Three ethical approaches to expanding newborn screening through genomics: a critical comparative analysis Authors: Gabriel Watts, Margaret Otlowski, Robin Banks, Ainsley J. Newson Published: 2025 ABSTRACT BackgroundThe expansion of newborn bloodspot screening (NBS) programs through genomic sequencing is proposed as a way to revolutionise infant and lifelong healthcare. But for all its promise, profound ethical challenges arise too. Robust analysis of these ethical challenges, which include technological and commercial imperatives, as well as balancing individual rights with communal goods, first necessitates clarity as to which ethical approach is best suited to considering the use of genomics in NBS.MethodsWe use normative ethical analysis to provide a critical comparison of three ethical approaches to the expansion of NBS that shape debates over the implementation of genomic newborn screening (gNBS): liberal individualism, public health ethics, and genomic healthcare as a human right.ResultsWhile these approaches often overlap in practice, their distinct priorities illuminate tensions between individual autonomy, collective welfare, and rights-based claims to genomic information and attendant healthcare. We argue that public health ethics should be the primary ethical approach for gNBS. Yet, none of the three approaches are individually sufficient to fully address the ethical complexities involved. This is because each approach sheds useful light on distinct benefits and limitations of gNBS.ConclusionsWhile rigorous evidence-gathering to inform the ethical and societal impacts of gNBS is critical, this must be accompanied by – and interpreted through – normative ethical analysis that clearly articulates the values and tensions at stake. Overall, ethical implementation of gNBS requires a policy approach that (i) adopts public health ethics for programme design, (ii) operationalises select human-rights claims in accordance with established screening principles, and (iii) embeds liberal protections against state or parental overreach. Background Newborn bloodspot screening (NBS) for the early detection of severe congenital conditions began in the United States (US) in the 1960s and is now practiced in many countries globally [1, 2]. It is a universal, state-run screening test that takes place in the first few days of life, whereupon a few drops of blood from a newborn baby’s heel are collected onto a type of paper called a bloodspot card. A ‘punch’ is made in the card to remove a dried blood sample for analysis. While programme specifics vary between jurisdictions, a common aim of all NBS is to reduce infant morbidity and mortality by identifying infants who would benefit from early intervention for treatable conditions [3]. While NBS undeniably saves lives, it is not without limitations: false negatives, false positives, ambiguous results, and the psychosocial weight of “liminal” diagnoses are persistent challenges [4, 5]. Yet for most families, NBS remains a routine and uneventful step in postnatal care, one amongst the many rituals of childbirth. Genomic newborn screening (gNBS) has been touted as a potential revolution in NBS. The ability to employ next generation DNA sequencing (NGS) techniques such as whole exome or whole genome sequencing (including ‘virtual panels’) within NBS – either as a first line test or in confirmatory testing – opens many possibilities. Proponents of gNBS herald the expansion of NBS through NGS as a paradigm shift, one that will open the door to a ‘lifetime health resource’ of one’s own genome, to be interrogated whenever and by whomever necessary as the ultimate precision health tool [6–8]. Building on the expansion agenda for NBS enabled by tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS), gNBS could further expand the scope of detectable conditions – including the possibility of detecting non-treatable conditions or late(r) onset conditions [9–11]. Other claims deployed in favour of gNBS are that it will accelerate biomedical research and will seed bigger and better population genomic datasets [12]. Yet enthusiasm for gNBS is tempered by ethical reservations. The potential harms of gNBS extend beyond those inherent to all screening – such as overdiagnosis and the anxieties attending so-called “patients-in-waiting” – to include risks unique to genomics: genetic discrimination in insurance or employment, anxiety and indecision fuelled by variants of uncertain significance, or the commodification of genomic data [13–15]. The task of implementing gNBS will be logistically and ethically momentous. Central to the ethical challenge of implementing gNBS is its promissory nature. The purported benefits of gNBS – avoidance of diagnostic odysseys, benefits to families through cascade testing, enabling personalised medicine, and improved equity – remain largely speculative, while its risks – which are often also speculative – are still poorly understood. Ethical debates surrounding gNBS often hinge not on settled evidence but on contested ideals: What constitutes a “benefit”? Who should bear the burdens of uncertainty? How should concepts such as autonomy, harm, solidarity, and justice be balanced in policymaking? While empirical research is indispensable for evaluating outcomes, evidence alone cannot resolve disputes rooted in divergent normative or value-based frameworks. To progress debate over gNBS, we need to view its implementation as a fundamentally ethical issue, comprised of various and often competing moral and practical considerations. To this end, our aim is to critically compare three ethical approaches to the implementation of gNBS – liberal individualism, public health ethics, and genomic healthcare as a human right. We ultimately advocate for an approach centred on public health ethics, but which also integrates protections for individual rights (drawn from liberal individualism) and selected human rights claims. Methods In this paper we use the methods of normative ethics to distinguish the fundamental value concepts and claims that mark liberal individualism, public health ethics, and genomic healthcare as a human right as three distinct approaches to the ethics of implementing gNBS. Through analysis of the characteristic normative claims of each approach we assess their respective strengths and weakness as ethical justifications for pursuing specific policies or actions, and rejecting others, when implementing gNBS. By taking this methodological approach we are able to separate the question of which ethical approach to gNBS is the best justified, given the nature of gNBS as a formal population health intervention, from questions of which screening test offers are justified from an empirical standpoint. These two questions are intimately related, but it is our assertion that the former determines the latter, hence our focus on the former.1 Our decision to focus on three distinct ethical approaches to the implementation of gNBS is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather reflects the fact that these are the three most prominent existing approaches to ethical questions concerning the expansion of NBS, whether through genomic sequencing or biochemical analyses. Nor do we mean to suggest that these three approaches do not and cannot overlap, but rather that attending to their distinct priorities illuminates important tensions between individual autonomy, collective welfare, and rights-based claims to genomic information and attendant healthcare. Indeed, while we argue that public health ethics should be the primary ethical approach for gNBS, none of the three are individually sufficient to fully address the ethical complexities involved, such that successful implementation of gNBS will require balancing the different approaches. By providing an in-depth analysis of each, as well as noting their strengths and limitations, we aim to equip policymakers with conceptual tools to balance competing ideals in a landscape marked by uncertainty, technological promise, and high-stakes trade-offs. Discussion Newborn screening: past, present, and future NBS began in the US in the early 1960s with Robert Guthrie’s invention of an assay for the rapid measurement of phenylalanine levels in blood [1]. This new test allowed for the early detection of phenylketonuria (PKU), a metabolic condition that causes severe intellectual impairments if left untreated, but which can be ameliorated by the implementation of a special diet in the first days of life [1]. Although it was contentious, universal bloodspot testing for PKU in newborns was quickly instituted as a minimum federal screening requirement in the US, and throughout the 1960s and ’70s, NBS for PKU was implemented in most high-income nations alongside other long-standing infant screening tests such as hearing and vision checks [16]. Up until the turn of the twenty-first century, only a handful of new conditions were added to NBS rosters worldwide. This changed during the 1990s with the invention of MS/MS. MS/MS enabled the simultaneous measurement of numerous metabolites from the same dried bloodspots used to test for PKU, at only marginal increased cost once the cost of purchasing MS/MS machines was accounted for [4]. Between 2000 and 2020, the uptake of MS/MS within NBS programs led to a significant increase in the average number of conditions screened [3, 17]. While this expansion attracted considerable controversy, NBS programs did expand and now typically test for around 30 conditions worldwide, and 50–60 conditions in the US [2]. Given the important role that innovative testing modalities have played in the history of NBS, it is unsurprising that genome sequencing is widely promoted as heralding the future of NBS [18]. Proponents of gNBS describe genomic sequencing as “ideally suited to population screening” [12] and several research projects evaluating gNBS are taking place, or have been completed, in high-income countries [2, 17, 19]. This said, concern remains as to whether the expansion of NBS through genomic sequencing is more a product of technological and commercial imperatives than being driven by established screening principles [20, 21]. Still, it is generally accepted that genomic sequencing has the potential to identify significantly more childhood conditions than current biochemical tests alone; and that there is the potential, however nascent, for genomic data gathered at birth to be re-analysed throughout a person’s lifetime to provide actionable information on both chronic and later-onset genetic diseases.2 Expanding NBS: three approaches to ethical analysis NBS has raised ethical questions since its inception. However, for the purposes of this paper we will focus on the period from the late 1990s onwards, as this is both when the scope of NBS began to rapidly expand and when resistance to the expansion of screening intensified. The impetus for the expansion of NBS was seeded in the late 1960s, when political attitudes to population screening were highly favourable [22]. Screening had proven to be an invaluable wartime technology, primarily as a means of detecting infectious diseases, and the post-war period saw a significant push to introduce population screening for chronic and congenital diseases [16, 22]. This period also saw the World Health Organisation publish an influential set of principles for the establishment of screening programmes, which saw their proliferation across many countries [23]. NBS was a crucial part of the proliferation of these programs, and while there was notable professional resistance to NBS, based on concerns of effectiveness and government intervention in medicine, these were minority voices [4, 16]. By the time that NBS began to expand in the late 1990 s, the field of bioethics had proliferated. At that time, bioethics scholarship was largely based on a politically liberal and individualistic approach to medical ethics. These approaches emphasised patient autonomy and the need for informed consent to medical procedures [23, 24, 25]. Yet in many countries, NBS was (and remains) an essentially mandatory public health intervention, one that sits at odds with bioethics’ emphasis on informed consent, and so the expansion of NBS was criticised [4]. These critiques notwithstanding, the eventual instigation of the United States Recommended Uniform Screening Panel (RUSP) in 2006 endorsed screening for a greatly expanded set of conditions [4, 26]. The RUSP has continued to expand in the years since, as have programs in other jurisdictions [27]. With continued expansion, debate about the scope of NBS has intensified over the past two decades [28, 29, 30, 31]. The first approach: liberal individualism The prominent ethical approach to the expansion of NBS at the turn of the century – and one of continuing importance to this day – can be called liberal individualism. Here we use ‘liberal individualism’ to describe an ethical approach to NBS policy-making that prioritises individual autonomy, informed consent, and a sharp distinction between public policy and private choice. In a review of NBS ethics literature from 2001 to 2018, van der Burg and Oerlemans [32] state that the most “striking” general feature of their findings is that “support for mandatory screening diminishes when expansions of NBS impact values that concern not only the protection of health, but also choices that people make in their private lives.” These impacted private choices include, for instance, decisions whether to receive information about untreatable conditions, carrier status for heritable conditions, risk-estimates for late-onset diseases, or clinically uncertain information. van der Berg and Oerlemans attribute this finding to several “tacit liberal presuppositions regarding what are and what are not appropriate topics for debate in policy-making” regarding NBS. More precisely, they found that existing (and largely mandatory) NBS programmes were commonly justified on the grounds that protecting the health of children through reducing morbidity and mortality uncontroversially permits state intervention in infant healthcare. As such, issues relating to the healthcare benefits of NBS were generally considered “public” topics, where state responsibility for decision-making was unequivocal. In contrast, there was deeper contention over the so-called “soft impacts” of screening such as its potential psycho-social harms. Some held that receiving information such as carrier status (which would not impact health in childhood) was a “private” matter to be determined by informed parental consent, while others argued that mitigating the potential for harms from such information was a state responsibility.3 Further, given the relative empirical intractability of questions concerning the “soft impacts” of expanded screening, a default position was to defer to parental discretion, leading to calls to make NBS voluntary. Deference to parental autonomy regarding personal healthcare decisions, and a focus on informed consent to receiving expanded NBS results are hallmarks of liberal individualism as an approach to the ethics of NBS. Interestingly, however, in early debates over the expansion of NBS an emphasis on individual choice in healthcare was used to justify both expanding and restricting the scope of NBS. Specifically, van der Berg and Oerlemans note that resistance to the prioritisation of parental autonomy in decision-making regarding NBS was articulated via a small set of personal rights held by infant children against their parents and the state: a right to information privacy, a right to an open future, and a right not to know [32]. Insofar as respect for the personal rights of newborns was offered as a ground to restrict the scope of NBS we find that liberal individualism operated as a basic shared approach underwriting early debates over expanded NBS, rather than one amongst others. The second approach: public health ethics The second approach to ethical analysis concerning the expansion of NBS – from around 2010 to the present – can be broadly described as public health ethics [25, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35]. Public health ethics approaches to expanded NBS can be seen as a rejection or at least a qualification of liberal individualism. Public health ethics looks to make a concerted break with individualistic framings of ethical issues in expanded NBS and is less insistent on the separation between public and private spheres. For instance, van der Burg and Oerlemans [32] contend that quintessentially private matters, such as “[t]he dependency of newborn children on their parents’ care, the blood relatedness of family members and disease inheritance within a family, as well as [the] connectedness of a patient to distant (future) others with the same (rare) disease” provide grounds to consider NBS as delivering common as well as individual benefits. Further, they and others (e.g., 26) emphasise the relevance of communitarian ethical norms such as dependency, reciprocity and solidarity in ethical discussions of the expansion of NBS. Public health ethics also recognises that bioethics itself has primarily focused on clinical care, and that its central ethical concepts and norms – however well suited to clinical practice – can be a poor fit for public health [24]. For example, when considering the potential expansion of NBS through genomic sequencing, Newson argues that offers of genomic information on the grounds of empowering autonomous decision-making imply a reciprocal responsibility to become suitably informed and to act appropriately [25]. Yet, while offers of complex genomic information in clinical contexts include taking a family history and genetic counselling, offers of information through genomic screening will necessarily be generic, with highly standardised consent and counselling processes [25]. As such, offering genomic information through screening on grounds of empowering autonomous decision-making risks over-responsibilising parents for its interpretation and carriage over time; especially given the complexity of genomic information and the generally low correlation between such information and prognostic certainty. As a result, a narrow focus on informed consent and patient autonomy is insufficient to address issues that arise in a public health context. A similar criticism is made against individualistic conceptions of justice as applied to the expansion of NBS. On this point, van der Burg and Oerlemans note that in the literature they reviewed, questions of justice were primarily framed through the lens of patients (and their families) as taxpayers [32]. As such, discussion of inequities arising from expanded NBS were mostly related to inequities of access – to testing or to follow-up services. By contrast, discussions of expanded NBS using public health ethics approaches have emphasised collective inequities [25, 31, 34, 35], such as diagnostic inequities arising from the under-representation of minority groups in genomic databases [31, 35], or inequities from an over-emphasis on genomics in health at the expense of social determinants [36]. On this view, any analysis of ethical issues from a broadly liberal and individualistic perspective will obscure important group-level concerns such as the potential to entrench health disparities through inequitable screening design or outcomes, even if access to testing and follow up is equal.4 The third approach: genomic healthcare as a human right The third approach, genomic healthcare as a human right, is still nascent but is quickly becoming established in the literature on the ethics of gNBS [8, 37, 38, 39]. The origins of the approach can be traced to a 2007 article about ethics and genomics research by Richard Ashcroft, who argued that while appeals to human rights in this area had traditionally been “protection-oriented”, e.g., the protection of personal rights to information and privacy, there was also room for a “development-oriented” approach that emphasised rights to the benefits of genomic science [40, 41, 42]. While Ashcroft did not apply his argument to NBS, those who adopt a genomic healthcare as a human right approach to gNBS have since done so. On this view, a “development-oriented” approach to human rights looks to frame gNBS as a means of upholding not only the right to enjoy the benefits of genomic science, but rights to health more generally. Proponents of human rights approaches to gNBS articulate rights-based claims through appeal to international human rights documents and the obligations they place on states parties. To this end, commonly cited rights include Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child [43], which reads: “Children have the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health. Governments should work towards the development of healthcare and diminish disease and child mortality” [8, 38, 39, 44], and its extended counterpart in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [45], which recognises “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health … [including] the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases” [8]. Also relevant is Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [46], which asserts “the right … to share in scientific advancement and its benefits” [39]. A crucial conceptual claim underlying this approach is that the “highest attainable standard” of health incorporates any benefits that genomic science can offer people, and thus rights to the highest attainable standard of health are rights to gNBS. Another important aspect is that while the human rights in question are held by individuals, they place obligations upon governments to provide public health initiatives that promote them.5 As such, where previous appeals to human rights claims within NBS discourse were appeals to individually held personal rights – e.g., a right to privacy or to an open future – the current trend is to posit individually held rights to public health initiatives as moral grounds for pursuing gNBS. For example, Brunelli et al. contend that “the incorporation of genomics into newborn screening presents a useful case study to recognize and uphold the rights of every child” [47]. Specifically, Brunelli et al. are concerned that the ideal of genomic pediatric medicine as “personalized and precise” healthcare is beset by “pervasive injustice, health inequities, and health disparities”, and this threatens the right of each child to (amongst other things) the highest attainable standard of health. They advocate pursuing precision pediatric medicine through the expansion of NBS into gNBS because NBS already aims at universal coverage and thereby “recognizes and upholds the fundamental human rights of every child”. Notably, the primary moral ground for pursuing gNBS on this view is not its value to newborns per se (whether as individual benefits or common goods), but rather that gNBS upholds obligations owed to children to promote their enjoyment of human rights. Brunelli et al. present children’s (human) rights as a general approach to implementing paediatric genomic medicine and see gNBS as an exemplary case. Even more generally, Gyngell et al. argue that “the fundamental human right” to “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” provides grounds for developing systems capable of storing genomic data from gNBS for use as a “lifetime health resource” [8]. While careful to stress that the individual benefits of revisiting genomic data are still highly speculative, they maintain that the strength of the right to the highest attainable standard of health provides “strong reasons” to start preparing healthcare systems to capitalise on the “potential benefits” of lifetime data storage now. Other authors have developed more detailed applications of the genomic healthcare as a human right approach. In a recent paper, Knoppers et al. drew upon several articles within the Convention of the Rights of the Child – including Article 24 – to posit the existence of “a novel ‘right of the asymptomatic at-risk child to be found’,” which “underpin[s] the rationale within all newborn screening programs to identify children with actionable conditions”. They claim that this right ought to serve as a guide to gNBS, including the scope of testing and modes of consent. Specifically, Knoppers et al. argue that introducing “open-ended whole genome sequencing (with no virtual panel)” into NBS paradoxically risks frustrating the right of asymptomatic at-risk children to be found through screening. As a population health initiative, NBS is offered or provided (depending on jurisdiction) with the impetus that it is worth having. Where obtained, consent is both generalised and standardised. Open-ended genome sequencing pulls against these factors because consent models for clinical genomic testing typically require in-depth explanations of the test process and what could be found. This could lead to increased parental refusal of gNBS and thus (existing) NBS, frustrating the right of asymptomatic at-risk children to be found. Therefore, Knoppers et al. contend that the use of gNBS ought to be limited to tightly constrained ‘virtual panels’ with conditions selected according to established screening principles, and where an approach to consent feasible for screening remains appropriate. Balancing the three ethical approaches The three approaches we have discussed – liberal individualism, public health ethics, and genomic healthcare as a human right – can be seen as expressing three distinct normative foundations for the ethical implementation of gNBS. They emphasise individual autonomy, collective welfare, and rights-based claims to genomic healthcare respectively. However, we do not mean to suggest that they are fundamentally incompatible, nor that authors always keep them apart. Rather they can and do overlap. Indeed, it is to be expected that gNBS policy will need to draw upon each of these approaches when balancing the ethical issues in gNBS. How to best do so will inevitably be shaped by contextual factors such as healthcare infrastructure, cultural values, and regulatory landscapes. That said, in this section we suggest how these approaches should be balanced when considering the ethical dimensions of implementing gNBS. In general, the most defensible ethical approach to implementing gNBS is public health ethics. Despite (contested) claims regarding the potential of gNBS for human health – such as it being a lifetime health resource, or through its value in seeding genomic databases, or for the development of novel therapeutics – we contend that gNBS, like traditional NBS, is and should be seen as a standardised population health intervention. At the operational level, gNBS demands universal screening protocols: sample collection must be routinised, screening panels standardised, and counselling and analysis generic. As such, the primary ethical lens through which to view the implementation of gNBS must be one on which considerable normative weight is accorded to questions of systemic feasibility and equitable delivery at scale. This lens is public health ethics insofar as public health ethics adopts a population-level view of the benefits that NBS policy should aim for, and harms to avoid, and emphasises communitarian ethical norms such as solidarity, reciprocity, social justice, and the maintenance of public trust in NBS. Public health ethics’ emphasis on the population-level implications of gNBS, and explicit appeals to common goods as rationales governing the implementation of gNBS, supports a broadly prioritarian approach to managing ethical trade-offs: one in which greater normative weight is given to the needs and rights of groups who will be left comparably worse-off by any policy decision.6 However, this raises questions regarding how to accommodate the human rights approach within public health ethics. For, although both approaches share commitments to equity, the approach of genomic healthcare as a human right prioritises the moral claims of individuals in normative argumentation, as opposed to the moral claims of populations. For instance, the human right to the “highest attainable standard of health” can be interpreted as a claim to any benefits that gNBS can offer individuals. This rights-based claim to benefits may sit in tension with a state’s capacity to equitably deliver gNBS that both benefits and avoids harming the entire newborn population – by, for example, limiting the conditions screened to those where equitable follow-up care pathways are in place, or where gene variants are well characterised in diverse population groups. A potential tension here is that public health ethics is seen as too conservative: that de-prioritising potential individual benefits of gNBS in return for a reduced likelihood of group-level harms risks frustrating human rights to the “highest attainable standard of health”. Nevertheless, Ashcroft’s development-oriented approach to genomic healthcare rights is arguably consistent with a public health ethics approach. For while genomic healthcare rights are individually held rights, they are rights to public health interventions, and inherit their attendant ethical considerations. Further, individually held rights to genomic public health interventions are often stronger when considered in light of the state’s capacity to equitably deliver genomic healthcare interventions across entire populations. This is because an inherent weakness of asserting genomic healthcare as a human right is that rights-based arguments in favour of genomic interventions risk overextending state obligations toward unproven interventions, especially if applied too generally, or to the more speculative benefits of gNBS. For instance, Brunelli et al.’s proposition that children’s rights provide moral grounds for pursuing gNBS leaves open the question of whether gNBS is in fact the best means of combating “pervasive injustice, health inequities, and health disparities” within paediatric medicine [47, 48, 49]. Similarly, Gyngell et al.’s claim that the right to the highest attainable standard of health potentially places a moral obligation upon states to start storing gNBS samples for lifelong reuse invokes speculative benefits in the face of immediate risks like data commodification and environmental costs [8]. The problem here is not that appealing to such rights cannot justify implementing gNBS, or lifelong data storage and reuse, but that the rights claims in question are so open-ended that they risk transgressing the boundaries of population health and undermining the objectives of NBS, unless constrained by considerations of public health ethics. By contrast, when Knoppers et al. introduce their novel “right of the asymptomatic at-risk child to be found (through screening)” they explicitly endorse gNBS as a public health endeavour necessitating the use of public health ethics and established population screening principles [39]. On the one hand, this places limits on the scope of any right to be found through screening. For instance, such a right cannot be used to justify screening for untreatable conditions both because the newborns who need to be found through screening are those who can be treated, and adding untreatable conditions may lead to greater refusals of NBS. But, on the other hand, when screening is restricted to a well-curated panel of conditions that can be feasibly and equitably screened at scale, then every at-risk newborn’s right to be found becomes a normatively weighty consideration. As a result, Knoppers et al.’s argument exemplifies how a public health ethics approach to implementing gNBS can serve to strengthen individually held rights to genomic healthcare interventions. What then, lastly, of the autonomous individual? Is liberal individualism an entirely inappropriate approach to the implementation of gNBS, one that ought to be superseded by a public health ethics approach? No, we contend that normative weight must still be accorded to individual interests, anchored in what Ashcroft described as “protection-oriented” rights. Core tenets of liberal individualism – privacy, bodily integrity, and the “right to an open future” – remain essential safeguards against state or parental overreach [50]. This is worth stressing against the background of public health ethics’ broadly communitarian ethos. Above we drew on van Der Berg and Oerlemans [32] to highlight how hereditary conditions can prompt a rethinking of the common good and the demands of solidarity, especially in light of technologies that reveal extensive health information about newborns. At the same time, screening infants for the purposes of initiating cascade testing amongst family members (also known as screening for reproductive benefit [51]) raises ethical concerns as to whether doing so violates the bodily integrity of the infant, as well as their personal privacy, for the benefit of others, at an age where it is impossible for them to provide consent. In situations like this liberal individualism’s protection-oriented approach to healthcare rights provides an important ethical counterweight against the potential for state and parental overreach in the name of a common good, and must figure in any balancing of ethical considerations. Conclusion The implementation of gNBS will require a nuanced synthesis of competing ideals and ethical trade-offs. Each of the ethical approaches we have examined in this paper – liberal individualism, public health ethics, and genomic healthcare as a human right – offer distinct insights into the promises and drawbacks of gNBS. While we have argued that public health ethics should be the primary approach drawn on, no single approach suffices to navigate the complex ethical terrain. Liberal individualism, with its emphasis on autonomy and resistance to state overreach, underscores the importance of protecting private values from coercive policymaking. Public health ethics prioritises collective welfare and equity, urging caution against systemic harms that disproportionately burden marginalised populations. Meanwhile, the genomic healthcare as a human right framework reframes gNBS as a moral obligation, compelling states to fulfill rights to health and scientific advancement. These perspectives reflect divergent priorities that policymakers must attempt to reconcile in any implementation of gNBS. The analysis presented here aims to provide some conceptual tools needed to navigate this evolving landscape, to ensure there is clearly articulated and well-justified ethical decision-making.