Luck and Intentional Action: A Causal Account
Tadeg Quillien · 2026
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Description
Tadeg Quillien offers a causal account of luck and intentional action in a 2026 article. People often deny that a lucky success was done on purpose, as when a poor shot hits a target by chance. Quillien argues that judgments hinge on how strongly a person's desire caused the outcome.
When chance dominates, desire looks like a weak cause, so purpose ratings fall. Experiments back the link: where purpose is denied, people also refuse to credit the agent's desire as the cause. Purpose judgments tracked cause judgments more closely than rival factors offered before. A firm desire-to-outcome link thus sits at the heart of the everyday idea of acting on purpose.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Tadeg Quillien |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2026 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 81722 |
| LICENSE | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |