinions and is free to consult additional physicians, which has happened in practice [64]. Moreover, patients may submit a new euthanasia request to another physician even if their circumstances remain unchanged, enabling a form of “physician shopping”. Given that the assessment of eligibility criteria constitutes the critical threshold of the euthanasia process – and that ex post review by the Euthanasia Commission depends largely on the quality of this prior evaluation – the Czech model’s qualified veto mechanism seems to offer a structurally stronger safeguard. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that this stronger safeguard may also have implications for the practical accessibility of assisted death. Its operation will necessarily depend on the interpretative practice of the physicians involved. It may be expected that some physicians will continue to approach assisted death with a degree of reluctance, which may manifest itself in a more restrictive assessment of whether the statutory criteria are met. Combined with the binding nature of the expert opinion, this model may in certain cases result in reduced access for patients who would otherwise satisfy the legal conditions. By contrast, legal frameworks based on the non-binding character of expert opinions, such as the Belgian model, leave greater room for a plurality of professional views, which may increase the flexibility of decision-making practice. Stronger investigatory powers of the review commission Another issue concerns the design and operation of the review commission. Both the Czech Bill and Belgian law rely on an ex post review model. Under the Czech Bill, the independent Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Assisted Death is appointed by the government and composed of three physicians in general medicine, three legal professionals, one member of the healthcare professions, and two representatives of patient-rights organisations (Sect. 20). Each case of assisted death must be reported by the performing physician within seven working days. The Commission then conducts a substantive assessment of compliance with the statutory conditions and refers cases to the competent authorities where violations are identified (Sect. 21); decisions may be taken by an absolute majority of all members (Sect. 20). Unlike purely formal review systems, the Czech Commission is expressly empowered to conduct a material review. It may request additional information and access complete, non-anonymous medical records, including direct inspection by medically qualified members and expert advisers. Public reporting is anonymised and members are bound by statutory confidentiality obligations. This design seeks to ensure effective oversight and meaningful accountability. In Belgium, once euthanasia has been performed, the physician must complete a detailed registration document and submit it within four working days to the Federal Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Euthanasia. This Commission is appointed by the government and consists of sixteen members: eight physicians, four legal experts, and four individuals with professional expertise in caring for incurably ill patients (Art. 6, §§ 1–2). Until 2024, the Belgian review system relied on a two-part registration document: an anonymous part used for initial assessment and an identifying part that could be opened by simple majority if doubts arose. Following the judgment of the ECtHR in Mortier v. Belgium – which found a violation because reliance on the anonymous part allowed a physician-member of the Commission who had participated in the euthanasia under review to remain silent about that involvement and to vote on the compatibility of their own conduct, thereby failing to ensure the independence required for the State’s assessment of the circumstances of death under Article 2 ECHR [12] – this model was reformed. The registration document now contains only identifying information and has been updated to enable more transparent review (Art 7, § 1). If the Commission concludes, by a two-thirds majority, that the legal requirements were not respected, it must refer the case to the Public Prosecutor for further investigation and possible prosecution (Art. 8). Under the current procedure, several commentators have expressed serious concerns that the Commission’s official filtering function may in practice operate as a blocking mechanism. Between 2002 and 2024, according to the Commission’s biennial reports, more than 34,000 euthanasia cases were reported, yet only one case was ever referred for prosecution – where, as noted above, the physician was ultimately not held liable because the facts concerned assisted suicide rather than euthanasia. The Commission’s limited transparency and strong internal veto structure – where physician-members of the Commission can in practice block any attempt to refer – have therefore been criticised as shielding physicians rather than functioning as an effective oversight body. This concern is reinforced by the Commission’s institutional position: because a two-thirds majority is required to refer a case to the Public Prosecutor, it exercises substantial control over whether judicial review will occur, even though prosecutorial authorities retain independent power to investigate on their own initiative or in response to individual complaints. It is therefore argued that entrusting ex post oversight to such a body allows decisions capable of keeping euthanasia cases outside the judiciary to be taken by a non-judicial authority [64]. This contrasts with the Netherlands, where oversight is organised through five Regional Review Committees, each composed of a physician, an ethicist, and a legal specialist, and decisions are taken by simple majority. These committees identify potential non-compliance in approximately 0.16% of reported cases, which are referred and subsequently published in anonymised form [65]. Crucially, the Czech Commission intentionally departs from the original Belgian framework, which relied primarily on anonymised reporting, and draws on the Dutch experience, where reporting has always been non-anonymous. Although the Czech Bill pre-dated the ECtHR’s ruling in Mortier v. Belgium, it effectively anticipated the risks identified in that judgment: by excluding anonymity in reporting and granting the Commission access to complete medical files, the Czech draft seeks to secure active and substantive review and meaningful accountability, including mandatory referrals to the public prosecutor and the health inspection authority where the statutory conditions are not fulfilled. When the Czech Bill was drafted (2019–2020), no domestic assisted-death framework provided for ex ante review, although such models were under consideration with reference to Spanish law and the then-proposed Portuguese legislation. The Spanish ex ante system – also reflected in the Portuguese proposal – entrusts an independent commission with reviewing requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide before the act is carried out, thereby offering clear preventive safeguards and protecting physicians from criminal liability once approval is granted [66–68]. However, this model also entails significant drawbacks, including administrative and financial burdens, bureaucratisation, procedural delays, and reduced flexibility in complex or borderline cases, potentially preventing some eligible applicants from accessing assistance. More fundamentally, the choice between ex ante and ex post review reflects different conceptions of moral responsibility. Whereas the Spanish model emphasises collective, preventive responsibility, ex post models – when properly designed and effectively enforced – combine preventive effects with retrospective individual accountability through the possibility of criminal sanctions. It has been argued that ex ante commission decision-making risks diffusing responsibility and weakening both physician and patient autonomy by transforming the physician into a mere executor of the commission’s decision [2]. For these reasons, the Czech draft opted for an ex post model, as in the Benelux countries, grounded in individual physician responsibility. An administrative sanctioning regime The final issue concerns sanctions for non-compliance. Because the Czech Bill decriminalises euthanasia and assisted suicide only if the legal conditions are met, breaches may trigger liability under the Criminal Code. More specifically, euthanasia may qualify as murder, punishable by 10 to 18 years of imprisonment (Criminal Code, § 140), while assisted suicide may qualify as participation in suicide, punishable by up to three years (Criminal Code, § 144). Importantly, the Bill itself also introduces a system of administrative sanctions for failure to comply with procedural safeguards, including adequately informing the patient, verifying the nature of the disease and the suffering, consulting an independent physician, failing to drawn up a statement on the conditions for assisted dying, failing to submit, submitting late, or submitting an incomplete registration form to the Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Assisted Death, and failing to allow the Commission or its expert advisers to inspect the patient’s medical records. The maximum fines are CZK 500,000, CZK 200,000, or CZK 100,000 depending on the type of offence (Sect. 23). This framework allows minor violations to be addressed through administrative sanctions, while reserving criminal liability for serious non-compliance with the substantive conditions governing assisted death. By contrast, in Belgium, the initial lack of a specific sanctioning regime in the Euthanasia Law meant that even minor procedural breaches could, in theory, lead to prosecution for murder by poisoning. The Constitutional Court held this to be unconstitutional, finding that the absence of differentiated penalties for violations of substantive versus procedural requirements infringed the principles of equality and non-discrimination [69]. In response, a differentiated sanctioning regime was introduced in 2024: a physician who performs euthanasia in breach of a substantive requirement (e.g., lack of legal capacity or absence of a medically hopeless situation of constant and unbearable suffering) is punishable by 10 to 15 years of imprisonment, while procedural breaches (e.g., failure to consult another physician) are punishable by 8 days to 3 years of imprisonment and/or a fine (Art. 13/3). The amendment also protects consulted physicians and psychologists from being treated as perpetrators or accomplices solely for providing the required opinion (Art. 3ter). However, residual ambiguity remains, because procedural breaches not expressly assigned a specific penalty in the Euthanasia Law could still, in theory, be prosecuted under the general criminal-law offence of poisoning. Compliance with the ECHR As clarified in the case law of the ECtHR, and in particular in Mortier v. Belgium – the first judgment in which the Court examined the compatibility of a euthanasia law with the ECHR – States may decriminalise assisted death provided that domestic law incorporates robust procedural safeguards, in particular ensuring that: (1) the category of persons eligible to request such assistance is defined clearly and precisely, (2) every request is voluntary, (3) enhanced protection is afforded to vulnerable persons, and (4) decision-makers verify the eligibility conditions in a precise manner [70]. In Mortier, the Court concluded that the Belgian Euthanasia Law met these standards, in particular because of the additional safeguards applicable to cases of mental suffering, including consultation with two independent physicians, one of whom must be a psychiatrist, and a mandatory waiting period [12]. The Court further held that, in the circumstances of the case, the euthanasia had been performed in accordance with Belgian law and therefore did not in itself constitute a violation of the Convention. As indicated, it did, however, identify a structural defect in Belgium’s system of ex post review, since, at the time, the Euthanasia Commission could assess compliance solely on the basis of the anonymous part of the registration document, which compromised the independence of the review mechanism and resulted in a violation of Article 2 ECHR, leading to an amendment to the Belgian Euthanasia Law in 2024 to abolish anonymity in the registration procedure. Measured against these standards, the Czech Bill appears fully compatible with the Convention and, in several respects, provides safeguards that exceed the minimum requirements identified by the Court. The Bill defines eligibility for assisted death with a high degree of precision, limits access to legally competent adults, and establishes a multi-layered procedure designed to ensure that every request is voluntary, informed, and stable over time. Its structure – combining a preliminary request, mandatory independent medical consultation, enhanced psychiatric or psychological assessment in non-terminal cases, a qualified formal request, and final verification immediately before the act – offers a level of procedural robustness that surpasses the safeguards examined in Mortier, particularly in relation to the protection of vulnerable persons and the verification of substantive eligibility criteria. The Czech framework also addresses the deficiency identified in Mortier, as it explicitly rejects anonymity in the assessment by the Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Assisted Death. Finally, the part of the Czech Bill regulating standard medical end-of-life practices, in particular the establishment of a subjective right to palliative care, is likewise closely aligned with the ECtHR’s end-of-life jurisprudence. The Court has consistently emphasised that effective access to high-quality palliative care constitutes a central safeguard in any legal framework governing dying, both as an element of respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR and as part of the State’s positive obligation to protect life under Article 2, as confirmed most recently in Karsai v. Hungary [71]. By recognising palliative care as an integral and non-optional component of healthcare, by imposing a legal duty to ensure adequate symptom relief whenever life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn, and by establishing clear procedural guarantees for treatment limitation and palliative sedation – including patient involvement, mediation by an ethics committee, and access to judicial review – the Czech Bill gives concrete effect to these human-rights standards. Conclusion This article has shown that the Czech Bill represents a serious and coherent attempt to bring end-of-life regulation in the Czech Republic into conformity with the human-rights standards developed in the case law of the ECtHR. In the field of traditional medical end-of-life practices – in particular palliative care, withholding and withdrawal of treatment, and palliative sedation – the Bill gives concrete expression to the State’s positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, as reflected in the Court’s judgments in Glass, Lambert, and Karsai. It does so by establishing a subjective right to palliative care, by ensuring effective access to symptom control and psychosocial support whenever life-sustaining treatment is limited, and by introducing clear procedural safeguards, including patient participation, ethics-committee mediation, and judicial oversight. As also recognised by the Czech Constitutional Court, such clear legal regulation is indispensable for legal certainty for both patients and physicians, and it transforms palliative care from a discretionary medical service into a legally protected component of the protection of autonomy and human dignity at the end of life. With respect to assisted death, the Czech Bill likewise appears fully compatible with the standards articulated by the ECtHR, particularly in Mortier, and in several respects provides stronger safeguards than those found in the Belgian Euthanasia Law. While the Belgian framework was held to satisfy Convention requirements regarding eligibility, voluntariness, protection of vulnerable persons, and verification of conditions, the Czech proposal strengthens these elements through its multi-stage request procedure, binding expert veto mechanism, the absence of any possibility for a patient whose request has been refused to resubmit it without a change in circumstances, and reinforced oversight. In contrast to Belgium’s former review system, which relied primarily on anonymised reporting and was criticised by the ECtHR, the Czech Bill provides for non-anonymous reporting and material ex post review with access to full medical file documentation. At the same time, the Czech framework avoids the difficulties present in Belgian law by explicitly regulating physician-assisted suicide alongside euthanasia, and by maintaining legal certainty through more detailed procedural rules. Finally, drawing on both the Belgian and Czech perspectives, this article concludes that comprehensive regulation of end-of-life decision-making is necessary, not only for assisted death but also for established practices such as palliative care, withholding and withdrawal of treatment, and palliative sedation. While such regulation need not be contained in a single law, it is essential that all these domains are governed by clear legal rules grounded in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The article has further emphasised the importance of precise statutory definitions of assisted-death practices in order to avoid ambiguity and the risk of misuse. From this perspective, we consider it appropriate to regulate both physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, as the moral distinctions between them are not sufficiently pronounced to justify privileging physician-assisted suicide alone. The article has also underlined the central role of transparent and independent oversight mechanisms. In this respect, ex post review may, in our view, be preferable to ex ante control, provided that the review process is characterised by genuine independence, effective investigatory powers, and internal decision-making rules that allow for meaningful referral. At the same time – and in light of Mortier – the importance of robust procedural safeguards has been emphasised, in particular for the protection of vulnerable persons at the end of life. In addition, the article questions whether the Czech Bill’s nationality and residence requirements are compatible with EU law, which prohibits discrimination against patients from other Member States unless the restriction is justified and shown to be necessary and proportionate. Moreover, the article highlights the need for a differentiated sanctioning regime, with distinct consequences for breaches of substantive conditions (whether through penalties in the assisted death law itself or under general criminal-law provisions) and breaches of procedural safeguards, which could be addressed through lower criminal penalties or administrative sanctions in order to preserve proportionality and legal certainty. On this basis, the article advances several de lege ferenda recommendations that seek to synthesise the strengths of the Czech Bill and the Belgian model while avoiding identified shortcomings. These recommendations aim to ensure that any European end-of-life framework remains firmly anchored in human-rights requirements, while also taking into account the practical realities of clinical decision-making and the accumulated legal experience of European states that have already introduced forms of assisted death.