History of U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 1969-1977, Detailed in New Declassified Documents Collection
National Security Archive
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Introduction
American nuclear nonproliferation policy under Presidents Nixon and Ford, from 1969 to 1977, is the subject of this Archive collection. It details that history in newly declassified documents. Those years cover the early life of the Nonproliferation Treaty and several national programs moving toward bombs.
A documentary history of a single policy lets readers watch choices accumulate: which programs drew pressure, which drew patience, and how the rules were enforced unevenly. The Nixon-Ford years set patterns that later administrations inherited. For students of proliferation, a bounded collection like this is more usable than scattered files, because the through line of one policy stays visible.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | National Security Archive |
|---|---|
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 30,774 bytes |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | National Security Archive |
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Full text
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History of U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 1969-1977, Detailed in New Declassified Documents Collection Published: Jun 25, 2025 | Briefing Book # 896 | Edited by William Burr U.S.-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Kissinger and Shah Discussed “Buy Back” of Spent Fuel Rods Kissinger Believed Nuclear Proliferation Was “Inevitable” But Wanted to “Slow it Down” Newly Declassified Intelligence on South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1975 Canadians Worried Reactor Supplied to India Would Become “Do-It-Yourself Bomb Kit” [Since the early 1960s, the U.S. government had closely monitored Western European efforts to develop gas centrifuge technology for producing highly enriched uranium as reactor fuel. Because of the gas centrifuge’s relevance to weapons proliferation, Washington had persuaded the Dutch, West Germans, and the British to apply secrecy controls to the technology to prevent its further dissemination. By the close of the decade, the three countries were working to combine their resources to use the gas centrifuge for producing enriched uranium on an industrial scale. The U.S. government was moderately supportive of the tripartite project, seeing it as compatible with the NPT and as a worthy example of West European cooperation, although it would produce a new competitor in world enriched uranium markets. One complication that the AEC shared with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was that the British plan to share their centrifuge model with the Dutch and the West Germans would involve the transfer of technology derived from secret U.S. “ restricted data. ” Yet after meeting with the British and inspecting their centrifuge model, AEC experts decided that it was in the U.S. interest not to interfere. In part, this was because the British model was “unadvanced” compared to U.S. gas centrifuge designs: “it does not appear to be desirable to force them to a more advanced model earlier than their present schedules would seem to call for.” According to the AEC, “From the standpoint of proliferation and potential competition with the U.S. in the foreign uranium market, there is some advantage to leaving things as they are.” The Tripartite project would eventually build a centrifuge plant in the Netherlands that hired Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan who stole design information for Pakistani’s nuclear weapons program.] Henry Gomberg, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Michigan, shown at the laboratory during the 1950s, several years before his fall November 1960 trip to Israel where he made discoveries about the Dimona reactor (photo courtesy of Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor). The Canada-India Utility Services (CIRUS) research reactor that Canada supplied to India, with minimal safeguards giving India wide scope for using the reactor’s spent fuel to produce plutonium used in the May 18, 1974 detonation. The reactor stayed in operation from 1960 until 2010. (Source: Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, Bhabha Atomic Research Center [ BARC ]) . Several months after India’s first nuclear test, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met during the former’s visit, October 27-30, 1974. (Source: United States Information Agency, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons ) President Gerald R. Ford and South Korean “President for Life” General Park Chung Hee at the arrival ceremony for Ford in Seoul on 22 November 1974. Before Ford’s visit, CIA officers in Seoul had been collecting intelligence about South Korea’s secret nuclear program. (Photo courtesy of Gerald R. Ford Library) Washington, D.C., June 25, 2025 – During August 1976 talks with the Shah of Iran over the sale of U.S. nuclear reactors, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “made it clear that reprocessing [spent nuclear fuel] in Iran on a purely national basis would not be an acceptable solution” and proposed a U.S. “buy back” of used fuel rods from Iran, according to records featured in a new collection of primary source documents on the history of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy under Presidents Nixon and Ford. (Document 11) Other records in the new Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) publication detail how the U.S. intelligence community evaluated information indicating that South Korea—a close U.S. ally ruled by longtime dictator Park Chung Hee—had begun a covert nuclear weapons program. In one recently declassified memo from January 1975 titled “South Korean Capabilities for Nuclear Weapons Development,” U.S. intelligence analysts doubted that South Korea “could produce a nuclear device in less than ten years even if its program proceeded relatively smoothly.” Key parts of the CIA report were released only recently after a declassification appeal by the National Security Archive. (Document 7) While the U.S. and its Canadian and French allies were ultimately able to persuade South Korea to set aside its attempt to acquire reprocessing technology, if not its nuclear weapons aspirations altogether, the new DNSA collection, U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation 2, Part II: The Nixon-Ford Years, 1969-1976 , also documents a number of cases where U.S.and its Canadian and French allies were ultimately able to persuade South Korea to set aside its attempt to acquire reprocessing technology, if not its nuclear weapons aspirations altogether, the new DNSA collection, U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation 2, Part II: The Nixon-Ford Years, 1969-1976 , also documents a number of cases where U.S. efforts to thwart the spread of nuclear technology and material, even to allied and friendly governments, were less successful, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, and features key declassified records on a range of nonproliferation issues, including: The discovery, during late 1960, of Israel’s secret nuclear reactor at Dimona and its possible weapons objective. (Document 1) U.S. policy to restrict the spread of gas centrifuge technology and the Nixon administration’s approach to the British-Dutch-West German program to establish a consortium to produce nuclear reactor fuel using the technology. (Document 2) The creation of a nuclear safeguards system by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was designed to verify compliance with the NPT. (Document 3) The role of IAEA officials in providing informal intelligence on Taiwan’s secret efforts to acquire nuclear reprocessing technology for a weapons program. (Document 4) India’s May 1974 nuclear test, which jarred the U.S. government and shocked the Canadians, who had supplied the reactor that provided spent fuel for plutonium reprocessing. (Document 5) The policy review ordered by Kissinger following the Indian test that gave higher priority to the proliferation issue in an effort to try to slow a process that he saw as “inevitable.” (Document 6) Efforts by the Ford administration to encourage governments that had not ratified the NPT to do so—especially Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party claimed uncertainty about U.S. interest in the NPT. (Document 8) The U.S.interest in the NPT. (Document 8) The U.S. discovery, in 1974, that Pakistan had embarked on a secret program to develop nuclear weapons, which became a matter of high-level concern in the Ford administration, especially as it became evident that Pakistan had a contract with France to purchase a reprocessing plant. (Document 9) The U.S. pressure campaign on South Korea, fortified by cooperation with Canada and France, to forego the acquisition of a nuclear reprocessing plant that could be used for producing plutonium. (Document 10) The new collection from ProQuest (part of Clarivate) is the latest installment in the DNSA series—which now consists of 65 distinct document collections—and includes over 1,400 documents on an array of