Analyzing governance of a sub-national health insurance scheme for providing universal health care and better social health protection performance through the lenses of the principal-agent theory in Anambra state Authors: Uchenna Ezenwaka, Simeon Onyemaechi Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractBackgroundHealth system governance plays a crucial role in the performance of health reforms. In Nigeria, recent reforms like the decentralization of social health insurance to sub-national levels, aimed at improving access to services and financial risk protection, established Anambra State Health Insurance Scheme (ASHIS). This study analysed governance factors and practices influencing the effective implementation of ASHIS, focusing on principal-agent relationships among actors towards better social health protection performance and attainment of universal health care in Anambra state, Nigeria.MethodsThe study adopted a descriptive qualitative design to explore governance factors and practices influencing the implementation of ASHIS. Data were collected from three categories of actors - policymakers (n = 10) and health care providers (HCPs) (n = 10) through in-depth interviews, then focus-group discussions (n = 10) with 67 health insurance enrollees. Data were analyzed using a thematic analysis approach, and the principal-agent theory was adapted for data synthesis.ResultsWithin the policymakers-clients sphere, there were positive assertions on responsiveness of the health insurance manager (as agent) on enrollee’s (as principal) needs, preferences and demands. There are established mechanisms for feedback from enrollees on service delivery, including round-the-clock customer care lines, weekly radio phone-in programs, random health facility visits, and annual town hall meetings. In the policymakers-health care provider (HCPs) sphere, the respondents stated that the insurance managers provide policies, and regulatory documents including operational guidelines, service level agreement, and resources for efficient and effective performance of the scheme. Respondents noted that HCPs as the agents deliver contracted services and instructions to their principal. However, some HCPs default through provider-induced moral hazard, and information asymmetry on matters like adequacy of provider payment mechanisms due to conflicting interests. Within the HCPs-clients sphere, while some respondents claimed that the agent uses enrollee’s (principal) inputs and oversight for improving service delivery, others rebutted the claim.ConclusionsThe study revealed series of governance practices supportive of progress, including the availability of regulatory policies/guidelines, feedback mechanisms and responsiveness to enrollee’s demands. Conversely, some disconnects in the principal-agent relationship were found. Addressing identified gaps will improve ASHIS’ performance and accelerate progress towards attaining UHC in Anambra state, Nigeria.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12913-026-14563-6.Keywords: Anambra State Health Insurance Scheme, Governance, Health Insurance, Nigeria, Principal-agent Relationship Background Over the past three decades, global health discussions have been dominated by policies that contribute to achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC)- defined as all people should have access to quality health services when and where they need them, without financial hardship [1–3]. High out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) has been reported to be a major barrier to achieving UHC particularly, in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) [4–6]. Studies have revealed that health insurance programs including social health insurance (SHI) are popular strategy being used by LMICs in accelerating progress towards the achievement of UHC [3, 7]. Hence, the implementation of SHI is essential to providing equitable access to quality healthcare towards achieving UHC in Nigeria. However, achieving the goal of universal health care through increasing coverage and implementation of health insurance requires good governance for social health protection performance [8, 9]. Good governance requires building an effective, accountable, and inclusive institution within a system [3, 10]. The relationship between governance and the health system is multifaceted, as there exists an interconnectedness of the health sector with the wider public policies and effectiveness of various organizations [8]. In the context of a health system, governance has been theorized in various ways [11], including a system for representing and engaging citizens; power and organizational authority; accountability mechanisms; political stability; ownership; transparency and; the rule of law [8, 9, 11]. It has also been explained by how public policies are formulated and implemented, how oversight and regulatory functions are developed and executed, and the built-in accountability mechanisms of all relevant actors within a health system [12, 13] for better performance. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), health systems governance is defined as ‘ensuring strategic policy frameworks exist and are combined with effective oversight, the provision of appropriate regulations, coalition-building, attention to system design, and accountability’ [12]. From this perspective, the authors, therefore, argue that a good health system governance entails effective leadership coordination of all resources and actors/stakeholders (policymakers, program implementers, civil society organizations (CSOs), private and public health providers, and citizens) involved in the implementation of healthcare services and programs including health insurance scheme. Studies show that good governance is imperative for the successful operationalization and effective implementation of health financing mechanisms [14, 15]. Evidence from countries indicate that governance remains a driver of success in achieving major progress in health and access to care relative to citizens’ level of wealth [16, 17]. However, there is some lucidity on the specific governance aspects, which are vital for a health insurance scheme in Nigeria. Therefore, it is imperative to examine their implementation in relation to governance as the governance of health policies. One approach to analyzing health system governance is through the application of the principal–agent theory, which originates from the core assumption that there is divergence in the goals of the ‘principals and agents’ relationship [18, 19]. The theory stipulates that while ‘agents’ are able to maximize their interests at the expense of the ‘principals’ goals because they have better information than principals about what they do, ‘principals’ seek to increase their control over ‘agents’ without extensive efforts to overcome the information gaps [18, 19]. In applying principal-agent theory in health insurance, the health insurance agency (principal) contracts both public and private healthcare providers (HCPs) (agents) to provide healthcare services to health insurance clients/enrollees. Another relationship is between health insurance clients/enrollees as principals, who expect their agents (health insurance agency and HCPs) to provide them with health services by the HCPs. Enrollees have the right to receive accurate and timely information about their health insurance plan, including coverage, benefits, and costs, to select or change healthcare providers, and to make an informed decision about their medical treatment and the right to refuse treatment. The relationship commences when the ‘principal’ contracts the ‘agent’ to perform specified tasks for them. The principal in this relationship takes a backstage while the agent plays the active role of executing predetermined tasks on behalf of the principal. The agent in carrying out the tasks to the principal takes decisions and actions which have consequences for both the principal and the agent [20]. The principal–agent theory has been widely applied in the public sector, recognizing the complexity of relationships characterized by multiple principals, externalities, and a wide variety of administrative processes and contracts that connect principals and agents [21]. Exploring the principal-agent relationship beyond the reconciliation of goal divergence to consider the possibility that in certain situations the goals of principals and agents may converge, takes this expanded application further, in a direction that some have termed stewardship theory [22, 23]. The theory argues that stewardship- responsibility, accountability, transparency and responsiveness are essential for ensuring the sustainability, equity, and quality of the healthcare system [22]. In Nigeria, a sub-national social health insurance scheme, Anambra State Health Insurance Scheme (ASHIS) was established by law in 2016 [24], following the decentralization of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). ASHIS, therefore, became a consensus health financing mechanism to provide access to equitable and quality healthcare to the citizenry towards achieving the desired goal of reducing OOPE from 91.9% in 2017 to less than 40% by UHC year 2030 [25, 26]. The scheme was launched by the state government and its operation commenced in September 2018. The scheme is managed by Anambra State Health Insurance Agency (ASHIA) with the sole mandate of providing access to quality, affordable and efficient health services for its citizens [24, 25]. Membership of ASHIS is mandatory for all residents of Anambra state encompassing employees of both public and organized private sectors employing more than five personnel; employees in the informal sector and all vulnerable populations [24, 25]. The scheme is financed through government subsidy (general, earmarked taxes, and non-tax revenues), premiums (social security, payroll deductions, and private contributions) [23, 24], and other sources (donations, philanthropy etc.) [24–27]. The law established an equity fund to cater for vulnerable persons’ premiums. For the public sector, the employer pays 10% of the employee’s basic salary while the employee contributes 5 per cent of their basic salary. However, employers of the organized private sector may choose to pay the entire contribution for the employees. The state health insurance scheme law stipulates that the scheme operates a single pool. The provider payment mechanism is capitation for primary care and fee-for-service (FFS) for secondary and tertiary healthcare. A co-payment of 10 per cent on the cost of medicines prescribed for an enrollee is also made to the HCPs at the point of accessing care [24, 25]. The operational guideline described the essential benefit package of services covered by the scheme to include promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative healthcare which are provided at the primary and secondary levels of care. The operational guideline also specified gatekeeping mechanisms for addressing health insurance risks like adverse selection and moral hazard as well as a reporting or complaint system. Within the context of the principal-agent relationship, the scheme provides specific feedback mechanisms among the actors for informed decision-making towards better and more efficient service provision [24, 25]. However, the empirical literature related to the principal-agent relationship in the implementation of ASHIS in Nigeria remains limited. More so, it is not clear how the principals and agents participate in the governance of the scheme and delivery of services. Several studies have focused on governance issues affecting the implementation of health financing reforms in LMICs including health insurance schemes. These issues include weak institutional capacity, corruption, weak regulatory and health government policies, lack of transparency, and weak accountability [17, 28, 29]. However, there is a gap in the literature on governance structures and processes to better understand the relationship between healthcare insurance scheme actors to inform policy and practice decisions to improve healthcare services and outcomes, efficiency and accountability. The paper contributes to the literature on how governance structures influence the implementation of sub-national social health insurance schemes, aiming to enhance universal access to healthcare. Specifically, this paper analyses governance arrangements and practices influencing the effective implementation of the ASHIS in Nigeria, with a focus on principal-agent relationships and their implications for social health protection and UHC. The theoretical framework The Brinkerhoff and Bossert health governance framework (2008) (Fig. 1) was adapted to analyze principal-agent linkages [19] in the governance of ASHIS. The framework uses principal-agent theory to explain the governance relationships involving three categories of actors and elaborate on the interconnectedness among them that establish the pathways through which governance of a health system is operational. The study conceptual framework adapted from Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008) The first is state actors, which include politicians, policymakers and other bureaucratic public health sector officials like the health ministry and the social health insurance agency. The second category of actors constitute health service providers - public and private, who through the regulation of the social health insurance agency provide healthcare to the enrollees. The last set of actors are the clients/people, that is, the enrollees and civil society organization(s). These actors are linked and respond to each other through the health governance relationships illustrated in Fig. 1. The principal–agent relationships between these actors are instrumental to how the principle of governance assists in improving health systems performance and achievement of health system goals. The arrows in the figure describe the nature of the relationships existing among the actors. For enrollees to health insurance managers sphere, the key feature of the relationship is how the enrollees express their needs, preferences and demands to policymakers, health insurance managers and public officials. For the health insurance managers to enrollees, the overriding relationship is how responsive they are to the enrollees’ expressed needs, preferences and demands. For healthcare providers to state actors’ sphere, key governance relationships revolve around reporting, with respect to providing information for purposes of monitoring and accountability as well as lobbying to influence state health policy and practices. The state actors in turn use the information for regulatory and oversight functions. In the last sphere, enrollees to healthcare providers, the enrollees convey their needs and demands for services including their level of satisfaction directly to providers, who in turn offer a mix of quality services that satisfy those needs and demands [19]. Methods Study area and design This study was undertaken in Anambra State, southeast Nigeria. The population estimate of Anambra is 6 million inhabitants in 2022 with a population growth rate of 2.8 per cent [30]. Legislatively, the State is divided into three: Northern, Central and Southern senatorial districts. For administrative purposes, there are 21 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Anambra State. The state health system is structurally organized into primary, secondary and tertiary levels of care. ASHIA is responsible for managing the social health insurance scheme of the State. The provision of healthcare services under ASHIS is done at both private and public hospitals in rural and urban locations of Anambra State [31]. This was a descriptive cross-sectional qualitative study that employed an exploratory approach to gain an in-depth understanding of actors’ experiences in the governance of ASHIS. Study population and sampling The study population comprised policymakers and health insurance managers, ASHIS-accredited HCPs, and enrollees of ASHIS. The choice of these categories of respondents was to capture the actors based on the principal-agent linkage framework as described above. Policymakers who are not involved in decision-making on ASHIS and non-enrollees who also access services at the selected ASHIS-accredited health facilities were excluded. Eligible people who refused to give consent to be interviewed were also excluded. A multistage sampling of ASHIS-accredited HCPs was adopted in the study. In the first stage, the State was stratified into three senatorial districts. Then, the simple random sampling (SRS) method was used in two senatorial districts. In the third stage, the SRS method was used to select four (4) LGAs (two (2) per senatorial district) comprising one urban and one rural LGA to ensure representation of geographical locations. In the fourth stage, we purposively selected ten (10 out 167) facilities from an updated list of ASHIS-accredited health facilities from the selected four LGAs based on facilities that have many enrollees (above 500), facility geographical locations (five urban and five rural) and facility ownership (five public and five private) to ensure adequate and diverse experience from the respondents. At the last stage, the respondents, facility heads – the Chief Medical Director (CMDs)/Medical Directors (MD) and the enrollees of the selected health facilities were purposively selected based on their roles in the health facilities and those accessing healthcare at the time of data collection respectively. For the state policymakers, the study purposively selected all the relevant ASHIS policy/decision makers including the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Technical Assistant to the State Governor on Health Insurance, Heads of the Department of - Marketing and Business Development; Planning, Research and Statistics; Administration and Human Resource; Accounts Finance and Internal Audit; Information, Communication and Technology and; Health Services Standards and Quality and Control and; Desk Officers at the selected LGAs. Data collection Data collection was done using a pretested in-depth interview (IDI) and focus group discussion (FGD) guides developed by the researchers between May and June 2022. The guides explored information on how enrollees express their preferences and needs, complaint mechanisms and to what extent are they being used, how responsive the health insurance managers are to their needs, how the insurance agency specifies and communicates the mode of operation of the providers, providers compliant with the agreed terms of services, enrollees satisfaction of services offered by the agency through the providers etc. (Supplementary material 1). The guides were validated by two expert health systems expert researchers to ensure internal consistency and transferability. Data were collected by ten (10) researchers experienced in qualitative study who were recruited and trained for 3 days and conducted the interviews over a period of 12 days. The researchers worked in pairs (a moderator/interviewer and a note-taker) to form five teams. The IDI respondents (policymakers and HCPs) were interviewed at convenient locations for respondents such as health facilities, and offices, while the FGDs participants (enrollees) were interviewed at a quiet place within the health facility. Interviews were conducted in English language for policymakers and HCPs, but in local language (Igbo) for enrollees to ensure cultural and linguistic sensitivity. The interviews/discussions were recorded, and hand-written notes were taken. An average time of 40 min was spent on each IDI and 55 min on each FGD. A total of 20 IDIs and 10 FGDs (7 female and 3 males) – comprising 7–9 participants per discussion group were conducted. Detailed characteristics of the respondents are summarized in Table 1. Table 1Background of the study respondentsVariablesIDI respondents(N = 20)FGD Participants (N = 67)n (%)n (%) Age group 21–3031–4041–5051–60Above 615 (25.0)5 (25.0)7 (35.0)2 (10.0)1 (5.0)7 (10.4)21 (31.3)17 (25.4)5 (7.5)17 (25.3) Sex MaleFemale13 (65.0)7 (13.0)24 (35.8)43 (64.2)Category of respondentPolicymakerHealthcare Provider10 (50.0)10 (50.0)- Educational qualification No formal education*PrimarySecondaryTertiary and above0 (0.0)0 (0.0)0 (0.0)20 (100.0)2 (3.0)13 (19.4)21 (31.3)31 (46.3) Occupation Civil/public servantsArtisansBusinessman/TraderRetired/pensionersUnemployed-42 (62.7)5 (3.0)4 (6.0)13 (19.4)3 (4.5) Marital status Married/widowSingle17 (75.0)3 (15.0)60 (89.6)7 (10.4) No of experience in current position (in years) 1–23–4Above 53 (15.0)11 (55.0)6 (30.0)- Duration of accessing healthcare via ASHIS (in years) Less 11–2Above 3-4 (6.0)25 (37.3)38 (56.7)* These participants were able to read and write, however they do not primary education certificate Background of the study respondents Age group 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 Above 61 5 (25.0) 5 (25.0) 7 (35.0) 2 (10.0) 1 (5.0) 7 (10.4) 21 (31.3) 17 (25.4) 5 (7.5) 17 (25.3) Sex Male Female 13 (65.0) 7 (13.0) 24 (35.8) 43 (64.2) Category of respondent Policymaker Healthcare Provider 10 (50.0) 10 (50.0) Educational qualification No formal education* Primary Secondary Tertiary and above 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 20 (100.0) 2 (3.0) 13 (19.4) 21 (31.3) 31 (46.3) Occupation Civil/public servants Artisans Businessman/Trader Retired/pensioners Unemployed 42 (62.7) 5 (3.0) 4 (6.0) 13 (19.4) 3 (4.5) Marital status Married/widow Single 17 (75.0) 3 (15.0) 60 (89.6) 7 (10.4) No of experience in current position (in years) 1–2 3–4 Above 5 3 (15.0) 11 (55.0) 6 (30.0) Duration of accessing healthcare via ASHIS (in years) Less 1 1–2 Above 3 4 (6.0) 25 (37.3) 38 (56.7) * These participants were able to read and write, however they do not primary education certificate Prior to the commencement of interviews/discussions, all participants were informed of the study objectives. Written consents were obtained from all participants having informed them of the purpose of the study, the benefits, and risks of participating in the study, their rights to voluntary participation and the confidentiality of data. Written consent was obtained from each participant before conducting the interviews/discussion. Permission to audio-record interviews/discussions was also obtained. Data analysis The study used a manual thematic analysis approach as described by Braun and Clarke (2017) [32]. All audio files were first transcribed in the language of the interview and those conducted in the local language (FGDs transcripts) were translated into English language to facilitate coding and theme identification as well as to enhance data quality and validation. Transcripts were compared with field notes to ensure completeness and accuracy. Two researchers (the first author and an independent researcher) read each transcript several times to gain a full insight into the text pattern. To ensure inter-coder reliability, texts were double reviewed and discrepancies resolved. After completing the coding, related codes were grouped into categories and the categories were grouped into themes, which were used in interpreting and reporting the findings. Texts were assigned to three major themes and six sub-themes deduced from the three spheres of the principal-agent linkages framework namely, (i) policymakers and citizens – Responsiveness and expression of voice; (ii) policymakers and providers - regulation, oversight, and resources and information and reporting; and (iii) providers and citizens - services and client power. Results Based on the principal-agent linkages model that guided the study analysis, the findings are presented below according to the different themes as described in the sub-section on data analysis. The findings on principal-agent relationship in the governance of ASHIS is summarized in Table 2. Table 2Summary of the findings on principal-agent relationship in the governance of ASHISThemesSub-themesSummary of key findingsPolicymaker and Citizen (Enrollee) SphereResponsivenessHealth insurance managers are responsive to enrollees’ needs and concerns. Mechanisms for providing feedback from enrollees include:- A 24/7 hours’ customer care phone number- Weekly Radio phone-in programme- Monthly Health Facility Quality Control Team visits- Desk office at all ASHIA-accredited health facilitiesExpression of VoiceEnrollees’ feedback is used for decision-making, however, some enrollees expressed dissatisfaction with their voices being heard or used for decision-making towards improving service deliveryPolicymaker and Provider SphereRegulation, Oversight, and ResourcesPolicy-makers (health insurance managers) provide regulatory policies including guidelines, and resources to HCPs. They provide oversight function/supports to HCPs through:- quarterly review meetings and trainings,- provision of financial and non-financial incentives- monthly monitoring and supervision visitsInformation and ReportingHCPs provide data for effective policy-making, but complain about provider payment mechanisms in relation to inadequacy of capitation to cover the cost of quality drugs required by the enrolleesProvider and Citizen (Enrollee) SphereServicesEnrollees can express concerns or expectations about service delivery directly to providers or through:- suggestion boxes- health facility management contact phone numbersHowever, some enrollees complained that the phone numbers are not always available/reachable.Client PowerHCPs claim to use enrollees’ information for decision-making, but some enrollees refute this.Enrollees’ opinions are divided on whether their voices are heard in decision-making processes. While some reported that HCPs solicit and consider their input, others claim that their voices are ignored. Summary of the findings on principal-agent relationship in the governance of ASHIS Health insurance managers are responsive to enrollees’ needs and concerns. Mechanisms for providing feedback from enrollees include: - A 24/7 hours’ customer care phone number - Weekly Radio phone-in programme - Monthly Health Facility Quality Control Team visits - Desk office at all ASHIA-accredited health facilities Policy-makers (health insurance managers) provide regulatory policies including guidelines, and resources to HCPs. They provide oversight function/supports to HCPs through: - quarterly review meetings and trainings, - provision of financial and non-financial incentives - monthly monitoring and supervision visits Enrollees can express concerns or expectations about service delivery directly to providers or through: - suggestion boxes - health facility management contact phone numbers However, some enrollees complained that the phone numbers are not always available/reachable. HCPs claim to use enrollees’ information for decision-making, but some enrollees refute this. Enrollees’ opinions are divided on whether their voices are heard in decision-making processes. While some reported that HCPs solicit and consider their input, others claim that their voices are ignored. Sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents The background characteristics of the respondents is shown in Table 1. Majority of the IDI respondents were within the age bracket of 41 to 50 years (35%) and most of them were male (65%). All the IDI respondents attended tertiary education. Most (65%) of the FGD participants were female and civil/public servants (63%). More than half (56%) have been accessing healthcare under ASHIS for more than 3 years. Principal-agent relationship in the governance of ASHIS Policymaker and citizen sphere Responsiveness From the state actors’ sphere, there were positive assertions on the responsiveness of the health insurance managers on enrollee’s needs, preferences and demands efficiently and effectively in the health insurance scheme. It was noted that a there is an established mechanism for enrollees to provide their feedback on their needs, preferences and concerns, enabling informed decision-making for better service delivery. These mechanisms include i) A 24/7 hours’ customer care phone number written on the enrollee’s care access card. In the word of a health insurance manager, “there is a complaint line on the back of their cards where they (enrollees) can call at any time…… I assure you that our lines are always busy, I can tell you that there is a fair usage of this complaint mechanism” (Policymaker, IDI 02). To further buttress the point, a health insurance manager said, “For instance, an enrollee went to a private hospital and had a cesarean section (CS) done on her and the facility in question told her that ASHIA does not cover CS which is not true and the husband went out and called our complaint line at the back of their ASHIA card, immediately I called the CMD of the hospital and asked that those patients be released immediately because this is a surgery for which ASHIA will pay you so what are you detaining them for. And the patient was discharged/released immediately.…” (Policymaker, IDI 01). Enrollees affirmed that the call line is always open for communication. An enrollee reported that she has “…not used or contacted ASHIA through their hotlines, but when I am at the hospital and people (other enrollees) call them, ASHIA does respond fast and well” (Enrollee, FGD, 08); ii) ASHIA desk officers (DO) office situated at most health facilities for enquires and complains by the enrollees; iii) Radio phone-in programme, done on weekly basis to allow enrollees to express their opinion on their experience with service delivery and functionality of the health insurance scheme. The radio programs are usually attended by top management of the health insurance scheme. One of the health insurance managers said, “live radio and people call-in to state their issues and we actually resolve these issues. So, by all these means people reach out to us” (Policymaker, IDI 08) and; iv) Monthly Health Facility Quality Control Team visits by the Department of Health Services Standards and Quality Control (HSSQC) of ASHIA whose primary responsibility is to maintain quality assurance at the accredited health facilities. The team embark on a monitoring exercise to ensure that service delivery is performed according to set standards. During the exercise, they also interact with the enrollees present in the facilities at the time of the visit, and decisions are taken based on the reports for improved service delivery. Expression of voice According to the state actors, enrollees’ feedbacks are used for decision-making. One of the structures for taking enrollees’ feedback is the annual townhall meeting mostly done on events to mark universal health coverage day (UHC). In the words of a policymaker, “We always mark UHC by bringing enrollees from different local government and facilities together, sit them down in event halls and interact with them. We also bring the HCPs to be in the same hall with them. The enrollees raise their complaints and we will address them accordingly” (Policymaker, IDI 01). A typical example where an enrollee’s feedback was used for decision-making, “When enrollees were complaining of unavailability of drugs in a particular hospital, ASHIA intervened and came up and engaged an outside pharmacy that is not affiliated with the hospitals, so when the hospitals don’t have drugs, the enrollees go to the pharmacy with the facility prescription form and pick the drugs and we pay them back at the end of the day” (Policymaker, IDI 02). However, some enrollees expressed displeasure with their voices being heard or used for decision-making. An enrollee narrated her experience thus, “I don’t think our voices are heard because I have also complained severally to ASHIA about the inadequacy of drugs in the pharmacy and nothing has been done to resolve it in this hospital. I was even told that they issue out drugs according to our salary earning level so we junior staff are not entitled to some drugs since then I just conditioned my mind that whenever I come to see a doctor, I will ask him to prescribe the drugs that he knows will work well for me that I don’t mind going to buy them outside the health facility because I know the pharmacy will never give me the drug” (Enrollee, FGD, 07). In addition, there is a CSO representative in the ASHIA board whose primary intent is to ensure enrollee’s common interests are represented and demands heard. The representative also advocates for the enrollee’s welfare during meetings with the managers of the scheme. Policymaker and provider sphere Regulation, oversight and resources Policymakers as principal, provides health insurance regulatory policies and procedures including health insurance law that specify objectives of the scheme; operational guidelines that specify procedures, standards and health benefit packages and; HCPs service level agreement that details the mode of operation of the scheme. They also exercise control and oversight functions relative to HCPs. HCPs in turn carry out the agreed-upon services and instructions of health policymakers. Compliance was reported to be monitored through monthly monitoring and supervision exercise done by the HSSQC department. According to a provider, “we did not suddenly get into a relationship with ASHIA, we signed a memorandum of understanding governing the business partnership between this agency and our facility. There is an operational guideline detailing roles and responsibilities of each partner” (Provider, IDI 17). In terms of resources and technical support, policymakers reported that there are financial and non-financial incentives for HCPs for better service delivery and health system performance. The financial incentive is prompt payment of capitation and FFS so that HCPs will have no reason not to render services to enrollees on account of unavailability of funds. A respondent said, “we pay regularly, so providers are sure of getting their money as and when due. And that is an incentive for them to adequately render quality services to the enrollees” (Policymaker, IDI 07). More so, some ASHIA-accredited HCPs reported to have used the funds to upgrade their health facilities to improve their services because they have the freedom to utilize their residual funds. A policy maker reported that “an ASHIA accredited public secondary built and equipped a big maxillofacial unit at the entrance of the hospital with the money gotten from the ASHIA. That project cost tens of millions of Naira”. A HCP alluded that, “The money ASHIA paid me was used for setting up a dental clinic and an ophthalmology unit in my hospital. I also know that some (hospitals) used the money to buy ambulances, others told me that they used theirs to install Solar energy in their facilities and that has changed the outlook of their hospitals” (Provider, IDI 06). HCPs reported that ASHIA organizes quarterly trainings usually on data reporting and claims management for the HCPs that facilitates improved quality of healthcare delivery. In the words of a HCP, “They do trainings usually on claims processing and submission and they sponsor this training and we appreciate them for that” (Provider, IDI 10). Though the policymakers determine various HCPs roles and responsibilities, set parameters for accountability and influence incentives for compliance, however, in practice, there are still issues relating to moral hazard, information asymmetry, and conflicts of interest. In the words of health insurance managers, “Like any human institution, there will be deviants, but the fact that in the service-level agreements we signed with them, we lay out punishments for penalties and we punish them appropriately. Initially, it was high but now because we have sanctioned a lot of HCPs things are better…. we do it in the open to teach others lesson” (Policymaker, IDI 01). “…Moral hazards necessitated the need for preauthorization before we can approve for secondary services to be rendered, otherwise for someone who is having malaria, HCPs will be requesting for a CT scan just to make money” (Policymaker, IDI 02). “We have regularly had issues relating to information irregularities. For instance, we had a claim submitted for reimbursement by a HCP and we called the enrollee to ask them about the service they received, only to find out that the said enrollee was never in the hospital and did not receive any secondary care. So, these are issues we face and we must be on top of our game to be able to beat them if not people will actually finish the funds in the scheme” (Policymaker, IDI 05). All the providers interviewed stated that there is no conflict of interest between the hospital and the policymakers because the terms of operation are clearly stated and signed on the memorandum of understanding. According to a HCP, “we make sure that we treat the enrollees as agreed……. on conflicting interest because ASHIA is quick to respond to any slight issues… they will just come down to this place, I give that to them. We all have the same goal which is to improve universal health coverage”. Information and reporting The policymakers affirm that accredited HCPs provide data for effective and evidence-informed policy-making which increases the probability that agents will pursue principals’ goals. The major complaint from HCP is on the provider payment mechanisms, in relation to inadequacy of capitation to cover the cost of quality drugs required by the enrollees. A policymaker said, “The only information that HCPs provide is on money. Such request that capitation should be increased a bit to meet up with the market reality. 500 Naira is being paid per enrollee monthly so they said it’s not enough for services for the enrollees. Anti-malaria used to supply them at the cost of 500 Naira is now 1000 Naira. And ASHIA is currently looking into it to see what can be done about it. Initially, it was 450 Naira per enrollee but after complaining they increased it to the 500 naira per enrollee. But since they are still complaining ASHIA will still look into it” (Policymaker, IDI 04). Provider and citizen sphere Services According to the providers and enrollees, there are mechanisms through which enrollees can express their concerns or expectations about service delivery. In the first instance, enrollees directly convey their needs and demands for services in terms of their level of satisfaction, service delivery gaps, information, waiting time, hospital opening hours and or attitude of health workers to providers or hospital administrators, who in turn offer a mix of quality services that satisfy the expressed needs and demands. In the words of a provider, “Part of my job is conflict resolution also to make sure the enrollees are happy. Most of the time if they go through all the processes and are not happy, they will come and report to me. Then we will sit down and sort it out, most times what they are requesting might be very flimsy. Such as services that are not covered by ASHIA, they (enrollees) will come and tell you that they (ASHIA) told them it is covered. You will now have to show them (enrollees)ASHIA handbook that it is not covered, boldly written, then the patient gets embarrassed” (Provider, IDI 13). Another provider said, “yes, enrollees are free to express themselves in this facility, for instance, the other day the ASHIA team came to the hospital and the enrollees aired out their minds, and this made the ASHIA team that was present angry that day because of the complaints they got” (Provider, IDI 09). Majority of the enrollees affirmed that, “if we (enrollees) have any issue with the hospital we will complain directly to the doctor, and he will attend to us immediately” (Enrollee, FGD 03). In addition, respondents stated that some health facilities provide complaints or suggestion boxes, while others provide health facility management contact phone numbers for enrollees to express their concerns as a second mechanism for communicating their demands or concerns. In affirmation, an enrollee said, “the hospital provided a suggestion box and they also provide a complaint line which you can lay your complaint which is pasted on the walls around the corners of the hospital, they do provide for whatever you want to complain of they do provide it” (Enrollee, FGD 10). Similarly, a HCP said, “We have numbers pasted over all the hospital walls, they are three numbers, one is the hospital administrator, the hospital secretary, and the information client officer, where the patients can call any of these numbers if they are having challenges within the hospital, some do call from home. The enrollees also call this number when they feel they are not satisfied with the hospital services” (Provider, IDI 20). However, some enrollees reported that the numbers are not always available. Most times, even when you succeed in reaching out to the HCPs, that their voices are still not heard. To buttress this, an enrollee said, “there is a number that usually gives to get in contact with the hospital management but at the end of the day when you call them it does not go through” (Enrollee, FGD 01). Clients power HCPs claim that they do use the information from enrollees for decision-making towards improving service delivery. Narrating how enrollee’s voices are used in decision-making for better service delivery, a hospital administrator said, “the renovation – expanding dispensary unit in the hospital is as a result of challenges that enrollees are complaining, so we trying to make service delivery better with satisfaction….” (Provider IDI 18). Another said, “Yes, we are currently working on expansion; before you came in, I was talking to a lady about this she just left my office. If you look behind you, we just bought some new machines; these machines are bought to accommodate the excesses, to reduce the crowd because our patients are complaining. Look at the paper two new staff have been added to the team to accommodate the pressure, we requested 5 but we got 2 people in the interim. So, the management of the hospital is doing very well within their limits and availability of funds to solve all issues we are having with the health insurance people” (Provider, IDI 06). A HCP said, “I get complaints from the desk officers and acknowledge these complaints and I also call for management meetings and take decisions on what to do and how to manage the enrollees. I try my best to ensure that whatever the enrollees are complaining about are resolved permanently to the best of my ability” (Provider, IDI 05). From the enrollee’s perspective, while some agree that “the hospital also listens to our voice and demands in decision making (Enrollee, FGD, 03), some refute that their voices are used for decision-making. According to an enrollee, “I have complained to the MD about the hospital opening hours….it is nothing to write home about but nothing changed” (Enrollee, FGD 04). Discussion This study has explored the governance factors and practices which have influenced the implementation of ASHIS using the principal-agent framework. Generally, our findings suggest that the involvement, contribution and practices of various actors are prominent aspects of governance that have supported the implementation of ASHIS in Anambra State Nigeria. The proactiveness of health insurance managers as the agents in responding to the principal (enrollees) needs, preferences and demands enabled the effective performance of the scheme. More so, establishing functional mechanisms for receiving feedback on service delivery from the principal is a commendable effort towards improving governance of ASHIS that could lead to better social health protection of the enrollees. This will also ensure an inclusive governance where citizens’ needs and demands will inform decision-making relating to better service delivery for their own health. Effective feedback has been reported to strengthen health system functionality and equip decision-makers with adequate and right information to make informed strategic decisions [33]. The findings suggest that an inclusive governance structure recognizing citizen’s input is required for the effective and optimal performance of a social health insurance scheme. Our assertion is in line with a previous report that a health systems process must embrace a top-down inclusive strategy in policy planning and implementation, increasingly adopting a people-centred approach [34]. Poor responsiveness has been attributed to poor health-seeking behaviour [31, 35]. Likewise, several studies have reported the effects of responsiveness on health service delivery and health outcomes [36–38]. The study revealed that the social health insurance regulator as principal provided relatively clear governance policies and regulatory guidelines that specify standards for the effective implementation of ASHIS. In practice, these have facilitated the principal’s oversight functions as well as the provision of resources and incentives for their agent (HCPs) to ensure better service delivery and improved health insurance performance. The agents, on the other hand, reciprocate by carrying out the agreed-upon services and directives of the principal. Several studies have shown that health schemes or programs with strong regulatory policies and mandates tend to perform optimally [39, 40]. However, principal-agent problems were noted between ASHIA and the HCPs in the area of moral hazard, information asymmetry, and conflicts of interest particularly in dispensing of medicines to enrollees and referral for secondary care. Some agents seem to be self-seeking in their practice against the agreed standard operating procedures. These problems could undermine the effective implementation of ASHIS and possibly limit its efficiency and performance in advancing UHC goals. This implies that the principal needs to devise a more strategic means of checkmating the agent’s practice with respect to identified problems. Our findings align with existing research on principal-agent issues in health insurance which often encounter moral hazard and unethical practices [41–43]. On the other hand, the study found that the HCPs as the agents provide information to the principal for the decision-making and budgeting process, increasing the likelihood that the agents pursue the principal’s goal for the scheme’s optimal performance. However, the findings indicate that the information the agents provide is mainly on the adequacy or otherwise of provider payment mechanisms. Again, this goes a long way to suggest that although they provide healthcare services to the enrollees as stipulated, they may be more self-seeking. In the HCP-enrollees sphere, findings reveal that there is a limited or poor formal system for the principal (enrollees) to execute their mandates by providing insight and inputs on decision-making with respect to service delivery. This means that the principals may be unable to express their concerns and their inputs to the agents that are required for decision-making towards the provision of quality health services. Moreso, although, some agents claimed that there is a system within the health facilities for the principals to communicate their concerns, however, in most cases, this does not translate to better service delivery. This means that the role of the principal in decision-making has been limited. To achieve the goal of ASHIS, clients’/enrollees’ voice is an essential driver of health systems’ performance towards achieving UHC [44]. Evidence shows that weak responsiveness of health providers could be accompanied by negative effects on the client’s satisfaction with the quality of service [45]. Therefore, governance arrangements within the HCP and enrollees sphere need to improve and rely more on an inclusive service delivery approach for rational decision-making towards universal health care. The findings of this study should be interpreted in light of some strengths and limitations related to the study design and setting. A major strength of this study is the inclusion of the main actors - policymakers, HCPs and beneficiaries implementing ASHIS to gain a deeper insight into their experiences and practices on the subject matter. This largely contributed to the richness of the findings because it enabled complementarities and validated responses from the actors. Second, the sampling technique employed, allowed for diversity in responses from different geographical locations, public and private HCPs, and a combination of enrollees from different backgrounds. Moreso, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to use principal-agent theory to investigate governance-related factors that influence the implementation of health insurance in Nigeria. However, the major limitation of the study is that although the Brinkerhoff and Bossert health governance framework (adapted in this study) is a valuable tool for assessing health governance but has a limitation i.e. insufficient emphasis on power dynamics and relationships between different stakeholders in the health sector, the authors should have considered incorporating additional dimensions or sub-dimensions to capture power dynamics, equity and socio-economic factors. However, the authors, adapted the framework to a specific context, taking into account certain factors including engaging providers and enrollees from different geographical locations and incorporating a participatory and inclusive approach by engaging with local stakeholders, including community members and Civil society organizations, healthcare providers and policymakers, hence ensuring that different perspective and experiences are taken into account. The second limitation of the study is that the results of our sample may not be generalizable to other states in Nigeria implementing State Social Health Insurance Schemes, since the finding was from one out of 36 states of Nigeria. Nevertheless, the study was specific to Anambra State and values highlighted in this study may be transferable to similar contexts and States. Conclusion The study identified a series of governance practices in the implementation of ASHIS in Nigeria that were supportive of progress, including the availability of regulatory policies and guidelines; feedback mechanisms put in place by ASHIS in its relationship with the HCPs and enrollees; and responsiveness to enrollee’s expressed needs and demands. However, there still exist some disconnects in the principal-agent relationship, two most important of which are: (1) the gap in regulatory and oversight function between the health insurance managers and the HCPs and (2) the inattention of the HCPs to some enrollee’s concerns and demands affecting their satisfaction with the quality of services. It is necessary that the identified gaps are strategically addressed to improve social health protection performance and accelerate progress towards attaining UHC in Anambra state, Nigeria. The study suggests that efforts should be directed towards (i) Strengthening the regulatory and oversight capacity of health insurance managers to monitor and supervise HCPs effectively, (ii) Regularly reviewing and refining feedback mechanisms to ensure that enrollees’ concerns and demands are promptly addressed and, (iii) Developing strategies to improve HCPs’ responsiveness to enrollees’ concerns, leading to increased satisfaction with the quality of services. Supplementary Information Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. Supplementary Material 1 Acknowledgements We thanked the research assistants who assisted in the data collection. We acknowledge Dr Chinasa Okeke, an independent researcher, for her contribution to the data analysis and validation of the results presented in the manuscript. We also appreciate the management of the health facilities for granting approval for the study. Abbreviations Anambra State Health Insurance Agency Anambra State Health Insurance Scheme Civil Society Organizations Health Care Providers Out-0of-pocket Expenditure Universal Health Coverage Author contributions UE and SO conceptualized the study and developed the study protocol including the data collection tools. UE analyzed the data. UE and SO drafted the first manuscript. Both authors reviewed and approved the final version for journal submission. Funding The research leading to results included in this study was funded fully by the authors. All views expressed in this article are of the authors only and do not necessarily represent views of ASHIA. Data availability The datasets generated and analyzed in this study are not publicly available due to limitations of ethical approval involving patient data and anonymity but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. Declarations Ethics approval and consent to participate Ethical approval was sought for and obtained from the Health Research and Ethics Committee of the State Ministry of Health Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria (Ref. no. MH/AWK/M/321/408). Following ethical approval, permission to conduct data collection was obtained from the management of all the selected health facilities. This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants provided both written and verbal informed consent. Participants were informed of the purpose of the research, rights of participants and measures that will be taken to protect them and their data. Hence, participation was voluntary, and confidentiality was assured. Verbal permission to audio-record interviews was also obtained from respondents. Consent for publication Bothe written and verbal consents were obtained from the study participants to use anonymized data or quotes from them for publication.statement. Competing interests One of the authors is affiliated with the Health Insurance Agency under studyHowever, certain measures were taken to reconcile the conflict of interest in the data analysis. these include:-Excluding the researcher from the Agency from being part of the coding of the transcript and analysis of coding outputs. -Engaging independent researchers to participate in the coding of the transcripts and validation of the coding outputs to ensure the accuracy and quality of the results presented (the independent researcher has been acknowledged in the acknowledgement section of the manuscript). The authors stated in their contribution that only one author not affiliated with the agency participated in the data analysis. Footnotes Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. References Associated Data Supplementary Materials Supplementary Material 1 Data Availability Statement The datasets generated and analyzed in this study are not publicly available due to limitations of ethical approval involving patient data and anonymity but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.