Nipah virus preparedness in a One Health framework: Implications for Europe Authors: Maciej Grzybek, Bartosz Mundt, Ravi Kant, Anna Bogacka Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractNipah virus (NiV) is a highly pathogenic zoonotic henipavirus associated with severe neurological and respiratory disease and a high case fatality rate. Although outbreaks have remained geographically limited, recurrent events in South and Southeast Asia highlight the persistent risk posed by NiV and the potential global consequences of delayed detection and response. In non-endemic regions such as Europe, preparedness presents distinct challenges due to the rarity of cases, stringent biosafety requirements, and reliance on specialised diagnostic and clinical capacities that may degrade without routine use.This narrative review synthesises evidence from peer-reviewed literature and international public health agency reports on NiV biology, epidemiology, diagnostics, treatment, and preparedness, with a particular focus on operational implications for Europe within a One Health framework. We examine determinants of zoonotic spillover and limited human-to-human transmission, outline constraints across the diagnostic pathway including specimen handling and biosafety requirements and summarise current approaches to clinical management and investigational medical countermeasures. Attention is given to how these factors inform risk assessment, diagnostic readiness, and clinical recognition in non-endemic health systems.Preparedness for NiV should be conceptualised as a continuous process of biomonitoring and response rather than an episodic emergency activity. Integrated surveillance across human, animal, and environmental domains is essential for early identification of spillover signals and proportionate public health action. For Europe, sustained preparedness depends on maintaining functional capacity across laboratory networks, clinical services, and public health systems, supported by cross-border coordination and the systematic integration of One Health intelligence.Keywords: Nipah virus, One Health, Zoonotic spillover, Biosafety and diagnostics, Outbreak preparedness, Europe Introduction Nipah virus (NiV) is a highly pathogenic zoonotic, negative-sense single-stranded RNA virus belonging to the genus Henipavirus (family Paramyxoviridae) [1]. Henipaviruses are characterised by a broad host range, efficient replication in respiratory and neural tissues, and the capacity to cause severe human disease, including encephalitis and acute respiratory illness, with a high case fatality rate [2]. NiV is classified as a risk group 4 agent [3], reflecting both the severity of associated disease and the stringent biosafety requirements that complicate diagnostic surge capacity, research activities, and clinical preparedness outside specialised high-containment facilities. At the molecular level, NiV entry is mediated by the viral attachment (G) and fusion (F) glycoproteins. The G protein binds ephrin-B2 and ephrin-B3 receptors, highly conserved ligands expressed on endothelial cells and neurons, contributing to the virus's vasculotropism and neuroinvasive potential [4]. These mechanisms underlie key clinical features such as systemic vasculitis, blood–brain barrier disruption, and encephalitis, and represent important targets for diagnostic assays and investigational medical countermeasures, including neutralising monoclonal antibodies and vaccine candidates directed against the G and F glycoproteins. Understanding these molecular interactions is therefore relevant for preparedness activities in specialised reference laboratories and research networks supporting diagnostics and countermeasure development. [5]. NiV is maintained in nature primarily in fruit bats of the family Pteropodidae, with extensive evidence supporting bats as the reservoir host across affected regions [6], [7]. Zoonotic spillover into humans occurs either directly, most notably through consumption of food products contaminated with bat excreta or saliva, or indirectly via intermediate hosts under specific ecological and agricultural conditions. Human infection may follow exposure to contaminated fruit or sap, contact with infected animals, or close contact with infected individuals. Person-to-person transmission, particularly in healthcare and household settings, underscores the risk that delayed recognition and suboptimal infection prevention, and control (IPC) measures can amplify outbreaks, even in the absence of sustained community transmission. [1], [3]. Recent reports of NiV cases in India during late 2025 and early 2026, based on publicly available outbreak notifications from the World Health Organization and regional surveillance reports (as of January 2026), illustrate how geographically limited outbreaks can nonetheless trigger cross-border responses and heightened public concern [8], [9], [10]. This high-consequence, low-frequency risk profile highlights the importance of One Health preparedness, in which effective interventions often occur upstream of clinical care at the human–animal–environment interface. Targeted surveillance, risk communication, and timely diagnostics, integrated with field epidemiology, are critical components of early detection and proportionate response strategies [11]. From a European perspective, NiV represents a stress test for health systems largely optimised for common respiratory pathogens but infrequently challenged by rare, high fatality zoonoses requiring specialised biosafety workflows, high-level isolation capacity, and coordinated animal and environmental surveillance [11]. Diagnostic preparedness is not determined solely by assay availability; safe specimen handling, validated inactivation procedures, and trained personnel are essential enabling factors and may become critical bottlenecks during alert-driven surges. Furthermore, early warning signals may emerge outside the healthcare sector, including changes in bat ecology, agricultural practices, or food production systems, reinforcing the need for coordinated biomonitoring and cross-sectoral data sharing within a One Health framework [12]. For example, wildlife monitoring programmes tracking bat populations or migration patterns may provide early indications of ecological changes relevant to zoonotic spillover risk and therefore inform integrated One Health surveillance efforts in Europe [13]. The following sections examine i) NiV biology and transmission determinants relevant to zoonotic spillover and outbreak amplification; ii) epidemiology and outbreak patterns, with emphasis on nosocomial and household transmission; iii) diagnostic approaches and biosafety constraints across the testing pathway; iv) the evolving landscape of treatment options and investigational medical countermeasures; and v) a One Health preparedness framework for Europe linking wildlife and livestock monitoring, human clinical surveillance, laboratory networks, and hospital readiness. Methods This article was prepared as a narrative review of the scientific and public health literature on Nipah virus (NiV), with particular emphasis on preparedness implications for Europe within a One Health framework. Relevant publications were identified through targeted searches of PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar using combinations of the terms “Nipah virus”, “henipavirus”, “outbreak”, “epidemiology”, “diagnostics”, “biosafety”, “clinical management”, “preparedness”, and “One Health”. In addition to peer-reviewed articles, we reviewed technical documents and outbreak communications from international and regional public health agencies, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). The search focused primarily on literature published between 2000 and January 2026, while earlier landmark publications were included where necessary to provide virological, clinical, or epidemiological context. Sources were selected based on relevance to one or more of the following domains: virology and transmission, outbreak epidemiology, laboratory diagnosis, biosafety and specimen referral, clinical management, investigational countermeasures, and One Health preparedness. Given the narrative nature of the review, the objective was not exhaustive systematic retrieval but rather the synthesis of evidence and operational insights most relevant to preparedness planning in non-endemic settings, particularly Europe. The included evidence encompassed outbreak investigations, clinical reports and reviews, diagnostic and biosafety studies, and publications relating to preparedness systems and medical countermeasures. Only publications available in English were included. Grey literature, including reports from international public health agencies (e.g., WHO and ECDC), was considered where directly relevant to preparedness and outbreak response. Conference abstracts and non-peer-reviewed preprints were not systematically included unless they provided essential contextual or technical information not available in peer-reviewed sources. Epidemiology of Nipah virus infections Since its recognition in the late 1990s, NiV has caused sporadic outbreaks characterised by marked heterogeneity in transmission routes, epidemiological context, and clinical presentation. Early outbreaks highlighted the role of intermediate hosts and agricultural amplification, whereas more recent events in South and Southeast Asia have predominantly reflected direct bat-to-human spillover, often accompanied by limited secondary transmission [14]. The World Health Organization estimates overall case-fatality rates ranging from approximately 40% to 75%, based on aggregated observations across multiple outbreaks and epidemiological settings, and these values should not be interpreted as a stable estimate for individual events [15].Outbreak investigations consistently identify fruit bats as the natural reservoir, with zoonotic spillover linked to behaviours, environmental conditions, and food production systems that increase contact between bats, domesticated animals, and humans [16]. In South Asia, exposures associated with consumption of contaminated food products and close contact with symptomatic patients have been repeatedly repeatedly documented. The incubation period is most reported as 4–14 days, although longer intervals of up to approximately 21–45 days have occasionally been documented [15]. These extended incubation periods have implications for contact monitoring strategies and cross-border risk assessment, particularly in non-endemic settings [17].Human-to-human transmission, while generally limited in duration and extent, has substantial operational implications, especially in healthcare settings. Delayed recognition of NiV infection has repeatedly resulted in small transmission clusters, typically involving healthcare workers, caregivers, or household contacts. Most documented clusters have been limited in size and context-specific, highlighting the importance of early case identification and infection prevention and control (IPC) measures [18]. Clinically, NiV infection spans a broad spectrum, from asymptomatic or mild illness to rapidly progressive encephalitis and severe respiratory disease with high fatality [19]. Early clinical manifestations are frequently non-specific, creating diagnostic uncertainty and increasing the likelihood of missed or delayed diagnosis unless exposure history is actively elicited and integrated into testing and isolation decision pathways triggers [20]. The temporal and geographic evolution of Nipah virus outbreaks since its discovery is summarised in Fig. 1, illustrating a shift from outbreaks dominated by animal-amplified transmission toward recurrent zoonotic spillover events with limited but operationally significant secondary transmission. This evolution underscores the growing importance of upstream surveillance and early-warning systems at the human-animal-environment interface as core components of NiV preparedness. From a preparedness perspective, this epidemiological shift has important implications for non-endemic regions such as Europe. Earlier outbreaks involving large-scale animal amplification produced distinct epidemiological signals and relatively rapid recognition. In contrast, recurrent spillover events associated with small clusters or isolated cases may initially resemble common infectious syndromes, particularly severe respiratory illness or encephalitis of unknown origin. For European health systems, this pattern implies that the most plausible risk scenario is not sustained community transmission but delayed recognition of a rare, imported case followed by limited secondary transmission in healthcare or household settings. Preparedness strategies must therefore prioritise early clinical suspicion, rapid diagnostic referral pathways, and strict IPC measures rather than large-scale outbreak response capacity. (See Fig. 2). Timeline of Nipah virus discovery and major outbreaks (1998–2026). Nipah virus was first identified during a pig-associated outbreak in Malaysia and Singapore in 1998–1999. Subsequent outbreaks have occurred primarily in South and Southeast Asia, with evolving epidemiological patterns including direct zoonotic spillover, animal amplification, and limited human-to-human transmission, particularly in healthcare and household settings. Events are colour-coded by dominant transmission context: orange denotes zoonotic spillover or animal amplification, blue indicates outbreaks with prominent human-to-human transmission, and grey represents sporadic or isolated cases. Icons illustrate the primary interfaces involved, including wildlife reservoirs (bat), intermediate animal hosts (pig, horse), and healthcare-associated transmission (hospital). The increasing frequency of recurrent outbreaks and sporadic cases in India since 2018 highlights the persistent re-emergence potential of Nipah virus and reinforces the need for sustained, long-term preparedness rather than episodic response strategies. Outbreak dates and transmission context classifications are based on published outbreak investigations, World Health Organization Disease Outbreak News reports, and related surveillance summaries cited in the reference list. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) Conceptual One Health surveillance framework for Nipah virus preparedness in Europe. Integrated surveillance across environmental drivers, animal reservoirs, and human clinical systems supports coordinated risk assessment in non-endemic regions. In the European context, these interactions are operationalised through established coordination mechanisms, including ECDC surveillance systems, cross-border laboratory networks and reference pathways, ERINHA-linked high-containment infrastructure, and One Health collaboration frameworks involving public health, veterinary, and environmental authorities. Depending on the signal detected, responses may include enhanced clinical vigilance, activation of laboratory referral pathways, reinforcement of IPC measures in healthcare settings, and targeted public health communication. For Europe, where NiV is not endemic, the principal risk arises from importation through international travel, with the potential for limited secondary transmission if case recognition is delayed or IPC measures are insufficient. Based on experience from previous outbreaks, the most plausible scenario would involve small healthcare- or household-associated clusters rather than sustained community transmission. Recent regional responses in Asia illustrate how even isolated events can rapidly trigger multi-country public health actions despite low absolute case numbers, underscoring the relevance of proactive preparedness in non-endemic regions [21]. Diagnostics of Nipah virus infection Laboratory diagnosis of NiV infection is shaped less by limitations of available assays than by the virus's biological characteristics, stringent biosafety requirements, and the complexity of the diagnostic referral pathway, particularly in non-endemic regions. NiV is a highly pathogenic, negative-sense RNA virus classified as a risk group 4 agent, and work involving infectious virus requires high-containment laboratory conditions, specifically biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) [22], [23]. These constraints substantially influence specimen handling, transport, and testing capacity, particularly in non-endemic regions where routine exposure to high-risk pathogens is uncommon. Diagnostic yield depends on specimen type, timing of collection relative to symptom onset, and pre-analytical handling. During the acute phase of infection, viral RNA may be detected by nucleic acid amplification tests in throat and nasal swabs [23], respiratory secretions, blood, urine, and cerebrospinal fluid [24]. In European clinical settings, respiratory samples and blood are typically the most practical specimens obtained during the initial evaluation of suspected cases, while cerebrospinal fluid may be collected when neurological involvement is suspected. As infection progresses, serological responses become increasingly informative: NiV-specific IgM antibodies are typically detectable during the early convalescent phase, followed by IgG seroconversion [22]. In fatal cases, postmortem histopathological examination with immunohistochemistry remains an important confirmatory tool. As an enveloped RNA virus, NiV is highly susceptible to degradation under suboptimal conditions, including temperature fluctuations, prolonged storage, repeated freeze–thaw cycles, and inappropriate transport media [25], [26]. Delays between specimen collection and processing can significantly reduce the sensitivity of molecular detection and increase the risk of false-negative results. In practice, the most vulnerable steps in referral pathways include prolonged transport times, disruptions in cold-chain maintenance, and repeated freeze–thaw cycles during specimen handling or storage, all of which may compromise RNA stability and diagnostic sensitivity. [27]. From an operational perspective, the diagnostic process can be conceptualised as an end-to-end pathway comprising several sequential control points: (i) clinical suspicion triggered by compatible symptoms and exposure history; (ii) appropriate specimen collection and biosafe packaging; (iii) validated specimen inactivation and pre-analytical handling; (iv) referral transport to a national or international reference laboratory; and (v) confirmatory molecular or serological testing with timely reporting of results. Failures at any step may delay diagnosis and increase the risk of secondary transmission. In European settings, the most vulnerable components of this pathway are often the early recognition stage, when NiV is not immediately suspected, and the specimen referral and transport stage, which may involve regulatory clearance, specialised couriers, and cross-border shipment to high-containment laboratories. Strengthening preparedness therefore requires coordinated protocols that integrate clinical triage systems, laboratory networks, and logistics infrastructure rather than focusing solely on assay availability. Biosafety considerations constitute a major operational constraint throughout the diagnostic pathway. While work involving infectious Nipah virus requires high-containment laboratory conditions (BSL-4), several diagnostic procedures can be performed outside BSL-4 laboratories following validated specimen inactivation protocols. In practice, molecular diagnostic steps such as RNA extraction and RT-PCR may be conducted in appropriately equipped biosafety laboratory class II (BSL-2) or biosafety laboratory class III (BSL-3) laboratories once viral inactivation has been confirmed, whereas virus isolation and neutralisation assays remain restricted to specialised high-containment facilities. [28]. Routine clinical diagnosis relies on molecular and serological assays performed on appropriately handled and inactivated specimens, frequently requiring referral to specialised national or international reference laboratories. Table 1 summarises the principal BSL-4 facilities in Europe capable of providing such reference support, illustrating their geographic distribution and the referral pathways available for suspected imported cases. Consequently, many hospital and regional laboratories are unable to initiate testing directly and depend on coordinated referral networks, underscoring the importance of preparedness planning beyond assay availibility. Table 1European BSL-4 laboratories with potential capacity to support diagnostics for Risk Group 4 pathogens, including Nipah virus.Table summarises European high-containment laboratories authorised to operate at BSL-4 or equivalent hazard category 4 conditions, based on publicly available documentation from the European Network of BSL-4 Laboratories and current membership information from the European Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic Agents (ERINHA). The facilities listed represent potential high-containment capacity that may support diagnostic confirmation or research activities. They do not necessarily constitute designated national diagnostic reference laboratories. Routine molecular testing may be performed in lower-containment laboratories following validated specimen inactivation procedures.CountryFacility / InstitutionCityContainment designationERINHA member*FranceLaboratoire P4 Jean Mérieux (Inserm)LyonBSL-4YesGermanyBernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical MedicineHamburgBSL-4NoGermanyPhilipps-Universität Marburg – Institute of VirologyMarburgBSL-4NoSwedenPublic Health Agency of SwedenSolnaBSL-4YesItalyINMI ‘L. Spallanzani’RomeBSL-4YesHungaryNational Public Health CentreBudapestBSL-4YesUnited KingdomUKHSA high-containment laboratories (Porton Down / London)Porton Down / LondonBSL-4YesNetherlandsErasmus MCRotterdamBSL-4YesGermanyRobert Koch InstituteBerlinBSL-4 (opened post-2013)NoSwitzerlandSpiez LaboratorySpiezHazard category 3 & 4NoCzech RepublicBiological Defence Centre TěchonínTěchonínBSL-3 / BSL-4 capacityNoContainment designations may vary across countries and regulatory frameworks. “BSL-4” refers to biosafety level 4 laboratories designed for work with Risk Group 4 pathogens. “Hazard category 3 & 4” reflects national regulatory classifications used in some countries and may not directly correspond to standard BSL terminology. “BSL-3 / BSL-4 capacity” indicates facilities with high-containment infrastructure that may support work at different biosafety levels depending on the activity performed. *List cross-checked against European BSL-4 network publications and ERINHA membership. European BSL-4 laboratories with potential capacity to support diagnostics for Risk Group 4 pathogens, including Nipah virus.Table summarises European high-containment laboratories authorised to operate at BSL-4 or equivalent hazard category 4 conditions, based on publicly available documentation from the European Network of BSL-4 Laboratories and current membership information from the European Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic Agents (ERINHA). The facilities listed represent potential high-containment capacity that may support diagnostic confirmation or research activities. They do not necessarily constitute designated national diagnostic reference laboratories. Routine molecular testing may be performed in lower-containment laboratories following validated specimen inactivation procedures. Containment designations may vary across countries and regulatory frameworks. “BSL-4” refers to biosafety level 4 laboratories designed for work with Risk Group 4 pathogens. “Hazard category 3 & 4” reflects national regulatory classifications used in some countries and may not directly correspond to standard BSL terminology. “BSL-3 / BSL-4 capacity” indicates facilities with high-containment infrastructure that may support work at different biosafety levels depending on the activity performed. *List cross-checked against European BSL-4 network publications and ERINHA membership. European high-containment laboratories were identified using publicly available information from the European Network of BSL-4 Laboratories, the European Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic Agents (ERINHA), and institutional sources. Facilities were included if they operate BSL-4 laboratories or equivalent high-containment infrastructure capable of supporting work with Risk Group 4 pathogens. The table reflects potential capacity to support diagnostic confirmation or outbreak response activities, rather than a formal designation as national clinical reference laboratories. The listed facilities represent heterogeneous functions, including both laboratories providing diagnostic reference support and those primarily engaged in research or preparedness activities. In practical terms, suspected NiV cases in Europe would typically be managed through tiered laboratory referral systems. Initial clinical specimens are collected in hospital settings and may undergo preliminary processing, including validated inactivation procedures, in hospital or regional laboratories operating at biosafety level 2 or 3. Subsequent molecular testing or confirmatory analysis is then coordinated through designated national reference laboratories, which maintain the capacity to perform specialised diagnostics and interface with international high-containment facilities when required. In countries without domestic BSL-4 capacity, specimens may be referred to partner laboratories within established European networks, such as those coordinated through ECDC and ERINHA. The effectiveness of these systems depends on clearly defined referral protocols, pre-approved specimen transport arrangements, and communication channels linking clinicians, laboratory specialists, and public health authorities. From a preparedness perspective, maintaining functional diagnostic capacity requires clearly defined roles across different laboratory levels. Regional or hospital laboratories should be capable of recognising suspect cases, implementing biosafe specimen handling procedures, initiating diagnostic referral, and, where validated protocols exist, performing molecular testing on inactivated material. National reference laboratories provide confirmatory diagnostics, assay validation, and coordination of external laboratory networks, while high-containment BSL-4 facilities support virus isolation, neutralisation assays, and advanced research activities. Clearly delineating these roles helps ensure that rare high-consequence pathogens can be managed effectively even in countries without domestic high-containment infrastructure. Transport of NiV-suspected specimens is tightly regulated due to the high-consequence nature of the pathogen. Compliance with international regulations for infectious substances, including specialised packaging requirements and the use of approved carriers, can introduce logistical delays, particularly when cases arise outside major urban centres or when cross-border shipment is required. In the European context, access to appropriate reference laboratories may necessitate international transport, extending turnaround times and complicating cold-chain maintenance [29]. Compliance with international regulations for infectious substances, including specialised packaging requirements and the use of approved carriers, can introduce logistical delays. In practice, turnaround times may be extended by administrative clearance procedures, the availability of specialised transport services, and cross-border shipment requirements, particularly when referral to international high-containment laboratories is necessary. These factors, together with the need to maintain cold-chain integrity, represent important operational constraints for timely diagnosis in non-endemic settings. Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) remains the primary method for diagnosing acute NiV infection because of its high analytical sensitivity and specificity under optimal conditions [23]. Serological assays, particularly IgM enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays, provide important complementary information during later stages of infection and in epidemiological investigations [23]. Molecular assays may be affected by genomic variation in primer or probe target regions. However, this currently represents a limited operational concern for routine diagnostics and is primarily relevant for ongoing assay validation and preparedness activities. Overall, diagnostic pathways for NiVmay be vulnerable to single-point failures, including delays in specimen referral, limited access to high-containment laboratories, and shortages of trained personnel. From a One Health perspective, strengthening diagnostic preparedness requires sustained investment in integrated systems that support timely detection across human, animal, and environmental domains, rather than reliance on isolated laboratory capacities. To illustrate how these components interact in practice, a plausible European scenario may involve a returning traveller presenting with acute encephalitis and respiratory symptoms following travel to South Asia. Initial assessment in an emergency department triggers suspicion based on exposure history, leading to immediate isolation and activation of IPC protocols. Diagnostic specimens are collected and, following validated inactivation procedures in a BSL-2 or BSL-3 laboratory, referred through national laboratory networks to a designated reference centre. Where domestic high-containment capacity is unavailable, cross-border referral to a European partner laboratory may be initiated through established networks (e.g., ECDC-coordinated systems or ERINHA-linked facilities). Concurrently, public health authorities initiate contact tracing and risk assessment, while clinical management proceeds in a high-level isolation unit. This scenario highlights that preparedness depends not on any single component, but on the coordinated functioning of clinical recognition, laboratory referral pathways, IPC measures, and cross-border communication systems within the European health security framework. Treatment and clinical management There is currently no licensed antiviral therapy or human vaccine approved for the treatment or prevention of NiV infection [23], [30]. Clinical management, therefore, remains largely supportive, with outcomes strongly influenced by early recognition, rapid initiation of appropriate care, and rigorous IPC measures [31]. Observational data from outbreak settings indicate that timely access to intensive supportive care may be associated with improved survival, although these findings are subject to confounding factors, including differences in disease severity and access to healthcare. [31].NiV infection most commonly presents as acute encephalitis, severe respiratory disease, or a combination of both, often following a short prodromal phase characterised by non-specific febrile illness, headache, and myalgia [32], [33]. Clinical deterioration may be rapid, underscoring the importance of maintaining a high index of suspicion in patients with compatible exposure histories. Early clinical management priorities prompt isolation of suspected cases, comprehensive neurological assessment, and close monitoring for signs of raised intracranial pressure, seizures, and altered consciousness. Seizure control, airway protection, and haemodynamic stabilisation are central components of early care [31]. Respiratory involvement ranges from mild pneumonia to fulminant acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), requiring escalating levels of oxygen therapy and, in severe cases, invasive mechanical ventilation [31], [34]. Supportive management includes lung-protective ventilation strategies and careful fluid management, balanced against the need to maintain cerebral perfusion in patients with concurrent neurological disease. Multiorgan dysfunction has been reported in severe cases, necessitating coordinated critical care support [3]. Overall, clinical management of Nipah virus infection largely follows established principles for the treatment of viral encephalitis and acute respiratory distress syndrome. The primary added value in the context of NiV lies in early recognition and the timely implementation of IPC measures to prevent secondary transmission in healthcare settings. Given the documented potential for nosocomial transmission, particularly during delayed diagnosis, clinical care must be delivered within strict IPC frameworks. This includes the appropriate use of personal protective equipment, rapid triage and cohorting of suspected cases, and minimisation of aerosol-generating procedures where possible. Clear clinical pathways linking frontline clinicians with infection control teams and reference laboratories are essential to reduce secondary transmission while ensuring timely escalation of care. Investigational therapeutics and medical countermeasures Several investigational medical countermeasures have been evaluated in preclinical models and limited clinical settings. The most advanced candidate is the fully human monoclonal antibody m102.4, which targets the henipavirus attachment (G) glycoprotein and blocks viral entry [35]. This antibody has demonstrated protective efficacy in multiple animal models and has been administered to a small number of humans cases under compassionate use and early-phase clinical evaluation. However, clinical data remain extremely limited and are not derived from controlled efficacy studies. Available evidence suggests an acceptable safety and tolerability profile [35], although conclusions are constrained by the limited number of treated individuals and the absence of systematic clinical trials. More broadly, the evidence base for NiV countermeasures remains restricted by the sporadic, geographically clustered, and unpredictable nature of outbreaks. Additional countermeasures, including vaccine candidates, antiviral agents, and other immunotherapeutics, are in various stages of development [36], [37], with most candidates remaining in preclinical or early clinical phases and only limited progression to advanced clinical evaluation. Their clinical evaluation is constrained by the low incidence of disease and the rapid containment of many outbreaks, which limit opportunities for conventional randomised controlled trials. These challenges underscore the need for alternative evaluation strategies, particularly in non-endemic settings where imported cases may represent the only opportunity to collect clinical evidence, including adaptive trial designs, pre-approved observational protocols, and regulatory mechanisms that enable the rapid deployment and systematic assessment of investigational products during outbreak responses. For non-endemic regions such as Europe, preparedness for the potential use of investigational countermeasures requires advance regulatory and logistical planning. Access to experimental therapeutics or vaccines may depend on mechanisms such as compassionate use, emergency authorisation pathways, or participation in international research protocols. Establishing pre-approved ethical and regulatory frameworks can facilitate rapid decision-making if imported cases occur. Given the rarity and unpredictability of NiV infections in Europe, conventional randomised clinical trials are unlikely to be feasible. Instead, preparedness efforts may focus on pre-approved observational study protocols, adaptive trial platforms, and international data-sharing arrangements, allowing systematic collection of clinical and virological data even during isolated cases or small clusters. These mechanisms would help ensure that rare events contribute to the global evidence base for NiV countermeasures while maintaining high standards of clinical governance and patient safety. Clinical and hospital preparedness as a One Health priority Effective treatment of NiV infection cannot be separated from broader health-system preparedness [38]. In non-endemic regions, including Europe, clinical readiness should be defined operationally rather than nominally, that is, by the ability to translate suspicion into action under time pressure and high uncertainty. This includes timely access to high-level isolation facilities, intensive care unit surge capacity for rare high-consequence pathogens, and multidisciplinary clinical teams trained to manage severe viral encephalitis and respiratory failure under high-biosafety conditions. Equally critical are functional systems that enable the rapid dissemination of clinical guidance, cross-border information sharing, and coordination between emergency departments, reference laboratories, IPC teams, and public health authorities [39]. Experience from NiV outbreaks demonstrates that failures most often occur at system interfaces, such as delayed recognition, slow laboratory confirmation, or weak linkage between clinical care and contact tracing, for example delayed referral of diagnostic specimens to reference laboratories or delayed escalation of IPC measures following initial patient presentation, rather than within individual clinical units [33], [40]. These interface failures can amplify transmission risk and delay proportionate response even when clinical expertise and diagnostic tools are theoretically available. From a One Health perspective, hospital preparedness should therefore be embedded within integrated preparedness architectures that connect clinical services with laboratory networks, public health surveillance, and animal and environmental monitoring systems. Sustained readiness depends not only on infrastructure and protocols, but also on regular training, simulation exercises, and communication pathways that preserve institutional memory for rare but high-impact zoonotic threats, drawing on expert guidance and outbreak experience from endemic regions. Maintaining competency for rare high-consequence pathogens requires regular proficiency testing, simulation exercises, and multidisciplinary training programmes involving clinicians, laboratory personnel, infection prevention specialists, and public health authorities. Periodic inter-laboratory exercises coordinated at national or European levels can test referral pathways, specimen transport procedures, and diagnostic workflows under simulated outbreak conditions. Such activities help preserve institutional memory and ensure that operational procedures remain functional despite the long intervals between actual cases. Continuous biomonitoring in a One Health framework Prevention and early containment of NiV infection depend on effective management of interfaces at the human–animal–environment nexus, including bat–human food pathways, bat–livestock interactions, and human-to-human transmission in healthcare and household settings [41], [42]. International guidance frames NiV control around integrated surveillance, laboratory capacity, clinical management, IPC, and community engagement, all of which align directly with a One Health approach when implemented across sectors [43]. NiV is characterised by episodic zoonotic spillover followed by limited secondary transmission [44]. This epidemiological profile favours preparedness strategies based on continuous, low-intensity monitoring rather than exclusively reactive responses to recognised outbreaks [45]. In this context, NiV surveillance can be conceptualised as a multi-domain One Health biomonitoring system, in which signals may emerge from human, animal, or environmental surveillance streams and require coordinated interpretation. This approach does not introduce a new surveillance framework but rather adapts existing One Health concepts to the operational realities of non-endemic settings such as Europe, where preparedness depends on maintaining coordinated surveillance, diagnostic readiness, and response capacity despite the rarity of cases. An effective One Health biomonitoring framework integrates three interdependent surveillance streams. Human surveillance combines event-based and sentinel approaches to support early case recognition; in clinical settings, predefined trigger criteria, such as acute encephalitis or severe respiratory disease in individuals with relevant exposure or travel history, prompt isolation, diagnostic referral, and public health notification [43]. Animal surveillance provides contextual information on viral circulation in reservoir and interface species, particularly fruit bats of the genus Pteropus, as well as relevant livestock populations [1], [43]. Environmental and behavioural surveillance addresses upstream drivers of spillover risk, including food handling practices, land-use change, and ecological disturbance for example through wildlife monitoring of bat populations and migration patterns or surveillance of imported food products that may be associated with zoonotic transmission pathways. Although these approaches do not predict outbreaks, they support risk stratification and the prioritisation of surveillance and preparedness activities [43]. In operational terms, effective One Health surveillance depends not only on monitoring these domains independently but also on the integration and interpretation of signals across sectors. For example, reports of unusual morbidity in bat populations, changes in bat migration or feeding behaviour near agricultural areas, or detection of henipavirus-related sequences in wildlife surveillance programmes may prompt heightened vigilance within human clinical surveillance systems. Similarly, clusters of unexplained encephalitis or severe respiratory illness in returning travellers may trigger targeted epidemiological investigations and reinforce diagnostic readiness within laboratory networks. In Europe, where NiV is not endemic, these signals would most likely lead to graduated preparedness responses, such as temporary enhancement of syndromic surveillance, reinforcement of laboratory referral readiness, or targeted risk communication, rather than large-scale outbreak interventions. In Europe, these surveillance streams are supported by established coordination mechanisms, including ECDC event-based surveillance systems, national and cross-border laboratory networks, ERINHA-linked infrastructure, and integrated One Health platforms involving veterinary and environmental monitoring. Preparedness for Europe in a non-endemic setting Because documented Nipah virus events in Europe have been extremely rare, many preparedness recommendations for non-endemic settings are based on expert consensus, risk-informed public health principles, and extrapolation from outbreak experience in endemic regions, rather than on high-level empirical evidence derived from European settings. Although NiV is not endemic in Europe, preparedness remains essential due to the risk of importation and the potential for limited secondary transmission [46]. Sustained readiness in non-endemic settings is likely to depend on maintaining specialised diagnostic, clinical, and biosafety capabilities that tend to degrade without routine use. Maintaining functional readiness requires regular proficiency testing and simulation exercises conducted at defined intervals (e.g., annually or periodically), even in the absence of cases. Regular proficiency testing, inter-laboratory exercises, and clearly defined cross-border referral pathways are therefore critical to preserve functional capacity. European preparedness can be structured around five interrelated pillars: laboratory network readiness; clinical recognition and isolation capacity; IPC preparedness; access to investigational countermeasures and trial readiness; and One Health intelligence and communication [47], [48]. These pillars are not intended to replace existing European preparedness frameworks but rather to operationalise and integrate them within a coherent structure tailored to non-endemic settings. They align with established European mechanisms, including ECDC-coordinated surveillance and laboratory networks, the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), the European Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic Agents (ERINHA), and relevant wildlife and environmental surveillance initiatives (e.g., EUROBATS and EFSA-linked systems). Together, these elements support a coordinated and proportionate response framework appropriate for a low-incidence but high-consequence risk environment (Box 1). Operational One Health preparedness priorities for Nipah virus in non-endemic European settings. Preparedness for Nipah virus (NiV) in Europe requires the sustained maintenance of specialised capabilities appropriate for a rare but high-consequence zoonotic pathogen. Key operational priorities include: •Laboratory network readiness: Designated national and cross-border reference pathways supported by validated specimen handling procedures, pre-approved specimen transport arrangements, and routine inter-laboratory proficiency testing to ensure that referral systems remain functional despite the rarity of cases, for example through periodic simulation exercises of specimen referral from peripheral hospitals to national or international reference laboratories, including packaging, documentation, and transport logistics. These activities are supported by European laboratory coordination mechanisms, including ECDC reference laboratory networks and ERINHA-linked high-containment facilities. Laboratory network readiness: Designated national and cross-border reference pathways supported by validated specimen handling procedures, pre-approved specimen transport arrangements, and routine inter-laboratory proficiency testing to ensure that referral systems remain functional despite the rarity of cases, for example through periodic simulation exercises of specimen referral from peripheral hospitals to national or international reference laboratories, including packaging, documentation, and transport logistics. These activities are supported by European laboratory coordination mechanisms, including ECDC reference laboratory networks and ERINHA-linked high-containment facilities. •Clinical recognition and isolation capacity: Standardised triage criteria for severe neurological or respiratory syndromes with relevant exposure or travel history, linked to pre-identified high-level isolation facilities and supported by periodic clinical simulation exercises testing triage, isolation, and escalation procedures. In Europe, such capacities are typically embedded within nationally designated high-level isolation units coordinated through EU preparedness frameworks. Clinical recognition and isolation capacity: Standardised triage criteria for severe neurological or respiratory syndromes with relevant exposure or travel history, linked to pre-identified high-level isolation facilities and supported by periodic clinical simulation exercises testing triage, isolation, and escalation procedures. In Europe, such capacities are typically embedded within nationally designated high-level isolation units coordinated through EU preparedness frameworks. •Infection prevention and control preparedness: Competency-based training in personal protective equipment, regular drills for aerosol-generating procedures, and occupational health systems for monitoring exposed healthcare workers. These measures are aligned with ECDC guidance and national IPC frameworks for high-consequence infectious diseases. Infection prevention and control preparedness: Competency-based training in personal protective equipment, regular drills for aerosol-generating procedures, and occupational health systems for monitoring exposed healthcare workers. These measures are aligned with ECDC guidance and national IPC frameworks for high-consequence infectious diseases. •Countermeasure access and trial readiness: Pre-negotiated ethical and regulatory frameworks enabling rapid access to investigational therapeutics and timely activation of adaptive or observational clinical study protocols during outbreak responses for example through pre-approved protocols that can be activated upon confirmation of a suspected case and integrated into international data-sharing platforms. At the European level, these processes may be supported by HERA and related regulatory coordination mechanisms for medical countermeasures. Countermeasure access and trial readiness: Pre-negotiated ethical and regulatory frameworks enabling rapid access to investigational therapeutics and timely activation of adaptive or observational clinical study protocols during outbreak responses for example through pre-approved protocols that can be activated upon confirmation of a suspected case and integrated into international data-sharing platforms. At the European level, these processes may be supported by HERA and related regulatory coordination mechanisms for medical countermeasures. •One Health intelligence and communication: Structured coordination mechanisms across public health, veterinary, wildlife, environmental, and food safety sectors, supported by proportionate, evidence-based risk communication. This pillar builds on existing European One Health coordination structures, including EFSA-linked surveillance systems and wildlife monitoring initiatives such as EUROBATS. One Health intelligence and communication: Structured coordination mechanisms across public health, veterinary, wildlife, environmental, and food safety sectors, supported by proportionate, evidence-based risk communication. This pillar builds on existing European One Health coordination structures, including EFSA-linked surveillance systems and wildlife monitoring initiatives such as EUROBATS. In this context, each pillar can be interpreted as a functional interface within existing European preparedness architectures, linking clinical systems, laboratory networks, public health coordination, and cross-sectoral One Health surveillance. The conceptual framework presented in this review is not intended to replace existing international or European preparedness systems, but rather to integrate and operationalise them within a unified One Health perspective tailored to non-endemic settings. Organisations such as the World Health Organization, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority provide comprehensive guidance on surveillance, laboratory preparedness, and outbreak response. However, these components are typically described within sector-specific or functional domains. The present framework contributes by explicitly linking these elements into an end-to-end operational model that emphasises system interfaces, cross-sectoral signal integration, and the practical challenges of maintaining readiness for rare, high-consequence pathogens in Europe. This integrative approach is particularly relevant for pathogens such as Nipah virus, where preparedness depends on coordination across systems that are only intermittently activated in routine practice. Conclusions Nipah virus represents a rare but potentially high-impact zoonotic threat for Europe. Preparedness in non-endemic regions depends less on outbreak response capacity than on maintaining integrated systems capable of recognising and managing rare, imported infections. Several operational priorities emerge. First, laboratory networks must maintain functional referral pathways for high-consequence pathogens, supported by validated specimen handling procedures and regular proficiency testing. Second, hospitals require clinical protocols that link early suspicion of severe encephalitis or respiratory disease with rapid isolation and diagnostic referral. Third, infection prevention and control preparedness remains critical to prevent secondary transmission in healthcare settings. Fourth, regulatory and research frameworks should enable rapid access to investigational countermeasures and systematic data collection during rare cases. Finally, sustained One Health surveillance integrating human, animal, and environmental signals is essential for early risk detection and proportionate public health response. CRediT authorship contribution statement Conceptualisation: MG. (Developing the framework or ideas for the article, defining the main topic and structure of the review) Methodology: MG, AB. (Designing the methodology for the literature review, selecting inclusion/exclusion criteria) Investigation: MG, BM, RK, AB. (Conducting the research, collecting and reviewing relevant literature) Writing – Original Draft: MG, AB, RK, BM. (Writing the first draft of the review article) Writing – Review & Editing: MG, AB. (Reviewing and revising the article critically for important intellectual content) Visualisation: MG. (Creating figures, tables, or any graphical representation of data in the review) Supervision: MG. (Providing guidance and oversight, ensuring the integrity of the entire project) Funding acquisition: N/A. (Securing financial support for the project, if applicable) Project administration: MG, AB. (Managing the planning, execution, and coordination of the project) Consent for publication Not applicable. Funding Not applied. Declaration of competing interest The authors declare no conflict of interest. Data availability No data was used for the research described in the article. References Associated Data Data Availability Statement No data was used for the research described in the article.