Abnormal variations in china’ s elite sport performance under the COVID-19 pandemic: evidence from world champions and world records (2020–2022) Authors: Yuan Ding, Zhang Aowei Published: 2025 ABSTRACT The COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly disrupted the global sports ecosystem, posing challenges not only to athletic performance but also to public health and physical activity promotion. Despite this, quantitative analyzes of the pandemic’s systemic impact on China’s elite sports output remain limited. This study leverages comprehensive data on Chinese world champions and world records spanning 2010 to 2024, employing a multi-period comparative framework that designates 2020–2022 as the pandemic impact phase. We systematically examine the temporal evolution, structural distribution, and institutional response mechanisms of sports output across pre-pandemic, pandemic, and post-pandemic periods. Applying moving averages, Z-score outlier detection, and structural attribution analyzes, we identify characteristic pandemic-related anomalies including a sharp decline in 2020, an abnormal rebound in 2021, and subsequent structural shifts. Further disaggregation by event type, gender, and institutional flexibility uncovers underlying systemic imbalances. Results reveal that core Olympic events sustained stable output through a “bubble mechanism” closed-environment strategy, mitigating infection risks and preserving training continuity. Conversely, peripheral and internationally-dependent sports experienced near-complete standstill. Female and para-sports demonstrated relative resilience, highlighting the role of targeted institutional support, whereas many non-Olympic events faced significant suspension. The 2021 rebound was accompanied by intensified institutional regulation and reduced international competition, leading to potential “policy-driven pseudo-performance” artifacts in some indicators. This study provides the first structural and mechanism-based quantitative assessment of the COVID-19 pandemic’s institutional impacts on China’s elite sports system. The proposed integrative analytical framework linking output data, institutional responses, and event structures offers novel insights into sports system resilience and informs public health policies integrating sports during major disruptions. Introduction Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the global sports system has faced unprecedented disruptions. Elite competitive sports, in particular, experienced forced interruptions in their output logic and institutional cycles, creating a window of structural change. In China, despite a robust national sports system, the number of world champions and world records from 2020 to 2022 exhibited significant anomalies, which attracted scholarly attention toward systemic risks, resilience mechanisms, and institutional adaptability of sports achievements under the pandemic1,2. Theoretically, this study integrates institutional resilience and critical juncture analysis frameworks. The pandemic is conceptualized as an external shock with potential to restructure institutions. Institutional resilience theory emphasizes the capacity of sports systems to maintain core structures and goals amid drastic changes3, while critical juncture theory highlights how major external events can serve as turning points or reinforcement windows for institutional pathways, especially in centralized systems4. Within China’s sports institutional context, this dual mechanism is pronounced: the state-led system demonstrates strong short-term recovery capacity, yet marginal sports, youth development mechanisms, and mass sports participation experienced disruptions or regressions. Based on this background, this study moves beyond descriptive accounts of event cancellations or reduced champion counts. Instead, it aims to deconstruct the coupling process between output structure and institutional responses, constructing a theoretical model to evaluate sports institutional adaptability and strategic reactions under major emergencies. Specifically, the study seeks to answer three research questions: First, what abnormal trends appeared in China’s elite sports output during the pandemic? Second, do these trends reflect institutional response delays or biases? Third, Are there structural differences in institutional buffering effectiveness across event types? Through these questions, the study clarifies the dynamic mechanisms of sports output under pandemic shocks and reveals the institutional logic behind structural changes. Theoretically, it enriches empirical understanding of the coupling relationship among “emergency event—institutional response—output structure,” offering new perspectives and cases for Chinese sports institutional research. Methodologically, the study applies time series analysis and institutional coupling models to provide high-frequency observation and structural decomposition of China’s sports achievement evolution. Practically, findings inform future risk management and adaptive governance policies, contributing to the construction of resilient institutional systems in sports under conditions of high uncertainty. Literature review The COVID-19 pandemic has generated a wide body of scholarship on its impact across the global sports system. Early research primarily examined the immediate disruption of competitions and its effects on athletes’ training routines, preparation cycles, and mental health5,6. These studies highlighted increased risks of psychological distress, uneven access to training facilities, and uncertainty over qualification for international events7. As the crisis prolonged, attention shifted to broader systemic effects, including organizational governance, financial sustainability, and international sporting calendars8. Researchers demonstrated how federations, leagues, and mega-events adopted hybrid strategies to mitigate losses, from cost-cutting and media innovation to postponement of flagship tournaments such as the Olympic Games9. Within this context, scholars identified both vulnerabilities and opportunities for innovation, including digital engagement, esports substitution, and biosecure “bubble” environments10. A growing strand of literature has examined the resilience of high-performance sport systems. Comparative studies across nations documented how the pandemic influenced medal distribution, performance peaks, and athlete career trajectories, often reinforcing pre-existing structural inequalities. Evidence from European and American contexts revealed that while elite systems were capable of short-term adaptation, disruptions in grassroots and talent pathways threatened long-term performance sustainability11. These findings underscore the importance of linking institutional response strategies with structural outputs in elite sport. In China, scholars have noted that institutional coping mechanisms such as “closed-loop training” (封闭式集训) and the “bubble mechanism” (赛事泡泡: The closed-loop training refers to biosecure, sealed training camps and controlled competition environments implemented to reduce infection risk and maintain training continuity.) buffered short-term performance stability. However, structural concerns remain, including monotonous training methods, restricted talent selection, and uneven development across disciplines. Studies further suggest that the Chinese system’s strong centralization allowed rapid recovery in flagship sports, yet created vulnerabilities in youth development, marginal events, and female participation12. Beyond immediate competition outcomes, scholars have investigated how the pandemic disrupted established performance rhythms and institutional path dependencies, leading to resource reallocation and reprioritization within sport programs. Policy-oriented research also explored the role of government regulation and sports diplomacy, noting how pandemic responses were embedded in broader strategies of national image and international influence. Such findings reinforce the importance of interpreting world champions and records not merely as sporting results but as institutionalized outputs reflecting systemic logics. Despite this growing body of literature, key gaps remain. First, most existing studies emphasize disruptions in competitions, athletes, or governance structures, but few have systematically examined anomalies in the production of world champions and world records as structural indicators of elite sport resilience. Second, comparative research on pandemic-induced performance shifts often lacks a theoretical model integrating institutional resilience with critical juncture analysis. Finally, empirical studies on China’s high-performance sport achievements during 2020–2022 remain descriptive, without sufficiently linking anomalies to institutional logics and response mechanisms. Addressing these gaps, this study provides a structural and institutional interpretation of abnormal variations in China’s world champions and world records, contributing to both empirical evidence and theoretical development. To provide a theoretical foundation for interpreting output anomalies, we draw on institutional resilience and critical juncture literatures. Institutional resilience emphasizes how organizations maintain core functions under shock, highlighting buffering mechanisms, rapid resource reallocation, and adaptive stability. Critical juncture theory highlights how rare, high-impact events can open windows for institutional reconfiguration and path-dependent change. Framing world champions and world records as institutionalized outputs allows us to interpret temporal anomalies as signals of institutional buffering, substitution, or structural reallocation during the pandemic. Methods Study design This study adopts an embedded time-series observational strategy within a mixed-methods framework. Time-series strategies are particularly useful for capturing institutional dynamics and shock-induced deviations over continuous periods, allowing researchers to identify both short-term disruptions and long-term adaptive trends12,13. By embedding the time-series design within a mixed-methods framework, the study integrates quantitative fluctuation analysis with qualitative causal attribution, which enhances both internal validity and explanatory depth12,14. The overall observation period spans 2010 to 2024, with a focus on examining the impact and adjustment effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on China’s elite sports output during 2020–2022. The design builds on the cyclical nature of institutional operations and policy response rhythms, dividing the study period into three functional windows: Baseline period (2010–2019): representing stable output under pre-pandemic institutional norms; Impact period (2020–2022): capturing anomalous features of sports output under pandemic-induced pressures; Recovery period (2023–2024): reflecting institutional rebound and structural rebalancing post-pandemic. Data sources and processing To ensure systematization and authority, three primary categories of data were used: ①Official statistics: Annual records of world champions and world records published by the General Administration of Sport of China (GASC)15–18, supplemented by official athlete results and world record data from international federations (e.g., World Athletics, FINA, IWF). The inclusion criteria were: For"world champions”: athletes who won first place in officially sanctioned World Championships or Olympic Games (including Youth Olympic Games and Paralympics), or their equivalent in recognized federations. For “world records”: performances recognized and ratified by international federations or the International Olympic Committee. Event scope covered Olympic and Paralympic sports, as well as internationally recognized non-Olympic events where China maintains elite competitiveness (e.g., Wushu, Table Tennis). ②Media and publication supplements: Reports from state media (e.g., Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily), Olympic websites, federation archives, and official yearbooks, used to fill temporal markers and contextualize disruptions. ③Policy documents: COVID-19 related training policies, event arrangements, and safeguard measures issued by GASC, provincial bureaus, and the Chinese Olympic Committee since 2020. Key examples include the Tokyo 2020 Closed-Loop Training Protocol, Bubble Competition Management Measures, and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Safeguard Guidelines. Clarification on 2024 data and extraction window: Data for 2024 were included to capture early post-pandemic recovery dynamics. All 2024 entries reported in this manuscript were extracted and verified up to June 30, 2024 (data extraction date). Where a 2024 result remained provisional or pending final ratification by an international federation at the time of extraction, it was clearly labeled as preliminary in the dataset and treated as such in sensitivity checks and narrative statements. Main-text references to 2024 figures explicitly indicate when values are preliminary. This procedure ensures transparency about the temporal coverage and the relative certainty of post-pandemic recovery evidence. Data harmonization followed established practices in sports statistics. Procedures included normalization of athlete names, event titles, and competition identifiers, manual verification of conflicting entries, and cross-checks with official announcements. Appendices list verified and excluded samples for transparency. Data analysis methods This study employs a combined quantitative-descriptive and qualitative-attribution analytical framework: ①Trend analysis and anomaly detection: Annual time-series plots and growth rates were computed. Outliers were identified using Z-scores (|Z|≥2.0; extreme anomalies |Z|≥2.8), complemented by moving averages and robustness checks12. In addition to statistical thresholds, all flagged anomalies were qualitatively cross-checked against contemporaneous institutional documents, event calendars, and media reports. This ensured that quantitative outliers corresponded to substantive disruptions in the sporting system, rather than merely statistical noise. Multi-method anomaly detection and consensus rule: To reduce reliance on any single statistical assumption, anomaly detection combined multiple complementary techniques: parametric Z-score standardization, a robust median absolute deviation (MAD) rule, percentile-based thresholds, and a change-point detection algorithm (PELT) for structural breaks19,20. For count-based sensitivity, simple residual checks against Poisson/negative-binomial expectations were also inspected. We operationalize an anomaly consensus rule: a given year is treated as an anomalous window for an indicator (WC or WR) if it is independently flagged by at least three of these methods. This consensus approach balances sensitivity and specificity, mitigates single-method artifacts, and strengthens causal attributions to institutional interventions rather than sampling or distributional idiosyncrasies. Results reported in the main text apply this consensus rule; where an indicator is borderline under the consensus rule, we explicitly describe the constituent method outcomes and provide cautious interpretation. ②Structural decomposition: Anomalous years were disaggregated by event type, gender, and disability status. ③Qualitative attribution analysis: Quantitative anomalies were triangulated with policy evidence. For example, the sharp decline in 2020 corresponded with GASC’s suspension of international competitions and implementation of “封闭式集训” (closed-loop training), while the rebound in 2021 aligned with the Tokyo Olympic Preparation Plan15. Similarly, fluctuations in winter sports were cross-referenced with the Beijing 2022 Safeguard File. This triangulation allowed causal mechanisms to be inferred at the intersection of policy, institutional response, and output performance. All analyzes were performed in Python (pandas library) with reproducibility safeguards. Statistical methods and robustness checks: Anomaly detection combined four complementary approaches: (1) parametric Z-score standardization (Z = (x − µ)/σ; thresholds reported below), (2) a median absolute deviation (MAD) rule, (3) percentile-based thresholds, and (4) PELT change-point detection. Specifically, Z-scores were computed using the 2010–2024 series (reported means and SDs are in Appendix A); we treat |Z| ≥ 2.0 as an anomaly and |Z| ≥ 2.8 as an extreme anomaly, with sensitivity checks at alternate thresholds. MAD was computed as median(|xi − median|) and we applied a rule |xi − median|/MAD > 3 to flag outliers. Percentile thresholds used the bottom/top 2.5% as supplementary indicators. PELT was implemented with BIC penalty (implementation: Python ruptures package). We operationalize a consensus rule: a year is classified as anomalous if independently flagged by at least three methods. Robustness checks include varying moving-average window widths (3-year vs. 5-year), alternative threshold values, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (1,000 replications) for key year-to-year differences, and permutation tests comparing candidate anomaly windows to baseline periods. Count-distribution checks (Poisson dispersion and negative-binomial fit diagnostics) were performed where appropriate. Results Trends in world champion output To identify the systemic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on China’s sports output, this study examines the period from 2010 to 2024, focusing on fluctuations during the 2020–2022 impact window. The years 2010–2019 are defined as the baseline period, while 2023–2024 serve as the recovery period for comparative analysis. Overall, the trends indicate that the pandemic caused a short-term extreme shock followed by a medium-term recovery, demonstrating the resilience and reconstructive capacity of China’s sports system. During the baseline period (2010–2019), the annual number of Chinese world champions remained above 50, exhibiting a generally stable upward trend. The Olympic cycles of 2012 and 2016 formed two peak platforms, reflecting the typical cyclical surge associated with the Games. Traditional powerhouse sports such as table tennis, diving, weightlifting, and badminton constituted the main sources of champion output, accounting for over 40% of the average contribution. Additionally, emerging sports sporadically began to produce champions during this period; for example, taekwondo and skating achieved breakthroughs, while non-Olympic events such as Go and international chess maintained steady performance. During the pandemic impact period (2020–2022), the sports competition system experienced severe disruption. Notably, in 2020, major international events were almost entirely suspended. China produced only four world champions throughout the year—a decline exceeding 90% compared to 2019—marking the lowest output in nearly three decades. Among these, only the Table Tennis World Cup, the Samsung Cup in Go, and the Women’s World Chess Championship were successfully held domestically or online, representing the residual operation of the sports output system under “minimum configuration.” This year stands as a systemic low point in the history of Chinese elite sports development. In 2021, due to the postponement of the Tokyo Olympic Games, China achieved a rapid rebound, securing 67 Olympic gold medals along with several championships in non-Olympic events. The total number of world champions recovered to over 80% of the pre-pandemic level. Key contributions came from policy-prioritized sports such as diving, weightlifting, and shooting, highlighting the strong restorative capacity of the sports governance system. Although the pandemic persisted in 2022, international single-sport events gradually resumed and regional-level competitions were held intensively. The annual champion output remained within a relatively stable range, signaling that the sports output system had entered a “stable recovery phase.” During the recovery period (2023–2024), as the pandemic’s impact largely subsided and international competitions fully resumed, China’s sports system demonstrated a “structural revival” in output capacity. The 2023 Hangzhou Asian Games served as a regional surge event, while the 2024 Paris Olympic Games further propelled the number of champions upward. Preliminary data suggest that the total number of world champions in 2024 is expected to return to levels comparable to 2016, fully confirming the high elasticity and institutional resilience of China’s sports system. The trend is illustrated in the figure below. Figure 1 illustrates a stable high-level plateau from 2010 to 2019. In 2020, the number of world champions sharply declined to only 4 due to the pandemic. In 2021, supported by the postponed Olympic Games and targeted policy measures, the number rebounded anomalously to 67. From 2022 onward, the output entered a stable recovery phase. Fig. 1Trend of China’s World Champion Output. Notes: Annual count of China’s World Champions (WC) from 2010 to 2024. Data sources are consistent with those listed in the manuscript (GASC records, international federation archives, and official yearbooks). The value for 2024 is preliminary (data extracted up to 30 June 2024). The figure presents raw annual counts (points) and highlights the main trend discussed in the text. Interpretation of the 2021 rebound should be considered together with Table 1 (policy timeline) and the outlier-detection results in Appendix A to avoid over-attribution. Trend of China’s World Champion Output. Notes: Annual count of China’s World Champions (WC) from 2010 to 2024. Data sources are consistent with those listed in the manuscript (GASC records, international federation archives, and official yearbooks). The value for 2024 is preliminary (data extracted up to 30 June 2024). The figure presents raw annual counts (points) and highlights the main trend discussed in the text. Interpretation of the 2021 rebound should be considered together with Table 1 (policy timeline) and the outlier-detection results in Appendix A to avoid over-attribution. Overall, the change follows a four-stage pattern: plateau—cliff drop—rebound—reconstruction. This pattern reflects the sensitivity of China’s sports system to external shocks and its institutional capacity for repair. The world champion output curve demonstrates a clear four-phase structure, with 2020 as the most significant structural breakpoint. This shift is not solely attributable to the pandemic itself but also highlights China’s high dependency on the international competition system and the inertia of its “winning through competitions” mechanism. Institutional responses—including rapid policy intervention, safeguarding of key sports, and incubation of emerging events—jointly built a structural adjustment capacity for sports output under the pandemic context. Changes in world records Compared to annual world champion output, world records better reflect sports’ capacity for “extreme breakthroughs,” making them a critical indicator of national competitive level and the forefront of training systems. Based on statistics of world records set by Chinese athletes from 2010 to 2024, this study finds that world record changes under pandemic impact exhibit an abnormal structural fluctuation pattern characterized by stagnation—surge—correction, demonstrating high dependency, sensitivity, and risks of structural shifts. During the baseline period (2010–2019), Chinese athletes broke over 70 world records in total, averaging 6–8 per year. This showed a growth trend closely coordinated with training rhythms, competition density, and technological progress. Weightlifting remained the dominant contributor to record outputs, while swimming, shooting, and other sports also saw multiple breakthroughs. Some records were set during international events hosted domestically or Olympic cycle adjustment years, maintaining an overall stable structure. In 2020, the outbreak year of the pandemic, world record counts nearly plummeted to zero. Due to widespread event cancellations, qualification round suspensions, and restrictions on testing systems globally, China broke only one internationally recognized world record all year—the lowest since 2000. This phenomenon marks a systemic halt in sports performance and validates the world record’s reliance on a triple condition: competition environment, rule verification, and technical measurement. In 2021, with the Tokyo Olympics held as rescheduled, Chinese athletes concentrated record-breaking performances in weightlifting, swimming, and shooting, with over 10 records set throughout the year—at times surpassing the 2016 Olympic peak. Although the results appeared remarkable, it is important to note that most records emerged within a controlled competition environment featuring closed-loop management, pandemic prevention protocols, and no spectators. Some sports faced controversies over competitive fairness and data standard compatibility due to changes in testing equipment or international referee deployment. This “controlled surge” phenomenon suggests that under special circumstances, record breakthroughs may not fully originate from training improvements but could be influenced by factors such as reduced psychological pressure, enhanced venue adaptation, and fluctuations in measurement tolerance. From late 2022 into 2023, as international competitions gradually normalized, China’s world record output began to return to pre-pandemic average levels. Although the 2023 Hangzhou Asian Games was a regional event, record output was limited due to international certification constraints. On the eve of the 2024 Paris Olympics, record numbers rebounded, and the overall structure returned to a rational distribution. This pattern demonstrates the system’s capacity for self-correction following short-term structural fluctuations. The trend is depicted in the figure below. Fig. 2Trend of World Records Broken by Chinese Athletes. Notes: Annual number of officially recognized World Records (WR) set by Chinese athletes (2010–2024), based on final confirmation by international federations and the IOC/IPC. The 2024 entry is preliminary as described in the manuscript. Because world record recognition depends on certified events, measurement procedures, and officiating, the 2020 trough and the localized concentration of breakthroughs in 2021 should be interpreted in conjunction with the “controlled/closed-loop competitions” discussion in the Results and Discussion sections. Trend of World Records Broken by Chinese Athletes. Notes: Annual number of officially recognized World Records (WR) set by Chinese athletes (2010–2024), based on final confirmation by international federations and the IOC/IPC. The 2024 entry is preliminary as described in the manuscript. Because world record recognition depends on certified events, measurement procedures, and officiating, the 2020 trough and the localized concentration of breakthroughs in 2021 should be interpreted in conjunction with the “controlled/closed-loop competitions” discussion in the Results and Discussion sections. As shown in Figure 2, the annual number of world records held steady between 6 and 8 from 2010 to 2019. In 2020, due to the pandemic, this number nearly dropped to zero, with only one record set. In 2021, there was a concentrated surge with over 10 records broken, although most occurred under a controlled competition environment, raising questions about their substantive value. After 2022, the number declined back to normal levels, indicating that world record production is highly dependent on competition environment and institutional conditions. In summary, China’s world record output during the pandemic exhibits a typical environment-sensitive fluctuation pattern: record-breaking capacity nearly stalled in 2020, rebounded sharply under “controlled advantages” in 2021, and gradually returned to normal from 2022 onward. This trend carries a cautionary implication: world records not only represent the pinnacle of athletic capability but also are outcomes jointly regulated by institutional, technological, and environmental systems. Therefore, record data from anomalous years must be interpreted cautiously within the context of structural conditions and background environments, to avoid overestimating institutional effectiveness or misreading the true limits of athletic performance. Structural disparities Under the highly uncertain conditions induced by the pandemic, the elasticity and recovery capacity of sports output varied significantly across gender, population groups, and event categories, manifesting as structural imbalances. Based on event-level data of world champions and world records from 2010 to 2024, this study finds that the pandemic’s impact on China’s sports output was neither linear nor homogeneous. Instead, it revealed a tensional structure between “resilience—vulnerability” and “core—periphery” across dimensions of gender, disability status, event type, and Olympic affiliation. Firstly, in terms of gender, female sports demonstrated notable resistance to the pandemic shock. For instance, in 2020, only four world champions were produced nationwide, with female athletes accounting for two (the Women’s Table Tennis World Cup and the Women’s World Chess Championship), representing 50%. This proportion remained above 47% in 2021, significantly outpacing the recovery rate of male-dominated events. This pattern can be partly explained by the concentration of female events in China’s traditional strengths (e.g., diving, gymnastics, weightlifting), whose training and selection systems remained relatively stable. It may also reflect more mature psychological coping and recovery mechanisms among female athletes during the pandemic. Secondly, some para-sports not only withstood the pandemic impact but experienced slight growth. For example, at the 2021 Tokyo Paralympics, the Chinese delegation set multiple historical bests, achieving peak gold medal and record counts. This “peripheral surge” pattern suggests that para-sports, traditionally on the institutional margins, received concentrated support and a resource allocation window during the pandemic, partially activating their developmental potential and demonstrating an institutional compensation logic for vulnerable groups. However, such “structural elasticity” was not universal. Data indicate that the pandemic severely affected non-Olympic and peripheral niche sports, such as dragon boat, wushu, bridge, Go, and international chess. Particularly, events relying heavily on international head-to-head competitions and offline mechanisms were nearly completely suspended between 2020 and 2022, with world champion output close to zero. Even traditional strengths like Go produced only one champion in 2020 (Samsung Cup), with no output in 2021 and 2022 due to event cancellations or postponements. Meanwhile, some events lost “valid competition scenarios” due to canceled international certifications or participation restrictions, causing systemic data discontinuities. Moreover, from an event distribution density perspective, championship events became more concentrated during the pandemic. In 2021, world champions were predominantly from Olympic core sports such as table tennis, diving, shooting, and weightlifting. These sports often maintain independent domestic training environments and event regulation authority, enabling rapid transitions between “closed-loop training” and “bubble competitions.” In contrast, disciplines like athletics and swimming, which rely heavily on international tour point systems, saw their output significantly constrained, exposing a structural contradiction: high system coupling correlates with weaker resilience under pressure. Fig. 3Event Type—Pandemic Impact Intensity Matrix (2020–2022). Notes: Event-type × pandemic-impact intensity matrix (2020–2022). Axes conceptually represent the “dependence on international competition/institutionalization level” and “output elasticity/resilience under pandemic conditions.” Categories are based on structural decomposition of output changes and triangulation with policy and media evidence (see Sect. "Structural disparities" and Table 2). The matrix functions as a conceptual visualization tool rather than a precise quantitative classification. For journal submission, it is recommended to indicate that categorization criteria derive from the study’s analytical framework and triangulated evidence. Event Type—Pandemic Impact Intensity Matrix (2020–2022). Notes: Event-type × pandemic-impact intensity matrix (2020–2022). Axes conceptually represent the “dependence on international competition/institutionalization level” and “output elasticity/resilience under pandemic conditions.” Categories are based on structural decomposition of output changes and triangulation with policy and media evidence (see Sect. "Structural disparities" and Table 2). The matrix functions as a conceptual visualization tool rather than a precise quantitative classification. For journal submission, it is recommended to indicate that categorization criteria derive from the study’s analytical framework and triangulated evidence. This matrix visually illustrates the differentiated resilience of various sports event types in China during the COVID-19 pandemic. Core Olympic sports maintained stable output throughout the pandemic. Non-Olympic events dominated by female athletes demonstrated a certain degree of resilience, while para-sports experienced moderate growth driven by targeted policy incentives. In contrast, niche events heavily reliant on international competitions were almost completely suspended, revealing uneven recovery capabilities across the sports structure during the crisis. In summary, the pandemic-induced shock to the sports system did not manifest as a uniform decline but rather as a structural and group-specific uneven response. Female sports and para-sports showed relative resilience under specific conditions; core Olympic sports maintained stability through resource concentration, whereas peripheral and non-Olympic events faced institutional “hibernation.” This disparity pattern warns sports governance bodies that emergency mechanisms and resource allocation must consider the elasticity and recovery capacity distributed unevenly across event types, to avoid reinforcing structural marginalization in times of crisis. Anomaly detection and attribution pathways To identify structural anomalies in sports output during the pandemic, this study combined annual data on World Champions (WC) and World Records (WR) with Z-score outlier analysis and moving average comparisons (details on thresholds, window settings, and robustness checks are provided in Sect. 3.3 and Appendix A). Quantitative results indicate a significant negative anomaly in 2020 across multiple methods, followed by a strong structural rebound in 2021, although the latter was not classified as an extreme outlier under all statistical thresholds (see full classification table in Appendix A). Although the parametric Z-score for the 2021 WC series does not exceed the strict |Z| ≥ 2.0 threshold (Z-score ≈ − 1.10), we apply a multi-method anomaly detection and a consensus rule to enhance robustness. Specifically, in addition to Z-scores we used median absolute deviation (MAD), percentile-based thresholds, and change-point detection (PELT). A year is classified as an anomalous window if it is independently flagged by at least three of these complementary methods. Under this consensus rule, 2021 was detected by MAD, percentile ranking, and change-point analysis. Crucially, this multi-method statistical signal aligns temporally with targeted institutional interventions (postponement of Tokyo 2020, deployment of closed-loop training, and domestic substitution competitions; see Table 1) and with sport-level concentration of gains in core Olympic disciplines. Therefore, we interpret 2021 as a structural rebound window—an institutionally mediated surge—while maintaining cautious, evidence-linked language in subsequent attribution. Below is a key timeline of related policies and events (Table 1) to assist readers in contextualizing the subsequent attribution analysis. These quantitative anomalies were cross-validated through qualitative inspection of competition schedules and policy announcements. For instance, the 2020–2021 decline coincided with widespread event cancellations and travel restrictions, supporting that the detected outliers reflected genuine institutional shocks. Table 1Key policy documents and corresponding event nodes (2020–2022).Date (Month/Year)Policy documentIssuing bodyRelated Event/Outcome01/2020Notice on Strengthening Safety Management in the Sports System during Epidemic Prevention and ControlGASCNationwide suspension of sports events; most training squads under closed management06/2020Interim Measures for Closed-Loop Training Management of National TeamsGASC Competitive Sports DepartmentCore sports entered “bubble mechanism” closed-loop training to maintain Olympic preparation12/2020Work Plan for Coordinating Tokyo Olympic Preparation and Epidemic PreventionGASCPriority guarantee list for Olympic events; suspension of some non-Olympic events03/2021Regulations on Tokyo Olympic Selection and Epidemic Prevention ManagementChinese Olympic CommitteeDomestic simulation results included in Olympic selection and World Champion certification08/2021Epidemic Prevention and Event Operation Plan for the 14th National GamesOrganizing Committee of the 14th National GamesNational Games held under closed-loop conditions, producing several world records04/2022Notice on Coordinating Epidemic Prevention and Sports Events ResumptionGASCGradual graded resumption of some international and domestic events; output data normalizedNotes: Timeline of major national and General Administration of Sport (GASC) policy documents and corresponding event or system-level outcomes (2020–2022). These documents constitute key evidence used for qualitative triangulation of anomaly years (WC/WR anomalies). The table does not exhaust all related documents; readers should refer to later policy updates mentioned in the manuscript. Original sources and links are provided in the references and footnotes. Table 1Key policy documents and corresponding event nodes (2020–2022).Date (Month/Year)Policy documentIssuing bodyRelated Event/Outcome01/2020Notice on Strengthening Safety Management in the Sports System during Epidemic Prevention and ControlGASCNationwide suspension of sports events; most training squads under closed management06/2020Interim Measures for Closed-Loop Training Management of National TeamsGASC Competitive Sports DepartmentCore sports entered “bubble mechanism” closed-loop training to maintain Olympic preparation12/2020Work Plan for Coordinating Tokyo Olympic Preparation and Epidemic PreventionGASCPriority guarantee list for Olympic events; suspension of some non-Olympic events03/2021Regulations on Tokyo Olympic Selection and Epidemic Prevention ManagementChinese Olympic CommitteeDomestic simulation results included in Olympic selection and World Champion certification08/2021Epidemic Prevention and Event Operation Plan for the 14th National GamesOrganizing Committee of the 14th National GamesNational Games held under closed-loop conditions, producing several world records04/2022Notice on Coordinating Epidemic Prevention and Sports Events ResumptionGASCGradual graded resumption of some international and domestic events; output data normalizedNotes: Timeline of major national and General Administration of Sport (GASC) policy documents and corresponding event or system-level outcomes (2020–2022). These documents constitute key evidence used for qualitative triangulation of anomaly years (WC/WR anomalies). The table does not exhaust all related documents; readers should refer to later policy updates mentioned in the manuscript. Original sources and links are provided in the references and footnotes. Key policy documents and corresponding event nodes (2020–2022). Notes: Timeline of major national and General Administration of Sport (GASC) policy documents and corresponding event or system-level outcomes (2020–2022). These documents constitute key evidence used for qualitative triangulation of anomaly years (WC/WR anomalies). The table does not exhaust all related documents; readers should refer to later policy updates mentioned in the manuscript. Original sources and links are provided in the references and footnotes. In quantitative identification, this study standardized the 2010–2024 WC and WR time series using Z-scores and compared 3-year centered moving averages, supplementing with median absolute deviation (MAD) and percentile methods as nonparametric robustness checks. Key findings are: 2020: WC = 4, corresponding Z-score ≈ −2.64 (mean ≈ 112.27, SD ≈ 41.00 for 2010–2024); WR = 1, Z-score ≈ −2.33. Multiple methods including Z-score, MAD, and percentile identified these as significant negative anomalies. This year reflects a systemic shock characterized by near cessation of competition systems, absence of international contests, and disruption of athlete selection pathways. 2021: WC = 67, a strong rebound compared to 2020, with a Z-score ≈ −1.10, which does not meet the |Z| ≥ 2.0 threshold for extreme outliers. Thus, the rebound should be interpreted as a structural rebound/anomaly window rather than an extreme statistical outlier. WR also increased in 2021 but some records were influenced by competition environments (closed-loop matches, absent opponents, certification adjustments) and should be interpreted cautiously within the institutional context. Based on this quantitative identification, qualitative attribution analysis identified three main causal mechanisms: “Bubble Mechanism” at Training Centers — During epidemic lockdowns, national training centers maintained training continuity and cyclic preparation through closed-loop management. For core Olympic events (e.g., table tennis, weightlifting, diving) with established domestic training and certification systems, this mechanism largely prevented talent pipeline disruption, enabling relatively stable champion and record production. “Internal Regulation” of Event Scheduling — In the context of stalled or restricted international events, national sports authorities strengthened authorization over domestic event certification, rescheduling, and alternative point/qualification arrangements (e.g., 2021 Olympic athlete selection and point substitution), allowing some events to validate results domestically or regionally, maintaining output continuity. “Systemic Low Pressure” due to International Competition Absence — The withdrawal or reduced participation of many traditional powerhouse teams created a “competitive vacuum” in some international events. This led to decreased substantive value of some champions and records, and short-term changes in competition conditions (participant composition, equipment, referee arrangements). Therefore, some 2021 high outputs must be interpreted cautiously in a dual context of competition environment and certification mechanisms. (All three mechanisms correspond to documents/events listed in Table 1, facilitating cross-validation.) Table 2Anomaly attribution matrix of sports output under COVID-19 (2020–2022).DimensionAnomaly PatternsCausal MechanismsWorld Champions OutputSharp decline to 4 in 2020 (Z < −2.8); rebound to 67 in 2021Extreme drop and anomalous rebound reflect coupling rhythm between pandemic impact and institutional regulationWorld Record TrendsRecord stagnation in 2020; concentrated breakthrough in 2021 but not fully matching Olympic peaksPost-pandemic “fatigue burst” and international absence causing certification bias; risk of “pseudo-high output” misinterpretationEvent DistributionNon-Olympic event suspension; concentration on core Olympic events; increased champion concentrationNational policy resource prioritization and internal simulation of event qualification leading to temporary event concentrationGender and Group StructureStable female output; some para-sports growth against trendInstitutional support stability and high group adaptability enhancing resilienceInstitutional Flexibility“Bubble mechanism” closed training ensured uninterrupted output in table tennis, diving, etc.National training centers formed dual-track “closed-loop training and simulated competition” protectionGlobal Competitive GapAbsence of Western powerhouse teams; some competitions became “home field”; the substantive competitive depth of events was likely reduced due to attenuated international participationLoss of international contest context demands cautious interpretation of champion data under “low pressure” environmentNotes: The anomaly-attribution matrix links output types (WC, WR, event distribution, gender/group composition, etc.) with inferred causal mechanisms such as “bubble systems,” “domestic substitute competitions,” or “reduced international exposure.” Mechanism assignment is based on (1) multi-method statistical outlier detection (Appendix A), (2) policy-timeline evidence (Table 1), and (3) triangulation with event reports and archival/media materials. Conclusions represent inferential attributions; the manuscript clarifies their status as evidence-based explanatory interpretations rather than deterministic causal findings. Table 2Anomaly attribution matrix of sports output under COVID-19 (2020–2022).DimensionAnomaly PatternsCausal MechanismsWorld Champions OutputSharp decline to 4 in 2020 (Z < −2.8); rebound to 67 in 2021Extreme drop and anomalous rebound reflect coupling rhythm between pandemic impact and institutional regulationWorld Record TrendsRecord stagnation in 2020; concentrated breakthrough in 2021 but not fully matching Olympic peaksPost-pandemic “fatigue burst” and international absence causing certification bias; risk of “pseudo-high output” misinterpretationEvent DistributionNon-Olympic event suspension; concentration on core Olympic events; increased champion concentrationNational policy resource prioritization and internal simulation of event qualification leading to temporary event concentrationGender and Group StructureStable female output; some para-sports growth against trendInstitutional support stability and high group adaptability enhancing resilienceInstitutional Flexibility“Bubble mechanism” closed training ensured uninterrupted output in table tennis, diving, etc.National training centers formed dual-track “closed-loop training and simulated competition” protectionGlobal Competitive GapAbsence of Western powerhouse teams; some competitions became “home field”; the substantive competitive depth of events was likely reduced due to attenuated international participationLoss of international contest context demands cautious interpretation of champion data under “low pressure” environmentNotes: The anomaly-attribution matrix links output types (WC, WR, event distribution, gender/group composition, etc.) with inferred causal mechanisms such as “bubble systems,” “domestic substitute competitions,” or “reduced international exposure.” Mechanism assignment is based on (1) multi-method statistical outlier detection (Appendix A), (2) policy-timeline evidence (Table 1), and (3) triangulation with event reports and archival/media materials. Conclusions represent inferential attributions; the manuscript clarifies their status as evidence-based explanatory interpretations rather than deterministic causal findings. Anomaly attribution matrix of sports output under COVID-19 (2020–2022). Notes: The anomaly-attribution matrix links output types (WC, WR, event distribution, gender/group composition, etc.) with inferred causal mechanisms such as “bubble systems,” “domestic substitute competitions,” or “reduced international exposure.” Mechanism assignment is based on (1) multi-method statistical outlier detection (Appendix A), (2) policy-timeline evidence (Table 1), and (3) triangulation with event reports and archival/media materials. Conclusions represent inferential attributions; the manuscript clarifies their status as evidence-based explanatory interpretations rather than deterministic causal findings. Table 2 systematically summarizes core anomalies and their causes in China’s sports output during the pandemic: extreme decline in 2020; abnormal rebound in 2021; concentrated world record surge with certification bias; event distribution centralization; resilience and growth in female and para-sports. The main mechanisms include bubble training, internal event regulation, and the international competitive gap. Cross-dimensional analysis of champion counts, record trends, event structure, group characteristics, and institutional regulation reveals a coupled logic of “high-pressure lockdown—system response—phase rebound”: core Olympic events maintained resilience via bubble mechanisms; non-Olympic events nearly halted due to resource contraction; female and para-sports showed relative robustness or growth under institutional compensation. These conclusions are empirically grounded in national achievement data and policy documents. Integrating the timeline of policy events in Table 1 with the anomaly attribution in Table 2, it is clear that the pandemic’s impact on Chinese sports output was not a simple suppressive effect. Instead, it manifested through the coupled dynamics of institutional regulation (training bubbles, event substitution, resource prioritization) and event adaptability, evolving as a process of “rigid decline—elastic rebound—structural shift.” It is important to emphasize that the quantitative findings, especially the significant 2020 drop, have been validated through multiple robustness tests. The 2021 rebound should be described as a structural rebound or anomaly window, always interpreted with reference to institutional interventions (Table 1) and year-by-year classification data (Appendix A). Discussion Institutional resilience and systemic stress tolerance Interpreting the results through institutional resilience and critical juncture frameworks clarifies the causal pathways observed. In this study, closed-loop training and prioritized resource allocation function as short-term buffering mechanisms (institutional resilience), whereas the 2020–2021 window may operate as a critical juncture that temporarily reconfigured output structures. Below we explicitly map the empirical findings onto these theoretical constructs. The results revealed a dynamic trajectory characterized by a dramatic contraction of world champions in 2020, a sharp rebound in 2021, and partial stabilization in 2022. These trends suggest that the pandemic functioned not as a linear suppressor but as a systemic stress test, forcing the Chinese sports system into cycles of contraction, compensation, and selective recovery. The following discussion contextualizes these findings within institutional resilience theory and international comparative evidence. This study finds that even during the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2022, China’s sports system maintained continuous championship outputs in core events such as table tennis, weightlifting, and diving. This resilience reflects the high organizational capacity and systemic robustness of the national sports apparatus under extreme conditions. Specifically, the centralized training system combined with the “bubble mechanism” (closed-loop training) effectively isolated external risks, ensuring the stability of training schedules and talent selection. This capability established a “stable output band” for select sports. These findings align closely with recent research on the resilience of state-led sports systems. Studies indicate that China’s national team system possesses rapid institutional response and efficient resource reallocation capacities, allowing it to maintain continuity during crises. In contrast, market- or community-driven systems are more vulnerable to training disruptions and talent loss21. Internationally, this distinction was especially apparent during the pandemic: countries like the UK and Canada, centered on multi-club structures, experienced prolonged training interruptions due to lockdowns, forcing some elite athletes to self-organize training venues. Meanwhile, countries with strong state-led models such as Russia and Iran sustained output stability in select key sports. Furthermore, China’s sports system demonstrated not only “organizational centralization” but also adaptive capacity at the resource level. For example, in 2021 when most domestic training facilities were closed, national centers in Beijing, Weihai, and Chengdu maintained training regimens through closed management, securing core Olympic preparations. This mirrors Russia’s approach during the pandemic, where closed national training camps preserved training continuity in figure skating and wrestling, demonstrating a dual characteristic of “institutional rigidity” combined with “operational flexibility”. The study also identifies a “selective institutional output,” where more centralized and better-supported programs showed stronger resistance to external shocks. Research on Beijing Winter Olympics preparation found that highly institutionalized events (e.g., short track speed skating, ski jumping) preserved nearly 90% of their training load during the pandemic, while peripheral sports saw average training reductions over 40%. Internationally, market-driven systems such as in the US faced dramatic performance fluctuations and event cancellations in sports reliant on commercial circuits, such as skiing and athletics, highlighting how institutional differences directly affect output resilience. Therefore, China’s “stable output band” not only exemplifies the advantage of institutional concentration but also reveals a crucial capacity of national sports systems in managing global crises: their “institutional stress tolerance” and “resource transformation efficiency.” This resilience framework not only underpins the achievement of national sports strategies but also offers theoretical reference for building high-resilience sports systems in other developing countries. This pattern corresponds with institutional resilience theory, which emphasizes adaptive stability in times of crisis3. Comparable dynamics have been observed in Russia’s national training camps and Iran’s wrestling programs, where centralized authority allowed continuity under extreme restrictions. These cross-national cases demonstrate that resilience is not a uniquely Chinese outcome but part of a broader institutional logic whereby state-centered systems maintain continuity under exogenous shocks. Structural logic of anomalous fluctuations This study systematically analyzes World Champion and World Record data from 2020 to 2022, finding that China’s sports output did not decline linearly but exhibited atypical “anomalous prosperity.” Despite a sharp reduction in overall events and suspension of most non-core programs, core Olympic and some nationally prioritized sports experienced structural growth supported by closed-loop training and institutionally regulated event reproduction. This “substitution prosperity” predominantly reflects institutional output compensation rather than reliance on international competition22. Such divergence indicates heterogeneous system responses driven by program-specific institutional dependencies. Key factors for sustaining championship output under pandemic stress include training resource concentration, dependence on international competitions, and robustness of internal certification mechanisms. For instance, table tennis and weightlifting possess comprehensive domestic selection and certification frameworks, enabling “world champion” recognition through internal national team simulations even when international events halted. This resembles approaches by some small European countries (e.g., Norway, the Netherlands) that replaced international points with domestic competitions in winter sports; however, their smaller athlete bases and limited internal competition constrained the compensatory effect compared to China. Notably, in 2021, the rebound to 67 world champions was driven not by full event resumption but by enhanced institutional control over event scheduling and replacement competitions. In contrast, Australia and Japan, despite resuming some domestic events, experienced limited performance rebounds due to reduced international participation. This international disparity underscores how central scheduling and internal substitution mechanisms variably support output data under different governance models. Therefore, while institutional compensation creates a “production illusion” in data, it also complicates performance evaluation logic. Where we use terms such as “policy-driven pseudo-performance” or “controlled surge,” these are purposely cautious characterization. They are grounded in a triangulation of evidence: (1) multi-method statistical identification under the consensus rule (see Methods, Sect. 3.3), (2) sport-level decomposition showing concentrated gains in a limited set of disciplines, and (3) temporal co-occurrence with documented institutional measures (Table 1). Accordingly, such labels denote potential institutional configuration effects on output (competition environment, certification arrangements, participant composition) rather than categorical judgments about athletes’ intrinsic performance quality. We therefore qualify these findings throughout the Discussion and recommend further athlete-level verification (physiological, longitudinal) before drawing stronger claims about substantive performance improvements. Balancing competitive authenticity and system stability within the “domestic simulation—international certification” model emerges as a critical reform challenge9. Policy documents issued by the General Administration of Sport in 2020 and 2021 explicitly mandated the use of “domestic substitution competitions” (国内替代赛事) to maintain championship legitimacy. Cross-referencing these directives confirms that anomalous prosperity was institutionally engineered rather than organically produced (State General Administration of Sport, 2021). Similar practices occurred in Norway and the Netherlands, but their smaller population bases limited substitution effectiveness. Sustainability of performance surges and institutional costs Although China’s world champion count surged anomalously to 67 in 2021, the sustainability and structural stability of this growth warrant careful scrutiny. International experience suggests that rapid performance increases during crises often coincide with risks such as resource overconcentration, intensified elite selection pressures, and damage to grassroots sports ecosystems. For example, Brazil’s heavy resource focus on medal-potential events post-2016 Rio Olympics sustained short-term success but led to long-term declines in mass sports participation, contrasting with China’s post-pandemic structural concentration. The concentration of output in institutionalized sports like table tennis, weightlifting, and diving—facilitated through “closed-loop training and sealed competition” pathways—while ensuring short-term gains, exposes risks related to administrative dependency and program homogeneity. Similar patterns occurred in Russia and Iran, where key sports sustained output but peripheral programs declined, narrowing overall competitive diversity. In the post-pandemic “concentrated recovery training” phase, some programs faced increased injury risks and talent pool shrinkage due to dense competition schedules and high training loads. Concurrently, the credibility of performance certifications diminished due to limited international competition context; some championship titles were earned only in Asian or domestic events. This phenomenon appeared in countries like Canada and South Korea, where domestic isolation led to “closed-loop” cycles, raising concerns over performance authenticity. In summary, this institutional concentration-driven short-term surge can realize goal attainment but risks falling into a “cyclic excitement—structural exhaustion” trap without timely adjustment of output structures and evaluation criteria. This study supplements existing literature by highlighting institutional feedback mechanisms, emphasizing the necessity to evaluate short-term results within a systemic balance and sustainability framework. The long-term risks identified—such as narrowed diversity and performance authenticity concerns—are not unique to China. Brazil after Rio 2016 and South Korea during pandemic isolation experienced comparable patterns of short-term concentration at the expense of long-term grassroots vitality. This comparative lens reinforces the necessity of balancing short-term resilience with sustainable system-wide development. Limitations and future research directions Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the classification of “world champions” relied on definitions sanctioned by international federations, which may vary across sports. Second, the qualitative attribution analysis primarily referenced national-level policy documents; future research should incorporate interviews with athletes and coaches to triangulate interpretations. Third, while this study adopted a mixed-methods approach, the relatively small sample size (2010–2024) constrained the robustness of advanced econometric modeling. Future research could expand in three directions. Cross-country comparative studies are needed to examine how different governance models—state-led versus market-oriented—mediate pandemic shocks. Longitudinal research extending into the 2024 Paris Olympics and beyond could clarify the sustainability of institutional compensations. Finally, incorporating athlete welfare indicators (mental health, injury rates) would provide a more holistic evaluation of system resilience, as highlighted in international sport governance literature23. Conclusion This study systematically examined the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on China’s sports output between 2010 and 2024, identifying a dynamic “cliff—rebound—structural shift” pattern. Rather than a uniform decline, the pandemic induced selective contractions and compensatory surges, reflecting both the strengths and vulnerabilities of China’s centralized sports system. Specifically, world champion numbers fell sharply in 2020 but rebounded anomalously in 2021, supported by bubble training and substitution mechanisms. Core Olympic sports demonstrated institutional resilience, while peripheral programs contracted significantly. These findings reveal how external shocks reshape institutional pathways, highlighting both resilience capacities and risks of structural imbalance. The key findings reported here (notably the 2020 collapse and 2021 rebound window) are robust to alternative anomaly detection procedures and to sensitivity checks that treat preliminary 2024 entries conservatively. Where we rely on preliminary 2024 data, this is explicitly stated and interpreted cautiously. The study contributes to sports governance research by empirically demonstrating how state-led systems negotiate crises through institutional compensation and resource reallocation. It provides evidence that resilience in elite sport is multidimensional—encompassing stability, adaptability, and sustainability. While the findings are contextualized in China, they offer a reference point for other nations seeking to design resilient sports governance systems under conditions of uncertainty. Appendix See Tables 3 and 4. Figs 4, 5, 6 and 7. Table 3Summary of outlier identification for china’s world champions (WC), 2010–2024.YearWCZZ > = 2.0Z > = 2.5Z > = 2.8MAD_mzMAD_flagPct_flagMA3Consensus2010108−0.104NoNoNo0.000NoNoNo20111380.628NoNoNo1.265NoNo117.67No2012107−0.128NoNoNo−0.042NoNo123.00No20131240.286NoNoNo0.674NoNo109.67No201498−0.348NoNoNo−0.422NoNo116.33No20151270.359NoNoNo0.801NoNo110.33No2016106−0.153NoNoNo−0.084NoNo113.33No2017107−0.128NoNoNo−0.042NoNo110.33No20181180.140NoNoNo0.422NoNo117.67No20191280.384NoNoNo0.843NoNo83.33No20204−2.641YesYesNo−4.384YesYes66.33Yes202167−1.104NoNoNo−1.728NoNo54.67No202293−0.470NoNoNo−0.632NoNo108.33No20231651.286NoNoNo2.403NoNo150.67No20241941.993NoNoNo3.625YesYesNoNotes:Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data. Columns "Z≥2.0/2.5/2.8" indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods. Table 3Summary of outlier identification for china’s world champions (WC), 2010–2024.YearWCZZ > = 2.0Z > = 2.5Z > = 2.8MAD_mzMAD_flagPct_flagMA3Consensus2010108−0.104NoNoNo0.000NoNoNo20111380.628NoNoNo1.265NoNo117.67No2012107−0.128NoNoNo−0.042NoNo123.00No20131240.286NoNoNo0.674NoNo109.67No201498−0.348NoNoNo−0.422NoNo116.33No20151270.359NoNoNo0.801NoNo110.33No2016106−0.153NoNoNo−0.084NoNo113.33No2017107−0.128NoNoNo−0.042NoNo110.33No20181180.140NoNoNo0.422NoNo117.67No20191280.384NoNoNo0.843NoNo83.33No20204−2.641YesYesNo−4.384YesYes66.33Yes202167−1.104NoNoNo−1.728NoNo54.67No202293−0.470NoNoNo−0.632NoNo108.33No20231651.286NoNoNo2.403NoNo150.67No20241941.993NoNoNo3.625YesYesNoNotes:Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data. Columns "Z≥2.0/2.5/2.8" indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods. Summary of outlier identification for china’s world champions (WC), 2010–2024. Notes:Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data. Columns "Z≥2.0/2.5/2.8" indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods. Table 4Summary of outlier identification for china’s world records (WR), 2010–2024. Notes:Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data. Columns "Z≥2.0/2.5/2.8" indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods.YearWRZZ > = 2.0Z > = 2.5Z > = 2.8MAD_mzMAD_flagPct_flagMA3Consensus2010150.617NoNoNo0.674NoNoNo20118−0.856NoNoNo−0.899NoNo12.33No2012140.407NoNoNo0.450NoNo11.67No2013130.196NoNoNo0.225NoNo12.33No201410−0.435NoNoNo−0.450NoNo11.67No201512−0.014NoNoNo0.000NoNo9.33No20166−1.276NoNoNo−1.349NoNo9.00No20179−0.645NoNoNo−0.674NoNo10.00No2018150.617NoNoNo0.674NoNo13.33No2019160.827NoNoNo0.899NoNo10.67No20201−2.328YesNoNo−2.473NoYes9.67No202112−0.014NoNoNo0.000NoNo8.00No202211−0.224NoNoNo−0.225NoNo14.33No2023201.669NoNoNo1.799NoYes16.67No2024191.459NoNoNo1.574NoNoNotes: Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data.Columns “Z ≥ 2.0/2.5/2.8” indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods. Table 4Summary of outlier identification for china’s world records (WR), 2010–2024. Notes:Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data. Columns "Z≥2.0/2.5/2.8" indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods.YearWRZZ > = 2.0Z > = 2.5Z > = 2.8MAD_mzMAD_flagPct_flagMA3Consensus2010150.617NoNoNo0.674NoNoNo20118−0.856NoNoNo−0.899NoNo12.33No2012140.407NoNoNo0.450NoNo11.67No2013130.196NoNoNo0.225NoNo12.33No201410−0.435NoNoNo−0.450NoNo11.67No201512−0.014NoNoNo0.000NoNo9.33No20166−1.276NoNoNo−1.349NoNo9.00No20179−0.645NoNoNo−0.674NoNo10.00No2018150.617NoNoNo0.674NoNo13.33No2019160.827NoNoNo0.899NoNo10.67No20201−2.328YesNoNo−2.473NoYes9.67No202112−0.014NoNoNo0.000NoNo8.00No202211−0.224NoNoNo−0.225NoNo14.33No2023201.669NoNoNo1.799NoYes16.67No2024191.459NoNoNo1.574NoNoNotes: Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data.Columns “Z ≥ 2.0/2.5/2.8” indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods. Summary of outlier identification for china’s world records (WR), 2010–2024. Notes:Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data. Columns "Z≥2.0/2.5/2.8" indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods. Notes: Z = Z-score relative to mean and standard deviation of 2010–2024 data. Columns “Z ≥ 2.0/2.5/2.8” indicate whether the year is classified as an outlier at respective thresholds.MAD_mz = modified Z-score based on Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).MAD_flag = outlier detection by MAD method (Yes/No).Pct_flag = outlier detection by 2.5%/97.5% percentile method.MA3 = 3-year centered moving average.Consensus = Outlier identified by at least 3 methods. Fig. 4Time Series of China’s World Champions (WC) 2010–2024 with 3-Year Centered Moving Average (MA3). Note: 3-year centered moving average applied to smooth short-term volatility (see Sect. 3.3 for rationale). Time Series of China’s World Champions (WC) 2010–2024 with 3-Year Centered Moving Average (MA3). Note: 3-year centered moving average applied to smooth short-term volatility (see Sect. 3.3 for rationale). Fig. 5Annual Z-score Curve of WC with Threshold Lines at ± 2.0, ± 2.5, and ± 2.8. Note: Horizontal lines indicate thresholds used for robustness checks (see Sect. 3.3 and Appendix A). Annual Z-score Curve of WC with Threshold Lines at ± 2.0, ± 2.5, and ± 2.8. Note: Horizontal lines indicate thresholds used for robustness checks (see Sect. 3.3 and Appendix A). Fig. 6Time Series of China’s World Records (WR) 2010–2024 with 3-Year Centered Moving Average (MA3). Note: Refer to Table A2 for yearly WR values and outlier flags. Time Series of China’s World Records (WR) 2010–2024 with 3-Year Centered Moving Average (MA3). Note: Refer to Table A2 for yearly WR values and outlier flags. Fig. 7Annual Z-score Curve of WR with Threshold Lines at ± 2.0, ± 2.5, and ± 2.8. Note: Horizontal lines mark analytical thresholds (see Sect. 3.3). Annual Z-score Curve of WR with Threshold Lines at ± 2.0, ± 2.5, and ± 2.8. Note: Horizontal lines mark analytical thresholds (see Sect. 3.3).