Case Report and Epidemiological Investigation of Healthcare-associated Plasmodium falciparum Malaria Transmission in Westchester County, New York—2023 Authors: Jennifer L White, Karen Southwick, Susan Madison-Antenucci, Nicholas P Piedmonte, Sujoy Gayen, Brooke Clemons, Monica Quinn, Kelly Barrett, P Bryon Backenson, Mike Antwi, Sally Slavinski, Ellen Lee, Ada Huang, Kevin Smith, Elissa Guzzardi, Jennifer C Hunter, Kimberly L McKinney, Kimberly E Mace, Alison D Ridpath, Seymour Williams, Joel L N Barratt, David Jacobson, Edwin Pierre-Louis, Marko Bajic, Julia Kelley, Peter D McElroy, Brian H Raphael, Alan Bulbin Published: 2025 ABSTRACT AbstractA 65-year-old resident of Westchester County, New York was diagnosed with Plasmodium falciparum infection on 2 October 2023. The case had no recent history of international travel to a malaria-endemic area. An extensive epidemiological investigation was initiated to identify the most likely source of the infection and assess the risk of continuing local transmission. Interviews with the case identified multiple potential exposure routes including domestic travel within the United States, hospitalizations overlapping that of individuals diagnosed with travel-associated malaria, residential proximity to imported malaria cases, and outdoor activity overlapping the potential dusk/dawn biting activity of Anopheles mosquitoes. The epidemiologic investigation included syndromic surveillance, healthcare facility investigations, and genetic analysis of specimens collected from the case patient and other malarious patients with epidemiologic links. Results of the genetic analysis and epidemiologic investigation implicated blood-borne transmission in a healthcare setting from a concurrently hospitalized traveler with confirmed malaria. The mechanism remains unknown, although it was likely due to a lapse in infection control. No mosquito-transmitted cases were identified in New York. No additional induced cases from a blood-borne/healthcare-associated exposure were identified. The identification and prompt investigation of potentially locally acquired malaria infections can aid in preventing additional cases by identifying the source and enacting appropriate control measures if necessary. Despite malaria being declared eliminated in the United States in 1951 [1] and the United States being certified as malaria-free in 1970 [2], rare cases of locally acquired mosquito-transmitted malaria (Plasmodium spp.) can occur. Most contemporary malaria cases identified in the United States are among infected travelers returning from malaria-endemic regions, but sporadic cases without relevant travel have been documented [3–5]. Mosquito-borne and other means of transmission have been identified as the likely route of malaria transmission in locally acquired cases documented in the United States [3–7] and other countries [8–12]. Non-mosquito-mediated malaria transmission has occurred in the healthcare setting via transfusion [13], accidental needlesticks [14], breaches of standard infection prevention practices, or contaminated equipment [3, 4, 8–10]. However, in many instances, definitively identifying infection sources or modes of transmission has been difficult. In 2023, public health officials from Florida [15], Texas [15], Maryland [16], and Arkansas [17] reported 10 locally acquired mosquito-transmitted malaria cases from May to September, representing the first detection of mosquito-transmitted US cases since 2003 when 8 locally acquired mosquito-transmitted Plasmodium vivax cases were documented in Florida [7]. In New York State (NYS), the most recently reported locally acquired malaria case occurred in 2012 and was hospital associated [4]. The following is a report documenting the first locally acquired malaria case in NYS since 2012 and a summary of the epidemiological and laboratory investigations that followed. A 65-year-old resident of Westchester County, New York (case 0) presented to the emergency department (ED) of hospital C on 1 October 2023 following 4 days of fever, malaise, and dark urine [18]. Initial clinical suspicion was for postoperative fever; hematology was consulted due to worsening anemia and thrombocytopenia. Babesiosis, a tick-borne disease endemic to NYS caused by Babesia microti, was considered. Subsequent blood smear examination at a commercial laboratory identified malarial parasites, which were later confirmed by smear (parasitemia 16.8%) and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing performed by the NYS Department of Health (NYSDOH) Wadsworth Center Parasitology Laboratory (WCPL). Case 0 was diagnosed with Plasmodium falciparum malaria on 2 October, treated with atovaquone-proguanil (Malarone™) and Artesunate, fully recovered and was discharged on October 9. The patient's clinician notified the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of the case's diagnosis and suspicious lack of international travel history on October 10. Case 0 had previously received care in 2 hospitals (hospitals A and B) in September 2023 following an injury requiring surgical intervention. Three days after surgery, case 0 was transferred to a third hospital (hospital C) for recovery. CDC alerted NYSDOH of the potential locally acquired infection and a multipronged public health investigation was jointly initiated with the Westchester County Department of Health (WCDOH) to identify the source of case 0's infection, determine if there were additional exposures, and assess the potential risk of ongoing transmission. METHODS Epidemiological Investigation Case 0 was interviewed on October 11 and asked about recent travel within the United States; recent and remote travel outside of the United States; occupational or recreational outdoor activity, including exposure to mosquitoes; previous diagnosis of malaria or history of living in a malaria-endemic country; symptoms of malaria or other febrile illness among household members or recent visitors; history of blood transfusions or other medical/laboratory exposures; underlying medical conditions with emphasis on those requiring immunosuppressive medications; and needle sharing, tattoo, or blood exposures. Mosquito surveillance activities in NYS normally operate from late May through early October with cessation of surveillance partially dependent on weather conditions. In 2023, WCDOH's mosquito surveillance staff operated CDC light traps, gravid traps, and BG-sentinel traps at county sites on a weekly basis from 7 June to 21 September and a summary of Anopheles species collected was provided. To assess the likelihood of mosquito-mediated local transmission, documented travel-associated malaria cases in Westchester County were geospatially mapped by residence relative to case 0's residence. Average flight range of native vectors reportedly approach 1 mile or less, though longer flight ranges have been documented [19]. A conservative 5-mile radius was overlayed atop case 0's residence to aid in identifying travel-associated cases potentially linked to case 0 via mosquito-mediated transmission (Figure 1). Blood specimens were available for all travel-associated malaria cases identified within the 5-mile radius of case 0's residence and workplace and were submitted to the WCPL for multiplex real-time PCR (rt-PCR) and subsequent targeted Next Generation Sequencing (tNGS) of 6 antimalarial resistance genes. Residual whole blood and parasite DNA were sent to CDC for additional genetic sequencing, including microsatellite analysis and whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Map of Westchester County displaying malaria cases of interest within residential proximity, New York, 2023. Map of Westchester County displaying the geographic location of the locally acquired case (red) in relation to documented travel-associated malaria cases and clusters with onset dates/diagnosis dates within 5 weeks of case 0. The 5-mile buffer used to explore the most likely travel-associated case candidates that could be linked to the locally acquired case is shown, including a familial cluster of 4 malaria cases (yellow) as well as an individual case (blue). Inset map is an overview of NYS with Westchester County highlighted. To identify unreported or undiagnosed people with malaria in the area, syndromic surveillance was performed by querying the National Syndromic Surveillance Program's (NSSP) Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) BioSense platform. Query parameters were provided courtesy of Florida Department of Health (Table 1) and were temporally restricted between 14 September and 27 October and spatially restricted as described above. The query was designed to identify patients with specific ICD-10-CM malaria diagnostic codes, along with patients for whom there was direct mention of key words in the chief complaint and discharge diagnosis text that were consistent with malaria such as “fever AND anemia AND thrombocytopenia.” Queries were performed weekly through 3 November to account for potential delays in reporting to NSSP. Table 1.Query Parameters Used to Identify Potential Malaria Cases in NSSP ESSENCESymptom or Condition of InterestQuery SyntaxMalaria or diagnosis of Plasmodium spp. infection^malaria^,or,^B500^,or,^B508^,or,^B509^,or,^B508^,or,^B510^,or,^B518^,or,^B510^,or,^B519^,or,^B520^,or,^B528^,or,^B529^,or,^B530^,or,^B531^,or,^B538^or,^B54^,or,^plasmodium^ ORFever or chills AND NOT no fever AND thrombocytopenia or anemia(,(,^fever^,or,^chill^, andnot,(,^denies fever^,or,^no fever^,),),and,(,^thrombocytopenia^,or,^anemia^,or,^[;/]D64.9^,or,^[;/]D696^,or,^[;/]D649^,or, ^low platelet^,or,^low red blood^,or,^decreased red blood^,),) ORAbdominal pain AND NOT no fever AND thrombocytopenia or anemia(,(,^abdominal pain^,or,^abd pain^,or,^R10.9^,or,^R109^, andnot,(,^denies fever^,or,^no fever^,),),and,(,^thrombocytopenia^,or,^anemia^,or,^[;/]D64.9^,or,^[;/]D696^,or,^[;/]D649^,or,^low platelet^,or,^low red blood^,or, ^decreased red blood^,),) ORSplenomegaly(,^splenomegaly^,or,^R16.1^,or,^R161^,) Query Parameters Used to Identify Potential Malaria Cases in NSSP ESSENCE Case 0's medical records were requested for all hospitalizations in the timeframe of concern for transmission to determine history of blood transfusions or other potential medical/laboratory exposures. Additionally, all hospitals conducted an internal review to identify any concurrent malaria admissions. Laboratory specimens associated with malaria cases that temporally and spatially overlapped that of case 0 in the hospital setting were analyzed at the WCPL by rt-PCR and tNGS and sent to CDC for WGS and microsatellite analysis. On-site hospital infection prevention and control (IPC) assessments were conducted by NYSDOH where case 0 overlapped spatially or temporally with another malaria patient, using a CDC infection control tool to identify possible modes of transmission. ED staff were interviewed, the timing and location of cases were assessed, and medical records and physician's orders were reviewed to identify common healthcare exposures, including healthcare personnel, medications, and procedures with a focus on exposures relevant to blood-borne transmission. Laboratory Investigation Genetic analyses performed on P. falciparum from case 0 and other potentially epidemiologically linked cases included microsatellite analysis of markers C2, C3, 2490, PFPK2, Poly-α, TA1, and TA109 [20, 21], amplicon sequencing of the conserved Plasmodium membrane protein (Pfcpmp) gene, sexual-stage surface protein 47 (Pfs47) gene and 6 antimalarial drug-resistance markers (chloroquine-resistance transporter, dihydrofolate reductase, dihydropteroate synthase, kelch13, and the multidrug-resistance protein 1 gene) plus WGS [22]. The WGS analysis was performed on the Illumina NextSeq 1000 or MiSeq platforms via selective whole-genome amplification of P. falciparum genomic DNA, using methods described elsewhere [23]. For reference, an additional 49 P. falciparum sequencing datasets were obtained via the MalariaGen Pf7 data release [24] and included data from African, Asian, and Oceanic strains. The 3D7 reference strain was also sequenced here. A core genome alignment of data from these strains was performed using Snippy (https://github.com/tseemann/snippy) and IQ-TREE 2 [25] was used to infer a maximum-likelihood tree. Geneious [26] was used to visualize the phylogeny. The 6 P. falciparum drug-resistance markers were sequenced via published methods [21] with slight modifications. Libraries were prepared in quarter volume reactions using the Illumina DNA Prep kit. Sequencing was performed on the NextSeq500 with a 300-cycle mid output kit by the Applied Genomics Technology Cluster. Data were analyzed by an in-house developed bioinformatics workflow with mutations reported if they minimally met the criteria of 10% frequency and ≥40× depth. RESULTS Investigation of case 0's recent activities identified out-of-state domestic US travel, residential spatial and temporal proximity to documented travel-associated malaria cases, and occupational and recreational outdoor activity overlapping with crepuscular Anopheles biting activity. Additionally, there was spatial and temporal overlap with travel-associated malaria cases during a recent hospitalization (Figure 2). Timeline outlining case 0 (top) and case 3 (bottom) activities leading up to and following their shared event, Westchester County, New York, 2023. Travel Case 0 reported travel outside of NYS but in the contiguous United States during August and September 2023, however, the areas of travel did not report local malaria transmission during 2023. CDC's Division of Global Migration Health confirmed that case 0 had not recently traveled internationally. Although case 0's country of origin is endemic for malaria (only P. vivax), they reportedly lived in the United States for >50 years without international travel nor a history of malaria. Case 0 reported no relevant underlying medical conditions or use of immunosuppressive medications and denied needle sharing, tattoo, or other nonmedical blood exposures. Residential Proximity Analyses Five travel-associated P. falciparum cases (illness onsets within 5 weeks of case 0) resided within a 5-mile radius of case 0: a familial cluster of 4 cases to the northeast with common travel history and an individual case to the southeast; all recently traveled to Africa (Figure 1). Environmental and Occupational Exposure Case 0 reported being bitten by mosquitoes during outdoor activity at their residence as well as at their worksite in the New York City metropolitan area. Mosquito Surveillance WCDOH mosquito surveillance staff provided a summary of Anopheles species captured during 2023 trapping activities, which verified the presence and activity of competent vectors (ie, Anopheles quadrimaculatus and Anopheles punctipennis) as late as 21 September. Twenty A. quadrimaculatus (5 in September) and 49 A. punctipennis (11 in September) were collected throughout the season, though collections tapered in September as temperatures cooled. Syndromic Surveillance NYS's syndromic surveillance queries identified 77 individuals presenting with signs and symptoms compatible with malaria; all had alternative diagnoses and malaria was excluded. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene performed the same syndromic surveillance query and identified 8 individuals admitted or in the ED at hospital B between 11 September and 13 October. Two were previously documented as travel-associated malaria cases, while the other 6 did not have malaria based on medical record review. Hospitalization and Infection Control Case 0's history of illness leading to the 1 October admission to hospital C began with an injury on 15 September. On 18 September, case 0 presented to hospital A with altered mental status, headache, and lethargy and was diagnosed with a subdural hematoma. The case was transferred to hospital B for management which included a 167-minute stay in the ED and a computed tomography (CT) scan of the head. An emergent craniotomy was performed in the operating room of hospital B. Case 0 was admitted to hospital B from 18 to 21 September and transferred to hospital C from 21 to 24 September. Case 0 was readmitted to hospital C on 1 October as outlined previously. Case 0 did not receive blood transfusions at any of the 3 hospitals. Neither hospital A nor hospital C reported other malaria cases during case 0's time in either facility. Hospital B reported 3 patients in the ED from 16 to 19 September (cases 1–3) with travel-associated malaria diagnoses. Case 3 overlapped with case 0 in the ED; no malaria patients overlapped with case 0 on the inpatient units. Specimens from case 0 and cases 1–3 were sent to the WCPL and CDC for sequencing and relatedness analysis. Case 3 returned from Côte d'Ivoire on 9 September, developed symptoms on 11 September, and was diagnosed with malaria on 18 September at hospital B. Different ambulance companies brought case 0 and case 3 to hospital B on 18 September. Nurses draw blood in the ED of hospital B; there are neither phlebotomists nor an intravenous (IV) start team. In the ED of hospital B on 18 September, case 0 was in 1 room, and case 3 moved between 3 rooms. Case 0 and case 3 overlapped for the duration of case 0's ED stay and were housed 30 feet apart with no walls between them; care stations were separated by privacy curtains. Both patients received blood draws and IV fluids, but only case 3 received IV medications in the ED. Case 0 did not have any other percutaneous exposures in the ED (eg, blood glucose monitoring, IV medications, and injections). Neither case 0 nor case 3 had open wounds. Case 0 and case 3 did not share any of the same clinicians in the ED. However, while in the ED, the 2 cases had CT scans in the same CT machine in close succession; case 3 had a contrast-enhanced chest/abdomen/pelvis CT and case 0 had a noncontrast head CT beginning ∼5 minutes later, with no intervening patients or procedures. Epidemiologic investigation revealed no other commonalities among cases 0 and 3. Cases 0 and 3 lived >5 miles apart and no other potential overlapping locations of exposure were identified during the investigation. During the on-site hospital IPC assessment, it was observed that all blood draws are done with retractable butterfly needles and reusing needles was not possible. Saline flush syringes are prefilled and plastic-wrapped by the manufacturer. Supplies necessary for blood draws and IV insertions as well as plastic-wrapped predrawn saline flushes, are distributed into numerous carts placed throughout the ED. No used saline flushes or multidose vials were observed in the carts or in the drawers or counters of patient bays. Observation of blood draws and IV insertion did not reveal practices that would contribute to blood-borne pathogen transmission. Laboratory Specimen Sequencing and Microsatellite Analyses NYSDOH WCPL Laboratory The WCPL performed multiplex real-time PCR and tNGS on specimens from case 0, the 5 travel-associated cases near case 0's residence, and cases 1–3 from hospital B. Case 0 and case 3 had identical mutations at similar frequencies for all 6 drug-resistance genes. All travel-associated cases near case 0's residence and cases 1 and 2 from hospital B had tNGS mutation profiles that differed from case 0's. CDC Microsatellite analysis supported a close genetic relationship between the P. falciparum infecting cases 0 and 3, though the profiles were not identical. Specifically, matches were observed at 6 of 7 microsatellite markers, with a Poly-α repeat length of 165 bases observed for case 0 and a repeat length of 156 bases for case 3. Amplicon sequencing of Pfcpmp and Pfs47 and the 6 drug-resistance genes confirmed identical sequences for cases 0 and 3. Comparisons were made between WGS data from cases 0 through 3, 49 MalariaGEN reference datasets, the 3D7 reference strain, plus WGS data generated from the 5 residentially related malaria case patients residing within a 5-mile radius of case 0 that had a recent history of travel to Africa (59 genomes total). This revealed 10,299 core genomic single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) sites with a sequencing depth of at least 20, across these 59 WGS datasets. Case 0 and case 3 strains were identical across all 10,299 SNPs and clustered separately from the residentially related cases and from cases 1 and 2 (Figure 3). Three of 4 strains from the familial related cases possessed an identical SNP profile to one another while the fourth profile was distinct, as was the fifth residentially related travel-associated case. Maximum likelihood phylogeny generated from whole-genome SNP barcodes. This phylogeny represents an analysis of 59 P. falciparum WGS datasets based on 10 299 polymorphic sites with at least 20-fold sequencing depth, identified using the “snippy” tool. Ten WGS datasets are from P. falciparum isolates sequenced in the present study (including 1 from the 3D7 reference strain), in addition to 49 datasets obtained from published reference isolates available via the MalariaGEN database. Sequencing datasets labeled in light blue and black represent MalariaGen datasets; light blue branch labels indicate African isolates and black labels indicate isolates from Oceania and Asia included as an “outgroup” for the tree. Orange tip labels (samples NY0001, NY0002, and NY0003) and the label shown in brown (NY0004) indicate sequence datasets generated for the residentially related familial cluster of cases identified within the same 5-mile radius as case 0. Despite the familial link, this result indicates that 1 of the 4 residentially related cases (brown) was caused by a separate P. falciparum strain to the other 3 cases (orange—genetically linked), potentially because their infections were acquired from different infected mosquitoes on separate occasions. Red tip labels represent data generated for case 0 (NY0005) and case 3 (NY0006), and reflect an identical SNP profile between them, supporting that these cases were infected with the same P. falciparum strain. Green labels represent datasets generated for case 1 and case 2 from hospital B (DM23_NY0065 and DM23_NY0068) which are not related genetically to one another, nor to cases 0 and 3. The dataset labeled in dark blue (DM23_NY0060) was sequenced from the nonfamilial case patient who resided within a 5-mile radius of case 0 and is distinct from all other strains sequenced. The dataset generated here for the 3D7 reference strain is labeled in pink. Sequence data for cases sequenced here were deposited in NCBI BioProject PRJNA1110244. Sequence data for samples DM23_NY0001 through DM23_NY0006 can be accessed under BioSample accessions SAMN44309504 through SAMN44309509. Sequence data for samples DM23_NY0060, DM23_NY0065, and DM23_NY0068 can be accessed under BioSample accessions SAMN48324080, SAMN48324081, and SAMN48324082, respectively. The specimen accessioning processes at both the WCPL and CDC were reviewed in detail to assess for the possibility of errors in specimen labeling. No errors were identified. Response Based on the results of the epidemiologic investigation, sequencing, and microsatellite analyses, case 0 was notified of blood-borne pathogen exposure at hospital B and additional blood-borne pathogen testing was recommended. No other possible cases of blood-borne malaria transmission were identified. DISCUSSION Our extensive multifaceted and multiorganizational investigation into the source of case 0's malaria exposure concluded that their P. falciparum infection was acquired in a healthcare setting at hospital B, likely via an unrecognized blood-borne exposure from case 3. Though commonalities in time, space, and procedures were identified between case 0 and case 3, the exact transmission mechanism was not identified. African P. falciparum strains are genetically diverse [27] yet cases 0 and 3 had identical sequences that were unique among other genomes examined (Figure 3). The genetic difference observed at Poly-α is noteworthy and was attributed to the rapid mutation rate of this polymorphic neutral microsatellite marker, relative to other genomic features [28]. The timing and overlap of their hospital encounter and the timeframe of case 0's illness onset are consistent with blood-borne transmission during hospitalization. Importantly, the extrinsic mosquito life cycle of the malaria parasite (8–16 days) and timing of the human infections make mosquito-borne transmission between these cases implausible. Initial investigation efforts focused on the possibility of local mosquito-borne transmission as observed in other US states in 2023; this included examining mosquito collections, identifying travel-associated malaria cases in close residential proximity to case 0, and occupational mosquito exposures leading up to their malaria diagnosis. Given the decline in anopheline mosquitos in Westchester County at the time of the investigation and genetic results clearly distinguishing case 0 and the 5 residentially associated imported cases as unrelated, investigative efforts then focused on the possibility of healthcare-associated malaria given case 0's multiple hospital visits and other malaria cases in proximity at hospital B. Healthcare-associated malaria is rare but has been documented within and outside the United States [3, 4, 8–12]. Breaches in standard infection control practices, including injection safety, by healthcare personnel are among suspected transmission mechanisms. Reuse of saline flushes, multidose vials and syringes, contamination of catheter and contrast medium for CT scanning, and possible inadequate surface disinfection of glucometers have been reported in the literature as possible exposure sources. A malaria patient who overlaps in the same care area is typically identified. It is often not possible to conclusively identify the transmission mechanism and no breaches in infection control practices were observed in the present case. However, genetic techniques in combination with traditional investigation efforts can provide compelling evidence to aid in verifying the source of such infections [29]. While uncommon, healthcare-associated malaria transmission is indicative of a breach in standard infection control measures against blood-borne pathogens. Acknowledging that these breaches can occur, patients presenting with suspected or confirmed malaria, but lacking documentation of travel to malaria-endemic countries, should be investigated. Prompt epidemiological investigation and response are important to identify potential sources of infection, breaches in safety measures, or infected blood/tissue/organs to prevent additional infections.