Party affiliation, political ideology, views on democracy and society, and support for political violence in the United States of America: findings from a nationally representative survey Garen J Wintemute, Andrew Crawford, Sonia L Robinson, Daniel Tancredi, Elizabeth A Tomsich, Julia P Schleimer, Paul M Reeping, Aaron B Shev ABSTRACT Background: Recent research in the United States has found concerning levels of support for and willingness to engage in political violence and for extreme beliefs linked to violence. Associations between political party affiliation and political ideology and these levels of support have not been quantified. Methods: Cross-sectional nationally representative survey conducted May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Primary outcomes concerned support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, presented as prevalences (weighted to achieve representativeness) with 95% confidence intervals (CI) and prevalence differences (adjusted for sociodemographics and geography) with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. Results: The completion rate was 55.8%; the analytic sample included 8,620 respondents. Higher percentages of Republicans (from 35.3% to 49.5%) than Democrats (from 24.7% to 26.7%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Few respondents (<3%), with no statistically significant differences by party affiliation, were “very or completely willing” to threaten or intimidate, injure, or kill another person for political purposes. Strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats to consider it “very or extremely likely” that they would be armed in a future situation where they considered political violence to be justified: 14.6% (95% CI, 12.5%, 17.0%) and 4.7% (95% CI, 3.4%, 6.3%), respectively; adjusted prevalence difference 9.7% (95% CI, 6.9%, 12.1%; q < 0.001). Respondents rarely (<2%), and again without differences by party affiliation, thought it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone in such a situation. Findings for political ideology resembled those for party affiliation. Conclusions: Republicans and conservatives were more likely than Democrats and liberals to view political violence as justified to advance specific political objectives; this finding is a function of the specific objectives that were presented. Republicans were not more willing than Democrats to engage in political violence themselves. These findings deepen our understanding of the potential threat posed by political violence in the United States and can contribute to prevention efforts. Introduction Findings from recent public opinion polls [ 1 – 4 ] and survey research [ 5 – 8 ], statements by elected officials [ 9 , 10 ], assessments by experts in several disciplines [ 11 – 13 ], and the report of the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol [ 14 ] have raised concern about the stability of democracy and the prospect of widespread political violence—the use of physical force to advance political objectives [ 15 ]—in the United States (US). “Political violence,” as used here, is a broad term that can include targeted violence (directed at a group defined by characteristics such as perceived race and ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, or national origin) and terrorist violence (which may be directed against the population in general). Like other forms of violence, political violence can properly be described as a public health problem [ 16 ]. Political violence kills and injures people and has many other negative population-level effects [ 17 , 18 ]; its incidence has increased in recent years in the US [ 11 ]. Given a high prevalence of firearm ownership in the US and increased support for political violence among subsets of firearm owners [ 19 ], there is specific concern for the possibility of firearm-involved political violence. Adopting a public health approach [ 20 ], which relies on systematic investigative techniques that were originally developed to address infectious and chronic diseases and intervention guidelines that were developed to address other forms of injury [ 21 , 22 ], will likely prove beneficial for understanding and preventing political violence—as it already has for firearm violence [ 23 ] and motor vehicle injuries [ 24 , 25 ]. Working from that public health perspective, in late spring 2022 we conducted the Life in America Survey to develop a better understanding of political violence based on data from a large nationally representative sample. The first report from the survey presented the broad contours of the problem [ 26 ]. We found concerningly high levels of support for extreme beliefs and the use of violence to advance political objectives in the US—including personal willingness to engage in that violence. Both support for and willingness to engage in political violence were more common among men than women and were inversely related to respondents’ education and income. In this study we seek to characterize variation in support for those extreme beliefs and for political violence in association with 2 related exposures of interest: the broad ranges of self-reported political party affiliation (from strong Democrat to strong Republican) and political ideology (from extremely liberal to extremely conservative). This study builds upon and extends our findings from the survey on support for political violence among so-called MAGA Republicans, in which the comparison of greatest interest was to other members of that same political party [ 27 ]. Most modern studies of party affiliation and support for political violence have found higher support for violence among Republicans than Democrats [ 1 , 3 – 7 , 28 – 30 ], with support particularly high among those who identify as strong Republicans [ 6 ], but there have been exceptions [ 31 – 33 ]. One study suggested that increased support for political violence among Republicans relative to Democrats may have developed only in the past few years [ 7 ]. These studies have largely involved small samples or addressed violence only against members of an opposing political party. They have generally not defined violence, asked about support for non-political violence (to assess the specificity of support for political violence) or violence to advance specific political objectives, or explored personal willingness to engage in political violence [ 8 ]. This study advances our understanding by proceeding from a specific definition of violence, broadening the scope of the inquiry beyond partisan violence to include many forms of political violence, establishing a context for support of political violence by assessing support for other forms of violence as well, probing specifically on the possibility of the use of firearms in political violence, and—perhaps most importantly—by assessing respondents’ self-reported willingness to engage in political violence themselves. The findings are likely to have direct implications for prevention efforts. Methods The 2022 Life in America Survey was designed by the authors and administered online in English and Spanish from May 13 to June 2, 2022 by the survey research firm Ipsos [ 34 ]. Written or verbal consent was not required for participation in this online survey; before participants accessed the questionnaire, they were provided informed consent information that concluded, “[by] continuing, you are agreeing to participate in this study.” The study was approved by the University of California Davis Institutional Review Board (protocol 187125: exempt from full review, category 2, survey research) without a consent requirement and is reported following American Association for Public Opinion Research guidelines [ 35 ]. Participants Respondents were drawn from the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, an online research panel that has been widely used in population-based research, including studies of violence and firearm ownership [ 36 – 41 ]. Studies by Ipsos and others have found that KnowledgePanel surveys yield findings similar to those from random digit dial samples, with little evidence of recruitment bias (difference between individuals who agree to or decline recruitment into KnowledgePanel), or self-selection bias (difference between KnowledgePanel members who respond or do not respond to an invitation to participate in a specific survey, including difference on stigmatized behaviors that are the topic of the survey) [ 42 ]. To establish a nationally representative panel, members are recruited on an ongoing basis through address-based probability sampling using data from the US Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File [ 42 , 43 ]. Recruited adults in households without internet access are provided a web-enabled device and free internet service, and a modest, primarily points-based incentive program seeks to encourage participation and promote participants’ retention in KnowledgePanel over time. A probability-proportional-to-size procedure was used to select a study-specific sample for this survey. All panel members who were aged 18 years and older were eligible for selection. Invitations were sent by e-mail; automatic reminders were delivered to non-respondents by e-mail and telephone beginning 3 days later [ 43 ]. A final survey weight variable provided by Ipsos adjusted for the initial probability of selection into KnowledgePanel and for survey-specific nonresponse and over- or under-coverage using design weights with post-stratification raking ratio adjustments. With weighting, the sample is designed to be representative of the noninstitutionalized adult population of the US as reflected in the 2021 March supplement of the Current Population Survey [ 42 , 44 , 45 ]. Measures Party affiliation and political ideology. Sociodemographic data, including political party affiliation and political ideology, were collected by Ipsos from profiles created and maintained by KnowledgePanel members. Party affiliation was derived following a procedure used since the 1950s by the American National Election Studies [ 46 ]. As described in the report of a previous KnowledgePanel survey, Respondents were first asked, “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as” (response choices: “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Independent,” “Another party,” “No preference”). Republicans/Democrats were then asked, “Would you call yourself a” (response choices: “Strong Republican/Democrat,” “Not very strong Republican/Democrat”). All others were asked the follow-up question: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the” (response choices: “Republican Party,” “Democratic Party”) [ 47 ]. Respondents who answered that follow-up question were coded by Ipsos as “Leans Republican/Democrat.” Respondents who refused to answer (n = 309, 3.6% of the sample) were coded by Ipsos as “undecided/independent/other.” Political ideology was reported by panel members in responding to the question, “In general, do you think of yourself as…” with 7 response options ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative” and with “moderate/middle of the road” as a midpoint. Beliefs. Survey questions in this area addressed beliefs regarding democracy, such as whether it is the preferred form of government for the US; the potential need for violence in the US; and beliefs about race and ethnicity, religion, and American society. Selected questions from prior surveys were included or adapted to track trends in opinion and provide context for responses to questions that had not been asked previously. Support for the QAnon delusion complex was determined through respondents’ agreement with statements of core elements of that complex: that US institutions “are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation” and that “a storm coming soon” will “sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders.” Support for the great-replacement belief [ 48 ] was determined through respondents’ agreement with the statement that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants.” Violence. Violence was represented by the phrase “force or violence,” defined as “physical force strong enough that it could cause pain or injury to a person.” “Force or violence to advance an important political objective that you support” was used in questions about respondents’ support for and willingness to engage in political violence. Questions on violence began with its use in non-political situations; these questions were included to assess whether differences seen in support for political violence were specific to political violence or were a manifestation of more generalized support for violence as a means of resolving interpersonal social problems and disputes. The items were presented in a fixed order that, in the judgment of the authors, proceeded from more likely to less likely to be seen by respondents as justifying violence: from “in self-defense” to “to get respect.” This was done to create an expected response transition from support to nonsupport for violence that respondents would need to reverse to indicate support for political violence. Respondents were then asked about the extent to which they considered political violence to be justified “in general” and to advance specified political objectives; examples include “to return Donald Trump to the presidency this year,” “to preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions,” and “to stop police violence.” There were 17 objectives; our intent in selecting them was to obtain responses on a wide array of specific possibilities. Some measures related to electoral violence; others addressed targeted violence (defined by the intended victims) or violence to accomplish narrow objectives; and still others concerned violence to bring about (or prevent) social change more broadly. Some were chosen to be of interest primarily to participants on one side or the other of the partisan and ideological spectra, and others were chosen for a lack of expected association with party affiliation and ideology. Nine objectives were presented to all respondents and 8 were paired, with each respondent seeing only 1 item from each pair; each respondent was presented with 13 of 17 objectives. Respondents who considered political violence to be at least sometimes justified for at least 1 of these objectives were asked about their personal willingness to engage in political violence: by type of violence (to “damage property,” “threaten or intimidate a person,” “injure a person,” “kill a person”) and against members of 9 target populations (examples: “an elected federal or state government official,” “a police officer,” “a person who does not share your religion”). Finally, all respondents were asked about the likelihood of their future use of firearms in connection with political violence in a situation where they considered such violence justified (e.g., “I will be armed with a gun,” “I will shoot someone with a gun”). The full text of all questions reported on in this study is provided in the supplement (see Supplementary information). Implementation Ipsos translated the questionnaire into Spanish, and interpreting services staff at UC Davis Medical Center reviewed the translation. Forty KnowledgePanel members participated in an English language pretest administered April 27 to May 2, 2022. Respondents were randomized 1:1 to receive response options in order from negative to positive valence or the reverse throughout the questionnaire. Where a question presented multiple statements for respondents to consider, the order in which those statements were presented was randomized unless ordering was necessary. To reduce response bias, logic-driving questions (those to which responses might invoke a skip pattern) included non-response prompts. The questionnaire included a check for inattentiveness among respondents: two fictitious entries were included in lists of news and information outlets for which respondents provided information on their extent of use. We employed unipolar response arrays without a neutral midpoint (e.g., do not agree, somewhat agree, strongly agree, very strongly agree). The literature is not in agreement on whether such midpoints should be included [ 8 , 49 ]. We were persuaded by the studies reviewed by Chyung et al. [ 49 ], which suggest that such midpoints facilitate selection of “a minimally acceptable response as soon as it is found,” known as satisficing. Our analyses focus on responses above the “somewhat” or “sometimes” level to minimize the impact of potential satisficing on the results. According to Chyung et al. [ 49 ], satisficing is particularly common when respondents are uncomfortable with the topics of the survey or under social desirability pressures; both conditions apply here. Statistical analysis To generate prevalence estimates, we calculated percentages weighted to achieve national representativeness and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) using PROC SURVEYFREQ in SAS version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC) and Complex Samples Frequencies in IBM SPSS Statistics, version 28 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). To compute unadjusted and adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs) and their 95% CIs, we defined outcomes dichotomously (such as by combining “very willing” with “completely willing” responses and “not willing” with “somewhat willing” responses in 2 categories) and used PROC SURVEYREG, employing robust standard errors to correct for design effects and heteroskedasticity in binary outcomes. We considered several models, choosing the final model based on concordance with theory, findings from prior research, and fit statistics. This model adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. We also considered an unadjusted model; a model that adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, and gender; and a model adjusting for those variables and income, education, and Census division. P-values were corrected for multiple comparisons by controlling the false discovery rate (FDR) using the Benjamini-Hochberg method [ 50 ]. The corrected values are known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values or as q-values [ 51 ]; we employ the latter term here. Q-values represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. For comparisons across the entire spectrum of party affiliation and political ideology, we chose midpoints as referents in regression models; these findings are presented in the tables. For political ideology, the midpoint was the “moderate/middle of the road” stratum. For party affiliation, the midpoint was the combination of the small “undecided/independent/other” stratum with the “leans Republican” and “leans Democrat” strata. We made this combination after exploratory analysis showed substantial overlap between this aggregate and the “moderate/middle of the road” political ideology stratum (S1 Table in S1 File ). We also directly compared strong Republicans with strong Democrats on some outcomes, again using adjusted prevalence differences and q-values. These comparisons are presented in the text with a visual summary included for key political violence measures. In a sensitivity analysis, we excluded the 447 inattentive respondents who reported use of one or both fictitious news sources. We compared responses from attentives and inattentives on other items associated with risk for violence (such as a prior history of arrest for violent crimes) using weighted percentages as described above and assessed the significance of differences with likelihood-ratio tests. Ethics approval This study was approved by the University of California Davis Institutional Review Board. The University of California, Davis, in accordance with its FWA with the Department of Health & Human Services, adheres to all federal and state regulations related to the protection of human research subjects, including 45 CFR 46 (“The Common Rule”), 21 CFR 50, 21 CFR 56 for FDA regulated products, and the principles of The Belmont Report and Institutional policies and procedures. In addition, the International Conference on Harmonization, Good Clinical Practice (ICH GCP) principles are adhered to insofar as they parallel the previously mentioned regulations and policies. Results Of 15,449 panel members invited to participate, 8,620 completed the survey, yielding a 55.8% completion rate, and another 730 (4.7%) members opened the survey but did not proceed. After weighting, half of the respondents (50.5%, 95% CI 49.3%, 51.7%) were female; 62.6% (95% CI 61.4%, 63.9%) were white, non-Hispanic; mean (SD) age was 48.4 (18.0) years. Demographic descriptions of respondents by party affiliation and political ideology are in S2 and S3 Tables in S1 File ; descriptions of respondents and nonrespondents are in S4 Table in S1 File . Findings for party affiliation Democracy, the potential need for violence, and civil war. Majorities of respondents across the spectrum of party affiliation (ranging from 60.4% to 82.8% for Republicans and from 54.7% to 79.3% for Democrats) perceived “a serious threat to our democracy” and believed it very or extremely important “for the United States to remain a democracy” (from 92.7% to 93.5% for Republicans and from 89.8% to 95.1% for Democrats) (S5 Table in S1 File ). While majorities agreed strongly or very strongly that “democracy is the best form of government” (from 75.2% to 77.8% for Republicans and from 66.8% to 79.1% for Democrats), large minorities of respondents agreed strongly or very strongly that “American democracy only serves the interests of the wealthy and powerful” (from 28.1% to 29.1% for Republicans and from 35.7% to 40.8% for Democrats). Strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats to agree strongly or very strongly that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy” (S5 Table in S1 File ) (aPD, 11.3%, 95% CI 7.9%, 14.7%; q < 0.001). Strong Republicans were also more likely than strong Democrats to agree strongly or very strongly that “armed citizens should patrol polling places at election time” (aPD 10.7%, 95% CI 8.3%, 13.2%; q < 0.001). Strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats ( Table 1 ) to agree strongly or very strongly that force or violence might be justified under 3 sets of circumstances: 1) to “protect American democracy…if elected leaders will not” (aPD 16.0%, 95% CI 12.6%, 19.4%; q < 0.001), 2) to save “our American way of life” that is “disappearing so fast” (aPD 21.4%, 95% CI 18.1%, 24.7%; q < 0.001), and 3) to “save our country” because “things have gotten so far off track” (aPD 13.7%, 95% CI 11.1%, 16.4%; q < 0.001). Strong Republicans were also more likely than strong Democrats to agree strongly or very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States” (aPD 7.8%, 95% CI 4.7%, 11.0%; q < 0.001). 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.t001 Table 1 Party affiliation and beliefs concerning the potential need for violence in the US. Statement Party Affiliation Strong Democrat Not Very Strong Democrat Undecided/Independent/Other/Leans Not Very Strong Republican Strong Republican Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) If elected leaders will not protect American democracy, the people must do it themselves, even if it requires taking violent actions. Do not agree 1050 61.9 (59.1, 64.6) 694 60.7 (57.3, 63.9) 1791 50.1 (48.2, 52.0) 447 45.3 (41.8, 48.9) 512 35.6 (32.9, 38.4) Somewhat agree 372 25.0 (22.7, 27.6) 263 25.7 (22.8, 28.7) 1024 30.4 (28.6, 32.1) 322 37.5 (34.0, 41.1) 483 34.2 (31.5, 37.0) Strongly or very strongly agree 174 13.1 (11.2, 15.3) 130 13.7 (11.5, 16.3) 641 19.6 (18.1, 21.1) 149 17.2 (14.6, 20.2) 421 30.2 (27.6, 33.0) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −3.9 (−6.4, −1.3; 0.01) −4.4 (−7.3, −1.6; 0.007) Referent −0.8 (−3.9, 2.4; 0.73) 12.1 (9.0, 15.3; < 0.001) Our American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it. Do not agree 1250 75.3 (72.7, 77.7) 738 66.5 (63.2, 69.6) 2073 57.7 (55.8, 59.6) 445 46.3 (42.8, 49.9) 443 29.7 (27.2, 32.3) Somewhat agree 231 15.0 (13.1, 17.1) 254 23.9 (21.2, 26.9) 875 26.9 (25.2, 28.6) 325 37.3 (33.9, 40.9) 527 37.7 (35.0, 40.5) Strongly or very strongly agree 121 9.7 (7.9, 11.8) 93 9.6 (7.7, 11.9) 506 15.4 (14.1, 16.9) 146 16.4 (13.9, 19.3) 446 32.6 (29.9, 35.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −3.9 (−6.2, −1.7; 0.003) −5.1 (−7.6, −2.6; < 0.001) Referent 2.0 (−1.0, 5.0; 0.29) 17.5 (14.1, 20.6; < 0.001) Because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country. Do not agree 1446 87.6 (85.3, 89.5) 909 82.1 (79.3, 84.6) 2605 73.8 (72.0, 75.5) 667 70.6 (67.1, 73.9) 759 52.6 (49.7, 55.4) Somewhat agree 108 8.5 (6.8, 10.4) 128 12.5 (10.5, 15.0) 583 18.3 (16.8, 19.9) 176 21.8 (18.8, 25.1) 426 29.9 (27.4, 32.6) Strongly agree 44 4.0 (2.9, 5.5) 49 5.3 (4.0, 7.2) 248 7.9 (6.9, 9.0) 70 7.6 (6.0, 9.7) 236 17.5 (15.4, 19.9) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −2.7 (−4.3, −1.0; 0.005) −2.2 (−4.2, −0.3; 0.06) Referent 1.1 (−1.1, 3.2; 0.44) 11.0 (8.5, 13.6; < 0.001) In the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States. Do not agree 883 53.3 (50.5, 56.1) 590 53.3 (49.9, 56.6) 1753 49.1 (47.2, 51.0) 474 49.2 (45.6, 52.8) 557 37.8 (35.1, 40.6) Somewhat agree 558 34.6 (32.0, 37.2) 393 36.2 (33.1, 39.5) 1235 36.7 (34.8, 38.5) 330 37.8 (34.3, 41.4) 605 42.4 (39.6, 45.3) Strongly or very strongly agree 156 12.1 (10.2, 14.3) 100 10.5 (8.5, 12.8) 446 14.2 (12.9, 15.6) 108 13.0 (10.7, 15.8) 253 19.8 (17.4, 22.3) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −0.6 (−3.0, 1.8; 0.73) −3.5 (−6.1, −1.0; 0.02) Referent 0.4 (−2.4, 3.1; 0.86) 7.2 (4.5, 10.0; < 0.001) APDs are for “strongly or very strongly agree” responses and are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. Race and ethnicity and American society. Five items explored beliefs on race and ethnicity and the great-replacement belief (S6 Table in S1 File ). Democrats were far more likely than Republicans to agree strongly or very strongly that “white people benefit from advantages in society that Black people do not have” (ranging from 55.4% to 74.3% for Democrats and from 5.5% to 15.3% for Republicans), that “straight white men hold far too much power in America” (from 39.7% to 62.6% for Democrats and from 6.3% to 13.9% for Republicans), and that “having more Black Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans is good for the country” (from 55.7% to 71.9% for Democrats and from 19.8% to 29.4% for Republicans). Conversely, Republicans were far more likely than Democrats to agree strongly or very strongly that “discrimination against whites is as big a problem as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities” (from 37.9% to 60.8% for Republicans and from 8.1% to 13.3% for Democrats) and that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants” (from 20.8% to 38.2% for Republicans and from 5.8% to 10.4% for Democrats) (S6 Table in S1 File ). Three items addressed the central elements of the QAnon delusion complex and a related religious belief (S7 Table in S1 File ). Strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats to agree strongly or very strongly that US institutions “are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation” (aPD 12.4%, 95% CI 9.6%, 15.2%; q < 0.001) and that “a storm coming soon” will “sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders” (aPD 13.1%, 95% CI 10.2%, 16.0%; q < 0.001). Strong or very strong agreement with the statement that “the chaos in America today is evidence that we are living in what the Bible calls ‘the end times’” was also more common among strong Republicans than among strong Democrats (aPD 21.0%, 95% CI 17.7%, 24.3%; q < 0.001). Non-political violence. Respondents’ views on the justifiability of non-political violence varied substantially with circumstance. Most respondents across the range of party affiliation—Republicans more frequently than Democrats—saw violence as usually or always justified in self-defense or to prevent assaultive or self-inflicted injury to others (S8 Table in S1 File ). Conversely, at least 80% of respondents across party affiliation reported that violence to win an argument, respond to an insult, or get respect was never justified. Fewer than 6% saw such violence as usually or always justified, and there were no statistically significant differences across party affiliation (S8 Table in S1 File ). Political violence. Support for political violence “in general” was uncommon and did not vary significantly across party affiliation. Fewer than 4% of respondents in any group viewed it as usually or always justified ( Table 2 ). 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.t002 Table 2 Party affiliation and justification for political violence, in general and for 9 specific objectives. What do you think about the use of force or violence in the following situations? Party Affiliation Strong Democrat Not Very Strong Democrat Undecided/Independent/Other/Leans Not Very Strong Republican Strong Republican Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) In general...to advance an important political objective that you support Never justified 1342 80.5 (78.0, 82.8) 910 80.0 (77.0, 82.6) 2863 78.4 (76.7, 80.0) 761 79.3 (76.0, 82.2) 1177 80.9 (78.4, 83.1) Sometimes justified 225 15.9 (13.9, 18.2) 153 16.4 (14.0, 19.2) 575 18.9 (17.4, 20.5) 144 17.7 (15.0, 20.8) 228 16.3 (14.2, 18.5) Usually or always justified 38 3.5 (2.5, 5.0) 31 3.6 (2.5, 5.2) 72 2.7 (2.1, 3.5) 18 3.0 (1.7, 5.1) 29 2.8 (1.8, 4.3) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 1.0 (−0.5, 2.5; 0.29) 0.4 (−1.1, 2.0; 0.69) Referent 1.2 (−.05, 2.9; 0.27) 1.7 (0.3, 3.1; 0.052) Usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 objectives 387 26.7 (24.3, 29.4) 265 24.7 (21.9, 27.7) 1075 31.5 (29.8, 33.3) 322 35.3 (31.9, 38.9) 714 49.5 (46.6, 52.3) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −3.3 (−6.3, −0.2; 0.09) −6.6 (−10.0, −3.2; < 0.001) Referent 5.2 (1.4, 9.0; 0.02) 18.4 (15.0, 21.8; < 0.001) To return Donald Trump to the presidency this year Never justified 1509 92.9 (91.0, 94.3) 1010 91.6 (89.4, 93.4) 3141 89.2 (87.9, 90.4) 799 85.4 (82.4, 88.0) 1136 78.8 (76.2, 81.1) Sometimes justified 38 2.8 (1.9, 4.0) 44 5.3 (3.8, 7.2) 181 6.4 (5.4, 7.5) 64 7.9 (6.1, 10.2) 134 9.4 (7.8, 11.2) Usually or always justified 48 4.3 (3.2, 5.9) 30 3.1 (2.1, 4.6) 138 4.4 (3.7, 5.3) 50 6.7 (4.9, 9.1) 155 11.9 (10.0, 14.0) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.5 (−1.2, 2.1; 0.68) −1.5 (−2.9, 0.0; 0.11) Referent 2.9 (0.7, 5.1; 0.02) 8.5 (6.2, 10.7; < 0.001) To stop an election from being stolen Never justified 1317 81.2 (78.9, 83.4) 885 80.5 (77.7, 83.0) 2662 76.3 (74.6, 77.8) 666 70.6 (67.1, 73.9) 865 60.5 (57.7, 63.3) Sometimes justified 182 12.0 (10.2, 14.0) 131 12.3 (10.3, 14.6) 564 16.6 (15.2, 18.0) 192 22.5 (19.6, 25.8) 326 22.5 (20.2, 24.9) Usually or always justified 94 6.8 (5.5, 8.4) 70 7.2 (5.6, 9.2) 240 7.2 (6.3, 8.3) 59 6.8 (5.1, 9.1) 233 17.0 (14.8, 19.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −0.1 (−1.9, 1.7; 0.93) −0.4 (−2.5, 1.7; 0.80) Referent 0.4 (−1.7, 2.6; 0.78) 10.2 (7.7, 12.8; < 0.001) To stop people who do not share my beliefs from voting Never justified 1512 92.6 (90.6, 94.1) 1008 90.8 (88.5, 92.7) 3273 92.8 (91.6, 93.8) 864 92.6 (90.1, 94.5) 1354 94.1 (92.4, 95.4) Sometimes justified 43 3.7 (2.6, 5.3) 53 6.0 (4.5, 7.9) 139 5.0 (4.2, 6.0) 44 6.1 (4.4, 8.4) 49 3.8 (2.9, 5.1) Usually or always justified 43 3.7 (2.7, 5.2) 27 3.2 (2.2, 4.8) 61 2.2 (1.7, 2.9) 8 1.3 (0.6, 2.8) 23 2.1 (1.3, 3.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 1.6 (0.2, 3.0; 0.055) 0.6 (−0.9, 2.0; 0.55) Referent 0.4 (−0.8, 1.5; 0.68) 1.7 (0.4, 2.9; 0.02) To prevent discrimination based on race or ethnicity Never justified 968 58.8 (56.0, 61.5) 713 63.3 (60.0, 66.5) 2275 62.5 (60.7, 64.4) 620 64.8 (61.2, 68.2) 1001 70.1 (67.4, 72.7) Sometimes justified 469 29.6 (27.2, 32.2) 282 27.3 (24.4, 30.5) 931 28.4 (26.7, 30.2) 246 29.5 (26.2, 33.0) 304 21.3 (19.1, 23.7) Usually or always justified 157 11.6 (9.8, 13.6) 90 9.4 (7.5, 11.6) 264 9.1 (8.0, 10.3) 51 5.8 (4.2, 7.9) 114 8.6 (7.0, 10.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 2.8 (0.6, 5.0; 0.04) −0.2 (−2.6, 2.2; 0.91) Referent −1.6 (−3.7, 0.5; 0.22) 1.8 (−0.3, 3.9; 0.17) To preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions Never justified 1370 86.2 (84.1, 88.0) 899 82.7 (80.0, 85.1) 2637 76.5 (74.8, 78.0) 610 67.6 (64.1, 70.9) 822 58.5 (55.7, 61.3) Sometimes justified 165 10.0 (8.5, 11.8) 146 13.6 (11.4, 16.0) 647 18.2 (16.8, 19.7) 260 27.8 (24.7, 31.2) 440 30.2 (27.6, 32.8) Usually or always justified 51 3.8 (2.8, 5.2) 37 3.7 (2.6, 5.3) 175 5.3 (4.5, 6.3) 38 4.6 (3.2, 6.5) 151 11.3 (9.5, 13.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −1.0 (−2.5, 0.4; 0.28) −1.3 (2.9, 0.3; .021) Referent 0.1 (−1.7, 1.9; 0.94) 6.5 (4.3, 8.7; < 0.001) To preserve the American way of life l believe in Never justified 1096 68.1 (65.5, 70.6) 695 64.2 (60.9, 67.3) 1986 57.9 (56.0, 59.7) 414 45.4 (41.8, 49.0) 496 35.8 (33.1, 38.7) Sometimes justified 385 23.9 (21.6, 26.3) 301 26.7 (23.9, 29.7) 1129 31.6 (29.9, 33.4) 386 41.2 (37.7, 44.8) 592 40.3 (37.5, 43.1) Usually or always justified 117 8.0 (6.6, 9.7) 95 9.1 (7.3, 11.2) 379 10.5 (9.4, 11.7) 119 13.4 (11.1, 16.2) 340 23.8 (21.4, 26.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −1.8 (−3.7, 0.2; 0.14) −0.9 (−3.2, 1.3; 0.54) Referent 3.5 (0.8, 6.3; 0.03) 13.2 (10.3, 16.0; < 0.001) To oppose Americans who do not share my beliefs Never justified 1462 89.2 (87.2, 91.0) 968 86.5 (83.9, 88.7) 3160 88.7 (87.4, 89.9) 838 88.7 (85.9, 91.0) 1314 91.2 (89.3, 92.7) Sometimes justified 97 7.1 (5.7, 8.9) 86 9.4 (7.6, 11.7) 269 8.8 (7.7, 9.9) 76 9.7 (7.7, 12.1) 91 6.4 (5.1, 7.9) Usually or always justified 42 3.6 (2.6, 5.1) 36 4.1 (2.9, 5.8) 67 2.6 (1.9, 3.4) 8 1.6 (0.7, 3.7) 26 2.5 (1.6, 3.8) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 1.2 (−0.2, 2.6; 0.18) 1.0 (−0.7, 2.6; 0.36) Referent −0.0 (−1.5, 1.4; 0.97) 1.3 (−0.0, 2.6; 0.11) To oppose the government when it does not share my beliefs Never justified 1388 84.4 (82.1, 86.5) 948 85.0 (82.2, 87.4) 2824 78.9 (77.2, 80.5) 766 82.0 (78.9, 84.8) 1110 77.8 (75.3, 80.1) Sometimes justified 167 12.3 (10.5, 14.4) 105 11.3 (9.2, 13.8) 537 17.1 (15.7, 18.7) 137 16.3 (13.6, 19.3) 257 18.1 (16.0, 20.4) Usually or always justified 41 3.3 (2.3, 4.6) 32 3.7 (2.5, 5.4) 111 4.0 (3.2, 4.9) 12 1.7 (0.9, 3.2) 52 4.1 (3.1, 5.6) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −0.3 (−1.7, 1.1; 0.78) −0.4 (−2.0, 1.3; 0.76) Referent −1.0 (−2.3, 0.3; 0.24) 1.7 (0.2, 3.2; 0.06) To oppose the government when it tries to take private land for public purposes Never justified 1196 72.8 (70.1, 75.2) 766 69.1 (65.9, 72.2) 2140 60.4 (58.5, 62.3) 533 56.2 (52.6, 59.8) 680 47.4 (44.5, 50.2) Sometimes justified 313 20.5 (18.3, 22.9) 257 24.9 (22.0, 27.9) 1016 29.4 (27.7, 31.2) 291 32.5 (29.2, 36.0) 543 37.0 (34.3, 39.8) Usually or always justified 85 6.7 (5.3, 8.4) 58 6.0 (4.6, 7.9) 309 10.2 (9.0, 11.4) 90 11.3 (9.0, 14.0) 201 15.7 (13.6, 18.0) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −2.0 (−3.9, −0.0; 0.10) −3.8 (−5.8, −1.7; 0.001) Referent 2.5 (−0.2, 5.2; 0.14) 7.0 (4.4, 9.5; < 0.001) APDs are for “usually or always justified” responses and are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. Regardless of their response on the justification for political violence in general, respondents were asked about the justification for political violence to advance 17 specific political objectives ( Tables 2 and 3 , Figs 1 and 2 ). Nearly a third of respondents (32.8%, 95% CI 31.7%, 33.9%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of these 17 objectives. Strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats to see violence as justified for at least 1 objective (aPD 21.7%, 95% CI 17.8%, 25.6%; q < 0.001). 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.t003 Table 3 Party affiliation and justification for political violence for 8 additional specific objectives*. What do you think about the use of force or violence in the following situations? Party Affiliation Strong Democrat Not Very Strong Democrat Undecided/Independent/Other/Leans Not Very Strong Republican Strong Republican Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) To stop voter fraud Never justified 672 82.5 (79.1, 85.5) 418 75.3 (70.8, 79.3) 1338 75.1 (72.7, 77.3) 326 71.3 (66.5, 75.7) 440 62.5 (58.5, 66.3) Sometimes justified 73 10.2 (7.9, 13.1) 78 17.7 (14.2, 21.9) 270 15.5 (13.7, 17.6) 94 21.4 (17.4, 25.9) 146 20.4 (17.3, 23.8) Usually or always justified 49 7.3 (5.4, 9.8) 40 7.0 (5.0, 9.8) 162 9.4 (7.9, 11.1) 35 7.3 (5.0, 10.5) 124 17.2 (14.2, 20.6) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −2.4 (−5.0, 0.3; 0.16) −1.8 (−4.7, 1.1; 0.32) Referent −0.8 (−3.8, 2.3; 0.71) 8.1 (4.4, 11.7; < 0.001) To stop voter intimidation Never justified 472 59.1 (55.2, 62.9) 371 66.7 (62.2, 71.0) 1065 62.1 (59.5, 64.7) 307 63.4 (58.3, 68.3) 398 56.2 (52.1, 60.1) Sometimes justified 244 29.6 (26.2, 33.3) 145 26.3 (22.4, 30.6) 491 28.6 (26.2, 31.1) 124 27.5 (23.2, 32.3) 202 27.2 (23.8, 30.8) Usually or always justified 90 11.3 (9.0, 13.9) 38 7.0 (4.9, 9.8) 170 9.3 (7.9, 10.9) 36 9.0 (6.0, 13.2) 121 16.7 (13.8, 19.9) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 2.0 (−1.0, 4.9; 0.29) −2.6 (−5.5, 0.4; 0.17) Referent −0.1 (−3.8, 3.7; 0.98) 7.7 (4.2, 11.2; < 0.001) To reinforce the police Never justified 466 58.9 (55.0, 62.7) 237 47.8 (42.9, 52.7) 753 45.3 (42.7, 48.0) 125 29.1 (24.7, 34.0) 135 19.9 (16.8, 23.4) Sometimes justified 271 32.3 (28.7, 36.0) 191 38.8 (34.1, 43.7) 734 40.2 (37.7, 42.8) 222 47.8 (42.7, 53.0) 284 39.3 (35.4, 43.3) Usually or always justified 65 8.8 (6.8, 11.5) 74 13.4 (10.5, 17.0) 280 14.5 (12.8, 16.3) 104 23.1 (18.9, 27.9) 296 40.8 (36.8, 44.9) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −5.2 (−8.1, −2.2; 0.002) −1.5 (−5.2, 2.2; 0.54) Referent 7.5 (2.8, 12.2; 0.006) 23.7 (19.1, 28.2; < 0.001) To stop police violence Never justified 338 39.8 (36.0, 43.7) 275 44.4 (40.0, 49.0) 811 44.8 (42.2, 47.5) 242 49.2 (44.2, 54.2) 385 53.3 (49.3, 57.3) Sometimes justified 349 44.1 (40.3, 48.0) 243 42.7 (38.3, 47.3) 715 42.3 (39.7, 45.0) 183 40.0 (35.2, 45.0) 257 36.8 (33.0, 40.8) Usually or always justified 111 16.1 (13.3, 19.3) 69 12.8 (10.0, 16.4) 203 12.9 (11.1, 14.9) 45 10.7 (7.8, 14.7) 72 9.8 (7.7, 12.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 3.5 (−0.1, 7.0; 0.12) 0.2 (−3.5, 3.9; 0.94) Referent −0.6 (−4.4, 3.1; 0.82) −1.2 (−4.2, 1.8; 0.55) To stop illegal immigration Never justified 652 79.5 (75.9, 82.7) 395 72.3 (67.8, 76.3) 1116 64.1 (61.5, 66.6) 228 47.3 (42.3, 52.4) 228 33.4 (29.7, 37.3) Sometimes justified 103 13.5 (10.9, 16.4) 108 20.8 (17.2, 24.9) 470 26.1 (23.8, 28.5) 190 40.8 (35.9, 45.8) 285 40.0 (36.2, 44.0) Usually or always justified 41 7.0 (5.0, 9.8) 33 6.9 (4.8, 9.9) 190 9.8 (8.4, 11.4) 61 11.9 (9.0, 15.7) 193 26.6 (23.2, 30.3) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −2.0 (−4.8, 0.9; 0.27) −2.9 (−5.8, 0.1; 0.11) Referent 1.8 (−1.8, 5.3; 0.44) 15.9 (11.9, 19.9; < 0.001) To keep borders open Never justified 531 65.2 (61.3, 68.8) 367 64.7 (60.0, 69.1) 1173 67.0 (64.4, 69.5) 287 64.5 (59.5, 69.2) 509 70.1 (66.1, 73.8) Sometimes justified 225 28.2 (24.8, 31.8) 151 27.8 (23.6, 32.3) 418 25.4 (23.1, 27.9) 118 26.5 (22.3, 31.2) 134 17.9 (15.0, 21.1) Usually or always justified 47 6.7 (4.9, 9.0) 37 7.6 (5.3, 10.6) 128 7.6 (6.3, 9.2) 37 9.0 (6.4, 12.4) 77 12.0 (9.3, 15.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −0.9 (−3.4, 1.6; 0.60) −0.3 (−3.4, 2.8; 0.91) Referent 1.7 (−1.5, 5.0; 0.40) 4.7 (1.3, 8.1; 0.02) To stop a protest or demonstration Never justified 578 71.4 (67.7, 74.8) 349 63.6 (59.1, 67.9) 1004 59.9 (57.2, 62.5) 185 42.2 (37.1, 47.4) 300 42.9 (39.0, 46.9) Sometimes justified 188 24.5 (21.3, 27.9) 178 30.5 (26.4, 34.8) 601 34.9 (32.3, 37.5) 224 51.5 (46.2, 56.7) 346 46.6 (42.6, 50.6) Usually or always justified 27 4.1 (2.7, 6.2) 31 5.9 (4.1, 8.5) 82 5.2 (4.1, 6.7) 28 6.3 (4.2, 9.4) 75 10.6 (8.2, 13.5) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −1.2 (−3.3, 0.9; 0.36) 0.4 (−2.2, 2.9; 0.86) Referent 1.7 (−1.1, 4.5; 0.36) 6.4 (3.3, 9.5; < 0.001) To support a protest or demonstration Never justified 623 74.3 (70.6, 77.8) 415 75.3 (70.8, 79.3) 1442 77.4 (75.1, 79.6) 409 84.1 (80.0, 87.5) 604 83.6 (80.3, 86.5) Sometimes justified 143 20.0 (16.9, 23.6) 93 18.9 (15.4, 23.0) 304 18.3 (16.3, 20.5) 58 12.2 (9.2, 16.1) 79 12.1 (9.6, 15.1) Usually or always justified 40 5.7 (4.1, 7.8) 25 5.8 (3.8, 8.8) 64 4.3 (3.2, 5.6) 18 3.7 (2.3, 5.9) 28 4.3 (2.9, 6.3) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 1.3 (−0.9, 3.5; 0.35) 0.8 (−1.9, 3.5; 0.66) Referent 0.8 (−1.2, 2.8; 0.57) 1.8 (−0.2, 3.8; 0.16) * These objectives were paired, with respondents randomized 1:1 to see 1 item in each pair. 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.g001 Fig 1 Adjusted prevalence differences for strong Democrats* and strong Republicans* for the view that force or violence is usually or always justified, in general and for 9 specific objectives. * The referent is respondents classified as undecided/independent/other/leans Democrat/leans Republican. APDs are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. . 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.g002 Fig 2 Adjusted prevalence differences for strong Democrats* and strong Republicans* for the view that force or violence is usually or always justified, for 8 additional specific objectives. * The referent is respondents classified as undecided/independent/other/leans Democrat/leans Republican. APDs are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. . APDs are for “usually or always justified” responses and are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. Republicans also endorsed violence for a greater number of specific political objectives than Democrats did. Nearly half (49.5%, 95% CI 46.6%, 52.3%) of strong Republicans and more than a third (35.3%, 95% CI 31.9%, 38.9%) of not very strong Republicans endorsed violence to advance multiple objectives; approximately one fourth of strong Democrats (26.7%, 95% CI, 24.3%, 29.4%) and not very strong Democrats (24.7%, 95% CI, 21.9%, 27.7%) did so. For 11 of these 17 specific objectives considered individually, strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats to see violence as usually or always justified ( Tables 2 and 3 , Figs 1 and 2 ). In 2 cases (preventing discrimination and stopping police violence) strong Democrats were slightly more likely than strong Republicans to see violence as usually or always justified; these differences were not statistically significant. Fewer than 5% of respondents in any party affiliation group reported that they were very or completely willing to damage property or to threaten or intimidate, injure, or kill a person to advance a political objective ( Table 4 ). When compared to the midpoint referent group, strong Republicans were, by small margins, more frequently very or completely willing to “threaten or intimidate a person” and “to kill a person” ( Table 4 , Fig 3 ). They did not differ significantly from strong Democrats (threaten a person: aPD 1.0%, 95% CI −0.5%, 2.5%; q = 0.32; kill a person: aPD 1.1%, 95% CI −0.2%, 2.5%; q = 0.19). 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.t004 Table 4 Party affiliation and personal willingness to engage in political violence, by type of violence. In a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important politicalobjective…How willing would you personally be to use force or violence in each of these ways? Party Affiliation Strong Democrat Not Very Strong Democrat Undecided/Independent/Other/Leans Not Very Strong Republican Strong Republican Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) To damage property Not asked the quesion 1221 73.4 (70.8, 75.9) 830 75.5 (72.6, 78.3) 2443 68.8 (67.0, 70.5) 603 64.7 (61.2, 68.1) 722 50.7 (47.9, 53.6) Not willing 302 20.1 (17.9, 22.5) 215 19.6 (17.0, 22.4) 892 25.1 (23.5, 26.7) 269 28.7 (25.5, 32.1) 618 42.3 (39.5, 45.2) Sometimes willing 42 2.9 (2.0, 4.1) 28 2.8 (1.9, 4.1) 102 3.7 (3.0, 4.6) 38 4.6 (3.2, 6.6) 57 4.2 (3.2, 5.6) Very or completely willing 39 3.6 (2.5, 5.1) 19 2.1 (1.3, 3.4) 69 2.4 (1.9, 3.2) 14 2.0 (1.1, 3.4) 33 2.7 (1.8, 3.9) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 1.8 (0.3, 3.4; 0.051) 0.1 (−1.3, 1.5; 0.91) Referent 0.3 (−1.0, 1.7; 0.75) 1.2 (−0.1, 2.4; 0.13) To threaten or intimidate a person Not asked the question 1221 73.4 (70.8, 75.9) 830 75.5 (72.5, 78.2) 2443 68.9 (67.1, 70.6) 603 64.7 (61.2, 68.1) 722 50.7 (47.9, 53.6) Not willing 318 20.5 (18.3, 22.8) 218 19.7 (17.1, 22.4) 885 24.9 (23.3, 26.5) 267 28.2 (25.1, 31.5) 612 41.8 (39.0, 44.7) Sometimes willing 41 3.8 (2.7, 5.3) 28 3.0 (2.0, 4.4) 132 4.7 (3.9, 5.7) 45 6.0 (4.3, 8.4) 66 4.9 (3.8, 6.4) Very or completely willing 24 2.4 (1.5, 3.7) 17 1.9 (1.1, 3.2) 42 1.6 (1.1, 2.2) 9 1.0 (0.5, 2.1) 30 2.6 (1.7, 3.8) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.9 (−0.4, 2.1; 0.29) 0.1 (−1.2, 1.3; 0.96) Referent 0.0 (−0.9, 1.0; 0.96) 1.9 (0.6, 3.1; 0.01) To injure a person Not asked the question 1221 73.5 (70.9, 75.9) 830 75.5 (72.5, 78.3) 2443 68.9 (67.1, 70.6) 603 64.8 (61.2, 68.2) 722 50.7 (47.8, 53.6) Not willing 336 22.4 (20.1, 24.8) 223 20.4 (17.9, 23.2) 909 25.8 (24.2, 27.4) 275 29.6 (26.4, 33.0) 623 42.6 (39.8, 45.4) Sometimes willing 26 2.3 (1.5, 3.7) 19 1.9 (1.1, 3.0) 100 3.6 (2.8, 4.5) 37 4.5 (3.1, 6.3) 59 4.5 (3.4, 6.0) Very or completely willing 20 1.8 (1.1, 2.9) 20 2.2 (1.4, 3.5) 46 1.8 (1.3, 2.4) 8 1.1 (0.5, 2.5) 27 2.2 (1.5, 3.4) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.1 (−1.1, 1.2; 0.96) 0.2 (−1.2, 1.5; 0.86) Referent 0.2 (−1.1, 1.4; 0.86) 1.1 (−0.0, 2.3; 0.11) To kill a person Not asked the question 1221 73.4 (70.8, 75.9) 830 75.5 (72.5, 78.2) 2443 68.9 (67.1, 70.6) 603 64.9 (61.4, 68.3) 722 50.7 (47.8, 53.5) Not willing 344 23.4 (21.1, 25.9) 233 21.3 (18.7, 24.1) 961 27.8 (26.2, 29.6) 290 31.8 (28.5, 35.3) 642 44.4 (41.6, 47.3) Sometimes willing 15 1.2 (0.6, 2.2) 11 1.3 (0.7, 2.4) 53 1.7 (1.3, 2.4) 18 2.1 (1.3, 3.5) 36 2.4 (1.7, 3.4) Very or completely willing 23 2.0 (1.3, 3.1) 19 2.0 (1.2, 3.2) 46 1.6 (1.1, 2.2) 11 1.2 (0.6, 2.2) 32 2.5 (1.7, 3.7) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.4 (−0.7, 1.6; 0.59) 0.7 (−0.6, 1.9; 0.39) Referent 0.4 (−0.6, 1.4; 0.59) 1.6 (0.4, 2.7; 0.02) APDs are for “very or completely willing” responses and are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.g003 Fig 3 Adjusted prevalence differences for strong Democrats* and strong Republicans* for willingness to engage in political violence†, by type of violence, and for likelihood of future firearm possession and use‡ in a setting where political violence is seen as justified. * The referent is respondents classified as undecided/independent/other/leans Democrat/leans Republican. † The comparison is for the very or completely willing stratum. ‡ The comparison is for the very or extremely likely stratum. APDs are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. Similarly, respondents reporting that they were very or completely willing to use force or violence against a person because of that person’s occupation or another social characteristic did not exceed 4% for any party affiliation group ( Table 5 ). Again by small margins, and when compared to the midpoint referent group, strong Republicans were more frequently very or completely willing to engage in violence against “a federal or state government official,” “an election worker, such as a poll worker or vote counter,”, and “a person who does not share your political beliefs.” They again did not differ significantly from strong Democrats (government official: aPD 0.5%, 95% CI −1.1%, 2.2%; q = 0.69; election worker: aPD 0.6%, 95% CI −0.8%, 2.0%; q = 0.53; person not sharing beliefs: aPD 0.7%, 95% CI −0.5%, 1.8%; q = 0.39). 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.t005 Table 5 Party affiliation and personal willingness to engage in political violence, by target of violence. In a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important politicalobjective…How willing would you personally be to use force or violence against a person because theyare… Party Affiliation Strong Democrat Not Very Strong Democrat Undecided/Independent/Other/Leans Not Very Strong Republican Strong Republican Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) An elected federal or state government official Not asked the quesion 1221 73.5 (70.9, 75.9) 830 75.7 (72.8, 78.5) 2443 69.1 (67.3, 70.8) 603 64.8 (61.2, 68.2) 722 50.8 (48.0, 53.7) Not willing 327 21.5 (19.3, 23.9) 220 20.3 (17.8, 23.2) 892 25.8 (24.1, 27.4) 286 30.2 (27.0, 33.6) 622 42.9 (40.1, 45.8) Sometimes willing 26 1.9 (1.3, 2.9) 26 2.5 (1.6, 3.7) 115 3.7 (3.0, 4.5) 23 3.3 (2.1, 5.3) 55 4.0 (2.9, 5.4) Very or completely willing 29 3.1 (2.1, 4.7) 13 1.5 (0.8, 2.6) 44 1.5 (1.1, 2.1) 11 1.7 (0.9, 3.1) 27 2.3 (1.5, 3.5) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 1.5 (0.1, 2.9; 0.09) −0.5 (−1.5, 0.7; 0.55) Referent 1.0 (−0.2, 2.2; 0.21) 2.0 (0.8, 3.3; 0.005) An elected local government official Not asked the question 1221 73.5 (70.9, 76.0) 830 75.7 (72.7, 78.5) 2443 69.1 (67.3, 70.8) 603 64.9 (61.4, 68.3) 722 50.8 (48.0, 53.7) Not willing 328 22.0 (19.7, 24.5) 221 19.9 (17.4, 22.7) 908 26.3 (24.6, 28.0) 283 29.6 (26.5, 33.0) 635 44.5 (41.7, 47.4) Sometimes willing 27 2.0 (1.3, 3.1) 21 2.5 (1.6, 3.9) 100 3.3 (2.6, 4.1) 26 3.4 (2.2, 5.1) 51 3.5 (2.6, 4.7) Very or completely willing 26 2.5 (1.6, 3.8) 17 1.8 (1.1, 3.1) 41 1.4 (1.0, 2.0) 11 2.1 (1.1, 4.1) 17 1.2 (0.7, 1.9) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 1.2 (−0.1, 2.4; 0.13) 0.2 (−1.0, 1.3; 0.86) Referent −1.1 (−0.4, 2.6; 0.27) 0.5 (−0.4, 1.4; 0.36) An election worker, such as a poll worker or vote counter Not asked the question 1221 73.6 (70.9, 76.0) 830 75.6 (72.6, 78.4) 2443 68.9 (67.1, 70.6) 603 65.0 (61.4, 68.4) 722 50.8 (47.9, 53.6) Not willing 337 23.0 (20.7, 25.5) 230 20.9 (18.3, 23.7) 972 28.0 (26.3, 29.7) 297 31.6 (28.4, 35.1) 658 45.5 (42.6, 48.3) Sometimes willing 20 1.4 (0.8, 2.3) 16 1.8 (1.1, 3.1) 53 1.8 (1.3, 2.5) 13 1.9 (0.9, 3.6) 31 2.2 (1.4, 3.4) Very or completely willing 23 2.1 (1.3, 3.2) 15 1.7 (1.0, 2.9) 33 1.3 (0.9, 1.9) 9 1.5 (0.8, 3.1) 17 1.5 (0.9, 2.7) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.9 (−0.3, 2.1; 0.23) −.02 (−1.3, 1.0; 0.86) Referent 1.0 (−0.2, 2.3; 0.19) 1.6 (0.4, 2.7; 0.02) A public health official Not asked the question 1221 73.4 (70.8, 75.9) 830 75.7 (72.7, 78.4) 2443 69.0 (67.3, 70.8) 603 64.9 (61.3, 68.3) 722 50.8 (48.0, 53.7) Not willing 338 22.9 (20.6, 25.4) 224 20.5 (17.9, 23.3) 939 27.1 (25.5, 28.9) 293 31.2 (28.0, 34.6) 638 44.3 (41.5, 47.2) Sometimes willing 25 2.0 (1.2, 3.1) 20 2.0 (1.2, 3.3) 71 2.3 (1.8, 3.0) 18 2.3 (1.4, 3.8) 49 3.5 (2.6, 4.8) Very or completely willing 20 1.7 (1.1, 2.8) 16 1.8 (1.1, 3.0) 40 1.5 (1.0, 2.1) 8 1.6 (0.7, 3.6) 17 1.3 (0.8, 2.1) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.4 (−0.7, 1.5; 0.57) 0.2 (−0.9, 1.4; 0.78) Referent 0.7 (−0.7, 2.0; 0.48) 0.8 (−0.2, 1.7; 0.18) A member of the military or National Guard Not asked the quesion 1221 73.4 (70.8, 75.9) 830 75.6 (72.6, 78.4) 2443 69.0 (67.2, 70.7) 603 65.0 (61.4, 68.4) 722 50.8 (48.0, 53.7) Not willing 322 21.5 (19.3, 23.9) 221 20.0 (17.5, 22.8) 916 26.3 (24.6, 28.0) 293 31.4 (28.2, 34.9) 650 45.2 (42.4, 48.1) Sometimes willing 35 2.4 (1.7, 3.5) 25 2.6 (1.7, 4.0) 92 3.0 (2.4, 3.8) 15 2.2 (1.2, 4.0) 31 2.2 (1.5, 3.1) Very or completely willing 25 2.6 (1.7, 4.1) 14 1.8 (1.0, 3.1) 46 1.7 (1.2, 2.4) 9 1.5 (0.7, 2.9) 23 1.8 (1.1, 3.0) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.9 (−0.4, 2.3; 0.28) 0.0 (−1.2, 1.3; 0.98) Referent 0.4 (−0.8, 1.6; 0.60) 0.9 (−0.2, 2.1; 0.19) A police officer Not asked the quesion 1221 73.4 (70.8, 75.9) 830 75.6 (72.6, 78.4) 2443 68.9 (67.1, 70.6) 603 65.2 (61.6, 68.5) 722 50.7 (47.9, 53.6) Not willing 302 19.8 (17.7, 22.2) 217 19.9 (17.4, 22.8) 909 26.1 (24.5, 27.8) 288 31.0 (27.8, 34.4) 658 45.6 (42.7, 48.4) Sometimes willing 48 3.7 (2.7, 5.1) 28 3.0 (2.0, 4.4) 89 2.8 (2.2, 3.5) 19 2.5 (1.4, 4.3) 25 1.7 (1.1, 2.5) Very or completely willing 33 3.0 (2.1, 4.5) 15 1.5 (0.8, 2.6) 59 2.2 (1.7, 2.9) 9 1.4 (0.7, 2.8) 24 2.0 (1.2, 3.3) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.9 (−0.5, 2.3; 0.31) −0.7 (−1.9, 0.5; 0.34) Referent −0.1 (−1.2, 1.1; 0.94) 0.9 (−0.3, 2.2; 0.24) A person who does not share your race or ethnicity Not asked the quesion 1221 73.6 (71.0, 76.0) 830 75.6 (72.6, 78.3) 2443 68.9 (67.1, 70.6) 603 65.0 (61.4, 68.4) 722 50.9 (48.0, 53.7) Not willing 335 22.4 (20.1, 24.9) 227 20.3 (17.8, 23.1) 972 27.8 (26.2, 29.5) 294 31.5 (28.2, 34.9) 657 45.7 (42.8, 48.6) Sometimes willing 24 2.1 (1.3, 3.3) 19 2.4 (1.5, 3.8) 50 1.8 (1.3, 2.5) 17 2.7 (1.5, 4.7) 28 1.9 (1.3, 2.9) Very or completely willing 20 1.9 (1.2, 3.2) 16 1.7 (1.0, 2.9) 35 1.5 (1.0, 2.1) 6 0.9 (0.4, 2.1) 18 1.5 (0.9, 2.6) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.2 (−0.9, 1.4; 0.79) −0.2 (−1.4, 0.9; 0.78) Referent −0.0 (−0.9, 0.9; 0.99) 1.1 (0.0, 2.1; 0.10) A person who does not share your religion Not asked the quesion 1221 73.6 (71.0, 76.1) 830 75.7 (72.7, 78.4) 2443 69.0 (67.2, 70.7) 603 64.9 (61.3, 68.3) 722 50.8 (48.0, 53.7) Not willing 337 22.7 (20.4, 25.2) 222 19.9 (17.4, 22.7) 965 27.9 (26.2, 29.6) 303 33.2 (29.8, 36.7) 673 46.8 (43.9, 49.7) Sometimes willing 22 1.7 (1.1, 2.7) 16 1.9 (1.1, 3.2) 52 1.9 (1.4, 2.6) 10 1.2 (0.6, 2.3) 19 1.5 (0.9, 2.6) Very or completely willing 21 2.1 (1.3, 3.3) 22 2.5 (1.6, 3.9) 33 1.2 (0.8, 1.8) 6 0.8 (0.3, 1.8) 12 0.9 (0.4, 1.7) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.6 (−0.6, 1.6; 0.43) 0.9 (−0.4, 2.1; 0.29) Referent 0.1 (−0.7, 1.0; 0.83) 0.7 (−0.1, 1.5; 0.19) A person who does not share your political beliefs Not asked the quesion 1221 73.6 (70.9, 76.0) 830 75.6 (72.6, 78.3) 2443 68.9 (67.2, 70.7) 603 65.0 (61.4, 68.3) 722 50.9 (48.0, 53.8) Not willing 326 21.5 (19.2, 23.9) 229 20.9 (18.3, 23.7) 960 27.8 (26.1, 29.5) 296 31.9 (28.6, 35.4) 653 45.4 (42.6, 48.3) Sometimes willing 38 3.4 (2.3, 4.8) 16 1.8 (1.0, 2.9) 68 2.2 (1.7, 2.9) 15 2.2 (1.2, 4.0) 30 2.2 (1.4, 3.2) Very or completely willing 17 1.6 (1.0, 2.6) 17 1.8 (1.1, 2.9) 29 1.1 (0.7, 1.7) 7 1.0 (0.5, 2.2) 19 1.5 (0.9, 2.5) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.5 (−0.5, 1.4; 0.45) 0.7 (−0.4, 1.7; 0.36) Referent 0.3 (−0.6, 1.2; 0.66) 1.1 (0.2, 2.1; 0.04) APDs are for “very or completely willing” responses and are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. Possession and use of firearms Finally, all 8,620 respondents were asked, regardless of their position on political violence or firearm ownership status, to predict the likelihood of their future use of a firearm “in a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective” ( Table 6 , Fig 3 ). Strong Republicans, more frequently than strong Democrats, thought it very or extremely likely that, in such a situation, “I will be armed with a gun” (aPD 9.5%, 95% CI 6.9%, 12.1%; q < 0.001) and that “I will carry a gun openly, so that people know I am armed” (aPD 4.4%, 95% CI 2.2%, 6.7%; q < 0.001). Fewer than 2% of respondents thought it very or extremely likely that “I will threaten someone with a gun” or that “I will shoot someone with a gun.” Except for a small and marginally significant increase in predicted threats with guns among strong Republicans as compared to the midpoint referent group, there was no statistically significant variation across party affiliation. 10.1371/journal.pone.0355678.t006 Table 6 Party affiliation and likelihood of firearm possession and use when political violence is perceived as justified. Thinking now about the future and all the changes it might bring, how likely is it that you will use a gun in any of the following ways in the next few years—in a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective? Party Affiliation Strong Democrat Not Very Strong Democrat Undecided/Independent/Other/Leans Not Very Strong Republican Strong Republican Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) Unweighted n Weighted % (95% CI) I will be armed with a gun. Not likely 1463 89.1 (87.0, 90.9) 950 85.5 (82.9, 87.8) 2886 81.1 (79.5, 82.6) 727 76.5 (73.1, 79.6) 1057 71.5 (68.7, 74.1) Somewhat likely 86 6.3 (4.9, 7.9) 91 9.6 (7.7, 11.8) 352 11.4 (10.1, 12.7) 123 15.1 (12.6, 18.2) 181 13.9 (12.0, 16.1) Very or extremely likely 53 4.7 (3.4, 6.3) 45 4.9 (3.6, 6.6) 237 7.5 (6.6, 8.6) 64 8.3 (6.5, 10.7) 173 14.6 (12.5, 17.0) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) −1.6 (−3.3, 0.1; 0.13) −2.3 (−4.1, 0.5; 0.04) Referent 1.7 (−0.7, 4.0; 0.27) 7.9 (5.4, 10.3; < 0.001) I will carry a gun openly, so that people know I am armed. Not likely 1532 93.8 (92.0, 95.3) 1016 92.9 (90.9, 94.5) 3174 90.4 (89.1, 91.5) 831 88.3 (85.4, 90.8) 1202 83.0 (80.5, 85.3) Somewhat likely 36 2.6 (1.8, 3.8) 40 4.2 (3.0, 5.9) 182 5.9 (5.0, 6.9) 61 8.6 (6.5, 11.2) 116 8.8 (7.2, 10.6) Very or extremely likely 35 3.5 (2.4, 5.1) 28 2.9 (1.9, 4.2) 114 3.7 (3.1, 4.6) 21 3.1 (1.9, 4.9) 91 8.2 (6.5, 10.3) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.7 (−0.8, 2.2; 0.48) −0.6 (−1.9, 0.8; 0.52) Referent −0.0 (−1.7, 1.6; 0.98) 5.1 (3.1, 7.2; < 0.001) I will threaten someone with a gun. Not likely 1573 97.5 (96.3, 98.4) 1056 96.5 (94.9, 97.6) 3406 97.8 (97.1, 98.3) 906 98.5 (97.2, 99.2) 1386 97.7 (96.3, 98.6) Somewhat likely 12 1.1 (0.5, 2.1) 19 2.1 (1.4, 3.4) 42 1.5 (1.0, 2.1) 10 1.2 (0.6, 2.4) 10 0.8 (0.4, 1.6) Very or extremely likely 16 1.4 (0.8, 2.4) 10 1.4 (0.7, 2.6) 21 0.7 (0.4, 1.1) 1 0.2 (0.0, 1.7) 13 1.5 (0.8, 2.8) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.9 (0.0, 1.8; 0.10) 0.6 (−0.4, 1.6; 0.34) Referent −0.1 (−0.7, 0.5; 0.86) 1.3 (0.2, 2.3; 0.045) I will shoot someone with a gun. Not likely 1558 96.5 (95.0, 97.5) 1043 95.4 (93.6, 96.7) 3358 96.0 (95.1, 96.8) 894 97.1 (95.4, 98.1) 1358 95.4 (93.8, 96.6) Somewhat likely 26 2.2 (1.4, 3.5) 28 3.0 (2.0, 4.5) 84 2.9 (2.3, 3.8) 20 2.7 (1.7, 4.3) 39 3.3 (2.3, 4.5) Very or extremely likely 15 1.3 (0.7, 2.3) 13 1.6 (0.9, 2.9) 33 1.0 (0.7, 1.5) 2 0.3 (0.1, 1.0) 13 1.3 (0.7, 2.6) Adjusted prevalence difference (95% CI; q-value) 0.3 (−0.6, 1.2; 0.60) 0.4 (−0.6, 1.4; 0.54) Referent −0.4 (−0.9, 0.2; 0.31) 0.8 (−0.2, 1.8; 0.20) APDs are for “very or extremely likely” responses and are adjusted for age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, Census division, and rurality. Q-values, also known as FDR-adjusted (or FDR-corrected) p-values, represent the probability that the given difference would be a false discovery; they represent the expected proportion of “false positives” that would be seen among the collection of all differences whose q-values were at or below the given q-value. Findings for political ideology Patterns of variation seen with political ideology (ranging from extremely conservative to extremely liberal) largely reflected those seen with party affiliation (ranging from strong Republican to strong Democrat); see S9-S18 Tables in S1 File . For example, extreme conservatives were more likely than extreme liberals to agree strongly or very strongly that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy,” to endorse racist and conspiratorial beliefs, and to predict civil war. They more frequently endorsed political violence to advance at least 1 of 17 specific objectives and to advance 8 of those 17 objectives considered individually (aPDs are available from the authors). Sensitivity analysis Sociodemographic characteristics of attentive and inattentive respondents are given in S19 Table in S1 File . Compared to attentive respondents, the 447 respondents who failed the attentiveness check had a substantially (but statistically non-significantly) higher prevalence of prior arrest for violent offenses (inattentives, 34.0%, 95% CI, 22.7%, 47.4%; attentives, 23.0%, 95% CI, 20.3%, 26.0%) (q = 0.077), a significantly higher prevalence of prior arrest for firearm-related offenses (inattentives, 11.9%, 95% CI, 5.9%, 22.7%; attentives, 4.2%, 95% CI, 3.1%, 5.7%) (q = 0.017) and, among those with prior firearm-related arrests, a marginally significant two-fold higher prevalence of arrests for firearm-related violent offenses (inattentives, 67.7%, 95% CI, 32.4%, 90.2%; attentives, 31.1%, 95% CI, 18.7%, 47.0%) (q = 0.054) (S20 Table in S1 File ). Results excluding the 447 inattentives were similar to those presented here. Modeled prevalence differences for the whole sample and with inattentives excluded showed a frequency difference of >1 and >2 percentage points 18.2% and 3.5% of the time, respectively, for party affiliation and 31.8% and 12.5% of the time, respectively, for political ideology. Discussion This study proceeded from the position that political violence and its potential antecedents can usefully be examined from a public health perspective, as is true of other forms of violence. With concern for the stability of democracy and for outbreaks of political violence rising rapidly in the US [ 1 – 14 ], we sought to learn whether beliefs about democracy and social issues, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence varied across the spectrum of party affiliation and political ideology. The beliefs that it is important for the US to remain a democracy and that democracy is the best form of government are widely shared across party affiliations and political ideologies, but other findings are much less encouraging. While most respondents believe that American democracy faces a serious threat, many respondents across the political spectrum and most extreme liberals believe strongly or very strongly that American democracy serves only the interests of the wealthy and powerful. Support for expressions of authoritarianism, such as “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy,” is concerningly high among strong Republicans and extreme conservatives. There are stark differences across the political spectrum on matters involving race and ethnicity and the distribution of power in the US. High prevalences of strong or very strong belief in the QAnon and great replacement delusions among strong Republicans and extreme conservatives are particularly striking. Both have been linked to violence in specific cases [ 52 – 54 ] and are plausible antecedents to political violence. There are both concerning and hopeful findings on political violence. It is concerning that support for general statements about the need for violence under current or plausible future conditions and endorsement of political violence are frequently quite common, more so here among Republicans and conservatives than Democrats and liberals. But there is hope in the findings that most respondents rejected political violence altogether, and that of those who considered violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, relatively few were more than somewhat willing to commit such violence themselves. These hopeful findings come with caveats, however. First, endorsement of violence by those who are unwilling to commit violence themselves may help create a climate of acceptance and promote violence by others [ 55 ]. Second, as there were an estimated 258 million adults in the US as of July 1, 2021 [ 56 ], small percentages of respondents in this sample represent large numbers of people. Third, the perception that partisan differences create an existential threat has become widespread. In the latter half of 2022, 81% of Democrats and 79% of Republicans agreed that the other party’s “agenda poses a threat that if not stopped will destroy America as we know it” [ 57 ]. Most Democrats (58%) and Republicans (56%) agreed that members of the other party are “enemies—that is, if they win, your life or your entire way of life may be threatened” [ 58 ]. To the extent that these topics have been explored previously, our findings are largely concordant with prior work [ 1 – 8 , 26 – 31 , 59 – 63 ]. In the aggregate, this body of work suggests a real possibility that large-scale political violence will emerge in the US in the near future [ 64 , 65 ]. Describing how support for and willingness to engage in political violence is distributed across the population is important for understanding the problem and developing effective prevention efforts. Further studies from this survey will examine other potential risk factors and seek to develop predictive models of support for political violence. The Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships [ 66 ], a targeted violence prevention program of the Department of Homeland Security, was developed following “principles for violence prevention” articulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Its operations through 2021 have, however, been criticized as “plagued by fundamental flaws, bias, and a reliance on ineffective methods” [ 67 ]. Fortunately, new research and analysis is identifying potentially efficacious interventions that could be adapted to specific high-risk groups or implemented at the population level [ 12 , 32 , 33 , 68 ]. Given the findings of this study, consideration might be given to implementing such interventions in partnership with Republican or conservative thought leaders and organizations. Limitations While the study assessed respondents’ support for violence to advance specific objectives, it did not specify the circumstances in which that support might (or might not) be given. For example, support for violence “to preserve the American way of life I believe in” might increase substantially if the US were under attack by the armed forces of another country. More broadly, the study did not proceed from an a priori judgement of the moral status of political violence—that it is innately and always “good” or “bad.” It is worth noting, however, that support for political violence in this cohort has been highest among those who strongly agree with expressions of racism, hostile sexism and other forms of hatred, fear and enmity toward others [ 69 ] and among those who strongly approve of organizations such as the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers and social movements such as the white supremacy movement and Christian nationalism [ 70 ]. Strengths associated with use of a sample from KnowledgePanel were described in the Methods section; several limitations exist as well. Persons without addresses are not recruited into KnowledgePanel. The participation rate was somewhat lower than expected. Crosstabulations frequently produce response counts of <100, and weighted prevalences for some important outcomes are below 5%. The large study sample results in relatively narrow confidence intervals in these cases, however. The findings are cross-sectional, and findings for 2023 or 2024 might differ. For example, larger partisan or ideological differences might be expected in 2024, a presidential election year that involved the attempted assassination of a major party candidate for the presidency. Widely publicized mass shootings occurred in Buffalo, NY and Uvalde, TX while the survey was in the field. The Buffalo shooting is understood to have been a race-related hate crime motivated by the great-replacement belief [ 53 , 54 ] and may have affected respondents’ views on race, violence, and replacement. Russia’s war against Ukraine may have influenced responses on violence and democracy. Other limitations are specific to this analysis. The original construction of the party affiliation variable did not include a true undecided/no affiliation stratum large enough to serve as a referent. Prevalences of support for political violence to advance 1 or more of 17 specific political objectives are in part a function of the specific objectives presented; a different list might have produced different results. There were inattentive respondents, but they accounted for only 5.2% of respondents by our measure and excluding them did not affect the results. In our sample, inattentives gave other responses suggesting a higher risk for violence generally. We conclude that while including inattentives may increase estimates of support for political violence, it may also decrease bias in those estimates; others may disagree [ 8 ]. The findings are also subject to social desirability bias, though that is less a factor in self-administered surveys such as this than in interview surveys [ 42 ]. In particular, support for and willingness to engage in political violence might be perceived as stigmatized; our survey may underestimate prevalences for them. We did not ask respondents to report acts of political violence; such acts would have been crimes, given our definition, and likely subject to substantial underreporting. Nor did we solicit specific information on what gives rise to support for political violence, or on how that support or its causes might best be addressed in prevention efforts. These remain subjects for future research. Conclusions Findings from this large, nationally representative survey suggest support for and willingness to engage in political violence are most prevalent at the political and ideological extremes and generally more common among Republicans and conservatives than Democrats and liberals. As these associations become better understood, risk-based interventions are likely to become more efficacious, particularly if coupled with population-based interventions on the factors that give rise to violence generally. Most respondents rejected political violence outright, in general and to advance any specific political objective, and most of those who endorsed it were unwilling to engage in it themselves. Declarations and acknowledgments Consent to participate Introductory text to the questionnaire as seen by participants included this statement: As with all KnowledgePanel surveys, your participation is entirely voluntary, and your responses will be kept confidential and anonymous. You will not be individually identified, and your de-identified responses will only be used for qualified research purposes. You may skip any question at any time. If you have any questions about this survey, you may contact the research team by calling (916) 734-3539. This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of California, Davis. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact the University of California, Davis, Institutional Review Board at (916) 703-9151. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or are dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of the survey, you may also contact KnowledgePanel panel member support at (800) 782-6899. By continuing, you are agreeing to participate in this study. Supporting information S1 File Supplement. Includes survey items that were included in this analysis, and 20 supplementary tables. (ZIP) S2 File Appendix. (DOCX)