Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 Cognitive Psychiatry and the processual refoundation of epistemology: Logos, concept, word, proposition and truth from Plato to analytic philosophy Psiquiatria Cognitiva e a refundação processual da epistemologia: Logos, conceito, palavra, proposição e verdade de Platão à filosofia analítica Psiquiatría Cognitiva y la refundación procesual de la epistemología: Logos, concepto, palabra, proposición y verdad de Platón a la filosofía analítica Received: 10/02/2026 | Accepted: 10/07/2026 | Published: 10/09/2026 Giovanna Azevedo Rodrigues ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-9020-9368 ASMIGO Psychiatric Hospital, Brazil E-mail: giovannagirodrigues@hotmail.com Marcelo Caixeta ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2357-6558 ASMIGO Psychiatric Hospital, Brazil Federal University of Goiás, Brazil E-mail: cfm11041963@ufg.br Abstract This theoretical article examines the relation between logos, concept, word, proposition and truth from Plato to analytic philosophy and proposes, from the standpoint of Cognitive Psychiatry, a processual reading of epistemology. The method is a qualitative conceptual essay supported by a narrative review of classical sources and of literature published between 2021 and 2026. The historical reconstruction follows the conversion of Kantian analyticity into logical deducibility by Frege, its relativisation to linguistic frameworks by Carnap and its rejection by Quine. We argue that these three moments share an exclusive attention to the finished product of thought, so that the proposition came to be treated as the original unit of knowledge and the cognitive process that generates it was left outside epistemology. The proposal reverses this order: the proposition is the terminal and relatively stabilised stage of a sequence that begins in the organism-world relation and passes through praxization, transduction of the processuality of the real, concept formation, perspectivation and conceptual hooks before reaching word and proposition. Three questions about truth are distinguished (objectual, formal and cognitive-processual), which allows error, lie and paradox to be treated as real, causally produced and explainable cognitive events. Recent work on analyticity, enactive cognition, process ontology, context-dependent concepts, word learning and scientific progress converges with separate components of the proposal, although its ontological claims remain hypotheses. Science is understood as an intersubjective, correctable and progressively deepened processualisation of the real, within a cognitive-processual realism. Keywords: Knowledge; Cognition; Concept formation; Logic; Philosophy. Resumo Este artigo teórico examina a relação entre logos, conceito, palavra, proposição e verdade de Platão à filosofia analítica e propõe, a partir da Psiquiatria Cognitiva, uma leitura processual da epistemologia. O método é o ensaio conceitual qualitativo, apoiado em revisão narrativa de fontes clássicas e de literatura publicada entre 2021 e 2026. A reconstrução histórica acompanha a conversão da analiticidade kantiana em dedutibilidade lógica por Frege, sua relativização a sistemas linguísticos por Carnap e sua rejeição por Quine. Sustenta-se que esses três momentos compartilham uma atenção exclusiva ao produto acabado do pensamento, de modo que a proposição passou a ser tratada como unidade originária do conhecimento e o processo cognitivo que a gera ficou fora da epistemologia. A proposta inverte essa ordem: a proposição é o estágio terminal e relativamente estabilizado de uma sequência que começa na relação organismo-mundo e passa pela praxização, pela transdução da processualidade do real, pela formação do conceito, pela perspectivação e pelos ganchos conceituais antes de chegar à palavra e à proposição. Distinguem-se três perguntas sobre a verdade (objetal, formal e cognitivo-processual), o que permite tratar erro, mentira e paradoxo como acontecimentos cognitivos reais, causalmente produzidos e explicáveis. Trabalhos recentes sobre analiticidade, cognição enativa, ontologia de processos, conceitos dependentes de contexto, aprendizagem de palavras e progresso científico convergem com componentes isolados da proposta, embora suas teses ontológicas permaneçam hipóteses. A ciência é entendida como processualização intersubjetiva, corrigível e progressivamente aprofundada do real, no quadro de um realismo cognitivo-processual. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento; Cognição; Formação de conceito; Lógica; Filosofia. 1 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 Resumen Este artículo teórico examina la relación entre logos, concepto, palabra, proposición y verdad desde Platón hasta la filosofía analítica y propone, desde la Psiquiatría Cognitiva, una lectura procesual de la epistemología. El método es el ensayo conceptual cualitativo, apoyado en revisión narrativa de fuentes clásicas y de literatura publicada entre 2021 y 2026. La reconstrucción histórica sigue la conversión de la analiticidad kantiana en deducibilidad lógica por Frege, su relativización a sistemas lingüísticos por Carnap y su rechazo por Quine. Se sostiene que estos tres momentos comparten una atención exclusiva al producto acabado del pensamiento: la proposición pasó a tratarse como unidad originaria del conocimiento y el proceso cognitivo que la genera quedó fuera de la epistemología. La propuesta invierte ese orden: la proposición es la etapa terminal y relativamente estabilizada de una secuencia que comienza en la relación organismomundo y pasa por la praxización, la transducción de la procesualidad de lo real, la formación del concepto, la perspectivación y los ganchos conceptuales. Se distinguen tres preguntas sobre la verdad (objetal, formal y cognitivoprocesual), lo que permite tratar el error, la mentira y la paradoja como acontecimientos cognitivos reales, causalmente producidos y explicables. Trabajos recientes sobre analiticidad, cognición enactiva, ontología de procesos, conceptos dependientes del contexto, aprendizaje de palabras y progreso científico convergen con componentes de la propuesta, aunque sus tesis ontológicas siguen siendo hipótesis. La ciencia se entiende como procesualización intersubjetiva, corregible y progresivamente profundizada de lo real, en el marco de un realismo cognitivo-procesual. Palabras clave: Conocimiento; Cognición; Formación de concepto; Lógica; Filosofía. 1. Introduction How can a statement carry knowledge of what is the case and, with the same grammatical means, say what is not the case? Plato raised the difficulty in the Sophist. If to speak is always to speak of something, a false statement would seem to speak of nothing, and yet it is plainly a statement and is plainly understood. His answer was to separate absolute not-being from notbeing understood as difference, and to give the statement an internal articulation of name and verb, so that it can attribute to a thing something other than what holds of it (Plato, 1997). A recent reading shows that this passage serves a wider inquiry into sophistic speech, whose power over an audience cannot be reduced to the falsity of isolated sentences (Foley, 2022). From the outset, then, the question of truth was a question about the logos as an activity of saying, and only secondarily a question about the truth value of a finished sentence. The later history of epistemology kept the question while narrowing its object. In Leibniz the truth of a proposition is grounded in the inclusion of the predicate in the complete concept of the subject (Leibniz, 1989). Kant asks which structures of the knowing subject make experience and science possible, and in doing so distinguishes analytic from synthetic judgments (Kant, 1998). Frege reformulates analyticity as provability from general logical laws and definitions (Frege, 1980), Carnap relativises it to the rules of constructed languages (Carnap, 1937), and Quine denies that the boundary can be drawn at all (Quine, 1951). So closely does this sequence follow a single notion that Hanna (2001, 2021) describes the history of classical analytic philosophy, from Frege to Quine, as the rise and fall of the concept of analyticity. The gain in formal precision along this path is beyond dispute, whereas its cost is seldom discussed. As logic became the privileged instrument for the study of thought, the logos was gradually identified with its formal objectification, and word and proposition came to be examined as linguistic or logical structures, detached from the cognitive process that produces them. The rejection of psychologism, justified in its own terms, reinforced the separation. What dropped out of view was the question of how a proposition comes to exist for a knower: how its terms were constituted, which operations related them, and what kind of contact with the world they still retain. Cognitive Psychiatry, the framework our group has been developing for the study of normal and pathological cognition, starts from clinical material in which that question cannot be set aside. A delusional statement, a confabulation or a lie is false as a description of the world, and it is at the same time a fact that the clinician has to explain, because it was produced by someone, through identifiable operations, for reasons that can be reconstructed. The clinician works every day with statements whose falsity does not exhaust their epistemic interest. This double status suggests that the truth value of a proposition is only part of what the proposition carries, and the suggestion can be generalised into an epistemological thesis: the proposition should 2 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 be treated as the terminal and relatively stabilised stage of a process that begins in the relation between organism and world, and a theory of knowledge remains incomplete until it includes the genealogy of that stage. The thesis has a wider scope than a defence of analyticity against Quine. It concerns the order in which epistemology takes its objects. The tradition begins with the finished proposition and asks how we know that it is true. We propose to begin with the process that produces the proposition and to ask, in addition, how it was formed, what relation to the real it objectifies, why it can go wrong and how its going wrong can itself become knowledge. The objective of this article is to present this thesis in an ordered form. We first reconstruct the historical path that led from logos to form (sections 3.1 to 3.4). We then set out the processual account of cognition, concept, word, proposition and truth proposed by Cognitive Psychiatry (sections 3.5 to 3.12). Finally, we answer the main objections to the proposal and examine how far literature published in the last five years supports, qualifies or leaves open each of its components (sections 3.13 and 3.14). 2. Methodology This is a qualitative study of a theoretical and conceptual nature, written as an argumentative essay supported by a narrative review of the literature (Pereira et al., 2018). Narrative reviews do not follow a fixed protocol of search and selection and are suited to the discussion of a theme from a theoretical point of view, which is the case here. The corpus has two parts. The first consists of primary sources of the tradition under examination: Plato’s Sophist, Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics and Monadology, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language, Russell’s Principles of Mathematics and Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Word and Object, together with the historiography of Hanna (2001) and Meyer (1988) and two reference works on the genesis of cognition (Piaget, 1971; Varela et al., 1991). The second part consists of books and articles published between 2021 and 2026, located in October 2026 through a non-systematic search of scholarly indexes and publisher repositories (PhilPapers, PubMed Central, SpringerLink, Cambridge Core and Frontiers). The search combined the terms analyticity, psychologism, Plato’s Sophist, enactivism, process ontology, structural representation, context-dependent concepts, cross-situational word learning, deception and cognition, and scientific progress. Texts were retained when they addressed directly one of the components of the proposal, whether in its favour or against it, and when their bibliographic data could be confirmed in the publisher’s record. The search was repeated during the revision of the manuscript, with the addition of the term delusion, in order to include work published in 2024 and 2025. These texts were retained under the same criteria, and their bibliographic data were confirmed in publisher or institutional repository records. The analysis proceeded in three steps. The historical material was read in order to identify what each author takes as the unit of knowledge. The proposal of Cognitive Psychiatry was then stated as a sequence of theses, each depending on the one before. Finally, each thesis was compared with the recent literature; the result of this comparison is reported together with the thesis in the corresponding subsection and is summarised in Table 2. Because the study uses only published sources and involves no human participants, approval by a research ethics committee was not required. 3. Results and Discussion 3.1 From logos to form Plato’s solution in the Sophist already contains the two elements whose relation would occupy later epistemology. The first is ontological: a false statement is possible because not-being can be understood as difference. The second is structural: a statement has parts, and truth or falsity belongs to their combination (Plato, 1997). Of the two, it was the structural element that 3 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 lent itself to refinement. Once truth is located in the combination of terms, the natural research programme is to describe the admissible combinations with increasing exactness, and the history that leads from the syllogism to modern logic can be read as the pursuit of that programme. We call the cumulative effect of this pursuit the coagulation of the logos. A living activity of making the real intelligible came to be studied, more and more, in the form of its stable deposits: the fixed concept, the word, the proposition, the logical structure, the truth condition. Each of these deposits is a legitimate object of study, and the precision obtained by isolating them is one of the achievements of Western thought. The difficulty appears only when the final form of thought is taken for thought itself. A simple case shows what is at stake. The expression P → Q states a relation with complete clarity. It is silent, however, about how P and Q were constituted, how the subject learned to tell them apart, which experience suggested the relation between them, which other concepts took part, which perspective was adopted, and which errors were made and corrected along the way. The formula is a cross-section. It stands to the cognition that produced it as a photograph stands to a film, and the claim defended in this article is that formal philosophy has studied the photograph with great success while the film went out of view. The three sections that follow trace the steps by which this happened. 3.2 Three moments of analyticity Hanna’s historiography offers a convenient thread. Following his reconstruction, the classical analytic tradition can be ordered in a logicist, a linguistic and a scientific or Quinean moment, and what changes from one to the next is the fate of analyticity (Hanna, 2001, 2021). In the first moment Frege displaces Kant’s criterion. For Kant, in the best known formulation, a judgment is analytic when the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject (Kant, 1998). For Frege, a truth is analytic when its proof depends only on general logical laws and definitions, and on this basis he sets out to show that arithmetic is derivable from logic, against the Kantian view that arithmetical judgments are synthetic a priori (Frege, 1980). Conceptual containment gives way to logical deducibility. In the second moment Carnap moves the question to formally constructed languages. Analyticity is now defined relative to a language, to its rules and to its framework, and no claim is made that a single division between analytic and synthetic holds for every language (Carnap, 1937). What had been a property of judgments, and then of proofs, becomes a property of sentences within a system. In the third moment Quine attacks the foundations of this construction: truth by convention, synonymy as the ground of analyticity, and the sharp boundary between analytic and synthetic statements. In their place he puts a holistic and naturalised picture of knowledge, in which statements face experience together and none is immune to revision (Quine, 1951, 1960). Quine’s criticism was historically decisive, but it did not close the debate. Bentley (2023) shows that the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is neither required by epistemological naturalism nor equivalent to it, and that a conception of analyticity such as Carnap’s is consistent with a naturalist stance. This matters for what follows, because it indicates that what Quine dismantled was a particular way of locating analyticity, in sentences and in linguistic rules, and it leaves open whether analyticity can be located elsewhere. For our purposes, the important observation concerns what the three moments have in common. They disagree on almost everything else, yet they agree on where to look: at logical laws, deductions, linguistic systems, sentences and verbal behaviour. In each case the object of analysis is a product. Even Quine, who dissolves the distinction, does so by examining sentences and the dispositions of speakers to assent to them. None of the three asks what takes place before there is a sentence to analyse, and it is at this point that the diagnosis of Cognitive Psychiatry begins. 4 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 3.3 The proposition as product The diagnosis can be stated by writing out the full sequence of which a proposition is the last link: world, processuality, organism, nervous system, praxization, cognition, concept, word, proposition, formalisation. Analytic philosophy concentrated, with remarkable results, on the last three or four links. Our hypothesis is that part of its impasses, including the impasse over analyticity, comes from having lost sight of the earlier ones. None of this amounts to a criticism of logic. Formal logic is indispensable for comparing, demonstrating, checking consistency and communicating with precision. The target is the reification of logic, that is, the treatment of the instrument of formalisation as if it were the whole of the logos. A river can be described in coordinates, and the coordinates are correct, although no one would mistake them for the river. In the same way, a formal proposition may be true without being the whole of the cognition that produced it. Frege deserves a careful place in this diagnosis. By treating concepts as functions he had already broken with a purely substantial image of the concept, and his antipsychologism was a condition for the constitution of modern logic, since truth could not be equated with the psychological state of an individual. The price was that the study of the cognitive process by which truth is grasped, formulated and transformed moved to the margin of philosophy. Recent scholarship suggests that Frege himself did not go that far. Kim (2022) argues that, for Frege, judgments remain mental acts throughout and are essential to logic, and that this is compatible with his rejection of logical psychologism. If that reading is right, the expulsion of the cognitive act from epistemology belongs to the reception of antipsychologism more than to its original formulation. Two questions therefore have to be kept apart. Whether an inference is formally valid is a logical question; how a cognitive system became able to produce and to recognise that inference is a cognitive one. An answer to the second does nothing to weaken the first, since cognitive genesis and logical validity are distinct properties and neither can be derived from the other. A complete theory of knowledge nevertheless needs both, and what we propose is to recover cognition without returning to psychologism. Kant is the author in whom this double requirement was last held together, which is why the argument has to pass through him. 3.4 Kant between the transcendental and the cognitive Kant occupies an intermediate position that the later tradition found hard to classify. When he speaks of forms of intuition, of synthesis and of categories, he is asking what must hold for experience to be possible, and that question concerns neither neural circuits nor stipulated linguistic rules (Kant, 1998). For logical positivism the transcendental level had no clear address: it was not pure logic, not sense datum, not linguistic convention and not experimental psychology. It was less refuted than deprived of status, a process we call indifferentiation. Meyer (1988) examined the tension between science and metaphysics inside the first Critique and showed how divergent ways of resolving it lead, when radicalised, either to idealism or to positivism. The indifferentiation of the transcendental is the positivist outcome of that tension. Cognitive Psychiatry takes up the Kantian question at the point where Kant left it. If there are formal conditions of experience, what is their effective cognitive realisation in an organism that acts in the world? The passage we propose runs from the transcendental to the cognitive, from the cognitive to the operative and from there to the empirical. It should not be read as a reduction of Kant to neurophysiology; it is an attempt to give empirical cogency to the Kantian intuition. Contemporary cognitive neuroscience has moved in a comparable direction. The predictive processing framework is now explicitly discussed in terms of its Kantian roots, since in it higher-level expectations organise the sensory input much as the understanding does in Kant’s account (Britten-Neish, 2024). Geometry provides a test case. “A triangle has three angles” looks analytic. “If a figure has three angles, it has three sides” looks analytic as well once it is understood, yet in order to understand it one typically builds the figure in imagination, 5 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 marks the three vertices, follows the connections between them and finds three sides. The result seems conceptually contained, whereas the route to it involved construction, rotation, spatialisation and inspection. This is close to what Kant meant when he held that mathematical cognition proceeds by construction in intuition and that 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetic because grasping it requires an active synthesis (Kant, 1998). The case obliges us to separate the logical status of a result from the cognitive process by which it is obtained, for a relation that appears analytic when ready may have required synthetic activity to become cognitively accessible. Experimental work is consistent with this constructive view. Dehaene et al. (2022) report that humans encode geometric shapes and sequences as compositions of a small set of primitives into mental programs, so that a square is represented by something like the procedure that generates it. Non-Euclidean geometries add a complication. A relation that is necessary within Euclidean geometry may fail in another system, so that part of geometrical necessity is local to the system, and it can no longer be said that all mathematical necessity derives from a Euclidean intuition. A more basic necessity nevertheless survives this result. To build a Euclidean geometry, to build a non-Euclidean one, to compare them, to rotate a figure or to state an axiom, a subject already has to order, to sequence and to hold something continuous through a transformation. The possibility of varying geometries presupposes cognitive invariants that precede any particular geometry. We call this structural cognitive necessity. A theorem may depend on the system, while the activity of thinking, comparing, constructing, denying and transforming depends on an organisation that the subject cannot suspend. We cannot de-temporalise a concrete experience, undo the causal character of what has already occurred as a process, or produce a not-being that erases an event retroactively. The next section describes this organisation. 3.5 Processuality as a pre-propositional form Kant named space and time as forms of intuition. We propose to widen the notion into a processual intuitive form, which includes temporality and, with it, continuity, causalisation, directionality, transformation, interactivity, complexification and functional completion. Time is a condition of process, but process is richer than succession: it is A becoming B, B producing C, and C being integrated into D. If this is correct, the question whether processuality is analytic or synthetic is badly posed. Analytic and synthetic classify judgments, relations between concepts or modes of acquiring knowledge, and processuality comes before judgment. The subject already acts, is affected, causes, anticipates and transforms before formulating any proposition. To ask for the analytic or synthetic status of processuality is therefore a category mistake, since its status is pre-propositional. The corresponding necessity can be called processual. Events are not received as loose points. When I see a lion I do not receive the bare datum “lion”: the animal appeared, it moves, it came from somewhere and is heading somewhere, it stands in some relation to me and its presence has consequences. The content of the perception is contingent, since there might have been no lion at all, whereas the processual form in which the content is apprehended could not have been otherwise. Piaget showed how much of intelligence is built from sensorimotor action (Piaget, 1971). The present proposal accepts this result and asks a prior question. Does manipulation create intelligibility, or is manipulation possible because it meets a world that is already structured? When a child handles an object, the object already offers resistance, shape, trajectory, continuity and causal regularity. Praxis does not produce these ex nihilo; it finds them and incorporates them. What has to be explained, then, is how the order found in the world becomes available as order in the mind. 3.6 From world to mind: transduction, isomorphism and praxization The representational tradition explains fairly well how a state of affairs can be represented and less well how a process in the world becomes a process in the mind. A representation, in the usual sense, is a photograph, and what has to be explained is how the film is preserved, with its change, continuity, causality and trajectory. For this we use the concept of transduction: a 6 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 process in the world undergoes a biological transformation into a functionally equivalent structure and then into a cognitive process. The nervous system does not need to copy the universe materially. It needs to preserve the relevant relations, so that external continuity becomes cognitive continuity, an external causal sequence becomes internal anticipation, and an external transformation becomes a transformation of what is represented. From this follows the requirement that nervous system and world be isomorphic in a functional and processual sense. The brain is not a miniature of the cosmos, but it must have operations able to correspond to the regularities, sequences, relations and transformations of the cosmos, otherwise it could neither anticipate nor act. The idea has a counterpart in the current debate on structural representation, where correspondence between relations among internal vehicles and relations in the represented domain is treated as an explanatory resource, and where what matters is that the organisation of the vehicles be useful for processing (Shea, 2023). The difference is one of emphasis, since the correspondence we have in mind holds between processes and is established through action. Knowing, on this account, is a form of acting, and three terms describe it. Praxization is the organism’s action upon the world. Synchronisation is the coordination of its internal processes with external ones. Concausalisation designates the fact that the organism does not merely undergo causality but takes part in it, so that the relation between organism and world runs in both directions and cognition takes place inside that circularity. This is the ground shared with embodied and enactive approaches, which abandoned the picture of the mind as a representational machine and placed cognition in the coupling of organism and environment (Gallagher, 2023; Varela et al., 1991). In its current formulation the enactive approach holds that life and mind are deeply continuous, in the sense that the organisational properties of the living are already sufficient for a basic form of cognition (Bogotá, 2024). The proposal parts from them at one point. To say that organism and world are coupled does not yet explain why the coupling is intelligible, that is, what makes it possible for action and world to correspond. Our answer is that biology emerges within a processuality that precedes it. Biology does not create temporality; it takes place in time. The same holds for causality and continuity, on which biology depends and which it does not originate. Processuality is a condition of biology before it is a product of it. The claim that living systems are better understood as processes than as substances has been defended on independent grounds in the philosophy of biology (Dupré, 2021). The present thesis goes one step further and holds that the processual character of the living is inherited from the processual character of the real. The same model allows a reinterpretation of the a priori. A structure can be a priori for the present operation and a posteriori for the evolutionary history that produced it. The processuality of the world, through evolution and biological incorporation, becomes a cognitive structure that then functions a priori in each act of knowing. In this way the proposal keeps what Kant saw, namely that some structures are conditions and not results of each experience, and adds what he was not in a position to say, namely that these conditions have a natural history of their own. The a priori acquires a genealogy without losing its function. 3.7 Beyond biology: hierarchy of ends and processual transcendence If processuality precedes biology at the lower end, it also exceeds biology at the upper end. The immediate biological motives are survival, feeding, reproduction, protection, territory and the avoidance of pain. Human beings nevertheless organise their lives around truth, justice, fidelity, knowledge, art and projects that span decades, and they do so to the point of acting against those motives. At the least, this shows that the present ends of cognition are not reducible to immediate biological motivation. It may be replied that such ends are biological strategies in disguise, selected because they once favoured cooperation or reputation. The reply concerns origins and leaves the present organisation of conduct untouched. As with the a priori in the 7 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 preceding section, a structure may have an evolutionary history and still operate now by a rule of its own. An end that arose because it was useful to survival can come to govern conduct against survival, and when it does, the conduct is explained by the end and not by the selective advantage that lay at its origin. Piaget (1971) had already described cognitive functions as prolonging organic regulations in the exchanges with the environment. What we add is that the prolongation yields a regulation of a new kind, in which conduct is governed by represented ends that can be compared with one another. Psychopathology is the field in which this can be demonstrated, because it offers cases in which the same outward conduct results from different processes. Self-sacrifice may result from depression, in which the person gives up a self to which no value is any longer attributed; from delusion, in which the sacrifice follows from a false premise held against all correction; from pathological guilt, which demands expiation; or from impulsivity, in which the act precedes any weighing of ends. In none of these cases has one end been subordinated to another. In the first the value of the self has collapsed, in the second and third the ranking rests on a distorted premise, and in the last no ranking took place. There is also renunciation that is lucid, critical, integrated and serene. A mother goes without food so that her child may eat; a physician remains at work during an epidemic; someone accepts suffering, and even the risk of death, for another person or for a value, without any wish to die. Here self-preservation has not failed. It remains valued, its loss is felt as a loss, and it is nonetheless placed below an end that the person ranks higher. The clinical difference between the two groups of cases can be described by four features: awareness of the cost, the capacity to examine reasons and alternatives, coherence with the history and the other values of the person, and the absence of a self-destructive aim. Outward behaviour does not discriminate between them, which is why the distinction has to be drawn at the level of the process that produced the conduct, a point taken up again in section 3.11. What these cases reveal is a hierarchy of ends. Cognition does not only generate ends. It compares them, ranks them and inhibits some in favour of others, so that hunger yields to a project, fear to the protection of someone else, and selfpreservation to an ethical end judged superior. The overriding of an immediate response in favour of a represented goal is the kind of operation that the experimental literature attributes to executive control, in which inhibitory processes, working memory and set-shifting operate together (Muñoz García et al., 2023). The hierarchy is itself processual. It is built over the history of a person, it can be revised, and its highest terms, such as truth and justice, are abstract concepts whose acquisition and stabilisation depend on interaction with other people (Borghi et al., 2025). An enactive account of psychopathology reaches a similar point when it treats the norms by which functioning is judged as arising from the organism’s own situated activity and not from a fixed biological standard (Nielsen, 2023). We call this processual transcendence, and no supernatural reading is intended. The expression designates three things at once: a level of organisation arises upon another; it becomes able to operate by ends that are not reducible to the immediate ends of the lower level; and it acts back upon that level. The first two features are in line with the enactive tradition, for which the organism brings forth a domain of significance through its own activity (Gallagher, 2023; Varela et al., 1991), and with a processual view of life in which the reducibility of wholes to the properties of their parts is explicitly put in question (Dupré, 2021). The third feature requires separate comment. An idea can make someone endure hunger, postpone pleasure, face pain or risk life. The sequence runs from idea to decision and from decision to bodily conduct, which is to say that cognitive structures have causal efficacy and that the relation between biology and cognition is not one-way. Nothing in this requires a suspension of physical causality, since the idea is itself realised in the nervous system. The claim is that the conduct cannot be explained without reference to the content of the idea and to its place in the hierarchy of ends: two organisms in the same state of hunger will act differently according to what each is trying to achieve. Concausalisation, introduced in the preceding section to describe the participation of the organism in the causality of the world, applies here to the participation of cognition in the causality of its own organism. Hierarchical models of 8 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 perception offer a restricted analogue, in so far as higher-level expectations shape the processing of what arrives at lower levels (Britten-Neish, 2024). Ends of this kind also extend the temporal scale of conduct. A project that occupies decades orders thousands of particular acts, each of which, taken alone, might be unintelligible or contrary to immediate interest. The processual form described in section 3.5, with its directionality and functional completion, is found again at the scale of a life. The hierarchy of ends bears on epistemology more directly than may appear. Truth is one of the ends that cognition can place above immediate interest, and science depends on this possibility: to accept an unwelcome result, to correct one’s own error and to refuse a convenient falsehood are all acts in which another end is subordinated to truth. The lie is the inverse case, in which truth, although known, is subordinated to something else. A cognitive system incapable of ranking its ends could neither do science nor lie. With a cognition that is causally effective and oriented by ends of its own, we can return to the problem from which the historical reconstruction started, namely the nature of the concept and the status of analyticity. 3.8 The concept as a living structure and cognitive analyticity A concept, in the account developed so far, is not a box with a fixed inventory. It is a historical, perspectival, relational and changeable structure. The concept of lion illustrates three ways in which knowledge is produced. I may meet a new lion, an albino one for example, and the world modifies the concept. I may change my perspective on a lion already represented, seeing it from behind, from the front or from above, and new information arises from perspectivation alone. Or I may bring another concept near, such as mammal, and a new connection is formed. We refer to these possibilities of connection as conceptual hooks. Some are latent. I already knew that lions are felines and that felines are mammals, and had never drawn the conclusion that lions are mammals: the hook was there and was not in use. Others are created. If I did not possess the concept of mammal and then acquire it, the new concept reorganises lion, and with it dog, cat and whale. Concepts are not stored as independent cards. They act on one another, and the arrival of one rearranges a whole network. Neuroimaging supports this dynamic picture. Gao et al. (2022) found that, when a linking context is retrieved, activity across the networks involved in semantic cognition tracks the context-dependent meaning of a word and not a fixed, contextfree one, so that the brain response follows the way the word is being used at that moment. Recent philosophical work on concepts points the same way. Shea (2024) describes concepts as an interface between general-purpose reasoning and special-purpose sensory, motor and evaluative systems, and gives an empirically based account of how thinking with concepts already possessed, in the absence of any present stimulus, leads to new conclusions. Two consequences follow. The first is that the equation of “analytic” with “nothing new” is cognitively poor. New knowledge can be produced by working only on contents already internalised, which means that cognitive novelty is not the same as syntheticity. The second is that an analytic relation may have a synthetic history. Today “lion” seems to include “mammal”, but that link had to be created once and was only later integrated and sedimented. Before Kant’s question, whether the predicate is contained in the subject, there comes another, which is how it came to be contained. The classical example of the Morning Star and the Evening Star, a commonplace of the philosophy of language since Frege, can be read in this light. The usual lesson is that two expressions have one referent. Before the two expressions, however, there were two cognitions, a morning one and an evening one, and their difference was real before the identity was discovered. Identity of object does not entail identity of cognition. The concept is cognitive before it is linguistic, and the word objectifies it without exhausting it. On this basis analyticity can be reconstructed at a level that Quine’s objections do not reach. Quine exposed deep difficulties in synonymy, convention and semantic rules, and these may simply indicate that analyticity was being sought at the 9 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 wrong level. We define cognitive analyticity as the set of operations by which a cognitive system works on contents already internalised, making relations explicit, changing perspectives, creating or activating hooks and reorganising conceptual networks, with no need for new and immediate empirical input. So defined, analyticity is a property of a process and not a static property of a sentence. Seen from here, the three historical criteria appear as partial descriptions of one activity. Containment describes the result of the operation once a hook has been sedimented. Deducibility describes the operation when it is carried out under explicit rules. Relativity to a framework describes the fact that the hooks available are always those of a given conceptual network at a given moment of its history. Each criterion captured a real aspect of the activity and took it for the whole. Leibniz reappears at this point. In the classical doctrine the predicate is contained in the complete concept of the subject, and each monad expresses the whole universe from its point of view (Leibniz, 1989). Read cognitively, the concept is a coagulated node of relations with the real. It is pregnant with relations because it has actual hooks, latent hooks, perspectival hooks and hooks still to be created by other concepts, and not because every proposition about its object lies ready inside it. “Lion” opens onto feline, mammal, genetics, evolution, ecology and behaviour. Every local concept can become a point of entry into a network of relations with the rest of the real that has no fixed limit, and this is the sense in which a word may be called science in potency. 3.9 Local objectivity, communication and progressive determination A concept that is mobile in this way might seem to lead to relativism, and the appearance has to be dispelled. When I say that there is a lion over there, my interlocutor and I must converge on the reference, and the reference has to be determinate enough for that. The concept may be globally open and historically changeable and still be locally objective. Plasticity at the global scale and determination in the local act are compatible, and holding both together avoids rigid essentialism on one side and relativism on the other. Communication is in this sense the operational mother of science. If A says x and B recognises x, the two can compare, measure, test and correct. This does not make consensus equivalent to truth. It means that without shareable reference there is no operational space in which a claim to truth could be tested at all. The recent literature on abstract concepts supports the weight given here to interaction: Borghi et al. (2025) argue that other people are needed to acquire abstract concepts and, once these are acquired, to align and build their meaning jointly, and that this holds more strongly for abstract than for concrete concepts. The cuts that communication requires (this lion, this paw, this colour, this relation) amount to a local and methodological atomism. It should not be confused with the metaphysical thesis, associated with logical atomism, that the world is composed of atomic facts. The cut is made within a processual world and remains part of it. Quine’s gavagai shows that observable evidence does not immediately fix a single translation, since the word may mean rabbit, undetached rabbit part or temporal stage of a rabbit (Quine, 1960). Our reply is that initial indeterminacy is not perpetual indeterminacy. Further communicative situations refine, compare, correct and delimit, so that determination is itself a process. This is how the empirical literature on word learning now treats the matter. Fifteen years of research on cross-situational word learning indicate that, although each naming episode taken alone is ambiguous, adults and infants arrive at the correct wordobject mappings by tracking co-occurrences across episodes (Roembke et al., 2023). A more recent experiment qualifies and extends this result. When the naming events were highly ambiguous, adult learners often failed to identify the exact meaning of a new word and were nevertheless able to recognise the kind of context in which it occurs, which indicates that ambiguous episodes first place the learner in the right region of semantic space (Schoener et al., 2025). The same can be said, on a longer time scale, of scientific concepts, whose reference is sharpened by successive rounds of measurement and dispute. 10 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 3.10 Word, proposition and logos With concept and communication in place, the status of the word can be stated. A word is more than sound, script or form. It is the communicable objectification of a cognitive processualisation, the last step of a path that goes from world to cognition, from cognition to concept and from concept to word. In that sense the word carries a segment of the logos. The relations among the terms used so far can now be given with some rigour. The concept is a cognitive coagulation of relations with the real. The word is the communicable objectification of the concept. The logos is the intelligible processualisation of those relations, that is, the activity through which they are formed, connected and made explicit. Science is the processualisation of the logos under conditions of intersubjective testing. Truth, finally, is the progressively deepened adequacy between cognitive processualisation and the real. Read in sequence, these definitions say in what sense the word is a carrier of the logos: it fixes, in a form that others can receive, a stretch of the activity by which the real becomes intelligible. The word has, accordingly, a double nature. It coagulates, because it stabilises a segment of experience under a form that can be repeated: lion. It also opens, because the stabilised form gives access to everything to which the concept is hooked: mammal, predator, evolution, ecology, genetics. Every word is at once a local closure and a relational opening. The same holds for propositions. “Lions are mammals” looks like a fixed unit, and formally it is a simple one. Cognitively it is thick, for it condenses perceptual experience, anatomical and taxonomic knowledge, an evolutionary history, a set of prior concepts and a long chain of communication among people who observed, classified and corrected one another. Formal analysis takes the proposition at the point where this genealogy has been compressed into subject and predicate, and a cognitive analysis decompresses it. It would be a misunderstanding to take this as a programme in the psychology of language, concerned with how words are processed in the brain. That is a legitimate empirical field, but the claim made here is of another order. It concerns the epistemological status of the word, which is redefined from its cognitive genesis: from a sign attached by convention to a thing, the word becomes an objectified node of cognitive processualisation, and whatever is said about its truth has to take that origin into account. 3.11 Three questions about truth: error, paradox and lie To say that the word carries logos is not to say that every word states something referentially true. The claim is that every word actually produced can carry a truth about some cognitive process. Take “there is a lion here”. If there is one, the statement is true of its object. If there is none, it is false of the world, and we can still find out what produced it: a perceptual error, a metaphor, a joke, a lie, a delusion, a memory. The false proposition remains a true cognitive fact. Three questions must therefore be distinguished. The first is whether the proposition corresponds to its object (objectual truth). The second is whether its logical structure is consistent (formal truth). The third is whether it is the case that a given cognitive operation occurred and produced that proposition (cognitive-processual truth). The result is a plural theory of truth, and it is not a relativist one. It does not hold that everything is true in some way, which would be empty; it holds that three different questions can be put to the same proposition, that each has a determinate answer, and that the answers are independent of one another. A negative answer to the first or to the second leaves the third open, and this is what restores a positive epistemological status to error, paradox and lie. Table 1 applies the three questions to five kinds of statement. 11 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 Table 1 - The three questions about truth applied to five kinds of statement. Statement Objectual truth Formal truth Cognitive-processual truth “There is a lion here”, said with a lion present True Consistent An adequate perception and categorisation occurred and can be reconstructed The same statement, with no lion present (perceptual error) False Consistent A misperception or misrecognition occurred, explainable by its conditions The same statement, said in order to deceive (lie) False Consistent The speaker knew the truth, represented the beliefs of the listener and planned the concealment Russell’s paradox No object is determined Inconsistent An unrestricted rule of set formation was applied to its own product Delusional statement False Often consistent An identifiable alteration of experience, inference or hierarchy of ends produced and sustains the statement Source: Authors (2026). The first two rows of Table 1 differ in their objectual truth, and what explains the difference is found in the last column: the same sentence is produced once by an adequate perception and once by a failed one. For a purely formal treatment the error is something to discard. For a cognitive treatment it is something to investigate, because it has an origin, a structure, a causal history and a trajectory. Explaining it yields knowledge, and in that specific sense the error contains logos. It becomes a legitimate stage of science on condition that it is objectified, examined, confronted with the real and corrected. Russell’s paradox is the paradigmatic case for formal failure. Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. If R is a member of R, it should not be; if it is not, it should be (Russell, 1903). Formally this is a breakdown. Cognitively it is very informative, for it shows how we construct sets, how the product of an operation is turned into the object of a new operation, how self-reference arises and how an unrestricted rule of formation generates an antinomy. The contradiction did not destroy mathematics. It forced the development of type theory, of axiomatic restrictions and of limits on set formation. The question why our cognition produced that structure is no less scientific than the statement that the structure is inconsistent, and it may well explain that statement. The lie is the corresponding case for objectual falsity. A lie is false with respect to what it asserts and rich in what it reveals: a representation of the interlocutor, an intention, a plan, knowledge of the truth that is being concealed and a prediction of consequences. The experimental literature describes it in just these terms. Dishonest behaviour imposes a cognitive burden and recruits inhibitory control, working memory, set-shifting and theory of mind (Muñoz García et al., 2023). There is no need to turn the false into the true. It is enough to recognise that propositional truth and falsity do not exhaust the scientific information that a proposition carries. The clinical case with which this article began belongs here as well. A delusional statement fails the first question and may pass the second, since many delusions are internally coherent. What psychopathology investigates is the third: which alteration of experience, of inference or of the hierarchy of ends produced the statement and sustains it against correction. Computational psychiatry now frames the question in comparable terms. Harding et al. (2024) derive the formation of a delusion and its later fixity from a model of how healthy agents infer the state of the world, so that the delusional statement is explained through the inferential process that generated it. Clinical psychiatry has long practised, without naming it, the distinction between objectual falsity and cognitive-processual truth. Plato’s question returns here in a new form. The logos can say the true and the false because it is more than the final truth value of a proposition and includes the intelligible process by which the proposition is constituted. False discourse therefore remains within the logos. It is not absolute not-being; it is an inadequate processualisation of the real, which is cognitively real and can be explained. 12 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 3.12 Science as process and cognitive-processual realism The three questions about truth bear directly on the conception of science. When the link between word, cognition and world is no longer understood, science tends to be described as instrument, model, conjecture, paradigm, convention or construction. Each of these conceptions has its own grounds, and none can be derived historically from logicism or from Russell’s paradox alone. Our point is a different one. Without a cognitive theory of the logos it becomes hard to say how science carries truth, and what remains is the statement that it works, that it is useful, that it is provisional. We call this tendency epistemological nihilism. The term does not mean that scientists have ceased to believe in facts; it names a philosophical difficulty in explaining why science reaches truth. The alternative is a realism that is not naive. The mind does not copy the world. It praxizes, transduces, takes perspectives, cuts out, errs, corrects and reprocesses. Truth is possible because mind and world belong to the same processuality: the cognitive system emerges inside a processual reality, incorporates and transduces its structures, acts within it and turns those relations into concepts and words. The correspondence between word and world is then neither a pure convention nor an unexplained semantic identity, since it has a causal, biological, cognitive and intersubjective genealogy. We call this position cognitive-processual realism. A related diagnosis has been made from within physics and the philosophy of mind. Frank et al. (2024) argue that science loses sight of the experience that makes it possible whenever it takes itself for a view from outside, and they present scientific knowledge as an account that corrects itself as world and experience change together. The present proposal shares the diagnosis and adds to it a description of the cognitive operations through which the real becomes intelligible. Science, in this view, is not a store of true propositions. It is the intersubjective process by which cognitions are objectified, communicated, confronted with the real, corrected, integrated and deepened. A proposition P1 gives rise to an identified error, the error to P2, a new perspective to P3, and the earlier falsity was part of the path. Progress is therefore more than the accumulation of truths. A later theory can integrate what the earlier one got right, why it erred, from which perspective it worked and under which conditions it failed, which is richer than declaring the old theory false and the new one true. This is close to the noetic account of scientific progress, according to which progress consists in enabling an increased understanding of phenomena and not in the accumulation of knowledge (Dellsén, 2021). The account has since been extended to philosophy itself, where progress is taken to consist in putting people in a position to represent more accurately the network of dependence relations between phenomena (Dellsén et al., 2024). The refoundation proposed can now be stated compactly. Classical epistemology asks how we know that P is true. Cognitive Psychiatry asks, in addition, how P came to be: how the concept was constituted, which structure of the world was transduced, how the concept was objectified in a word, how it was communicated, with what it was confronted and how it was corrected. Epistemology, on this view, has to incorporate the cognitive genealogy of the proposition alongside its justification. A methodological consequence follows for the relation between disciplines. Philosophy isolated from the study of cognition risks producing refined distinctions without empirical cogency, and psychology restricted to induction risks accumulating facts without conceptual depth. Logic studies form, psychology behaviour and cognition, neuroscience implementation, linguistics language and epistemology justification, so that each sees one segment of the path. What is needed is a circulation from empirical findings to concepts, from concepts to deductions and from deductions to new findings, and Cognitive Psychiatry is offered as one attempt to reconstruct the path as a whole. 3.13 Objections and replies Four objections can be anticipated. The first is that the proposal dissolves truth into psychology. It would do so if it replaced the first question about truth with the third, and it does not. The thesis is not that truth is whatever someone thinks. It is because there is a world that some cognitions succeed and others fail, that some hooks hold and others do not, that some 13 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 propositions correspond and others do not. Cognition is free to produce, and the world resists, corrects and sets limits. The third question is added to the first two and leaves their answers untouched. The second objection is that an account of origins says nothing about validity, and that to suppose otherwise is to commit the genetic fallacy. We agree with the premise and deny that it applies. Section 3.3 separated genesis from validity, and nothing in the proposal makes the validity of an inference depend on how it was acquired. The claim is that the genealogy of a proposition is additional information of epistemic value, which becomes indispensable precisely where justification fails, as in error, paradox and delusion. The third objection is circularity. To affirm that mind and world share one processuality is to use cognition in order to describe the world that is supposed to ground cognition. The circle exists, and it is the same circle that every naturalised epistemology has to accept once it gives up a standpoint outside knowledge. As Bentley (2023) shows in another context, naturalism admits more than one coherent form. The circle is not vicious, because the correspondence between cognitive and worldly processes is put to the test each time an anticipation succeeds or fails and each time an action meets resistance. The fourth objection is triviality: every statement is trivially a cognitive fact, and little seems to follow from saying so. The reply is that cognitive-processual truth becomes non-trivial when the reconstruction of the process is explanatory. To know that Russell’s paradox was thought by someone is trivial. To know which operation of set formation, applied to its own product, generates the antinomy is a result, and it was this result that guided the reform of set theory. The value of the third question lies in the explanations it makes possible. 3.14 Convergence with recent literature and limits of the proposal Table 2 lists the components of the proposal, the literature from 2021 to 2026 that converges with each of them and the point that remains open in each case. Table 2 - Components of the processual proposal, convergent literature (2021–2026) and open points. Component of the proposal Convergent recent literature What remains open Analyticity as the thread of analytic philosophy; Quine’s criticism as non-final Hanna (2021); Bentley (2023) Whether a cognitive notion of analyticity escapes Quine’s objections or only relocates them Antipsychologism does not exclude the cognitive act Kim (2022) How to articulate genesis and validity without collapsing one into the other Constructive character of geometrical cognition; cognitive realisation of Kantian structures Dehaene et al. (2022); Britten-Neish (2024) Compatibility of a symbolic model with a processual account Processual isomorphism between nervous system and world Shea (2023) Criteria for processual, as distinct from structural, correspondence Organism-world circularity; processuality prior to biology Gallagher (2023); Bogotá (2024); Dupré (2021) The priority of processuality over biology is an ontological hypothesis without direct empirical test Hierarchy of ends and processual transcendence Nielsen (2023); Borghi et al. (2025); Muñoz García et al. (2023) Operational criteria to distinguish lucid renunciation from pathological self-sacrifice Concept as a dynamic, context-dependent structure Gao et al. (2022); Shea (2024) Empirical identification of latent and created hooks Local objectivity through communication; progressive determination of reference Borghi et al. (2025); Roembke et al. (2023); Schoener et al. (2025) Extension from word-object mapping to theoretical concepts Cognitive-processual truth of error, lie and false discourse Muñoz García et al. (2023); Harding et al. (2024); Foley (2022) Formal relation among the three questions about truth Science as process of deepening understanding Dellsén (2021); Dellsén et al. (2024); Frank et al. (2024) A measure for the depth of processualisation Source: Authors (2026). 14 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 The table shows that support is uneven. The historical and cognitive components find direct counterparts in recent work: the reading of analytic philosophy through the fate of analyticity, the survival of analyticity after Quine, the place of judgment in Frege, the context-dependence of concepts, the progressive resolution of referential ambiguity and the cognitive structure of deception. The ontological component, that is, the priority of processuality over biology, is consistent with process ontology but goes beyond it and cannot at present be tested empirically. One convergence is partial in a way that should be stated. The model of Dehaene et al. (2022) is explicitly symbolic, so that it supports the constructive character of geometrical cognition while standing in tension with the criticism of the representational tradition made in section 3.6. Other limits should be made explicit. The proposal is a conceptual construction and has not been submitted to empirical test as a whole. Its historical claims rest on a selective reading, and a full delimitation of its originality would require a detailed confrontation with Peirce, with phenomenology, with pragmatism, with process philosophy and with the enactive literature, in all of which partial anticipations can be found. The review of recent literature was narrative and non-systematic, so that the convergences listed in Table 2 indicate compatibility and do not amount to confirmation. Finally, notions such as transduction, conceptual hook and depth of processualisation still lack operational definitions that would allow their use in experimental or clinical research. 4. Final Considerations The path followed in this article can be read as the history of a single problem, without any claim of doctrinal identity among the authors who faced it. Plato asks how the logos can say the true and the false. Leibniz asks how the concept contains its determinations, and Kant asks which structures make knowledge possible. Frege turns the question into one of objective logical deduction, Carnap into one of explicit formal language, and Quine asks whether the logical and linguistic boundary can be sustained at all. The pursuit of rigour brought an undeniable formal gain and left a gap, which is the cognitive process that makes form possible. Cognitive Psychiatry proposes to occupy that gap by following the chain in the reverse direction, from proposition to word, from word to concept, from concept to cognition, and from there to praxization, organism and the processuality of the real. Reopened in this way, the word is history, perspective and relation as well as form, and the proposition is the momentarily stabilised stage of a relation between mind and world. Error becomes a cognitive event that can be objectively explained, paradox a source of information about the architecture that produced it, and science the progressive processualisation of the real by cognitive systems that belong to the real. Four theses summarise the result. First, the proposition is a product and not the origin of knowledge, and the logos should not be identified with its propositional expression. Second, analyticity can be reconstructed as a cognitive operation on internalised contents, which removes it from the reach of objections directed at its linguistic version. Third, truth has to be asked about in three ways, objectual, formal and cognitive-processual, and the third restores an epistemic function to what is false or inconsistent. Fourth, truth is possible because the knower is part of the processual reality that is known, so that the correspondence between word and world has a genealogy and is neither conventional nor mysterious. Future work should proceed on three fronts: a systematic historical comparison with the traditions that anticipated parts of this view; the operationalisation of conceptual hooks, perspectivation and transduction in terms that allow experimental study; and the application of the three questions about truth to clinical material, in particular delusion, confabulation and lying, where the distance between objectual falsity and cognitive-processual truth is greatest and can be observed directly. The question from which the article started may then be asked in its full form: which process of the logos made a given proposition possible, what relation to the real it objectifies, why it can err, and how the error itself becomes new knowledge. 15 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 10, e40151051800, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i10.51800 References Bentley, J. (2023). Quine, Carnap, and analyticity. 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