Declassified Documents Key to Judgment Against Colombian Paramilitary

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Introduction

A court judgment against a Colombian paramilitary rested in part on declassified documents, and Michael Evans edited this briefing book, number 778, about them in October 2021. The court reached a striking finding about how the fighters related to the state.

Paramilitaries, the court found, had a symbiotic relationship with Colombian state actors. That phrase means each side fed the other, rather than the gunmen acting wholly on their own. The documents matter because they helped a court say so on the record. Readers can see how secret files become legal proof years after the events.

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CREATORNational Security Archive
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE14,649 bytes
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCENational Security Archive

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Declassified Documents Key to Judgment Against Colombian Paramilitary Published: Oct 4, 2021 | Briefing Book # 778 | Edited by Michael Evans Court finds paramilitaries had “symbiotic relationship with Colombian state actors” [There is a "body count syndrome" in the Colombian Army's counterinsurgency strategy that "tends to fuel human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors," according to a recently retired Colombian Army colonel whose comments form the basis of this intelligence report. According to the officer, that obsession is in part responsible for commanders "allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies for the [Colombian army] in contributing to the guerrilla body count." The 17th Brigade in Uraba had been cooperating with paramilitaries "for a number of years," he said, but it "had gotten much worse" under the command of Gen. Rito Alejo Del Rio. The officer was critical of several other high-level military commanders, including Gen. Jorge Enrique Mora, who would later serve as armed forces commander. Mora had a clean public reputation, according to the officer, but "probably was one of those who looked the other way" with respect to collaboration with paramilitaries. Former armed forces commander Gen. Harold Bedoya "fell into the same category," in that both officers "never allowed themselves to become directly involved in encouraging or supporting paramilitary activities, but they turned their backs to what was happening and felt the [Colombian army] should in no way be blamed for any resulting human rights atrocities committed.”] Washington, D.C., October 4, 2021 – Declassified State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that “acknowledge the long-standing relationship between [Colombian] state security forces and the paramilitaries” are among the key evidence behind a historic $12-million judgment against a former Colombian paramilitary leader last week in U.S. federal court in Miami. Federal Magistrate Judge Edwin Torres found that Carlos Mario Jiménez, the former paramilitary leader known as “Macaco,” was responsible for the murder of Colombian community leader Eduardo Estrada in 2001. The case was developed by the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) on behalf of victims in Colombia. More than eleven years in the making, the plaintiffs filed the initial complaint on June 15, 2010. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe extradited Jiménez to the U.S. in 2008, where he was convicted and served 11 years of a 33-year sentence for drug trafficking. His extradition and the subsequent U.S. decision to focus solely on narcotrafficking charges, prevented thousands of victims of Macaco’s paramilitary group, the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB), from seeking justice for assassinations, massacres, and other acts of violence. In 2019 Jiménez was released and repatriated to Colombia where he was immediately arrested on homicide and conspiracy charges. In ruling for the plaintiffs, Torres cited “an abundance of evidence” that the BCB “operated in a symbiotic relationship with Colombian state actors” in Colombia’s Magdalena Medio. The evidence helped establish that paramilitaries were operating under color of law when they committed murders and other atrocities, a necessary condition to bring a claim under the U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Expert testimony introduced by the plaintiffs cite declassified documents obtained by the National Security Archive and other evidence to show how the BCB and other members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) benefitted from a cooperative relationship with Colombian security forces. A declassified March 2001 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report cited by two key experts is an especially vivid example of Colombian state collaboration with Macaco’s BCB just a few months before the Estrada murder. The CIA said that the BCB and another AUC bloc that “were temporarily forced to relocate” by the Colombian Army the previous month “were subsequently released, along with their weapons.” “The Army treated them ‘well,’” according to the report. University of Toronto professor Luis Van Isschot cited an array declassified evidence from the National Security Archive collection to illustrate the longstanding pattern of cooperation between illegal paramilitary groups and Colombian state actors, including our 2007 posting on the Colombian Army’s links to the paramilitary group known as Triple-A in the late 1970s and records relating to the February 2000 massacre at El Salado . Other documents cited in the testimony concern Gen. Rito Alejo Del Río, a former Army commander who in 2012 was convicted for the 1997 murder of community leader Marino López. A March 1998 Embassy cable said the former 17th Brigade commander had ordered his troops to work with paramilitary groups in the Magdalena Medio “whenever he was physically absent from the area” and that he had diverted “a planeload of weapons and ammunition to paramilitaries in the Magdalena Medio region in 1985.” Another cable found that Del Río’s “systematic arming and equipping of paramilitaries” in the mid-1990s “was pivotal to his military success at the time.” Additional records show that US officials had grave doubts whether the Colombian military had any interest in combatting paramilitary groups who they viewed as de facto allies against leftist insurgents. One of these recounts a 1999 meeting in which Colombia’s Deputy Army Commander told U.S. officials that his troops "had no business pursuing paramilitaries," characterizing them as "apolitical common criminals" who "did not threaten constitutional order through subversive activities." Weeks later, the Embassy’s military attaché confirmed that the “Colombian Armed Forces have not actively persecuted paramilitary group members because they see them as allies in the fight against the guerrillas, their common enemy.” A January 1999 cable signed by two top State Department officials decried the fact that “paramilitarism has continued to grow” in Colombia “and that the government has done little to confront them.” A December 2001 Embassy cable cited by Colombia expert Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) describes an atmosphere of tacit collaboration among paramilitaries and security forces in Barrancabermeja, long a hotbed of insurgent and paramilitary violence. The Embassy said that its Colombian government contacts were “careful not to appear like paramilitary apologists,” but were nevertheless “convinced that Barrancabermeja is better off today than it was a year ago, when still dominated by guerrillas.” Colombian police and military officials claimed, “that the paramilitaries’ increased presence has reduced chaos and violence in Barrancabermeja, but that their success owes much to the fact that, unlike the ELN and FARC, paramilitaries do not attack GOC security forces patrolling the city.” Another cable cited among the court records describes how Macaco continued to manage his paramilitary empire from prison in 2007 and worked with Vicente Castano and other former AUC members in the hope of reviving a “national network along the lines of the old AUC.” National Police intelligence chief, Gen. Oscar Naranjo, told Embassy officials that Macaco and other BCB members “remain belligerent and committed to anti-subversive rhetoric” and that Castano “enjoys ‘significant collaboration’ from elements of the police and military.” The civil judgment against Macaco is an important first step in the long-delayed pursuit of justice for BCB atrocities. Claret Vargas, senior staff attorney at CJA, called the decision “a victory for truth.” “After over a decade of litigation and over a thousand pages of evidence … a court has acknowledged the facts surrounding Eduardo’s assassination and held the head of the

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