Chromodynamics of Cooperation in Finite Populations
Arne Traulsen, Martin A. Nowak · 2007
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Introduction
Arne Traulsen and Martin A. Nowak published this theoretical biology paper in PLOS ONE in 2007, under the coined heading chromodynamics of cooperation. It studies how cooperation survives in finite populations, where chance events in small groups can help or kill a cooperative strategy. The authors model that process with tools borrowed from physics.
Cooperation is puzzling because cheaters can exploit it, yet it thrives in nature. Finite population maths shows when cooperators can still win. The paper adds a formal framework for that question, one used across biology, economics, and the study of human social behavior.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Arne Traulsen, Martin A. Nowak |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2007 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 28 KB |
| LICENSE | Creative Commons Attribution License |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | PLOS ONE |
Source: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0000270
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Chromodynamics of Cooperation in Finite Populations Authors: Arne Traulsen, Martin A. Nowak Published: 2007, PLOS ONE DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0000270 ABSTRACT The basic idea of tag-based models for cooperation is that individuals recognize each other via arbitrary signals, so-called tags. If there are tags of different colors, then cooperators can always establish new signals of recognition. The resulting “chromodynamics” is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators use a secret tag until they are discovered by defectors who then destroy cooperation based on this tag. Subsequently, a fraction of the population manages to establish cooperation based on a new tag. We derive a mathematical description of stochastic evolutionary dynamics of tag-based cooperation in populations of finite size. Benefit and cost of cooperation are given by b and c . We find that cooperators are more abundant than defectors if b/c > 1+2 u/v , where u is the mutation rate changing only the strategy and v is the mutation rate changing strategy and tag. We study specific assumptions for u and v in two genetic models and one cultural model. In a genetic model, tag-based cooperation only evolves if a gene encodes both strategy and tag. In a cultural model with equal mutation rates between all possible phenotypes (tags and behaviors), the crucial condition is b/c > (K+1)/(K−1), where K is the number of tags. A larger number of tags requires a smaller benefit-to-cost ratio. In the limit of many different tags, the condition for cooperators to have a higher average abundance than defectors becomes b > c . INTRODUCTION The green beard effect was introduced by William D. Hamilton as a thought experiment in sociobiology: a gene that leads both to a visible tag (such as a green beard) and the tendency to help others with the same tag allows evolution of cooperation [1] – [11] . But if tags and behaviors evolve independently, then cheaters can undermine the system. Defectors might display the correct tag without providing any help. They will spread in the population, because they enjoy the support of cooperators without incurring the cost of cooperation. Thus, tag based cooperation seems to be a problematic idea. Nevertheless, tags are abundant in social systems and provide good opportunities for distinguishing between in-group and out-group [12] . Tribal costumes or school uniforms are visible tags that indicate common grounds, possibly leading to cooperation. Fashionable clothing can be a secret sign among the few that are aware of the trend. Later, when the trend is picked up by many, the early adaptors switch to a new fashion. Wearing an uncomfortable tie can be a signal of conforming with social expectations. Cooperation can be based solely on these observable tags without the need of reputation or prior interactions (as is assumed in the framework of indirect reciprocity [13] ). There are also examples for tag based cooperation among animals. In the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, single genes have been found that control both the tag and the corresponding helping behavior [14] . Because homophilic cell adhesion is responsible for both properties, cheating is not possible. The same mechanism seems to exclude cheating in green beard mechanisms found in conflicts of parental investment into offspring during pregnancy [15] , [16] . Lizards cooperate based on the color of others, which serves as an indicator of male strategy [17] . There seem to be genetic constraints that do not allow disentangling throat color (and its recognition) from the behavioral strategy. Ant workers kill queens, who try to initiate reproduction, if they do not share a certain gene. This leads to tag based spiteful behavior [18] . Again, genetic constraints seem to exclude the possibility that ants create the odor cue that serves as a signal for the gene, but not the corresponding behavior. While the original green beard effect excludes defectors a priori, more general forms of tag based cooperation as the one described here consider situations in which individuals may have the tag, but not the corresponding behavior. An example of tag-based cooperation on the internet are peer-to-peer networks [19] – [21] . In these networks, computer programs and files are shared among participants. A cooperator is someone who contributes his own high quality files, whereas defectors just download from the community. Often it is not easy to assess the quality of these networks from the outside and different mechanisms are applied to prevent defectors from joining networks, such as restricting new membership to acquaintances of old members. However, in the long run such mechanisms can fail and cooperation might break down. Then new networks have to be initiated by the cooperators. There have been several theoretical approaches to tag based cooperation. Riolo et al. [5] have introduced a model with a continuum of tags, but which does not include the possibility of cheating against somebody who uses the same tag [6] . The basic aspects of this model can be understood by considering a system with only two tags [7] , [8] . Axelrod et al. [9] have shown that tags can lead to cooperation in the presence of cheaters in structured populations. Jansen and van Baalen [10] have considered tag based cooperation in a system with one gene for the tag and a second gene for the strategy. In their spatial model, tags lead to high levels of cooperation even if no cooperation is expected based on the population structure alone. Cooperators might recognize each other by a secret handshake [22] . Once defectors find out about this handshake, it loses its value. Cooperators must establish a new handshake. There is a permanent race between cooperators and defectors: cooperators are trying to encode new handshakes, while defectors attempt to break their code. The crucial question is under which conditions can cooperators run faster than defectors? Here, we will answer this question based on an analysis of a model similar to that of Jansen and van Baalen [10] , but formulated for finite, well-mixed populations. In contrast to the model of Jansen and van Baalen where the coexistence of many tags is possible, the analytical description of our model considers only two tags at a time and tag diversity is only reflected by the mutation rates. In our model, the number of possible tags is given by K . Individuals interact with others who have the same tag. For each tag, i = 1,…, K there are cooperators, C i , and defectors, D i . In total there are 2K different strategies. Cooperators help all others with the same tag at a cost, c , for the donor and a benefit, b , for the recipient. The payoff matrix is shown in Figure 1 . This payoff matrix has the property that the sum of the diagonal elements is the sum of the offdiagonal elements. However, not all subgames have this property: For example, the 2×2 game between defectors and cooperators with different tags does not have this property. While our analysis does not rely on the particular choice of this payoff matrix, it allows us to write our results in a form that is easy to interpret. Payoff matrix for chromodynamics of cooperation. Interactions that lead to nonzero payoffs