Realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution
Ivan Sushchev, Kirill Bugai, Sergei Molotkov, Daniil Bulavkin, Anna Sidelnikova, Dmitry Melkonian, Veronika Vakhrusheva, Roman Lokhmatov, Dmitriy Dvoretskiy · 2025
Read Realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution by Ivan Sushchev, Kirill Bugai, Sergei Molotkov, Daniil Bulavkin, Anna Sidelnikova, Dmitry Melkonian, Veronika Vakhrusheva, Roman Lokhmatov, Dmitriy Dvoretskiy (2025) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/pmc-12749383.txt.
Description
Ivan Sushchev and co-authors probe a realistic way to break quantum key distribution, in work from 2025. Decoy-state systems send light pulses of set brightness to expose eavesdroppers, and they assume that brightness stays fixed.
The attack pairs laser damage, which silently alters the sender's optics and raises pulse brightness, with a measurement scheme that sorts pulses without disturbing the decoy statistics. Simulations show that once brightness climbs 10 to 20 decibels past the safe range, an eavesdropper can recover the whole key with off-the-shelf gear while standard checks stay quiet. A variant even mimics all expected counts. The authors urge hardened hardware and live monitoring.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Ivan Sushchev, Kirill Bugai, Sergei Molotkov, Daniil Bulavkin, Anna Sidelnikova, Dmitry Melkonian, Veronika Vakhrusheva, Roman Lokhmatov, Dmitriy Dvoretskiy |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2025 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 38 KB |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |