Implications of accelerated and delayed climate action for Ireland’s energy transition under carbon budgets Authors: Vahid Aryanpur, Olexandr Balyk, James Glynn, Ankita Gaur, Jason McGuire, Hannah Daly Published: 2024 ABSTRACT AbstractLimiting global warming requires the effective implementation of energy mitigation measures by individual countries. However, the consequences of the timing of these efforts on the technical feasibility of adhering to cumulative carbon budgets—which determines future global warming—are underexplored. Moreover, existing national studies on carbon budgets either overlook integrated sectoral interactions, path dependencies, or comprehensive demand-side strategies. To address this, we analyse Ireland’s mitigation pathways under equal per-capita carbon budgets using an energy systems optimisation model. Our findings reveal that delayed mitigation brings forward the need for a net-zero target by five years, risks carbon lock-in and stranded assets, increase reliance on carbon dioxide removal technologies and leads to higher long-term mitigation costs. To keep the Paris Agreement targets, countries must set and meet accelerated mid-term mitigation goals and address energy demand.Subject terms: Climate-change mitigation, Environmental impact Introduction To mitigate climate change, constraining cumulative net carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is imperative, and discussions increasingly focus on the remaining carbon budget (RCB)1,2. The RCB represents the maximum allowable cumulative CO2 emissions to limit global warming to a specific temperature rise with a given probability1. RCBs have been used for analysing the potential implications of a carbon-constrained future at the global level3–5. Meeting global climate commitments requires an unprecedented transformation in energy systems6–9. Limiting global warming to well-below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels by the end of this century and pursuing efforts to cap warming at 1.5 °C—the aspirational goal of the Paris Agreement (PA)—will require countries to intensify their near-term ambitions for mitigation by 203010–13. However, countries typically frame climate targets around endpoint targets (e.g. achieving net-zero by 2050) without a clearly defined carbon budget, or regard to how this aligns with the RCB, risking a deviation from temperature and equity goals outlined in the PA14. Therefore, aligning national mitigation efforts with RCBs, and translating RCBs into detailed country- and sector-specific mitigation pathways, is crucial. Global integrated assessment models (IAMs), form the backbone of IPCC assessments, and have been highly valuable tools for climate policymaking and exploring global emissions pathways consistent with PA commitments15, but they lack the granularity needed for informing national mitigation strategies. Moreover, existing modelling approaches insufficiently incorporate demand-side options and systems analysis16. Thus, national-scale energy systems modelling with explicit demand mitigation levers offer a solution by reflecting countries’ unique circumstances, including their starting points, energy resources, spatial development patterns17, economic conditions, existing technology stock, population and economic growth and aligning with national policy objectives18. An emerging trend in this direction is the utilisation of downscaled global RCBs to investigate national decarbonisation pathways. Earlier studies have explored the transition of the Australian electricity sector towards renewables19, decarbonisation scenarios for the iron and steel industry in Germany20 and India21, major industrial sectors in Sweden22, and the operational and embodied carbon of buildings in Switzerland23. However, these studies concentrate on specific sectors. While some notable studies have analysed the broader transition under carbon budgets, envisioning energy system decarbonisation in the US24, the UK25, Brazil26 and Japan27, the timing of mitigation under RCB scenarios remains insufficiently explored. The timing of mitigation measures—whether accelerated or delayed—determines compliance with RCBs. For a given temperature outcome, delayed action rapidly depletes the carbon budget, necessitating sharp reductions or greater reliance on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) later on. A few previous studies examining power and energy system transformations in China28 and India29 illustrate these dynamics within limited scenarios. They show that late action requires a higher reliance on CDR, while early action is characterised by the rapid deployment of advanced technologies. Analysing the timing of Paris-aligned mitigation actions identifies optimal moments for interventions, avoiding lock-in effects and facilitating a smoother transition. Additionally, it provides insights into the cost-effectiveness of immediate versus delayed efforts30 and helps investors with capital allocation decisions10. However, despite the benefits of early action, multiple sources of inertia, driven by physical, economic, and social constraints, lead to carbon lock-in31 and act as a barrier to rapid, widescale mitigation. Firstly, the energy system is capital-intensive, and assets are long-lived32. Operating existing energy infrastructure risks surpassing PA-aligned carbon budgets33. Thus, a trade-off emerges between the urgency of climate change mitigation efforts and maximising the utilisation of existing assets. Moreover, continued investment in fossil-based infrastructures increase the risk of stranded assets, necessitating early retirement or underutilisation34. Secondly, while rapid changes in energy consumption behaviours and cultural norms can occur during rare and specific circumstances (e.g. the COVID-19 pandemic period35), these changes typically take decades to become sustained. In light of these constraints, demand-side mitigation efforts become crucial, playing a pivotal role in operating energy systems under carbon budget constraints36,37 and are particularly important for driving the pace and direction of deep decarbonisation pathways38. Some studies have examined demand-side strategies. These include the implementation of energy-efficient technologies and smart metres in India39, the transition from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy carriers in buildings and transportation sectors in major economies40. Additionally, efforts in Russia have focused on electrifying end-use sectors and achieving large-scale energy efficiency improvements and productivity enhancements41. However, achieving climate goals requires comprehensive demand-side strategies ranging from improvements in energy efficiency and adoption of zero-emission fuels and technologies to profound lifestyle changes42. In summary, existing national mitigation pathways consistent with a carbon budget either (1) are sector-specific, (2) explore the timing of actions in limited scenarios, (3) neglect path dependency and near- to mid-term targets or (4) focus on technological transformation alone, and partially address demand-side strategies. We extend the existing literature by using a whole energy systems modelling framework that integrates sectoral interactions, considers path dependency, analyses the timing of actions across more than 50 scenarios, and comprehensively incorporates demand-side strategies, all within the context of two distinct carbon budgets. We employ an energy systems optimisation modelling to construct detailed technology-, fuel- and demand-specific mitigation scenarios for the entire energy system. These scenarios align with carbon budgets aimed at limiting global temperature increases to up to 2 °C. The national carbon budget is estimated using an equal per-capita approach. The framework includes explicit sub-sectoral demand projections under both current trends and low-demand pathways and quantifies trajectories for capital assets and fuel flows across the energy system, indicating the speed of technology deployment and reliance on CDR technologies necessary. Exploring the impact of accelerated or delayed mitigation action on the energy system under temperature outcomes aligned with global commitments allows the examination of the risk that delayed climate mitigation brings for carbon lock-in and reliance on unproven CDR. Furthermore, this approach can identify climate measures and targets that demonstrate resilience in the face of uncertain futures, while considering the long-lived nature of energy infrastructure and societal dynamics. The framework is applied to Ireland, which has adopted legally-binding carbon budgets whose basis in legislation is consistent with, among other factors, the principle of climate justice and Articles 2 and 4 of the PA43. While Ireland’s GHG emissions are relatively small on the global scale, the insights from this study are applicable in other high-emitting, fossil fuel-dependent countries, and the framework can be adopted and applied elsewhere. Results Mid-century mitigation pathways With a larger 400Mt carbon budget (aligned with a 67% likelihood of limiting global warming to 2.0 °C) and energy demands growing along with historical (BAU) trends (the 400Mt-BAU scenario), net emissions fall by 89% in 2040 relative to 2018, and turn negative by 2050, facilitated by Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) (Fig. 1). With lower energy demands (LED), the 400Mt-LED scenario requires no BECCS. With greater climate ambition and a smaller 315Mt carbon budget (aligned with a 50% likelihood of limiting global warming to 1.7 °C), negative emissions are required by 2040, intensifying over subsequent years and reaching about 5 Mt in 2050, cumulatively capturing 43 Mt during the decade. CO2 emissions from the energy system across different scenarios. The left panel shows sectoral emissions, removals, and total net CO2 for a 400Mt-BAU, b 400Mt-LED, c 315Mt-BAU and d 315Mt-LED, measured in MtCO2. The right panel displays cumulative emissions for the corresponding scenarios (e–h), also measured in MtCO2. The percentage values within the boxes on the left panel denote the total net CO2 reduction for each decade. “Unabated” in the right panel refers to the cumulative overshoot of the carbon budget limit by 2050. Because the model faces constraints in deploying low-carbon technologies and, therefore, decommissioning existing fossil-based infrastructure, LED scenarios facilitate more rapid emissions decreases in the 2020s, particularly with a lower carbon budget. However, with the increased availability of low-carbon technologies and driven by a lower remaining carbon budget, emissions in BAU scenarios will fall faster in the 2030s. In the 400Mt-BAU scenario, cumulative emissions breach the carbon budget in 2042 (right panel of Fig. 1), because of earlier overshoot. In the 2040s, therefore, BAU scenarios rely on BECCS to achieve substantial negative emissions. In contrast, the 400Mt-LED scenario remains within the carbon budget over the entire time horizon and, therefore, does not rely on BECCS. In the more stringent 315Mt-BAU scenario, cumulative emissions exceed the budget limit by 2030. Even with some compensating effects from negative emissions with BECCS in the 2040s, this scenario overshoots the budget by 67 MtCO2. In the 315Mt-LED case, the budget breach occurred 6 years later, with a considerably lower excess of 26 MtCO2. Energy system transformation By 2050, total final energy consumption (TFEC) will increase by 14% in BAU cases relative to 2020, and decline by 39% in LED cases (Fig. 2). The share of fossil fuels in TFEC will fall from around 75% in 2020 to below 15% in 2050 in BAU scenarios, an 80% decline in absolute consumption, and as low as 9% in LED scenarios. The share of electricity in TFEC rises from 23% to 56–60%. Fossil fuel consumption is not completely eliminated in any pathway due to lack of alternatives in the industrial sector. This transformation from an energy system based on fossil fuels to one based mainly on renewable electricity largely occurs by 2040: in all cases, the share of electricity in TFEC exceeds fossil fuels before 2035 and occurs earlier with smaller carbon budgets. Final energy consumption by fuel in mitigation scenarios. Fuel consumption is shown for a 400Mt-BAU, b 400Mt-LED, c 315Mt-BAU, and d 315Mt-LED scenarios. Fuels are disaggregated into electricity, fossil (excluding jet fuel for international flights), and other sources (bioenergy, hydrogen, ambient heat, district heat and solar heat). The percentage values within the boxes indicate the increase or decrease in total electricity consumption for each decade. Accelerated versus delayed climate action: detailed sectoral emissions pathways Figure 3 presents emissions pathways for each scenario and sector, in both accelerated and delayed action cases. In delayed action cases, up to 30% additional of the total carbon budget is allocated before 2030, reallocated from a corresponding amount between 2030 and 2050. As a result, emissions reductions in these cases are shallower before 2030, requiring deeper cuts post-2030. Emissions pathways for accelerated versus delayed climate action. Sectoral and cumulative emissions are shown for a–e power sector, f–j residential sector, k–o transport sector, p–t economic sectors and u–y total emissions under different carbon budgets in Mt CO2. The boxes in the right panel indicate the range from the 25th to the 75th percentiles. The upper/lower whiskers illustrate the maximum/minimum values in the absence of outliers, extending up to ±1.5 times the interquartile range. Outliers, represented by dots, show individual data points beyond the whiskers. The lines within the boxes represent the medians, matching the colour of the scenarios. The economic sector includes the integration of the industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors. The power sector is fully decarbonised by 2030 to 2038. This milestone occurs around 5 years sooner in LED cases, as BAU cases require an additional 20% electricity in 2035, which requires an additional 4 GW of renewable capacity, equivalent to the entire renewable capacity of Ireland in 2022. This difference will grow to 10 GW in 2050. Power generation across 2020–2050 grows rapidly in all cases, from an average annual rate of 1.5% between 2010 and 2020 to a minimum of 2.9% in LED cases, and at least 4.0% in BAU cases. Delayed action in BAU cases requires a 4.5% average annual growth rate. In the residential sector, delayed action scenarios require full decarbonisation before 2040, whereas accelerated action scenarios require achieving near-zero emissions (equivalent to about a 90% reduction compared to 2020) by the same year. In Accelerated action cases, emissions fall by on average 11% annually in the 2020 s, and by 14% in the 2030 s. In contrast, emissions fall annually by 8% in delayed action cases in the first decade, followed by an unprecedented rate of over 50% in the 2030s. In all cases, emissions cuts in the transport sector converge on 55% by 2033, relative to 2020. In all cases, the sector is fully—or nearly fully—decarbonised by 2040. Delayed action expedites the year of near-zero by around 5 years in BAU cases. Accelerated cases require more rapid vehicle fleet electrification. In the 400Mt-BAU scenario, internal combustion engine (ICE) sales will cease by 2025 and 35% of the passenger vehicle fleet will be fully electrified by 2030. With an intermediate delay, 19% of the passenger fleet will be electrified by 2030, requiring less rapid electric vehicle (EV) adoption but promoting carbon lock-in and stranded assets as ICE vehicles continue to be sold. Economic sectors, including industrial, services, and agricultural sectors, do not fully decarbonise, mainly due to limited decarbonisation options for industrial process emissions and agricultural machinery. Delayed action cases bring forward the date of net-zero by 7–10 years and in nearly all cases, increases reliance on negative emissions technologies in the 2040s (Fig. 3, bottom panels). The range of cumulative emissions in each decade and sector is relatively limited apart from power generation in the 2040s (Fig. 3, right panels), due to the sensitivity of BECCS deployment to the speed of action: wider panels indicate more flexibility. In the more stringent 315Mt cases, the range of trajectories before 2030 is narrow, indicating that the model is deploying mitigation options to the maximum feasible extent. In all cases, the majority of the total carbon budget—averaging 82%—is expended in the current decade by existing fossil fuel infrastructures. The breakdown includes 29% from transportation, 24% from economic sectors, 16% from power, and 13% from residential sectors. Over the entire study period, economic sectors account for an average of 41% of the carbon budget, followed by transportation at 37%, residential at 16%, and power at 6%. Carbon removal and unabated emissions Only three out of 52 pathways achieve the carbon budget without relying on any removal technologies (Fig. 4). These three pathways operate under low energy demand projections and a higher carbon budget (400Mt-LED), with a maximum overshoot of up to 5%. All other pathways have either unabated emissions, particularly in accelerated cases, where the carbon budget in the 2020s is smaller, or rely more on carbon removals (BECCS), in delayed cases. The highest level of unabated emissions and carbon removals combined are in accelerated 315Mt-BAU cases, because of a stringent budget pre-2030 and the model’s limitations in immediately replacing existing fossil-based technologies with cleaner alternatives. Cumulative activities of carbon removal technologies and unabated emissions. Cumulative activities are shown for a 400Mt-BAU, b 400Mt-LED, c 315Mt-BAU and d 315Mt-LED scenarios. The 0% represents the core scenarios, and the others represent overshoots from 2.5% to 30% in each core scenario. “Unabated” refers to emissions with no mitigation options before 2030, assumed to be addressed by negative emissions technologies after 2050. Economic implications Figure 5 compares system costs and marginal abatement costs per decade across different scenarios. Accelerated action incurs higher initial costs but delivers substantial long-term cost reductions. While intermediate action reduces marginal abatement costs in the first decade, it does not achieve the significant cost reductions seen under accelerated action. It is worth noting that the high marginal abatement cost does not reflect a carbon tax policy but highlights deployment constraints under the BAU demand projection. The model struggles to deploy clean energy technologies quickly enough to meet the constraints of the accelerated scenario. Consequently, this necessitates a greater reliance on expensive removal technologies, costing €2000/tonne of captured CO2, to avoid emissions overshoot before 2030. Delayed action offers short-term savings but results in significantly higher long-term costs across all metrics. This analysis suggests that although delaying action may offer short-term economic benefits, they are ultimately offset by higher long-term costs. Total O&M costs, investment costs and average marginal abatement costs. Costs are presented per decade for a 400Mt-BAU, b 400Mt-LED, c 315Mt-BAU and d 315Mt-LED scenarios. O&M costs include fuel costs and fixed and variable operation and maintenance costs. Accelerated, intermediate and delayed action correspond to the 0%, 15% and 30% overshoot cases, respectively. The difference in O&M and investment costs between the accelerated and delayed cases in each scenario is less than 10%. However, the absolute difference, ranging from 5 to 15 billion Euros per decade, is significant. This difference arises solely from the timing of actions, as all other factors—such as demand, carbon budget, planning horizon, net-zero year and techno-economic parameters and constraints—remain consistent across each scenario. Discussion This research introduces a systematic and flexible framework for developing national energy system transition scenarios consistent with an explicit effort-sharing framework under the PA, using downscaled global carbon budgets to the country level. These energy transition scenarios consistent with downscaled carbon budgets, give important insights on the impacts of accelerated or delayed action, and on the impact of BAU and lower energy demands. The key findings are as follows. Firstly, an acceleration in the energy transition is necessary to maintain a plausible pathway to the PA goals, a finding aligned with international44–46 and national-level research47,48. Our analysis confirms conclusions from a study in 2018, which found it is highly challenging to limit GHG emissions within a carbon budget compatible with 1.5 °C49. Each year that rapid mitigation is delayed will compound this challenge, putting the PA goals increasingly out of reach. Our study confirms the finding that fossil-based infrastructures and technologies are a major barrier to achieving climate targets33,50–52, and thus, the explicit policy focus on phasing out fossil fuels is required to complement policies to stimulate zero-carbon energy. CDR becomes increasingly necessary with higher energy demands, more delayed mitigation action and more ambitious climate goals. Excessive reliance on CDR entails significant environmental, economic and legal risks53,54 and may act as a deterrent to mitigation55. For example, growing crops for BECCS demands a considerable land area: the removal of 6 MtCO2/year could require around 10% of Irish agricultural land (based on the lowest land use intensity of BECCS from purpose-grown energy crops56), raising land use conflicts with nature, agriculture, fibre production, and natural carbon sinks. At the EU level, similar concerns are echoed in studies that indicate achieving the same magnitude of net-negative emissions by 2050 (200 MtCO2/year, considering the current total emissions of about 2400 MtCO2/year in the EU) would pose considerable challenges57,58. Furthermore, while delaying mitigation action eases the pace of change required in the short term, it would require deeper and even more rapid changes after 2030 to meet the same carbon budget, even with increased CDR. Delayed action also requires up to 20% more power generation post-2030, for example, because of the need for deeper electrification of the residential and transport sectors. Within the residential sector, delayed action requires achieving absolute zero emissions before 2040, requiring emissions to fall by over 50% each year during the period from 2030 to 2040. Conversely, accelerated action demands near-zero emissions by 2040, a reduction of around 90%. In the transport sector, scenarios converge on a common point of a 55% reduction by 2033, but overshooting carbon budgets before that depletes the remaining budget and expedites the need to achieve near-zero emissions by around 5 years. Moreover, delayed action cases postpone the phase-out of fossil fuel technologies, leading to carbon lock-in and stranded assets. For example, delaying the phase-out of ICE vehicles could lead to a carbon lock-in, requiring underutilisation or early retirement as the remaining carbon budget dwindles. Secondly, mitigation measures focussed on lowering energy demand are required for achieving ambitious climate targets with limited reliance on CDR, a conclusion supported by global integrated assessment modelling59,60. In BAU demand cases, a population-weighted downscaled carbon budget corresponding to an 83% chance of limiting global temperature rise to 2 °C is breached by the early 2040s, necessitating heavy reliance on CDR—over 30% of mitigation is delivered from CDR in some cases. Conversely, the low energy demand scenario successfully stays within the carbon budget limits without relying on removal technologies. In the scenario aligned with 1.7 °C, the energy system exceeds the budget in the early 2030s with BAU demands, but adopting a low energy demand approach can postpone this breach to the late 2030s, and the share of mitigation delivered from CDR falls below 10% with accelerated action. Accelerating mitigation and lowering energy demand are robust climate strategies that offer greater flexibility, mitigate against the risk of insufficient progress in new technologies and allow for more ambitious decarbonisation aligned with the PA. Importantly, reliance on unproven at-scale, or as-of-yet unavailable carbon removal technologies is reduced61,62. Additionally, accelerated action allows for the flexibility to adjust RCBs in response to emerging scientific findings63, including the potential impact of carbon cycle feedback on anthropogenic emissions64,65, and mitigates against the risk of a lack of action in other sectors, such as agriculture and land use. Finally, accelerated action helps overcome inertia in economic systems63, enabling learning and scale effects to unfold. This, in turn, contributes to a reduction in technology costs66 and diminishes the risk of investing in stranded assets67. Finally, a profound and rapid transformation in the energy system away from fossil fuels, largely towards electrification based on renewable energy sources, is required in all cases. The timeframe from 2025 to 2030 is particularly critical, to avoid carbon budget overshoot. In our scenarios, the electricity share of final energy demand exceeds fossil fuels by 2035. The share of energy services met by electricity is higher than this, given its efficiency. As of 2022, fossil fuels and electricity contribute 73% and 22% of the final energy demand in Ireland68. This emphasises the urgency of implementing policies and initiatives that accelerate the shift towards electrification and insist on achieving a balanced fuel mix before 2035. This urgency is globally relevant, considering that fossil fuels and electricity contribute to 66% and 20% of world demand. The identified critical timeframe and the goal of achieving 40% parity provide a straightforward and measurable reference for setting global targets and timelines. It can facilitate coordinated efforts on an international scale to attain a more balanced and sustainable global energy landscape by 2035. A focus on mitigation in later decades is also necessary—in several scenarios, emissions will become net-negative by 2045, indicating the insufficiency of the goal of “net-zero by 2050”. Many uncertainties and limitations remain. The vast majority of near-term mitigation is delivered by technologies and measures that are already available and largely cost-effective. The barriers to accelerating mitigation and lowering energy demand are not technical in nature but lie in supply chains, workforce and institutional capacity, planning and permitting, social acceptance and the need for greater policy focus59,69 on changing energy demand behaviour and adopting new technologies which may disrupt incumbents70. These constraints cannot be resolved within an energy systems model. Moreover, national mitigation pathways aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C are limited; achieving this would require significant reliance on CDR. Therefore, detailed modelling of CDR technologies and extending the model horizon beyond 2050 will provide a better understanding of their potential impact and scalability. Finally, other downscaling approaches can substantially change the size of national carbon budgets. Further research should analyse the implications of various approaches. Methods Analytical framework and scenario construction Figure 6 illustrates the methodological framework employed in this study, including three levels: global, national and subnational. Methodological framework illustrating the downscaling of the global carbon budget, scenarios, and integration of national and subnational details. At the global level, the analysis focuses on the RCBs aiming to align with below 2 °C of global warming with high confidence. Utilising the best estimates, the RCBs stand at 1150 GtCO2 for a 67% likelihood of limiting global warming to 2 °C and 900 GtCO2 for about 50% likelihood of limiting warming to 1.7 °C since the start of 2020. This study uses a transparent and straightforward method to downscale global carbon budgets on a per-capita basis to estimate Ireland’s equitable share. This allocation considers population as a key factor. Two distinct energy-related carbon budgets are estimated for Ireland, each rounded to approximately 315 and 400 million tonnes for the period of 2021–2050. The third level involves a granular examination of future energy demand projections using detailed sector-specific analysis. Accordingly, two demand projection scenarios, business as usual (BAU) and low energy demand (LED), are considered. The LED scenario includes demand reduction and restructuring as a mitigation option. The LED scenario represents the energy sector meeting the Climate Action Bill 2021 decarbonisation objectives through structural changes in energy service demands and de-materialising the economy along with low-carbon technology. The energy service demands are decoupled from economic growth by shifting travel, increasing end-use efficiency, densifying urban settlement, focusing on low-energy intensive economic activities and changing social infrastructure. The main assumptions underlying the LED scenario are as follows (see the full details in ref. 71): Per capita passenger kilometres are expected to reach the European average of 12,000 km/person by 2050 through compact development of Irish cities as outlined in the National Planning Framework. A mode shift towards active and public transport is also assumed. Per capita passenger kilometres are expected to reach the European average of 12,000 km/person by 2050 through compact development of Irish cities as outlined in the National Planning Framework. A mode shift towards active and public transport is also assumed. The freight activities will return to the 1995 levels, achievable by reviving local economies, better logistics and reductions in consumer demand. The freight activities will return to the 1995 levels, achievable by reviving local economies, better logistics and reductions in consumer demand. New dwellings constructed henceforth will consist of apartments and attached housing types, which have lower energy service demands than detached dwellings. Further, behavioural and efficiency improvements will reduce other energy demands within households, such as cloth or dishwashing. New dwellings constructed henceforth will consist of apartments and attached housing types, which have lower energy service demands than detached dwellings. Further, behavioural and efficiency improvements will reduce other energy demands within households, such as cloth or dishwashing. The energy intensity (energy/GDP) of the industrial sector is assumed to decline by 45% by 2050 by increasing production efficiency and better material usage. The energy intensity (energy/GDP) of the industrial sector is assumed to decline by 45% by 2050 by increasing production efficiency and better material usage. The space required for commercial and public service activities will be reduced due to dense development and the promotion of practices like telecommuting. The space required for commercial and public service activities will be reduced due to dense development and the promotion of practices like telecommuting. Combining the CO2 budgets and demand projection pathways generates four following scenarios: 400Mt_BAU: This scenario involves a generous 400 Mt carbon budget aligned with the 2 °C target and represents a demand projection in line with BAU projections. 400Mt_BAU: This scenario involves a generous 400 Mt carbon budget aligned with the 2 °C target and represents a demand projection in line with BAU projections. 400Mt_LED: It involves a 400 Mt carbon budget and represents a demand projection in line with LED projections. 400Mt_LED: It involves a 400 Mt carbon budget and represents a demand projection in line with LED projections. 315Mt_BAU: This scenario involves a more stringent 315 Mt carbon budget aligned with a 1.7 °C target, reflecting demand projections associated with BAU practices. 315Mt_BAU: This scenario involves a more stringent 315 Mt carbon budget aligned with a 1.7 °C target, reflecting demand projections associated with BAU practices. 315Mt_LED: With a 315 Mt carbon budget, it reflects the LED scenario. 315Mt_LED: With a 315 Mt carbon budget, it reflects the LED scenario. The TIMES-Ireland model (TIM), an optimisation model of the Irish energy system, is employed to assess decarbonisation pathways under these scenarios. TIM calculates the cost-optimal fuel and technology mix to meet future energy service demands while ensuring decarbonisation under carbon budget limitations. It has three major components. The supply-side module covers various energy resources, fuel production, conversion technologies, and transmission infrastructure. The demand side focuses on energy service demands in different end-use sectors. The emission control module tracks CO2 emissions, ensuring compliance with carbon constraints and enabling carbon neutrality through direct CO2 removal technology utilisation. Starting in 2030, TIM will include carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, with options for retrofitting existing coal, peat, and gas power plants. BECCS will also be available and provide net-negative CO2 capture and allow negative emissions electricity generation. In our model, direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) will serve as a backstop technology with a fixed cost of €2000 per tonne of CO2. This is a very conservative assumption that sets an upper bound on the model’s marginal abatement cost at a level that ensures no plausible mitigation measures are excluded. Based on the analysis by Young et al.72, this high abatement cost reflects the sensitivity of carbon prices to the scale of carbon capture deployment. Their findings show that for EU countries like the UK and Germany, the cost of DACCS ranges from $400 to $3000 per tonne of CO2 for installations with a capacity of one million tonnes per year which aligns with the required capture capacity in our case study. The carbon constraints do not encompass the decarbonisation efforts related to international aviation and shipping. The detailed TIM structure and assumptions are outlined in73 and have been utilised for decarbonisation analysis in the residential sector74,75, light-duty76 and heavy-duty vehicles77. It is worth noting that the allocation of national carbon budgets can be based on various approaches, with extensive literature using equity principles as the foundation for effort-sharing78. These principles include allocations of carbon budgets based on current emission shares (grandfathering), an equal cumulative per-capita distribution of emissions, considering a country’s cumulative historical emissions, and ability to pay based on GDP per-capita79–81. Grandfathering disproportionately benefits countries with a larger share of current emissions. But the other approaches generally result in significantly smaller80 or even negative carbon budgets79 for developed countries or make the calculation of national carbon budgets highly sensitive to the degree of global connectivity82. In addition to equity-based approaches, cost-optimal allocation of carbon budgets is used for regional distribution of mitigation actions, focusing on achieving the lowest possible costs globally83. Yet, national distribution is highly dependent on the assumed marginal abatement cost curves and investment requirements84,85. Moreover, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) emphasises the importance of equity principles in selecting a national allocation approach. According to the UNFCCC, all nations agreed to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”86. Building on these principles, resource-sharing methods that account for population and current emissions—reflecting equity and inertia, respectively87—suggest Ireland’s carbon budget ranging from 290 Mt to 390 Mt (Extended Smooth Pathway Model) and 435 Mt to 580 Mt (Contraction and Convergence Model). The carbon budget estimations in the current research, based on equal per-capita distribution, align more closely with the lower range suggested by the former resource-sharing method. Carbon budgets: accelerated versus delayed action Currently, the carbon budgets are the cornerstone of Ireland’s climate action88. This legally binding emission programme operates within 5-year budget periods. The allocation period is more comparable to the 400Mt CO2 budget in this study. To examine the impact of accelerated versus delayed action, 12 additional cases for each core scenario are defined. These cases involve overshooting the carbon budget within the first two periods of 2021–2025 and 2026–2030, with increments of 2.5%. These cases investigate overshoot scenarios ranging from 2.5% to 30% during these periods. Consequently, the study investigates four core scenarios, including two carbon budgets and two demand projections. For each of these scenarios, 12 sensitivity cases are also conducted, resulting in a total of 52 pathways. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of two carbon budgets across various time periods. For instance, in the 400Mt scenarios with a 15% overshoot, there is a 15% higher carbon budget until 2030, followed by a reduction in the post-2030 period. Conversely, the base 400Mt scenario represents a more constrained budget in pre-2030 periods, offering an accelerated action pathway. As the permissible overshoot increases in the sensitivity cases, expanding the budget for the pre-2030 period, the model allows for more emissions in the initial periods, suggesting a delayed action pathway. The magnitude of the overshoot correlates with the timing of the action pathway, with higher overshoots indicating later action. The total emissions in all original CO2 budgets and the sensitivity cases remain constant at 315Mt and 400Mt, and overshoots refer to exceeding the budget in the pre-2030 periods. It is worth noting that, in line with the guidelines set forth in the PA, emissions are envisioned to reach net zero beyond 205089 in this study. Carbon budget allocation in various accelerated and delayed cases. The figure represents two carbon budgets with CO2 emission limits of (a) 400Mt and b 315Mt. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge the support of the Department of Environment, Climate and Communications through the Climate and Energy Modelling Services to the Climate Action Modelling Group (CAMG) (grant No. RFT2022/S 164-466018). The authors gratefully acknowledge Bakytzhan Suleimenov and Andrew Smith for their valuable contributions to the development of TIM. The project was also supported by MaREI, the Research Ireland Centre for Energy, Climate and Marine (grant No. 12/RC/2302_P2). Author contributions Conceptualisation: V.A. and H.D. Formal analysis and visualisation: V.A. Writing—original draft preparation: V.A. and H.D. Supervision: H.D. Investigation and validation: V.A., O.B., J.G., A.G., J.G. and H.D. All authors contributed to reviewing and editing of the paper and approved the final version. Data availability The data used in this research are all available on GitHub and archived on Zenodo90. Detailed results on investments and fuel flow across the energy system across all scenarios are available on an online portal: https://epmg.netlify.app/TIM-Carbon-Budget-2023. Code availability TIMES code is open source and has been archived on Zenodo91. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Footnotes Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. References Associated Data Data Availability Statement The data used in this research are all available on GitHub and archived on Zenodo90. Detailed results on investments and fuel flow across the energy system across all scenarios are available on an online portal: https://epmg.netlify.app/TIM-Carbon-Budget-2023. TIMES code is open source and has been archived on Zenodo91.