Evidence-based opportunities to address pandemic drivers via the Pandemic Agreement: lessons from the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Authors: Hope Ferdowsian, Sam Halabi Published: 2025 Summary box In May of 2025, WHO Member States adopted a Pandemic Agreement to strengthen global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. In May of 2025, WHO Member States adopted a Pandemic Agreement to strengthen global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. To date, the WHO’s only other public health agreement concluded under its treaty-making authority is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). To date, the WHO’s only other public health agreement concluded under its treaty-making authority is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). FCTC implementation, including evidence-based attention to supply and demand market forces, could provide useful lessons for successful implementation of the Pandemic Agreement. FCTC implementation, including evidence-based attention to supply and demand market forces, could provide useful lessons for successful implementation of the Pandemic Agreement. Successful implementation of the Pandemic Agreement could help avoid global failures identified during the COVID-19 pandemic and prevent loss of lives. Successful implementation of the Pandemic Agreement could help avoid global failures identified during the COVID-19 pandemic and prevent loss of lives. In December 2021, the World Health Assembly reached global consensus to negotiate and draft an international instrument to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness and response.1 The instrument was the second-ever accord negotiated under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution. Beginning in 2021, there were a series of negotiations, informal focused consultations and public hearings that ultimately resulted in adoption of a Pandemic Agreement by WHO Member States on 20 May 2025.2 The cost of the COVID-19 pandemic, in terms of lives and financial losses, provided a sound basis for an international pandemic instrument that addresses both response and prevention.3 An estimated 14.83 million deaths were attributed to COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021, and the pandemic disproportionately affected the most vulnerable and disadvantaged populations.4 Disparate policy responses throughout the pandemic determined differences in transmission patterns, public reactions to mitigation measures and economic impacts.5 Although the exact origin of SARS-CoV-2, the virus which causes COVID-19, is unknown, a growing body of evidence confirms that ecosystem degradation, habitat loss, commercial trade in wild animals, intensive animal farming and antimicrobial resistance increase the global risk for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs).6 The Pandemic Agreement therefore justifiably includes attention to pandemic drivers and a One Health approach—an integrated, unifying approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimise the health of people, animals and ecosystems.7 To date, the WHO’s only other public health agreement concluded under its treaty-making authority is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). That treaty explicitly and decidedly aimed at reducing both supply of and demand for tobacco products. There is abundant evidence, for example, that raising taxes on tobacco products—as indicated in FCTC Article 6—lowers consumption.8 The adoption of laws establishing smoke-free public places—as indicated in FCTC Article 8—has led to an absolute reduction in smoking prevalence of 3.4 %, reduced cigarette consumption by 2.2 cigarettes per day, increased quit attempts by 4.1 % and increased successful cessation by 6.4%.9 Nearly 22 million future premature smoking-attributable deaths were averted because of strong implementation of demand reduction measures adopted by countries during its initial 10 years of implementation.10 Moreover, the governance mechanisms of the FCTC appear to propel many of these results. Participation in the treaty creates a nexus between international charities and determined tobacco control advocates.11 Participation in the FCTC’s Conference of Parties—the same mechanism used in the Pandemic Agreement—was correlated with stronger tobacco control policies in low-income countries.12 Though infectious diseases with pandemic potential are not bought and sold in the same way as tobacco products, the Pandemic Agreement’s attention to pandemic drivers at the human-animal-environment interface could provide a basis for policy changes that address these drivers in the context of supply and demand provisions. Policies and practices that attend to such evidence-based measures are more likely to promote effective prevention, preparedness and response. As policy makers; medical, legal and public health professionals; and other stakeholders look towards the practical implementation of the Pandemic Agreement, the following supply reduction and demand reduction opportunities, and supply enhancement strategies, could be adapted based on the strength of the evidence base. ‘Supply reduction’ provisions ‘Supply reduction’ under the FCTC meant legal measures such as banning sales to minors, restricting the sale of tobacco in vending machines and making the manufacture, import and export of tobacco products subject to a licensing system. Analogous supply-side reduction measures for pandemic preparedness include enhanced regulation or prohibition of unprescribed or unlicensed antibiotics, limitation of agricultural and food processing practices that heighten pandemic risk and better enforcement against substandard and adulterated medicines. The inability to accurately predict the precise emergence of novel pathogens demonstrates the prime importance of prevention in the Pandemic Agreement. Despite evidence of anthropogenic drivers of EIDs in humans and other species, relatively little has been done at the policy level to address these upstream risks.13 Many of these risks, such as the amounts of antibiotics dispensed or sold without prescription, are in fact quantifiable as supply-side problems. Furthermore, an evidence-based, prevention-centred approach would imply that the Pandemic Agreement must address the broad range of supply-side factors that lead to disease emergence, including agricultural, extractive and other high-risk practices that drive spillover. Land use changes attributable to agricultural and extractive industries fuel EID risk through deforestation, changes in migration patterns, contributions to global warming and threats to biodiversity.14 Just as with the FCTC, the Pandemic Agreement’s Conference of the Parties could issue extensive guidelines addressing supply-side measures. For example, using the One Health approach referenced in the agreement, the pandemic instrument could bolster rules and regulations for international trade established through the United Nations Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species and the World Trade Organization. Additionally, coordination across the Quadripartite of the WHO, Food and Agriculture Organization, UN Environment Program and the World Organization for Animal Health could enhance efforts to curb illicit trade and high-risk agricultural and extractive practices. As with the FCTC, the Pandemic Agreement could also provide a basis for industry accountability mechanisms for high-risk sectors, projects and practices at the human-animal-environment interface. Addressing each of these supply-side factors would build upon the Pandemic Agreement’s emphasis on ‘measures aimed at prevention at source’.15 ‘Demand reduction’ provisions ‘Demand reduction’ under the FCTC was addressed through recommendations to increase tobacco taxes; ban or limit advertising, marketing and promotion of tobacco products; prohibit smoking in public places; and provide support for smoking cessation. Similarly, pandemic risk is reduced where demand for agricultural land, unlicensed antibiotics and illicitly traded wildlife is diminished. The Pandemic Agreement addresses, as it must, the financial capacity of national preparedness as well as the system for global preparedness and response overseen by the WHO. Financial sustainability could be linked to evidence-based measures that merge with the Pandemic Agreement’s objectives. For example, inappropriate use of antimicrobials in agriculture feeds antimicrobial resistance, which serves as a primary thread within the Pandemic Agreement. A levy on the market price of antimicrobials in animal feed could deter misuse of antimicrobials and raise revenue for international preparedness just as higher taxes on cigarettes reduce consumption and provide additional public health investment revenue. Similarly, just as the FCTC provides opportunities for public education and the regulation of marketing and promotion of tobacco products, the Pandemic Agreement’s emphasis on education and community engagement could help leverage the growing body of evidence on sources of misinformation and disinformation to support public health preparedness. Public education on pandemic drivers could also lend greater support for individual and population-based risk reduction strategies. ‘Supply enhancement’ provisions In addition to the demand and supply reduction measures, the Pandemic Agreement also offers ‘supply enhancing’ opportunities. Articles of the Pandemic Agreement addressing public health surveillance, supply chains and access-and-benefit sharing open channels to supply enhancing opportunities related to critical public health responses, information and technology transfer and research and healthcare infrastructure. These opportunities may be particularly relevant considering the limited availability of personal protective equipment, diagnostics and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic between March 2020 and December 2021. Similarly, response-side supply and demand could be a useful way to consider medical countermeasures and their availability. These approaches could address global failures identified during the pandemic, including those related to transparency, evidence-based public health practice and operational coordination.16 Conclusion The FCTC has exerted significant force in reducing the global toll of tobacco consumption. It has done so with an approach that ascertained supply-and-demand measures. Implementation of the Pandemic Agreement could take a similar evidence-based approach to address pandemic drivers fueled by global market forces. Footnotes Funding: The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. Handling editor: Soumitra S Bhuyan Patient consent for publication: Not applicable. Ethics approval: Not applicable. Provenance and peer review: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed. Data availability statement No data are available. References Associated Data Data Availability Statement No data are available.