Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 Form without cosmos: A psychiatric-cognitive critique of transcendental synthesis, spontaneity, and the methodological split between philosophy and psychology A forma sem cosmos: Uma crítica psiquiátrico-cognitiva da síntese transcendental, da espontaneidade e da cisão metodológica entre filosofia e psicologia La forma sin cosmos: Una crítica psiquiátrico-cognitiva de la síntesis trascendental, la espontaneidad y la escisión metodológica entre filosofía y psicologia Received: 09/11/2026 | Accepted: 09/16/2026 | Published: 09/17/2026 João Acyr Chueiry Filho ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-0473-2505 Hospital ASMIGO, Brazil E-mail: joaoacyr@hotmail.com Giovanna Azevedo Rodrigues ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-9020-9368 Hospital ASMIGO, Brazil E-mail: giovannagirodrigues@hotmail.com Marcelo Caixeta ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2357-6558 Federal University of Goiás, Brazil E-mail: cfm11041963@ufg.br Abstract The general objective of this article is to propose an epistemological and psychiatric-cognitive critique of the absolutization and reification of form in philosophy (in Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein), grounding a ‘third way’ that reintegrates formal analysis, psychogenesis, praxis, and clinical-neurological evidence under the central thesis that form does not ground the world but bears witness to it. Kant maintains that understanding does not passively receive the unity of objects but synthesizes the manifold of sensibility according to a priori forms and categories. It nevertheless remains insufficiently explained how the transcendental I performs this synthesis and where the organizing force of the forms applied to experience originates. When the organism effectively unifies elements, it does so primarily in relation to praxis rather than purely contemplative gnosis. Cognitive form is therefore understood as a stabilization of the interaction among cosmos, organism, body, action, nervous system, language, and social coexistence. The paper further argues that Kantian transcendentalization inaugurates or intensifies a recurrent procedure in modern and contemporary philosophy: the absolutization of form and its separation from the cosmic, psychological, bodily, and practical sources that give it force. This procedure reappears, with differences, in Husserlian intentionality, Heideggerian existential analysis, and Wittgensteinian accounts of use, language games, and forms of life. Finally, the article examines the methodological split between philosophy and psychology and proposes a reintegration of formal analysis, psychogenesis, clinical evidence, and the intelligibility of the cosmos. Keywords: Cognition; Cognitive Science; Philosophy; Neuropsychology; Neuropsychiatry. Resumo O objetivo geral deste artigo é propor uma crítica epistemológica e psiquiátrico-cognitiva à absolutização e reificação da forma na filosofia (em Kant, Husserl, Heidegger e Wittgenstein), fundamentando uma “terceira via” que reintegre a análise formal, a psicogênese, a praxia e a evidência clínico-neurológica, sob a tese central de que a forma não funda o mundo, mas o testemunha. Kant sustenta que o entendimento não recebe passivamente a unidade dos objetos, mas sintetiza o múltiplo da sensibilidade segundo formas e categorias a priori. Entretanto, permanece insuficientemente explicado como o Eu transcendental realiza essa síntese e de onde provém a força organizadora das formas que aplica à experiência. Quando o organismo efetivamente reúne elementos, ele o faz primariamente em função de uma praxia, e não de uma gnosia puramente contemplativa. A forma cognitiva seria, portanto, uma estabilização da interação entre cosmos, organismo, corpo, ação, sistema nervoso, linguagem e convivência. Argumenta-se ainda que a transcendentalização kantiana inaugura ou intensifica um procedimento recorrente na filosofia moderna e contemporânea: a absolutização da forma e seu desligamento das fontes cósmicas, psicológicas, corporais e práxicas que lhe conferem força. Esse procedimento reaparece, com diferenças, na intencionalidade husserliana, na analítica existencial de Heidegger e na concepção wittgensteiniana do uso, dos jogos de linguagem e das formas de vida. Por fim, examina-se a cisão metodológica entre filosofia e psicologia: a primeira especializou-se na análise das formas, 1 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 enquanto a segunda se especializou na investigação empírica e psicogenética, deixando frequentemente de compreender as estruturas lógicas, matemáticas, gramaticais e ontológicas das funções que estuda. Propõe-se a reintegração da análise formal, da psicogênese, da clínica e da inteligibilidade do cosmos. Palavras-chave: Cognição; Ciência Cognitiva; Filosofia; Neuropsicologia; Neuropsiquiatria. Resumen El objetivo general de este artículo es proponer una crítica epistemológica y psiquiátrico-cognitiva de la absolutización y reificación de la forma en la filosofía (en Kant, Husserl, Heidegger y Wittgenstein), fundamentando una “tercera vía” que reintegre el análisis formal, la psicogénesis, la praxis y la evidencia clínico-neurológica, bajo la tesis central de que la forma no funda el mundo, sino que da testimonio de él. Kant sostiene que el entendimiento no recibe pasivamente la unidad de los objetos, sino que sintetiza lo múltiple de la sensibilidad según formas y categorías a priori. Sin embargo, permanece insuficientemente explicado cómo realiza esta síntesis el Yo trascendental y de dónde procede la fuerza organizadora de las formas aplicadas a la experiencia. Cuando el organismo reúne elementos, lo hace primariamente en función de una praxis y no de una gnosis puramente contemplativa. La forma cognitiva se comprende, por tanto, como estabilización de la interacción entre cosmos, organismo, cuerpo, acción, sistema nervioso, lenguaje y convivencia. Se sostiene además que la trascendentalización kantiana inaugura o intensifica un procedimiento recurrente en la filosofía moderna y contemporánea: la absolutización de la forma y su separación de las fuentes cósmicas, psicológicas, corporales y prácticas que le confieren fuerza. Este procedimiento reaparece, con diferencias, en la intencionalidad husserliana, la analítica existencial de Heidegger y las concepciones wittgensteinianas del uso, los juegos de lenguaje y las formas de vida. Finalmente, se examina la escisión metodológica entre filosofía y psicología y se propone reintegrar el análisis formal, la psicogénesis, la clínica y la inteligibilidad del cosmos. Palabras clave: Cognición; Ciencia Cognitiva; Filosofía; Neuropsicología; Neuropsiquiatría. 1. Introduction The investigation of the nature, formation, and grounding of cognitive structures—whether spatial, temporal, categorial, or linguistic—constitutes a central thematic axis in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the cognitive sciences. Nevertheless, modern and contemporary philosophy has recurrently tended to isolate and reify form, treating it as a pure, originary, and selfsufficient structure severed from the embodied body, psychogenetic development, and the physical reality of the cosmos. At first glance, Immanuel Kant's transcendental psychology presents points of convergence with contemporary models of information processing and cognitive architecture, especially in its descriptions of apprehension, reproduction, imagination, and the synthesis of the sensible manifold. As Robert Hanna (2001, 2005) argues, this convergence is sustainable only when the central role reserved for the spontaneity of understanding in the Kantian model is minimized or disregarded. Spontaneity designates the active, nonreceptive capacity of understanding to produce combinations, apply concepts, formulate judgments, and subject the manifold of sensibility to the unity of transcendental apperception. Whereas psychological naturalism seeks to explain the functioning of the mind through causal chains, biological processes, ontogenetic development, and environmental adaptation, Kantian spontaneity is conceived as the source of unity, normativity, and the a priori legislation of experience. In examining the tension between naturalism and transcendentalism, Susan Hurley (1994, 1998) linked the Kantian rejection of empirically received experience—the critique of the “myth of the given”— to the risk of positing an unconditioned spontaneous activity capable of “giving” experience an intelligibility ungrounded in the world—the “myth of the giving.” This procedure of preserving form by severing it from its real sources unfolded throughout the history of philosophy: it assumed the character of the transcendental form of the subject in Kant (2015), the intentional form of consciousness in Husserl (2006), formal-existential analysis in Heidegger (2012), and the communicational form of language games and forms of life in Wittgenstein (1994, 2017). The postulation of spontaneity and transcendental synthesis raises an explanatory problem: by attributing the unity of the object exclusively to the activity of the I, the theory incurs a tautological circularity according to which the subject synthesizes because it possesses a synthetic capacity, and we know that it possesses such a capacity because it synthesizes. In parallel, this absolutization of form established a methodological and institutional split between philosophy and psychology. As may be inferred from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's (1992) analysis of philosophy as the activity of creating concepts, philosophy 2 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 specialized in handling conceptual structures, producing “forms without genesis,” whereas empirical psychology concentrated on observing processes, producing a “genesis without form.” Despite the accumulation of data in specific domains, a fundamental epistemological gap persists: there is no explanation of how synthetic capacity concretely develops in ontogenesis or why formal structures articulate so effectively with the phenomenal world. Transcendental philosophy and its variants explain neither the sensorimotor constitution of synthesis nor the reason for the fit between form and world, precisely because they have isolated form from its originary sources—the structured cosmos, the embodied organism, the circuit of praxis, and the findings of psychiatric-neurological clinical practice. Overcoming this gap is scientifically relevant because the central objects of cognition—such as time, space, causality, language, and number—are essentially cross-cutting phenomena. By dividing these objects among isolated fields, academic hyperspecialization generates a paradox in which local precision increases while global intelligibility diminishes. Reintegrating formal analysis with psychogenesis makes it possible to restore an architectural view of cognitive functions without uprooting them from their biological and historical development. The study is justified because cognitive form derives its force not from being “pure” or self-sufficient, but from extracting, condensing, and stabilizing real relations, rhythms, and causalities of the cosmos—understood here strictly as the physical, biological, ecological, and relational structure of nature. The world does not affect the organism as disordered chaos; objects possess cohesion, permanence, and their own “center of activity,” which guides and constrains perception. Moreover, cognitive synthesis is primarily grounded in praxis, directed toward action and the adaptive manipulation of the environment rather than pure contemplation. The plausibility of this integration finds support in neuropsychiatric clinical practice, which operates as a natural analysis of forms by indicating that cognitive structures can be delayed, fragmented, and selectively disorganized in aphasias, apraxias, agnosias, dyscalculias, and psychoses. Against this background, the Main Research Question is formulated: How does the integration of formal analysis, psychogenesis, and psychiatric-neurological clinical practice make it possible to demonstrate that cognitive form is not a selfsufficient a priori ground, but a co-synthetic stabilization derived from the interaction among the cosmos, the embodied organism, and praxis? The general objective of this article is to propose an epistemological and psychiatric-cognitive critique of the absolutization and reification of form in philosophy (in Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein), grounding a ‘third way’ that reintegrates formal analysis, psychogenesis, praxis, and clinical-neurological evidence under the central thesis that form does not ground the world but bears witness to it. 1. To explicate the circularity and limits of Kantian spontaneity and transcendental synthesis, demonstrating the inadequacy of attributing the unity of the object to the a priori legislation of an abstract I. 2. To map the recurrence of the formal fetish in the works of Husserl (intentional form), Heidegger (existential form), and Wittgenstein (communicational form). 3. To demonstrate the praxis-based and co-synthetic dimension of experience, showing that the objects of the cosmos possess their own causalities and centers of activity, which affect and guide the organism's action. 4. To diagnose the methodological split and the deleterious effects of hyperspecialization between philosophy (form without genesis) and psychology (genesis without form). 5. To demonstrate the usefulness of psychiatric-neurological clinical practice as an integrative bridge capable of examining the architecture of cognitive forms through their functional failures. 3 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 2. Methodology This is a theoretical, epistemological, and conceptual study (Dutra, 2010) based on critical-analytical review (Ogassawara et al., 2025) and interdisciplinary synthesis within a qualitative study (Risemberg et al., 2026a; Pereira et al., 2018). The study investigates the methodological and institutional split between philosophy—which specializes in creating and analyzing concepts and conceptual forms without investigating their genesis—and empirical psychology—which focuses on psychogenesis and observable processes without mastering the formal architecture of what is generated. The method is characterized as qualitative-conceptual reflection grounded in the deconstruction of formal presuppositions, categorial analysis, and triangulation among philosophical critique, sensorimotor psychogenesis, and evidence from psychiatric-neurological clinical practice. The classical theoretical corpus comprises fundamental works of modern and contemporary philosophy concerning cognitive formalization—Kant's (2015) Critique of Pure Reason, Husserl's (2006) Ideas, Heidegger's (2012) Being and Time, Wittgenstein's (1994, 2017) Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, and Deleuze and Guattari's (1992) What Is Philosophy?—articulated with contributions from the analytic philosophy of mind by Hurley (1994, 1998) and Hanna (2001, 2005). These 10 references were complemented by 15 peer-reviewed articles published between 2022 and 2026, selected for their relevance to the problem, editorial quality, diversity of design, and balance among three axes: embodied cognition or enactive cognition and sensorimotricity; ecological perception, affordances, and environmental regularities; and active inference or predictive processing in dialogue with neuropsychiatry. This selection serves an argumentative purpose and provides conceptual updating; it is not presented as a systematic review or an exhaustive survey of the literature. The analytical procedures unfolded in four stages: (1) epistemological deconstruction of the formalization theses in the philosophical corpus; (2) reconstruction of sensorimotor development and praxis as the basis for constituting logical, temporal, and spatial notions; (3) clinical-neuropsychiatric triangulation, using aphasias, apraxias, agnosias, dyscalculias, and psychoses as a natural experimental analysis of forms; and (4) theoretical synthesis of the “reincarnated form” model. Because this research is exclusively theoretical and bibliographical, submission to a Research Ethics Committee for empirical intervention was not necessary. 3. Results The systematization of the exegetical and conceptual findings extracted from the analytical corpus made it possible to organize five fundamental cores of results: 1. The Circularity of Kantian Synthetic Activity: The analysis maintains that attributing the unity of the object exclusively to the activity of the I generates a logical circularity: the subject synthesizes because it possesses synthetic capacity, and we know that it possesses synthetic capacity because it synthesizes. The analysis indicates that the Kantian notion of synopsis oscillates between production by the I and reception of a unity already partially articulated in the cosmos, making it possible to maintain that objects possess a “center of activity,” cohesion, and causality of their own. 2. The Recurring Pattern of the Reification of Form: The analysis identifies four metamorphoses of the formal fetish in philosophy: Kant (transcendental form of the subject), Husserl (intentional form of consciousness), Heidegger (existential form of Dasein), and Wittgenstein (communicational form of language games and forms of life). In every case, the force of form is preserved by severing it from its originary sources. 3. The Primacy of Praxis and the Circuit of Co-Synthesis: The results indicate that perceptual integration does not aim at pure contemplation but occurs as a function of praxis. Synthesis constitutes a circuit of organism–world co-synthesis: real 4 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 structure of the cosmos → sensory affection → bodily integration → action → return from the world → correction → stabilization of gnosis → language and concept. 4. The Methodological Split between Philosophy and Psychology: The analysis based on Deleuze and Guattari (1992) suggests that the concept is philosophy's raw material. Specialization in handling concepts leads philosophy to produce “forms without genesis”—treating developed functions as originary structures—whereas psychology produces a “genesis without form”—studying processes without understanding their logical architecture. In cross-cutting problems, hyperspecialization increases local precision and diminishes global intelligibility. 5. Neuropsychiatric Clinical Practice as a Natural Analysis of Forms: The clinical literature indicates that cognitive form can be delayed, fragmented, and selectively disorganized in agnosias (alterations in recognition), apraxias (alterations in organized action), aphasias (alterations in language), dyscalculias (alterations in numerical processing), and psychoses (alterations in temporality and the experience of reality). These phenomena are incompatible with a conception of cognitive form as an entirely self-sufficient structure indifferent to bodily and neural conditions. Along the axis of embodied cognition and enactive cognition, the synthesis of recent articles identified convergence around three components: bodily dependence, orientation toward action, and organism–environment coupling. Barrett and Stout (2024) associate cognition, movement, emotion, and culture; Wu (2024) places agency and sensorimotor contingencies at the center of enactivism; and Lee and Millar (2025) characterize perception as skillful interaction between agent and world. The developmental dimension appears in Pearce and Miller (2025), for whom movement, motor skills, and bodily exploration participate in forming early executive functions. Mendes (2026) systematizes the specificity of autonomist enactivism within 4E approaches. Taken together, these results support the analysis of synthetic activity as a bodily and relational process, without thereby denying the participation of neural or representational mechanisms. Along the ecological axis, the selected studies showed that perception is constrained by environmental regularities and the possibilities for action available to the organism. Stoffregen and Wagman (2025) describe higher-order affordances as structured relations among possibilities for action, whereas Malo and Prié (2024) advocate closer articulation between conceptual elaboration and empirical investigation of affordances. Hansen (2024) shows that visually similar objects may offer different practical possibilities, reinforcing the dependence of perception on the context of action. In addition, Peterson et al. (2024) found an association between learning a new locomotor affordance and changes in the complexity of head movement. Taken together, these findings are compatible with the hypothesis that the world does not supply an entirely amorphous manifold, because its physical and functional organization participates in perceptual selection and stabilization. Along the clinical-neuropsychiatric axis, the literature brought together formal models and evidence concerning alterations in the integration of experience. Badcock and Davey (2024) assess active inference as an integrative framework for relations among action, perception, body, and environment, while emphasizing the need for clinical validation. Keller and Sterzer (2024) relate predictive processing, cortical circuits, and psychotic symptoms, and Qela et al. (2025), in a transdiagnostic systematic review, find heterogeneous results, with nonsocial predictive alteration being more consistent in schizophrenia. Limongi et al. (2023) associate conceptual disorganization, speech uncertainty, and salience-network connectivity in firstepisode schizophrenia. Rodrigues et al. (2026) propose an integrative nosographic organization of psychopathology, whereas Costa et al. (2026) delimit the general factor of psychopathology as a robust descriptive synthesis that remains insufficient to demonstrate a unitary etiology. These results reinforce the usefulness of clinical practice for examining the neural, bodily, and contextual dependence of cognitive forms. Cross-axis comparison showed that body, environment, and action do not appear as independent variables but as reciprocally conditioning dimensions of cognitive organization. The continuity between movement and cognition described by 5 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 Barrett and Stout (2024) approximates Lee and Millar's (2025) thesis that perceiving is the exercise of a situated skill. This convergence is complemented by Pearce and Miller (2025), who identify motor development as a relevant condition for the emergence of executive functions, and by Peterson et al. (2024), whose study relates perceptual learning to changes in bodily exploration. The common result is not the elimination of the subject's activity but its redistribution: synthesis ceases to be attributed exclusively to a formal I and is instead described as coordination among organic capacities, environmental regularities, and a history of actions. This pattern provides convergent support for the circuit of co-synthesis proposed in this article, although the studies employ distinct levels of analysis and do not directly test the Kantian interpretation. The analysis also identified important limits on the generalization of the findings. Malo and Prié (2024) note that the concept of affordance loses precision when separated from empirical criteria, whereas Hansen (2024) shows that the relation between visual properties and possibilities for action is not univocal. In the field of active inference, Badcock and Davey (2024) observe that the model's integrative power still exceeds its direct clinical validation. Qela et al. (2025) report heterogeneity across diagnoses and tasks, and Costa et al. (2026) distinguish the descriptive robustness of a general factor of psychopathology from the demonstration of a unitary etiology. These limits constitute a result of the review: recent literature favors relational and transdiagnostic models, but it does not authorize the transformation of concepts such as enaction, affordance, or prediction error into universal explanations. Accordingly, reincarnated form is presented as a hypothesis for integration across levels, not as a totalizing substitute for existing philosophical, neurobiological, or clinical explanations. When the findings are related to the study objectives, a correspondence emerges between each philosophical problem and an empirical-conceptual domain. The critique of spontaneity parallels the sensorimotor dependence of cognition described by Wu (2024) and Mendes (2026). The critique of the isolation of form finds support in Stoffregen and Wagman's (2025) studies of affordances and Hansen's (2024) analysis of the organism–environment relation. The proposal to use clinical practice as a natural analysis of forms is supported by the conceptual disorganization examined by Limongi et al. (2023), the models of psychosis reviewed by Keller and Sterzer (2024), and the nosographic integration proposed by Rodrigues et al. (2026). The final synthesis of the results therefore organizes the literature into three articulated levels: the bodily constitution of cognition, the ecological constraint of perception, and the clinical-neural vulnerability of experience. This articulation does not by itself resolve the transcendental problem, but it delineates natural conditions that a contemporary explanation of synthesis cannot ignore. The conceptual and categorial findings developed throughout the study are summarized and structured in Table 1 below. Table 1. Synthesis of categorial findings and metamorphoses of the formal fetish. Categorial axis Philosophical / disciplinary position Formal substitute / concept Identified omission / weakness Kantianism Transition from metaphysics to the transcendental. Spontaneity, synthesis, and transcendental apperception. Circularity and disregard for the object's center of activity. Phenomenology Eidetic reduction in Husserl. Intentional form and noesis–noema. Veiled dependence on a world that lends itself to intention. Ontology Existential analysis in Heidegger. Ontological structure of Dasein. Formalization of existence and rejection of biology / psychology. Language Language games in Wittgenstein. Form of life and grammatical rule. Omission of the bodily, affective, and cosmic sources of use. Disciplinary split Philosophy vs. empirical psychology. Concept (“form without genesis”) vs. process. Impoverishment of knowledge through hyperspecialization. Clinical practice Natural analysis of disorganization. Decomposition (agnosia, apraxia, aphasia). Questioning of a priori purity in light of clinical failures. Source: Prepared by the Authors based on their analysis of the research corpus. 6 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 4. Discussion The interpretation of the findings makes it possible to correlate the conceptual results directly with the central research problem. The philosophical literature examined indicates that Kant's transcendental psychology departs from causal naturalism because of the concept of the spontaneity of understanding, conceived as a source of normativity and a priori legislation. Modern philosophy's attempt to preserve intelligibility without preserving an intelligent cosmos can be interpreted as overloading formal structures, thereby converting form into a self-sufficient and reified ground. As the findings demonstrate, the study converges with Robert Hanna (2001, 2005) in recognizing that spontaneity and normativity preclude the simplistic assimilation of the Kantian model into psychological naturalism. It also follows Susan Hurley's (1994, 1998) critique of the risk of the “myth of the giving”: rejecting the passive reception posited by empiricism— the “myth of the given”—does not justify attributing to the I the capacity to give spontaneously an intelligibility unanchored in reality. The argument also engages with Deleuze and Guattari (1992) by recognizing that the concept is philosophy's instrument, which explains the tendency to treat conceptual configurations as constitutive grounds of reality. Conversely, the study diverges from transcendental idealism by maintaining that the sensible manifold does not arrive as disordered chaos: the objects of the cosmos possess cohesion, permanence, and their own center of activity. Although Heidegger and Wittgenstein sought to overcome intellectualism by focusing on use and Dasein, respectively, both ultimately reinscribed formalization at the level of ontological structure and grammatical rule. A qualification is necessary: although these authors opposed abstractionism, their solutions continued to refuse an examination of bodily, biological, and psychiatric psychogenesis. In light of embodied cognition and enactive cognition, cognitive form can be understood not as a self-sufficient a priori, but as a co-synthetic stabilization that emerges from the interweaving of body, nervous system, action, and world. The continuity among sensation, movement, emotion, and culture highlighted by Barrett and Stout (2024) supports this reading without transforming a research orientation into a metaphysical conclusion. Convergently, Wu (2024) situates cognition in organism– environment coupling and action-oriented agency, whereas Lee and Millar (2025) describe perception as a skillful interaction that constitutively involves perceiver and world, while preserving legitimate tensions with mechanistic explanations. With respect to development, Pearce and Miller's (2025) review indicates that movement, motor skills, and bodily exploration should be incorporated into models of early executive function rather than treated as mere vehicles for internal operations. Mendes (2026), in turn, explicates the theoretical emphasis of autonomist enactivism, according to which cognition emerges from dynamic and embodied interactions. Taken together, these studies offer conceptual and empirical support compatible with the hypothesis that praxis and sensorimotor contingencies participate in the constitution of cognitive form; they do not demonstrate that neural or representational mechanisms are dispensable, nor do they prove a specific ontology of mind. This co-synthetic stabilization also depends on the physical and ecological structure of the world: environmental regularities do not function merely as external data but delimit possibilities for action relative to the organism's capacities, skills, and histories. Stoffregen and Wagman (2025) propose that higher-order affordances emerge from nonadditive relations among other affordances and may structure informational patterns accessible to perception. Malo and Prié (2024), however, note that the scientific fruitfulness of the concept requires closer articulation between theoretical formulation and empirical investigation, an important caution against its merely metaphorical use. Hansen (2024) adds that visually similar objects may afford different actions, reinforcing the pragmatic orientation of perception without reducing all perceptual identification to a single explanation. In an experimental study, Peterson et al. (2024) observed that learning a new locomotor affordance was accompanied by changes in the complexity of head movement, a correlational finding compatible with active exploration. Thus, environment, organism, and praxis form a historically adjustable relational unity in which language and social coexistence may sediment shared saliences. 7 Research, Society and Development, v. 15, n. 9, e6215951713, 2026 (CC BY 4.0) | ISSN 2525-3409 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v15i9.51713 These studies support the interpretation that the cosmos constrains and guides perceptual activity, but they do not establish that affordances eliminate inference, representation, or neural mediation at every level. At the neuropsychiatric level, active inference makes it possible to formulate cognitive form as the dynamic stabilization of predictions, actions, and bodily afferents, but its clinical scope remains under evaluation. Badcock and Davey (2024) present this framework as capable of integrating action–perception cycles and body–mind–environment relations, while also noting the scarcity of validation in real-world contexts. Regarding psychosis, Keller and Sterzer (2024) articulate predictive processing with cortical circuits and the possible effects of antipsychotics, whereas Qela et al.'s (2025) review of 72 studies identifies heterogeneous alterations, with nonsocial predictive impairment being more consistent in schizophrenia. At the level of language, Limongi et al. (2023) relate conceptual organization, uncertainty in speech production, and salience-network connectivity in first-episode schizophrenia. Rodrigues et al. (2026) propose an integrative nosography to explain comorbidity, symptom migration, and etiopathogenic sharing across categories, whereas Costa et al. (2026) caution that, given the current state of the evidence, the general factor of psychopathology is more safely interpreted as a descriptive synthesis of vulnerability and impairment than as a demonstrated unitary etiology. The convergence of these studies makes it possible to investigate how failures of coordination among body, brain, language, and social coexistence destabilize experience, but it does not metaphysically prove the co-synthetic thesis or authorize the reduction of clinical practice to prediction error. The scientific and clinical implications are profound. Bringing formal analysis and psychogenesis together avoids the paradox of hyperspecialization in cross-cutting objects. In neuropsychiatric clinical practice, the observation that form can be delayed, disorganized, and selectively dissociated—in agnosias, apraxias, aphasias, and psychoses—provides evidence compatible with the bodily and neural dependence of cognitive structures, while furnishing clinicians with a formal framework for understanding the symptom. The limitations of the study include its exclusively theoretical-conceptual nature at this stage and the absence of its own primary empirical sample. The conceptual safeguard is reiterated that the notions of “cosmos” and “intelligibility of reality” are employed strictly within a naturalistic framework—the physical, biological, and relational structures of nature—excluding any mystical connotation. Future research should empirically test the co-synthetic model, especially with respect to alterations of temporality in psychosis and the relations among praxis, language, and the organization of experience. 5. Conclusion This study fulfilled its general objective by proposing an epistemological and psychiatric-cognitive critique of the absolutization and reification of form in modern and contemporary philosophy. It argued that Kantian transcendental psychology attributes the unity of experience to a spontaneity whose concrete origin remains obscure, thereby incurring logical circularity. It maintained that the organism is affected by a cosmos already endowed with its own aggregations and causalities, and that synthesis occurs primarily within the sensorimotor circuit of praxis. The study mapped the recurring pattern of the preservation of form in Kant (transcendental), Husserl (intentional), Heidegger (existential), and Wittgenstein (communicational). It argued that this formal fetish arises from an institutional methodological split between philosophy—“forms without genesis”—and psychology—“genesis without form.” Neuropsychiatric clinical practice can operate as a natural analysis by indicating that cognitive forms may decompose in aphasias, apraxias, and agnosias. The principal contribution of this study is the formulation of an epistemological “third way” grounded in the concept of reincarnated form. In this model, form is not a self-sufficient a priori, but the condensed and stabilized result of a cosmic, biological, sensorimotor, and clinical history. 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