Risk factors for adverse incidents in patients during helicopter emergency medical services transports: a scoping review Authors: Changchang Chen, Kai Zhang, Zhenhua Liu, Tongjie Zhang, Jialu Li, Qian Yang, Ning Zha, Yiming Li, Huan Xu, Xuejun Hu, Hongjuan Lang Published: 2026 ABSTRACT IntroductionRisk management is essential for maintaining the quality and safety of helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) worldwide. The scarcity of consolidated evidence on HEMS-specific risk factors hinders effective early prevention and risk mitigation. This scoping review aimed to summarize and map current research progress on risk factors for adverse incidents in patients during HEMS transports.MethodsThis review was performed following the PRISMA-ScR guidelines. Five electronic databases (PubMed, Web of Science Core Collection, ProQuest, CNKI, Wanfang Databases) were searched from January 1, 2006 to April 9, 2026. Studies in English or Chinese that focused on risk factors during HEMS were included. Two independent reviewers carried out study selection, quality assessment and data extraction.ResultsA total of 48 peer-reviewed studies were included. The results revealed that risk factors varied across man, machine, environment, management (MMEM) system. Patient factors included baseline characteristics, disease-related characteristics, demand for medical interventions, and special patient populations. Crew factors encompassed operational execution, decision-making judgement, physiological and psychological factors, and team collaboration. Machinery factors comprised medical equipment and consumables, mission support and service systems, and aircraft platforms and airworthiness. Environment factors included natural environment factors, environment temporal characteristics, aircraft environment factors, and ground environment factors. Management factors involved system, procedure, culture, resource allocation, team management, and technical support.ConclusionsThe findings highlighted the multifaceted risk factors during HEMS transports. This synthesis underscores that effective risk mitigation requires a systematic approach addressing patient, crew, machinery, environment, and management elements. Future efforts should focus on developing individualized, patient-centered risk assessments tailored to specific acute conditions. Enhancing preparedness in these key areas is crucial for the early prevention of adverse events and for ultimately improving the safety and quality of care for HEMS.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s13049-026-01627-z. Introduction Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS), also frequently called air ambulance services, represent a vital component of modern healthcare systems [1]. Around the world, several countries have launched initiatives to standardize HEMS development, optimize air rescue process, and refine the risk control mechanism. Studies have shown that HEMS can significantly improve the survival rate and reduce follow-up complications [2], and has become an essential part in the pre-hospital treatment of critically ill patients. Compared to ground emergency medical services, the aviation environment is more complex, involving factors such as hypobaria, hypoxia, and acceleration. Therefore, effective HEMS risk management is crucial [3]. Especially in time-sensitive, safety-critical, and high-risk aviation, the occurrence of adverse incidents may be more frequent [4]. Adverse incidents during HEMS transports refer to unplanned clinical deteriorations directly resulting from the interaction of multiple dynamic risk factors, including the patient condition, therapeutic interventions, and the aviation environment. These incidents can manifest as hypoxemia, hypotension, pneumothorax, shock, cardiac arrest, or even death. Given their life-threatening nature, therapeutic intervention is necessary [5]. The overall level of adverse incidents during HEMS was 44.2% [6]; studies have also shown that fatal accidents occur far more frequently in HEMS operations compared to in non-HEMS operations [3, 7]. And Lorenzen et al. found that misplaced intubation occurred in 10.4% of HEMS providers after intubation, undetected esophageal intubation in 3.6%, while 5.2% attempted three or more intubations [8]. Multiple factors contribute to adverse incidents during HEMS transports [7, 9, 10]. For example, a recent review showed that flight-related hypobaric hypoxia increases the risk of hypoxaemia, while gas expansion at high altitude can lead to barotrauma: tracheitis, abdominal barotrauma, and pneumothorax expansion [10]. However, this study did not adequately address crew factors such as operational risks, personnel fatigue, and psychological distress. Despite the increased attention to risk management, these factors have not been systematically integrated and thoroughly analysis. Studies failed to integrate all the factors leading to the occurrence of adverse incidents, including patient, crew, machinery, environment, and management factors [7, 8, 11]. This will hinder the development of effective prevention and control strategies, thereby compromising overall HEMS safety. Therefore, this review adopted the man-machine-environment-management (MMEM) framework to systematically analyze the risk factors for adverse incidents during HEMS transports (Fig. 1). The framework has been validated in aviation research [12, 13], providing the basis for risk management for HEMS-transported patients. Using this model, this study aims to systematically integrate existing evidence to provide a comprehensive perspective for assessing risk factors associated with major adverse incidents in patients during HEMS transports. Fig. 1The conceptual framework of risk factors for major adverse incidents in patients during helicopter emergency medical services The conceptual framework of risk factors for major adverse incidents in patients during helicopter emergency medical services Methods This scoping review was guided by Arksey and O’Malley’s framework [14, 15] and the JBI Methodology for Scoping Reviews [16, 17]. The study was reported using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses for Scoping Review (PRISMA-ScR) (see Supplementary material 1) [18]. Identifying the research question The review aimed to address the following question: What are the risk factors contributing to major adverse incidents in patients during HEMS transports? Search strategy Two reviewers (CCC and KZ) conducted a comprehensive search across five databases, including PubMed, Web of Science Core Collection, ProQuest, CNKI, and Wanfang. The search strategy was developed by combining free text and Medical Subject Headings terms of each database. An experienced librarian at the researcher’s university was invited to review the process. The total search strategy is shown in Supplementary material 2. Eligibility criteria Studies were included if they met the following criteria: (1) population: the research populations were HEMS team, and/or the transferred patients; (2) concept: studies involved risk factors for adverse incidents in patients during flight; (3) context: this study did not impose restrictions on the context of the literature, including regions, settings, or genders; language was restricted to English and Chinese; and the type of air ambulance was helicopters; (4) types of publications: peer-reviewed original articles and reviews, as well as potential references of the included studies; (5) the time span was from January 1, 2006 to April 9, 2026. Exclusion criteria: (1) studies focused on risk factors, disease spectrum, or prediction models related to aircraft captains or co-pilots; (2) the studies targeted space station mission astronauts; (3) studies only addressed the transfer of medicines, blood, organs, rather than acutely ill patients; (4) types of research were commentary, editorial, meeting abstract, and letters; (5) and the full text was unavailable. Study selection After one author (CCC) searched the literature, the search results were exported to EndNote X9 (Clarivate Analytics), a reference management software. Duplicate literature was removed, and the remaining literature was extracted using Microsoft Excel. Two reviewers (CCC and KZ) independently completed screening by title, abstract, and full text according to predefined eligibility criteria. Inter-rater agreement for the screening process was substantial, with a Cohen’s κ of 0.68. Any conflicts were resolved by consensus or by the lead author (HJL). Data extraction and analysis Two investigators (CCC and KZ) independently extracted data from the included publications using Excel (Microsoft). We collected data related to study characteristics and risk factors. Study characteristics included first author, year of publication, country, and study population. For risk factors, a comprehensive literature review was conducted and discussed extensively within the research team to categorize them. Thematic analysis was conducted inductively without a predefined coding framework. Two reviewers independently categorized risk factors into five levels: patient, crew, machine, environment, and management. This framework provides a structured lens, ensuring comprehensive identification of factors influencing major adverse incidents among patients. The results of this study were summarized and described in the form of tables, figures, and narratives. Risk of bias assessment The bias of quality was appraised by the RoBANS 2 (the Revised Risk of Bias Assessment Tool for Nonrandomized Studies of Intervention 2.0) [19]. The risk of study bias was described as ‘low’, ‘some concerns’, or ‘high’ risk of bias. Two reviewers (CCC and KZ) independently assessed the quality of the study, and any disagreements were resolved by an experienced expert (HJL). Results Search results A total of 17,191 records were initially retrieved from the databases, and six additional references were added from reference lists. After completing the entire process, 48 studies were included in our scoping review. The PRISMA flow diagram presenting the screening and selection process is shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 2The search flow The search flow Characteristics of the included studies The 48 article details are summarized in Table 1. Of these, 42 were published in English and 6 in Chinese, with publishing between 2006 and 2025. By country, 20 were conducted in USA, 6 in China, 4 in Germany, and 3 each in Japan, Canada, and Finland. Two studies each were done in Turkey, Australia, and the UK. In addition, one study each was conducted in Norway, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. Table 1Risk factors during helicopter emergency medical services transportsNo.First authorYearCountryStudy populationRisk factorsPatient factorsCrew factorsMachinery factorsEnvironment factorsManagement factors1Korentsides et al. [11]2025USAPatientsNRNRPostcrash fireAdverse flight conditions (weather)Absence of a copilot2Baumgartner et al. [7]2025USAAccidentsNRSituation awareness, judgment and decision-making errors, adherence to procedures, experience and trainingNRWeather-related risks (fog, notable wind conditions, and ceilings being lower than expected), mountainous terrain, bird strikes, nighttime lighting conditionsCommunication, safety culture, operator policy and procedures3Golcuk et al. [31]2025TurkeyAccidentsNRSpatial disorientation, decision-making under stress, fatigue, pilot medical events, adherence to proceduresNRDense fog, notable wind conditions, and ceilings being lower than expected, night, bird strikesSafety culture, operator policies and procedures4Yanagawa et al. [32]2025JapanMild head trauma patientsAge > 78, respiratory rate > 21, lower GCS scoresNRNRNRNR5Ganter et al. [33]2025GermanyPatients with acute coronary syndromeNational advisory committee for aeronautics score, national early warning score, major medical events scoreNRMedical equipmentNightCrew configuration6Sanchez et al. [34]2024USAAccidentsNRPhysical, psychological, experience/knowledge, action/decision, task performanceAircraft handling/service, aircraft systems, aircraft structures, propeller/ rotor, aircraft powerplant, aircraft oper/ perf/capability, fluids/misc hardwareOperating environment, physical environment, conditions/weather/ phenomena, task environmentDevelopment, management, support/oversight/ monitoring,7Wu [35]2024ChinaPatients with infectious diseasesContinued deterioration of the patients’ diseaseNRNRHigh altitude, low pressure, low oxygen environment, flight weather, air currents, flight vibration, noise, reduced air humidity, limited on-board medical operationsSpread of infectious diseases, insufficient medical supplies8Lorenzen et al. [8]2024GermanyPatients with oesophageal intubationsTrauma, cardiopulmonary resuscitationUndetected oesophageal intubation, lack of experienceNon-use or low utilization rate of video laryngoscopyNRInsufficient training9Hayes et al. [36]2024AustraliaPatients with rapid sequence intubationMale sex, a chest injury, increased weight, and lower saturations pre-RSINRMonitoring limitationsNRNR10Rasmussen et al. [37]2024NorwayPhysiciansNRExperienceNRDarkness and noise, Time and space, type and size of the helicopter and its interiorTraining, difficult communication, procedures and checklists, not enough hands, leadership, teamwork, reporting systems with nonpunitive feedback11Özensoy et al. [38]2024TurkeyPatientsSex, age, disease diagnosis classificationNRNRTransportation distanceNR12Ambarwati et al. [9]2024IndonesiaNurses and air ambulance service providersPatient position, patient cases, change of patient’s conditionLack of understanding about flight equipmentSpecial equipment such as ventilators and incubators, types of transportation usedTypes of transportation used, flight duration, limited space on the aircraftCommunication difficulties, absence of regulations and standard operating procedures, training13Shekhar et al. [39]2023USAAccidentsNRPilot disorientation, pilot errors, maintenance errors, impairment, fatigue, or weather misestimationEngine type (e.g., turbine or piston) and configuration (e.g., single-engine or twin-engine), mechanical failure, instrument meteorological conditions equippedNight, weatherNR14Zhu et al. [20]2023ChinaFlight nursePatient conditionLack of knowledge and experience, healthcare psychology (e.g., stress, tension, anxiety, self-blame, helplessness, frustration, fear), management coordination skillsUnable to secure monitoring equipment, unportable oxygen delivery system, lack of communication systemLimited space on the aircraft, hypoxia, hypothermia, noise, joltingInadequate plans and procedures Inadequate preparation of rescue materials and instruments15Zheng et al. [40]2023ChinaCritically ill cardiac patientsPatient condition, ageTube fixation, emergency medical managementEquipped with medical supplies and emergency medicationsNoise, jolts, low air pressure, and hypoxiaTransportation procedures16Rose et al. [24]2023UKHEMS CrewNRFatigueNRNRNR17Jänig et al. [41]2023GermanyTrauma patients with massive haemorrhageMen, age, site of trauma, rSIG (reversed shock index multiplied with the Glasgow Coma Scale)NRAdministration of blood productsNRNR18Richardsen et al. [25]2023USAFlight nurses, doctorsNRFatigueNRNRNR19Zhu et al. [42]2022ChinaPatients in highland and alpine regionsNRLevel of knowledge mastery, physical and mental fitnessNRLow pressure, low oxygen plateau and alpineCommunication, management20Baru et al. [6]2022EthiopiaPatients with COVIDHistory of chronic medical illnessFailure to recognize hypoxic patients and administer oxygen promptly, patients handling mishapsMalfunctioned suction devicesDistance of transportAbsent suctioning devices21Cheung et al. [26]2022ChinaCritically ill patientAge ≥ 70 years, Casualty Evacuation A+ category (Immediate life threatening and Unstable vital sign), and any pre-flight emergency medical interventionsNRMedical devicesNRClassification of urgency of casualty evacuation, crew composition22Björkman et al. [43]2022FinlandTrauma patientsDiagnoses of trauma typeNRNRNRNR23Araiza et al. [10]2021USACritically Ill PatientsSudden deterioration of the patient’s conditionNRTypes of air vehicles, Equipment on boardUnexpected weather changes, altitude, temperature, humidity, acceleration, noise, and vibrations, delaysLack of equipment and staffing standards24Greenhaw et al. [3]2021USAAccidentNRPilot decision making/judgment, pilot incapacitation, pilot experience,Multiengine aircraftVisibility/darknessOrganizational compliance, nonscheduled operations, pilots with a second-class medical certificate rather than first-class, lack of a second pilot25Yamada et al. [44]2021JapanCritically ill patientsAge, male, playing sports, gasping, patient’s condition (presence of stroke symptoms and/or impaired consciousness)NRNRNRNR26MacDonald et al. [45]2021CanadaAgitated patientMental agitationRisk assessmentNRNRMental health risk assessment tool27Yang et al. [46]2021USATrauma patientBleeding risk index, blood consumption, shock index, and revised trauma scoreNRNRNRNR28Björkman et al. [47]2021FinlandCritically ill patientsShock index, age, out-of-hospital cardiac arrestNRNRNRNR29Yanagawa et al. [48]2020JapanCritically ill patientsRevised trauma score, age, injury severity score, maximum abbreviated injury scale (MAX-AIS) for the upper extremity (negative), year of helicopter dispatch, japan coma scale, MAX-AIS for the head, MAX-AIS for the abdomen/pelvis, and MAX-AIS for the spineNRNRNRNR30Ruskin et al. [49]2019USAAccidentsNRInadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions, loss of control, controlled flight into terrain, fatigue, misjudged weatherNRNight conditionsInadequate training, threat and error management31Aherne et al. [50]2019USAAccidentNRLow pilot experienceVisual Flight Rule capabilityNight operations, adverse weatherManagement policies of mission combination32Pulkkinen et al. [51]2019FinlandPatientsPatient typeNRLack of aircraft icing certification, absence of ice protection systemsIcing weather conditions, seasonal weather, geography and distanceAircraft fleet selection33Sperry et al. [52]2018USATrauma patientsPrehospital administration of thawed plasmaNRNRNRAvailability of pre-hospital red blood cells34Hatzfeld et al. [53]2018USAPatientsMental distressNRSeating and littersLimited time to education, noiseMilitary culture, barriers to communication35Chang et al. [22]2017ChinaCritically ill patientsAge, Glasgow Coma Scale score, haematocrit level, haemodynamic instability, tracheal intubationNRNRTransit periods and seasons, flight timeType of medical personnel36Pham et al. [54]2017USATrauma patientsInjury Severity ScoreNRNRNRHEMS dispatch time, on-scene time37Coons et al. [21]2016USA/NRFatigue managementOn-board equipmentNight flightsStaffing, crew workload, training, pre-flight debriefing content and procedures, safety manager, safety management system38Powell et al. [55]2016USATrauma patientsNRConcentrated red blood cell infusion delayed by 10 minNRNRPrehospital and emergency department transfusion capabilities39Lee et al. [56]2015CanadaEmergency patientGlasgow Coma Scale score < 15 on arrival of helicopter team,Scene timesNRNRNR40Nix et al. [57]2014USAAccidentsNRPilot perception error, flight time, poor decision making, lack of skillsNRDynamic weather conditions, obstacles in the operating environmentAircraft airworthiness, fatigue, crew resource management, training41Habib et al. [58]2014USACrashesNRPilot error: technical, inappropriate decision making, inadequate preflight inspection/preparation, spatial disorientation, impaired judgmentMechanical failureWeatherLimited resources, inadequate equipment, and the undertaking of suboptimal trips42Cudnik et al. [59]2012USATrauma patientsAge > 44 years, GCS < 14, systolic blood pressure < 90 mmHg, flail chest, two or more fractures of the humerus/femur, neurovascular injury, head injuryIntubation by emergency medical services, failure to localize to pain on examinationNRNRNR43Hinkelbein et al. [60]2011GermanyAccidentsNRObstacle collision, ground/water collision, uncontrolled flight, hard landingTail rotor damage, engine failure, fireObstacle, water, adverse conditionsOmissions in maps, accident with car44Fatovich et al. [61]2011AustraliaTrauma patientsAge, injury severity score, timeNRNRTransport distanceNR45Sullivent et al. [62]2011USATrauma patientsAge, sex, injury severity scoreNRNRNRNR46Singh et al. [63]2009CanadaCritically ill patientsAge, sex, diagnostic category of disease, haemodynamic instability prior to transport, use of assisted ventilation prior to transportScene timeType of aircraftTransit season, length of transportType of ambulance crew on board, type of hospital at destination47Thomas et al. [64]2006UKPatients with myocardial infarctionAge, male, pathological characteristics, anxietyNRNRLow pressure, low oxygenNR48Baker et al. [65]2006USACrashesNRNRNRDarkness, post-crash fire, bad weatherNRNote. NR, not reported Table 1Risk factors during helicopter emergency medical services transportsNo.First authorYearCountryStudy populationRisk factorsPatient factorsCrew factorsMachinery factorsEnvironment factorsManagement factors1Korentsides et al. [11]2025USAPatientsNRNRPostcrash fireAdverse flight conditions (weather)Absence of a copilot2Baumgartner et al. [7]2025USAAccidentsNRSituation awareness, judgment and decision-making errors, adherence to procedures, experience and trainingNRWeather-related risks (fog, notable wind conditions, and ceilings being lower than expected), mountainous terrain, bird strikes, nighttime lighting conditionsCommunication, safety culture, operator policy and procedures3Golcuk et al. [31]2025TurkeyAccidentsNRSpatial disorientation, decision-making under stress, fatigue, pilot medical events, adherence to proceduresNRDense fog, notable wind conditions, and ceilings being lower than expected, night, bird strikesSafety culture, operator policies and procedures4Yanagawa et al. [32]2025JapanMild head trauma patientsAge > 78, respiratory rate > 21, lower GCS scoresNRNRNRNR5Ganter et al. [33]2025GermanyPatients with acute coronary syndromeNational advisory committee for aeronautics score, national early warning score, major medical events scoreNRMedical equipmentNightCrew configuration6Sanchez et al. [34]2024USAAccidentsNRPhysical, psychological, experience/knowledge, action/decision, task performanceAircraft handling/service, aircraft systems, aircraft structures, propeller/ rotor, aircraft powerplant, aircraft oper/ perf/capability, fluids/misc hardwareOperating environment, physical environment, conditions/weather/ phenomena, task environmentDevelopment, management, support/oversight/ monitoring,7Wu [35]2024ChinaPatients with infectious diseasesContinued deterioration of the patients’ diseaseNRNRHigh altitude, low pressure, low oxygen environment, flight weather, air currents, flight vibration, noise, reduced air humidity, limited on-board medical operationsSpread of infectious diseases, insufficient medical supplies8Lorenzen et al. [8]2024GermanyPatients with oesophageal intubationsTrauma, cardiopulmonary resuscitationUndetected oesophageal intubation, lack of experienceNon-use or low utilization rate of video laryngoscopyNRInsufficient training9Hayes et al. [36]2024AustraliaPatients with rapid sequence intubationMale sex, a chest injury, increased weight, and lower saturations pre-RSINRMonitoring limitationsNRNR10Rasmussen et al. [37]2024NorwayPhysiciansNRExperienceNRDarkness and noise, Time and space, type and size of the helicopter and its interiorTraining, difficult communication, procedures and checklists, not enough hands, leadership, teamwork, reporting systems with nonpunitive feedback11Özensoy et al. [38]2024TurkeyPatientsSex, age, disease diagnosis classificationNRNRTransportation distanceNR12Ambarwati et al. [9]2024IndonesiaNurses and air ambulance service providersPatient position, patient cases, change of patient’s conditionLack of understanding about flight equipmentSpecial equipment such as ventilators and incubators, types of transportation usedTypes of transportation used, flight duration, limited space on the aircraftCommunication difficulties, absence of regulations and standard operating procedures, training13Shekhar et al. [39]2023USAAccidentsNRPilot disorientation, pilot errors, maintenance errors, impairment, fatigue, or weather misestimationEngine type (e.g., turbine or piston) and configuration (e.g., single-engine or twin-engine), mechanical failure, instrument meteorological conditions equippedNight, weatherNR14Zhu et al. [20]2023ChinaFlight nursePatient conditionLack of knowledge and experience, healthcare psychology (e.g., stress, tension, anxiety, self-blame, helplessness, frustration, fear), management coordination skillsUnable to secure monitoring equipment, unportable oxygen delivery system, lack of communication systemLimited space on the aircraft, hypoxia, hypothermia, noise, joltingInadequate plans and procedures Inadequate preparation of rescue materials and instruments15Zheng et al. [40]2023ChinaCritically ill cardiac patientsPatient condition, ageTube fixation, emergency medical managementEquipped with medical supplies and emergency medicationsNoise, jolts, low air pressure, and hypoxiaTransportation procedures16Rose et al. [24]2023UKHEMS CrewNRFatigueNRNRNR17Jänig et al. [41]2023GermanyTrauma patients with massive haemorrhageMen, age, site of trauma, rSIG (reversed shock index multiplied with the Glasgow Coma Scale)NRAdministration of blood productsNRNR18Richardsen et al. [25]2023USAFlight nurses, doctorsNRFatigueNRNRNR19Zhu et al. [42]2022ChinaPatients in highland and alpine regionsNRLevel of knowledge mastery, physical and mental fitnessNRLow pressure, low oxygen plateau and alpineCommunication, management20Baru et al. [6]2022EthiopiaPatients with COVIDHistory of chronic medical illnessFailure to recognize hypoxic patients and administer oxygen promptly, patients handling mishapsMalfunctioned suction devicesDistance of transportAbsent suctioning devices21Cheung et al. [26]2022ChinaCritically ill patientAge ≥ 70 years, Casualty Evacuation A+ category (Immediate life threatening and Unstable vital sign), and any pre-flight emergency medical interventionsNRMedical devicesNRClassification of urgency of casualty evacuation, crew composition22Björkman et al. [43]2022FinlandTrauma patientsDiagnoses of trauma typeNRNRNRNR23Araiza et al. [10]2021USACritically Ill PatientsSudden deterioration of the patient’s conditionNRTypes of air vehicles, Equipment on boardUnexpected weather changes, altitude, temperature, humidity, acceleration, noise, and vibrations, delaysLack of equipment and staffing standards24Greenhaw et al. [3]2021USAAccidentNRPilot decision making/judgment, pilot incapacitation, pilot experience,Multiengine aircraftVisibility/darknessOrganizational compliance, nonscheduled operations, pilots with a second-class medical certificate rather than first-class, lack of a second pilot25Yamada et al. [44]2021JapanCritically ill patientsAge, male, playing sports, gasping, patient’s condition (presence of stroke symptoms and/or impaired consciousness)NRNRNRNR26MacDonald et al. [45]2021CanadaAgitated patientMental agitationRisk assessmentNRNRMental health risk assessment tool27Yang et al. [46]2021USATrauma patientBleeding risk index, blood consumption, shock index, and revised trauma scoreNRNRNRNR28Björkman et al. [47]2021FinlandCritically ill patientsShock index, age, out-of-hospital cardiac arrestNRNRNRNR29Yanagawa et al. [48]2020JapanCritically ill patientsRevised trauma score, age, injury severity score, maximum abbreviated injury scale (MAX-AIS) for the upper extremity (negative), year of helicopter dispatch, japan coma scale, MAX-AIS for the head, MAX-AIS for the abdomen/pelvis, and MAX-AIS for the spineNRNRNRNR30Ruskin et al. [49]2019USAAccidentsNRInadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions, loss of control, controlled flight into terrain, fatigue, misjudged weatherNRNight conditionsInadequate training, threat and error management31Aherne et al. [50]2019USAAccidentNRLow pilot experienceVisual Flight Rule capabilityNight operations, adverse weatherManagement policies of mission combination32Pulkkinen et al. [51]2019FinlandPatientsPatient typeNRLack of aircraft icing certification, absence of ice protection systemsIcing weather conditions, seasonal weather, geography and distanceAircraft fleet selection33Sperry et al. [52]2018USATrauma patientsPrehospital administration of thawed plasmaNRNRNRAvailability of pre-hospital red blood cells34Hatzfeld et al. [53]2018USAPatientsMental distressNRSeating and littersLimited time to education, noiseMilitary culture, barriers to communication35Chang et al. [22]2017ChinaCritically ill patientsAge, Glasgow Coma Scale score, haematocrit level, haemodynamic instability, tracheal intubationNRNRTransit periods and seasons, flight timeType of medical personnel36Pham et al. [54]2017USATrauma patientsInjury Severity ScoreNRNRNRHEMS dispatch time, on-scene time37Coons et al. [21]2016USA/NRFatigue managementOn-board equipmentNight flightsStaffing, crew workload, training, pre-flight debriefing content and procedures, safety manager, safety management system38Powell et al. [55]2016USATrauma patientsNRConcentrated red blood cell infusion delayed by 10 minNRNRPrehospital and emergency department transfusion capabilities39Lee et al. [56]2015CanadaEmergency patientGlasgow Coma Scale score < 15 on arrival of helicopter team,Scene timesNRNRNR40Nix et al. [57]2014USAAccidentsNRPilot perception error, flight time, poor decision making, lack of skillsNRDynamic weather conditions, obstacles in the operating environmentAircraft airworthiness, fatigue, crew resource management, training41Habib et al. [58]2014USACrashesNRPilot error: technical, inappropriate decision making, inadequate preflight inspection/preparation, spatial disorientation, impaired judgmentMechanical failureWeatherLimited resources, inadequate equipment, and the undertaking of suboptimal trips42Cudnik et al. [59]2012USATrauma patientsAge > 44 years, GCS < 14, systolic blood pressure < 90 mmHg, flail chest, two or more fractures of the humerus/femur, neurovascular injury, head injuryIntubation by emergency medical services, failure to localize to pain on examinationNRNRNR43Hinkelbein et al. [60]2011GermanyAccidentsNRObstacle collision, ground/water collision, uncontrolled flight, hard landingTail rotor damage, engine failure, fireObstacle, water, adverse conditionsOmissions in maps, accident with car44Fatovich et al. [61]2011AustraliaTrauma patientsAge, injury severity score, timeNRNRTransport distanceNR45Sullivent et al. [62]2011USATrauma patientsAge, sex, injury severity scoreNRNRNRNR46Singh et al. [63]2009CanadaCritically ill patientsAge, sex, diagnostic category of disease, haemodynamic instability prior to transport, use of assisted ventilation prior to transportScene timeType of aircraftTransit season, length of transportType of ambulance crew on board, type of hospital at destination47Thomas et al. [64]2006UKPatients with myocardial infarctionAge, male, pathological characteristics, anxietyNRNRLow pressure, low oxygenNR48Baker et al. [65]2006USACrashesNRNRNRDarkness, post-crash fire, bad weatherNRNote. NR, not reported Risk factors during helicopter emergency medical services transports Note. NR, not reported The following are the findings of thematic analysis of the included papers, with a full description on the risk factors (see Fig. 3). Fig. 3Risk factors from man-machine-environment-management system framework Risk factors from man-machine-environment-management system framework Risk factors for major adverse incidents in patients during helicopter emergency medical service transports Patient factors Patient factors emerged as the most consistently reported and highest-risk category that may elevate adverse incidents and complications among critical patients during HEMS. These factors were stratified into four critical dimensions. First, patient baseline characteristics encompassed age, gender, and chronic diseases history. Second, disease characteristics included patient severity indices (e.g., Glasgow Coma Scale), trauma degree (e.g., trauma score), and hemodynamic stability, particularly hypoxic sensitivity to cabin altitude (FiO₂ requirements) and barometric sensitivity (e.g., pneumothorax risk). Third, the need for interventions during transfers required additional attention, such as endotracheal intubation (ETT) and the cuff pressure of the ETT. Additionally, special patient populations should be taken into account. For example, pediatrics often requires decompression of the abdomen with an intra-gastric tube. MacDonald et al. also suggested that patient agitation poses a high risk of disruptive behavior such as unplanned extubation, as well as harm to on-board healthcare professionals. Crew factors The effectiveness of HEMS is heavily dependent on crew factors, which can be categorized into three key domains. First, operational execution demands high proficiency in clinical skills and strict standardization of equipment use to ensure patient safety in challenging aviation settings. Second, decision-making judgement plays a pivotal role, requiring accurate prediction of patient deterioration, expected clinical course, and optimal resource allocation (e.g., prioritizing interventions during multi-casualty scenarios). Third, physiological, psychological factors and team collaboration are essential for maintaining patient safety under pressure. They included crew psychological resilience (e.g., stress tolerance during night operations), fatigue risk management, and leadership (e.g., dynamic task delegation in crisis situations). Machinery factors At this level, we reviewed broader machinery factors that increase adverse incident possibilities among HEMS-transported patients. These factors were categorize into three types and 14 specific factors. The categories of medical equipment and consumables included diagnostic and monitoring equipment, resuscitation equipment, and others. The second category, mission support and service systems, encompassed lack of communication systems, power supply compatibility issues, and inadequate night-time lighting conditions. Aircraft platforms and airworthiness involved aircraft type, visual flight rules vs. instrument flight rules equipped, lack of icing certification, and absence of ice protection systems. Environment factors The operational effectiveness of HEMS was significantly influenced by multifaceted environmental constraints. Natural environmental factors encompass meteorological impediments (e.g., fog-induced visibility limitations, wind shear, and extreme temperature fluctuations) and geographical hazards such as mountainous terrain, low-altitude power lines, and wildlife incursions. Environmental temporal characteristics further compound these challenges, with diurnal variations (e.g., night-flight visual degradation during lighting transitions) and seasonal patterns (e.g., winter icing risks or summer thunderstorm frequency) dictating operational windows. The aircraft environment introduces physiological stressors, including hypobaric hypoxia, cabin noise, turbulence-induced spatial disorientation, and acceleration forces, while ground environments impose critical dependencies on communication infrastructure reliability and landing-zone preparedness (e.g., urban helipads vs. remote sites). Management factors Management factors during HEMS transfer mainly involved system and process, resource allocation, team management, and technical support. In-depth interviews conducted by Zhu et al. [20] showed that incomplete flight plans and processes, teamwork and communication, and inadequate preparation of rescue materials were important risk factors. In terms of resource allocation, several studies have shown the importance of in-flight staffing and crew workload [21, 22]. On-board equipment and resources also directly affected patient safety, including inadequate or malfunctioning suction devices, delayed transfusion of concentrated red blood cells, and stretcher malfunctions [10, 21, 23]. As for team management, crew fatigue has been shown to increase significantly in three-shift rotations over a five-week shift cycle, making fatigue risk management critical [24, 25]. Regarding technical support, pre-hospital 5G telemedicine support technology facilitates the reduction of patient risk. Quality assessment The result of the risk of bias is shown in Supplementary material 3. Notably, a high risk of bias was observed in most studies (n = 27), primarily attributed to limitations in outcome blinding, target group comparability, and incomplete data handling. Discussion This review employed broad inclusion criteria to comprehensively map evidence on risk factors during HEMS transports. While this approach introduced heterogeneity, it enabled a panoramic overview of the current literature. This categorized them into five domains: patient, crew, machinery, environment, and management factors. Patient factors are listed as a separate category, as extensive research has shown that the patient conditions are the key determinant of survival during HEMS transports. Specific patient characteristics (e.g., age ≥ 70 years, pre-flight emergency interventions) also served as independent predictors of in-flight medical events [26]. A study investigated cardiac critically ill patients and found that this population was more susceptible to life-threatening events, including hypoxemia, artificial airway-related complications (e.g., accidental extubation), and cardiac arrest during transport [24]. To mitigate these risks, pre-flight assessment must include rigorous evaluation of physiological stability and anticipated clinical course. High-risk patients, such as those with cardiac arrest or respiratory failure, may benefit from proactive measures such as securing advanced airways prior to transport and ensuring adequate sedation and restraint to prevent device dislodgement due to turbulence or movement. Continuous monitoring of vital signs and readiness to manage rapid deterioration are essential. Furthermore, tailored protocols should be developed for special populations, including the elderly and those requiring complex medical support, to standardize care and reduce adverse events during aeromedical evacuation. Regarding the crew factors, previous study showed that 14.9% of patients required medical interventions during flight, with oxygen therapy, intravenous fluids, and pharmacological interventions being the most common [26]. However, the direct impact of provider factors on specific procedural outcomes remains ambiguous. Richardsen et al. found no significant association between provider factors (experience, stress, fatigue) or scene conditions and procedural outcomes (intubation success, care quality metrics, on-scene time) [25]. This suggested that the relationship between crew factors and operational performance in HEMS may be nonlinear and mediated by other variables such as organizational protocols, team dynamics, or the use of cognitive aids. Nevertheless, we recommend conducting regular simulation-based training combining technical competencies with non-technical skills such as situational awareness, communication abilities, and decision-making under pressure. For machinery factors, HEMS utilizes specialized equipment to optimize emergency response and patient outcomes during transport. Essential gear includes advanced life support devices, monitoring systems, rewarming tools, and others. Especially, for patients with special needs, a study focusing on neonatal air transport of conjoined twins illustrates the need for innovative modifications to existing transport equipment to ensure adequate care delivery in challenging cases [27]. Similarly, the increasing prevalence of obesity presents additional challenges for HEMS, as the extra adipose tissue complicates airway management and pharmacological considerations, necessitating tailored equipment and protocols for effective care [28]. Owing to a substantial percentage of missions involving critically ill patients, with advanced interventions typically requiring physician oversight, there is an increased reliance on specialized equipment during prehospital care. Unique aspects of the aeromedical environment (e.g., atmospheric pressure changes, spatial limitations, noise, and vibration) may worsen critical illness, increasing the likelihood of adverse events like pneumothorax and hypoxemia [10]. Studies have shown that for every 10-minute increase in transfer duration, there is a 2% increase in the chance of a risk event, highlighting the importance of time management in the safety [26]. Helicopters also face other constant hazard at low altitudes, such as obstacles, bird strikes, wildlife, and unmanned aerial vehicles [7]. These events can lead to catastrophic collisions, forcing emergency maneuvers that exacerbate in-cabin patient instability or cause mission abortion. Effective mitigation of environmental risks in HEMS operations relies on comprehensive pre-flight planning, including detailed assessment of terrain and potential obstacles [29]. The implementation of advanced navigation systems, such as Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems and real-time weather monitoring, significantly enhances situational awareness. Furthermore, dedicated low-altitude air corridor planning for helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles ensures safer routing and minimizes exposure to hazardous conditions. Management factors in HEMS also presented significant and universally acknowledged risks. Studies consistently indicated that the absence of dedicated safety pilots, co-pilots, or HEMS technical crew (HEMS-TC) led to a surge in cognitive load during critical flight phases [11]. Furthermore, several studies identified crew fatigue as a major hazard [24, 25]. A global lack of standardized fatigue risk management systems within HEMS prevailed, contrasting sharply with the highly regulated protocols of scheduled airline services within commercial aviation. Therefore, it is recommended that clear organization-wide standard operating procedures (SOPs) be established for the entire mission lifecycle. This will ensure operational consistency, reduce ambiguity, and enhance overall security resilience. Scientific staffing arrangements should be implemented to mitigate fatigue. Implications for future research Although existing studies have provided valuable practical insights, there remains considerable potential for further development in risk management. Future research and practice can be optimized in the following ways: first, it is recommended to develop machine learning-based risk prediction algorithms [30]. These algorithms could integrate multivariate data such as patient physiological parameters, flight metrics, and environmental variables to create dynamic risk assessment models for clinical decision support. For instance, Nelson estimated the causal effect of prehospital intubation on 30-day survival by using a machine-learning stratification model [30]. Second, a multidimensional risk factor assessment system needs to be established. A time-series analysis method is suggested to explore the differential effects of different risk factors (e.g., acceleration, vibration, noise) on various types of critically ill patients during the various phases of the flight in order to elucidate their pathophysiological mechanisms. Such investigations would inform stratified intervention strategies. In addition, it is proposed to develop intelligent monitoring platforms leveraging 5G, big data analytics, and UAV technologies for real-time risk detection and early warning in aeromedical transport. This can provide strong technical support for the realization of all-round, intelligent risk management for patient transfer safety. Finally, efforts should be advanced to develop an integrated digital rescue management system integrating air and ground systems. This system features multiple functional modules, including dispatch, monitoring, and risk management, and integrates technologies such as satellite navigation, remote sensing, and mobile medical terminals. By integrating multi-source data from air, land, and hospital settings, the system would substantially enhance the safety of transporting patients with acute and critical illnesses. Limitation This study has the following limitations: (1) the “man” category was subdivided into “crew factor” and “patient factor” to better reflect the unique characteristics of HEMS patient transport safety. This adaptation of the MMEM is context-specific and has not yet been validated in other studies. Caution should be taken when extending the classification method used in this study to other aviation medical scenarios; (2) the inclusion of only English and Chinese literature may have excluded relevant studies published in other languages, potentially introducing language bias; (3) significant variations in study designs, risk definitions, and reporting standards across the included publications limited our ability to perform quantitative comparisons or meta-analyses; (4) limited data on risk factors restricted the exploration of causal and interaction relationships. More prospective randomized controlled studies are needed in the future. Conclusion This scoping review systematically synthesized risk factors in domestic and international HEMS, highlighting their multidimensional and complex nature. The findings can inform targeted risk-assessment protocols and enhance training programs for aviation medical teams, pilots, maintenance, communication, safety, and leadership. They also help guide the development of standardized safety guidelines. Future research should prioritize real-time data integration and patient-specific risk modeling to optimize HEMS outcomes, thereby ensuring safer aeromedical transport for critically ill patients. Electronic supplementary material Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. Supplementary Material 1 Supplementary Material 1 Supplementary Material 2 Supplementary Material 2 Supplementary Material 3 Supplementary Material 3