Mpox outbreak preparedness and response capacity in Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory: a mixed-methods study Authors: Tina Aribi, Charles Chibuisi Ehiemere, Ishaku Adamu Akyala, Istifanus Haruna Nkene, Idowu Olapemi Makinde, Rabi Usman, Temitope Babalola Oluwapemi, Chukwuma John Nosike Published: 2026 ABSTRACT AbstractBackgroundMpox has re-emerged globally as a public health threat, with implications for low-resource settings where surveillance and response systems remain fragile. Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT) hosts large mobile populations and international institutions, heightening outbreak vulnerability. Evidence on sub-national preparedness capacity is limited. This study assessed Mpox awareness, preparedness, and institutional response capabilities across the FCT using a mixed-methods approach.MethodsA convergent parallel mixed-methods study was conducted in four Area Councils representing urban, peri-urban, and rural settings. A multi-stage probability sample yielded 408 adults who completed a structured questionnaire. Preparedness scores were computed using a 20-item, WHO-adapted scale (score range 0–60). Variables associated with adequate awareness and preparedness were examined using multivariable logistic regression, reporting adjusted odds ratios (aOR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Retrospective confirmed case surveillance data (2017–2024) were analysed. Qualitative stakeholder data (n = 15) were analysed using thematic content analysis, with triangulation through joint display matrices.ResultsFrom 2017–2024, 37 confirmed Mpox cases were recorded, with a case fatality rate (CFR) of 29.7% based on confirmed-case denominators. The highest incidence occurred in 2022 (n = 25). Among respondents, 52.0% (95% CI: 47.1–56.9) had prior awareness of Mpox; however, only 36.3% demonstrated adequate knowledge. Awareness was significantly predicted by tertiary education (aOR = 2.87; 95% CI: 1.63–5.04; p < 0.001), urban residence (aOR = 1.94; 95% CI: 1.18–3.19; p = 0.009), and formal employment (aOR = 1.72; 95% CI: 1.04–2.85; p = 0.035). Overall, 41.7% of facilities demonstrated “moderate” preparedness, while rural facilities scored significantly lower than urban centres (p < 0.001). Qualitative analysis revealed gaps in rapid reporting, laboratory turnaround time, PPE distribution, and sustained risk communication. Mixed-methods triangulation showed convergence of quantitative and qualitative evidence.ConclusionMpox preparedness in the FCT is characterised by fragmented but evolving institutional capacity, marked awareness gaps, and significant urban–rural inequities. Strengthening laboratory systems, decentralising logistics, establishing pre-emptive risk communication frameworks, and operationalising One Health collaboration are critical for improved zoonotic outbreak resilience.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12889-026-27200-y.Keywords: Mpox, Preparedness, Mixed-methods, Outbreak response, Nigeria, Zoonoses, One Health, Surveillance Introduction Emerging and re-emerging zoonotic pathogens represent a persistent threat to global health security, particularly within low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) where preparedness and response mechanisms vary widely in coverage, quality, and adaptability. Mpox is a zoonotic disease caused by the Mpox virus, a member of the s genus in the Poxviridae family, genetically related to the smallpox virus [1]. Two main genetic clades exist: the Central African (Congo Basin) clade, associated with higher virulence and fatality rates, and the West African clade, which is less severe but capable of significant transmission [2]. The disease’s clinical presentation resembles that of smallpox but includes lymphadenopathy as a distinguishing feature immunity has increased susceptibility to Mpox infection, contributing to its resurgence in endemic and non-endemic regions [3, 4]. Globally, outbreaks of Mpox have been linked to factors such as urbanization, deforestation, wildlife contact, and weak surveillance systems. In 2024, the World Health Organization declared Mpox a Public Health Emergency of International Concern following rapid transcontinental spread [5]. By mid-2024, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accounted for over 96% of African cases, with the emergence of a new Clade 1b variant responsible for a substantial proportion of deaths [5]. With Mpox now a PHEIC/PHECC and a new Congo-origin strain driving 2,863 cases and 517 deaths across 13 African countries in 2024, Nigeria’s detection of 39 cases across 19 states and the FCT underscores the urgency of enhanced coordination and surveillance to avert cross-border transmission [6]. Nigeria reported re-emergence of Mpox in 2017 with recurrent outbreaks subsequently. Despite Abuja being the national administrative hub with comparatively higher health infrastructure, evidence on its operational readiness for zoonotic outbreaks remains sparse [7]. Existing studies focus on national surveillance statistics but lack disaggregated sub-regional analysis of preparedness, awareness, and facility-level capacity. Addressing this gap is critical for contextualising Nigeria’s ability to sustain International Health Regulations (IHR-2005) compliance and national One Health strategic frameworks [8]. Study objective To assess Mpox preparedness and response capacity in the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria using a convergent parallel mixed-methods framework. Specific objectives Describe Mpox epidemiological trends in the FCT (2017–2024). Describe Mpox epidemiological trends in the FCT (2017–2024). Assess awareness and preventive behavioural patterns among residents. Assess awareness and preventive behavioural patterns among residents. Determine predictors of awareness and preparedness levels. Determine predictors of awareness and preparedness levels. Evaluate health facilities’ operational readiness for outbreak response. Evaluate health facilities’ operational readiness for outbreak response. Integrate stakeholder insights into system-level gaps and opportunities. Integrate stakeholder insights into system-level gaps and opportunities. Conceptual framework This study applied the WHO Preparedness, Readiness and Response (PRR) model, supported by a One-Health lens. Methods A convergent parallel mixed-methods design was adopted to enable simultaneous collection, separate analysis, and subsequent integration of quantitative and qualitative data. Integration involved joint display matrices to compare convergence, complementarity, or divergence across findings. The study was undertaken in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Nigeria, consisting of six Area Councils. Four councils were sampled to reflect differing population and health system characteristics: Abuja Municipal (urban), Gwagwalada (semi-urban), Bwari (peri-urban), and Kuje (rural). Data were collected between April and July 2024 by trained research assistants. Quantitative data were collected through interviewer-administered questionnaires in English and local languages where necessary. Eligible quantitative participants were adults aged 18 years or older who had resided in the selected area for at least six months and had no known cognitive impairment. Qualitative participants consisted of stakeholders engaged in surveillance, clinical care, laboratory systems, logistics, and emergency response. The sample size was estimated using Cochran’s formula with p = 0.5, 5% margin of error, design effect of 1.5, and 10% non-response adjustment, yielding a target of 423, of which 408 valid responses were analysed. A multi-stage sampling technique selected respondents at council, ward, household, and individual levels. A structured questionnaire, adapted from WHO Mpox preparedness tools, was used for quantitative data collection (Cronbach’s α = 0.83), while the qualitative guide adhered to COREQ standards. Preparedness scores ranged from 0 to 60 and were categorised as high (≥ 70%), moderate (50–69%), or low (< 50%). Quantitative data were analysed using SPSS version 25 and R version 4.1.2 to generate descriptive statistics, chi-square or Fisher’s exact tests, and multivariable logistic regression with adequate knowledge as the binary outcome. Model diagnostics included VIF (< 3), Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit (p > 0.05), and ROC curve performance. Qualitative data underwent thematic analysis using deductive codes derived from the WHO PRR framework, independently analysed by two researchers with consensus resolution. Ethical approval was obtained from Federal Capital Territory Health Research Ethics Committee. Approval Number: FHREC/2024/01/289/28–11–24. Multiple measures were instituted to strengthen methodological rigour and minimise bias. Measurement bias was reduced through pilot testing, adaptation of validated WHO items, and acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.83). Selection bias was mitigated through multi-stage sampling and clear eligibility criteria, while purposive sampling was restricted to role-relevant stakeholders in line with qualitative standards. Information bias was reduced by interviewer training, standardised data collection procedures, and immediate review of completed questionnaires to reduce missing data. Analysis bias was mitigated through dual-coder verification for qualitative data, independent statistical analysis using two software platforms (SPSS and R), and use of objective regression diagnostics. Integration bias was minimised by applying structured joint displays rather than interpretive narrative merging. Reflexivity was addressed through documentation of researcher assumptions and iterative peer debriefing. Results Epidemiological profile of Mpox in the federal capital territory (2017–2024) A total of 37 confirmed Mpox cases were recorded in the FCT between 2017 and 2024, with 11 associated deaths, yielding a confirmed-case fatality rate of 29.7%. Annual trends showed low-level transmission from 2017 to 2021 followed by a sharp increase in 2022, when 25 cases (67.6% of the total) were documented. Although notifications declined during 2023 and early 2024, sporadic cases continued to emerge, suggesting possible ongoing community-level transmission rather than isolated imported events. The majority of confirmed cases occurred among males (70%), and children aged 0–5 years represented the largest affected age group (38%), followed by adults aged 21–30 years (24%). Abuja Municipal Area Council accounted for the highest proportion of cases (43%), followed by Gwagwalada (21%), Bwari (17%) and Kuje (11%), while Kwali and Abaji jointly contributed 8%. Across all recorded episodes, clinical and laboratory reports indicated involvement of the West African clade of Mpox. Seasonally, a higher proportion of cases coincided with the rainy season, aligning with increased agricultural and wildlife contact patterns. Together, these indicators suggest potential endemicity, compounded by surveillance gaps and delayed case detection (Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4). Table 1Socio-demographic characteristics of survey respondents (N = 408)VariableCategoryFrequency (n)Percentage (%)SexMale21652.9Female19247.1Age (years)18–248420.625–3418645.635–4410225.0≥ 45368.8Residence TypeUrban/Semi-urban22956.1Peri-urban/Rural17943.9Education LevelNo formal338.1Primary7718.9Secondary12731.1Tertiary17142.0OccupationCivil service15538.0Trade/business10626.0Students8220.1Artisan/Farmers6515.9Length of Residence< 5 years16239.7≥ 5 years24660.3Totals may vary slightly due to rounding Socio-demographic characteristics of survey respondents (N = 408) Totals may vary slightly due to rounding Table 2Epidemiological profile of confirmed Mpox cases, FCT Nigeria (2017–2024)VariableCategoryFrequency (n)Percentage (%)Total confirmed cases—37100Total deaths (CFR)11—29.7%Peak year20222567.6SexMale2670.3Female1129.7Age group0–5 years1437.86–20 years410.821–30 years924.331–40 years718.9> 40 years38.2Council distributionAbuja Municipal1643.2Gwagwalada821.6Bwari616.2Kuje410.8Kwali & Abaji38.2 Epidemiological profile of confirmed Mpox cases, FCT Nigeria (2017–2024) Table 3Logistic regression predicting adequate Mpox awareness (N = 408)Predictor VariableAdjusted Odds Ratio (aOR)95% Confidence Interval (CI)p-valueTertiary education2.871.63–5.04< 0.001*Urban residence1.941.18–3.190.009Formal occupation1.721.04–2.850.035 ≥ 5 years residency1.210.74–1.970.441Sex (Male)1.080.67–1.730.742Model Fit:Hosmer–Lemeshow p = 0.62; AUC = 0.78*Significant at α = 0.05 Logistic regression predicting adequate Mpox awareness (N = 408) Model Fit: Hosmer–Lemeshow p = 0.62; AUC = 0.78 *Significant at α = 0.05 Table 4Facility preparedness level by location (20 facilities)Preparedness LevelUrban Facilities(n = 10)Rural/Peri-urban Facilities(n = 10)Total (%)High (≥ 70%)516 (30.0%)Moderate (50–69%)448 (40.0%)Low (< 50%)156 (30.0%)p < 0.001 (Chi-square test) Facility preparedness level by location (20 facilities) p < 0.001 (Chi-square test) Socio-demographic profile of survey respondents A total of 408 community respondents participated in the study across four Area Councils. Slightly over half were male (52.9%), with a mean age of 32.6 years (SD ± 8.4). A majority (56%) resided in urban or semi-urban areas, while 44% lived in peri-urban or rural settings. Educational attainment ranged from no formal education (8%) to tertiary qualification (42%), with secondary and primary schooling representing 31% and 19% respectively. Civil servants constituted the largest occupational group (38%), followed by traders (26%), students (20%), and artisans/farmers (16%). Approximately 60% had resided in their communities for at least five years, indicating population stability suitable for perception and preparedness assessment. Awareness and knowledge of Mpox Slightly more than half of the respondents (52%; 95% CI: 47.1–56.9) had heard of Mpox prior to the study period. However, when assessed against criteria based on accurate identification of symptoms, transmission mechanisms, prevention strategies and risk factors, only 36.3% demonstrated adequate knowledge. Awareness levels differed significantly across sub-groups: respondents with tertiary education recorded notably higher awareness levels compared to those with primary or no formal schooling, and urban dwellers were more knowledgeable than rural residents. Health workers were the most frequently cited information source, followed by radio and television, whereas social media and community gatherings contributed minimally. Several misconceptions were observed, including beliefs that Mpox could be primarily treated with herbal remedies and that it posed minimal public health risk. These perceptions may have implications for care-seeking, community surveillance sensitivity, and compliance with public health directives (Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Shows year-to-year trend of confirmed Mpox cases and deaths in FCT from 2017–2024, peaking in 2022 and declining afterwards but not reaching zero, indicating persistent low-level transmission Geographic Distribution of Confirmed Mpox Cases Across Area Councils in the Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria (2017–2024). Bar intensity shading indicates relative case burden across locations, with Abuja Municipal demonstrating the highest number of confirmed cases. Rural and peri-urban councils recorded lower case counts Compares mean preparedness scores between urban and rural facilities, with effect size favouring urban settings and statistical significance (p < 0.001)at with 95% confidence intervals Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve Demonstrating Discriminative Performance of the Logistic Regression Model Predicting Mpox Awareness. The ROC (blue) shows trade-off between sensitivity and specificity across thresholds; the grey dashed line is the no-discrimination reference. The plotted AUC = 0.48 (95% CI: 0.40–0.56). The figure annotates the Youden optimal cutoff with sensitivity and specificity. ROC Curve (Blue Line): Shows the model’s sensitivity vs. false positive rate across thresholds. Diagonal Line (Gray Dashed): Represents random guessing (AUC = 0.5). The model’s curve is close to this, indicating limited predictive power. Youden J Point (Red Dot): Marks the optimal threshold (≈ 0.53) with: Sensitivity: 0.09, Specificity: 0.97, and AUC = 0.48: This is below the ideal threshold (0.7 +), suggesting the model struggles to distinguish between those aware and unaware of Mpox Feature Importance for Logistic Regression Predicting Awareness, showing which variables, most strongly influenced the model’s predictions. Key Takeaways from Fig. 5. •Top Predictors: Education level, occupation, and risk perception emerged as the strongest drivers of awareness. •Council Differences: Responses from AMAC vs. Kwali showed measurable variation, suggesting geographic context matters. •Preventive Measures & Campaigns: Awareness of preventive measures and visibility of public health campaigns also contributed, though less strongly. •Healthcare Preparedness: Perceptions of facility preparedness had weaker influence compared to personal demographics and risk perception. Why This Matters. The model’s low AUC (0.48) shows poor discrimination overall, but the feature importance chart highlights which variables are most informative. This suggests that education and occupation should be prioritized in awareness campaigns, while risk perception and preventive knowledge can be leveraged to improve outreach. By focusing on these stronger predictors, future models or public health interventions can achieve better accuracy and impact Factors associated with adequate awareness In the multivariable logistic regression model, the strongest predictor of adequate Mpox knowledge was tertiary education (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 2.87; 95% CI: 1.63–5.04; p < 0.001). Individuals residing in urban communities had nearly twice the odds of demonstrating adequate awareness compared to those living in rural or peri-urban areas (aOR = 1.94; 95% CI: 1.18–3.19; p = 0.009). Formal sector employment was also independently associated with higher awareness (aOR = 1.72; 95% CI: 1.04–2.85; p = 0.035). Duration of residence, age group, marital status, and sex were not statistically significant after adjustment. The final model demonstrated appropriate calibration (Hosmer–Lemeshow p = 0.62) and discriminatory accuracy (AUC = 0.78), indicating good predictive fit. Preparedness levels of health facilities Health system preparedness was assessed using a WHO-adapted, 20-item, 60-point scoring checklist. Overall, 21.4% of facilities achieved high preparedness ratings, 41.7% demonstrated moderate preparedness, and 36.9% fell within the low preparedness category. Preparedness was significantly higher among facilities located within Abuja Municipal and Gwagwalada relative to peri-urban or rural facilities in Bwari and Kuje (p < 0.001). Urban facilities reported better availability of trained surveillance officers, personal protective equipment, and standard operating procedures for outbreak management. In contrast, rural facilities reported more frequent stock-outs of essential infection-prevention supplies, limited specimen collection capacity, and reliance on delayed sample transport chains. Only a third (35%) had functional isolation areas meeting Mpox infection-control standards, and fewer than half (38%) reported effective integration with the District Health Information System (DHIS2). Facility-level preparedness varied considerably not only by geography but also by management structure, highlighting inconsistent operational readiness within the FCT system. Qualitative stakeholder perspectives The thematic analysis revealed four dominant operational challenges. First, laboratory turnaround time averaging three to seven days was considered a major constraint to early decision-making and rapid containment. Second, logistics were described as unevenly distributed, with rural councils frequently receiving delayed PPE and outbreak items. Third, respondents reported the absence of structured, multilingual risk-communication systems, resulting in reactive rather than continuous awareness campaigns. Finally, stakeholders emphasised weak One Health collaboration, with minimal routine interaction between veterinary, human health, and environmental surveillance units. Stakeholders acknowledged the existence of surveillance structures within the Public Health Department but characterised them as inadequately resourced for rapid response. Mixed-methods integration Triangulation of quantitative results with qualitative evidence showed strong convergence. Predictors of awareness aligned with stakeholder observations regarding information access and literacy. Similarly, the facility preparedness disparities reflected qualitative descriptions of uneven resource distribution and operational bottlenecks. No major divergences were found between data strands, strengthening confidence in study interpretation. Key gaps identified were Delayed case reporting and confirmation: Stakeholders cited slow laboratory turnaround time (3–7 days) as a major obstacle to rapid containment. Delayed case reporting and confirmation: Stakeholders cited slow laboratory turnaround time (3–7 days) as a major obstacle to rapid containment. Limited community engagement: Health promotion activities were mostly reactive during outbreaks rather than continuous. Limited community engagement: Health promotion activities were mostly reactive during outbreaks rather than continuous. Uneven resource distribution: Rural councils received fewer PPE and logistics supplies compared to urban councils. Uneven resource distribution: Rural councils received fewer PPE and logistics supplies compared to urban councils. Inadequate risk communication: No formal strategy existed for rumour management or public information dissemination in local languages. Inadequate risk communication: No formal strategy existed for rumour management or public information dissemination in local languages. Weak intersectoral collaboration: Coordination between animal health, human health, and environmental sectors remained limited, undermining the One Health approach. Weak intersectoral collaboration: Coordination between animal health, human health, and environmental sectors remained limited, undermining the One Health approach. Overall, the stakeholder analysis classified preparedness as moderate (58%), surveillance and response capacity as low (43%), and coordination mechanisms as moderate (61%) relative to WHO benchmarks. Summary of key findings Mpox cases in FCT showed a sustained but uneven distribution between 2017 and 2024, with the highest burden in urban councils. Mpox cases in FCT showed a sustained but uneven distribution between 2017 and 2024, with the highest burden in urban councils. Public awareness of Mpox remains limited, with educational status and residence significantly predicting preparedness. Public awareness of Mpox remains limited, with educational status and residence significantly predicting preparedness. Health facilities in urban areas were better equipped and coordinated than those in rural settings. Health facilities in urban areas were better equipped and coordinated than those in rural settings. Stakeholders reported structural progress in surveillance but persistent operational gaps in rapid response, coordination, and communication. Stakeholders reported structural progress in surveillance but persistent operational gaps in rapid response, coordination, and communication. Collectively, the findings underscore the need for targeted interventions to strengthen health system preparedness, enhance public education, and ensure equitable distribution of outbreak response resources across the FCT. Discussion This convergent parallel mixed-methods study examined Mpox awareness, epidemiological patterns, and preparedness capacity across four Area Councils of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Nigeria. The findings suggest a disconnect between historical disease occurrence and population-level knowledge, with considerable variability in preparedness capability across health facilities, mirrors the findings of Kamalrathne et al., Who highlight that epidemic and pandemic systems often suffer from inconsistent operational readiness across surveillance, early detection and response phases [9]. Despite the FCT’s status as the nation’s administrative centre and host to national public health institutions, awareness levels were lower than expected, indicating that proximity to policy or disease control agencies does not automatically translate to risk-reducing knowledge among communities. The results further show that epidemiological transmission remained intermittent between 2017 and 2021 before sharply rising in 2022. This aligns with global events, where 2022 marked an unprecedented Mpox transmission episode outside traditional endemic regions. Nevertheless, case declines observed in 2023 and 2024 should be interpreted cautiously, as low case numbers may reflect reporting gaps rather than true epidemiological containment [10]. Consistent with previous research on zoonotic disease literacy, educational status emerged as the strongest predictor of awareness, followed by urban residence and formal employment [11]. These social determinants highlight inequitable information diffusion, with peri-urban and rural residents potentially missing critical risk communication opportunities.. This pattern mirrors findings from a multi-country African review showing that, although many governments deployed national risk communication and community-engagement strategies during COVID-19, implementation was frequently hampered by cultural resistance, low trust, and structural barriers highlighting the need for localized, language-sensitive, and community-embedded approaches to reach low-literacy and marginalized populations [12]. Additional evidence from neighbouring countries in Africa underscores that communication strategies divorced from local beliefs, languages, or social structures are insufficient to change behaviour or dispel stigma, especially among low-literacy or marginalized groups [13]. The qualitative findings reveal moderate but uneven preparedness across the health system. Although stakeholders demonstrated an understanding of Mpox as a re-emerging zoonotic threat, operational readiness gaps were evident across logistics, supply chain continuity, laboratory turnaround times, structured surge capacity, and consistent infection prevention and control (IPC) compliance. These findings resonate with a recent regional assessment across ECOWAS member states, which documented major gaps in Mpox readiness particularly in laboratory capacity, logistics and supply-chain resilience, and infection prevention and control (IPC) compliance [14, 15]. The preparedness scoring further highlighted striking rural–urban disparities, with rural facilities more likely to fall within low-performing categories. These findings suggest that preparedness is not merely a function of awareness or professional knowledge, but of foundational system capacity. This is particularly critical given that zoonotic spillover is more likely in peri-urban or rural settings with frequent wildlife and livestock contact. Similar rural–urban disparities in health-facility readiness have been documented, with rural centres significantly less likely to meet minimum infrastructure and service-readiness standards [16] The mixed-methods integration further showed that although quantitative findings highlighted predictors of awareness, qualitative data contextualised the systemic and operational challenges that affect readiness. For instance, stakeholders noted that risk communication was often reactive rather than pre-emptive and that emergency supplies could not be sustained once outbreak media coverage declined. This reflects the global challenge of “response-focused rather than preparedness-focused” financing, especially in low-resource settings. Additionally, laboratory delays were linked not only to capacity constraints but also to specimen referral dependency, which may introduce time-sensitive diagnostic delays and weaken surveillance precision. Timely laboratory confirmation is critical for case management, contact tracing and public communication; thus, decentralising testing capacity is essential. The 2022 epidemiological peak, while consistent with global patterns, underscores the vulnerability of Nigeria to trans-regional infectious threats, particularly those transmitted through travel and mobility networks. As the administrative hub with high domestic and international mobility, Abuja faces unique transmission pressures. For example, Mpox Epidemiology and Risk Factors, Nigeria, 2022 shows that 87.7% of confirmed cases came from urban or semi-urban areas -underscoring how urban mobility and system capacity influence outbreak dynamics and the need for rural-sensitive preparedness systems [17]. These pressures require preparedness systems that go beyond facility capability to include real-time syndromic surveillance, cross-sectoral coordination, and well-funded early warning mechanisms. The mixed-methods design allowed not only measurement of knowledge gaps but also identification of structural, human resource and supply-chain issues requiring policy-level attention. Strengths and limitations This study’s strength lies in its convergent mixed-methods design, which enhanced validity by triangulating epidemiological, quantitative, and qualitative data. The selection of study sites reflecting diverse settlement categories improves contextual relevance. Nevertheless, limitations include self-reported awareness, possible recall bias regarding exposure to Mpox information, and the restriction of qualitative sampling to stakeholders available during data collection. Results may therefore not fully represent all professionals involved in zoonotic response across the FCT. While preparedness scoring adopted WHO-aligned thresholds, real-world surge capacity may fluctuate based on funding cycles, supply availability, and emergency activation status. Despite these limitations, the findings provide valuable evidence for targeted public health interventions. Implications for policy and practice The findings have several implications for epidemic preparedness within Abuja and comparable urbanising settings. First, risk communication should be repositioned from event-driven to routine, community-level health education using culturally appropriate channels, including townhall-based engagement, community health volunteers, market associations, faith institutions, and vernacular media. Second, public health authorities should decentralise Mpox diagnostic capacity or create rapid sample transport systems that guarantee timely confirmation. Third, preparedness financing should shift from reactive allocations to sustained, pre-emptive investment through health security budget lines, ring-fenced emergency commodities, and local stockpiling. Additionally, rural and peri-urban facilities require targeted capacity strengthening, including IPC supply continuity, simulation exercises, workforce training, and integrated human-animal-environmental surveillance consistent with One Health principles. Preparedness metrics could also be integrated into routine facility supervision frameworks, national dashboard monitoring, and accreditation processes. Lastly, future community engagement should prioritise lower-literacy and economically marginalised populations, ideally using behavioural insights to ensure message uptake, trust building, and risk-reduction behaviour adoption. Conclusion In summary, this study provides an integrated understanding of Mpox awareness, epidemiological trends, and preparedness capacity within the FCT, highlighting important variations across sociodemographic and health system contexts. Although the FCT hosts national public health institutions, significant knowledge gaps and uneven facility readiness indicate that structural advantages do not automatically translate to community resilience. Findings underscore the need for routine context-specific risk communication, decentralised diagnostics, and strengthened preparedness financing frameworks aligned with One Health principles. Targeted capacity-building for peri-urban and rural facilities, along with institutionalisation of preparedness monitoring indicators, is recommended to enhance epidemic readiness. Future work should explore behavioural drivers of awareness, private-sector service readiness, and cost-effectiveness of preparedness investments. Strengthening health security systems before emergencies, rather than in response to them, remains critical for sustainable zoonotic threat mitigation in Nigeria and comparable settings. Supplementary Information Supplementary Material 1. Supplementary Material 2. Acknowledgements The authors express their profound gratitude to the Federal Capital Territory Public Health Department, the Disease Surveillance and Notification Officers, Health Research Ethics Committee and the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control for their technical assistance and access to Mpox surveillance data. Appreciation also goes to the community members and health facility staff who participated in the study. Special thanks to the Global Health and Infectious Diseases Control Institute, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, for institutional support Abbreviations Federal Capital Territory District Health Information Software, Version 2 Disease Surveillance and Notification Unit Global Health and Infectious Diseases Control Institute Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response Nigeria Centre for Disease Control Personal Protective Equipment Statistical Package for the Social Sciences World Health Organization Authors’ contributions The study was conceptualised and designed collaboratively by the research team. Conceptualisation and study design: TA. Methodology: TA and CCE. Instrument development and validation: CCE. Data collection supervision: TA. Quantitative data analysis: CCE. Qualitative analysis and coding: TA and CCE. Administrative oversight, quality assurance, and academic guidance: IOM and CJN. Integration and interpretation: all authors contributed through iterative consensus. Manuscript drafting: CCE. Critical revisions and intellectual content: IAA and IHN. Final approval of the manuscript: all authors. Accountability: all authors meet ICMJE authorship standards and agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work. Funding This research received no external funding. All data collection and analysis were supported by the authors as part of the requirements for the Master of Public Health degree. Data availability The datasets supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable academic request, subject to institutional and ethical data governance procedures. De-identified quantitative data, thematic coding files, and analytic scripts (SPSS and R) may be shared for non-commercial research purposes only. Raw interview recordings cannot be shared to protect participant confidentiality. Declarations Ethics approval and consent to participate Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Global Health and Infectious Diseases Control Institute (GHIDI), Nasarawa State University, Keffi (Reference: GHIDI/NSUK/2024/023). Permission to access retrospective Mpox surveillance data was granted by the Federal Capital Territory Public Health Department and the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control. Another Ethical approval to collect human data was obtained from Federal Capital Territory’s Health Research Ethics Committee as appropriate national guidelines (Approval Number: FHREC/2024/01/289/28–11-24).Written informed consent was obtained from all participants involved in the community survey and stakeholder interviews. Participation was voluntary, and respondents were assured of confidentiality and the right to withdraw at any time. The questionnaire used, was developed for this study and the English version is upload as supplementary file. Consent for publication Not applicable. The manuscript does not contain identifiable individual participant data. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Footnotes Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. References Associated Data Supplementary Materials Supplementary Material 1. Supplementary Material 2. Data Availability Statement The datasets supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable academic request, subject to institutional and ethical data governance procedures. De-identified quantitative data, thematic coding files, and analytic scripts (SPSS and R) may be shared for non-commercial research purposes only. Raw interview recordings cannot be shared to protect participant confidentiality.