Prefecture government fiscal intervention and corporate asset allocation: The perspective of transaction cost theory

Jieyang Pan · 2026

Read Prefecture government fiscal intervention and corporate asset allocation: The perspective of transaction cost theory by Jieyang Pan (2026) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/plos-pone-0345478.txt.

Description

Jieyang Pan, writing in 2026, asks how local government money decisions in China steer what companies do with their assets. The study covers listed Chinese firms from 2008 to 2023. It views the question through transaction cost theory, which focuses on the hidden costs of doing business in a place.

When prefecture governments intervened more heavily in the economy, firms shifted away from operating assets. They held more financial assets instead, a clear substitution pattern. Pan argues that intervention raises local transaction costs. Higher costs then discourage long-term productive investment. The shift was strongest among private firms and firms tied closely to their local economy. The findings warn that heavy-handed local finance can push companies toward speculation rather than real production.

Catalog record

CREATORJieyang Pan
YEAR2026
COLLECTIONPAPERS
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE51973
LICENSECC_BY
RIGHTSCC BY
SOURCEPLOS

Source: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0345478

Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel