Shrinking appetites: Will GLP-1 adoption in high-income countries accelerate Big Food’s push into low- and middle-income countries? Authors: Brice Even, Abdul-Rahim Abdulai, Ramya Ambikapathi, Christophe Béné, Gina Kennedy, Mark Lundy Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractBackgroundGlucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) based medicines (for example Ozempic, Wegovy, Zepbound) are moving rapidly from specialist care to mass adoption in high-income countries, with measurable effects on food purchases and eating patterns. Early retail and household panel data from the United States indicate that households with a GLP-1 user reduce total grocery spending by about 5% within six months, with larger declines among higher-income households and even more marked reductions in snacks and other energy-dense items. Major manufacturers are already deploying “GLP-1-responsive” strategies such as reformulation, smaller portion-size packaging, and “GLP-1-friendly” branding.Main bodyWe argue that if demand for energy-dense, ultra-processed products softens further in high-income markets, transnational food and beverage firms may hedge by redirecting and intensifying marketing pressure and portfolio growth towards some low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where regulatory frameworks often remain weaker and GLP-1 access remains uneven. This could add to the already rising burden of diet-related non-communicable diseases linked to ultra-processed foods and beverages in LMICs. The risk is sharpened by limited and inequitable access to GLP-1 therapies in these settings, even though most people living with overweight and obesity are projected to reside in LMICs by 2035. We outline plausible pathways for an LMIC GLP-1 “spillover effect”, including intensified corporate political activity, more aggressive marketing, accelerated modern retail expansion; and more aggressive use of price promotions, pack size engineering, and premium “healthier for you” ultra-processed products.ConclusionPolicymakers and global health actors should treat GLP-1 induced shifts in high income countries as an early warning signal. Precautionary, equity focused policies are needed to prevent potential GLP-1-related demand shift from translating into heightened commercial determinants of health in LMICs. Policy safeguards should include comprehensive restrictions on unhealthy food marketing including digital marketing; fiscally effective excise taxes on sugar sweetened beverages and other ultra-processed products; stronger management of conflicts of interest in food policy; and improved monitoring of retail food environments and corporate practices.Keywords: GLP-1, NCD, Commercial determinants of health, LMIC, UPF, Food system, Food environment Background Over the past two years, glycemic control medicines based on glucagon‑like peptide‑1 (GLP‑1; e.g. Ozempic, Wegovy, Zepbound) have moved from diabetes clinics into mainstream culture in high-income countries (HIC) and are now widely promoted as a transformative tool for obesity treatment [1]. GLP‑1 agonists mimic endogenous gut hormones that stimulate insulin secretion and delay gastric emptying, resulting in reduced appetite, sustained satiety, and weight loss. Clinical trials demonstrate average weight losses of 5–25% and improvements in cardiovascular risk profiles [2, 3]. Despite notable side effects [4], nutritional challenges and uncertainties [5, 6], societal implications [3], and high costs with resulting low cost-effectiveness, these weight-loss outcomes have spurred enormous demand. In the United States, GLP-1 prescriptions increased by more than 400% from 2019 to 2023 (roughly a five-fold rise) and nearly doubled between 2022 and 2023 [7]. By mid‑2025, approximately 6 million Americans (i.e., about 2% of the population) were using GLP‑1s, and analysts project that 24 million could be using these products by 2035 [8, 9]. Uptake is also increasing across parts of Europe, where GLP-1 drugs are becoming increasingly available. In Great Britain, Kantar's GLP-1 study [10] of 12,000 households estimated that the share of households with an active GLP-1 user rose from 2.3% to 4.1% of households over one year. In Germany, recent consumer survey data suggest that 8% of consumers have used the weight-loss drug in the previous 12 months, while a further 15% reported interest in doing so [11]. Such rapid uptake is not only a therapeutic trend; it is reshaping food demand and beginning to alter the business models and strategies of global food and beverage corporations. These developments have clear implications for the commercial determinants of health within a globalized food system. As household food baskets contract in HICs under the influence of GLP-1 use and large manufacturers confront potential revenue losses, a critical question arises: will transnational “Big Food” corporations respond by intensifying their activities in low‑ and middle‑income countries (LMICs) where GLP‑1 uptake remains limited, regulatory frameworks are often weaker, and markets are younger and growing? In this Debate article, we build on the substantial literature documenting how global corporate strategies influence food environments and dietary outcomes [12–14]. Our specific argument is that the GLP‑1 boom in the United States and other HICs may add a new demand-side shock that could intensify pre-existing commercial determinants of health for LMIC populations, thus accelerating the penetration of ultra-processed foods and beverages (UPF/UPB) in those countries. We develop this hypothesis, outline plausible pathways for a GLP-1 “spillover effect” in LMICs, and propose precautionary, equity-focused policy safeguards to prevent GLP-1 related demand shifts in HICs from being externalized onto LMIC populations. Main text Shrinking HIC consumers’ appetites and Big Food revenues Recent evidence points to a substantial and potentially profound behavioral impact of GLP-1 use on HIC consumers. Early retail signals include Walmart’s U.S. CEO John Furner noting “a slight pullback in overall [food] basket” [15]. Aligned with this, a nationally representative US household panel shows that households with a GLP-1 user reduced grocery spending by about 5.3% within six months of adoption, with high-income households cutting spending by 8.2% [8]. Declines were concentrated in energy-dense, high-sugar, high-fat products, with the largest decreases observed in chips/savory snacks (-10.1%), sweet bakery (-8.8%), and cookies (-6.5%). The same study also reports an 8% decline in spending at fast-food chains, coffee shops, and limited-service restaurants, suggesting that the effect extends beyond home grocery purchases, and that these demand shifts appear to persist through the first year of medication use [8]. Other studies report substantial calorie reductions among current GLP-1 users, alongside lower consumption of foods commonly deemed “less healthy,” with the strongest reported decreases in ultra-processed foods, sugar-sweetened beverages, refined grains, and red meat, and estimated reductions of roughly 720–990 kcal per day [9], or a reduced calorie intake of 20–30% [16]. Dilley et al. [9] also report notable reductions in starchy vegetables, pork, alcohol, fruit juice, and dairy milk, while fruits, leafy greens, and water are the only items showing an overall increase in consumption. A recent obesity expert joint advisory likewise points to a broad shift away from sweet, savory, starchy, and high-fat foods, consistent with other early evidence [2]. While the strongest market-level evidence currently comes from the United States, emerging evidence from other HICs points in a similar direction. In Great Britain, Kantar estimates a £136 million reduction in food and drink spending and a 2.2 point greater fall in grocery spending among users than non-users [10]. Additional market reporting from Europe suggests reduced consumption of takeaway foods, pizza, alcohol, and snacks among GLP-1 users [11], and recent studies from Japan report reduced total energy intake, fewer food cravings, and lower preference for sweet, starchy, and high-fat foods after semaglutide treatment [17, 18]. Taken together, these findings suggest that GLP-1 use reduces overall food intake across multiple categories, while also indicating some degree of qualitative shift away from several energy-dense and ultra-processed products. These behavioral shifts imply sizable revenue risk for the processed food industry. KPMG, one of the “Big Four” global consultancy firms, estimates that under a “moderate and steady increase” in GLP-1 users, annual US food and beverage spending could be $41–55 billion lower by 2034 relative to a 2024 baseline; with larger shortfall if GLP-1 access expands [19]. Reflecting industry unease, Novo Nordisk’s CEO Lars Fruergaard Jørgensen reported that “a couple of CEOs from, say, food companies have been calling me [him], […] they are scared about it [Ozempic]” [20]. These early signals should be interpreted with caution. First, the strongest market-level evidence remains short- to medium-term and is concentrated in the United States. Second, clinical evidence indicates that appetite reduction can be sustained during 2-years continued treatment [21], but evidence beyond this time window, so far, remains limited; and, persistence on treatment is imperfect: evidence suggests that around 50% of people with obesity discontinue GLP-1 receptor agonists within 12 months of initiation [22]. Third, discontinuation is often followed by substantial weight regain, with a recent systematic review estimating that approximately 60% of prior weight loss is regained within 52 weeks of cessation [23]; yet evidence on post-discontinuation grocery purchasing and dietary behaviour remains limited. GLP-1-related demand effects in high-income countries should therefore not necessarily be viewed as a simple permanent contraction, but rather as a potentially important yet unstable shift in food demand. Reactions from Big Food Large manufacturers are clearly repositioning their portfolios to align with GLP-1 driven demand signals. Nestlé launched Vital Pursuit, described as “a new line of foods intended to be a companion for GLP-1 weight loss medication users”, emphasizing portion alignment, protein, and fiber [24]. Conagra, one of the largest U.S. packaged-food manufacturers, has introduced a “GLP-1-friendly” front-of-pack badge across 26 products to help consumers identify GLP-1 compatible options [25]. Coca Cola is working to outmaneuver GLP-1 concerns by expanding zero- and low-sugar drinks, increasing the availability of portion-controlled pack sizes (e.g., mini-cans), and leaning into high-protein beverage offerings (e.g., Fairlife) [26]. Collectively, these moves indicate rapid product reformulation, labeling, and packaging adjustments designed to retain volume and margin as calorie-dense categories face pressure. The rapid wave of “GLP-1-responsive” launches may deliver the intended functional claims, yet they also raise substantive public-health concerns, as most of these items remain ultra-processed foods. Evidence links UPF consumption to adverse health outcomes beyond calories and macronutrient content; they also stem from industrial formulation and processing practices such as the use of cosmetic additives, alteration of texture and food matrix, and convenience features such as engineered palatability that can trigger rapid eating rates and higher frequency of intake [27–30]. In this context, the current emphasis on reformulation, fortification, and functionalization largely reprises the nutritional-engineering strategies described by Scrinis [31], refreshing brand value while normalizing continued UPF consumption. What to expect in LMICs? Over recent decades, as growth plateaued in many high-income markets, multinational food and beverage firms increased their commercial activities in emerging and developing economies; they have expanded distribution networks, broadened product portfolios, and intensified marketing investments [32, 33]. In parallel with nutrition and food-environment transitions [33, 34], including wider availability, accessibility, affordability and appeal of UPFs and UPBs [35, 36], have coincided steep rises in obesity, diabetes, and other NCDs across many LMICs [37–40]. By 2035, 79% of adults and 88% of children living with overweight or obesity are projected to reside in LMICs [41]. Against this backdrop, early signals of GLP-1-related demand contraction in HICs raise concerns about a renewed intensification of commercial activity in LMICs. We hypothesize that transnational food and beverage corporations may increasingly treat many LMICs as key growth zones for low-priced, energy-dense, ultra-processed products, leveraging globalized supply chains, cross-border marketing capabilities, and regulatory asymmetries. This would be consistent with prior episodes where slower demand or stronger regulation in HICs prompted firms to seek volume growth in jurisdictions with weaker regulatory constraints and higher market potential [36, 42, 43], similar to long-documented patterns in the tobacco [44, 45] and alcohol [46] industries. If this dynamic materializes, the already escalating food-related NCD epidemics in LMICs could be further aggravated. Yet it would be misleading to treat LMICs as a homogeneous group. Upper-middle-income countries such as China, Brazil, or South Africa are experiencing nascent but rapid market growth for GLP-1 therapies [47]. At the same time, recent global estimates suggest that potential clinical eligibility for GLP-1 treatment is substantial across world regions, with almost four in five eligible adults living in LMICs [48]. Nevertheless, cost and affordability remains decisive barriers to mass uptake: publicly reported launch prices for major branded GLP-1 therapies in China and India cluster at roughly USD 160–203 per month at starter doses, equivalent to about 14–24% of average monthly wages in urban China and roughly 58–84% of average monthly earnings in India [49–51]. WHO recently warned that, even with rapid production expansion and lower-cost generic development, GLP-1 therapies are projected to reach fewer than 10% of those who could benefit by 2030 [52]. Applying a commercial determinant of health lens [53], we delineate five pathways (operating through market strategies and corporate political activity) by which GLP-1-related pressures in HICs could intensify or reconfigure existing commercial strategies, thereby contributing to increased UPF burden and NCD risk in LMICs: Policy influence: Transnational food and beverage companies have a well-documented track record of corporate influence, including lobbying, framing, and coalition building to delay or dilute public-health regulation [14, 54, 55]. This has included opposition to SSB taxes, front-of-pack labelling, and advertising restrictions in multiple jurisdictions [56–61]. As GLP‑1 use dampens sales in HICs, there is a risk that transnational firms intensify their political activity in LMICs, for example to prevent the adoption of effective fiscal and regulatory measures that could constrain future growth in these markets. Policy influence: Transnational food and beverage companies have a well-documented track record of corporate influence, including lobbying, framing, and coalition building to delay or dilute public-health regulation [14, 54, 55]. This has included opposition to SSB taxes, front-of-pack labelling, and advertising restrictions in multiple jurisdictions [56–61]. As GLP‑1 use dampens sales in HICs, there is a risk that transnational firms intensify their political activity in LMICs, for example to prevent the adoption of effective fiscal and regulatory measures that could constrain future growth in these markets. Marketing intensification: Consistent with prior expansion cycles, food corporations may redirect their advertising and marketing tactics and strategies towards LMICs where regulations remain less constraining or poorly enforced [62–64]. This is likely to include heightened use of digital platforms (or influencers), where regulatory frameworks for digital marketing are especially underdeveloped [65, 66]. Such pervasive marketing can quickly normalize the consumption of UPF and UPB, especially among children and adolescents [55, 67, 68], and has well-documented negative effects on dietary patterns [67, 69, 70]. Marketing intensification: Consistent with prior expansion cycles, food corporations may redirect their advertising and marketing tactics and strategies towards LMICs where regulations remain less constraining or poorly enforced [62–64]. This is likely to include heightened use of digital platforms (or influencers), where regulatory frameworks for digital marketing are especially underdeveloped [65, 66]. Such pervasive marketing can quickly normalize the consumption of UPF and UPB, especially among children and adolescents [55, 67, 68], and has well-documented negative effects on dietary patterns [67, 69, 70]. Retail expansion: Supermarket and convenience store chains, which structurally favour UPF and UPB availability, accessibility, and affordability [13, 71, 72] are rapidly expanding in LMIC cities (and increasingly secondary towns) reshaping food access and purchasing patterns [73–75]. Under GLP-1-related pressure in HICs, global retail corporations and their suppliers may further accelerate capital investment, acquisitions of domestic retailers, and integration into LMIC distribution systems to lock in new sources of demand for ultra-processed products. Retail expansion: Supermarket and convenience store chains, which structurally favour UPF and UPB availability, accessibility, and affordability [13, 71, 72] are rapidly expanding in LMIC cities (and increasingly secondary towns) reshaping food access and purchasing patterns [73–75]. Under GLP-1-related pressure in HICs, global retail corporations and their suppliers may further accelerate capital investment, acquisitions of domestic retailers, and integration into LMIC distribution systems to lock in new sources of demand for ultra-processed products. Price promotions and pack-size engineering: To reach low‑income consumers, firms commonly deploy aggressive promotions and small, single-serve packs that lower purchase thresholds and increase consumption frequency, as documented for cigarettes and sachet alcohol in many LMICs [76–78]. In resource-constrained settings, the combination of temporary discounts and very small packs generates powerful affordability cues and can undermine the impact of excise taxes by enabling down-switching to smaller units or promoted items. Intensified use of these tactics in LMICs would be a plausible strategy for transnational corporations seeking to protect volumes and revenues in the face of demand softening in HICs. Price promotions and pack-size engineering: To reach low‑income consumers, firms commonly deploy aggressive promotions and small, single-serve packs that lower purchase thresholds and increase consumption frequency, as documented for cigarettes and sachet alcohol in many LMICs [76–78]. In resource-constrained settings, the combination of temporary discounts and very small packs generates powerful affordability cues and can undermine the impact of excise taxes by enabling down-switching to smaller units or promoted items. Intensified use of these tactics in LMICs would be a plausible strategy for transnational corporations seeking to protect volumes and revenues in the face of demand softening in HICs. Product transfers and premium segments: “GLP-1-responsive” innovations developed for HICs – including zero-calorie beverages, portion-controlled UPF lines, or high-protein ultra-processed products – may be selectively introduced in LMIC urban markets as premium offerings aimed at higher-income consumers. This would reinforce ultra-processing within “healthier-for-you” or “functional” positioning [79, 80], while coexisting with continued expansion of lower-priced UPF/UPB for mass segments. In effect, global product pipelines could transmit HIC-oriented reformulation and branding strategies into LMICs, widening the spectrum of ultra-processed options across income groups. Product transfers and premium segments: “GLP-1-responsive” innovations developed for HICs – including zero-calorie beverages, portion-controlled UPF lines, or high-protein ultra-processed products – may be selectively introduced in LMIC urban markets as premium offerings aimed at higher-income consumers. This would reinforce ultra-processing within “healthier-for-you” or “functional” positioning [79, 80], while coexisting with continued expansion of lower-priced UPF/UPB for mass segments. In effect, global product pipelines could transmit HIC-oriented reformulation and branding strategies into LMICs, widening the spectrum of ultra-processed options across income groups. These pathways are plausible rather than proven; there is no direct evidence yet of food corporations re-targeting LMICs in response to GLP-1 usage. And we are not suggesting that GLP-1 use has created the commercial determinants of health already documented in LMICs. Rather, the concern is that demand shifts linked to GLP-1 uptake in HICs may amplify, accelerate, or redirect these pre-existing strategies in ways that further intensify pressure on LMIC food environments. Early market signals, corporate executives’ declarations, and the historical pattern of transnational corporations anticipating and transferring risks when profits are threatened [55], suggest that such shocks in HICs should be treated as a plausible driver of future intensified commercial pressure on LMIC food environments. We also recognize that UPF expansion in LMICs is not driven exclusively by transnational “Big Food”. While transnational corporations exposed to HIC markets are the most likely direct vectors of such spillover effects, domestic and regional firms also shape LMIC food environments, sometimes independently and sometimes in alliance or competition with transnational corporations. Evidence from Thailand, for example, shows that national UPF companies deploy a wide range of commercial strategies, similar to those used by transnational firms [81, 82]. More broadly, recent work conceptualizes the UPF industry as a wider ecosystem of manufacturers, retailers, suppliers, advertisers, lobby groups, and allied actors, rather than as a small set of transnational companies alone [83, 84]. Policy safeguards and orientation for future research To reduce the risks of a GLP‑1‑induced demand shift translating into greater NCD burdens in LMICs, policymakers and global health actors should act along several fronts: (i)Protect consumers from unhealthy-food marketing (including digital): Enact comprehensive, statutory restrictions on the marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages, especially to children, across broadcast, digital, and social/influencer media, and ensure adequate enforcement capacity. The WHO [85] guideline explicitly recommends mandatory, comprehensive policies in this area. Protect consumers from unhealthy-food marketing (including digital): Enact comprehensive, statutory restrictions on the marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages, especially to children, across broadcast, digital, and social/influencer media, and ensure adequate enforcement capacity. The WHO [85] guideline explicitly recommends mandatory, comprehensive policies in this area. (ii)Use effective fiscal policies: Implement specific excise taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages – and, where feasible, other ultra-processed products – at levels sufficient to shift retail prices and purchasing patterns. Evaluations from LMICs show sustained reductions in taxed-beverage purchases following well-designed SSB taxes [86–89]; Use effective fiscal policies: Implement specific excise taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages – and, where feasible, other ultra-processed products – at levels sufficient to shift retail prices and purchasing patterns. Evaluations from LMICs show sustained reductions in taxed-beverage purchases following well-designed SSB taxes [86–89]; (iii)Manage conflicts of interest: Institutionalize systematic screening, disclosure, and limits on engagement with commercial actors in nutrition and food policy processes (per WHO/PAHO roadmaps). Strengthen public-sector capacity and require full transparency of consultancy engagements (scope, clients, fees) in nutrition, tax, and regulatory advice, given evidence of systemic conflicts of interest and weakened accountability in these domains [90–92]. Manage conflicts of interest: Institutionalize systematic screening, disclosure, and limits on engagement with commercial actors in nutrition and food policy processes (per WHO/PAHO roadmaps). Strengthen public-sector capacity and require full transparency of consultancy engagements (scope, clients, fees) in nutrition, tax, and regulatory advice, given evidence of systemic conflicts of interest and weakened accountability in these domains [90–92]. (iv)Monitor and hold to account: Use tools such as Food-EPI/INFORMAS [92] and the WCRF NOURISHING database [93] to track the adoption, strength, and enforcement of food environment policies, including restrictions on digital marketing, price promotions, and the retail availability of UPF/UPB. Where possible, integrate indicators that capture shifts in corporate practices and marketing narratives. Monitor and hold to account: Use tools such as Food-EPI/INFORMAS [92] and the WCRF NOURISHING database [93] to track the adoption, strength, and enforcement of food environment policies, including restrictions on digital marketing, price promotions, and the retail availability of UPF/UPB. Where possible, integrate indicators that capture shifts in corporate practices and marketing narratives. These are not new policy instruments; rather, the potential GLP-1 “spillover effect” increases the urgency of adopting them more comprehensively in LMICs, adapting them to renewed forms of commercial pressure, and situating them within broader, equity-oriented responses to obesity. A complementary response should also be acknowledged: over time, greater availability, accessibility, and affordability of GLP-1 therapies in LMICs could reduce some of the asymmetries discussed in this paper. Recent WHO guidance makes clear that obesity should be addressed through a broader continuum of care that combines prevention, healthier environments, and long-term multimodal treatment [52]. It also indicates that, even under optimistic production scenarios, only a small share of the global population currently living with obesity is likely to be covered, while costs, manufacturing, and supply-chain bottlenecks are expected to remain major barriers to broad uptake in the near term. It further suggests that mechanisms “enabling generic production, pooled procurement, tiered pricing, voluntary [or compulsory] licensing, and local manufacturing will be critical” for expanding access ([94], p. E3), especially in LMIC settings. Nonetheless, wider pharmaceutical access should complement, not replace, regulation of unhealthy food environments, because medication alone cannot address the deeper commercial determinants driving obesity and diet-related disease [53, 83, 84]. Further research is needed to better document how GLP-1 consumption in HICs may effectively shape commercial strategies and health outcomes in LMICs. One priority is to test whether reduced demand in HICs is followed by measurable expansion of corporate activity in LMICs. This could be examined through (i) company surveillance (for example, changes in geographic revenue mix, marketing spend, and capital investment), combined with systematic tracking of corporate political activity; (ii) retail audits in LMIC settings (for example, shelf space allocation, promotions, and pack-size distributions); and (iii) digital monitoring of brand and influencer contents to detect shifts in targeting, themes, and youth exposure. Future studies could also analyze how narratives and product positioning evolve as firms start to commercialize “healthier-for-you” UPF/UPB (for example, “protein,” “zero,” “portion control,” “GLP-1-friendly”) in LMICs. Linking these narrative shifts to household panel data on purchases and intake would help to assess how such claims shape preferences and practices, particularly among urban youth, and how they relate to downstream dietary and metabolic outcomes. Conclusions GLP-1 uptake is already reshaping food demand in high-income markets, and large manufacturers are piloting “GLP-1-responsive” portfolios; clear signals that commercial strategies are adjusting. Yet the resulting global landscape is unlikely to be defined by a neat HIC-LMIC divide. Rather, access to these medicines in many LMICs remains limited, costly, and socially stratified. This creates structural asymmetries of demand compression in richer countries, partial pharmaceutical expansion in a few commercially attractive LMIC settings, and continued growth opportunities for UPF/UPB in many others. Through familiar commercial determinants of health - corporate political activity, intensified marketing, retail expansion, price/promotion tactics, and product transfers - this asymmetry could amplify pre-existing market pressure into LMIC food environments even in the absence of explicit corporate statements or formal “pivot” strategies. Regulators and global health actors should adopt precautionary approaches that act on these early signals rather than waiting for post-hoc evidence. This includes implementing comprehensive marketing restrictions consistent with WHO guidance; strengthening fiscal measures on unhealthy products; tightening conflict-of-interest rules and institutionalizing routine monitoring of promotions, pack sizes, and retail availability alongside disclosure of corporate lobbying and market spending. Without early guardrails anchored in equity, GLP-1 therapies may help curb calories in the North while exporting commercial risk and diet-related disease to the South. Abbreviations Chief Executive Officer Glucagon-like peptide-1 High-income country Low- and middle-income country Non-communicable disease Sugar-sweetened beverage Ultra-processed beverage Ultra-processed food Author contributions BE wrote the first manuscript. AA, RA, CB, GK, and ML contributed to later drafts and approved the final document. Funding BE (corresponding author) is supported by the Better Diets and Nutrition (BDN) Science Program of the CGIAR. The funding body had no role in this publication. Data availability No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study. Declarations Ethics approval and consent to participate Not applicable. This article does not report any new studies with human participants or animals. Consent for publication Not applicable. This article does not contain any individual person’s data in any form. Competing interests The authors (BE, AA, RA, CB, GK) declare that they have no competing interests. ML sits on two investment committees (the Fairtrade Access Fund and the N3F fund managed by Incofin) and is a Board Member of Rikolto, an international NGO. Footnotes Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. References Associated Data Data Availability Statement No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.