First record of Zika virus in Yemen Authors: Rania Nada, Hanan El Mohammady, Isabelle Nakhla, Ismail Attia, Qasem Buhaibeh, Ali Al Waleedi, Waheed Al Bakhshi, Yasser Bahshem Published: 2026 ABSTRACT Zika virus (ZIKV) is mainly transmitted by Aedes aegypti worldwide. Despite mosquito endemicity, ZIKV has not been reported previously in Yemen. We screened 186 acute febrile patients using qPCR; of these, 8 (4.3%) were ZIKV-positive. This is the first record of ZIKV in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, highlighting the need for enhanced regional surveillance. Introduction Zika virus (ZIKV) is a Flavivirus primarily transmitted by Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus, the mosquito vectors responsible for the transmission of dengue, yellow fever, and chikungunya viruses (Simonin et al., 2017; Ahebwa et al., 2023). While most ZIKV transmission happens through infected mosquitoes, the virus can also be spread via sexual contact, maternofetal exchange, and blood transfusions (CDC, 2025a). ZIKV is generally known to cause mild or no symptoms in humans; however, it has been linked to the development of Guillain-Barré syndrome, encephalopathy, myelitis, uveitis, and thrombocytopenia (CDC, 2025a). Additionally, the epidemic potential of the virus, as demonstrated during the 2015–2016 epidemic that began in Brazil and spread globally, aggravates the situation (WHO, 2025). In Yemen, Ae. aegypti is endemic and has contributed to the endemicity of the dengue virus and to the occurrence of dengue and chikungunya outbreaks (Zayed et al., 2024; Abdullah et al., 2025). ZIKV has never been reported in Yemen, and recent reports from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) listed Yemen among countries with established populations of Ae. aegypti, the mosquito vector of ZIKV, but with no reported human Zika cases to date (CDC, 2025b; WHO, 2025). In this paper, we report the first recorded Zika virus cases in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. We will also discuss the epidemiology, the clinical presentation of the ZIKV cases identified, and the risk that the virus poses to public health in Yemen. Materials and methods In collaboration with the United States Naval Medical Research Unit EURAFCENT (NAMRU-EURAFCENT), the Malaria Control Programme of the Ministry of Health of Yemen has been conducting surveillance for acute undifferentiated febrile illness (AUF) in the Governorate of Aden. AUF is defined as a febrile illness, with temperatures of ≥ 38 °C for less than two weeks without organ-specific symptoms at presentation. Testing for ZIKV was part of a broader investigation during a dengue virus outbreak in Aden. Upon enrollment, each participant completed a clinical questionnaire covering demographics, clinical presentations, treatment, severity indicators, risk factors, and impact of the illness. Subsequently, 3–5 ml blood sample was collected from each case in an EDTA tube. Total nucleic acid extraction was carried out using MagMax Viral/Pathogen Ultra Nucleic Acid Isolation kit (Applied Biosystem, Darmstadt, Germany) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Detection of Zika virus was done using a singleplex ZIKA virus-single check CE Real-time PCR kit (Genekam Biotechnology AG, Duisburg, Germany), which specifically targets ZIKV RNA. The kit is highly specific and sensitive for ZIKV with no reported cross-reactivity to dengue or other flaviviruses. Per manufacturer specifications, the kit maintains 95–98% sensitivity at a limit of detection (LOD) of 160 copies/ml (4 copies/run) and 100% specificity. The assay was performed in a total reaction volume of 20 μl in accordance with the manufacturer’s directions. Amplification was done in a 7500 Real-Time PCR System (qPCR, Applied Biosystem, California, USA) using the following amplification cycles: initial incubation at 42 °C for 60 min and 70 °C for 10 min, followed by 40 cycles of denaturation at 95 °C for 15 s and annealing/extension at 60 °C for 1min. Samples with a cycle threshold (Ct) value of ≤ 40 were considered positive as per standard diagnostic parameters for this assay. Results From 28 May to 2 June 2025, a total of 186 AUF cases were enrolled during a dengue outbreak, and ZIKV was detected in 8 (4.3%) cases. Positive ZIKV cases were identified in three geographically distant districts in Aden: Khour Maksar (n = 4, 50%), Al Buraiqa (n = 3, 37.5%) and Tawahi (n = 1, 12.5%). Cases were equally distributed between males and females, with age ranging from 22 to 60 years (median age 25.5 years), and no reported history of travel outside Yemen. Chills/rigors, muscle/joint pain, headache, and weakness were reported by all patients, whereas poor appetite was noticed in 75% of the patients. The time between the onset of illness and the detection of ZIKV ranged between 1 and 10 days. Co-infection with dengue was found in 3 (37.5%) ZIKV-positive patients, and only dengue serotypes DENV-3 or DENV-4 were detected (Table 1).Table 1Detection of ZIKV and ZIKV + dengue co-infection in May-June 2025 in Yemen.Table 1ZIKV casesDistrictMonth of detectionAge (years)SexCo-pathogen1TawahiJune 202522MaleDENV-42Al BuraiqaJune 202524Female–3Al BuraiqaJune 202524Male–4Al BuraiqaJune 202524Female–5Khour MaksarMay 202530MaleDENV-46Khour MaksarMay 202527Female–7Khour MaksarMay 202560MaleDENV-38Khour MaksarJune 202528Female–Note: Geographical coordinates for the districts where cases were identified are: Tawahi (12.783°N, 44.983°E), Al Buraiqa (12.739°N, 44.884°E), and Khour Maksar (12.865°N, 45.055°E). Table 1Detection of ZIKV and ZIKV + dengue co-infection in May-June 2025 in Yemen.Table 1ZIKV casesDistrictMonth of detectionAge (years)SexCo-pathogen1TawahiJune 202522MaleDENV-42Al BuraiqaJune 202524Female–3Al BuraiqaJune 202524Male–4Al BuraiqaJune 202524Female–5Khour MaksarMay 202530MaleDENV-46Khour MaksarMay 202527Female–7Khour MaksarMay 202560MaleDENV-38Khour MaksarJune 202528Female–Note: Geographical coordinates for the districts where cases were identified are: Tawahi (12.783°N, 44.983°E), Al Buraiqa (12.739°N, 44.884°E), and Khour Maksar (12.865°N, 45.055°E). Detection of ZIKV and ZIKV + dengue co-infection in May-June 2025 in Yemen. Note: Geographical coordinates for the districts where cases were identified are: Tawahi (12.783°N, 44.983°E), Al Buraiqa (12.739°N, 44.884°E), and Khour Maksar (12.865°N, 45.055°E). Discussion Yemen has been categorized as a country at risk of ZIKV transmission as both Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus vectors are present in the country (CDC, 2025a; WHO, 2025). However, no earlier reports indicated the presence of ZIKV in Yemen. Our study thus represents the first record of ZIKV in Yemen and in the Arabian Peninsula. The detection of the virus in geographically widely separated districts in Aden suggests potential circulation of the virus rather than confinement to a single spot. However, it must be noted that this study provides only a brief snapshot taken during an active dengue outbreak. For a more accurate assessment of the ZIKV prevalence in Yemen, the virus has recently been added to the country’s surveillance activities for AUF. As no known vaccines or preventive medicines are currently available for ZIKV, successful prevention of its spread must rely primarily on strengthening vector control measures. As previously mentioned, enrollment of AUF cases took place during a dengue outbreak in Aden, which may have indirectly led to the underestimation of the true prevalence of other pathogens, including ZIKV. On the other hand, the behavior of Aedes mosquitoes is known to change after infection with DENV. The infected mosquitoes are more attracted to the host, their biting efficiency decreases, which forces the mosquitoes to bite more frequently for a complete blood meal (Wei Xiang et al., 2022). Consequently, a dengue outbreak may enhance the transmission of other viruses harbored by Aedes mosquitoes, such as ZIKV. Co-infection of the genetically related dengue and Zika viruses was previously reported in a few articles (Dupont-Rouzeyrol et al., 2015; Carrillo-Hernandez et al., 2018; Zambrana et al., 2024). This co-infection is clinically important because of the development of complex viral interactions in the form of antibody-dependent enhancement (ADE), as observed in both in vitro studies and in vivo mice and macaque models (Olawoyin and Kribs, 2020). During ADE, cross-reactive antibodies generated during one infection can enhance the uptake and the replication of the other virus, potentially resulting in a more severe disease. Since we observed this co-infection in only three cases, we could not link the severity of infection to the co-occurrence of DENV and ZIKV. Further studies are needed to understand these interactions and their impact on public health. Our study has some limitations. The data collection period was brief, limiting broader epidemiological conclusions. Additionally, the lack of genomic analysis restricts our ability to verify the viral lineage (African versus Asian) or trace its origin. To strengthen future surveillance efforts, the inclusion of phylogenetic analysis should be prioritized. The political unrest in Yemen during the past decade has resulted in a collapsed economy and devastated infrastructure, including healthcare facilities. The situation has been worsened by repeated outbreaks of cholera, dengue fever, chikungunya and measles (Alsabri et al., 2021). In this already fragile context, the epidemic potential of the Zika virus and the recurrent dengue outbreaks underscore the significance of our findings as a major public health concern, where vulnerable populations remain at risk of severe disease. Our findings underscore the need for enhanced public health surveillance to identify and monitor areas of high transmission, inform targeted control measures, and guide the allocation of appropriate resources. We recommend that authorities adopt relevant protective measures to mitigate the risk and safeguard public health. Conclusion The detection of ZIKV in acute febrile patients in Aden represents the first documented evidence of the virus in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, signaling a critical new public health threat. The identification of cases across geographically separated districts, coupled with observed dengue co-infections, suggests active local circulation facilitated by the endemic Ae. aegypti vector. In the context of Yemen’s fragile healthcare infrastructure and a history of recurrent arboviral epidemics, these findings highlight an urgent need for expanded regional epidemiological and genomic surveillance. Ultimately, strengthening vector control and proactive epidemiological monitoring will be essential to mitigate ZIKV transmission and safeguard regional public health. Ethical approval The study protocol was determined as a non-human research project that involves public health activity by the Naval Medical Research Command Institutional Review Board, and, for this reason, no ethical review is required. CRediT authorship contribution statement Rania Nada: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Resources, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing, Project administration, Funding acquisition. Hanan El Mohammady: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Writing - review & editing. Isabelle Nakhla: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Writing - review & editing. Ismail Attia: Investigation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. Qasem Buhaibeh: Supervision, Project administration, Writing - review & editing. Ali Al Waleedi: Investigation, Project administration, Writing - review & editing. Waheed Al Bakhshi: Supervision, Investigation, Writing - review & editing. Yasser Bahshem: Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Project administration, Writing - review & editing. Disclaimer Some authors are military service members and employees of the U.S. Government. This work was prepared as part of their official duties. Title 17 U.S.C. §105 provides that “Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government”. Title 17 U.S.C. §101 defines a U.S. Government work as a work prepared by a military service member or employee of the U.S. Government as part of that person’s official duties. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of War, nor the U.S. Government. Funding This work was supported by funding from the U.S. Armed Forces 10.13039/100018696Health Surveillance Division, 10.13039/100008086Global Emerging Infections Surveillance (GEIS) Branch, ProMIS ID P0103_25_N3. Declaration of competing interests The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.