Society’s struggle with unwanted species: what centuries of history reveal about species bounty programs Authors: Julian D Olden, Jessica O Diallo, Rachel M Fricke, Emily Jameson, Rachelle C Johnson, Rebekah R Stiling, Brielle K Thompson Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractSpecies bounty programs, much like bounty hunters charged to bring fugitives to justice, enlist the public to locate and remove unwanted species through financial incentives. With the goal of reducing population sizes, these programs address perceived ecological and economic damage caused by target species. In this study, we provide the first global assessment of species bounty programs, drawing on evidence from both historical and contemporary efforts across diverse regions and cultural contexts over the past eight centuries. We uncovered a long history of bounty programs involving at least 283 species—mammals, birds, fish, plants, reptiles, mollusks, insects, amphibians, and crustaceans—across 449 programs in 60 countries. Using this collective knowledge, we offer five perspectives on species bounty programs. First, bounty programs are launched for a variety of reasons, including economic (livestock, crops, fisheries, infrastructure), ecological (species, ecosystems), and social (human health) considerations related to unwanted species. Second, bounty programs vary in their design and implementation, ranging from well-planned operations with clear management and conservation objectives to ad hoc operations with limited articulation and investigation of project outcomes. Third, evidence points to unintended consequences, in which bounty programs result in the incidental removal of non-target species or in effects that may inadvertently benefit target species. Fourth, while not always the case, fraudulent activities have been reported, compromising the management outcomes of some programs. Fifth, public perception of bounty programs is highly dynamic and ensuring program engagement remains a persistent challenge. By reviewing the scattered narratives of past and present bounty programs globally, this review seeks to inform the evolving role of this management strategy.Subject terms: Ecology, Ecology, Zoology Introduction Throughout history, humans have been locked in a persistent struggle to tame nature, often seeking to control or eliminate undesirable species1. European settlers frequently cleared native vegetation to establish agricultural land and actively hunted and suppressed indigenous animals they viewed as competing with or consuming domesticated livestock and crops. In what is perhaps the most symbolic example of humanity’s conflicts with wildlife, the 1932 “Emu Wars” in Western Australia saw the government deploy soldiers armed with machine guns to cull the many thousands of roaming emus damaging wheat crops2. In recent decades, conflicts have escalated amid the intensification of globalization and environmental change, which have contributed to the rapid spread and population growth of both native3 and invasive species4 deemed harmful. The result is heightened calls for stronger management and policy action against nuisance species globally5, including the deployment of control programs across diverse scales and vast geographies6–8. Ambitious management actions continue in an effort to combat native and invasive species that are viewed as conflicting with human interests – hereafter referred to as unwanted species9,10. Most control strategies aim to reduce population size or density with the goal of limiting ecological, economic, or human harm11–13. As challenges related to unwanted species persist, various harvest incentive programs have been implemented14. Public-led species bounty programs involve monetary compensation—either a cash reward or a prize – to an individual upon the acceptable delivery of proof of a dead organism. Contractor programs are similar but involve agreements with service providers to harvest an unwanted species for payment. Commercial programs engage private companies to harvest unwanted species for the marketplace (e.g., for consumption), and may include financial subsidies to reduce production costs, thereby helping create or maintain operations15. Lastly, recreational harvest programs promote public fishing, hunting, or trapping of unwanted species by modifying harvest seasons, liberalizing bag limits, and relaxing or eliminating license requirements16,17. Harvest incentive programs are not to be confused with government-implemented species control efforts, including the deployment of wildlife officers or game wardens to harvest target species. Species bounty programs are a long-standing practice that target a diverse range of animals and plants across various management and political contexts. Central to the effectiveness of these programs is the idea that financial incentives, or bounties, will encourage private citizens to increase their harvesting effort, thereby reducing abundance and/or minimizing the perceived ecological or economic damage caused by unwanted species14. Some bounty programs have been heralded as a management success, whereas others have been criticized for not having clear management objectives14, failing to elicit sufficient participation18,19, inciting fraudulent behaviors such as forging proof or farming species to collect the bounty20, causing unintended consequences that include increases in target species populations21, and promoting inhumane killing of animals22. Despite widespread aspirations and public support for removing unwanted species, the aforementioned challenges have led some to question the use of species bounty programs as a management strategy. The long history of bounty programs persists today, with management agencies and other organizations actively considering or implementing them to control unwanted species. Here, we offer the first broad-scale review of public bounty programs for unwanted species, bridging historical reflection and a future prospectus for this management paradigm. By drawing on examples from freshwater, marine and terrestrial ecosystems worldwide, we explore the geography and taxonomy of species bounty programs over time. Next, we offer five key insights to inform future conversations on the role of public harvest incentive programs in species management. By tracing the fragmented narratives of individual bounty programs globally, this study offers an important glimpse into the complex human history of placing bounties on unwanted species. Taxonomy and geography of species bounty programs At least 283 species have been the focus of public bounty programs worldwide, while acknowledging that our assessment is conservative in that non-English information sources are not fully represented (Fig. 1). Mammals (n = 103, 36.4%) represent over one-third of the species, and include marsupials (e.g., potoroo, wallaby, kangaroo), rodents (e.g., rat, groundhog, nutria, beaver), felids (e.g., bobcat, mountain lion, jaguar, domestic cat), canines (e.g., coyote, wolf, fox, dog), pinnipeds (e.g., grey seal, harbor seal, ringed seal), and many others. Bounties have been offered for many bird species (n = 101, 35.6%), such as raptors (e.g., hawks, eagles, kite, osprey), owls, corvids (e.g., crow, raven), house sparrows, and European starlings (Fig. 1). Numerous fish species (n = 31, 10.9%) have also been subject to bounties, including carp (grass, bighead, silver, black), trout (lake, rainbow), catfish, lionfish, northern snakehead, and various sharks. Bounty programs have also focused on plants (n = 23, 8.1%), reptiles (n = 14, 4.9%), insects (n = 4, 1.4%), mollusks (n = 4, 1.4%), amphibians (n = 2, 0.7%), and crustaceans (n = 1, 0.4%). Animal and plant species (n = 283) subject to bounty programs, both past and present, over the past 8 centuries (ca. 1300-2024) Rectangles represent species, where the area is proportional to the number of countries with a bounty program and are organized (by color) according to major taxonomic groups. Total number of species: mammals (n = 103), birds (n = 101), fish (n = 31), plants (n = 23), reptiles (n = 14), mollusks (n = 4), insects (n = 4), amphibians (n = 2), and crustaceans (n = 1). Bounty programs for unwanted species are geographically widespread, spanning at least 60 countries and totaling 449 species-country programs (Fig. 2). The United States (n = 138 species, 30.7%), Finland (n = 47, 10.5%), United Kingdom (n = 40, 8.9%), Australia (n = 32, 7.8%), New Zealand (n = 22, 4.9%), Spain (n = 21, 4.7%), and South Africa (n = 21, 4.7%) have the most species subject to bounties according to our review. Ten island nations have implemented species bounty programs. Additionally, although we report bounty programs at the country level, we recognize that programs are commonly implemented at the level of geopolitical units (e.g., states, provinces, regions, counties, townships). Using the United States as an example, we recorded 426 instances of species-state programs, resulting in a diverse geography in the number and composition of species subject to bounties (Fig. S1). Countries placing bounties on animal and plant species, past and present, over 8 centuries (ca. 1300-2024). Displayed are 449 species bounty programs in 60 countries. Island nations are shown as circles to enhance the presentation. Numbers represent example bounty programs, and species names and photo credits are provided in Table S2. Our review revealed that three-quarters of bounty programs have focused on terrestrial species (n = 218 out of 283 species, 77.0%), followed by freshwater (n = 41, 14.5%) and marine (n = 24, 8.5%) species. Species-country programs targeted native species (n = 312 out of 449 programs, 69.5%) more so than nonnative species (n = 137, 30.5%). A complete list of taxa subject to bounties, including country, native status and period, is presented in Table S1. History of species bounty programs The payment of bounties to control unwanted species has been widespread throughout human history. Species bounty programs have involved a wide range of incentives, including monetary rewards, prizes, and, in rare instances, even incentives tied to avoiding negative penalties for failing to comply with mandatory participation requirements (Box 1). We illustrate this timeline with representative, but not exhaustive, examples of bounty programs worldwide (Fig. 3a). Timelines of animal and plant species subject to bounty programs. a Each line represents a species in a single country, showing the earliest and latest years of implementation. b Composition by taxonomic group (bars) and total number by species origin (lines). Presented are the 384 species-country programs (out of 449 total) where the time period could be determined with certainty from the data source (see Table S1). Examples of major country bounty programs are noted in text. Participation in species bounty programs hinges on offering attractive incentives to recruit and retain participants over time to achieve desired management outcomes. Bounty rewards perceived as too low may result in poor enrollment, whereas rewards set too high may fuel perverse or fraudulent behavior. Incentives include money, prizes, and, in rare instances, even penalties or perceived risk of not participating in compulsory bounty programs. Money. Monetary rewards are most often associated with species bounty programs. Cash offerings have ranged, for example, from pennies for various birds, rats and insects, dollars for fish, seals, and snakes, tens of dollars for beavers, pigs, and foxes, and hundreds of dollars for wolves, dogs, and bears, per individual returned (Table S1). Examples of monetary rewards are presented throughout the main text. For longer-lived bounty programs, the reward amount often changed substantially over time to incentivize new and continued participation98. Prizes. Bounty programs have offered a diversity of prizes for the return of target organisms, including ammunition, raffles for cash, retail gift certificates, and lifetime hunting or fishing licenses. More unique rewards include Australian millionaire Tom Hedley announcing a beer-for-a-bag-of-toads bounty that offered two free beers at his pub in Cairns, Australia, for every bag of live cane toads. Clever newspaper reporting suggested that it would take 57 million liters of free beer to wipe out the estimated hundreds of millions of cane toads in Australia105. A sweeter example involves officials in Round Lake State Park, Idaho, who have, in recent years, offered an ice cream sandwich bounty to visitors for every dozen nonnative Chinese mystery snails (Cipangopaludina chinensis) removed from the lake106. A South African charity offered a free cell phone to anyone who delivered 60 dead rats collected in a Johannesburg township107. In the Mongolian People’s Republic, anyone who presented proof of a dead wolf during two national hunting weeks was rewarded with a sheep, and some felt92. Proof of removing a dead Bradford pear tree is rewarded with a native tree or shrub seedling in some United States state programs67. Avoiding penalties. Although rare, there are historical examples of citizens who failed to participate in mandatory bounty programs facing severe penalties. As early as 1667, Massachusetts Bay settlers enacted laws targeting red-winged blackbirds (Agelaius phoeniceus) to help reduce losses in corn production. Henry David Thoreau (1865) recounts a law in Eastham, Massachusetts, where townspeople were required to kill twelve blackbirds or three crows. By 1695, the law had targeted unmarried men, requiring them to comply before they could marry108. In response to the Locust Plague of 1874, when hordes of Rocky Mountain locusts invaded the Great Plains in the United States and Canada, a controversial bounty required every “healthy man” in affected counties to catch grasshoppers and destroy their eggs. When monetary rewards were not successful in recruiting grasshopper hunters, a 1877 Nebraska (United States) law imposed that all men in the affected counties were liable for one day’s involuntary grasshopper catching each week between May and July; failure to do so resulted in fines up to $10 or two days in jail109. From 1742 to 1881, the Faroe Islands imposed a “beak tax,” requiring men aged 15 to 50 to submit one raven beak or two beaks from crows, great skua (Stercorarius skua), or great black-backed gulls (Larus marinus), each year, with fines for noncompliance. The tax was abolished in 1881, after which beaks were purchased instead up until 1934110. Patriotism. Motivations to participate in bounty programs have also been framed as a patriotic duty, with refusal to engage carrying the risk of public shaming or the appearance of political dissent. Perhaps the best known example involves the Four Pests campaign launched by Mao Zedong, the first leader of the People’s Republic of China, which sought to reduce infectious diseases (e.g., typhoid, malaria and bubonic plague) and grain loss by targeting the public harvest of rats, flies, mosquitoes, and sparrows. From 1958 to 1962, the Communist government mobilized the Chinese population aged five and above with tools like fly swatters, glue and net traps, poisoned bait, poles, slingshots, guns and drums to fight these perceived pests. For example, much like a coordinated military campaign, children were required to hunt sparrows at a specific hour after every school day. While estimates are highly uncertain, it is reported that billions of sparrows and rats and many millions of kilograms of flies and mosquitoes were killed111. By destroying eggs in nests, shooting birds in the sky, and banging loud objects together to prevent them from resting and causing death by sheer fatigue, the bounty campaign led to the near-extinction of the Eurasian tree sparrow (Passer montanus) in China. By 1960, the lack of sparrow predators resulted in exploding locust and insect populations, which, by some estimates, accounted for a nearly 20 percent drop in crop production, leading to the deaths of two million people112. The campaign against sparrows was then ended and replaced by one against bedbugs. Early centuries The wolf (Canis lupus) is likely the earliest species to be subject to a bounty due to its perceived threat to humans and their pastoral livelihoods. In the sixth century BC, the first wolf bounty was reportedly opened when Solon of Athens (638-558 BCE), an Athenian politician, offered five silver drachmas to hunters who presented a dead male wolf23. Years later, in France, the Statutes of Charlemagne (A.D. 742-814) offered rewards “to destroy wolves”23. Wolf bounties were paid in Italy during the 12th and 13th centuries, when Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the first Duke of Milan, offered 10 Imperial marks for every wolf killed. In England, during the 13th century, King Edward I sought the total extermination of wolves in his kingdom by establishing the first bounty. Over almost three centuries (1395–1678), a bounty system in the Liberty of Bruges, Flanders, incentivized the killing of thousands of wolves with payments ranging from 0.5 to 2 Parisian livres24. In the 16th century, the scope of bounties widened when King Henry VIII first introduced the Preservation of Grain Act (1532) to address food shortages; this required every man, woman, and child to kill as many animals as possible from an official list of ‘vermin’ species believed to threaten food production25. This law was then significantly expanded under his daughter, Elizabeth I, in 1566, covering a wide range of nuisance animals, from birds to mammals. Collectively, the Tudor Vermin Acts offered bounties ranging from one penny for the head of a kite to one shilling (12 pence) for a European badger (Meles meles) or a red fox (Vulpes vulpes), paid by churchwardens in local parishes. These were considerable amounts when the average agricultural wage was around four pence a day25. Sparked by wild animals destroying crops and livestock, South Africa introduced numerous bounty programs starting in 1656 (ending in 1956) to address perceived human-wildlife conflicts associated with so-called vermin, including hyenas, lions, jackals and raptors26. 17th century The first bounties in North America, enacted in the 17th century, were also intended primarily to protect livestock and wild ungulates from large predators (Fig. 3a). Only 10 years after the Mayflower arrived in America, Puritan settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony offered a bounty for dead wolves on November 9, 1630, precisely one shilling per animal killed, established in the following decree: “This Court doth order, as an encouragement to persons to destroy Woolves, That henceforth any person killing any Woolf, shall be allowed out of the Treasury of that County where such Woolf was slain.”23. The first Canadian wolf bounty was not offered until 179322. Bounties were also commonly used throughout Europe to control an array of terrestrial carnivores. A Finnish bounty system encouraged the persecution of many animals through the 1647 Royal Decree on Hunting, which offered rewards for killing brown bears and wolves and later extended to red foxes, lynx (Lynx lynx), and pine martens (Martes martes), among others27. In Barbados, widespread crop raiding by vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) – introduced by early European settlers as exotic pets or food for slaves—prompted government-sanctioned bounties from 1682 to 1714. The bounty program was reinstated in 1975 and remains in effect today, albeit with a Bds$25 bounty compared to the original 5-shilling reward28. 18th century Bounty programs for mammals and birds grew throughout the 18th century (Fig. 3a). In Norway, wolves and bears were subjected to an official bounty paid by locally raised taxes from 1733, and later the Law on Predator Control and Game Preservation (1845) included a bounty on dozens of avian and mammalian predators29. Finland’s 1741 Royal Decree on Avian Pests established a bounty for dozens of raptors and “pest” birds, including eagles, hawks, owls and corvids, as well as house sparrows (Passer domesticus) and numerous ‘buntings and finches’ because of reported damage caused to agriculture and thatched roofs27. As settlers colonized westward across the United States to capitalize on abundant grazing land, they encountered more and different animal threats to their livestock. As such, numerous bounties were offered for large predators, including the coyote (Canis latrans), red fox, mountain lion (Puma concolor), bobcat (Lynx rufus), and brown bear (Ursus arctos). Predominantly hostile public attitudes towards large carnivores persisted for decades, leading most states and territories across the United States to pay out tens of thousands of dollars in bounties annually30. 19th century Bounty programs targeting unwanted native species steadily increased throughout the 19th century (Fig. 3b). Bounties were first used in Australia in 1830 when two shillings were paid for the tail of any unregistered dog found roaming the streets of certain townships in the Colony of New South Wales under the Dog Nuisance Act of 183231. Starting in 1861, New Zealand’s acclimatization societies established bounties on animals suspected of preying upon nonnative stocked trout or pheasants, resulting in the killing of over 200,000 harrier hawks (Circus approximans) in a single province over 15 years32. In 1877, the Queensland Government enacted the Marsupial Destruction Act, which experts estimate killed up to 27 million kangaroos, wallaroos, bandicoots, and other marsupials (ending in 1930), and paid £1,187,000 in bounties to reduce alleged competition for feed with valued livestock33. Perceived threats to local economies, including the depletion of fish stocks and damage to nets, led to the first recorded dolphin bounty program in 1865, when the French Government began offering 25 Fr for each dolphin killed in the Mediterranean Sea. Dolphin bounties were also widespread across Italy, where in 1889 the Government paid for each dolphin killed and authorized experimental use of bomb guns35. On the east coast of North America, bounties for harbor seals (Phoca vitulina) were introduced in the late 1880s to reduce the number of seals harassing fishermen and consuming fish in nets. This long-lived bounty scheme (1888-1962) resulted in an estimated 72,000 to 136,000 seals killed and claimed for bounties in Maine and Massachusetts20. Similar bounty programs for ringed seals (Pusa hispida), harbor seals and grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) existed in Denmark, Finland and Sweden36. For perhaps the first time, species subject to bounties also extended to freshwater environments, when the Belgium Ministry of Agriculture established a bounty program in 1889 for the Eurasian otter (Lutra lutra) with the hope of reducing their populations and reported ecological impacts on rivers37. Early 20th century (1900–1950) Bounty programs grew in the 20th century, remaining essential for large carnivore management, while broadening to include new taxonomic groups (Fig. 3a). The turn of the century witnessed bounty programs for reptiles, including timber rattlesnakes (Crotalus horridus) in the United States (starting as early as 1892 and ending as late as 1971 depending on the state) in response to public perception and fear of venomous bites38. In Australia, species native to the region, including the Murray River turtle (Emydura macquarii, 1905–1919), little black cormorant (Phalacrocorax sulcirostris, 1905–1954), and Australian pelican (Pelecanus conspicillatus, 2011), were subject to bounties due to perceived impacts on local fish stocks39. The pelican bounty ended abruptly because of public outcry against the mass killings40. Farmers in many U.S. states continued in their struggle with pests that threatened grain and fruit production. Large outbreaks of browntail moth (Euproctis chrysorrhoea) defoliating orchards in Maine triggered a 1905 bounty on caterpillars and their silk-strand nests, which routinely led to massive bonfires to destroy them41. Bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus, 1917–1953), harbor seals (1927–1958), and Dolly varden trout (Salvelinus malma, 1933–1941) were bountied in Alaska to reduce predation on salmon and minimize commercial fishery losses42. Growing concerns about damage to native fauna prompted Iceland’s American mink (Neovison vison) bounty program in 1939, just eight years after the species was introduced for fur farming43. Similarly, between 1951 and 1961, approximately 8.2 million common brushtail possums (Trichosurus vulpecula) were killed under a bounty that paid NZ$3.15 per token (strip of fur)44. The Provincial Boards for the Extinction of Harmful Animals and the Protection of Hunting were established during the Franco dictatorship in Spain to protect hunting and livestock by offering bounties on animals deemed harmful, especially predators. The boards incentivized the killing of over 600,000 corvids, birds of prey, and mammals from 1954 to 196845. Late 20th century (1950–2000) By the mid-20th century, public and policy opposition led to dramatic reductions in native species bounty programs (Fig. 3a, b). Following the first Nature Conservation Act in Finland (1923), bounties on avian predators ended, and by the early 1970s, all national bounty payments ceased27. Bounty programs also began to attract critics in the United States, particularly with the heightened environmental awareness that followed World War II and the spread of environmental ideals popularized by writers such as Aldo Leopold, who held that predators were essential to maintaining natural systems in balance. Birds benefited especially from these shifts in attitude, supported by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (1918) and subsequent amendments, as did large carnivores in the midwestern United States which were removed from bounty programs. However, wolves and coyotes were still subject to bounties in western states (Table S1). Ironically, many native species that were once targets of bounty programs in previous decades have increasingly become the focus of conservation (Box 2). Bounty programs continued to broaden their taxonomic scope later in the 20th century (Fig. 3a). Agricultural pests were the primary focus of many new bounty programs in island nations. This included Samoa, where a few cents were offered for each giant African snail (Lissachatina fulica) killed from 1980 to 1989, and a short-lived bounty (1997) for golden apple snail (Pomacea canaliculata) in the Dominican Republic, given its rapid spread and impacts in irrigated-rice fields46. Increasing populations of native northern pikeminnow (Ptychocheilus oregonensis), which prey heavily on young salmonids and threaten a highly valued fishery, led to the establishment of a sport reward fishery program in 199147. The program offers cash incentives to anglers who catch and remove pikeminnow, and to date, close to 6 million northern pikeminnow have been harvested at a total bounty cost of over US$38 million (Fig. 4). For over ten years, house crows (Corvus splendens) were targeted by a bounty program on Socotra Island in the Republic of Yemen (1998–2008) due to concerns about impacts on endemic fauna, agricultural damage, and harassment of locals and tourists48. In marine environments, the discovery of the rapa whelk (Rapana venosa) in Chesapeake Bay, introduced via ballast water from a European ship, led to the launch of a bounty program (1999) that harvested over 18,000 animals49. Trends in annual harvested northern pikeminnow (Ptychocheilus oregonensis) – a native fish species—associated with the Northern Pikeminnow Management Program (1991–2025). Values above bars represent total bounty payments each year. Anglers are paid for each northern pikeminnow that they catch (from within program boundaries) that exceeds 9 inches in total length. In 2025, rewards begin at US$6 each for the first 25 fish caught during the season, then US$8 for each fish caught from 26-200, and US$10 for each fish caught over 200. The program’s top angler in 2025 was paid approximately US$59,310 by collecting bounties on an estimated 15,715 fish. Data from47. The changing tides of species bounty are perhaps no more evident than in native species that were once the targets of bounty programs but later became the focus of conservation efforts. Of the 260 animal species revealed in this study to be subject to bounties, 22 species are classified as at-risk (Critically Endangered, Endangered, or Vulnerable) or extinct, and another 16 are classified as Near Threatened under the IUCN Red List113. Examples of former bounties on species now facing extinction concern include jaguar (Panthera onca, Near Threatened), hellbender (Cryptobranchus alleganiensis, Vulnerable), New Zealand longfin eel (Anguilla dieffenbachii, Endangered), great hammerhead shark (Sphyrna mokarran, Critically Endangered), and the two species discussed below. The world’s largest marsupial carnivore, the now-extinct thylacine or Tasmanian tiger (Thylacinus cynocephalus), was viewed by European settlers as a pest and a threat to livestock. This led to the creation of a bounty program (1888–1912) in Tasmania, supporting the last remaining population, offering £1 per head and resulting in over 2000 individuals killed114. The bounty program was a primary contributor to its extinction in 1936115. Similarly, European settlers viewed the Tasmanian devil (Sarcophilus harrisii) as a threat to livestock, leading the Van Diemen’s Land Company—a farming corporation still active today—to place a bounty on the species, offering £0.13–0.18 per animal between 1830 and 1941116. Population declines caused by over a century of trapping and poisoning resulted in this species being nationally protected in 1941, and it is now listed as IUCN Endangered. Another notable example is the kea (Nestor notabilis, Endangered), a large parrot species endemic to the forested and alpine regions of New Zealand’s South Island. Due to concerns about kea attacking sheep, the New Zealand government paid a bounty for kea beaks117. The bounty was intended to apply only to birds killed on farms and in participating council areas, but some hunters also targeted kea in national parks, where they were legally protected. Over 150,000 kea were killed in the century leading up to 1970, when the bounty was abolished. By then, an estimated 5000 birds remained in the wild. In response to additional threats, the species was granted full protection under the New Zealand Wildlife Act in 1986; today, only a few thousand individuals are estimated to remain in the wild58. Box 2 Caption. (a) Species that have been subject to bounties in the past and are now threatened by extinction or are extinct according to the IUCN Red List. Annually paid bounties for killed (b) thylacines from 1888-1912 in Australia (data from118), and (c) kea from 1870 to 1970 in New Zealand (data from58). Inset photos depict Mr. Weaver and his killed thylacine in 1869 (public domain image) and the Collins family with two dead kea that were shot in the late 1920s or early 1930s (image: The Weekend Press, June 5, 2021). 21st century (2000-present) Bounty programs steadily increased in the 21st century, with their gaze shifting abruptly from native to nonnative species (Fig. 3b) and diversifying substantially (Fig. 5). Several bounties for nonnative semi-aquatic rodents were implemented. For example, after being imported to foster a new fur trade and subsequently proliferating throughout Tierra del Fuego, Argentina, the North American beaver (Castor canadensis) was targeted by an ill-fated bounty (2005-2006) that did little to curb the species’ massive population growth50. Nutria or coypu (Myocastor coypus), native to South America and introduced around the world for fur and meat, have similarly drawn concern due to their damage to crops, native vegetation, and drainage systems. Louisiana’s Coastwide Nutria Control Program consists of an economic incentive payment of US$6 per nutria tail to encourage public harvest51. Similarly, in 2011, South Korea offered hunters ₩30,000 per nutria to control rapidly growing populations and their damage to wetlands52. Bounties on unwanted plants and insects emerged during this period (Fig. 3a). As early as 2009, bounties were offered on puncturevine (Tribulus terrestris), where US$1 per bag of vines was offered by numerous cities and counties in the western United States, in the hopes of controlling its infestation of pastures, agricultural fields, and roadsides53. Origin of species subject to bounty programs, both past and present, over the past 8 centuries (ca. 1300-2024). Native (n = 312 programs) and nonnative (n = 137 programs) species according to the number of species-country programs. Several new bounty programs have been launched in the past decade. To minimize the economic impact of wild boar (Sus scrofa) damage to crops and properties, a bounty program in central Texas, United States, resulted in the killing of over 18,000 animals from 2013 to 202354. The Python Elimination Program in Florida, United States, has compensated people in participating counties for killing numerous invasive snakes, including pythons, anacondas, and boa constrictors, since 201755. Since 2020, the Turkish government has maintained a bounty program to control the Mediterranean population of silver-cheeked toadfish (Lagocephalus sceleratus). These highly toxic species damage gear and reduce fishery catches56. Today, with over 4 million green iguanas (Iguana iguana) on Puerto Rico causing blackouts by burrowing under electric plants and weakening building foundations, the program allows the public to hunt iguanas and sell their meat for up to US$6 per pound57. Key insights about species bounty programs Certain societies—especially in contexts shaped by imperialism and colonial expansion—have historically implemented measures to control wildlife populations, including bounty programs directed at species considered undesirable. Drawing on the historical record outlined above, we discuss five key insights on bounty programs that help inform future decisions on their role in species management. Motivations for establishing species bounty programs are far-ranging Economic, ecological, and public health factors have historically driven the establishment of bounty programs, with these motivations evolving over time. Economic motivations Bounties have been motivated by reported or perceived economic, agricultural, recreational, and infrastructural damage associated with certain species. Many bounties in the United States were enacted to protect livestock from predation by large carnivores such as wolves and coyotes. Kea were bountied between 1867 and 1970 sparked by reported aggression towards sheep livestock in New Zealand58, house crow bounties established in present-day Tanzania in 1917 because of reported attacks on poultry59, and the hedgehog was subjected to wholesale persecution in England because of hen egg consumption and the erroneous belief that it sucked milk from the teats of recumbent cows at night25. Many bounty programs have targeted species damaging valuable agriculture, such as the giant African snail on many island nations60, wild boar bounties in Canada61 and Australia62, spotted knapweed (Centaurea stoebe) in the United States63, and the Hispaniolan woodpecker (Melanerpes striatus) in the Dominican Republic64, all due to crop damage concerns. Similarly, motivated to protect important fisheries, bounty programs have targeted many predacious species, including: northern pikeminnow, seals, and bald eagle in the United States20,42,47; orca (Orcinus orca) in Greenland; dolphins in Japan, Italy, Croatia, and France34,35; Australian pelican (Pelecanus conspicillatus) in Australia40; and longfin eel (Anguilla dieffenbachii) in New Zealand65, to name a few (Table S1). Damage to infrastructure also spurred bounty programs, such as those targeting house crows that damage rooftops48, green woodpeckers that impacted church steeples25, wolverines (Gulo gulo) for damaging trappers’ cabins and equipment42, common wombat (Vombatus ursinus) for weakening fences and other farming structures66, Bradford pear tree (Pyrus calleryana) for its fragile branches falling on buildings67, and nutria for damaging irrigation systems68. Ecological motivations Ecological rationale for implementing species bounty programs is also common, although it is rarely the sole reason. Threats to native freshwater biodiversity have prompted a suite of bounty programs targeting predatory fish species (e.g., walleye, northern snakehead, lionfish, northern pike, and brown trout) in the United States69,70. Concerns about threats to native fauna led Iceland to launch a bounty program for the American mink in 1939, which continues to this day43. Motivated by the predatory impacts on native birds, unowned domesticated cats (Felis catus) are the focus of a current bounty program in Australia, offering AUD$15 per scalp submitted71. There are also notable examples of ecological motivations leading to the establishment of new bounty programs targeting species that had previously been intentionally introduced for (bio)control of other unwanted pests (Box 3). In these cases, species once valued for their beneficial roles were subsequently deemed undesirable and became targets of bounty efforts. Although initially introduced to control other unwanted species, some bounty programs were ironically created for these introduced species years later. Mustelids (stoats, weasels, and ferrets) were imported, bred and then introduced beginning in 1879 to control invasive rabbits damaging pastoral farmlands in New Zealand (Rabbit Nuisance Act of 1876). Foreshadowing their ecological impact, the stoats and weasels on the first voyage from the UK reportedly consumed around 100 pigeons119. Indeed, mustelids became invasive themselves, preying on native wildlife, including endangered birds such as the kakapo (Strigops habroptilus) and the blue duck (Hymenolaimus malacorhynchos)120. This led to the complete removal of legal protections, followed by the launch of an approximately 30-year. bounty program (1931–1959), during which it is estimated that over 37,000 stoat tails were submitted for bounty on the North Island of New Zealand (1939–1948)121. The Javan mongoose (Urva javanica) was intentionally released on Amami Islands, Japan, in 1979, to control the venomous Okinawa habu pit viper snake (Protobothrops flavoviridis) and reduce black rat infestations that damaged crops98. However, years later, the government supported a 5-year bounty program (2000–2004) to eradicate the mongoose due to their devastating impacts on native wildlife. The common myna (Acridotheres tristis), a bird native to South and Southeast Asia, was introduced to the Cook Islands in 1915 to control the coconut stick-insect (Graeffea crouanii), a major pest affecting coconut palms. While initially viewed as a biological control agent, the myna quickly spread across multiple islands, where it began to compete aggressively with native birds, raid crops, and invade human settlements, causing significant ecological and economic harm. Consequently, a bounty program was initiated on Atiu Island, which by 2014 had resulted in the trapping of nearly 13,000 birds122. Box 3 Caption. (a) Dead stoats trapped in New Zealand (image: reWild Wainui); (b) a captured mongoose on the island of Amami-Oshima, Japan (image: Mainichi/Kazuaki Kanda); (c) a common myna nesting in a house wall (image: CC BY 4.0). Human health motivations Bounty programs are also encouraged by concerns for human health. Fear of human attacks fueled bounty programs targeting wolves, mountain lions, and bears in many countries, as well as sharks (e.g., tiger, white, and hammerhead) in Australia (Table S1). Driven by the fear of venomous bites, many parts of the United States had long-lasting bounties on timber rattlesnakes, starting as early as 1892 and ending only recently, in some states, in 199072. Bounties on house crows in the Republic of Yemen were offered, in part, due to reported harassment of locals and tourists48, and in Kenya, because they pose a bird strike hazard at airports73. In addition to impacting native species, the potential dangers posed by small Indian mongooses (Urva auropunctata) carrying rabies were a motivating factor for launching a bounty program (1902–1930) in Trinidad and Tobago74. Management goals of species bounty programs are diverse Our review of individual bounty programs suggests that their management goals tended to fall along a continuum between two endpoints. On the one hand, some bounty programs were found to have well-planned operations with clear and meaningful management and conservation objectives, supported by logistical and financial resources, that contributed to adaptive program improvement14. For example, in response to the rapidly growing nutria population and its reported impacts on wetlands, the Louisiana Coastwide Nutria Control Program (U.S.) was launched in 2002 with the goal of harvesting 400,00051 nutria annually. The program also monitors coastal marsh recovery alongside trends in nutria capture rates to evaluate its outcomes. In the 2024-25 season, a total of 357,015 nutria tails, worth US$2.1 million in incentives, were paid to participants. Some bounty programs have also tracked performance toward desired management outcomes, and those that have failed to do so, such as not reducing population sizes or minimizing the ecological or economic impacts of targeted species, have been discontinued in the past18. At the other end of the spectrum are bounty programs with ad hoc operations that involve simple bookkeeping of harvest levels, minimal tracking of preferred conservation or management outcomes, and no consideration of participant satisfaction to ensure program longevity. For such programs, evaluating management success is challenging. Past scientific studies that have quantitatively assessed the effectiveness of a bounty program, albeit limited in number, generally report only small reductions in the abundance of target species and rarely track any other ecological outcome. Examples include red foxes75–77, dingoes78,79, wild boars21 and coyotes80. Moving forward, we highlight the need for further investigation into the specifics and the management effectiveness of species bounty programs. This represents a very large knowledge gap. In doing so, a host of biological, ecological, and socio-economic factors should be simultaneously evaluated, including key legal and regulatory considerations14. Unintended ecological consequences of species bounties are possible Species bounty programs may trigger a range of unintended ecological consequences. While such consequences are far from universal, when present, they can challenge the effectiveness and long-term viability of these interventions. Misidentification and indiscriminate killing of non-target species Misidentification and indiscriminate killing of non-target species is possible, elevating the risks of inadvertent “friendly fire”81. For example, hybridization between protected dingoes and domestic dogs continues to challenge the wild dog bounty in Victoria, Australia82. The city of Liuzhou, China, issued a 1000 yuan bounty on piranhas in the Liujiang River, but this program was terminated after just four days when too many native fish were being killed in the angling craze83. Indiscriminate trapping when used in bounty programs can also result in the accidental harvest of non-target species—an outcome that is true of both species bounty and government-led control programs. For example, killing neck snares are a widespread mammal trapping device used by bounty hunters because they are cheap, lightweight, easy to set and camouflage—yet they can result in the non-selective killing of non-target animals22. Increasing target species populations Many bounty programs have reduced the abundance of the target species; however, there have also been instances of counterintuitive outcomes in which the species benefited. Density-dependent overcompensation can lead to a hydra effect, where population size increases due to reduced competition for resources and enhanced survival and reproduction84. For example, in response to increasing negative impacts on native biodiversity and military training, a bounty program for wild boars was implemented at Fort Benning, United States. Despite the lethal shooting of 1138 pigs and bounties totaling US$60,000, surveys indicated that pig density and occupancy rates increased from 12–130%, and the number of juveniles per adult female increased 191–219% in subsequent years21. Baiting strategies to attract animals to hunting sites may have increased food availability and nutrition, and hunters primarily focused on eliminating “trophy” male pigs to maximize return on effort rather than targeting smaller, maturing males, females, and juveniles. Overcompensation was also observed in the Australian Victorian Fox Bounty Trial (2002–2003), where, despite the harvest of roughly 20% of Victoria’s red fox (Vulpes vulpes) population, the resulting pulse of available resources for survivors stimulated litter survival and subsequent population increases77. In short, compensatory population dynamics can undermine the effectiveness of many management strategies, including species bounty programs. Increasing target species impacts Bounty programs can also unintentionally modify the behavior or traits of surviving individuals, amplifying their ecological consequences. For example, lionfish (Pterois volitans), which are subject to a bounty using spearfishing, have become more crepuscular, potentially increasing their predation on native reef fishes at dawn and dusk85. Additionally, spillover effects can amplify the ecological impacts of the targeted bounty species. Initially introduced to “enrich” local wildlife and foster a fur trade that never manifested, hundreds of thousands of North American beavers now flourish in Tierra del Fuego, in part, because they are unchecked by predators. The governments of Chile and Argentina placed a short-lived bounty on North American beavers from 2005 to 2006, resulting in approximately 30,000 individuals being captured. However, this led to even greater forest damage, as new beavers colonized previously occupied territories, gnawing and felling more trees to build new dams50. Fraudulent behaviors in species bounty programs can manifest Bounty programs also risk encouraging fraudulent behaviors, including deliberately farming or introducing the target species, forging proof or submitting non-target organisms, and harvesting individuals outside authorized areas or time periods. Not killing the target species Claiming bounties for target species that remain alive was problematic throughout the early history of some bounty programs. The “Great Hanoi Rat Massacre” (1902) in Hanoi, Vietnam (then known as French Indochina), was initiated after an outbreak of bubonic plague, offering 1 cent for each severed tail as proof. Despite collecting over 55 million severed tails in a year, the bounty program ended when government officials observed tailless rats throughout the city, as hunters cut off their tails and then released them to reproduce86. The grey squirrel bounty in the United Kingdom was terminated in 1958 for the same reason25. In another example, to maintain income, some hunters in the United States released adult female wolves from traps to ensure future breeding87. Farming and encouraging new introductions of the target species Mark Twain (1907) put it best when he said, “the best way to increase wolves in America, rabbits in Australia, and snakes in India, is to pay a bounty on their scalps. Then every patriot goes to raising them.”88. In perhaps the most notorious example (now known as the cobra effect), residents of colonial Delhi during the British Raj (1858-1947) discovered that the bounty offered by the British government for venomous Indian cobras (Naja naja) exceeded the cost of breeding them. People, unsurprisingly, began breeding cobras to collect the bounty for profit. Once the government discovered this, it ended the program—prompting breeders to release their snakes into the wild, creating an even larger problem89. Similar instances of farming species that capitalize on bounty rewards include the giant African snail bounty in Samoa90, the dingo and wild boar in Australia78, and American crows in the United States91. Bounty programs have also encouraged intentional releases into previously unoccupied areas to create new populations for subsequent harvest, thereby increasing overall numbers and hindering efforts to reduce undesirable impacts14. Forging proof and claiming non-target species Forging proof has been synonymous with some past bounty programs. Historical evidence suggests that fraud was rampant in bounties for harbor seals in Maine and Massachusetts, United States, starting in the late 1880s. Some participants reportedly deceived a town clerk by creating multiple tails (initial proof) or fake noses (revised proof) from a single seal hide to claim multiple bounties20. In 1858, after spending the equivalent of ₽1,250,000 to reward the killing of over a million wolves in Central Russia, officials grew suspicious. They uncovered that some hunters had been purchasing cheap wolf pelts, cutting them into pieces, and submitting the fragments—particularly the tails—to magistrates to fraudulently claim bounties92. Similar scams involved cutting the vervet monkey tail into several pieces to claim multiple bounties in Barbados93, stretching and cutting the lips of a coyote to create two bounty claims in South Dakota, United States72, and claiming multiple bounties for a single brown rat by stretching its skin over a walnut to shape it like the scalp in Michigan, United States94. Scams involving bounty programs have also resulted from officials not closely examining proof of authenticity, leading to numerous United States bird bounty programs being terminated throughout the 1900s due to fraudulent claims involving non-target species. Programs have also responded positively to the discovery of fraud by revising the standards for what constitutes acceptable proof of eligibility for rewards. Harvesting outside regulated areas and times Problems with bounty claims for animals killed outside the program’s jurisdiction are also evident from past programs. Fox and wolf body parts have been reported to have been collected from areas outside the targeted control zone or the specified time frame22. In 1917, a traveling locomotive fireman was discovered importing wolf hides from Minnesota and submitting them for redemption in various counties in Wisconsin and Michigan, United States. A study a few years later revealed that only about one-third of the wolves submitted for redemption in Michigan were legitimate or taken from within the state’s borders94. Elsewhere, claims for regional bounties on common brushtail possums in New Zealand often arose from animals harvested outside regulated areas44. Finally, although many past bounty laws in the United States required participants to deface the proof when claiming the reward, there were reports of defrauders collecting bounties on the same animal in different counties when the type of proof marking differed72. Challenges associated with harvesting outside regulated areas are also evident in depredation programs that employ hunters to control large carnivores Ensuring public engagement in species bounty programs is challenging Public engagement in species bounty programs is highly dynamic. Significant reductions in native species bounty programs starting at the turn of the 21st century (Fig. 3b) were driven by a range of factors. In some cases, public support for species bounty programs diminished due to concerns about animal welfare, especially in cases involving people who are untrained in the acceptable methods of capturing, handling, and humanely euthanizing the target species22. For example, the controversial death-trap - killing mink by drowning - has been increasingly applied in Iceland over the past two decades, which may be partly responsible for waning engagement and decreased numbers of bounties claimed43. “Struck and lost”, referring to animals that are wounded during a hunt, but lost during landing, also raised issues regarding the humane treatment of animals. For example, struck-and-loss rates for seals were estimated to be 50–67% in the Maine and Massachusetts seal bounty hunts (1888–1962)20. Dingo bounty programs in Australia, which widely deploy leg-hold traps, remain controversial due to the inhumane impacts on both target and non-target species95. By contrast, some bounty programs appear to remain popular with the public, albeit with growing opposition by some groups, such as the Nest Predator Bounty Program in South Dakota, United States. Since 2019, this program has awarded $US 3.3 million in bounties for > 340,000 raccoons (Procyon lotor), red foxes, opossums (Didelphis virginiana), American badgers (Taxidea taxus), and striped skunks (Mephitis mephitis), with the goal of reducing predation on pheasant and duck nests96. Motivations for continued public participation in bounty programs also depend heavily on monetary incentives and price-setting. Bounty payments have been shown to influence harvest rates—for example, in Norway, hunters in municipalities offering bounties caught about twice as many American mink as those in municipalities without bounties97. Maintaining public participation often requires adjusting rewards over time, such as repeated increases in bounties for small Asian mongoose98 and nutria51 to ensure sustained harvesting levels. However, increasing bounty payments is not always successful in encouraging public harvest. For example, no relationship was observed between the value of bounties offered and the number of dingo scalps submitted in New South Wales, Australia, from 1883 to 193099. In this case, the main incentive for killing dingoes was likely to protect livestock, rather than the monetary reward. This is further supported by the coyote boundary program in Utah, United States, where survey results suggested that participants remained engaged over time because they enjoyed the outdoors and valued big-game protection, rather than primarily because of the bounties offered18. Finally, while large bounties can boost harvest, high rewards may threaten a program’s financial sustainability. In New Hampshire, a US$0.10 bounty on groundhogs was repealed after claims skyrocketed from a few hundred to tens of thousands in a single year, straining the state’s budget100. Conclusion From the historic bounty on the now-extinct thylacine to more recent programs targeting green iguanas, this study highlights the wide range of species that human societies have sought to control through bounty programs. Despite this long history, however, a fundamental question remains: what is the future of species bounty programs in natural resource management? We suggest that no single answer exists, as perspectives on bounty programs are likely as diverse as the species they target. Advocates maintain that bounty programs are among several management tools that can play an essential role in controlling unwanted species, promoting environmental stewardship, and educating the public about invasive species. Others argue that bounty programs may be poorly designed, costly, largely ineffective, and distract from deeper environmental issues—such as habitat loss, pollution, and climate change—that allow unwanted species to thrive. Public opinion remains largely divided, with some viewing bounties as necessary and valuable, while others assert that programs are unethical and should be discontinued. Often receiving far less explicit recognition is the fact that bounty programs are implemented in real places and ecosystems, involving humans with diverse values, risk perceptions, and attitudes towards native and invasive species101. It is within this convergence of social and ecological contexts that the future of species bounty programs will be shaped. Methods We conducted an exhaustive narrative review of a broad range of information sources, including published literature, government reports, print and online media articles, and reputable websites, to identify past and present species bounty programs. First, we deployed literature and web searches using Web of Science Core Collection, Google Scholar, and Google search engine involving various combinations of the following search terms: species, bounty, public, citizen, invader, invasive, nonnative, alien, unwanted, nuisance, native, management, control, cull, harvest, incentive, money, prize, and cash. Searches were conducted over multiple years and last updated in December 2024. A snowball approach was employed to explore all reference sections of published articles and hyperlinked citations in online media sources. Second, we screened all sources using inclusion criteria to ensure that programs: (a) allowed public participation (not limited to contractors, game wardens, or specific groups); (b) offered monetary or prize incentives for removing unwanted species (not laws or regulations that merely allowed the public to kill certain animals on their land); and (c) were implemented, not just proposed or permitted. From these sources, we identified the species, location, and time frame (when possible), and assigned origin status (native or nonnative) at the country level, based on the Global Register of Introduced and Invasive Species102 and other databases. In a limited number of cases when programs offered bounties on entire groups of related species, we assigned species manually. These were addressed in the following instances. First, the “dolphin” bounty in Croatia, France, and Italy was presented as the dolphin species occurring in the Mediterranean Sea: common dolphin (Delphinus delphis), Risso’s dolphin (Grampus griseus), striped dolphin (Stenella coeruleoalba), and common bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus); and the “dolphin” bounty in Japan was presented as the most common dolphin species (out of 18 present-day species) occurring in the Japanese coastal waters of the Indo-Pacific: bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops aduncus), Pacific white-sided dolphins (Aethalodelphis obliquidens), and striped dolphins (Stenella coeruleoalba). Second, regarding the Queensland Government (Australia) Marsupial Destruction Act of 1922, a bounty was offered on all kangaroos, wallaroos, bandicoots, and other marsupials, which we considered to be all species present in Queensland. This specifically included three species of kangaroos: red kangaroo (Osphranter rufus), eastern gray kangaroo (Macropus giganteus), western grey kangaroo (Macropus fuliginosus); three species of wallaby: agile wallaby (Notamacropus agilis), black-striped wallaby (Notamacropus dorsalis), red-necked wallaby (Notamacropus rufogriseus); one species of wallaroo: common wallaroo (Osphranter robustus); two species of bandicoot: northern brown bandicoot (Isoodon macrourus) and long-nosed bandicoot (Perameles nasuta); and two species of potoroo: long-footed potoroo (Potorous longipes) and long-nosed potoroo (Potorous tridactylus). Third, subspecies of species were presented at the species level (e.g., wolves were collectively classified as Canis lupus). Lastly, “hawk” bounties for Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma and Rhode Island were presented as the current-day list of hawk species in each state, under the assumption that species colonization and extinction in these states have been minimal in recent decades. The goal of this review was not to record all instances of bounty programs for a particular species in each country. Indeed, bounty programs can be administered for the same species in multiple regions of the same country. Instead, our assessment focused on whether evidence exists that a species was ever subject to a bounty at the country level (except for the United States, which we also recorded at the state level); thus, the list of programs for each country is illustrative, not exhaustive. Our aim was not to evaluate program effectiveness using a systematic review, as the monitoring and reporting data for these programs were largely insufficient. Additionally, while the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) framework is widely recognized for ensuring transparency in reviews, it was not applied because the majority of the sources were media-based (e.g., news articles, digital content, and other non-academic materials), which are not consistently indexed, standardized, or stable to the extent needed to ensure reproducible searches and formal eligibility criteria. In short, the topic’s cryptic nature required a more interpretive and discursive synthesis103,104. Despite our efforts to be representative in our synthesis, we readily acknowledge potential geographic biases arising from the search criteria, which predominantly revealed sources published in English. Individuals pictured in Box 2 are deceased, and it was not possible to obtain written informed consent to publish from the person’s next of kin. Supplementary information Olden_Supplementary_Information_Rev Acknowledgements This project was supported by the Richard C. and Lois M. Worthington Endowed Professor in Fisheries Management from the School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, University of Washington, to JDO. JDO thanks John Linnell for conversations regarding bounty programs in Norway, Clio Reid for providing the kea bounty numbers for New Zealand, and all others who engaged in "bounty" conversations over the years. Author contributions Conceptualization, formal analysis, funding acquisition, methodology, project administration, writing—original and final draft: J.D.O.; Data curation: J.D.O., J.O.D., R.M.F., E.J., R.C.J., R.R.S., B.K.T.; Investigation: J.D.O., J.O.D., R.M.F., E.J., R.C.J., R.R.S., B.K.T.; Visualization: J.D.O., R.M.F.; Writing—review & editing: J.D.O., J.O.D., R.M.F., E.J., R.C.J., R.R.S., B.K.T. Data availability The data that support the findings of this study are available on reasonable request from the corresponding author. Code availability The underlying code for this study is not publicly available but may be made available to qualified researchers on reasonable request from the corresponding author. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Footnotes Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Supplementary information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1038/s44185-026-00132-x. References Associated Data Supplementary Materials Olden_Supplementary_Information_Rev Data Availability Statement The data that support the findings of this study are available on reasonable request from the corresponding author. The underlying code for this study is not publicly available but may be made available to qualified researchers on reasonable request from the corresponding author.