Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets?
Jesus Sáenz González, Emma García‐Meca · 2013
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Description
Jesus Sáenz González and Emma García-Meca published this study in the Journal of Business Ethics in 2013. They asked whether corporate governance curbs earnings management in Latin American markets. Firms there often sit under controlling family owners with weak legal protection, so lessons from the United States and Europe may not carry over.
The sample covered listed non-financial firms from 2006 to 2009, with manipulation measured through discretionary accruals. Outside directors played only a limited monitoring role in this setting. Boards that met more often watched insiders more actively, and their firms manipulated less. Insider ownership helped only at moderate levels. Stronger government effectiveness in a country also went with less manipulation.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Jesus Sáenz González, Emma García‐Meca |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2013 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 109 KB |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | OpenAlex / Journal of Business Ethics |