A prospect-theoretic evolutionary game approach for disinformation governance in social-media ecosystems
Song Xiaoyu · 2026
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Description
Song Xiaoyu proposed in 2026 a game-theoretic model for governing disinformation on social media, built on how people actually weigh gains and losses. Viral falsehoods threaten public opinion and social stability, yet traditional models assume fully rational actors and miss loss aversion, the fear of losses more than equal gains. They also miss diminishing sensitivity to larger stakes. The model pits three boundedly rational players against each other: regulators, platforms, and self-media operators who create content.
By adding a prospect-theoretic value function, the author derives the conditions under which the system settles into its ideal cooperative state. Regulators would disclose truthfully, platforms would moderate proactively, and creators would verify before publishing. Simulations show that initial willingness to cooperate, reward and penalty strength, and loss aversion all steer whether the system converges to cooperation or drifts away. The findings translate into policy guidance for curbing disinformation without goodwill alone.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Song Xiaoyu |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2026 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 117 KB |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |