Assessment of provably secure hybrid authenticated key exchange for dual-use applications
Simon Abelard, Juan Antonio Vieira Giestinhas, Delaram Kahrobaei, Ludovic Perret, Timothy Spiller, Christoph Striecks · 2026
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Description
Simon Abelard and co-authors offer a 2026 assessment of hybrid key exchange schemes that marry quantum key distribution with post-quantum algorithms. Quantum computers threaten today's public-key maths, so pairing the two defences promises a safety net if either one cracks. The review weighs published schemes by proof strength, speed, and readiness for real deployment.
Settings ranged from military satellite links to banking backbones. Trade-offs turned on trust in relay nodes, link distance, and how mature each design stands today. Some cases, such as untrusted satellite relays or very long ground links, may need extra measures beyond the standard hybrids. The authors map which design fits which mission, giving planners a grounded menu rather than hype. Dual-use stakes make the proof quality, not just speed, the deciding factor.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Simon Abelard, Juan Antonio Vieira Giestinhas, Delaram Kahrobaei, Ludovic Perret, Timothy Spiller, Christoph Striecks |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2026 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 76221 |
| LICENSE | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |