Omissions in nurses’ infection prevention and control practices and their contributing factors: a CFIR-based sequential explanatory mixed-methods study Authors: Shanfeng Huang, Xinjiao Ning, Rongli Lian, Rongfei Suo, Xi Liu, Xu Liu Published: 2026 ABSTRACT BackgroundOmissions in infection prevention and control (IPC) practices may increase the risk of healthcare-associated infections, yet their underlying determinants remain insufficiently understood. This study aimed to examine the extent of IPC omissions among nurses and identify contributing factors using the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR).MethodsAn explanatory sequential mixed-methods study was conducted at a tertiary hospital in China from October to December 2023. Quantitatively, 397 nurses completed a survey assessing IPC omissions using the Missed Nursing Care in Infection Prevention and Control (MNCIPC) scale. Qualitatively, semi-structured interviews were performed to further explored the causes and mechanisms of IPC omissions, and the data were analyzed using the CFIR framework.ResultsIPC omissions were common among nurses and varied substantially across practices, with omission rates ranging from 10.8% to 72.8%. A bipolar pattern in hand hygiene emerged: most nurses reported performing hand hygiene after gown removal or body fluid exposure, whereas omissions were frequently reported before patient contact and after touching patient surroundings. Agreement on the proposed contributing factors was low to moderate. The qualitative findings corroborated most of the quantitative factors and further expanded determinants across CFIR domains, including unequal nurse–physician accountability, risk perception bias, evidence–practice gaps, and limited authority of infection control personnel.ConclusionIPC omissions among nurses were common and were shaped by interacting individual, contextual, and implementation-related factors, indicating a system-sensitive subtype of missed care. Improving IPC adherence requires shifting from individual blame to systems-based strategies that strengthen leadership, accountability, adaptive implementation, and context-sensitive training.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12912-026-04777-8. Background Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) are a major global threat to patient safety and quality of care, contributing to prolonged hospital stays, increased health-care costs, and elevated mortality. The 2024 World Health Organization (WHO) Global Report on Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) estimates that HAIs affect 7% to 15% of hospitalized patients worldwide, with rates reaching approximately 30% in intensive care units (ICUs) [1]. Joint projections from the WHO and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) warn that up to 3.5 million lives may be lost annually due to HAIs by 2050 [1]. IPC encompasses a set of evidence-based strategies designed to prevent infection transmission among patients, healthcare workers, and visitors during care delivery [2]. Although 35% to 70% of HAIs are considered preventable through measures such as hand hygiene, environmental cleaning, staff training, and HAI surveillance [3], persistent omissions in implementing these practices–defined as the partial or complete failure to execute recommended IPC activities–continue to undermine infection control efforts and contribute to HAI transmission [4]. Nurses, as frontline caregivers, play a critical role in the implementation of essential IPC practices. However, a growing body of literature indicates that the IPC practices, such as hand hygiene and the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), are frequently omitted, left undone, or inadequately performed by nurses [4–6]. For instance, nurses often struggle to consistently integrate proper hand hygiene with appropriate glove use, particularly during complex care episodes or in resource-limited settings [7, 8]. A study conducted in a tertiary referral teaching hospital in Iran reported that hand hygiene compliance among clinical nurses to be as low as 20% [5, 6]. Similarly, survey data have shown that nurses commonly report having omitted PPE use and isolation precautions while delivering care to patients colonized or infected with multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) [4]. Previous studies have explored the factors contributing to these omissions. Researchers have conceptualized IPC omissions as a form of missed nursing care and have drawn on theoretical frameworks related to missed nursing care or nursing care left undone proposed by Aiken et al. [9], Kalisch et al. [10], and Ausserhofer et al. [11]. A scoping review identified five themes of factors contributing to missed nursing care in IPC, which included organization of nursing staff and resources, workplace environment, nursing care context, managerial and inter-professional relationships, and individual nurse factors [12]. Based on the theoretical frameworks related to missed nursing care, Henderson et al. developed the Missed Nursing Care Infection Prevention and Control (MNCIPC) scale, identifying contributing factors including systemic (e.g., staff shortages), organizational (e.g., lack of managerial support), environmental (e.g., shared patient facilities), and personal (e.g., inadequate IPC education or knowledge) determinants [4]. Blackman et al. hypothesized that the variation in infection control practice was underpinned by work environment, workload, and nurse’s demographic factors. They therefore developed a theoretical model to predict the frequency and types of missed IPC, identifying factors such as staff adequacy, work intensity, nurses’ age, gender, employment status, clinical experience, job retention, and country of origin [13]. However, most existing studies and theoretical models focus on general missed nursing care (e.g., emotional support and oral care) and do not adequately address the unique determinants of different types of omissions, such as infection-control-specific omissions, which may be driven by different mechanisms [14]. IPC activities, unlike many task-specific interventions, are embedded in routine nursing practice and often rely on nurses’ professional judgment and autonomous decision-making; they are therefore influenced by a more complex and multilayered set of determinants [14]. Thus, frameworks that treat all missed nursing care as a single construct may be insufficient to capture the complexity of missed IPC practices [15, 16]. Researchers have called for the advancement of theoretical frameworks by incorporating principles from complexity theory to better elucidate the interacting factors that drive different types of missed care and, ultimately, to support more effective intervention design [14]. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has heightened global awareness of IPC and may have reshaped both the patterns and determinants of missed IPC activities, yet limited research has examined how IPC omissions have evolved in the post-pandemic context [17–19]. A recent European study reported that the nurses’ awareness of IPC omissions decreased post-pandemic, and the total variance in IPC omissions explained by system-level factors (e.g., external policies and resources) and organizational factors (e.g., internal staffing and workload) also declined [17]. China adopted a dynamic and adaptive response strategy in response to the evolving epidemiological situation, transitioning from a strict containment phase to a “dynamic zero-COVID” approach [20], and later to a policy optimization and adjustment phase–an approach that differed markedly from strategies implemented in many Western countries. Correspondingly, Chinese healthcare institutions maintained stringent IPC measures for a longer period, which may have reshaped nurses’ IPC behaviors [21, 22]. As a result, existing evidence on the mechanisms underlying IPC omissions, which predominantly originates from Western contexts, may have limited applicability to the Chinese healthcare setting. These gaps highlight the need for a theory-informed and context-specific research to examine the extent of IPC omissions among nurses and to better understand the determinants across multiple contextual levels contributing to these omissions. To address these gaps, we adopted a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design to first quantitatively examine the prevalence and patterns of IPC omissions among Chinese nurses, followed by a qualitative phase guided by the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR), a comprehensive and well-validated framework studying complex implementation processes, to explore the underlying mechanisms and contextual factors. CFIR enables researchers to examine a broad range of factors that may influence the success or failure of implementation efforts across five domains: intervention characteristics, outer setting, inner setting, characteristics of individuals, and implementation processes [23]. This multilevel and interactive structure is especially well-suited to unpacking the complex, context-dependent nature of IPC practice omissions, which are shaped not only by individual nurse behaviors but also by organizational, resource-related, and system-level constraints [24]. The findings of this study are intended to inform targeted, implementation-oriented strategies to improve IPC practices and, ultimately, enhance nursing quality and patient safety. Methods Study design, setting, and participants This study employed an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design and was conducted at a tertiary hospital in Guangdong Province, China. A cross-sectional online questionnaire survey was first administered between October and December 2023 to quantitatively assess the prevalence of IPC omissions and nurses’ ratings of their contributing factors. Based on the quantitative findings, semi-structured interviews were subsequently conducted to qualitatively explore the contributing factors and underlying mechanisms of IPC omissions, thereby addressing the limited explanatory capacity of the survey data. This approach not only provided methodological triangulation to enhance conceptual understanding and strengthen the validity and trustworthiness of the study, but also generated new insights into the contributing factors of IPC omissions, thereby providing robust evidence to inform the development of clinical interventions in infection control practice [25]. Eligible participants were frontline registered nurses with over six months of work experience. In the quantitative phase, a convenience sampling strategy was adopted. Since the study was conducted in an acute hospital with more than 2000 nurses, we anticipated that at least 300 respondents would complete the survey. According to the standard formula for the margin of error (MoE; as below), such a sample size (n = 300) would be adequate to estimate the mean scores of omission items with a MoE at most \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\pm\:$$\end{document}0.09 at a confidence level of 95% (Z-score = 1.96) and an estimated standard deviation (\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:\sigma\:$$\end{document}) of 0.8. The formula for the MoE of the mean is:\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\:MoE=Z\times\:\frac{\sigma\:}{\sqrt{n}}$$\end{document} In the qualitative phase, participants were recruited using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling. Initial participants were purposively selected from infection control nurses in departments such as internal medicine, surgery, and the ICU, who served as key informants. Subsequently, snowball sampling was used to recruit additional nurses with diverse characteristics, including variation in age, years of experience, and professional roles, with efforts made to include under-represented groups such as junior and outpatient nurses. Sampling continued until theoretical saturation was reached, defined as three consecutive interviews yielding no new themes (n = 18). This study is reported according to the Good Reporting of a Mixed Method Study (GRAMMS) guideline [26]. Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the Fifth Affiliated Hospital, Sun Yat-sen Unversity. Data collection Quantitative phase Eligible nurses were invited to participate through an online survey platform (https://www.wjx.cn), and the questionnaire link was distributed via the hospital’s WeChat groups for nurses. Participation was voluntary and anonymous, and electronic informed consent was obtained before participation. As the survey was open to all eligible nurses until the target sample size was reached without tracking of access, the exact number of non-respondents could not be determined. The validated Chinese version [27] of the MNCIPC scale [4] was used to assess IPC omissions. Permission to use the MNCIPC scale was obtained from the authorized translator and the copyright holder of the Chinese version [27] via email correspondence prior to data collection. The scale consists of demographic section and two subscales. The IPC omission pattern subscale measures the frequency of missed IPC practices (e.g., hand hygiene, PPE use, catheter care, transmission‑based precautions). The contributing factor subscale assesses potential reasons for omissions, categorized into four domains: environmental, personal, organizational, and systemic factors (Table 3). The MNCIPC has demonstrated acceptable reliability and validity in previous studies [27–30]. In this study, Cronbach’s α was 0.933 for both subscales. Qualitative phase Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted in dedicated research rooms to ensure privacy. The interview guide was developed according to the CFIR interview guide tool (https://cfirguide.org/guide/app/#/) and informed by the quantitative findings to specifically probe experiences of IPC omissions and their underlying reasons, particularly for IPC practices with the highest omission rates identified in the quantitative phase (Supplementary Appendix 1). Written informed consent and permission for audio-recording were obtained before the interviews. The interviews began with open-ended questions inviting participants to describe their professional roles, the implementation of IPC practices, and their experiences with IPC omissions in daily clinical work. To mitigate potential selection bias resulting from initiating recruitment with infection control nurses, participants were encouraged to reflect on unit-level practices rather than solely on their personal behaviors. Interviewers used neutral and non-directive probing techniques (e.g., “Can you elaborate on that experience?“) and took real-time notes to record nonverbal cues. After each interview, the audio recordings were transcribed and verified with the interviewees within 24h, then the transcripts were securely stored in password-protected files. To ensure confidentiality, participants were assigned anonymous codes. The coding system comprised a sequential number (01–18) and the participant’s department (IM = Internal Medicine; Surg = Surgery; ICU = Intensive Care Unit; OB/GYN/Peds = Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Pediatrics; OP/ER = Outpatient and Emergency; Oth = Other). Data analysis Quantitative data analysis was performed using R statistical software (version 4.4.2; R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria). Descriptive statistics were presented as mean ± standard deviation for continuous variables and frequency (percentage) for categorical variables. Comparisons of IPC omissions across nurse characteristics were conducted using independent-samples t-tests, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), or chi-square tests, as appropriate. Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05. Qualitative data were analyzed using deductive content analysis to identify factors influencing IPC omissions. Codes were organized hierarchically in NVivo (version 12; QSR International, Doncaster, Australia), with CFIR domains as parent nodes, constructs as child nodes, and inductively derived subthemes nested within each construct. In the preparatory phase, two independent researchers repeatedly read the transcripts to gain an overall understanding of participants’ experiences. Deductive coding was then conducted using CFIR as an a priori framework, with its domains and constructs serving as the predefined coding scheme. Coding discrepancies were resolved through discussion until consensus was reached. In addition to guiding the coding process, CFIR was also used as an interpretive lens to examine interactions among multilevel factors and to explain the mechanisms underlying IPC omissions. The findings were shared with participants to verify the credibility of the findings. Data analysis was conducted in Chinese to preserve meaning, and translation into English was performed by a bilingual expert during the reporting phase. Integration occurred at multiple stages. First, at the design stage, the quantitative findings informed the development of the semi-structured interview guide. Second, at the results display stage, qualitative findings were organized using the CFIR framework and compared with survey-identified factors to determine whether they corroborated, expanded (i.e., qualitative findings enriched or elaborated the meaning of the survey-identified factors), or introduced new determinants. Direct quotations from interviewees were used to describe and substantiate each construct and domain. Third, at the interpretation stage, both datasets were synthesized to generate an integrated understanding of multilevel influences on IPC omissions, thereby contextualizing the survey results. Results Demographic characteristics of the participants A total of 397 participants were included in the quantitative survey, and 18 nurses participated in the qualitative interviews. Most participants were female, aged 25 to 45 years, had over six years of professional experience, and held a baccalaureate degree. Approximately 14% were serving as or had previously served as, IPC nurses. Nearly half of the participants worked in internal medicine departments (Table 1). Table 1Demographic characteristics of the participants [n (%)]CharacteristicsQuantitative phase (n = 397)Qualitative phase (n = 18)Gender (Female)345 (86.9)16 (89.0)Age (years) < 2570 (17.6)2 (11.1) ≥ 25 and < 35202 (50.9)9 (50.0) ≥ 35 and < 45109 (27.5)5 (27.8) ≥ 4516 (4.0)2 (11.1)Education level Associate degree9 (2.3)0 Baccalaureate degree382 (96.2)18 (100.0) Postgraduate Degree and Above6 (1.5)0Years of work ≤ 396 (24.2)3 (16.7) > 3 and ≤ 641 (10.3)1 (5.6) > 6 and ≤ 10122 (30.7)6 (33.3) > 10138 (34.8)8 (44.4)Have been an infection control nurse55 (13.9)3 (16.7)Have been a head nurse31 (7.8)5 (27.8)Department Internal medicine175 (44.5)8 (44.4) Surgery57 (14.5)5 (27.8) Obstetrics, gynecology, and pediatrics16 (4.1)1 (5.6) Intensive care unit59 (15.0)3 (16.6) Outpatient & emergency81 (20.6)0 Others5 (1.3)1 (5.6) Table 1Demographic characteristics of the participants [n (%)]CharacteristicsQuantitative phase (n = 397)Qualitative phase (n = 18)Gender (Female)345 (86.9)16 (89.0)Age (years) < 2570 (17.6)2 (11.1) ≥ 25 and < 35202 (50.9)9 (50.0) ≥ 35 and < 45109 (27.5)5 (27.8) ≥ 4516 (4.0)2 (11.1)Education level Associate degree9 (2.3)0 Baccalaureate degree382 (96.2)18 (100.0) Postgraduate Degree and Above6 (1.5)0Years of work ≤ 396 (24.2)3 (16.7) > 3 and ≤ 641 (10.3)1 (5.6) > 6 and ≤ 10122 (30.7)6 (33.3) > 10138 (34.8)8 (44.4)Have been an infection control nurse55 (13.9)3 (16.7)Have been a head nurse31 (7.8)5 (27.8)Department Internal medicine175 (44.5)8 (44.4) Surgery57 (14.5)5 (27.8) Obstetrics, gynecology, and pediatrics16 (4.1)1 (5.6) Intensive care unit59 (15.0)3 (16.6) Outpatient & emergency81 (20.6)0 Others5 (1.3)1 (5.6) Demographic characteristics of the participants [n (%)] Quantitative findings Status of IPC practice omissions The mean score for IPC omissions was 1.64 ± 0.35 (1 = never missed, 5 = always missed), with omission rates raging from 10.8% to 72.8% across different IPC practices. Hand hygiene omissions showed a bipolar pattern: approximately 90% of participants reported never omitting hand hygiene after gown removal or after exposure to blood, body fluid, or secretions, whereas more than 60% reported occasionally omitting hand hygiene before patient contact or after contact with patients’ surroundings. Additionally, 40% to 50% of nurses reported omissions in other IPC practices, including hand hygiene before and after medication administration, before aseptic procedures, and after patient contact, as well as PPE use, patient hygiene assistance, and equipment handling (Table 2). No significant differences in IPC omission rates were observed by gender, education level, role (IPC nurse vs. non-IPC nurse), or department. However, nurses aged 25 to 34 years and those with 6 to 10 years of professional experience generally reported fewer IPC omissions, particularly in hand hygiene, correct PPE use and removal, respiratory precautions, catheter care, preoperative preparation, and IV cannula disinfection (Tables S1–S4). Causes of IPC omissions Participants demonstrated low to moderate endorsement of the causes of IPC omissions identified in the MNCIPC scale, with mean scores ranging from 2.13 ± 0.89 in the environmental domain to 2.58 ± 0.73 in the personal domain (1 = not a cause, 4 = primary cause). Among all contributing factors surveyed, an unexpected rise in patient volume or acuity, urgent patient situations, and inadequate staffing levels were identified as major contributing factors by at least 1/4 of participants. However, about 50% to 80% of respondents rated the environmental, personal, organizational, and systemic factors listed in the MNCIPC as either non-contributing or minor contributing factors (Table 3). No statistically significant differences were observed by gender, age, education level, years of experience, professional position, and department in the perceived determinants of IPC omissions (Table S5 to S7). Table 2Omissions of hospital infection prevention and control practices reported by nursesInfection control practicesFrequency (M ± SD) 1Rate [n (%)]2Hand hygiene is performed before touching a patient2.21 ± 0.90289 (72.8)Perform hand hygiene after contact with patient surroundings2.15 ± 1.08247 (62.2)Hand hygiene is completed before drug administration1.90 ± 1.01194 (48.9)Patients are invited or assisted to perform hand hygiene following use of a bedpan or urinal in bed1.86 ± 1.17164 (41.3)Cleaners/support staff adhere to signage related to transmission-related precautions1.84 ± 0.97187 (47.1)Hand hygiene is completed after drug administration1.82 ± 0.95178 (44.8)Gloves are worn and/or hand hygiene performed for preparing and administration of antibiotics1.82 ± 1.00171 (43.1)Patients are showered preoperatively1.80 ± 1.01170 (42.8)Patient-used instruments and equipment should be properly stored after being disinfected/sterilized1.78 ± 0.94171 (43.1)Hand hygiene is performed after touching a patient1.77 ± 0.93170 (42.8)Cleaners/support staff wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE)1.75 ± 0.93168 (42.3)Perform hand hygiene prior to clean/aseptic procedures1.74 ± 0.93162 (40.8)PPE is donned in the correct order, for example putting on gown first and then gloves to ensure that they are pulled over the cuff of the gown so that no skin is exposed1.59 ± 0.90125 (31.5)Appropriate signage informing staff and visitors of the need for transmission-based precautions is displayed when managing a patient with multi-resistant organisms (MROs)1.58 ± 0.88126 (31.7)Gloves are changed when moving from a contaminated/dirty site to a clean site1.55 ± 0.87118 (29.7)The nurse/midwife follows up with a medical officer/ senior nurse if a patient has indications of an infection, for example temperature increase, presence of new swelling or pus1.55 ± 0.89112 (28.2)Gloves are removed before taking off the gown1.53 ± 0.87110 (27.7)Intravenous cannulas are swabbed with alcohol for 15 s and allowed to dry for 15 s before flushing or administering medications1.52 ± 0.89107 (26.9)Goggles and mask or mask face shield is worn when caring for patients on respiratory/droplet precautions1.51 ± 0.87107 (26.9)Nurse/midwives communicate patient’s MRO status at handover1.49 ± 0.85101 (25.4)Appropriate PPE (such as gloves and gowns) is usedwhen providing direct care to patients/residents who have a transmissible disease including MROs.1.43 ± 0.8190 (22.7)Nurses/midwives communicate patient’s MRO status on transfer to other wards or to new department, for example X-rays1.42 ± 0.7988 (22.8)Touch contamination’ is avoided, for example not scratching your nose or adjusting your glasses1.40 ± 0.7981 (20.4)Catheter toilet care is performed each shift1.36 ± 0.7674 (18.6)Facial equipment is removed before hands are washed1.34 ± 0.7472 (18.1)Hand hygiene is undertaken following gown removal1.26 ± 0.6654 (13.6)Perform hand hygiene after contact with blood, body fluids, or secretions1.20 ± 0.6043 (10.8)Note: 11 = never missed, 5 = always missed. 2 No omissions correspond to a score of 1 point, while the presence of omissions corresponds to scores of 2–5 points Table 2Omissions of hospital infection prevention and control practices reported by nursesInfection control practicesFrequency (M ± SD) 1Rate [n (%)]2Hand hygiene is performed before touching a patient2.21 ± 0.90289 (72.8)Perform hand hygiene after contact with patient surroundings2.15 ± 1.08247 (62.2)Hand hygiene is completed before drug administration1.90 ± 1.01194 (48.9)Patients are invited or assisted to perform hand hygiene following use of a bedpan or urinal in bed1.86 ± 1.17164 (41.3)Cleaners/support staff adhere to signage related to transmission-related precautions1.84 ± 0.97187 (47.1)Hand hygiene is completed after drug administration1.82 ± 0.95178 (44.8)Gloves are worn and/or hand hygiene performed for preparing and administration of antibiotics1.82 ± 1.00171 (43.1)Patients are showered preoperatively1.80 ± 1.01170 (42.8)Patient-used instruments and equipment should be properly stored after being disinfected/sterilized1.78 ± 0.94171 (43.1)Hand hygiene is performed after touching a patient1.77 ± 0.93170 (42.8)Cleaners/support staff wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE)1.75 ± 0.93168 (42.3)Perform hand hygiene prior to clean/aseptic procedures1.74 ± 0.93162 (40.8)PPE is donned in the correct order, for example putting on gown first and then gloves to ensure that they are pulled over the cuff of the gown so that no skin is exposed1.59 ± 0.90125 (31.5)Appropriate signage informing staff and visitors of the need for transmission-based precautions is displayed when managing a patient with multi-resistant organisms (MROs)1.58 ± 0.88126 (31.7)Gloves are changed when moving from a contaminated/dirty site to a clean site1.55 ± 0.87118 (29.7)The nurse/midwife follows up with a medical officer/ senior nurse if a patient has indications of an infection, for example temperature increase, presence of new swelling or pus1.55 ± 0.89112 (28.2)Gloves are removed before taking off the gown1.53 ± 0.87110 (27.7)Intravenous cannulas are swabbed with alcohol for 15 s and allowed to dry for 15 s before flushing or administering medications1.52 ± 0.89107 (26.9)Goggles and mask or mask face shield is worn when caring for patients on respiratory/droplet precautions1.51 ± 0.87107 (26.9)Nurse/midwives communicate patient’s MRO status at handover1.49 ± 0.85101 (25.4)Appropriate PPE (such as gloves and gowns) is usedwhen providing direct care to patients/residents who have a transmissible disease including MROs.1.43 ± 0.8190 (22.7)Nurses/midwives communicate patient’s MRO status on transfer to other wards or to new department, for example X-rays1.42 ± 0.7988 (22.8)Touch contamination’ is avoided, for example not scratching your nose or adjusting your glasses1.40 ± 0.7981 (20.4)Catheter toilet care is performed each shift1.36 ± 0.7674 (18.6)Facial equipment is removed before hands are washed1.34 ± 0.7472 (18.1)Hand hygiene is undertaken following gown removal1.26 ± 0.6654 (13.6)Perform hand hygiene after contact with blood, body fluids, or secretions1.20 ± 0.6043 (10.8)Note: 11 = never missed, 5 = always missed. 2 No omissions correspond to a score of 1 point, while the presence of omissions corresponds to scores of 2–5 points Omissions of hospital infection prevention and control practices reported by nurses Appropriate PPE (such as gloves and gowns) is used when providing direct care to patients/residents who have a transmissible disease including MROs. Note: 11 = never missed, 5 = always missed. 2 No omissions correspond to a score of 1 point, while the presence of omissions corresponds to scores of 2–5 points Table 3Nurse reported contributing factors of infection prevention and control practice omission [n (%)]FactorsMean Score 1 (M ± SD)Not a contributing factorMinor contributing factorModerate contributing factorMajor contributing factor Environmental factors 2.13 ± 0.89 Sterile supplies/ equipment not available when needed2.34 ± 1.15141 (35.5)125 (31.5)55 (13.9)76 (19.1)Patient room allocation made without consideration to principles of infection control2.31 ± 1.14142 (35.8)123 (30.9)61 (15.4)71 (17.9)Patients’ rooms overcrowded/cluttered with equipment/ supplies2.17 ± 1.07152 (38.3)129 (32.5)71 (17.9)45 (11.3)Lack of cleaning schedule for environmental cleaning in clinical areas2.04 ± 1.10184 (46.4)107 (26.9)59 (14.9)47 (11.8)Patient rooms/bays lack sinks for hand washing1.98 ± 1.13203 (51.1)91 (22.9)51 (12.9)52 (13.1)Insufficient plastic puncture proof containers for sharps/ used needles1.95 ± 1.11210 (52.9)103 (26.0)41 (10.3)43 (10.8) Personal factors 2.58 ± 0.73 Unexpected rise in patient volume and/or acuity on the ward/unit2.72 ± 1.0259 (14.9)133 (33.5)99 (24.9)106 (26.7)Nurses/midwives have inadequate understanding of transmission-based precautions2.53 ± 1.11101 (25.4)129 (32.5)75 (18.9)92 (23.2)Urgent patient situation (e.g. a patient’s condition worsening)2.83 ± 1.0151 (12.9)137 (34.5)87 (21.9)122 (30.7)Inadequate handover from previous shift, unit, health or aged care facility2.47 ± 1.03101 (25.4)165 (41.6)70 (17.6)61 (15.7)Lack of prompts in patient records to check for signs of infection2.32 ± 1.05118 (29.7)132 (33.3)90 (22.7)57 (14.3) Organizational factors 2.35 ± 0.88 Lack of support from the hospital infection control department to clinical departments2.24 ± 1.06139 (35.0)139 (35.0)71 (17.9)48 (12.1)Absence of management by infection control surveillance nurses2.35 ± 1.15141 (35.5)125 (31.5)55 (13.9)76 (19.1)Ward culture does not support infection control activities2.31 ± 1.04123 (31.0)149 (37.5)76 (19.1)49 (12.4)Nurses/midwives have inadequate education/knowledge of infection control practices2.60 ± 1.0789 (22.4)146 (36.8)72 (18.1)90 (22.7)Lack of support from hospital management for resources to undertake infection control activities2.27 ± 1.08138 (34.8)134 (33.8)70 (17.6)55 (13.8) Systemic factors 2.46 ± 0.80 Inadequate number of medical staff2.65 ± 1.0879 (19.9)127 (32.0)85 (21.4)106 (26.7)Inadequate number of nursing/midwifery staff on the ward/unit2.55 ± 1.0587 (21.9)142 (35.8)87 (21.9)81 (20.4)Inadequate number of cleaning/support staff2.51 ± 1.0388 (22.2)147 (37.0)91 (22.9)71 (17.9)Deficiencies in the hospital’s hierarchical infection control management structure and incomplete implementation of related protocols2.12 ± 1.12175 (44.0)117 (29.5)52 (13.1)53 (13.4)Note: The contributing factor section uses a Likert-4 scale: 1 = not a contributing factor, 2 = minor contributing factor, 3 = moderate contributing factor, 4 = major contributing factor Table 3Nurse reported contributing factors of infection prevention and control practice omission [n (%)]FactorsMean Score 1 (M ± SD)Not a contributing factorMinor contributing factorModerate contributing factorMajor contributing factor Environmental factors 2.13 ± 0.89 Sterile supplies/ equipment not available when needed2.34 ± 1.15141 (35.5)125 (31.5)55 (13.9)76 (19.1)Patient room allocation made without consideration to principles of infection control2.31 ± 1.14142 (35.8)123 (30.9)61 (15.4)71 (17.9)Patients’ rooms overcrowded/cluttered with equipment/ supplies2.17 ± 1.07152 (38.3)129 (32.5)71 (17.9)45 (11.3)Lack of cleaning schedule for environmental cleaning in clinical areas2.04 ± 1.10184 (46.4)107 (26.9)59 (14.9)47 (11.8)Patient rooms/bays lack sinks for hand washing1.98 ± 1.13203 (51.1)91 (22.9)51 (12.9)52 (13.1)Insufficient plastic puncture proof containers for sharps/ used needles1.95 ± 1.11210 (52.9)103 (26.0)41 (10.3)43 (10.8) Personal factors 2.58 ± 0.73 Unexpected rise in patient volume and/or acuity on the ward/unit2.72 ± 1.0259 (14.9)133 (33.5)99 (24.9)106 (26.7)Nurses/midwives have inadequate understanding of transmission-based precautions2.53 ± 1.11101 (25.4)129 (32.5)75 (18.9)92 (23.2)Urgent patient situation (e.g. a patient’s condition worsening)2.83 ± 1.0151 (12.9)137 (34.5)87 (21.9)122 (30.7)Inadequate handover from previous shift, unit, health or aged care facility2.47 ± 1.03101 (25.4)165 (41.6)70 (17.6)61 (15.7)Lack of prompts in patient records to check for signs of infection2.32 ± 1.05118 (29.7)132 (33.3)90 (22.7)57 (14.3) Organizational factors 2.35 ± 0.88 Lack of support from the hospital infection control department to clinical departments2.24 ± 1.06139 (35.0)139 (35.0)71 (17.9)48 (12.1)Absence of management by infection control surveillance nurses2.35 ± 1.15141 (35.5)125 (31.5)55 (13.9)76 (19.1)Ward culture does not support infection control activities2.31 ± 1.04123 (31.0)149 (37.5)76 (19.1)49 (12.4)Nurses/midwives have inadequate education/knowledge of infection control practices2.60 ± 1.0789 (22.4)146 (36.8)72 (18.1)90 (22.7)Lack of support from hospital management for resources to undertake infection control activities2.27 ± 1.08138 (34.8)134 (33.8)70 (17.6)55 (13.8) Systemic factors 2.46 ± 0.80 Inadequate number of medical staff2.65 ± 1.0879 (19.9)127 (32.0)85 (21.4)106 (26.7)Inadequate number of nursing/midwifery staff on the ward/unit2.55 ± 1.0587 (21.9)142 (35.8)87 (21.9)81 (20.4)Inadequate number of cleaning/support staff2.51 ± 1.0388 (22.2)147 (37.0)91 (22.9)71 (17.9)Deficiencies in the hospital’s hierarchical infection control management structure and incomplete implementation of related protocols2.12 ± 1.12175 (44.0)117 (29.5)52 (13.1)53 (13.4)Note: The contributing factor section uses a Likert-4 scale: 1 = not a contributing factor, 2 = minor contributing factor, 3 = moderate contributing factor, 4 = major contributing factor Nurse reported contributing factors of infection prevention and control practice omission [n (%)] Note: The contributing factor section uses a Likert-4 scale: 1 = not a contributing factor, 2 = minor contributing factor, 3 = moderate contributing factor, 4 = major contributing factor Qualitative findings Integration of quantitative and qualitative findings. Nearly all potential contributors to IPC omissions identified in the quantitative MNCIPC scale (17 out of 20; 85%) were reinforced and expanded by the qualitative data. In addition, 37 new contributing factors emerged from 25 constructs across all five CFIR domains: 15 in the inner setting, 8 in intervention characteristics, 6 in characteristics of individuals, 6 in process, and 2 in outer setting. For illustration, key findings from the inner setting domain, including barriers, facilitators, and their alignment with MNCIPC items, are summarized below (Table 4). Detailed findings for the remaining CFIR domains are provided in Table S8. Inner setting. The qualitative findings revealed that, beyond the inner setting constructs assessed in the survey (i.e., structural characteristics, culture, relative priority, leadership engagement, available resources, and access to knowledge and information), several unmeasured constructs emerged as influential. These included networks & communications, tension for change, compatibility, organizational incentives and rewards, and goals and feedback. Within structural characteristics, newly identified barriers included unequal accountability between nurses and physicians, with physicians facing few consequences for poor IPC compliance, and high staff turnover, which complicated management efforts. Within networks and communications, timely, multichannel coordination with the IPC department facilitated adherence, whereas weak physician-nurse and nurse-patient connections hindered implementation. Limited engagement from care aides and family members reduced tension for change. Regarding organizational incentives & rewards, performance-based rewards, corrective feedback, and educational support promoted adherence, whereas punitive approaches were counterproductive. Feedback loops that enhanced goal alignment and cross-disciplinary accountability further strengthened compliance. Within available resources, poorly designed PPE was identified as a barrier, whereas standardized IPC training protocols, under access to knowledge and information, acted as a facilitator. Table 4Contributing factors of IPC omission identified via qualitative data and integration with quantitative data (Take Inner Setting Domain as example)ConstructsFacilitators (F) or Barriers (B) of IPC implementation & Measured in MNCIPC scale (Yes [+; mean score]/No [-])Supportive InformationStructural CharacteristicsF: Structured multidisciplinary infection control team with clear role delineation and rigorous quality control [+; 2.12 ± 1.12];Infection control surveillance nurse enrolled management [+; 2.35 ± 1.15]“The infection control management in our hemodialysis department is structured according to hospital policies. We have an infection control team divided into three specialized roles: physicians, nurses, and biomedical engineers. Physicians oversee medical-related infection control protocols, while nurses collaborate with physicians to implement nursing-specific infection control measures. Biomedical engineers are responsible for the maintenance and quality control of medical equipment, water treatment systems, dialysate preparation during dialysis procedures, and monitoring dialysis solution concentrations. All these processes undergo rigorous quality control testing to ensure compliance.” P18-Oth“In our ICU shift scheduling, dedicated time will be allocated for infection control nurses to conduct quality control.” P14-ICUB: Unequal accountability between nurses and doctors in IPC [-];Limited oversight capacity of the infection control department [+; 2.24 ± 1.06];Staffing shortages and workload [+; 2.55 ± 1.05];High staff turnover [-];Insufficient and undertrained cleaning staff hinder environmental infection control in ICU settings [+; 2.51 ± 1.03]. “The burden of managing hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) rests solely on nurses. Physicians perceive no consequences for suboptimal infection control implementation and consequently do not take it seriously.” P17-OGP “As a small department, the Infection Control Department struggles to oversee every detail. They (the Infection Control Department) prioritize supervising critical areas like neonatal units, ICUs, and hemodialysis rooms, which are their top focus. For general internal medicine wards, compliance with protocols still largely depends on our own efforts to enforce the details.” P01-IM“In managing multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), staffing shortages and heavy workloads make it impossible to wear isolation gowns during busy shifts. These gaps create infection risks, and I feel this issue is currently unsolvable.” P02-IM“If our department had fewer new staff, I believe infection control could improve from good to excellent. But with patient family visits, internal and external consultations, rotating residents, and nearly 100 transient personnel (including our own doctors), the sheer number and instability of people make management extremely challenging. This is a critical bottleneck.” P14-ICU“The two cleaning staff assigned to us by the contracting company have relatively weak infection control knowledge. Their (cleaning staff) age also affects work efficiency, directly impacting our surgical ICU’s infection management. With only two cleaners for such a large ICU, many infection control requirements simply can’t be met.” P14-ICUNetworks & CommunicationsF: Timely communication and rapid response [-];Multichannel coordination between frontline and infection control department [-].“For patients undergoing liver transplantation, we maintain round-the-clock communication. For instance, if abnormal parameters are detected in a liver transplant recipient, we immediately report the situation in our dedicated communication platform, discuss actionable steps, and respond swiftly—demonstrating highly efficient coordination.” P09-Surg“As the unit-based infection control nurse, I maintain direct liaison with colleagues from the Hospital Infection Control Department. A dedicated communication platform is established for all infection control personnel to consult peers. The Infection Control Department contacts me via the hospital’s official communication system or secure instant messaging, and I provide timely feedback on any identified issues.” P10-SurgB: Challenges in physician-nurse collaboration [-];Nurse-patient communication barrier [-].“In my view, the foremost challenge lies in fostering collaboration between physicians and nurses. Coordinating joint training sessions proves particularly difficult due to scheduling conflicts.” P03-IM“Nurses demonstrate diligent adherence to protocols, whereas some physicians perceive nurses merely as assistants. These physicians may even operate within a hierarchical paradigm that views nursing input as devoid of professional authority.” P17-OGP“The majority of our patients are elderly, and linguistic barriers frequently impede effective communication. This poses significant challenges in ensuring thorough patient education regarding infection control protocols.” P03-IM“Infection control compliance is better among nurses. Some doctors outright ignore my reminders, which undermines my management effectiveness.” P15-ICUCultureF: Collaborative culture with shared responsibility for infection control and structured incident review processes [+; 2.31 ± 1.04].“In our ICU shift scheduling, dedicated time will be allocated for infection control nurses to conduct quality control. Nursing team leaders will also participate in infection management during their shifts. Should any hospital-acquired infection (HAI) incident occur, the department’s quality management team will convene for discussion. This includes infection control nurses, physicians, department head, nurse manager, and personnel responsible for the three-catheter surveillance. All involved parties will collaboratively analyze the incident and submit a report.” P14-ICUB: Lack of leadership engagement and absence of multidisciplinary collaboration hinder effective infection control culture [+; 2.27 ± 1.08].“In practice, our department director demonstrates minimal engagement in infection control governance. Ward-level infection control analysis reports are mandated to be jointly reviewed by the department director, head nurse, and hospital infection control physician. However, this collaborative case review protocol has never been implemented within our unit, consequently perpetuating unresolved operational challenges.“P04-IMTension for ChangeB: Care aides’ resistance to infection control due to low awareness and lack of formal training [-].Insufficient engagement of patients’ families limits infection control effectiveness [-].“Regarding hospital care aides, we consistently emphasize glove use when they (hospital care aides) attend to drug-resistant patients. However, hospital care aides often dismiss the requirement, claiming it’s unnecessary. Due to their lack of formal infection control training, they fail to prioritize precautions and still neglect hand hygiene after patient contact.” P02-IM“While our infection control protocols are relatively comprehensive, effective implementation cannot rely solely on healthcare staff. Guiding patients’ families to participate collaboratively in prevention efforts would significantly enhance compliance and outcomes.” P05-IMCompatibilityB: Misalignment between self-perception and IPC roles of healthcare workers [-].“The disparity in hand hygiene compliance across different clinical phases fundamentally stems from healthcare workers’ failure to perceive themselves as integral components of the infection control framework. For instance, when approaching patients, medical staff often view the patient as the ‘contaminated’ entity while considering themselves ‘clean’. This flawed perception neglects their potential roles as infection sources or transmission vectors, thus resulting in suboptimal adherence to protocols.” P09-SurgRelative PriorityF: Risk-stratified compliance based on patient infectiousness, procedure risk, and transmission routes [+; 2.53 ± 1.11].“Infection control in ICUs is inherently more stringent than in general wards, given the immunocompromised status of critically ill patients. The primary focus in critical care revolves around three-catheter infection surveillance—specifically, the prevention of central venous catheter-associated infections, urinary catheter-related infections, and ventilator-associated pneumonia. These remain top priorities for intervention.” P14-ICU“Variations in infection control compliance are risk-stratified based on patient conditions. Greater vigilance is directed toward highly contagious drug-resistant pathogens or bloodborne transmission risks (e.g., HBV, HIV). Healthcare workers naturally demonstrate heightened precautionary adherence when managing such cases.” P11-Surg“Hand hygiene receives heightened attention during high-risk nursing procedures. For example, collecting specimens from airborne-transmitted pathogens (e.g., influenza, COVID-19 nucleic acid samples) demands stricter compliance compared to blood draws. Additionally, influenza specimen collection procedures are more prone to operator contamination than venipuncture.” P06-IMB: Urgent patient situation [+; 2.83 ± 1.01]“For high-risk items like hand hygiene lapses identified in quantitative studies, these are topics we consistently emphasize in nursing education. Additionally, during major outbreaks, such protocols become critical components of response efforts, making them easier to remember. Their importance is more salient in those critical moments.” P09-SurgOrganizational Incentives & RewardsF: Performance-based rewards and corrective feedback and education [-].“The implementation of incentive mechanisms is warranted to enhance infection control governance. A structured feedback system should be established, incorporating corrective education for protocol non-adherence alongside performance-based rewards for exemplary compliance. Such moderate policy design demonstrates efficacy in optimizing healthcare workers’ engagement within infection prevention frameworks.” P06-IMB: Punitive measures [-].“I question the efficacy of punitive mechanisms, as penalties may yield only transient compliance. For instance, imposing financial sanctions or severe performance evaluation penalties risks generating staff resentment. Given current compensation levels for healthcare workers, such measures could inadvertently exacerbate workforce attrition.” P02-IM“While exemplary infection control performance—such as award-winning compliance—may trigger unit-level recognition, a persistent punitive enforcement paradigm focused exclusively on deficiency identification predictably engenders workforce resentment.” P17-OGPGoals & FeedbackF: Feedback loops addressing implementation barriers [-]; Cross-disciplinary accountability [-].“Our department regularly conducts study sessions on infection control knowledge and addresses current infection control problems and implementation barriers encountered during adherence to IPC measures. The department director oversees the medical aspects, while I (nurse manager) manage the nursing side. Together, we review infection control protocols, management guidelines, and develop corrective measures.” P07-IM“During our daily morning briefings or nursing staff meetings, the infection control nurse provides feedback on departmental issues, which we then discuss and use to drive improvements.” P08-IMLeadership EngagementF: Context-sensitive leadership engagement from department directors and nursing managers [+; 2.31 ± 1.04].“The current infection control practitioner in our unit is the department director himself. His clinical oversight proves particularly rigorous in managing antimicrobial resistance surveillance, including standardized processing of bacterial cultures. Furthermore, his physician management strategies exhibit superior efficacy compared to conventional approaches.” P15-ICU“I implement differentiated infection control management across departments. In the neurology unit with a newly appointed nurse manager, intensive efforts have been devoted to capacity building. Newly established units often exhibit weaker infection control awareness, where the nurse manager’s leadership competence and unit culture prove critical. The nurse manager’s operational authority substantially impacts multidisciplinary coordination.” P08-IMAvailable ResourcesB: Unreasonable bed allocation [+; 2.31 ± 1.14]; Overcrowded ward environments [+; 2.17 ± 1.07]; Incompatible personal protective equipment design [-].“Sometimes, due to various reasons—for example, if we urgently admit a patient with Influenza A or B but lack sufficient beds—we still allow them to stay with other patients, though we require them to wear masks.” P02-IM“Our ward environment isn’t ideal. Some rooms have inadequate spacing between beds and feel overcrowded. At times, it’s clear that infection control standards fall short here.” P05-IM“For patients with drug-resistant bacteria, we require goggles and face shields. However, most doctors here wear glasses. When performing bronchoscopy, adding a face shield or goggles obstructs their vision, so they refuse to use them.” P14-ICUAccess to Knowledge & InformationF: IPC training protocol standardization [-].“We have a specialized training protocol handbook for hemodialysis nurses, which includes infection control content. However, while the teaching methods may vary among instructors, the theoretical knowledge and practical procedures covered are standardized.” P18-OthB: Weak knowledge retention on infrequent procedures [+; 2.60 ± 1.07]“Infection control measures are more likely to be neglected in less frequently performed nursing procedures. For example, proper waste segregation after administering chemotherapy medications, or practices like washing hands and changing gloves when moving from contaminated wounds to clean areas. These can be reinforced through repeated intensive training, whereas basic protocols like hand hygiene before patient contact receive less emphasis.” P06-IMNote: Participant ID format: P[number]-[department]. Department abbreviations: IM = Internal Medicine; Surg = Surgery; ICU = Intensive Care Unit; OGP = Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Pediatrics; OE = Outpatient and Emergency; Oth = Others Table 4Contributing factors of IPC omission identified via qualitative data and integration with quantitative data (Take Inner Setting Domain as example)ConstructsFacilitators (F) or Barriers (B) of IPC implementation & Measured in MNCIPC scale (Yes [+; mean score]/No [-])Supportive InformationStructural CharacteristicsF: Structured multidisciplinary infection control team with clear role delineation and rigorous quality control [+; 2.12 ± 1.12];Infection control surveillance nurse enrolled management [+; 2.35 ± 1.15]“The infection control management in our hemodialysis department is structured according to hospital policies. We have an infection control team divided into three specialized roles: physicians, nurses, and biomedical engineers. Physicians oversee medical-related infection control protocols, while nurses collaborate with physicians to implement nursing-specific infection control measures. Biomedical engineers are responsible for the maintenance and quality control of medical equipment, water treatment systems, dialysate preparation during dialysis procedures, and monitoring dialysis solution concentrations. All these processes undergo rigorous quality control testing to ensure compliance.” P18-Oth“In our ICU shift scheduling, dedicated time will be allocated for infection control nurses to conduct quality control.” P14-ICUB: Unequal accountability between nurses and doctors in IPC [-];Limited oversight capacity of the infection control department [+; 2.24 ± 1.06];Staffing shortages and workload [+; 2.55 ± 1.05];High staff turnover [-];Insufficient and undertrained cleaning staff hinder environmental infection control in ICU settings [+; 2.51 ± 1.03]. “The burden of managing hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) rests solely on nurses. Physicians perceive no consequences for suboptimal infection control implementation and consequently do not take it seriously.” P17-OGP “As a small department, the Infection Control Department struggles to oversee every detail. They (the Infection Control Department) prioritize supervising critical areas like neonatal units, ICUs, and hemodialysis rooms, which are their top focus. For general internal medicine wards, compliance with protocols still largely depends on our own efforts to enforce the details.” P01-IM“In managing multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), staffing shortages and heavy workloads make it impossible to wear isolation gowns during busy shifts. These gaps create infection risks, and I feel this issue is currently unsolvable.” P02-IM“If our department had fewer new staff, I believe infection control could improve from good to excellent. But with patient family visits, internal and external consultations, rotating residents, and nearly 100 transient personnel (including our own doctors), the sheer number and instability of people make management extremely challenging. This is a critical bottleneck.” P14-ICU“The two cleaning staff assigned to us by the contracting company have relatively weak infection control knowledge. Their (cleaning staff) age also affects work efficiency, directly impacting our surgical ICU’s infection management. With only two cleaners for such a large ICU, many infection control requirements simply can’t be met.” P14-ICUNetworks & CommunicationsF: Timely communication and rapid response [-];Multichannel coordination between frontline and infection control department [-].“For patients undergoing liver transplantation, we maintain round-the-clock communication. For instance, if abnormal parameters are detected in a liver transplant recipient, we immediately report the situation in our dedicated communication platform, discuss actionable steps, and respond swiftly—demonstrating highly efficient coordination.” P09-Surg“As the unit-based infection control nurse, I maintain direct liaison with colleagues from the Hospital Infection Control Department. A dedicated communication platform is established for all infection control personnel to consult peers. The Infection Control Department contacts me via the hospital’s official communication system or secure instant messaging, and I provide timely feedback on any identified issues.” P10-SurgB: Challenges in physician-nurse collaboration [-];Nurse-patient communication barrier [-].“In my view, the foremost challenge lies in fostering collaboration between physicians and nurses. Coordinating joint training sessions proves particularly difficult due to scheduling conflicts.” P03-IM“Nurses demonstrate diligent adherence to protocols, whereas some physicians perceive nurses merely as assistants. These physicians may even operate within a hierarchical paradigm that views nursing input as devoid of professional authority.” P17-OGP“The majority of our patients are elderly, and linguistic barriers frequently impede effective communication. This poses significant challenges in ensuring thorough patient education regarding infection control protocols.” P03-IM“Infection control compliance is better among nurses. Some doctors outright ignore my reminders, which undermines my management effectiveness.” P15-ICUCultureF: Collaborative culture with shared responsibility for infection control and structured incident review processes [+; 2.31 ± 1.04].“In our ICU shift scheduling, dedicated time will be allocated for infection control nurses to conduct quality control. Nursing team leaders will also participate in infection management during their shifts. Should any hospital-acquired infection (HAI) incident occur, the department’s quality management team will convene for discussion. This includes infection control nurses, physicians, department head, nurse manager, and personnel responsible for the three-catheter surveillance. All involved parties will collaboratively analyze the incident and submit a report.” P14-ICUB: Lack of leadership engagement and absence of multidisciplinary collaboration hinder effective infection control culture [+; 2.27 ± 1.08].“In practice, our department director demonstrates minimal engagement in infection control governance. Ward-level infection control analysis reports are mandated to be jointly reviewed by the department director, head nurse, and hospital infection control physician. However, this collaborative case review protocol has never been implemented within our unit, consequently perpetuating unresolved operational challenges.“P04-IMTension for ChangeB: Care aides’ resistance to infection control due to low awareness and lack of formal training [-].Insufficient engagement of patients’ families limits infection control effectiveness [-].“Regarding hospital care aides, we consistently emphasize glove use when they (hospital care aides) attend to drug-resistant patients. However, hospital care aides often dismiss the requirement, claiming it’s unnecessary. Due to their lack of formal infection control training, they fail to prioritize precautions and still neglect hand hygiene after patient contact.” P02-IM“While our infection control protocols are relatively comprehensive, effective implementation cannot rely solely on healthcare staff. Guiding patients’ families to participate collaboratively in prevention efforts would significantly enhance compliance and outcomes.” P05-IMCompatibilityB: Misalignment between self-perception and IPC roles of healthcare workers [-].“The disparity in hand hygiene compliance across different clinical phases fundamentally stems from healthcare workers’ failure to perceive themselves as integral components of the infection control framework. For instance, when approaching patients, medical staff often view the patient as the ‘contaminated’ entity while considering themselves ‘clean’. This flawed perception neglects their potential roles as infection sources or transmission vectors, thus resulting in suboptimal adherence to protocols.” P09-SurgRelative PriorityF: Risk-stratified compliance based on patient infectiousness, procedure risk, and transmission routes [+; 2.53 ± 1.11].“Infection control in ICUs is inherently more stringent than in general wards, given the immunocompromised status of critically ill patients. The primary focus in critical care revolves around three-catheter infection surveillance—specifically, the prevention of central venous catheter-associated infections, urinary catheter-related infections, and ventilator-associated pneumonia. These remain top priorities for intervention.” P14-ICU“Variations in infection control compliance are risk-stratified based on patient conditions. Greater vigilance is directed toward highly contagious drug-resistant pathogens or bloodborne transmission risks (e.g., HBV, HIV). Healthcare workers naturally demonstrate heightened precautionary adherence when managing such cases.” P11-Surg“Hand hygiene receives heightened attention during high-risk nursing procedures. For example, collecting specimens from airborne-transmitted pathogens (e.g., influenza, COVID-19 nucleic acid samples) demands stricter compliance compared to blood draws. Additionally, influenza specimen collection procedures are more prone to operator contamination than venipuncture.” P06-IMB: Urgent patient situation [+; 2.83 ± 1.01]“For high-risk items like hand hygiene lapses identified in quantitative studies, these are topics we consistently emphasize in nursing education. Additionally, during major outbreaks, such protocols become critical components of response efforts, making them easier to remember. Their importance is more salient in those critical moments.” P09-SurgOrganizational Incentives & RewardsF: Performance-based rewards and corrective feedback and education [-].“The implementation of incentive mechanisms is warranted to enhance infection control governance. A structured feedback system should be established, incorporating corrective education for protocol non-adherence alongside performance-based rewards for exemplary compliance. Such moderate policy design demonstrates efficacy in optimizing healthcare workers’ engagement within infection prevention frameworks.” P06-IMB: Punitive measures [-].“I question the efficacy of punitive mechanisms, as penalties may yield only transient compliance. For instance, imposing financial sanctions or severe performance evaluation penalties risks generating staff resentment. Given current compensation levels for healthcare workers, such measures could inadvertently exacerbate workforce attrition.” P02-IM“While exemplary infection control performance—such as award-winning compliance—may trigger unit-level recognition, a persistent punitive enforcement paradigm focused exclusively on deficiency identification predictably engenders workforce resentment.” P17-OGPGoals & FeedbackF: Feedback loops addressing implementation barriers [-]; Cross-disciplinary accountability [-].“Our department regularly conducts study sessions on infection control knowledge and addresses current infection control problems and implementation barriers encountered during adherence to IPC measures. The department director oversees the medical aspects, while I (nurse manager) manage the nursing side. Together, we review infection control protocols, management guidelines, and develop corrective measures.” P07-IM“During our daily morning briefings or nursing staff meetings, the infection control nurse provides feedback on departmental issues, which we then discuss and use to drive improvements.” P08-IMLeadership EngagementF: Context-sensitive leadership engagement from department directors and nursing managers [+; 2.31 ± 1.04].“The current infection control practitioner in our unit is the department director himself. His clinical oversight proves particularly rigorous in managing antimicrobial resistance surveillance, including standardized processing of bacterial cultures. Furthermore, his physician management strategies exhibit superior efficacy compared to conventional approaches.” P15-ICU“I implement differentiated infection control management across departments. In the neurology unit with a newly appointed nurse manager, intensive efforts have been devoted to capacity building. Newly established units often exhibit weaker infection control awareness, where the nurse manager’s leadership competence and unit culture prove critical. The nurse manager’s operational authority substantially impacts multidisciplinary coordination.” P08-IMAvailable ResourcesB: Unreasonable bed allocation [+; 2.31 ± 1.14]; Overcrowded ward environments [+; 2.17 ± 1.07]; Incompatible personal protective equipment design [-].“Sometimes, due to various reasons—for example, if we urgently admit a patient with Influenza A or B but lack sufficient beds—we still allow them to stay with other patients, though we require them to wear masks.” P02-IM“Our ward environment isn’t ideal. Some rooms have inadequate spacing between beds and feel overcrowded. At times, it’s clear that infection control standards fall short here.” P05-IM“For patients with drug-resistant bacteria, we require goggles and face shields. However, most doctors here wear glasses. When performing bronchoscopy, adding a face shield or goggles obstructs their vision, so they refuse to use them.” P14-ICUAccess to Knowledge & InformationF: IPC training protocol standardization [-].“We have a specialized training protocol handbook for hemodialysis nurses, which includes infection control content. However, while the teaching methods may vary among instructors, the theoretical knowledge and practical procedures covered are standardized.” P18-OthB: Weak knowledge retention on infrequent procedures [+; 2.60 ± 1.07]“Infection control measures are more likely to be neglected in less frequently performed nursing procedures. For example, proper waste segregation after administering chemotherapy medications, or practices like washing hands and changing gloves when moving from contaminated wounds to clean areas. These can be reinforced through repeated intensive training, whereas basic protocols like hand hygiene before patient contact receive less emphasis.” P06-IMNote: Participant ID format: P[number]-[department]. Department abbreviations: IM = Internal Medicine; Surg = Surgery; ICU = Intensive Care Unit; OGP = Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Pediatrics; OE = Outpatient and Emergency; Oth = Others Contributing factors of IPC omission identified via qualitative data and integration with quantitative data (Take Inner Setting Domain as example) F: Structured multidisciplinary infection control team with clear role delineation and rigorous quality control [+; 2.12 ± 1.12]; Infection control surveillance nurse enrolled management [+; 2.35 ± 1.15] “The infection control management in our hemodialysis department is structured according to hospital policies. We have an infection control team divided into three specialized roles: physicians, nurses, and biomedical engineers. Physicians oversee medical-related infection control protocols, while nurses collaborate with physicians to implement nursing-specific infection control measures. Biomedical engineers are responsible for the maintenance and quality control of medical equipment, water treatment systems, dialysate preparation during dialysis procedures, and monitoring dialysis solution concentrations. All these processes undergo rigorous quality control testing to ensure compliance.” P18-Oth “In our ICU shift scheduling, dedicated time will be allocated for infection control nurses to conduct quality control.” P14-ICU B: Unequal accountability between nurses and doctors in IPC [-]; Limited oversight capacity of the infection control department [+; 2.24 ± 1.06]; Staffing shortages and workload [+; 2.55 ± 1.05]; High staff turnover [-]; Insufficient and undertrained cleaning staff hinder environmental infection control in ICU settings [+; 2.51 ± 1.03]. “The burden of managing hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) rests solely on nurses. Physicians perceive no consequences for suboptimal infection control implementation and consequently do not take it seriously.” P17-OGP “As a small department, the Infection Control Department struggles to oversee every detail. They (the Infection Control Department) prioritize supervising critical areas like neonatal units, ICUs, and hemodialysis rooms, which are their top focus. For general internal medicine wards, compliance with protocols still largely depends on our own efforts to enforce the details.” P01-IM “In managing multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), staffing shortages and heavy workloads make it impossible to wear isolation gowns during busy shifts. These gaps create infection risks, and I feel this issue is currently unsolvable.” P02-IM “If our department had fewer new staff, I believe infection control could improve from good to excellent. But with patient family visits, internal and external consultations, rotating residents, and nearly 100 transient personnel (including our own doctors), the sheer number and instability of people make management extremely challenging. This is a critical bottleneck.” P14-ICU “The two cleaning staff assigned to us by the contracting company have relatively weak infection control knowledge. Their (cleaning staff) age also affects work efficiency, directly impacting our surgical ICU’s infection management. With only two cleaners for such a large ICU, many infection control requirements simply can’t be met.” P14-ICU F: Timely communication and rapid response [-]; Multichannel coordination between frontline and infection control department [-]. “For patients undergoing liver transplantation, we maintain round-the-clock communication. For instance, if abnormal parameters are detected in a liver transplant recipient, we immediately report the situation in our dedicated communication platform, discuss actionable steps, and respond swiftly—demonstrating highly efficient coordination.” P09-Surg “As the unit-based infection control nurse, I maintain direct liaison with colleagues from the Hospital Infection Control Department. A dedicated communication platform is established for all infection control personnel to consult peers. The Infection Control Department contacts me via the hospital’s official communication system or secure instant messaging, and I provide timely feedback on any identified issues.” P10-Surg B: Challenges in physician-nurse collaboration [-]; Nurse-patient communication barrier [-]. “In my view, the foremost challenge lies in fostering collaboration between physicians and nurses. Coordinating joint training sessions proves particularly difficult due to scheduling conflicts.” P03-IM “Nurses demonstrate diligent adherence to protocols, whereas some physicians perceive nurses merely as assistants. These physicians may even operate within a hierarchical paradigm that views nursing input as devoid of professional authority.” P17-OGP “The majority of our patients are elderly, and linguistic barriers frequently impede effective communication. This poses significant challenges in ensuring thorough patient education regarding infection control protocols.” P03-IM “Infection control compliance is better among nurses. Some doctors outright ignore my reminders, which undermines my management effectiveness.” P15-ICU B: Care aides’ resistance to infection control due to low awareness and lack of formal training [-]. Insufficient engagement of patients’ families limits infection control effectiveness [-]. “Regarding hospital care aides, we consistently emphasize glove use when they (hospital care aides) attend to drug-resistant patients. However, hospital care aides often dismiss the requirement, claiming it’s unnecessary. Due to their lack of formal infection control training, they fail to prioritize precautions and still neglect hand hygiene after patient contact.” P02-IM “While our infection control protocols are relatively comprehensive, effective implementation cannot rely solely on healthcare staff. Guiding patients’ families to participate collaboratively in prevention efforts would significantly enhance compliance and outcomes.” P05-IM “Infection control in ICUs is inherently more stringent than in general wards, given the immunocompromised status of critically ill patients. The primary focus in critical care revolves around three-catheter infection surveillance—specifically, the prevention of central venous catheter-associated infections, urinary catheter-related infections, and ventilator-associated pneumonia. These remain top priorities for intervention.” P14-ICU “Variations in infection control compliance are risk-stratified based on patient conditions. Greater vigilance is directed toward highly contagious drug-resistant pathogens or bloodborne transmission risks (e.g., HBV, HIV). Healthcare workers naturally demonstrate heightened precautionary adherence when managing such cases.” P11-Surg “Hand hygiene receives heightened attention during high-risk nursing procedures. For example, collecting specimens from airborne-transmitted pathogens (e.g., influenza, COVID-19 nucleic acid samples) demands stricter compliance compared to blood draws. Additionally, influenza specimen collection procedures are more prone to operator contamination than venipuncture.” P06-IM “I question the efficacy of punitive mechanisms, as penalties may yield only transient compliance. For instance, imposing financial sanctions or severe performance evaluation penalties risks generating staff resentment. Given current compensation levels for healthcare workers, such measures could inadvertently exacerbate workforce attrition.” P02-IM “While exemplary infection control performance—such as award-winning compliance—may trigger unit-level recognition, a persistent punitive enforcement paradigm focused exclusively on deficiency identification predictably engenders workforce resentment.” P17-OGP “Our department regularly conducts study sessions on infection control knowledge and addresses current infection control problems and implementation barriers encountered during adherence to IPC measures. The department director oversees the medical aspects, while I (nurse manager) manage the nursing side. Together, we review infection control protocols, management guidelines, and develop corrective measures.” P07-IM “During our daily morning briefings or nursing staff meetings, the infection control nurse provides feedback on departmental issues, which we then discuss and use to drive improvements.” P08-IM “The current infection control practitioner in our unit is the department director himself. His clinical oversight proves particularly rigorous in managing antimicrobial resistance surveillance, including standardized processing of bacterial cultures. Furthermore, his physician management strategies exhibit superior efficacy compared to conventional approaches.” P15-ICU “I implement differentiated infection control management across departments. In the neurology unit with a newly appointed nurse manager, intensive efforts have been devoted to capacity building. Newly established units often exhibit weaker infection control awareness, where the nurse manager’s leadership competence and unit culture prove critical. The nurse manager’s operational authority substantially impacts multidisciplinary coordination.” P08-IM “Sometimes, due to various reasons—for example, if we urgently admit a patient with Influenza A or B but lack sufficient beds—we still allow them to stay with other patients, though we require them to wear masks.” P02-IM “Our ward environment isn’t ideal. Some rooms have inadequate spacing between beds and feel overcrowded. At times, it’s clear that infection control standards fall short here.” P05-IM “For patients with drug-resistant bacteria, we require goggles and face shields. However, most doctors here wear glasses. When performing bronchoscopy, adding a face shield or goggles obstructs their vision, so they refuse to use them.” P14-ICU Note: Participant ID format: P[number]-[department]. Department abbreviations: IM = Internal Medicine; Surg = Surgery; ICU = Intensive Care Unit; OGP = Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Pediatrics; OE = Outpatient and Emergency; Oth = Others Intervention characteristics. Multiple underexplored intervention characteristics, beyond complexity and cost assessed quantitatively, substantially influenced IPC adherence. Participants perceived externally mandated IPC regulations as legitimate and authoritative (intervention source), which facilitated adherence, whereas internally developed IPC protocols sometimes elicited skepticism. Concerns about the sufficiency and reliability of supporting evidence (evidence strength & quality) limited compliance. Recognition of IPC as essential for patient safety and outbreak prevention (relative advantage) strongly motivated adherence. Flexible adaptation of monitoring and feedback mechanisms (adaptability) facilitated adherence, whereas rigid, non-contextualized protocols that conflicted with clinical workflows impeded implementation. The multifaceted and labor-intensive nature of IPC procedures, together with uncertainty about patients’ infection status (complexity), posed additional challenges. High-quality instructional materials and well-structured procedural packages (design quality & packaging) supported adherence. Resource constraints, including limited access to disinfection equipment and consumables (cost), were also significant barriers. Outer setting. The qualitative data identified several outer setting factors influencing IPC adherence. Under patient needs and resources, nurses’ awareness of patient vulnerability and potential harm facilitated strict adherence, whereas high patient acuity or specific care demands constrained compliance. Regarding cosmopolitanism, limited external learning and exchange opportunities in IPC hindered staff skill development and adherence. External policies and incentives were important facilitators, particularly policy-driven initiatives introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic, which strengthened IPC awareness and compliance across departments. Characteristics of individuals. Factors within the characteristics of individuals domain were only minimally captured in the quantitative phase but were richly described in the interviews. Prominent constructs included knowledge and beliefs about the intervention, self-efficacy, and individual identification with the organization. Variations in self-discipline, cognitive assumptions about patient behaviors, and physical or psychological limitations (e.g., dermatitis caused by gloves or sanitizers) undermined consistent adherence. Conversely, awareness of infection risks, confidence in the effectiveness of IPC measures, greater clinical experience and proficiency, and an internalized sense of responsibility to supervisors, colleagues, and the organization supported sustained adherence. Process. Factors within the process domain, particularly planning, engaging, executing, and reflecting and evaluating, were also underexplored quantitatively but emerged as critical in the qualitative findings. Structured planning and clear task delegation (planning) supported coordinated IPC implementation. Influential nursing leaders promoted awareness and modeled compliance, while active infection control officers reinforced adherence across disciplines. Conversely, the absence of designated infection control physicians weakened accountability and interdisciplinary coordination (engaging). Proactive, data-driven execution (executing) enhanced implementation effectiveness, while regular feedback loops and case-based reviews (reflecting and evaluating) facilitated continuous improvement. Conversely, weak enforcement mechanisms and the lack of closed-loop evaluation systems hindered the sustainability of IPC compliance. Discussion This mixed-methods study identified the widespread presence, patterns, and perceived contributing factors of omissions in IPC practices among nurses. Hand hygiene emerged as the most prominent area of reported omission, showing a marked contrast between high compliance after exposure and low compliance before patient contact. Participants reported only low-to-moderate endorsement of the causes of IPC omissions captured by the MNCIPC scale. By integrating the quantitative and qualitative findings, this study suggests that nurses corroborated most of the contributing factors included in the MNCIPC scale and additionally identified 37 factors not captured in the quantitative phase across all five CFIR domains, particularly within the Characteristics of Individuals and Process domains, addressing explanatory gaps left by the quantitative phase. The contrast between post-exposure vigilance versus pre-contact neglect aligns with global IPC patterns [31]. While the quantitative findings identified this pattern, the qualitative findings further refined the interpretation of this quantitative pattern by showing that it was not merely a matter of inconsistent compliance or insufficient knowledge. Rather, it may reflect a biased risk appraisal process, in which nurses appeared to prioritize visible contamination and self-protection, such as after contact with blood or body fluids, while underestimating invisible transmission risks associated with pre-contact care and the patient environment. The interviews also suggested that this pattern was reinforced by task prioritization under clinical urgency, reactive coping norms in resource-constrained settings, and insufficient training that emphasized self-protection more strongly than interruption of transmission chains [32, 33]. Thus, the qualitative strand moved the interpretation beyond identifying where omissions occurred to explaining why certain IPC steps were more likely to be omitted. However, the IPC compliance erosion may be mitigated by professional experience. We found that nurses aged 25–34 years and those with 6–10 years of professional experience generally reported fewer IPC omissions. This pattern is broadly consistent with Aiken’s multinational findings [34] and may reflect greater risk vigilance, procedural automaticity developed through repeated practice, and heightened IPC awareness shaped by frontline pandemic experience [16, 35–38]. Nevertheless, in the post-COVID-19 context, such pandemic-related gains may not be automatically sustained as emergency-level surveillance, external policy pressure, and perceived infection risk decline. This may partly explain why routine transmission-prevention practices, especially those less directly linked to visible contamination or self-protection, remained vulnerable to omission. These findings suggest the need for consistent, experience-tailored IPC training, regular feedback, and cognitive recalibration strategies to maintain risk awareness, correct selective risk perceptions, and sustain behavioral consistency across career stages. The quantitative findings suggested that participants were more likely to attribute IPC omissions to individual factors than to inner-setting factors. Moreover, 59.2%–73.6% of participants did not identify organizational or systemic factors as major contributors. This pattern may partly reflect structural attribution avoidance—a cultural tendency to internalize responsibility and overemphasize individual awareness while overlooking contextual constraints [39, 40]. Alternative explanations are also possible, including measurement limitations of the MNCIPC scale, social desirability or response bias, and the possibility that some system-level determinants are less visible to frontline nurses or difficult to recognize through structured survey items. Importantly, the qualitative findings helped refine the interpretation of this quantitative pattern. The low-to-moderate endorsement of organizational and systemic factors in the survey should not be interpreted as evidence that system-level barriers were unimportant. Rather, the qualitative strand revealed several less visible structural and implementation-related determinants that were not fully captured by the quantitative instrument, including unequal accountability between nurses and physicians, limited authority of infection control personnel, weak multidisciplinary collaboration, limited leadership engagement, counterproductive punitive approaches, and insufficient feedback loops. Conversely, structured communication channels, performance-based incentives, and accessible feedback systems were perceived as facilitators of adherence. In this way, the qualitative findings modified the interpretation of the quantitative results by suggesting that system-level barriers may have been under-recognized, under-reported, or under-measured in the survey. These findings therefore support a shift from an individual-blame explanation of IPC omissions toward a more systems-oriented perspective that addresses organizational accountability, leadership, and contextual constraints. The qualitative findings further expanded the scope of determinants beyond those captured in the MNCIPC scale. Within the Intervention Characteristics domain, evidence–practice gaps and skepticism toward internally developed protocols emerged as important barriers, highlighting the need for adaptive strategies that bridge evidence and practice [41]. Within the Outer Setting, fluctuating policy support, training deficits during non-pandemic periods, and competing clinical priorities such as emergency care demands influenced IPC adherence, pointing to ongoing challenges in resource allocation and policy sustainability. Within the Characteristics of Individuals domain, self-efficacy, professional identity, and assumptions about infection risk played important roles. The Process domain further highlighted the importance of authority and system responsiveness: effective implementation required infection control personnel with sufficient executive authority, proactive improvement systems informed by data and case review, and regular feedback loops to sustain adherence over time. This study suggests that IPC omissions can be conceptualized as a system-sensitive subtype within the broader framework of missed care. Their conceptual boundaries are defined not only by whether a task-oriented bedside care activity is left undone, but also by whether a transmission-prevention process is partially, inconsistently, or inadequately implemented. The system-sensitive nature of IPC omissions lies in their strong dependence on interacting individual, contextual and implementation-related conditions. Our findings indicate that, although IPC omissions are influenced by factors commonly emphasized in existing missed nursing care frameworks, such as staffing shortages and individual knowledge deficits, they may also reflect additional infection-control-specific mechanisms, including real-time infection risk appraisal, workflow compatibility, multidisciplinary accountability, leadership engagement, resource availability, protocol adaptability, feedback mechanisms, and the authority of infection control personnel. Future research should further refine the measurement of IPC omissions by incorporating complexity theory to better capture the multidimensional drivers of IPC failures. Studies should also include objective behavioral measures and multicenter designs to validate self-reported findings and improve generalizability. In addition, intervention studies are needed to test theory-informed, context-sensitive strategies targeting the key determinants identified in this study, such as leadership engagement, accountability mechanisms, and the adaptability of IPC protocols. The strengths of this study lie in its rigorous mixed-methods design and the use of the CFIR framework to integrate quantitative and qualitative evidence. However, several limitations should be acknowledged. First, because this study was conducted in a single tertiary hospital in Guangdong Province, the transferability of the findings to hospitals with different levels, regions, ownership types, or resource conditions may be limited. Second, the quantitative survey used convenience sampling, which may have introduced selection bias if nurses with greater interest in IPC or stronger perceptions of IPC-related problems were more likely to participate. Third, because access to the online survey was not tracked, we could not calculate the response rate or compare respondents with non-respondents, and potential non-response bias cannot be excluded. Therefore, the prevalence and patterns of IPC omissions should be interpreted cautiously as context-specific findings rather than population-level estimates. Fourth, IPC omissions and their contributing factors were assessed using self-reported survey and interview data and may therefore be subject to social desirability and recall bias. The findings should be interpreted as nurses’ reported experiences and perceptions rather than direct observations of IPC behavior. Therefore, causal interpretations and claims about the actual frequency of IPC omissions should be made cautiously. Fifth, CFIR is a broad implementation framework rather than an IPC-specific theory; therefore, some aspects of IPC omissions may not have been fully captured by its constructs. These include micro-level bedside workflow dynamics, moment-to-moment infection risk appraisal, professional power relations, informal ward norms, emotional or moral dimensions of compliance, and pathogen- or procedure-specific transmission risks. Future studies could combine CFIR with IPC-specific behavioral theories, complexity theory, or ethnographic approaches to capture the dynamic and situated nature of IPC omissions more fully. Conclusions IPC omissions among nurses were commonly reported in this study and appeared to be shaped by interacting factors across individual, organizational, and implementation-related domains, suggesting that IPC omission represents a distinct, system-sensitive subtype of missed care. Although nurses often attributed omissions to individual causes, qualitative findings suggested that broader systemic determinants, including leadership engagement, performance incentives, policy enforcement, and skepticism regarding the link between IPC and patient safety, may also contribute to IPC omissions. Reducing IPC omissions may therefore require a shift from individual blame to a systems-based approach that strengthens leadership, promotes feedback, bridges evidence–practice gaps through workflow-adapted strategies, and tailors training to nurses’ experience and practice context. Supplementary Information Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. Supplementary Appendix 1: Semi-structured interview guide based on the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR). Supplementary Appendix 2. Supplementary quantitative results. Tables S1–S7 present the proportions of nurses reporting no omissions in different IPC practices and the factors contributing to IPC omissions across nurse characteristics.Supplementary Appendix 3. Supplementary qualitative results. Table S8 presents the contributing factors of IPC omissions identified through qualitative thematic analysis and their integration with quantitative findings across CFIR domains, excluding the Inner Setting domain. Supplementary Appendix 1: Semi-structured interview guide based on the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR). Supplementary Appendix 2. Supplementary quantitative results. Tables S1–S7 present the proportions of nurses reporting no omissions in different IPC practices and the factors contributing to IPC omissions across nurse characteristics.Supplementary Appendix 3. Supplementary qualitative results. Table S8 presents the contributing factors of IPC omissions identified through qualitative thematic analysis and their integration with quantitative findings across CFIR domains, excluding the Inner Setting domain.