Seafood procurement auctions in the presence of origin falsification: Price-only auction versus scoring auction
Shangjun Piao, Jiantao Guo · 2026
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Description
Shangjun Piao and Jiantao Guo modelled how seafood buyers should run purchasing auctions when sellers may lie about where the fish was caught. Origin fraud distorts prices and punishes honest suppliers, and penalties alone deter weakly. The authors derived the outcomes of two auction designs, one judged on price only and one scoring quality and origin claims alongside price. Then they varied how much fraud and how much buyers care about true origin.
Counter to intuition, the plain price auction often served the buyer better, and its edge grew when buyers prized origin most and when detection technology existed alongside heavy fraud. Under some conditions, knowingly buying from cheap, low-value origins even suited the buyer. The authors argue auction design itself is a fraud-fighting tool, and that scoring systems can backfire by rewarding polished lies.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Shangjun Piao, Jiantao Guo |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2026 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 61519 |
| LICENSE | CC_BY |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | PLOS |