Cryptanalysis of a controller-independent controlled bidirectional QSDC protocol
Chia-Wei Tsai, Yao-Chung Chang, Andy Su, I-Chun Chen, Ying-Hsun Lai · 2026
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Description
Chia-Wei Tsai and co-authors break a recently published quantum messaging scheme that claimed ironclad security. The scheme let two parties exchange secret bits both ways under a controller's supervision, using four-particle quantum states, and its proof leaned on wiretap channel theory. The critics assume the controller is fully untrusted, exactly as the original design allowed, and show how that controller can cheat with a classic Trojan horse trick.
By sneaking probe light into the equipment, the controller can quietly read off the private keys and then reconstruct every secret bit both parties sent, the attack shows. Because the probes leave the checked particles untouched, the scheme's own error alarms never fire. Tsai and colleagues argue the proof failed by ignoring the physical layer, a warning for quantum security claims generally.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Chia-Wei Tsai, Yao-Chung Chang, Andy Su, I-Chun Chen, Ying-Hsun Lai |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2026 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 29250 |
| LICENSE | CC_BY |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | PLOS |