The “Launch on Warning” Nuclear Strategy and Its Insider Critics

National Security Archive

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Introduction

Launch on warning means firing nuclear missiles on the first warning of an enemy attack, before the incoming warheads land. William Burr edited this briefing book, number 674, published in June 2019, updating a 2001 posting. The policy was adopted in the 1970s and remains in effect.

Its danger is the false alert: a sensor error could trigger launch in minutes. A top defense official in 1978 called the policy dangerous, wrong, and ineffective. A Reagan directive, by contrast, aimed to leave Soviet planners with strong uncertainty about the American response. The set preserves an argument among insiders that has never been settled in public.

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The “Launch on Warning” Nuclear Strategy and Its Insider Critics Published: Jun 11, 2019 | Briefing Book # 674 | Edited by William Burr Update for Briefing Book #43 originally posted in April 2001 Policy Adopted in 1970s, Still in Effect Today Despite Danger of False Alerts Top Defense Official in 1978 Called It “Dangerous, Wrong, and Ineffective” Reagan Directive Called for Leaving Soviet Planners “with Strong Uncertainty” about U.S. Response to Warning [This brief memo unambiguously conveys the notion that in the missile age, even civilian officials would take it for granted that launch-on-warning of attack would be possible and necessary. In late April 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proposed that President Eisenhower agree to Anglo-American talks for a "fully agreed and understood procedure" for making decisions to launch nuclear retaliation against a Soviet attack. With the U.S.'s major nuclear deployments in the United Kingdom and the close nature of Anglo-American relations, Macmillan sought U.S. agreement on consultations before making the most fundamental military decision of them all. British leaders had been pressing Washington for agreements on consultation since the November 1950 Korean War crisis but U.S. leaders, anxious to preserve freedom of action, would agree to only the most general commitments. [13] In commentary on the problem of consultation, State Department official Robert Fearey broke down the issue into "four possible cases": The first scenario amounted to "launch under attack": when nuclear bombs and missiles are raining on British and U.S. territory, consultations would not be necessary or possible because of the urgent necessity to launch a retaliatory strike. "Launch-on-warning" characterizes the second scenario: with electronic sensors detecting a Soviet bomber-missile attack "there might be time" for consultations on whether warning information was accurate and whether missiles or bombers should be launched in retaliation. Only if the Soviets launched a non-nuclear attack or if Western intelligence had advance warning of a Soviet nuclear strike would there be time for consultations on nuclear weapons use. Although the Eisenhower administration accepted the importance of consultations between president and prime minister, in the June 1958 Murphy-Dean agreement, it reaffirmed the initial understanding that decisions to launch bombers or missiles had to be made "in the light of the circumstances at the time." In other words, consultation might not always be possible.] Cutaway drawing of the Minuteman III launch site and control post. Air Force photo, n.d. (Source: National Archives, Still Pictures Division, Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations (RG 342B), box 669, LGM 30G) Drawing of Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) sites in Alaska, Greenland, and the United Kingdom. Excerpt from Office of the Historian, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Air Command, History of Strategic Air Command FY 1974, Historical Study 142, Volume I, Narrative, 28 January 1974, Top Secret, Published on Digital National Security Archive Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. “Aerial View of radomes at BMEWS site III at Flyingdale’s Moore, England, 6 August 1963.” [Quotation from caption on archival copy] Source: RG 342B, box 1519, Flyingdale’s Moor. Drawing of Defense Support Program Satellite, including the infra-red telescope used to detect heat from missile launch plumes. Excerpt from Office of the Historian, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Air Command, History of Strategic Air Command FY 1974, Historical Study 142, Volume I, Narrative, 28 January 1974, Top Secret, Published on Digital National Security Archive Drawing of Defense Support Program System satellites deployed for collecting and transmitting data on missile launches and nuclear explosions. Excerpt from Office of the Historian, Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Air Command, History of Strategic Air Command FY 1974, Historical Study 142, Volume I, Narrative, 28 January 1974, Top Secret, Published on Digital National Security Archive. Grand Forks AFB, 15 August 1970. “Launch control officer, seated at launch control panel, turns switch to start launching sequence. Testing operational readiness of Minuteman crews using Modified Operational Missiles (MOM’s)." U.S. Air Force photo. [Quotation from caption]. Source: RG 342B, box 912, Operational Readiness “Overall view of the antenna and its power plant at the Pave Paws [Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System] radar site,” Beale Air Force Base, CA, September 1979 [Quotation from caption]. Deployed on the East and West Coasts, Alaska, and overseas, Pave Paws radars were used to detect launches of submarine launched ballistic missiles. They were later replaced by the Solid State Phased Array Radar System (SSPARS). US Air Force photo. Source: RG 342B, box 923, Beale AFB, CA. Washington, D.C., June 11, 2019 – “Launch-on-warning,” a feature of U.S. nuclear warfighting strategy since the late 1970s, has frequently faced intensive criticism because of the high risk of accidental launches and uncontrollable outcomes, including massive casualties, according to recently declassified records posted today by the nongovernmental National Security Archive. Yet, successive presidential administrations have stood by a prompt-launch approach. The new documents, obtained through archival research and declassification requests, are combined here with an earlier National Security Archive e-book to further illuminate high-level thinking about a key aspect of nuclear war planning the public rarely hears about. Two newly declassified highlights in the posting are White House adviser William Odom’s critique of launch-under-attack and President Ronald Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 13, which provided criteria for nuclear war planning, including launch-on-warning as a way to keep Moscow "uncertain." _____________________________________________ In the fall of 1979, as the Carter administration was revamping U.S. nuclear strategy, Lt. Colonel William Odom, an official on the White House national security staff, raised doubts about the recent inclusion of a launch-under-attack option in the nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). In a memorandum published today by the National Security Archive, Odom argued against rapid launching of Minuteman missiles in response to electronic warnings because warning systems were “just not good enough to let us know that our ICBMs are under attack.” Moreover, according to Odom, not enough thought had been given to the launch-under-attack targets: they would strike “empty Soviet silos.” Further, if the U.S. launched a follow-up nuclear attack, the nuclear explosions and radiation effects caused by a launch-under-attack strike could destroy incoming U.S. missiles through “fratricide.” Launch-under-attack as a SIOP option, Odom advised, should be cancelled. Odom’s advice was disregarded but since then, presidents, presidential candidates, former officials, and defense policy experts have questioned the U.S.’s reliance on a high-alert, instant reaction posture for Minuteman missiles that provide a launch-on-warning capability. When he was a presidential candidate George W. Bush declared that “keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.” His successor, Barack Obama, highly aware of the danger of nuclear weapons, explicitly called for reducing the role of launch-under-attack in U.S. nuclear planning. Yet, neither president changed the quick-reaction/launch-on-warning posture, perhaps to avoid a conflict with the Pentagon. Today’s publication updates a National Security Web posting from April 2001, “Launch on Warning: The Development of U.S. Capabilities, 1959-1979.” The original documents are included in addition to more recently declassified items, , not only the Odom memorandum cited above, but records on policy development during the Carter and Reagan administrations when launch-on-warning and launch-under-attack postures were incorporated into the SIOP and official “nuclear weapons employment policy.” Among the new documents are: Excerpts from a 1968 Strategic Air Command history

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