When supply chains fail: rethinking resilience in intensive care Authors: Clara Del Prete, Luca Carenzo, Marta Caviglia Published: 2026 ABSTRACT Intensive care units (ICUs) are designed to support critically ill patients through life-threatening organ dysfunction, relying on highly optimized processes and specialized resources. Yet they are increasingly exposed to systemic shocks of geopolitical, environmental, and technological origin. These act not only on infrastructure and workforce but, more insidiously, through the supply chains on which bedside care depends, rendering ICU autonomy largely illusory: the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients is highly concentrated geographically, while some critical products depend on a single manufacturing site worldwide; consequently, a disruption at a single node can propagate rapidly to the bedside. We trace this cascade, from shock to the depletion of just-in-time buffers and the distorting effect of phantom demand, to the rationing, substitution, and improvisation that increase workload, variability, and clinical risk. This fragility is not incidental but the product of decades of efficiency-driven reform that has systematically reduced organizational slack: the inventory, redundant capacity, and workforce flexibility that enable adaptation under stress. The relationship between efficiency and resilience should be understood as a structural tension rather than a fixed trade-off. Targeted organisational strategies can strengthen ICU resilience, including regionalized ICU networks governed by formal agreements, diversification and strategic stockpiling of high-risk medications, and pre-emptive protocols for drug and fluid conservation. Scalable digital infrastructure and in-situ simulation can further support these strategies. Resilience should therefore be understood as a design principle, not an emergent property of crisis response. It is day three of a propofol shortage. Your patient with acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) requires deep sedation for prone positioning, but the pharmacy’s stock is exhausted. The alternative supplier cannot deliver for at least 10 days. You switch to midazolam; within 48 h, that too is rationed. It is day three of a propofol shortage. Your patient with acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) requires deep sedation for prone positioning, but the pharmacy’s stock is exhausted. The alternative supplier cannot deliver for at least 10 days. You switch to midazolam; within 48 h, that too is rationed. Such scenarios are no longer rare. Intensive care units (ICUs), designed to manage physiological instability through highly optimized processes and specialized resources, are increasingly exposed to systemic shocks driven by geopolitical, environmental, and technological disruptions [1]. While these shocks may directly affect infrastructure or the workforce, they also operate indirectly through supply chain disruptions that increasingly constrain ICU operations [2]. Importantly, the focus of this manuscript is not the direct impact of individual geopolitical, environmental, or technological crises on ICU functioning. Rather, we examine supply chain disruption as a common pathway through which diverse external shocks are translated into operational constraints and ultimately affect bedside care. Supply chains and the illusion of ICU autonomy Supply disruptions have become a persistent operational challenge. Recent geopolitical conflicts, disruptions affecting strategic maritime trade routes, energy market volatility, and pandemic-related manufacturing constraints have exposed the growing vulnerability of globally interconnected supply chains to recurrent and cascading disruptions [3–7]. These shocks can propagate across countries and sectors through disruptions in energy, transport, production, and logistics, with consequences extending to the availability and movement of critical healthcare supplies [7, 8]. Historical examples within healthcare, including the 2017 saline shortage following Hurricane Maria and COVID-19-related sedative shortages, further demonstrate how disruptions affecting geographically concentrated production can rapidly compromise ICU functionality [9–11]. This vulnerability is structurally embedded in global healthcare supply chains. The production of active pharmaceutical ingredients is geographically concentrated, with a substantial proportion originating from China and India, while some critical products depend on a limited number of manufacturers or even single production sites [12]. Consequently, a disruption originating far from the point of care, whether affecting manufacturing, energy, transport, or logistics, can propagate through interconnected supply networks and ultimately reach the ICU bedside [6, 8, 11]. ICU autonomy is therefore largely illusory. The cascade of disruption: from shock to bedside ICU vulnerability can be understood as a process of supply chain disruption propagation. Different systemic shocks, including geopolitical events, environmental disasters, cyber disruptions, or sudden demand surges, may differ in their origin but converge on common supply chain mechanisms by generating bottlenecks across manufacturing, transport, distribution, and information systems. These disruptions are followed by rapid depletion of available buffers, particularly in systems operating under just-in-time (JIT) models, where inventory is intentionally minimized. Many hospitals maintain less than one month of essential stock, leaving limited capacity to absorb supply interruptions. This fragility is further amplified by behavioral responses such as over-ordering (“phantom demand”), where organizations place orders that exceed their actual needs in anticipation of future shortages, which distort supply signals and worsen allocation inefficiencies. As buffers are exhausted, shortages reach the bedside, forcing clinicians to adopt suboptimal therapies, substitute medications, or repurpose equipment under time pressure [13]. These constraints increase workload, variability, and risk of error, translating into measurable clinical consequences, including prolonged ICU stays and higher complication rates. ICU failures during crises are therefore increasingly driven not only by clinical factors, but by upstream system fragility. Efficiency-oriented design as a source of vulnerability This fragility reflects decades of efficiency-driven healthcare reforms. Lean management principles have enabled important gains in cost control and performance in high-income health systems [11]. However, emerging evidence suggests that highly optimized systems may be less adaptable under stress [14, 15]. During COVID-19, European countries with higher pre-pandemic efficiency indices experienced worse outcomes, suggesting structural limitations in their ability to absorb shocks [16]. Central to this dynamic is the concept of organizational slack: buffers such as inventory, redundant capacity, and workforce flexibility. While often minimized in efficiency-oriented systems, slack plays a critical role in enabling adaptation. Its systematic reduction improves performance under stable conditions but reduces the capacity to absorb variability, making systems more fragile under stress. Rather than a fixed trade-off, the relationship between efficiency and resilience, defined as the capacity of a health system to absorb, adapt to, and recover from disruptions while maintaining essential functions, should be understood as a structural tension shaped by system design. Designing resilience while preserving performance The challenge is not to abandon efficiency, but to redesign systems to improve resilience while preserving performance. This requires moving beyond the assumption that preparedness necessarily entails substantial efficiency losses. Although strengthening resilience requires some upfront financial and organizational investment, it does not necessarily require substantial resource expansion or the maintenance of large amounts of unused reserve capacity. Targeted investments in preparedness can generate benefits that outweigh their initial costs by reducing the clinical, operational, and economic consequences of disruption. The OECD emphasizes that investments in health-system resilience can generate substantial returns in both routine and crisis conditions [17]. Evidence from disaster resilience indicates the potential magnitude of such benefits. In Germany, multi-hazard resilience investments have been estimated to generate median benefits of approximately €2–6 for every €1 invested [18]. These estimates support a principle directly relevant to ICU resilience: targeted investments made before disruption may prevent substantially greater downstream losses. The following proposed strategies target different stages of supply chain disruption propagation (Fig. 1), aiming to prevent upstream disruptions from translating into downstream clinical impact. Fig. 1Propagation of supply chain disruptions and organisational strategies for ICU resilience Propagation of supply chain disruptions and organisational strategies for ICU resilience First, resilience should not remain the responsibility of individual hospitals. Regionalized ICU networks, supported by formal memoranda of understanding (MOUs), can enable rapid redistribution of patients, medications, and equipment to areas of need, acting as a distributed buffer and reducing care delays. Such load-balancing across facilities, rather than within a single hospital, may be among the most important factors in averting crisis-level care [15]. In Germany, integration of the nationwide DIVI registry with a state resource board provided real-time ICU occupancy data, supporting a cluster-based transfer concept organized around maximum-care (ECMO) centers. This enabled coordinated inter-hospital intensive care transfers across six supply regions, preventing overload of individual hospitals while preserving care for non-COVID critically ill patients [19]. Extending these agreements to non-clinical services (e.g., laundry, sterilization, cold storage) further strengthens system-wide continuity. Second, healthcare leaders should identify critical supplies characterized by geographic or supplier concentration and implement diversification strategies, including dual sourcing across regions to safeguard against conflicts and natural disasters, as already recommended by the American College of Chest Physicians in 2014 [12]. This is particularly relevant for drug classes with concentrated market control: sedatives such as propofol and midazolam face a high single-source risk because production is concentrated among a small number of manufacturers, necessitating contracts with both European and Asian suppliers and the maintenance of strategic rotating stocks (e.g., up to 60 days depending on local risk assessment) [12, 20, 21]. Vasopressors, particularly norepinephrine, carry a moderate risk, while neuromuscular blocking agents (such as rocuronium) represent a high-risk category, requiring the development of cisatracurium substitution protocols and the implementation of “virtual sequestration” through wholesalers [22]. This latter strategy allows rotation of redundant stockpiles among multiple sites to minimize expiration-related waste while ensuring availability during disruptions. By ensuring continuity of supply, these measures reduce the likelihood of abrupt therapeutic changes and associated clinical risks [22–24], thereby preserving evidence-based care pathways even under constrained conditions. Third, ICUs should develop pre-emptive, multidisciplinary protocols for drug and fluid conservation to preserve unit- and system-wide supply, rather than solely optimizing individual patient fluid balance. Beyond nurse-driven sedation protocols and the pivot from continuous infusions to push-dose or oral medications where appropriate, recent guidance from the Society of Critical Care Medicine highlights operational bedside measures that directly protect the strategic crystalloids reserve, including matching bag size to infusion rate, completing the active bag before switching solutions, avoiding line pre-priming, and auditing the fluid-warmer stock [25]. “To-Keep-Open” orders should be standardized to the lowest reasonable rate, with catheter locks used when clinically feasible, and electronic health record protocols should embed automatic stop times (e.g., 24 h) for maintenance fluids and structured prescriber–nurse checkpoints before a new bag is primed [25, 26]. Perioperative pathways that shorten nothing-by-mouth intervals and routine intravenous (IV)-to-oral conversions (including for electrolytes) further reduce reliance on parenteral volume [25, 26]. At the system level, end-to-end supply chain visibility and a regularly revisited continuity-of-operations plan can ensure that crystalloids remain available for resuscitation, major surgery, and other critical indications when needed most [25, 26]. These strategies can be supported by two key enablers. Digital infrastructure can enhance situational awareness through real-time monitoring of bed capacity, workforce strain, and critical equipment. This can be achieved through scalable solutions, including integrating existing hospital information systems and implementing simplified tracking tools. While fully integrated platforms require financial investment and organizational support, scalable solutions based on existing hospital information systems or simplified tracking tools can provide substantial benefits at lower implementation costs, supporting earlier detection of supply imbalances and more coordinated regional responses. The objective is not technological complexity per se, but the ability to anticipate demand and act before shortages become critical. Multidisciplinary in-situ simulation training conducted within the clinical environment, using available resources, represents a pragmatic approach to testing system response under stress. Beyond clinical skills, simulations can explore responses to logistical and infrastructural disruptions, such as temporary supply shortages, IT downtime, or reduced staffing. These exercises help identify latent system vulnerabilities and improve team adaptability without requiring major financial investment. In this sense, training acts as a force multiplier, enhancing the effectiveness of existing resources rather than adding new ones [27]. While these strategies provide a common framework for strengthening ICU supply chain resilience, their relevance, feasibility, and implementation are necessarily context-dependent. Supply chain disruptions are inherently global, but their effects are unevenly distributed across health systems. Disruptions originating in one region can propagate internationally through concentrated manufacturing, energy dependence, maritime chokepoints, and interconnected transport networks [6, 7]. Import-dependent and resource-constrained health systems may be particularly vulnerable, as rising transport and energy costs, longer lead times, and limited access to alternative suppliers can further constrain their capacity to absorb shortages [7]. Recent disruptions in the Middle East further illustrate this interdependence, with consequences extending beyond the affected region to pharmaceutical distribution and other critical healthcare inputs [8]. Accordingly, the proposed strategies should not be applied as a uniform blueprint. While the underlying principles of diversification, coordination, visibility, and adaptive capacity are broadly applicable, their implementation should reflect local supply dependencies, resource availability, existing infrastructure, and governance capacity, prioritizing interventions that offer the greatest resilience gains relative to their organizational and financial costs. Conclusions ICUs are increasingly shaped by systemic disruptions that extend beyond clinical care, with supply chain instability emerging as a critical determinant of performance. Resilience should therefore be understood as a design principle rather than an emergent property of crisis response. Strengthening adaptability through organizational redesign and improved coordination offers a feasible path to maintain high-quality care under conditions of sustained uncertainty. Future research should assess the scalability and cost-effectiveness of these approaches across different healthcare settings, where implementation may require adaptation to local resources and organizational structures.