Dynamic analysis of weak prisoner’s dilemma game considering conservative and aggressive cooperative strategy
Sihui Li, Sida Kang, Hongyu Liu · 2026
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Description
Sihui Li, Sida Kang, and Hongyu Liu used the prisoner's dilemma game to study how two different styles of cooperation affect a group, in a 2026 modeling paper. In the weak form of the game, cooperating costs a player while benefiting others. The authors build real people's varied cooperation styles into the model.
Their setup adds two cooperator types to the usual defectors. Conservative cooperators pay an extra identification cost when sizing up partners. Aggressive cooperators invest more resources to encourage cooperation around them. In well-mixed populations, lowering the identification cost or raising cooperation's benefit helped cooperation spread. In structured populations where players copy neighbors, which strategy led changed in stages as the two costs varied. The authors conclude that having more than one flavor of cooperator helps cooperation survive in social dilemmas.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Sihui Li, Sida Kang, Hongyu Liu |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2026 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 47639 |
| LICENSE | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |