FRUS: 1969–1976, Volume X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975 — 202. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, April 2, 1975 (evacuation decisions as Saigon collapses)
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian · 1975
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Introduction
Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group meeting, held April 2, 1975, record the U.S. response to collapse in Indochina. The record is document 202 in Volume X of the 1969-1976 Foreign Relations series. Kissinger chaired the meeting. Colby briefed that few South Vietnamese units were still fighting. The group agreed to start moving U.S. dependents out of South Vietnam at once. It also asked Embassy Saigon for a ranked list of Vietnamese to evacuate.
The talk turns to stretching the Cambodia airlift to April 17. Schlesinger presses for fast removal of staff who are not essential. The minutes catch a government shifting from war support to rescue.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1975 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 18382 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Foreign Relations of the United States (history.state.gov) |
Source: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d202
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Full text
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202. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting Washington, April 2, 1975, 10:43–11:28 a.m. SUBJECT: Indochina PARTICIPANTS - Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger - State: Robert Ingersoll, Philip Habib, Robert Miller, Carlyle Maw - DOD: James Schlesinger, William Clements, Robert Ellsworth, Morton Abramowitz - JCS: Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly - CIA: William Colby - NSC Staff: Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, W.R. Smyser, William Stearman, David Ransom, James Barnum SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS It was agreed that: —the evacuation of dependents of US personnel in South Vietnam and those US citizens who left the cities in the north will begin immediately; —Embassy Saigon would prepare, by April 3, 1975, a detailed breakdown by categories and numbers of those Vietnamese the US should evacuate from South Vietnam. The breakdown is to be organized in order of priorities and should include recommendations regarding necessary arrangements with the GVN, transport, safehavens, and staging areas; —Attempts would be made to stretch out the Cambodian airlift to April 17. Secretary Kissinger: I'm going to have to get a new briefer. I don't like the briefings I've been getting lately. Mr. Colby: (Began to brief from the attached text.) Secretary Kissinger: Are any South Vietnamese fighting? Mr. Colby: Not many. There are a few units scattered around the country that are still putting up a fight, but not many. Secretary Kissinger: Did any (South Vietnamese) fight at any point during this thing? Mr. Colby: No, not really. It was the shock effect. Secretary Schlesinger: There was very little resistance. In Tay Ninh Province there are still some pretty good fighters left. There are still some in the Delta too. Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that nobody in South Vietnam fought. It seems to me there was total collapse. Mr. Colby: It was the psychology of the situation—the shock effect. The shock effect of collapse went ahead of the troops. Secretary Schlesinger: There were some troops that stood their ground. The 22nd Division stood up moderately well. It was really rather hit and miss around the country. Some stood up, others didn't. Secretary Kissinger: Of course, we'll never know what would have happened if they would have stood their ground. Secretary Schlesinger: It was the shock effect of the swift withdrawal that led to the collapse of that house of cards. If they would have stayed their ground, perhaps they would have been able to hold on to Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. I don't know. I don't think, however, the situation would have been this bad had they stood their ground. Mr. Colby: There were two main things that contributed to this situation: the pell-mell evacuation of Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, and the evacuation of Hue. (Continued to brief.) Secretary Kissinger: Let me get a grasp on the situation. Is there anyplace—is there anywhere the South Vietnamese have a chance of establishing a line and of stopping the North Vietnamese? Mr. Colby: Yes, north of Saigon here (pointing to a line on the map). Current plans call for bringing the remnants of the 2nd Division to here (pointing to map) and for establishing a line. Secretary Schlesinger: That's hopeless! Secretary Kissinger: My experience is that the South Vietnamese have not been good attackers in that area (north of Saigon). Secretary Schlesinger: That whole effort is hopeless! Mr. Colby: In addition, they are moving to bring some troops up from Bang Tau. It's the 18th Division, I believe. Secretary Kissinger: Is that unit any good? Secretary Schlesinger: No. In fact, it's the worst division of all. There's an airborne battalion from MR 1 that's not too bad. Secretary Kissinger: As I recall, the 1st Division fought well in 1972. Mr. Colby: Yes it did, and it fought well this time until the situation started to wobble. In addition, the South Vietnamese can call on (to defend Saigon) the 2nd Airborne Division now in the south, the 25th Division, which is not too bad, and three other divisions in the Delta. The question is, can Saigon afford to take these units out to help north of Saigon? I don't know. We've already had indications of increased activity in the Delta. Secretary Kissinger: What do you think, is South Vietnam going to collapse before the beginning of the rainy season? Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, I would give it 60 to 90 days at the outside. It could fall within 3 weeks. Mr. Clements: I was talking to the Chiefs (Joint Chiefs of Staff) yesterday, and they pointed out that the rainy season will have no impact on the Delta. They were quite explicit about that. The rainy season affects fighting in the highlands, but not in the Delta. Secretary Kissinger: Yeah, in 1972 they fought right into July. Mr. Clements: Besides, they don't have any logistics problems bringing the stuff down from the north. There are hard-surface roads all over that area (around Saigon). It's just not the same situation. Secretary Kissinger: Okay, we just have to be prepared for the collapse of the South within the next three months. Secretary Schlesinger: I would say we should be prepared for collapse within three weeks. Smith (of DAO) says Saigon could fall in a matter of days. I think that's the worst-case situation. I would think that we have from three to four weeks. I wouldn't count on any more than 45 more days. Secretary Kissinger: Are you all agreed on that? Bill? Mr. Colby: Yes. It could come anytime. Secretary Kissinger: Basically, then, nothing can be done. Secretary Schlesinger: I can't think of anything. General Weyand (Army Chief of Staff), in my telephone conversations with him, is much more pessimistic than when he first got out there. He's quite grim about the situation. And, he's talking mostly to those who are optimistic. Mr. Colby: I think there are only two possibilities left: some sort of temporary stability around Saigon, and total collapse within the next couple of weeks. Secretary Kissinger: All of this was triggered by Thieu's strategy of withdrawal, right? Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. There is one other aspect of the situation I would like to bring up. We have indications that the North Vietnamese 5th Division has been ordered to cut the roads south of Saigon in the Delta area. What we will begin seeing is the break-up of the Delta region. Mr. Colby: We also have indications that two more North Vietnamese Divisions being held in reserve are beginning to more south. Secretary Kissinger: Well, let's go on to Cambodia. Bill would you like to brief? Mr. Colby: (Briefed from the attached text.) Secretary Schlesinger: Those 6,000 to 7,000 insurgents at Neak Luong will probably now move on toward Phnom Penh. It is our estimate that Cambodia has only eight to ten days left. Secretary Kissinger: Phil (Habib) what do you think? Mr. Habib: Ambassador Dean reports that the post-Lon Nol government's strategy now is to try to build up morale. They feel that their only hope is to make some sort of deal with the Communists. I don't think much of their chances. Secretary Schlesinger: The airlift stops on April 12th. They don't have much time. Secretary Kissinger: Why does the airlift stop on April 12th? Secretary Schlesinger: We