Cryptanalysis of a controller-independent controlled bidirectional QSDC protocol
Chia-Wei Tsai, Yao-Chung Chang, Andy Su, I-Chun Chen, Ying-Hsun Lai · 2026
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Description
Chia-Wei Tsai and colleagues published a 2026 cryptanalysis of a quantum communication protocol. The protocol promised provably secure direct messaging. A controller supervised exchanges between two parties. The original authors assumed the controller might be hostile. Their security proof claimed protection even then.
Tsai's team shows the claim fails. The controller can send hidden probe particles. Those probes quietly reveal the secret encoding keys. Combining probes with public data recovers every message bit. The attack leaves no errors for checks to catch. The result exposes a blind spot in the proof. Quantum security claims need attacks tested, not just theorems.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Chia-Wei Tsai, Yao-Chung Chang, Andy Su, I-Chun Chen, Ying-Hsun Lai |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2026 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 32 KB |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |