Airworthiness Directives; BAE SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ Airplanes
Transportation Department; Federal Aviation Administration · 2011
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Rule published in the Federal Register on 2011-06-01 by Transportation Department; Federal Aviation Administration. Text from federalregister.gov (official edition: govinfo). [Pages 31459-31462] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-12585] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2010-0673; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-208-AD; Amendment 39-16705; AD 2011-11-06] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; BAE SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Transportation Department; Federal Aviation Administration |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2011 |
| COLLECTION | LAW |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 21 KB |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Federal Register |
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Airworthiness Directives; BAE SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ Airplanes Citation: us:fr:2011-12585 Creator: Transportation Department; Federal Aviation Administration Year: 2011 Source-URL: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/06/01/2011-12585/airworthiness-directives-bae-systems-operations-limited-model-bae-146-and-avro-146-rj-airplanes Context: Rule published in the Federal Register on 2011-06-01 by Transportation Department; Federal Aviation Administration. Text from federalregister.gov (official edition: govinfo). [Pages 31459-31462] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-12585] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2010-0673; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-208-AD; Amendment 39-16705; AD 2011-11-06] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; BAE SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: In June 2000, prompted by a crack found at the top of the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) oleo, BAE Systems Operations) Ltd (BAE Systems) issued Inspection Service Bulletin (ISB) ISB.32-158. * * * Later, as part of an accident investigation, the examination of a fractured NLG main fitting showed that M-D (Messier-Dowty) SB.146- 32-150 was not accomplished * * *. BAE Systems determined that more NLG units could be similarly affected. * * * Subsequently, investigation and analysis by M-D identified the need for a reduction of the inspection threshold and the repetitive inspection interval for the affected NLG units * * *. * * * * * * * * [I]nvestigation by M-D showed that if any undetected crack was present at the time of the embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150, Part B or Part C, it could continue to grow while the NLG is in service and could lead to the failure of the main fitting and possible collapse of the NLG. * * * [B]AE Systems have received additional reports of cracked NLG main fittings. One operator reported a crack in a premodification main fitting. * * * * * * * * Undetected cracks could lead to failure of the NLG Main Fitting and collapse of the NLG. * * * * * The unsafe condition is cracking of the NLG, which could adversely affect the airplane's safe landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective July 6, 2011. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of July 6, 2011. ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Discussion We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 7, 2011 (76 FR 6575), and proposed to supersede AD 2002-03-10, Amendment 39-12651 (67 FR 6855, February 14, 2002). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states: In June 2000, prompted by a crack found at the top of the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) oleo, BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd (BAE Systems) issued Inspection Service Bulletin (ISB) ISB.32-158. This ISB was classified mandatory by the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority under AD number 002-06-2000, requiring repetitive Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) crack inspections on the upper end of the NLG oleo. The AD also provided an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections, by embodiment of Messier-Dowty (M-D) Service Bulletin (SB) SB.146-32-150. Later, as part of an accident investigation, the examination of a fractured NLG main fitting showed that M-D SB.146-32-150 was not accomplished, although the records indicated that it had been. BAE Systems determined that more NLG units could be similarly affected. These NLG units were overhauled at Messier Services in Sterling, Virginia, in the United States. To address this situation, [European Aviation Safety Agency] [[Page 31460]] EASA issued Emergency AD 2009-0043-E to require repetitive NDT inspections of each affected NLG unit and, if cracks are found, replacement with a serviceable unit, in accordance with the instructions of BAE Systems Alert ISB.A32-180 and M-D SB.146-32-149. Subsequently, investigation and analysis by M-D identified the need for a reduction of the inspection threshold and the repetitive inspection interval for the affected NLG units and replaced M-D SB 146-32-149 with M-D SB.146-32-174. Consequently, BAE Systems SB 32- 158 was withdrawn and superseded by BAE Systems Alert ISB.A32-180 Revision 1, which was mandated by EASA Emergency AD 2009-0197-E. As further information became available, BAE Systems saw a need to clarify the compliance instructions in the ISB and issued Revision 2 of Alert Service Bulletin ISB.A32-180. The layout of Revision 2 was no longer compatible with the instructions of EASA Emergency AD 2009-0197-E, so EASA issued AD 2010-0001-E which superseded EASA AD 2009-0197-E and which reduced the threshold and interval of the repetitive NDT inspections and required repetitive NDT inspections of each affected NLG unit and, if cracks were found, the replacement of the NLG with a serviceable unit. The optional closing action of EASA AD 2010-0001-E is embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150 (polishing and shot peening of the NLG main fitting) or confirmation that it has already been accomplished, as applicable. Further investigation by M-D showed that if any undetected crack was present at the time of the embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150, Part B or Part C, it could continue to grow while the NLG is in service and could lead to the failure of the main fitting and possible collapse of the NLG. For this reason, EASA issued AD 2010-0072 (and its revision 1) which required the introduction of repetitive NDT inspections (defined in BAE Systems ISB 32-181) on NLG main fittings following embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150. Despite the aforementioned measures, BAE Systems have received additional reports of cracked NLG main fittings. One operator reported a crack in a pre-modification main fitting. Shot peening was not present, as this was a pre-modification gear, but the surface finish was better than that required for a post-modification fitting. This implies that the surface finish achieved by the modification may not be effective in preventing cracking. In addition, a positive inspection return from BAE Systems ISB 32-181 also questions whether the combination of improved surface finish and shot peening are effective, as a crack may have initiated from a surface which is compliant with the modification standard. It has been concluded that the polishing and the shot peening of the NLG main fitting embodied through M-D SB 146-32-150 are potentially ineffective in preventing cracks and that all NLG main fittings should be subject to the same 300 Flight Cycles (FC) repetitive inspection to ensure pre-critical crack detection. Undetected cracks could lead to