Alerts, Crises, and DEFCONs
National Security Archive
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Introduction
Nuclear alerts and raised readiness levels, the DEFCONs, mark the moments the Cold War came closest to firing. William Burr edited this briefing book, updated in May 2021. Its headline item is a top-secret 1966 RAND summary report posted publicly for the first time.
That report concluded the United States came fairly close to using tactical nuclear weapons during the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958. A finding like that, written by analysts close to the events, carries weight. The set lets readers trace how alerts worked in practice: who raised them, how far they went, and how they were stood down.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | National Security Archive |
|---|---|
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 84,521 bytes |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | National Security Archive |
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Alerts, Crises, and DEFCONs Published: Mar 17, 2021 | Briefing Book # 750 | Edited by William Burr | Updated: May 26, 2021 U.S. Shows of Force Became Routine During International Crises Canadians Worried that U.S. Nuclear Armed Exercise Could Prompt Soviet Attack in 1959 Berlin Crisis Part I: From the 1948 Berlin Crisis to the First DEFCON New: 1966 RAND Report Shows U.S. Was "Fairly Close" to Nuclear Use against China [This “working paper” stayed in draft form but apparently SAC historians found it polished enough to treat it as a numbered study. This excised version provides a detailed account of the three components of SAC alert arrangements: ground alert beginning in 1955, airborne alert from 1959 to 1968, and ICBM alert. The section on ground alert includes the Reflex Action program which deployed B-47 bombers to overseas bases on a rotating basis from 1957 to 1965. While most of the base locations, except for British bases, were excised from this study by the State Department, the Second Air Force and the Sixteenth Air Force histories listed below include relevant detail. Another ground alert system, Airmail, provided for rotating B-47 deployments at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. Ground alert was a continuing activity until the end of the Cold War. Originally, the target was capability to launch bombers within 15 minutes, but by the early 1960s, with improved warning systems, the goal became “minutes and seconds.” By 1967 the program stipulated six minutes to launch alert aircraft in response to warning of an attack by submarine launched ballistic missiles, although that would change once it had become clearer that six minutes was not enough. Thus, SAC developed a new dispersal program to enhance survivability of the bomber force. A related element of ground alert was training for a DEFCON1S posture, intended to be a “less severe” version of DEFCON1, which involved “maximum readiness” of military forces (see Document 7).Originally, the target was capability to launch bombers within 15 minutes, but by the early 1960s, with improved warning systems, the goal became “minutes and seconds.” By 1967 the program stipulated six minutes to launch alert aircraft in response to warning of an attack by submarine launched ballistic missiles, although that would change once it had become clearer that six minutes was not enough. Thus, SAC developed a new dispersal program to enhance survivability of the bomber force. A related element of ground alert was training for a DEFCON1S posture, intended to be a “less severe” version of DEFCON1, which involved “maximum readiness” of military forces (see Document 7). While the details of DEFCON1S are classified, according to this account it was close to the Sustained Reaction Posture (SRP): whereby B-52s with “engines shut-down [were] positioned as close as possible to the runway for immediate takeoff.” There was an exception, however: the first four of the alert aircraft had their power on with pilots and a crew member living in the cockpit in twelve-hour shifts. Other crew would be housed in nearby trailers close to a klaxon that would alert them. The section on airborne alert includes useful information on the history of the program to keep nuclear-armed B-52s in the air 24 hours a day, amounting to a continuous show of force. Code named Chrome Dome (later Giant Wheel), airborne alert provided for flights on various northern and southern routes, which included flights to Greenland and Spain. Keeping bombers constantly in the air involved major risks – so after a major B-52 crash in Spanish airspace in 1966, SAC planners began to look beyond airborne alert. They invented a new program, Selective Exercise of Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA), which SAC leaders saw as incorporating the best features of air and ground alerts. Source FOIA request to Air Force (currently under mandatory declassification review request) Keeping bombers constantly in the air involved major risks – so after a major B-52 crash in Spanish airspace in 1966, SAC planners began to look beyond airborne alert. They invented a new program, Selective Exercise of Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA), which SAC leaders saw as incorporating the best features of air and ground alerts. Designed to provide an “instant response to tactical warning” of an attack, the various SEAGA options were compatible with SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) targeting priorities. When another B-52 accident occurred in January 1968, SAC brought airborne alert to an end and replaced it with SEAGA. That provided a range of alert options, including Giant Lance airborne alert, by a specific number of aircraft “to remain in full combat configuration and ready to respond instantly.” A chapter on alert activities for the ICBM forces provides rich detail on the early years of the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman programs. By the mid-1960s, Titan II and especially Minuteman were the workhorses of missile alert efforts. Soon the bulk of SAC alert forces were Minuteman missiles, for which the goal was to keep on alert 24 hours a day. Probably because of the extreme secrecy involved, the actual launch time, or launch time goals, of the Minuteman force is not discussed. FOIA request to Air Force (currently under mandatory declassification review request)] B-47 strategic bombers parked at the U.S. base at Sidi Slimane, Morocco, around August 1954. (National Archives, Still Pictures Division, RG 342B, box 1479) Suitability trials for use on an aircraft carrier of the Douglas A3D-1 nuclear capable Skywarrior, aboard USS Forrestal (CVA-59), 4 April 1956. (Source: NavSource Online) Admiral Arleigh A. Burke (1901-1996), taken 8 July 1955, the month before he became Chief of Naval Operations. As CNO, Burke directed U.S. naval shows of force and crisis responses from the Suez Crisis to the Bay of Pigs. (Naval Historical Center, Photograph Division, Photo #: 80-G-668829) (Thanks to David A. Rosenberg for digital image) The Joint Chiefs of Staff during the crisis year of Lebanon, Taiwan Strait, and Berlin. Chairman General Nathan F. Twining (center), with (left to right) Commandant of the Marine Corps General Randolph M. Pate, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White, at the Pentagon on January 15, 1958. (Wikimedia Commons) Strategic Air Command B-52 bomber on ground alert, with crew running to it. n.d. (Wikimedia Commons) After the collapse of the Paris Summit in May 1960, as a precautionary move, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. instructed the Joint Chiefs to initiate DEFCON 3, the first try-out of the new readiness system. (U.S. Department of Defense) Update Washington D.C., May 26, 2021 – “The United States came fairly close to using tactical nuclear weapons” during the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, according to a top-secret 1966 RAND summary report posted today for the first time by the National Security Archive. Washington contemplated this extreme response to anticipated Chinese aggression “despite opposition to its policy by most of its allies and many in the United States,” the report notes. Furthermore, even though President Dwight Eisenhower had insisted to his commanders that conventional armaments should be used first, the study found that the president’s written and spoken comments to other officials “left little doubt ... that he was prepared